• Washington mobilise 24.000 agents à sa frontière sud en prévision d’un afflux de migrants | TV5MONDE - Informations
    https://information.tv5monde.com/international/washington-mobilise-24000-agents-sa-frontiere-sud-en-prevision

    Washington mobilise 24.000 agents à sa frontière sud en prévision d’un afflux de migrants
    10 mai. 2023 à 21h32 (TU)
    ParAFP ar Moises AVILA
    © 2023 AFP
    Image aérienne de migrants le long de la frontière sud des Etats-Unis à El Paso, au Texas, le 10 mai 2023
    Les Etats-Unis se préparaient mercredi, avec la mobilisation de 24.000 agents, à la levée imminente d’une mesure sanitaire qui verrouillait l’accès à leur territoire depuis le début de la pandémie, tandis que des migrants attendaient aux portes du pays avec un mélange de confusion et d’anxiété.
    Le ministre de la Sécurité intérieure Alejandro Mayorkas a reconnu qu’il était possible que « les jours et semaines à venir » soient « très difficiles », indiquant que les autorités observaient déjà « un nombre élevé d’arrivées dans certains secteurs ».La veille, le président démocrate Joe Biden était allé jusqu’à admettre que la situation serait « chaotique » à l’expiration du dispositif dit « Titre 42 », jeudi à 23h59 heure de Washington.Les villes frontalières comme Brownsville, Laredo et El Paso ont vu arriver de nombreux candidats à l’exil, venus principalement d’Amérique latine mais aussi de Chine, de Russie ou de Turquie.De l’autre côté de la frontière, à Ciudad Juarez et Matamoros, des centaines de personnes se dépêchaient d’essayer d’entrer aux Etats-Unis pour demander l’asile, de crainte que le changement de règles ne les empêche de le faire pendant cinq ans. Le « Titre 42 », censé limiter la propagation du Covid-19, conférait la possibilité aux autorités américaines de refouler immédiatement tous les migrants entrés dans le pays, y compris les demandeurs d’asile. En trois ans, il a été utilisé à 2,8 millions de reprises.Pour aider les autorités locales, le gouvernement a annoncé mercredi le déploiement de « plus de 24.000 agents et forces de l’ordre, ainsi que plus de 1.100 coordinateurs » de la police aux frontières. C’est sans compter les 1.500 soldats dépêchés par le ministère de la Défense, en renfort des 2.500 déjà sur place. En parallèle, les ministères de la Justice et de la Sécurité intérieure ont finalisé de nouvelles restrictions au droit d’asile. Annoncées en février, elles ont fait l’objet d’une procédure obligatoire de consultation et entreront en vigueur dès jeudi soir.
    Avant de se présenter à la frontière, les demandeurs d’asile, à l’exception des mineurs isolés, devront désormais avoir obtenu un rendez-vous sur une application téléphonique mise en place par les gardes-frontières, ou s’être vu refuser l’asile dans un des pays traversés lors de leur périple migratoire.
    Dans le cas contraire, leur demande sera présumée illégitime et ils pourront faire l’objet d’une procédure d’expulsion accélérée, leur interdisant pendant cinq ans l’entrée sur le sol américain.Les Etats-Unis prévoient d’augmenter les vols de rapatriement, qui doubleront ou tripleront pour certaines destinations. Quelque 7.000 places supplémentaires seront créées dans les centres de rétention, afin que les migrants ne disparaissent pas dans le pays en attendant l’examen de leur dossier. Pour encourager les voies légales d’immigration, Washington a prévu d’ouvrir à terme une centaine de « centres régionaux de gestion », situés en dehors du pays, et où seront étudiés les dossiers des candidats à l’émigration. Les premiers sont prévus en Colombie et au Guatemala.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#etatsunis#politiquemigratoire#droit#asile#expulsion#retention#frontiere#titre42
    #immigration#postcovid

  • UK to fund France detention site as leaders agree migration deal

    The UK will help fund a detention centre in France as part of a financial package to tackle irregular migration.
    France and the United Kingdom have agreed on a multiyear financial package to stop migration across the Channel, days after the UK government drew criticism for a bill barring unauthorised arrivals.

    As part of the deal announced on Friday, the UK will help fund a detention centre in France while French authorities will deploy a new dedicated permanent policing unit and enhanced technology to patrol the country’s beaches, including drones and aircraft.

    The agreement also involves doubling the number of personnel deployed to northern France to tackle small-boat crossings, half of whom will be in place by the end of 2023.

    It will see a new 24-hour zonal coordination centre with permanent British liaison officers that will bring all relevant French authorities together to coordinate the response.

    Officers from both countries will also look to work with countries along the routes favoured by people traffickers.

    The UK said it would contribute roughly $581m in funding over the next three years to help pay for the new measures, adding that it expected France to contribute “significantly more funding”. France did not provide any cost estimates.

    British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and French President Emmanuel Macron said at a news conference after meeting in Paris that the two sides had agreed to work more closely together.

    “It is time for a new start,” Macron said.

    Sunak, who took office in October 2022, said the two countries shared “the same beliefs” and had “taken cooperation to an unprecedented level”.

    “Criminal gangs should not get to decide who comes to our country. Within weeks of my coming into office, we agreed our largest ever small boats deal and today we’ve taken our cooperation to an unprecedented level to tackle this shared challenge,” he said.

    The two leaders also discussed further cooperation on defence, as well as the joint training of Ukrainian troops.

    Sunak has made stopping boat arrivals one of his five priorities after the number of people arriving on the south coast of England increased to more than 45,000 last year.

    Camille Le Coz, an analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, told Al Jazeera that in terms of policy, “what we are seeing is more of the same.”

    UK-French cooperation over controls at their shared borders has been formalised in the past through a series of bilateral agreements.

    “What the UK really wants is to be able to return people to France, and this is something that has not been agreed and won’t be agreed by France,” Le Coz said.

    Al Jazeera’s Natacha Butler, reporting from Paris, said ties between the two countries have been rocky since the UK voted to leave the European Union in 2016, but have been fortified by the countries’ support for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion last year.

    Friday’s summit was the first in five years, Butler said, and the realignment was partly due to “a common sense of purpose” forged by the ongoing conflict.
    UK plan to stop Channel crossings

    The new deal came on the heels of criticism in the UK of new draft legislation – dubbed the “Illegal Migration Bill” – barring the entry of asylum seekers arriving by unauthorised means, such as in small boats across the Channel.

    The legislation would enable the detention of people without bail or judicial review for the first 28 days after arrival.

    It would also disqualify people from using modern slavery laws to challenge government decisions to remove them in the courts.

    Sunak said the government would “take back control of our borders, once and for all”.

    Diane Abbott, a member of Parliament with the main opposition Labour Party, said the bill was “mistreating migrants and their rights” and would not work “in the real world”.

    Ylva Johansson, the European Union’s commissioner for home affairs, said she believed the plans breached international law.

    Opposition parties and rights organisations have questioned the morality and practicality of the government’s longstanding migration policies, including deporting some asylum seekers to Rwanda.

    UK home secretary Suella Braverman admitted on Tuesday that the government had “pushed the boundaries of international law”.

    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/10/uk-to-fund-france-detention-centre-as-leaders-agree-migration-deal

    #UK #Angleterre #France #Channel #migrations #asile #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #drones #rétention #détention_administrative #externalisation #accord

  • Rinchiusi e sedati: l’abuso quotidiano di psicofarmaci nei Cpr italiani

    Nei #Centri_di_permanenza_per_il_rimpatrio le persone ristrette vengono “tenute buone” tramite un uso dei medicinali arbitrario, eccessivo e non focalizzato sulla presa in carico. Dati inediti mostrano la gravità del fenomeno. Da Milano a Roma

    “Mentre sono addormentati o storditi, le loro richieste diminuiscono: così le persone trattenute nel Centro di permanenza per il rimpatrio (Cpr) non mangiano, non fanno ‘casino’, vengono rimpatriate e non pretendono i propri diritti. E soprattutto l’ente gestore risparmia, perché gli psicofarmaci costano poco. Il cibo e una persona ‘attiva’, invece, molto di più”. Il racconto di Matteo, nome di fantasia di un operatore che ha lavorato diversi mesi in un Cpr, è confermato da dati inediti ottenuti da Altreconomia e che fotografano un utilizzo elevatissimo di questi farmaci all’interno dei centri di tutta Italia. Una “macchina per le espulsioni” -dove “l’essere umano scompare e restano solo i soldi”, racconta Matteo- a cui il Governo Meloni non vuole rinunciare. Nell’ultima legge di Bilancio sono stati previsti più di 42,5 milioni di euro per l’ampliamento entro il 2025 della rete dei nove Cpr già attivi e il nuovo decreto sull’immigrazione licenziato a marzo 2023, appena dopo i fatti di Cutro, prevede procedure semplificate per la costruzione di nuove strutture, con l’obiettivo di realizzarne almeno una per Regione. Questo nonostante le percentuali dei rimpatri a seguito del trattenimento siano bassissime mentre incalcolabile è il prezzo pagato in termini di salute dalle oltre cinquemila persone che nel 2021 sono transitate nei centri.

    Per confrontare i dati ottenuti sulla spesa in farmaci effettuata dagli enti gestori delle strutture, abbiamo chiesto le stesse informazioni al Centro salute immigrati (Isi) di Vercelli, il servizio delle Asl che in Piemonte prende in carico le persone senza regolare permesso di soggiorno (non iscrivili quindi al sistema sanitario nazionale) e segue una popolazione simile a quella dei trattenuti del Cpr anche per età (15-45 anni), provenienza e condizione di “irregolarità”. A Vercelli la spesa in psicofarmaci rappresenta lo 0,6% del totale: al Cpr di via Corelli a Milano, invece, questa cifra è 160 volte più alta (il 64%), al “Brunelleschi” di Torino 110 (44%), a Roma 127,5 (51%), a Caltanissetta Pian del Lago 30 (12%) e a Macomer 25 (10%).

    Numeri problematici non solo per l’incidenza degli psicofarmaci sul totale ma anche per la tipologia, all’interno di una filiera difficile da ricostruire e che coinvolge tre attori: l’azienda sanitaria locale, la prefettura e l’ente gestore a cui è affidata, tramite bando, la gestione del centro. “A differenza della realtà carceraria, nel Cpr la cura della salute non è affidata a medici e figure specialistiche che lavorano per il sistema sanitario nazionale, bensì al personale assunto dagli enti gestori il cui ruolo di monitoraggio si è dimostrato carente, se non assente”, spiega Nicola Cocco, medico ed esperto di detenzione amministrativa.

    Grazie ai dati raccolti dall’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi) e dall’associazione di volontariato Naga relativi ai farmaci acquistati per il Cpr di Milano tra ottobre 2021 e febbraio 2022, sappiamo però che in cinque mesi la spesa in psicofarmaci è superiore al 60% del totale, di cui oltre la metà ha riguardato il Rivotril (196 scatole): farmaco autorizzato dall’Agenzia italiana del farmaco (Aifa) come antiepilettico ma usato ampiamente come sedativo.

    Nel primo caso necessiterebbe una prescrizione ad hoc ma le visite psichiatriche effettuate alle persone trattenute nei mesi che vanno da ottobre 2021 a dicembre 2022 sono solo otto. In alternativa, un utilizzo del farmaco diverso rispetto a quello per cui è stato autorizzato dovrebbe avvenire solo previo consenso informato della persona a cui viene somministrato. “Chiedevano a me, operatore, di darlo, ma io mi rifiutavo perché non potevo farlo, non sono né un medico né un infermiere: i più giovani non sanno neanche che cosa sia questo medicinale ma no, non ho mai visto nessuna acquisizione del consenso”, racconta Matteo. A Torino la spesa in Clonazepam (Rivotril) dal 2017 al 2019 è di 3.348 euro, quasi il 15% del totale (22.128 euro) mentre a Caltanissetta tra il 2021 e il 2022 sappiamo che sono state acquistate 57.040 compresse: 21.300 solo nel 2021, a fronte di 574 persone trattenute. Significa mediamente 37 a testa. “L’utilizzo degli psicofarmaci all’interno dei Cpr è troppo spesso arbitrario, eccessivo e non focalizzato sulla presa in carico e sulla cura degli individui trattenuti, concorrendo ad aggravare la patogenicità di questi luoghi di detenzione”, osserva Cocco.

    Si registra inoltre un elevato consumo di derivati delle benzodiazepine, che dovrebbero essere utilizzate quando i disturbi d’ansia o insonnia sono gravi. A Roma in tre anni (2019, 2020 e 2021) sono state acquistate 3.480 compresse di Tavor su un totale di 2.812 trattenuti, cui si aggiungono, tra gli altri, 270 flaconi di Tranquirit da 20 millilitri e 185 fiale intramuscolo di Valium. Gli stessi farmaci li ritroviamo a Caltanissetta: 2.180 pastiglie di Tavor (più 29 fiale) tra il 2021 e il 2022; Zoloft (antidepressivo, 180 compresse); Valium e Bromazepam. Simile la situazione a Milano: tra ottobre 2021 e febbraio 2022 sono state acquistate, tra le altre, 27 scatole di Diazepam e 32 di Zoloft. Una “misura” del malessere che si vive nei centri è dato anche dall’alta spesa in paracetamolo, antidolorifici, gastroprotettori e farmaci per dolori intestinali. Un esempio su tutti: a Roma, in cinque anni, sono state acquistate 154.500 compresse di Buscopan su un totale di 4.200 persone transitate. In media, 36 pastiglie a testa quando un ciclo “normale” ne prevede al massimo 15.

    Un quadro eloquente in cui è fortemente problematica la compatibilità tra la permanenza della persona nel centro e l’assunzione di farmaci che prevedono precisi piani terapeutici. Qui entrano in gioco anche i professionisti assunti dall’ente gestore, che devono effettuare lo screening con cui si valuta lo stato di salute della persona trattenuta e l’eventuale necessità di visite specialistiche o terapie specifiche.

    A Milano gli psicofarmaci pesano per il 64% sul totale della spesa sanitaria. A Torino per il 44%, a Roma per il 51%. All’Isi di Vercelli appena per lo 0,6%

    Infatti, come previsto dallo schema di capitolato che disciplina i contratti d’appalto legati alla gestione dei Cpr italiani, “sono in ogni caso assicurati la visita medica d’ingresso [screening, ndr] nonché, al ricorrere delle esigenze, la somministrazione di farmaci e altre spese mediche”. Non è chiaro però, né dal capitolato né dalla nuova direttiva che regola diversi aspetti del funzionamento dei centri siglata il 19 maggio 2022 dal Dipartimento per le libertà civili e l’immigrazione, in seno al ministero dell’Interno, quali siano le modalità con cui avviene la somministrazione di farmaci e chi effettivamente si faccia carico dei relativi costi.

    Dunque ogni Cpr (e quindi ogni ente gestore e ogni prefettura) adotta le proprie prassi, anche in virtù dell’esistenza o meno di protocolli con le Asl che gli uffici del governo sarebbero obbligate a stipulare. Una disomogeneità che genera scarsa trasparenza. Un altro caso di scuola: a Milano la prefettura chiarisce come “i farmaci acquistati dall’ente gestore sono prescritti da personale sanitario dotato di ricettario del Servizio sanitario nazionale, in capo al quale ricadono i relativi costi”. L’Asl a sua volta, ricordando l’esistenza di un protocollo d’intesa stipulato con la Prefettura, riporta che i medici del Cpr possono avvalersi del ricettario regionale per tutto un elenco di prestazioni, ma “non per la prescrizione di farmaci ai cittadini stranieri irregolari”. Un cortocircuito.

    Se anche i farmaci venissero forniti seguendo attente prescrizioni e piani terapeutici il problema sarebbe comunque la compatibilità del trattenimento con le patologie delle persone. I “trattenuti” accedono infatti nei Cpr solamente dopo una “visita di idoneità alla vita in comunità ristretta”, che dovrebbe sempre essere svolta da un medico della Asl o dall’azienda ospedaliera. Secondo quanto stabilito dalla citata direttiva del maggio 2022 la visita di idoneità serve a escludere “patologie evidenti come malattie infettive contagiose, disturbi psichiatrici, patologie acute o cronico degenerative che non possano ricevere le cure adeguate in comunità ristrette”.

    La presenza tra le “spese” di antipsicotici, antiepilettici o di creme e gel che curano, ad esempio, la scabbia, sembra quindi un “controsenso”. “Se non si può arrivare a parlare di incompatibilità assoluta è perché il regolamento è un riferimento normativo secondario -sottolinea Maurizio Veglio, avvocato di Torino e socio dell’Asgi specializzato in materia di detenzione amministrativa-. Se una prescrizione legislativa specifica che persone con determinate patologie non possono stare nel centro e poi abbiamo percentuali di spesa così alte per farmaci ‘congruenti’ con quel profilo c’è una frizione molto forte”.

    “Nel Cpr la cura della salute non è affidata a medici e figure specialistiche che lavorano per il Ssn, bensì al personale assunto dagli enti gestori” – Nicola Cocco

    Una frizione che si traduce, concretamente, nella presenza di farmaci acquistati in diversi Cpr come Quetiapina, Olanzapina o Depakin, indicati nella terapia di schizofrenia e disturbo bipolare; Pregabalin (antiepilettico); Akineton, utilizzato per il trattamento del morbo di Parkinson (30mila compresse in due anni a Caltanissetta), piuttosto che il Rivotril. A Macomer, in provincia di Nuoro, l’ente gestore Ors Italia in una comunicazione rivolta alla prefettura il 9 settembre 2020 di cui abbiamo ottenuto copia scrive che la “comunità di persone trattenute è caratterizzata da soggetti con le più svariate criticità […]: tossicodipendenza, soggetti con doppia diagnosi (dipendenza e patologia psichiatrica, ndr), pazienti affetti da patologie dermatologiche”. Uomini e donne per cui non è problematizzato l’ingresso o meno nel centro. E il Servizio per le dipendenze patologiche territoriale (Serd), dal canto suo, ci ha fornito i piani di trattamento degli ultimi tre anni.

    Il metadone è presente anche nelle spese di Torino (circa 1.150 euro in quattro anni). Sempre nel capoluogo piemontese, nello stesso periodo, la spesa per la Permetrina, un gel antiscabbia, è di quasi 2.800 euro; una voce che si ritrova anche a Milano e Caltanissetta dove, nel 2022, sono stati acquistati 109 tubetti di Scabianil mentre a Roma, nel 2020, troviamo un farmaco per la tubercolosi (50 compresse di Nicozid). In tutti i Cpr in analisi troviamo anche antimicotici, legati a infezioni fungine (dermatologiche o sistemiche). “Se non c’è incompatibilità assoluta, l’idoneità non può essere valutata su una ‘normale’ vita comunitaria, ma va ‘calibrata’ sulla specificità di quello che sono quelle strutture -conclude Veglio-. A Torino, prima della sua momentanea chiusura a inizio marzo 2023 dormivano sette persone in 35 metri quadrati”. Luoghi definiti eufemisticamente come “non gradevoli” dal ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi a metà marzo 2023 a commento delle nuove regole sull’ampliamento della rete dei centri rispetto a cui le informazioni sono spesso frammentate o mancanti.

    Un tema che ritorna anche rispetto alla spesa sui farmaci. Due esempi: a Palazzo San Gervasio, struttura situata in provincia di Potenza e gestita da Engel Italia, secondo l’Asl nel 2022 la spesa totale è pari ad appena 34 euro (un dato costante dal 2018 in avanti) senza la presenza di psicofarmaci o antipsicotici. Un quadro diverso da quello descritto dai medici operanti all’interno del Centro che, secondo quanto riportato dall’Asgi in un report pubblicato nel giugno 2022, dichiaravano un “massiccio utilizzo di psicofarmaci (Rivotril e Ansiolin) da parte dei trattenuti”. Un copione che si ripete anche per il centro di Gradisca d’Isonzo, in provincia di Gorizia, già finito sotto i riflettori degli inquirenti. A metà gennaio 2023 è iniziato infatti il processo per la morte di Vakhtang Enukidze, 37 anni originario della Georgia, avvenuta il 18 gennaio 2020.

    Vakhtang Enukidze è morto nel Cpr di Gradisca d’Isonzo il 18 gennaio 2020 per edema polmonare e cerebrale causato da un cocktail di farmaci e stupefacenti

    Come ricostruito sul quotidiano Domani, l’autopsia ha accertato che la causa della morte è edema polmonare e cerebrale per un cocktail di farmaci e stupefacenti. Pochi mesi dopo, il 20 luglio 2020, Orgest Turia, 28enne originario dell’Albania, è morto per overdose di metadone. Due morti che danno ancor più rilevanza all’accesso ai dati. Ma sia l’Azienda sanitaria universitaria Giuliano Isontina (Asugi) sia la prefettura di Gorizia riferiscono ad Altreconomia di non averli a disposizione. In particolare, l’ufficio del governo sottolinea che “l’erogazione dei servizi non avviene tramite rendicontazione delle spese mediche affrontate”. Citando la “documentazione di gara” si specifica che le spese per i farmaci sono ricomprese “nell’ammontare pro-capite pro-die riconosciuto contrattualmente”. Buio pesto anche a Brindisi, Trapani e Bari.

    Qualche tribunale inizia però a fare luce. È il caso di Milano, dove a fine gennaio 2023 la giudice Elena Klindani non ha convalidato il prolungamento della detenzione di un ragazzo di 19 anni, rinchiuso in via Corelli da cinque mesi, perché “ogni ulteriore giorno di trattenimento comporta una compromissione incrementale della salute psicofisica per il sostegno della quale non è offerta alcuna specifica assistenza, al di fuori terapia farmacologica” e la salute del giovane “è suscettibile di ulteriore compromissione per via della condizione psicologica determinata dalla protratta restrizione della libertà personale”. Altro che “luogo non gradevole”.

    https://altreconomia.it/rinchiusi-e-sedati-labuso-quotidiano-di-psicofarmaci-nei-cpr-italiani
    #rétention #détention_administrative #Italie #CPR #asile #migrations #sans-papiers #médicaments #psychotropes #données #chiffres #cartographie #visualisation #renvois #expulsions #coût #Rivotril #sédatif #Clonazepam #benzodiazépines #Tavor #Tranquirit #Valium #Zoloft #Bromazepam #Buscopan #Quetiapina #Olanzapina #Depakin #méthadone #Permetrina #Scabianil #Nicozid #Ansiolin

    • Condizioni di detenzione nei Centri per il Rimpatrio - Conferenza stampa di #Riccardo_Magi
      https://webtv.camera.it/evento/22168

      –-

      “Rinchiusi e sedati” alla Camera dei deputati grazie a @riccardomagi e @cucchi_ilaria che chiedono “spiegazioni urgenti” al ministro Piantedosi sull’abuso di psicofarmaci all’interno dei Cpr denunciato dall’inchiesta: “La verità è una sola, questi luoghi vanno chiusi”

      https://twitter.com/rondi_luca/status/1644003698765381632

    • “Perché i Centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio devono indignare”

      L’avvocata Giulia Vicini, socia dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione, conosce bene i Cpr e le condizioni di vita di chi vi è trattenuto. In particolare in quello di via Corelli a Milano. Luoghi di privazione della libertà, con garanzie inferiori a quelle della custodia in carcere. Stigmi cittadini. Il suo racconto

      Cpr. A dispetto del nome e dei nomi che lo hanno preceduto -Centro di permanenza temporanea (Cpt), Centro di identificazione ed espulsione (Cie), e ora l’acronimo sta per Centro di permanenza per il rimpatrio- si tratta di un luogo di privazione della libertà personale. La stessa struttura di questi centri lo dimostra: alte mura, filo spinato e telecamere sul perimetro. Presidio costante di almeno quattro corpi di forze dell’ordine: esercito, carabinieri, polizia di Stato e Guardia di Finanza.

      I francesi hanno trovato un nome per diversificare la privazione della libertà personale dei cittadini stranieri in attesa di rimpatrio dalla detenzione nelle carceri ed è “retention”. In Italia si parla di trattenimento amministrativo. Come lo si voglia chiamare, si tratta della stessa privazione della libertà personale a cui sono sottoposti coloro che sono stati condannati per avere commesso dei reati. Chi sta nel Cpr non può andare da nessuna parte e risponde a regole che sono proprie del carcere, nonostante siano diversi i presupposti per il trattenimento e anche le garanzie e le tutele del trattenuto.

      I trattenuti nel Cpr sono cittadini stranieri in attesa dell’espletamento delle procedure di esecuzione di un rimpatrio forzato. Tra i presupposti (quantomeno quelli previsti dalla legge) per il trattenimento presso il Cpr vi è quindi anzitutto di non avere o non avere più un titolo per soggiornare regolarmente nel territorio nazionale, un permesso di soggiorno. Prendendo in prestito uno degli alienanti nomi in voga nel dibattito pubblico, chi può essere trattenuto al Cpr è “irregolare”. O, peggio ancora, “clandestino”. Ma, sempre in forza delle norme di legge, l’irregolarità non è sufficiente perché si possa applicare la misura del trattenimento presso il Cpr. È anche necessario che lo straniero sia “espellibile”, che possa essere destinatario di un provvedimento di rimpatrio. Questo perché l’ordinamento nazionale prevede delle ipotesi in cui il cittadino straniero, pur non avendo un permesso di soggiorno, non può essere allontanato dal territorio nazionale. È il caso dei minori, delle donne in stato di gravidanza e -quantomeno fino alla recente riforma della protezione speciale- di coloro che avevano maturato in Italia dei legami famigliari o sociali significativi e degni di protezione.

      Ulteriore presupposto perché le autorità di pubblica sicurezza possano ricorrere al trattenimento è che il provvedimento di rimpatrio comminato possa essere eseguito con la forza. L’uso della forza e il trattenimento sono infatti previsti come ultima ratio per garantire l’esecuzione del rimpatrio. L’ordinamento disciplina delle misure alternative, meno afflittive della libertà personale, quali ad esempio l’obbligo di firma e il ritiro del passaporto.

      Questi i presupposti di legge. L’esperienza però ci mostra che nei Cpr vengono spesso trattenute persone inespellibili o che potrebbero avere accesso a misure alternative. Quello che è certo è che chi è trattenuto presso il Cpr non ha commesso alcun reato, o quantomeno non è trattenuto per avere commesso un reato. Il suo trattenimento è unicamente finalizzato a consentire alle autorità di pubblica sicurezza di rimuoverlo forzatamente dal territorio.

      Che il trattenimento nel Cpr non sia conseguenza di alcun reato è tanto più evidente se si considera che anche chi vi è trattenuto dopo avere espiato una pena in carcere non lo è per “pagare” una pena -appunto già pagata altrove- ma per essere identificato, in un sistema che si rivela incapace, o forse disinteressato a procedere all’identificazione e al riconoscimento durante la (spesso lunga) permanenza in carcere.

      Per riassumere, della popolazione del Cpr fanno parte coloro che entrano nel territorio senza un titolo per l’ingresso o il soggiorno o che entrano con un titolo trattenendosi però oltre la sua scadenza. Coloro che perdono un titolo di soggiorno spesso per cause non a loro imputabili, quali la perdita dell’occupazione. Ma anche i richiedenti asilo. Coloro che chiedono protezione internazionale perché in fuga da persecuzioni e guerre.

      Il decreto legge 20/2023 convertito in legge 50/2023 ha peraltro reso il trattenimento del richiedente asilo la norma ogni qualvolta la domanda è presentata “in frontiera”. Dove il concetto di frontiera si amplia a dismisura ricomprendendo territori scelti senza alcuna apparente ragione (si pensi ad esempio Matera) con la conseguenza che alla domanda di protezione presentata in questi territori seguirà un trattenimento. Le direttive europee prescrivono che il trattenimento del richiedente protezione debba rappresentare una misura eccezionale e che si debbano distinguere i luoghi di trattenimento perché diversi sono i presupposti e diverse le procedure e le garanzie. Nondimeno i richiedenti asilo possono essere trattenuti fino a dodici mesi negli stessi luoghi dei cittadini stranieri in attesa di esecuzione del rimpatrio.

      Quando e quanto si può essere trattenuti nel Cpr? Sul quando, si è già detto, lo straniero che viene portato al Cpr non è solo quello che è appena entrato in Italia ma anche quello che si trova nel territorio da moltissimi anni e che nel territorio ha costruito un percorso di vita. Sul quanto vale la pena interrogarsi perché la disciplina degli stessi termini del trattenimento dimostra l’esclusiva funzionalità alla conclusione di un procedimento -quello di espulsione- che molto spesso le autorità non portano a termine. La proroga del trattenimento, dopo i primi trenta giorni, può infatti essere consentita dal Giudice di pace solo se “l’accertamento dell’identità e della nazionalità ovvero l’acquisizione di documenti per il viaggio presenti gravi difficoltà”. Il trattenimento può essere prorogato per altri trenta giorni solo se risulta probabile che il rimpatrio venga eseguito. Il trattenimento non solo è funzionale all’esecuzione del rimpatrio ma anche spesso determinato da inefficienze o ritardi della Pubblica amministrazione.

      Dove si consuma il trattenimento ai fini del rimpatrio? Nonostante le nostre preoccupazioni e la nostra indignazione riguardino spesso, legittimamente, i Cpr, gli stranieri destinatari di misure di rimpatrio vengono trattenuti anche negli aeroporti. In quella Malpensa in cui i titolari di passaporto italiano transitano senza alcun ostacolo e in cui i cittadini stranieri a cui si contesta di “non avere i documenti in regola” al momento del loro arrivo vengono trattenuti anche fino a otto giorni, in aree sterili, senza vedere la luce del giorno e senza avere accesso ai loro oggetti personali, e poi vengono “accompagnati” all’aereo che li riporta a casa. Dall’entrata in vigore del decreto legge 113/2018 è inoltre possibile trattenere presso dei locali all’interno delle questure in attesa di rimpatrio. E negli uffici di via Montebello della questura di Milano questi locali esistono e vengono comunemente utilizzati.

      Infine, quello che forse più deve indignare è come si svolge il trattenimento. Ai trattenuti nel Cpr sono riconosciute garanzie inferiori a quelle della custodia in carcere, tanto nel procedimento che porta alla privazione della libertà, quanto nelle condizioni materiali di tale privazione. Il caso dell’utilizzo della forza pubblica per l’esecuzione del rimpatrio di cittadini stranieri è l’unico per cui -in alcune ipotesi- la legge nazionale esclude la necessità di una convalida giudiziaria. Questo vale per i respingimenti “immediati” ai valichi di frontiera e anche, con l’entrata in vigore del decreto legge 20/2023, per chi è destinatario di misure di espulsione di carattere penale. Anche dove una convalida giudiziaria è prevista, la stessa è molto al di sotto degli standard del giusto processo, con udienze che si svolgono da remoto, senza concedere ai legali adeguato tempo per conferire con l’assistito, e hanno una durata complessiva di poco più di un quarto d’ora. Nel procedimento di convalida, inoltre, opera spesso un’inversione de facto dell’onere della prova in cui lo straniero deve offrire prova documentale di tutto quello che deduce mentre sulle dichiarazioni rese dalla Questura, parte istante, si fa cieco affidamento.

      Quanto alle condizioni, l’ampia reportistica risultante dai sopralluoghi effettuati presso i Cpr è più che eloquente. Lo straniero trattenuto non riceve alcuna informativa sui diritti e sui servizi a cui ha titolo. Significativo è che lo stesso venga identificato e arrivando nella sala colloqui con l’avvocato si identifichi con un numero. Quando si iniziano a identificare le persone con i numeri la storia ci insegna che non si arriva mai a nulla di buono.

      https://altreconomia.it/perche-i-centri-di-permanenza-per-il-rimpatrio-devono-indignare

    • Abuso di psicofarmaci nei Cpr: perché la versione del ministro Piantedosi non sta in piedi

      Intervistato da Piazzapulita sulle terribili condizioni dei trattenuti nei Centri, il titolare del Viminale ha provato a confutare i risultati della nostra inchiesta “Rinchiusi e sedati”. Ma le sue tesi non reggono: dalla presunta richiesta dei reclusi all’ipotizzata presenza solo di persone con reati commessi durante la loro permanenza in Italia

      Giovedì 25 maggio su La7 la trasmissione Piazzapulita (https://www.la7.it/piazzapulita/video/inchiesta-esclusiva-di-piazzapulita-violenze-e-psicofarmaci-ai-migranti-dentro-a) il servizio di Chiara Proietti D’Ambra ha mostrato immagini inedite sulle condizioni di vita delle persone recluse nei Centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio italiani (Cpr). Il lavoro si è concentrato sulle strutture di Gradisca d’Isonzo (Gorizia) e palazzo San Gervasio (Potenza) dando conto anche dei risultati dell’inchiesta “Rinchiusi e sedati” pubblicata da Altreconomia ad aprile e che per la prima volta ha quantificato, dati alla mano, l’abuso di psicofarmaci in cinque delle nove strutture detentive attualmente attive in Italia.

      Le immagini e i dati sono stati mostrati anche al ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi che ha risposto alle domande della giornalista Roberta Benvenuto (https://www.la7.it/piazzapulita/video/piantedosi-se-cpr-gestiti-da-privati-in-modo-insoddisfacente-possibilita-di-gest). Risposte lacunose, giunte tra l’altro prima in televisione rispetto alle quattro interrogazioni parlamentari presentate più di un mese fa da diversi senatori e deputati e tuttora rimaste inevase.

      Il ministro ha spiegato di “escludere nella maniera più categorica che vi sia un orientamento della gestione dei Centri finalizzata alla sedazione di massa. C’è una richiesta da parte degli ospiti. Fare il confronto tra le prescrizioni all’esterno e all’interno delle strutture non ha senso perché è più facile che nei Cpr si concentrano persone per cui quel tipo di prescrizioni si rivela normale”. Come descritto nella nostra inchiesta, presentata alla Camera dei Deputati a inizio aprile con Riccardo Magi e Ilaria Cucchi, l’utilizzo di psicofarmaci rispetto a un servizio dell’Asl che prende in carico una popolazione simile è però spropositato: 160 volte in più a Milano, 127,5 a Roma, 60 a Torino e così via.

      Il confronto è nato esattamente dalla necessità di quantificare un utilizzo di cui neanche le prefetture hanno contezza per partire da un dato di realtà che vada oltre le testimonianze dei reclusi. Piantedosi dichiara che non è significativo questo confronto perché il “sovrautilizzo” è dovuto al fatto che all’interno dei centri vi sono delle persone per cui quei farmaci sono necessari. Ma nell’inchiesta abbiamo riscontrato un largo utilizzo di Quetiapina, Olanzapina o Depakin, indicati nel­la terapia di schizofrenia e disturbo bipolare; Pregabalin (antiepilettico); Akineton, utilizzato per il trattamento del morbo di Parkinson (30mila compresse in due anni a Caltanissetta); Rivotril.

      Se questi farmaci sono forniti tramite prescrizioni e non somministrati al di fuori di quanto previsto dal foglio illustrativo, significa nei centri si trovano persone con patologie psichiatriche gravi. Ma nel maggio 2022 una direttiva dello stesso ministero dell’Interno aveva specificato che la visita d’ingresso nel Centro per valutare l’idoneità alla “vita” in comunità ristretta nella struttura deve escludere “pato­logie evidenti come malattie infettive contagio­se, disturbi psichiatrici, patologie acute o croni­co degenerative che non possano ricevere le cure adeguate in comunità ristrette”. Delle due l’una: o le persone non possono stare nei Centri per la loro condizione sanitaria, oppure i farmaci vengono forniti off-label, senza cioè seguire un preciso piano terapeutico.

      Nel centro di via Corelli a Milano, nonostante il 60% delle scatole di farmaci acquistate in cinque mesi sia stato di psicofarmaci, le visite psichiatriche svolte in quasi due anni (quindi un periodo più lungo) sono state appena otto. Un altro segnale inquietante sulle modalità di utilizzo di questi psicofarmaci.

      Va ricordato inoltre che all’interno dei Cpr la cura della salute non è affidata a medici che lavorano per il Sistema sanitario nazionale ma da personale assunto dagli enti gestori sulla base di convenzioni ad hoc con prefetture e aziende sanitarie locali. “Il ruolo del monitoraggio si è dimostrato carente se non assente. Il ricorso a specialisti psichiatri e centri di salute mentale, per quanto garantito dalla normativa vigente, risulta spesso difficoltoso dal punto di vista burocratico e poco utilizzato -ha spiegato ad Altreconomia il dottor Nicola Cocco, esperto di detenzione amministrativa-. L’utilizzo degli psicofarmaci all’interno di molti Cpr è appannaggio del personale medico dell’ente gestore, che quasi sempre non ha alcune esperienza di presa in carico della patologia mentale e della dipendenza, tanto più in un contesto complesso come quello della detenzione amministrativa per persone migranti”.

      Questo aspetto è problematico anche rispetto alla “giustificazione” avanzata dal ministro Piantedosi rispetto alla richiesta da parte delle stesse persone recluse della somministrazione di questi farmaci. “Dal punto di vista medico la eventuale ‘richiesta’ dei trattenuti non giustifica nulla: gli psicofarmaci vengono somministrati a discrezione del personale sanitario. Sempre”, ricorda Elena Cacello, referente sanitaria del Centro salute immigrati di Vercelli (VC).

      La presunta richiesta dei reclusi -presentata come giustificazione risolutiva- conferma in realtà l’inefficienza del sistema. “Vi è spesso una gestione improvvisata di eventuali quadri di patologia mentale dei trattenuti -ribadisce Cocco-. Tale improvvisazione si manifesta attraverso la prescrizione arbitraria di psicofarmaci da parte dei medici degli enti gestori, in mancanza spesso di un percorso di presa in carico e cura, ma solo per la risoluzione del sintomo”. Un sintomo che, considerando che non può essere presente già all’ingresso nel Centro (che quindi dovrebbe escludere il trattenimento), insorge a causa delle pessime condizioni di vita nelle strutture -dove non è prevista alcuna attività, spesso neanche nella disponibilità del proprio telefono cellulare- e dettato anche dalla necessità di “tenere buoni” i reclusi. “Un altro aspetto può ‘spiegare’ questo sovrautilizzo di psicofarmaci a scopo sedativo o tranquillizzante funziona: la somministrazione funziona come una vera e propria ‘camicia di forza farmacologica’ nei confronti delle persone trattenute, al fine di evitare disordini e, non meno importante, l’intervento diretto delle forze di polizia; è evidente come in questo caso l’utilizzo degli psicofarmaci non ha una rilevanza clinica per le persone interessate, bensì di sostegno all’apparato di polizia”.

      Il ministro ha dichiarato poi che “all’interno dei Cpr tutte le prestazioni sanitarie sono nella normalità garantite, controllate e monitorate”. Un dato smentito da diverse testimonianze di avvocati e attivisti che si occupano di detenzione amministrativa ma soprattutto da sentenze di tribunali.

      Partiamo da quella della giudice Elena Klindani che a fine gennaio 2023 non ha prorogato il trattenimento di un ragazzo di 19 anni rinchiuso in via Corelli a Milano da cinque mesi perché “ogni ulteriore giorno di trattenimento comporta una compromissione incrementale della salute psicofisica per il sostegno della quale non è offerta alcuna specifica assistenza, al di fuori terapia farmacologica” e la salute del giovane “è suscettibile di ulteriore compromissione per via della condizione psicologica determinata dalla protratta restrizione della libertà personale”. Per avere una panoramica completa di quello che succede è utile leggere, tra gli altri, “Il Libro nero del Cpr di Torino”, a cura dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi) che racconta “quattro casi di ordinaria ferocia” di persone trattenute nel Cpr da Torino che danno conto dell’insufficiente garanzia rispetto alle cure sanitarie di cui necessitano i trattenuti e il lavoro di denuncia dell’Associazione Naga, con sede a Milano, che da diversi anni segnala la scarsa tutela della salute all’interno del centro di via corelli. E poi i lavori della rete Mai più Lager-No ai Cpr e di LasciateCIEntrare.

      Moussa Balde, Wissem Abdel Latif, Vakhtang Enukidze sono solo alcuni dei nomi delle oltre 30 persone morte nei Cpr. Sul suicidio di Balde e di Enukidze sono tutt’ora in corso procedimenti penali, rispettivamente a Torino e a Trieste, per accertare le responsabilità di chi aveva in custodia i due giovani. Di fronte a questo quadro il titolare del Viminale ha parlato di “salute garantita” e dichiarato, solo a seguito dell’insistenza della giornalista, che è “possibile, probabile” che siano necessari più controlli.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQF1F1lyFRY&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Faltreconomia.it%2F&

      Infine il ministro ha sottolineato che nei Cpr sarebbero presenti solamente persone con reati commessi durante la loro permanenza in Italia per una “prassi che si è consolidata negli anni”. “L’articolo 32 sul diritto alla salute è garantito a tutti, a prescindere dal loro passato”, ha giustamente risposto in studio lo psicoterapeuta Leonardo Mendolicchio.

      Ma il punto è che quanto detto da Matteo Piantedosi è falso. Secondo dati ottenuti da Altreconomia, e forniti proprio dal ministero dell’Interno, nel 2021 sono state 987 le persone che hanno fatto ingresso nei Cpr direttamente dal carcere: il 19% del totale di 5.174 trattenuti. Una percentuale a cui vanno certamente aggiunti coloro che hanno precedenti penali e vengono rintracciati sul territorio successivamente alla loro scarcerazione ma che comunque smentisce la versione governativa.

      Il ministro dichiara che non voler “rinforzare il sistema di espulsione e rimpatrio” sarebbe “omissivo” da parte di qualsiasi governo. Negli ultimi quattro anni la percentuale delle persone trattenute effettivamente rimpatriate ha superato il 50% solo nel 2017: questi centri non raggiungono quindi nemmeno l’obiettivo per cui sarebbero stati creati, sulla carta. La presunta omissione non passa dall’esistenza di queste strutture.

      Piantedosi ha poi paradossalmente auspicato una “collaborazione da parte degli ospiti” perché terribili scene come quelle mostrate nel servizio non avvengano più. Quasi a dire che i diritti fondamentali fossero materia da elargire, a mo’ di premio al merito, e non invece da garantire punto e basta. “Il Cpr è psicopatogeno di per sé e come sistema -conclude Cocco-. Le proteste sono legittime, sono un diritto. Chiedere più collaborazione è quasi come impedire a qualcuno di poter fare lo sciopero della fame: utilizzare il proprio corpo è la extrema ratio che si ha per manifestare il proprio malessere. Tocca allo Stato evitare che le persone si facciano male o muoiano. Non certo ai reclusi”. Che il ministro, nella lunga sequela di falsità, chiama “ospiti”.

      https://altreconomia.it/abuso-di-psicofarmaci-nei-cpr-perche-la-versione-del-ministro-piantedos

    • Pioggia di ansiolitici al Cpr di #Palazzo_San_Gervasio per rendere innocui i reclusi

      Oltre 2.800 pastiglie in appena sei mesi per poco più di 400 trattenuti transitati: i dati inediti sulla struttura in provincia di Potenza. La Procura intanto indaga sulla gestione di Engel Italia. Gli psicofarmaci sarebbero serviti a “neutralizzare ogni possibile lamentela per le condizioni disumane in cui spesso si trovavano a vivere le persone”

      Una scatola di psicofarmaci per ogni persona che è entrata al Cpr di Palazzo San Gervasio tra gennaio e luglio 2022. I dati inediti ottenuti da Altreconomia fotografano l’abuso dell’antiepilettico Rivotril e di benzodiazepine all’interno della struttura, su cui sta indagando anche la Procura di Potenza. “Le situazioni di degrado e non conformità al rispetto della persona umana e dei diritti in cui si trovavano a vivere i reclusi -scrivono gli inquirenti nell’ordinanza applicativa di misure cautelari di fine dicembre 2023 rivolta, tra gli altri, ad Alessandro Forlenza amministratore di fatto della Engel Italia Srl, che ha gestito il centro dal 29 ottobre 2018 al 23 giugno 2023- venivano lenite dall’uso inappropriato di farmaci sedativi volti a rendere gli ospiti innocui e quindi neutralizzare ogni loro possibile lamentela per le condizioni disumane in cui spesso si trovavano a vivere”.

      In sei mesi di spesa, da gennaio a luglio 2022, il 38% delle 791 scatole di farmaci acquistati erano psicofarmaci, per un totale di oltre 2.800 tra compresse e capsule e 1.550 millilitri in fiale o flaconi. Numeri esorbitanti se si considera che, secondo i dati della prefettura, la presenza media in struttura è stata di 70 persone con circa 400 transiti in sei mesi. Tra i farmaci acquistati troviamo soprattutto sedativi e ansiolitici come il Diazepam (65 scatole), l’Alprazolam (45), Tavor (14) ma anche Rivotril (77 confezioni), un antiepilettico con importanti effetti secondari di stordimento. “Tale farmaco veniva acquistato sistematicamente in quantità tali da non rimanere mai senza copertura -ha spiegato una delle operatrici sentite dalla Procura di Potenza-. Senza Rivotril sarebbe scoppiata la rivolta”.

      Gli inquirenti hanno così focalizzato la loro attenzione, rispetto all’operato della Engel Italia Srl, società madre di Martinina Srl, sotto indagine a Milano per presunte frodi nella gestione del Cpr di via Corelli, anche sull’utilizzo smodato degli psicofarmaci. Per diversi motivi. L’antiepilettico “Rivotril” dovrebbe essere utilizzato off-label, quindi al di fuori dei casi in cui la persona soffre di epilessia, solo laddove non vi siano “valide alternative terapeutiche” e in ogni caso con l’acquisizione del consenso della persona di cui, però, secondo la Procura, non vi sarebbe “alcuna traccia”.

      “Risulta che l’uso del medicinale -come si legge nell’ordinanza di custodia cautelare- prescindeva dalla volontà del paziente e corrispondeva alla specifica necessità di controllare illecitamente l’ordine pubblico interno da parte della Engel”. Che per la gestione del centro ha ricevuto oltre 2,8 milioni di euro dalla prefettura di Potenza.

      Un problema di quantità ma anche di modalità di somministrazione e prescrizione. La direzione dell’ente gestore, sempre stando alle ricostruzioni degli inquirenti, avrebbe richiesto “a seconda delle esigenze” di ridurre le dosi “per risparmiare sui costi del farmaco” allungando i flaconi con l’acqua. Ma non solo. Due medici operanti all’interno del Cpr sarebbero indagati per la redazione di “false ricette per la dispensazione dei predetti farmaci a carico del Servizio sanitario nazionale”.

      Con riferimento sempre agli psicofarmaci, “su 2.635 confezioni dispensate tra gennaio 2018 e agosto 2019 dai due medici ben 2.235 erano destinati a pazienti identificati con Stp (codice fiscale per chi non ha un permesso di soggiorno, ndr) e quindi presumibilmente ospitati presso il Cpr di Palazzo San Gervasio”. Con un dettaglio non di poco conto. Diverse prescrizioni sarebbero state destinate a soggetti, ordinanza alla mano, che erano già usciti dal Cpr. Un modo, presumibilmente, per continuare ad acquistare scatole di farmaci gravando sul sistema sanitario nazionale e non sull’ente gestore.

      I dati ottenuti da Altreconomia sui farmaci comprati dalla Engel Italia Srl potrebbero quindi essere solo una fetta di quelli somministrati perché riguardano quelli per cui la società ha chiesto rimborso dalla prefettura. Ma escludono quelli “passati” dall’azienda sanitaria. Rispetto a cui, però, i conti non tornano: nella nostra inchiesta “Rinchiusi e sedati” pubblicata ad aprile 2023 si è dato conto del riscontro dell’Asl territoriale che ha dichiarato importi bassissimi. Nei primi dieci mesi del 2022 in totale 19 prescrizioni e 34,7 euro di farmaci destinati al Cpr. Qualcosa, stando anche ai dati della Procura, non torna.

      Oltre agli psicofarmaci -tra cui troviamo anche la Quetiapina, antipsicotico prescrivibile per gravi patologie psichiatriche- nei farmaci acquistati dalla Engel si trovano diverse tipologie di farmaci acquistati che raccontano della presenza all’interno della struttura di persone dalla salute precaria. Due esempi su tutti: la Spiriva, prescrivibile per la broncopneumopatia, una malattia dell’apparato respiratorio caratterizzata da un’ostruzione irreversibile delle vie aeree e il Palexia, usato per il trattamento del dolore cronico grave in adulti che possono essere curati adeguatamente solo con antidolorifici oppioidi.

      Dal 20 giugno 2023 Engel Italia Srl non è più l’ente gestore del Cpr di Palazzo San Gervasio. Ad aggiudicarsi il nuovo appalto per 128 posti, con importo a base d’asta di 2,2 milioni di euro, è stata #Officine_Sociali, cooperativa di Priolo Gargallo in provincia di Siracusa. Officine Sociali ha partecipato a diverse gare per la gestione di Cpr e grandi strutture di accoglienza nel corso degli anni, finendo per aggiudicarsi la gestione dell’hotspot di Taranto e Pozzallo; per quest’utimo ha incassato, da inizio dicembre 2021 a giugno 2023, oltre 1,3 milioni di euro. Pochi mesi prima della gara indetta dalla prefettura di Potenza per la gestione del Cpr, Officine sociali costituiva un “raggruppamento temporaneo di imprese” con Martinina Srl, la nuova “creatura” di Forlenza, per aggiudicarsi la gara per la gestione del Cpr di Gorizia. Un anno prima, le due società avevano gareggiato insieme per vincere l’appalto di Torino. Una sinergia di intenti.

      Tornando alla gestione di #Engel_Italia Srl “il livello di assistenza e di cura”, secondo la Procura, sarebbe stato “insufficiente a garantire loro le modalità di trattenimento idonee ad assicurare la necessaria assistenza ed il pieno rispetto della dignità umana”. Il servizio medico sarebbe stato garantito 4.402 ore in meno di quanto, quello infermieristico di più di 11mila in meno nel periodo compreso tra febbraio 2021 al 31 ottobre 2022. “Nell’ambulatorio è sempre mancata l’acqua corrente”, si legge nell’ordinanza. Per la gestione del Cpr di Potenza sono indagati anche dottori, due albergatori della zona, un commissario e due ispettori di polizia. “Gli ospiti apparivano infatti molto provati proprio dal contesto in cui si trovavano a vivere -ha raccontato un’operatrice sentita dalla Procura-. Dopo qualche settimana di permanenza alcuni di loro cominciavano a sviluppare comportamenti ossessivi come il camminare in cerchio”.

      A Milano intanto si verificano nuove proteste e violenze sui trattenuti nonostante il commissariamento, così come a Caltanissetta, dove la condizione di vita nelle strutture è insostenibile (un video dall’interno lo dimostra) fino ad arrivare Trapani, con la condanna del governo italiano da parte della Corte europea per i diritti dell’uomo per trattamenti inumani e degradanti a danni di un recluso nel Cpr. Tutto questo a meno di una settimana di distanza dal suicidio di Ousmane Sylla che ha acceso i riflettori sull’attuale gestione da parte di Ors Italia della struttura di Ponte Galeria a Roma. Intanto il ministero dell’Interno resta in silenzio: a “camminare in cerchio” sembra non essere solamente chi è trattenuto. Perché il sistema Cpr non va messo in discussione.

      https://altreconomia.it/pioggia-di-ansiolitici-al-cpr-di-palazzo-san-gervasio-per-rendere-innoc

  • Traversées de la Manche : Londres durcit sa loi contre l’« immigration illégale »
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/03/07/traversees-de-la-manche-londres-durcit-sa-loi-contre-l-immigration-illegale_

    Traversées de la Manche : Londres durcit sa loi contre l’« immigration illégale »
    Le gouvernement britannique a présenté mardi 7 mars un projet de loi contre l’immigration illégale qui prévoit d’empêcher les migrants arrivant par la Manche de demander l’asile au Royaume-Uni et de les expulser « en quelques semaines », un texte aux limites du droit international de l’aveu même de Londres.« Si vous arrivez de manière irrégulière, vous ne pouvez pas demander l’asile. Vous ne pouvez pas bénéficier de nos protections contre l’esclavage moderne. Vous ne pouvez pas faire de demandes fallacieuses liées aux droits humains et vous ne pouvez pas rester » au Royaume-Uni, a déclaré lors d’une conférence de presse le premier ministre britannique Rishi Sunak. « C’est dur mais c’est nécessaire, et c’est juste », a-t-il affirmé, soulignant que le nombre des migrants traversant la Manche avait « plus que quadruplé ces deux dernières années », malgré les tentatives des gouvernements conservateurs successifs pour enrayer ces traversées. Avec plus de 45 000 arrivées par la Manche l’année dernière (surtout des Albanais et Afghans mais aussi des Iraniens, Irakiens et Syriens) et déjà plus de 3 000 cette année, le système d’asile au Royaume-Uni est « dépassé » selon Londres. « Nous placerons en détention les personnes qui viennent ici illégalement, puis nous les renverrons en quelques semaines », soit dans leur pays soit dans un pays jugé sûr comme le Rwanda, a précisé Rishi Sunak, ajoutant que le gouvernement allait construire de nouveaux centres de détention. Il a précisé que la loi une fois adoptée s’appliquerait de manière rétroactive au 7 mars. « Interdire aux gens de demander l’asile est illégal, inapplicable et complètement inhumain », a réagi sur Twitter la directrice de Human Rights Watch pour le Royaume-Uni, Yasmine Ahmed. (...)Pour le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés, le projet de loi équivaut à « une interdiction d’asile ». « La loi, si elle est adoptée, reviendra à mettre fin au droit d’asile, privant ceux qui arrivent illégalement au Royaume-Uni du droit de chercher la protection accordée à un réfugié, quelles que soient l’authenticité et l’urgence de leur demande », a déclaré le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés (UNHCR) dans un communiqué.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#postcovid#asile#politiquemigratoire#royaume-uni#retention#migrationirreguliere#rwanda

  • « Les centres de rétention sont devenus des lieux de violations systématiques des droits et d’atteintes graves à la dignité humaine », Fanélie Carrey-Conte, Cimade

    Depuis 1984, La Cimade est présente dans ces lieux où sont enfermées les personnes étrangères que l’administration cherche à expulser. D’une durée de sept jours initialement, la rétention peut, depuis la loi de 2018, durer jusqu’à trois mois.

    Toute personne sans papiers, y compris des familles avec enfants et des ressortissants européens, peut être enfermée dans ces lieux peu connus du grand public, assimilables à des prisons. En dépit de nos alertes régulières, les centres de rétention administrative (CRA) sont devenus des lieux de violations systématiques des droits et d’atteintes graves à la dignité humaine.
    Témoins quotidiens des pratiques abusives de l’Etat, nous dénonçons ici les conditions dans lesquelles ces personnes sont interpellées, enfermées puis expulsées.
    Contrôles au faciès, procédures administratives irrégulières, absence de prise en compte de la vulnérabilité, expulsions violentes, chaque jour des personnes sont enfermées malgré une violation manifeste de leurs droits fondamentaux, souvent avec l’assentiment des tribunaux.

    Enfermements arbitraires

    Les préfectures enferment à la chaîne sans examiner, même de manière superficielle, la situation individuelle des personnes, ce qui peut conduire à des enfermements arbitraires. Ainsi, pour le seul mois de janvier 2023, plus de la moitié des procédures de placement dans les CRA où La Cimade intervient ont été déclarées irrégulières par un juge.
    L’amalgame systématique entre immigration et délinquance conduit l’administration à enfermer et expulser toute personne étrangère qui représenterait une « menace pour l’ordre public ». La lecture des décisions administratives révèle pourtant l’absurdité de cette notion : ont par exemple été considérés comme une menace pour l’ordre public le fait de cracher au sol dans la rue, de ralentir la circulation des voitures, de regarder « suspicieusement » autour de soi, mais aussi d’appeler la police à la suite d’une agression dont l’intéressé a été la victime.

    Pour alimenter la machine à expulser, les préfectures contactent les autorités consulaires de pays qui ne respectent pas les droits humains au risque de mettre en danger les personnes qu’elles souhaitent expulser. L’Etat a par exemple transmis au gouvernement [syrien] de Bachar Al-Assad les identités de personnes syriennes alors même qu’il a rompu ses relations diplomatiques avec Damas.

    Il a aussi pris attache avec les autorités soudanaises pour des personnes dont les craintes étaient reconnues, ou iraniennes pour une opposante au régime. Des démarches ont aussi été organisées pour des expulsions vers la Somalie, l’Irak, l’Erythrée, le Soudan du Sud et vers Haïti, malgré une situation sécuritaire alarmante.

    Expulsions illégales

    L’exercice de nos missions d’accès aux droits en CRA devient toujours plus difficile. A rebours des déclarations politiques considérant que les personnes en situation irrégulière disposent de trop nombreuses possibilités de recours, nous constatons chaque jour que l’accès à un recours effectif n’est pas garanti.
    Les personnes sont parfois expulsées illégalement avant même d’avoir vu un juge ou alors qu’elles ont demandé l’asile sur le territoire français. L’Etat comme les tribunaux refusent régulièrement d’appliquer la loi et organisent l’expulsion de personnes pourtant protégées par le droit (au titre de leur vie familiale, de leur santé, de leurs craintes de persécutions, etc.).

    En dépit d’un accès aux soins défaillant, et des risques sanitaires encourus en cas d’expulsion, de nombreuses personnes malades sont enfermées dans les #CRA. Certaines, souffrant de pathologies psychiatriques lourdes, ne sont pas en mesure de comprendre où elles se trouvent et leur absence de discernement ne leur permet pas d’engager des démarches juridiques. Des personnes sous curatelle renforcée ont aussi été enfermées. Au Mesnil-Amelot (Seine-et-Marne), malgré nos multiples alertes, une femme est enfermée depuis plus d’un mois alors qu’elle ne communique pas et ne peut s’alimenter ni se laver seule.
    Les conditions d’enfermement se dégradent continuellement : locaux insalubres, parfois non chauffés ou sans eau courante, présence de rongeurs, quantités de nourriture insuffisantes… Les violences et les mises à l’isolement répétées se multiplient.

    Un climat de stigmatisation grandissante

    Face à l’aggravation de la situation, à l’indignité et à l’illégalité des pratiques d’enfermement et d’expulsion, nous demandons :
    – le respect du droit : la fin des expulsions illégales des personnes avant leur audience devant le juge administratif ou avant la réponse à leur demande d’asile, la fin des expulsions de personnes légalement protégées contre l’éloignement, et le respect des décisions de justice par les préfectures ;
    – la fin de l’enfermement des personnes vulnérables et leur protection, notamment pour les personnes ayant des troubles psychiatriques manifestes, les victimes de violences conjugales et les mineurs ;
    – la fin des placements à l’isolement massifs et abusifs et du recours à la force systématique : les violences policières et l’impunité des personnes dépositaires de l’autorité publique doivent cesser ;
    – la libération et la délivrance d’un titre de séjour pour les personnes inexpulsables et pour les personnes en danger dans leur pays d’origine.

    Dans un climat de stigmatisation grandissante des personnes étrangères [alors qu’un projet de loi destiné à « contrôler l’immigration et améliorer l’intégration » a été adopté, mercredi 1er février, en conseil des ministres], La Cimade demande un changement de paradigme des politiques migratoires, garantissant le respect des droits et libertés fondamentales.
    Elle réaffirme son positionnement pour la fermeture de tous les centres et locaux de rétention et plus largement la suppression de toutes les formes d’enfermement spécifiques aux personnes étrangères.

    La Cimade (à l’origine acronyme de Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués) est une association de défense des droits des personnes réfugiées et migrantes.
    https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/03/02/les-centres-de-retention-sont-devenus-des-lieux-de-violations-systematiques-

    #étrangers #migrants #réfugiés #immigration #politique_migratoire #rétention #enfermement #expulsions #xénophobie_d'État

  • L’Unione europea finanzia un nuovo centro di detenzione a Lipa, in Bosnia ed Erzegovina

    A pochi chilometri dal confine croato è sorta una nuova struttura di detenzione amministrativa per “facilitare” i rimpatri dei migranti che transitano lungo questo snodo di rotta balcanica. Per il commissario europeo Várhelyi, sostenitore del nuovo progetto, si tratterebbe di “falsi richiedenti asilo”. Cade il velo sul vero scopo di Lipa

    L’Unione europea ha finanziato un nuovo centro di detenzione nel campo di Lipa, in Bosnia ed Erzegovina. A pochi chilometri dal confine con la Croazia, la nuova struttura è stata costruita per facilitare i rimpatri dei migranti che transitano lungo questo pezzo di rotta balcanica. La conferma arriva ad Altreconomia dal Rappresentante speciale dell’Ue in Bosnia, Ferdinand Koenig. La costruzione dell’eufemisticamente definito “Temporary retention facility”, spiega Koenig, si sarebbe resa necessaria perché la struttura di detenzione amministrativa più vicina a Lipa è a Sarajevo Est, in località Lukavica, a 300 chilometri di distanza. Troppi per l’obiettivo europeo di bloccare i “falsi richiedenti asilo” -come li ha definiti il commissario europeo per il vicinato e l’allargamento, Olivér Várhelyi, a fine novembre 2022– al confine con la Croazia e poi organizzare rapidi rimpatri verso i Paesi d’origine.

    Arrivando da Bihać, la città più vicina a Lipa, la nuova struttura è stata costruita all’inizio del centro al posto del campetto di pallone. L’ufficio della delegazione Ue in Bosnia sottolinea come “l’unità di detenzione” sia separata dal centro da un “corridoio sicuro e da un ingresso indipendente” e la costruzione sia stata “agevolata” dal Centro internazionale per lo sviluppo delle politiche migratorie (Icmpd), un’organizzazione fondata nel 1993 su iniziativa di Austria e Svizzera e che opera in oltre 90 Paesi ed è molto attiva sul tema delle gestione delle frontiere (l’avevamo già “incontrata” in progetti riguardanti la guardia costiera tunisina). Questa avrebbe provveduto ad appaltare i lavori di costruzione della struttura. Non è dato sapere quale sia l’azienda né l’importo totale della costruzione: l’Icmpd ha riferito infatti ad Altreconomia che queste informazioni sono riservate. “Al termine dei lavori -risponde l’Icmpd- la gestione del centro sarà affidata al Servizio per gli affari degli stranieri (Sfa) del ministero della Sicurezza bosniaco”. Una gestione che prevede “uno staff dedicato e procedure operative standard chiare in linea con le norme internazionali in materia di migrazione” e che prevede un periodo di detenzione di “massimo 72 ore” prima del trasferimento al centro di Lukavica.

    Così il “centro multiuso” di Lipa, costruito sulle macerie di quello andato a fuoco nel dicembre 2020, svela il suo “vero” obiettivo: confinare, arrivando anche alla detenzione, per poi respingere. Come già raccontato dalla rete RiVolti ai Balcani nel report “Lipa, il campo dove fallisce l’Europa”, pubblicato nel dicembre 2021, il centro è distante due chilometri dalla strada statale asfaltata e a 24 chilometri da Bihać e da servizi essenziali come ospedali, poste, scuole, stazioni, supermarket o altre infrastrutture: un “confinamento di fatto” rispetto a cui il nuovo step della detenzione amministrativa è una finalità che secondo Gianfranco Schiavone, presidente del Consorzio italiano per i rifugiati (Ics) di Trieste è “solo apparentemente contrastante con le finalità iniziali ma in realtà già occultate nella iniziale indeterminatezza giuridica con cui il campo è sorto e si è sviluppato”. Non è nota la capienza di questa nuova struttura, si sa però che il Centro di Lipa, all’8 febbraio di quest’anno, “ospitava” appena 128 persone su una capacità di 1.500 (uomini, donne e minori). Ma l’aumento delle persone transitate lungo la “rotta balcanica” nel 2022 ha allarmato, nuovamente, le istituzioni europee.

    Il commissario Várhelyi a fine novembre 2022 ha dichiarato appunto che “i falsi richiedenti asilo devono essere detenuti fino al loro ritorno nei Paesi d’origine” annunciando “un nuovo progetto pilota da 500mila euro con la Bosnia ed Erzegovina”. In questo quadro gioca un ruolo fondamentale anche l’Organizzazione mondiale per le migrazioni (Oim), in primo piano anche a Lipa. La capo missione nel Paese e coordinatrice dell’area dei Balcani occidentali, Laura Lungarotti, ha scritto ad Altreconomia che l’Oim non è coinvolta né nella gestione né nella costruzione della struttura di detenzione “vista la (nostra) politica di ricerca di alternativa alla detenzione amministrativa” e che la parola detenzione “è stata erroneamente messa nello stesso annuncio”, riferendosi al comunicato stampa in cui Várhelyi presentava il progetto. L’organo delle Nazioni Unite si occupa invece di tutto ciò che riguarda i rimpatri volontari assistiti. Anche con riferimento al centro multiuso di Lipa, Lungarotti ha detto che Oim starebbe “devolvendo sempre più responsabilità al Servizio stranieri”. Pur senza essere coinvolta in primo piano rispetto alla nuova struttura e ai rimpatri forzati, l’Organizzazione assiste però lo Sfa nelle procedure di rimpatrio forzato. “Sarà effettuato un counseling continuo prima della partenza -le parole di Lungarotti- nel qual caso volessero poter rientrare volontariamente e anche altro supporto di salvaguardia dei diritti umani nel corso di tutto il processo”. Il diritto d’asilo in Bosnia ed Erzegovina, però, dati dell’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (Unhcr), è un ologramma. Nel 2022 sono state registrate appena 149 richieste d’asilo, con 12 riconoscimenti di protezione con un tempo medio di analisi delle domande di 306 giorni. Quasi un anno, con scarsissime possibilità di ottenere una regolarizzazione: un elemento ormai consolidato.

    La costruzione di un centro di detenzione nasce come secondo tassello della strategia europea per “delegare” le espulsioni a Paesi terzi. Il primo passo è stata l’implementazione di accordi con i Paesi d’origine verso cui “rimandare” le persone. Caso di scuola è il Pakistan. Il 31 luglio 2022, con grande enfasi mediatica, un volo di linea con a bordo due persone residenti sul territorio bosniaco senza regolare permesso di soggiorno è atterrato a Islamabad. È stata la prima operazione di espulsione a seguito della firma di un’intesa con il governo pakistano del 23 luglio 2021, sempre su “mandato” delle istituzioni europee. “Di fatto è stata posta come prerequisito al Paese balcanico per entrare nell’Ue la sottoscrizione di accordi con Paesi terzi per facilitare le espulsioni dei migranti. È un tassello fondamentale -aveva spiegato allora ad Altreconomia la ricercatrice Gorana Mlinarevic-. Anche perché per diverse nazionalità, come quella pakistana, questo rappresenta l’unico modo per l’Ue di rimpatriare le persone. E Bruxelles lo sa bene”. Anche in quest’ottica a livello europeo qualcosa si muove: a inizio febbraio 2023, il nuovo direttore di Frontex, Hans Leijtes, ha fatto visita proprio al ministro dell’Interno del Pakistan per rafforzare la cooperazione con il Paese.

    L’Ufficio della delegazione Ue in Bosnia ed Erzegovina sottolinea nella sua risposta ad Altreconomia come “il governo bosniaco deve rafforzare le sue capacità e adottare tutte le misure necessarie per gestire efficacemente il centro di Lipa nel pieno rispetto dei diritti fondamentali, della legislazione nazionale e degli standard internazionali, anche per quanto riguarda lo screening e la registrazione, la protezione delle persone vulnerabili e la detenzione”. Un altro ologramma.

    https://altreconomia.it/lunione-europea-finanzia-un-nuovo-centro-di-detenzione-a-lipa-in-bosnia

    #Lipa #Bosnie-Herzégovine #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #financement #UE #EU #Union_européenne #externalisation #renvois #Temporary_retention_facility #détention #rétention #détention_administrative #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Lukavica #OIM #IOM #expulsions

  • La #France assume de délivrer des #OQTF à des personnes non expulsables

    L’attaque qui a fait six blessés, dont un grièvement, mercredi 11 janvier, à la gare du Nord à Paris, aurait été perpétrée par une personne étrangère en situation irrégulière, qui pourrait être de nationalité libyenne ou algérienne, selon les derniers éléments communiqués par le parquet de Paris. Des sources policières n’ont pas tardé à préciser que l’auteur des faits faisait l’objet d’une obligation de quitter le territoire français (OQTF), signée l’été dernier par une préfecture en vue d’un renvoi vers la Libye, comme le confirme le ministère de l’intérieur auprès de Mediapart.

    L’affaire vient une nouvelle fois démontrer les obsessions du ministère de l’intérieur en matière de chiffres concernant les expulsions. Si l’on ignore encore le profil et les motivations de l’individu interpellé – deux proches de son entourage ont été entendus jeudi –, il s’avère que l’OQTF dont il faisait l’objet n’avait pas été exécutée, puisque l’instabilité que connaît la Libye et le manque de relations diplomatiques avec ce pays ne permettent pas de renvoyer qui que ce soit là-bas.

    Sans surprise, l’extrême droite n’a pas tardé à s’exprimer : « Le nombre de clandestins sous le coup d’une OQTF impliqués dans des actes criminels se multiplie. La future loi sur l’immigration devra apporter une réponse ferme et déterminée à cette menace exponentielle. Nous y veillerons », a tweeté Marine Le Pen en réaction à un article de BFMTV, indiquant que l’individu était connu des services de police pour des faits de droit commun, « principalement des atteintes aux biens ».

    « L’assaillant de la gare du Nord qui a blessé six personnes faisait l’objet d’une OQTF et aurait crié “Allah Akbar” au moment des faits. Quand ces OQTF seront-elles enfin exécutées ? », a réagi de son côté Éric Ciotti, sans prendre la moindre précaution quant aux propos prononcés, qui pour l’heure ne sont pas avérés.

    Le parquet de Paris, qui a ouvert une enquête pour « tentative d’assassinat » et confié les investigations à la police judiciaire, confirme ses antécédents mais se montre prudent. « L’identification précise du mis en cause est en cours, ce dernier étant enregistré sous plusieurs identités dans le fichier automatisé des empreintes digitales alimenté par ses déclarations au cours de précédentes procédures dont il a fait l’objet », indique un communiqué de la procureure de Paris. « Il pourrait s’agir d’un homme né en Libye ou en Algérie et d’une vingtaine d’années, dont l’âge exact n’est pas confirmé. »

    Un profil ni régularisable ni expulsable.

    Le ministère de l’intérieur

    Une question subsiste : pourquoi délivrer une OQTF à un ressortissant supposé être libyen, lorsque l’on sait qu’on ne peut expulser vers la Libye ?

    Interrogé à ce sujet, le ministère de l’intérieur s’explique, tout en soulignant que l’enquête est toujours en cours : « L’individu est a priori libyen. La Libye étant un pays instable et en guerre, il n’y a pas d’éloignement vers ce pays. L’OQTF est la conséquence d’une situation administrative irrégulière. En l’absence de droit au séjour, elle est appliquée par les services. En l’espèce, il s’agit d’un profil ni régularisable ni expulsable. »

    L’objectif est de prendre une OQTF malgré tout, poursuit le ministère, afin que l’individu « puisse être expulsé dès que la Libye sera stabilisée ».

    Depuis plusieurs années, outre la Libye, la France n’expulse plus vers un certain nombre de pays comme la Syrie, l’Afghanistan ou plus récemment l’Iran, considérant que la situation de ces pays, ravagés par les guerres, les conflits, l’instabilité ou la répression, ne permettent pas de garantir la sécurité des personnes éloignées. Parce qu’il est trop compliqué, aussi, d’obtenir les laissez-passer consulaires nécessaires au renvoi d’un ressortissant de ces pays lorsque les relations diplomatiques sont rompues.

    Il n’existerait pas de liste « officielle » des pays vers lesquels on ne renvoie pas, bien que des associations d’aide aux étrangers plaident pour que ce soit le cas et pour qu’une position claire soit adoptée par les autorités. « On ne peut pas prononcer des OQTF à des ressortissants tout en sachant qu’on ne peut pas les expulser, en arguant qu’on ne peut pas négocier avec les talibans ou Bachar al-Assad, c’est absurde », commente un représentant associatif.

    Selon des sources associatives, au moins 44 personnes se déclarant de nationalité libyenne ont ainsi été enfermées en rétention en 2022, contre 119 en 2021 et 110 en 2020. Aucun ressortissant libyen n’a été expulsé vers la Libye au cours des dernières années, assure le ministère de l’intérieur.

    De plus en plus d’Afghans font aussi l’objet d’une OQTF et sont placés en centre de rétention administrative (CRA), ces lieux de privation de liberté où sont enfermés les sans-papiers en attente de leur éloignement (90 jours au maximum avant d’être libérés). Début 2022, l’association La Cimade craignait des expulsions « par ricochet » (voir ici ou là), c’est-à-dire des renvois de ressortissants afghans vers des pays n’ayant pas suspendu les expulsions vers l’Afghanistan (c’était le cas, par exemple, de la Bulgarie).

    Des ressortissants syriens, comme a pu le documenter Mediapart, se voient eux aussi délivrer des OQTF et sont placés en CRA pendant des jours alors même qu’ils ne sont pas expulsables. Marlène Schiappa le réaffirmait d’ailleurs sur France Inter fin novembre dernier : la France « ne renvoie pas quelqu’un vers la Syrie ».

    Cela n’a pas empêché non plus la préfecture de l’Aude de prononcer une OQTF contre une ressortissante iranienne, qui avait pourtant fui la répression qui sévit dans son pays face au mouvement de révolte des femmes, lui enjoignant de quitter le territoire français et de « rejoindre le pays dont elle possède la nationalité ».
    Une stratégie contradictoire avec les objectifs du gouvernement

    Ces OQTF précarisent les étrangers et étrangères qu’elles visent, les contraignant à vivre dans l’ombre et dans la crainte du moindre contrôle, y compris lorsqu’ils et elles se rendent sur leur lieu de travail.

    Ces personnes sont aussi conscientes que l’OQTF est bien souvent associée à la notion de délinquance, alors même que beaucoup n’ont rien à se reprocher. Un système « contre-productif » aux yeux de l’avocat Stéphane Maugendre, spécialiste en droit des étrangers et en droit pénal, qui « surprécarise les personnes parfaitement insérées en France », mises en difficulté dans chaque petit acte du quotidien et aujourd’hui stigmatisées par les discours répétés de Gérald Darmanin visant à faire un trait d’union entre OQTF et délinquants dits étrangers.

    En guise d’exemple, l’avocat cite le cas récent de deux de ses clients, victimes du caractère aujourd’hui systématique de la délivrance des OQTF : l’un était déjà en cours de recours au tribunal administratif, l’autre avait déposé une demande d’admission exceptionnelle au séjour en préfecture et travaille dans un métier en tension – il pourrait donc être concerné par la future mesure voulue par Gérald Darmanin dans le projet de loi immigration à venir, censé permettre de régulariser plusieurs milliers de sans-papiers qui répondent à certains critères (lire notre analyse).

    Dans une course aux chiffres, les autorités continuent de délivrer toujours plus d’OQTF, et tant pis si, dans le lot, un certain nombre de personnes ne peuvent être éloignées du territoire. Une stratégie contradictoire avec les objectifs que se sont fixés le chef de l’État et son gouvernement concernant le taux d’exécution de ces OQTF, qu’ils aimeraient voir augmenter. En 2019, Emmanuel Macron promettait même, dans une interview à Valeurs actuelles, d’exécuter 100 % des OQTF – un objectif intenable.

    Plus récemment, son ministre de l’intérieur, Gérald Darmanin, donnait aux préfets pour instruction de « prendre des OQTF à l’égard de tout étranger en situation irrégulière, à l’issue d’une interpellation ou d’un refus de titre de séjour », et se réjouissait « d’améliorer le résultat » concernant le nombre d’OQTF exécutées en 2022, en hausse de 22 % à la date de novembre dernier.

    « En 2021, la France est le pays d’Europe qui a le plus expulsé », s’est aussi vantée, sur France Inter, l’ex-secrétaire d’État chargée de la citoyenneté, Marlène Schiappa. Mais cette surenchère sur la délivrance d’OQTF pourrait avoir enfermé le gouvernement dans une spirale infernale. Soumises à des injonctions contradictoires, les préfectures sont poussées à délivrer des obligations de quitter le territoire sans même étudier les cas particuliers – ces mêmes cas qui ne peuvent, de fait, pas contribuer à améliorer le taux d’exécution des OQTF puisqu’il s’agit de personnes non expulsables.

    Pour Me Stéphane Maugendre, le ministère de l’intérieur et les préfectures sont « tombés dans une sorte de piège » : « Ils ont multiplié les OQTF, de manière systématique, pour pouvoir dire que des mesures d’éloignement sont prises. Sauf que plus il y a d’OQTF délivrées, moins leur taux d’exécution a de chance d’augmenter, parce que derrière, il y a des contingences matérielles et il faut des moyens colossaux pour y arriver. »

    Une analyse qui se retrouve dans les chiffres, notamment entre 2016 et 2019, période durant laquelle le nombre d’OQTF prononcées bondit de 50,4 % pour atteindre 122 839 OQTF par an, tandis que leur taux d’exécution chute de près de 10 points, passant de 14,3 % à 4,8 %. Si les chiffres enregistrent une forte baisse en 2020 et en 2021, c’est lié à la crise sanitaire du Covid-19, qui n’a pas permis d’éloigner les personnes en situation irrégulière.

    Certains États, notamment du Maghreb, rechignent aussi à délivrer les laissez-passer consulaires nécessaires, entraînant alors un véritable bras de fer entre les autorités de ces pays et Paris. La France a choisi d’instaurer un « chantage » aux visas pour les obtenir, et, un an plus tard, la stratégie semble avoir payé pour l’Algérie, qui reprend plus facilement ses ressortissants aujourd’hui – la sœur de la meurtrière présumée de la petite Lola a d’ailleurs été expulsée vers l’Algérie mi-décembre, a-t-on appris via l’AFP. Le 19 décembre, un retour à la normale a depuis été annoncé par Gerald Darmanin pour l’octroi des visas aux Algérien·nes.

    Également président honoraire du Groupe d’information et de soutien aux immigré·s (Gisti), Stéphane Maugendre estime que les OQTF sont devenues la « nouvelle tendance », notamment depuis le meurtre de Lola, dont la meurtrière présumée était une ressortissante algérienne sous OQTF. « On qualifie désormais les personnes au regard de leur situation administrative, on parle automatiquement de l’OQTF dont ils font l’objet, qui, faut-il le rappeler, n’est pas une mesure d’expulsion mais une décision prise par la préfecture demandant à la personne de quitter le territoire français. »

    Une politique qui ne fait qu’alimenter le discours de l’extrême droite, qui scrute désormais les moindres faits divers impliquant une personne étrangère sous OQTF et en fait la recension sur les réseaux sociaux, surtout pour réclamer l’arrêt pur et simple de l’immigration en France. « Derrière la politique du gouvernement, l’extrême droite, dont le Rassemblement national, vient dire que le taux d’exécution des OQTF est trop bas, complète Me Maugendre. Gérald Darmanin est obligé de surenchérir et d’annoncer une loi qui permettra de réduire les délais et le nombre de recours. L’État crée une crise de toutes pièces et justifie ensuite sa loi pour la résoudre. »

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/130123/la-france-assume-de-delivrer-des-oqtf-des-personnes-non-expulsables

    #politique_du_chiffre #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sans-papiers #obsession #profil_ni_régularisable_ni_expulsable #réfugiés_libyens #réfugiés_afghans #détention_administrative #rétention #chiffres #statistiques #réfugiés_syriens #expulsabilité #précarisation #criminalité #régularisation #exécution #laissez-passer_consulaires #taux_d'exécution #chantage #visas #extrême_droite

    ping @karine4

  • Qu’est-ce que l’entrée de la #Croatie dans #Schengen peut changer à la route migratoire des Balkans ?

    La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace Schengen. L’intégration de ce pays des Balkans dans la zone de libre circulation pourrait changer la donne à la frontière croate, où les #refoulements de migrants sont fréquents, observe la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. Par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine pourrait se durcir.

    La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace de libre circulation européen Schengen alors que la route migratoire des Balkans connaît une forte hausse de fréquentation depuis l’été. Zagreb a enregistré 30 000 migrants irréguliers dans le pays au cours des dix premiers mois de 2022, soit une augmentation de 150% par rapport à la même période de l’année précédente.

    Pour Camille Le Coz, analyste au Migration policy institute, l’entrée de la Croatie dans Schengen permet d’"acter quelque chose qui était déjà en place sur le terrain". « La Croatie a été récompensée pour ses bons et loyaux services en faisant en sorte de limiter les arrivées de migrants [dans l’UE] », affirme-t-elle.

    Depuis son intégration dans l’Union européenne en 2013, la Croatie est chargée de protéger les frontières extérieures de l’UE, dont la majeure partie est partagée avec la Bosnie. Si les chiffres n’ont rien à voir aujourd’hui avec ceux de 2015, des milliers d’exilés tentent encore chaque année ce passage par la route des Balkans, via la Serbie ou la Bosnie.

    Depuis 2018, le nord de la Bosnie, à la frontière croate, s’est transformé en cul-de-sac pour ces migrants. Voulant montrer à Bruxelles sa capacité à protéger les frontières de l’Union, la Croatie a en effet déployé de nombreux garde-frontières sur la zone. Les refoulements se sont multipliés et, dans la plupart des cas, ils se sont accompagnés de graves violences, tortures et vols, régulièrement dénoncés. Depuis des années, les rapports d’ONG se multiplient sur les exactions commises contre les exilés à la frontière bosno-croate.
    Vers davantage de respect des droits humains ?

    Mais cela pourrait changer à la faveur de cette nouvelle situation, explique la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. « Le respect des droits de l’Homme fait partie des obligations liées à l’entrée dans Schengen. Il est donc possible que l’entrée de la Croatie mette plus de pression sur les policiers et les garde-frontières croates », pointe-t-elle. Les cas de non-respect des droits humains pourraient ainsi être davantage contrôlés.

    Cette entrée pourrait aussi s’accompagner d’aides pour améliorer le système d’asile dans le pays et d’une coopération sur les retours volontaires de migrants. À condition que les garde-frontières ne refoulent pas systématiquement les exilés qui entrent dans le pays pour demander une protection internationale.

    A contrario, et par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine, qui a récemment obtenu le statut de candidat à l’entrée dans l’Union européenne, pourrait se durcir.
    « Éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks »

    Le 28 novembre, le commissaire européen Olivér Várhelyi a annoncé le financement d’un protocole d’accord entre l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le ministère bosnien de la Sécurité à hauteur de 500 000 euros. Cette somme doit servir à augmenter le nombre de « retours volontaires et forcés » des migrants vers leur pays d’origine. Le commissaire a également indiqué que le camp de Lipa, situé dans le nord de la Bosnie serait amené à devenir un centre de détention. « Les faux demandeurs d’asile doivent être détenus jusqu’à leur retour dans leur pays », a-t-il déclaré.

    Barbara Becares, chargée des relations avec la presse de l’ONG No Name Kitchen, qui vient en aide aux exilés en Bosnie et en Serbie, voit dans ce projet la volonté de Bruxelles d’"éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks […] en gardant les personnes en Bosnie".

    Sur le terrain, les polices bosniennes et serbes œuvrent déjà à retenir les personnes le plus loin possible des frontières de l’UE, selon elle. « Les expulsions sont très courantes, autant en Bosnie qu’en Serbie, observe-t-elle. La police va chercher très tôt le matin les personnes qui dorment à l’extérieur des camps et les emmène dans des endroits éloignés des frontières ». En Bosnie, elles sont généralement emmenées dans le camp de Lipa, alors qu’en Serbie, elles sont conduites dans le sud du pays.

    Pour freiner les arrivées via la route des Balkans, Bruxelles compte aussi sur l’aide de la Serbie. Le pays est, lui aussi, candidat à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne et son intégration dépendra sans doute largement, comme pour la Bosnie, de sa capacité à montrer à Bruxelles qu’il contrôle ses frontières.

    En octobre, Belgrade a déjà, à la demande de Bruxelles, mis fin à l’exemption de visas pour les ressortissants tunisiens et burundais. L’obligation de détenir un visa pour entrer dans le pays a été étendue, le 1er janvier, aux ressortissants d’Inde et de Guinée-Bissau.

    #espace_Schengen #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #refoulements_en_chaîne #récompense #frontières_extérieures #soutien_financier #accord #protocole_d'accord #OIM #IOM #retours_volontaires #retours_forcés #Lipa #rétention #détention_administrative #expulsions #push-backs #visas #Serbie

  • #Sulla_loro_pelle”, l’inchiesta sui CPR che ha vinto il Premio Morrione
    Un documentario di #Marika_Ikonomu#Alessandro_Leone#Simone_Manda

    Ha vinto l’undicesima edizione del Premio Roberto Morrione per il giornalismo investigativo, l’inchiesta “Sulla loro pelle” di Marika Ikonomu, Alessandro Leone, Simone Manda (tutor Sacha Biazzo di Fanpage.it) che ha investigato l’opacità della gestione privata dei Centri di Permanenza per il Rimpatrio e le ripercussioni sui diritti basilari delle persone migranti.

    «L’inchiesta “Sulla loro pelle” dà voce agli ultimi con equilibrio e forza narrativa attraverso immagini e testimonianze, con maturità professionale e attenzione al linguaggio visivo e narrativo. Un lavoro toccante, di attualità, sempre più necessario, che tiene accesa l’attenzione su un tema, quello dei Centri di Permanenza per i Rimpatri, veri e propri luoghi di detenzione di cui si parla sempre troppo poco» sono le motivazioni della giuria.

    I Cpr sono appunto luoghi di detenzione amministrativa destinati al rimpatrio delle persone migranti. Anche se non sono ufficialmente delle carceri, le condizioni di vita e le morti avvenute al loro interno hanno portato società civile e associazioni a denunciare ripetutamente violazioni dei diritti umani. Sulla loro pelle affronta le problematiche di questo sistema: dai rapporti tra i privati gestori e le prefetture, a chi dentro quelle strutture ha perso la propria vita, dando voce al racconto di lavoratori e reclusi.

    https://www.meltingpot.org/2022/11/sulla-loro-pelle-linchiesta-sui-cpr-che-ha-vinto-il-premio-morrione

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hb5XBVFUzDY


    #film #film_documentaire #documentaire #CPR #rétention #détention_administrative #Italie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #déboutés #sans-papiers

  • Oltre 40 milioni di euro per nuovi Cpr. Il governo investe su un modello fallimentare

    Nei prossimi tre anni l’esecutivo vuole ampliare la rete dei Centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio. Lo ha previsto nella manovra finanziaria presentata in Parlamento. Un investimento senza precedenti che ignora volutamente le condizioni di vita e il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali di chi è costretto al “trattenimento”

    Più di 42,5 milioni di euro nei prossimi tre anni assegnati al ministero dell’Interno per “l’ampliamento della rete dei Centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio (Cpr)”. È scritto nella manovra finanziaria 2023 varata il 21 novembre dal Consiglio dei ministri su proposta del ministro dell’Economia, Giancarlo Giorgetti, e sottoposta al dibattito parlamentare con tempistiche contingentate. L’obiettivo annunciato è quello di assicurare “la più efficace esecuzione dei decreti di espulsioni dello straniero”. “È l’antica tecnica della diversione dell’attenzione perché l’imbuto sta sempre negli accordi con i Paesi di origine -spiega l’avvocato Maurizio Veglio, socio dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione-. Se il rapporto tra numero di persone trattenute e rimpatriate è sempre lo stesso, cioè il 50%, è il pericolo di episodi di violenza o gesti anticonservativi a rischiare un aumento esponenziale: nuovi Cpr significano nuovi rischi per la salute di chi è trattenuto”.

    L’aumento della capienza dei Cpr sembra essere l’obiettivo primario. Sono due le voci di spesa imputate al ministero. Da un lato oltre 36,5 milioni di euro destinati alla “costruzione, acquisizione, completamento, adeguamento e ristrutturazione di immobili” destinati a centri di trattenimento di accoglienza; dall’altro circa sette milioni per le spese relative “all’attivazione, locazione e gestione dei Cpr”. La progressione dei finanziamenti è scalare e l’aumento più consistente avverrà nel 2025 con 16 milioni destinati alla costruzione e più di quattro per la seconda voce. “In questo momento non è agevole comprendere come verranno utilizzati questi fondi -riflette Veglio-. La qualità dei servizi essenziali all’interno dei centri (sanità, assistenza psicologica, mediazione linguistica, informazione legale) è del tutto inadeguata ma dubito che il denaro verrà impiegato per potenziare queste voci”. 

    Manovra alla mano, la “gestione” dei Cpr è già inserita nella seconda voce con un portafoglio cinque volte più magro rispetto al finanziamento per la costruzione dei centri. Già nel febbraio 2017, con il via libera del Consiglio dei ministri al cosiddetto decreto Minniti, l’allora ministro dell’Interno aveva dichiarato che i “nuovi” Cpr (ex Cie) sarebbero stati costruiti uno per Regione per un totale di 1.600 posti. “La decisione di stanziare nuovi fondi per il sistema della detenzione, allo scopo presumibile di ampliare la capienza, in assenza di qualunque intervento di contenimento dei danni rischia di innescare ennesime situazioni estreme, come l’epidemia di tentati suicidi registrata a Torino nello scorso autunno”, aggiunge Veglio. Finanziamenti quindi che non tengono conto del fallimento del “modello” Cpr. Finanziamenti quindi che non tengono conto del fallimento del “modello” Cpr. 

    I dati su quelli attualmente in funzione sono eclatanti. Nel 2021 sono transitati all’interno dei dieci centri attivi in Italia poco più di 5mila persone ma ne sono state espulse meno del 50% (2.519). Un dato che secondo la relazione del Garante nazionale delle persone private della libertà personale è rimasto costante nel corso degli anni nel 2019 il 48,3%, nel 2020 il 50,9%. Il tema resta quello degli accordi con i Paesi di origine e i costi effettivi di rimpatrio, Ma non solo. Il caso della Tunisia, come raccontato su Altreconomia, sembra “funzionare” in termini di voli charter che partono alla volta di Tunisi ma non garantisce il rispetto dei diritti delle persone trattenute. I Cpr sono dei “buchi neri”, come titola la Coalizione italiana libertà e diritti civili (Cild) in un report dedicato al tema, o dei luoghi in cui “le persone camminano sull’orlo di un burrone” secondo il “terribile” documento pubblicato dall’Asgi dove vengono raccontate sette storie di ordinaria ferocia al Cpr di Torino. E le morti di chi vive l’esperienza del trattenimento sono numerose: il suicidio di Moussa Balde, giovane originario della Guinea morto nel maggio 2021, ha spinto la Procura di Torino ad aprire un’indagine, che è ancora in corso, sul funzionamento del Centro per il rimpatrio del capoluogo piemontese (a cui è “dedicata” una puntata del podcast Limbo).

    La Cild, commentando la proposta del governo, sottolinea come i Cpr non siano un “male necessario”. “Esistono alternative possibili, come il case management -spiegano- con la presa in carico individuale delle singole persone che, oltre a essere infinitamente più economiche, offrono risultati maggiormente apprezzabili nel garantire percorsi di integrazione nelle comunità” anche perché il trattenimento nei Centri avviene “in assenza di ordinamento o un regolamento, a differenza di quanto avviene ad esempio per il carcere, e l’esercizio dei diritti delle persone trattenute è difficoltoso e incerto”. Dal diritto alla salute all’assistenza legale, passando per la possibilità di avere contatti con l’esterno. Temi strettamente connessi anche ai capitolati d’appalto per la gestione di questi Centri a cui accennava anche l’avvocato Veglio. I centri, infatti, sono gestiti da enti privati e i trattenuti diventano oggetti di un business milionario. Almeno 43 milioni per la gestione di dieci centri sono stati spesi nel 2021.

    “In nome della massimizzazione del profitto, questi enti comprimono ancora di più i servizi che dovrebbero essere offerti alle persone recluse che non hanno commesso alcun reato”, sottolinea la Cild. “Spesso quando si parla di Cpr -sottolinea Emilio Caja, uno dei curatori del libro ‘Corpi reclusi in attesa di espulsione’ pubblicato per Edizioni SEB27 all’inizio del 2022- si dipinge questi luoghi come qualcosa di ‘eccezionale’ in cui quando qualcuno muore sembra un evento eccezionale. Non è così, la gestione dei Centri si inserisce perfettamente nelle dinamiche economiche dell’economia contemporanea”. Caja fa riferimento agli enti gestori che vincono i bandi pubblicati dalle prefetture. “L’Ors Italia, ad esempio, presente a Macomer prima e oggi ente a cui è appaltata la gestione del Brunelleschi di Torino è una multinazionale con sede nel Regno Unito e varie articolazioni in tutta Europa. Sono dinamiche economiche classiche del nostro tempo: finanziarizzazione, diversificazione del portfolio, esternalizzazione dei servizi”. Con gravi conseguenze sulla salute e l’esercizio dei diritti delle persone che il governo sembra volutamente ignorare.

    https://altreconomia.it/oltre-40-milioni-di-euro-per-nuovi-cpr-il-governo-investe-su-un-modello
    #CPR #rétention #détention_administrative #cra #Italie #sans-papiers #déboutés #migrations #asile #réfugiés #financement #budget #efficacité #Ors_Italia #privatisation #ors

  • #Mehran_Karimi_Nasseri ’s thirteen-year layover

    “I’m waiting for my identity,” says Mehran Karimi Nasseri, touching the lesion that has erupted on his scalp as he inhales nearly half of his Dunhill in one drag. He sighs, looks around, smiles. Surrounded by a decade’s worth of newspapers, magazines, clothes and books, a Sony Walkman, an alarm clock, and a pair of Lufthansa boxes containing his 1000 page-plus handwritten diary, #Nasseri, or “#Alfred” as he is known, lives on a 1970s red plastic bench in the departure lounge of Terminal One at Paris’s #Charles_de_Gaulle Airport. In November he will mark his 13th anniversary there.

    Mehran Karimi Nasseri’s story begins in 1977. Expelled from his native Iran for anti-government activity, he bounced around Europe for a few years before receiving official refugee status from Belgium in 1981. Nasseri lived as a student there and traveled to the UK and France without difficulty until 1988, when he landed at Charles de Gaulle Airport after being denied entry into Britain because his passport and United Nations refugee certificate had been stolen. He was detained for days, then weeks, then months, then years. His limbo stretched on. French human-rights lawyer Christian Bourget took on the case and the media homed in. Dozens of articles appeared in the world press, and at least three documentary films were made. Oddly enough, with all the attention focused on Nasseri, none of his relatives or friends sought him out.

    In 1995 the Belgian government, which originally issued Nasseri’s refugee papers, said he could come back and live in Belgium. But after spending seven years of his life in the airport, Nasseri proclaimed that he was intent on living in the UK because, he asserted, his mother was Scottish. (He’s since claimed several nationalities, including Swedish, then Danish and, briefly, Finnish). By then Nasseri, who’d been getting along well with the food coupons and occasional gifts of money and clothes, had begun to show the strains of waiting, and was afraid to move for fear of arrest—a concern Bourget said was totally unfounded. Finally the Belgians agreed to reissue the original documents if Nasseri would come to Brussels and sign them in person. But Bourget’s client protested that he couldn’t cross the border without his papers and so again he refused.

    With Bourget’s persistence, the documents were sent from Brussels, but again Nasseri refused to sign them. Why? The papers, he complained, listed his name as Mehran Kamari Nasseri, which “is not my name.” Nor was Iran his birthplace anymore. Alfred explained his new name to one newspaper: “The UK immigration forms offer a space for an adopted name, and I chose Alfred because I thought it sounded nice. One day I got a letter back from them addressed to me as ‘Dear Sir, Alfred,’ and so it just stuck.” Sir Alfred was born on an immigration form.

    Identity is the key issue for Alfred, and the contemporary international airport, symbol of anonymous global nomadism, is perhaps where it is best expressed. Piped-in muzak and inaudible announcements for flights that are boarding, delayed, or canceled, for missing persons and lost children, or for reminders not to smoke, give airports the quality of a restless dream. Its participants are forever shifting, standing, stretching, buying a magazine, turning a page, crossing their legs, staring into a stage filled with extras, and nervously checking their passports, proof of who they are.

    When I asked “Alfred“ over a meal of Big Macs on his bench if he was Iranian, he said that he was not, and was still waiting to find out where he is really from, who he really is, even where his parents are now. “The United Nations High Commission on Refugees will establish my identity and my place of birth,” he said confidently. He hasn’t had any contact with the UNHCR since before Christmas 2000.

    “He blames Iran for many of his problems,” Dr. Philippe Bargain, chief medical officer for the airport told one newspaper in 1999. “We have to convince him to sign his legal papers with his original name. It is a ridiculous situation.” It’s not only ridiculous but scandalous, says airport chaplain Père Fournier, who calls Nasseri a “bel escroc“ (a pretty swindler). Fournier believes he “not only has his passport, but he has plenty of money…from the films and from what people give him.” Dr. Bargain, who sees Alfred more often than the other principals in the saga, finds him a pleasant man, but admits, “He is a bit mad… He has all the papers he needs, but he won’t leave.”

    “There’s nothing I can do for him anymore,” adds Bourget, who hasn’t seen him in more than two years. “Now he cannot face the possibility of leaving because he has a nest there. And he feels that if he goes out he will not be a media star anymore. His story is finished.” While the French police have no legal right to remove him, they probably wouldn’t risk even a diplomatic effort to get him to go. “They don’t want to try anything because immediately dozens of reporters would be there to tell the story,” says Bourget.

    So Alfred sits and waits for the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. But when I called their Paris office to get an update on his case, I was told, “It’s pure folly,” by a spokesperson. “No, we are not trying to locate his mother and father and give him his identity.” While the UNHCR does work in the airports, largely in the zone d’attente helping foreign nationals seeking asylum, Alfred has all the papers he needs. There are no other papers for him. The refugee no longer needs asylum.

    The airport is a city of speed, maximizing the commodification of modern life: ATMs, fast-food restaurants, people-movers, hotel services, rent-a-car desks, rental carts for moving your life’s belongings, all com-pressed in an environment dedicated to getting you in and out as fast as possible. There is little “present tense“ in the airport—few dawdle there for their own pleasure, although in-flight magazines would have you believe otherwise with their promotions of duty-free shopping and upscale first class lounges. Gilded with promising ads of blue skies, white beaches and filled with roaming armed police, airports are the ideal places to live out the future if you had no home and wanted people to come to you.

    Alfred lived within throwing distance of the McDonald’s for most of the booming 1990s. He celebrated Christmas and the new millennium at the little round table he’s acquired and positioned at the center of his universe of carts and objects. He doesn’t speak French and says he does not dream. He has no friends and little contact with the airport employees although everyone knows him. Certainly Alfred is an observer of change as well as stasis, although what it means to him is a mystery. He regards the world through daily newspapers (his subscription to Time magazine was stopped by the airport post office a few years ago). But he has also observed the world change around him—the McDonald’s used to be a Burger King; the CD vendor moved into the push-scooter market.

    To keep himself occupied, Alfred keeps a longhand journal that details whom he has met and things he remembers about his case. “Some points each day,” he says. But he doesn’t have a mobile phone and it isn’t clear he’d know how to use one; he’s never seen the Internet although he knows he can be found on it (he showed me an article on him printed out from the New York Times web site). Alfred does, however, know how to survive, and without paying rent or taxes.

    But maybe the slim balding man with the trim mustache has found his place after all—as a celebrity homeless person. Indeed, Alfred, whose closest “neighbors” are a photo booth and a copy machine, is eerily Warholian. And this in effect might explain why, even after receiving in 1999 a special European travel visa (which permits him to voyage and live anywhere in Europe, even the US), he refuses to leave. If he did leave, it would mean tacit acceptance of an identity.

    As a gift for his time, I brought Alfred a book I thought might open him up to life beyond the asphalt and concrete gardens of Charles de Gaulle, a paperback copy of Carl Sagan’s Is There Intelligent Life in the Universe? “I will read this,” he said, intrigued, thumbing through the pages. “Thank you.”

    https://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/4/rose.php

    #limbe #terminal #attente #no-solution #migrations #asile #réfugiés #aéroports #transit #zone-tampon #limbo #rétention #captivité #migrerrance #Paris #France

    sur ce cas, voir aussi :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/979619

    –----

    voir aussi une « métaliste » de cas d’exilés détenus pendant des mois dans un #aéroport :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/720652

  • Turkey : Hundreds of Refugees Deported to Syria

    EU Should Recognize Turkey Is Unsafe for Asylum Seekers

    Turkish authorities arbitrarily arrested, detained, and deported hundreds of Syrian refugee men and boys to Syria between February and July 2022, Human Rights Watch said today.

    Deported Syrians told Human Rights Watch that Turkish officials arrested them in their homes, workplaces, and on the street, detained them in poor conditions, beat and abused most of them, forced them to sign voluntary return forms, drove them to border crossing points with northern Syria, and forced them across at gunpoint.

    “In violation of international law Turkish authorities have rounded up hundreds of Syrian refugees, even unaccompanied children, and forced them back to northern Syria,” said Nadia Hardman, refugee and migrant rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Although Turkey provided temporary protection to 3.6 million Syrian refugees, it now looks like Turkey is trying to make northern Syria a refugee dumping ground.”

    Recent signs from Turkey and other governments indicate that they are considering normalizing relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In May 2022, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey announced that he intends to resettle one million refugees in northern Syria, in areas not controlled by the government, even though Syria remains unsafe for returning refugees. Many of those returned are from government-controlled areas, but even if they could reach them, the Syrian government is the same one that produced over six million refugees and committed grave human rights violations against its own citizens even before uprisings began.

    The deportations provide a stark counterpoint to Turkey’s record of generosity as host to more refugees than any other country in the world and almost four times as many as the whole European Union (EU), for which the EU has provided billions of Euros in funding for humanitarian support and migration management.

    Between February and August, Human Rights Watch interviewed by phone or in person inside Turkey 37 Syrian men and 2 Syrian boys who had been registered for temporary protection in Turkey. Human Rights Watch also interviewed seven relatives of Syrian refugee men and a refugee woman whom Turkish authorities deported to northern Syria during this time.

    Human Rights Watch sent letters with queries and findings to the European Commission, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, and the Turkish Interior Ministry. Human Rights Watch received a response from Bernard Brunet, of the EU’s Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations. The content of this letter is reflected in the section on removal centers.

    Turkish officials deported 37 of the people interviewed to northern Syria. All said they were deported together with dozens or even hundreds of others. All said they were forced to sign forms either at removal centers or the border with Syria. They said that officials did not allow them to read the forms and did not explain what the forms said, but all said they understood the forms to be allegedly agreeing to voluntary repatriation. Some said that officials covered the part of the form written in Arabic with their hands. Most said they saw authorities at these removal centers processing other Syrians in the same way.

    Many said that they saw Turkish officials beat other men who had initially refused to sign, so they felt they had no choice. Two men detained at a removal center in Adana said they were given the choice of signing a form and going back to Syria or being detained for a year. Both chose to leave because they could not bear the thought of a year in detention and needed to support their families.

    Ten people were not deported. Some were released and warned that if they did not move back to their city of registration they would be deported if found elsewhere. Others managed to contact lawyers through the intervention of family members to help secure their release. Several are still in removal centers waiting for a resolution to their case, unaware why they are being detained and fearing deportation. Those released described life in Turkey as dangerous, saying that they are staying at home with their curtains closed and limiting movement to avoid the Turkish authorities.

    Deportees were driven to the border from removal centers, sometimes in rides lasting up to 21 hours, handcuffed the whole way. They said they were forced to cross border checkpoints at either Öncüpınar/Bab al-Salam or Cilvegözü/Bab al-Hawa, which lead to non-government- controlled areas of Syria. At the checkpoint, a 26-year-old man from Aleppo recalled a Turkish official telling him, “We’ll shoot anyone who tries cross back.”

    In June 2022, the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, said that 15,149 Syrian refugees had voluntarily returned to Syria so far this year. The local authorities who control Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam border crossings respectively publish monthly numbers of people crossing through their checkpoints from Turkey to Syria. Between February and August 2022, 11,645 people were returned through Bab al-Hawa and 8,404 through Bab al-Salam.

    Turkey is bound by treaty and customary international law to respect the principle of nonrefoulement, which prohibits the return of anyone to a place where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture or other ill-treatment, or a threat to life. Turkey must not coerce people into returning to places where they face serious harm. Turkey should protect the basic rights of all Syrians, regardless of where they are registered and should not deport refugees who are living and working in a city other than where their temporary protection ID and address are registered.

    On October 21, Dr. Savaş Ünlü, head of the Presidency for Migration Management, responded by letter to Human Rights Watch’s letter of October 3 sharing this report’s findings. Emphasizing that Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, Dr. Ünlü rejected Human Rights Watch’s findings in their totality, calling the allegations baseless. Setting out the services provided by law to people seeking protection in Turkey, he underscored that Turkey “carries out migration management in accordance with national and international law.”

    “The EU and its member states should acknowledge that Turkey does not meet its criteria for a safe third country and suspend its funding of migration detention and border controls until forced deportations cease,” Hardman said. “Declaring Turkey a ‘safe third country’ is inconsistent with the scale of deportations of Syrian refugees to northern Syria. Member states should not make this determination and should focus on relocating asylum seekers by increasing resettlement numbers.”

    Human Rights Watch focused on the deportation of Syrian refugees who had been recognized by Turkey’s temporary protection regime but whom authorities nevertheless deported or threatened with deportation to Syria in 2022. All 47 Syrian refugees whose cases were examined had been living and working in cities across Turkey, the majority in Istanbul, before they were arrested, detained, and in most cases deported. All detainees are identified with pseudonyms for their protection.

    All but two had a Turkish temporary protection ID permit when they lived in Turkey, commonly called a kimlik, which protects Syrian refugees against forced return to Syria. Several said they had both a temporary protection ID and a work permit.

    Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants in Turkey

    Turkey shelters over 3.6 million Syrians and is the world’s largest refugee-hosting country. Under a geographical limitation that Turkey has applied to its accession to the UN Refugee Convention, Syrians and others coming from countries to the south and east of Turkey’s borders are not granted full refugee status. Syrian refugees are registered under a “temporary protection” regulation, which Turkish authorities say automatically applies to all Syrians seeking asylum.

    Turkey’s Temporary Protection Regulation grants Syrian refugees access to basic services including education and health care but generally requires them to live in the province in which they are registered. Refugees must obtain permission to travel between provinces. In late 2017 and early 2018, Istanbul and nine provinces on the border with Syria suspended registration of newly arriving asylum seekers.

    In February 2022, Turkey’s Deputy Interior Minister Ismail Çataklı said applications for temporary and international protection would not be accepted in 16 provinces: Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Bursa, Çanakkale, Düzce, Edirne, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Muğla, Sakarya, Tekirdağ, and Yalova. He also said residency permit applications by foreigners would not be accepted in any neighborhood in which 25 percent or more of the population consisted of foreigners. He reported that registration had already been closed in 781 neighborhoods throughout Turkey because foreigners in those locations exceeded 25 percent of the population.

    In June, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu announced that from July 1 onward, the proportion would be reduced to 20 percent and the number of neighborhoods closed to foreigners’ registration increased to 1,200, with cancellation of temporary protection status of Syrians who traveled in the country without applying for permission. Many interviewees explained that they could not find employment in their city of registration and could not survive there but could find work in Istanbul.

    Rising Xenophobia in Turkey

    Over the past two years, there has been an increase in racist and xenophobic attacks against foreigners, notably against Syrians. On August 11, 2021, groups of Turkish residents attacked workplaces and homes of Syrians in a neighborhood in Ankara a day after a Syrian youth stabbed and killed a Turkish youth in a fight.

    In the lead-up to general elections in spring 2023, opposition politicians have made speeches that fuel anti-refugee sentiment and suggest that Syrians should be returned to war-torn Syria. President Erdoğan’s coalition government has responded with pledges to resettle Syrians in Turkish-occupied areas of northern Syria.

    Arrests

    Most of those interviewed were arrested on the streets of Istanbul, and others during raids in their workplaces or homes. The arresting officials sometimes introduced themselves as Turkish police officers, and all demanded to see the refugees’ identification documents.

    Under Turkey’s temporary protection regulation, Syrian refugees are required to live in the province where they first register as refugees. Seventeen of these 47 refugees were living and working in their city of registration, while the rest were living and working in a different province.

    Five refugees said they were arrested because of complaints or spurious allegations from neighbors or employers, ranging from making too much noise to being a terrorist. All refugees said these accusations had no foundation. Four of them were acquitted, released, or deported; one man is still being investigated.

    Detention

    On arrest, Syrian refugees were either taken to local police stations for a short period or directly to a removal center, usually Tuzla Removal Center in Istanbul. Other removal centers included were in Pendik, Adana, Gaziantep, and Urfa. In all cases, Turkish officials confiscated the Syrians’ telephones, wallets, and other personal belongings.

    The authorities refused refugees’ requests to call their family members or lawyers. One man who asked to speak to a lawyer said an officer at the police station said, “‘Did you commit any crime?’ When I said ‘no,’ he said, ‘Then you don’t need to call a lawyer.’”

    All said the Turkish authorities kept them in cramped, unsanitary rooms in various removal centers. Beds were limited and interviewees said they often had to share them. Refugees said they were usually divided according to nationality and were generally held with other Syrians. Boys under 18 were detained with adult men.

    While some removal centers had better conditions than others, all interviewees described a lack of adequate food and access to washroom facilities, as well as other unsanitary conditions. In Tuzla, where the majority of interviewees passed through, Syrians described being held outside in areas described as “basketball courts” for hours on end while waiting to be assigned a space, which was usually inside a cramped metal container.

    “Ahmad” described conditions at Tuzla Removal Center, where he was detained alongside unrelated children in overcrowded metal containers:

    There were six beds in my cell and two or three people had to share each bed, and in my cell, one kid was 16 and one was 17. At first there were 15 of us [in the cell] but then they added more people. We stayed 12 days without taking a shower because they didn’t have one.

    Beatings and Ill-Treatment

    All interviewees said Turkish officials in the removal centers either assaulted them or they witnessed officials kicking or beating other Syrians with their hands or wooden or plastic batons. “Fahad,” a 22-year-old man from Aleppo, described the beatings in Tuzla Removal Center:

    I was beaten in Tuzla…. I dropped my bread by accident and I tried to pick it up from the floor. An officer kicked me and I fell down. He started to beat me with a wooden stick. I couldn’t defend myself. I witnessed beatings of other people. In the evening if people smoked they were beaten. They [the guards] were always humiliating us. One man was smoking … and five guards started to beat him very hard and they made his eye black and blue and beat his back with a stick. And everyone who tried to intervene was beaten.

    “Ahmad,” a 26-year-old man from Aleppo, said Turkish police arrested him at his workplace, a tailor shop in Istanbul, and took him to Tuzla Removal Center where he was severely beaten on multiple occasions:

    I was beaten in Tuzla three times; the last time was the harshest for me. I was arguing about the fact that I should be allowed to go out of the doors of the prison, I should have been allowed time for breaks. So they [the guards] cursed me and insulted me and my family. I said I would complain to their director. I was beaten on my face with a wooden stick, and they [the guards] broke my teeth.

    Ahmad was eventually deported to northern Syria through the Bab al-Salam border crossing and is now staying in Azaz city, currently under the control of the Turkey-backed Syrian Interim Government, an opposition group, as he cannot cross into Syrian government-controlled Aleppo city because he is wanted by the Syrian army. “I fled the war [in Syria] because I am against violence,” he said. “Now they [the Turkish authorities] sent me back here. I just want to be in a safe place.”

    “Hassan,” a 27-year-old former political prisoner and survivor of torture from Damascus, was arrested at his house when his neighbors complained about the noise coming from his apartment. He spent a few months being transferred between various removal centers. At the last one, he was told to sign a voluntary return form. When he refused to sign, Hassan said, “I was put inside a cage, like a cage for a dog. It was metal … approximately 1.5 meters by one meter. When the sun hit the cage it was so hot.”

    When he was first arrested, Hassan managed to contact his wife before his phone was confiscated. She found a lawyer who helped secure his release.

    Forced to Sign “Voluntary Return” Forms

    Many deportees said Turkish officials – either removal center guards, or officials they described as “police” or “jandarma” interchangeably – used violence or the threat of violence to force them into signing “voluntary” return forms.

    Human Rights Watch gathered testimony indicating deportees were forced to sign “voluntary return” forms at removal centers in Adana, Tuzla, Gaziantep, and Diyarbakır, and a migration office in Mersin.

    “Mustafa,” a 21-year-old man from Idlib, was arrested on the streets in the Esenyurt neighborhood of Istanbul. After several days in a removal center in Pendik, he was transferred to Adana, where he was put in a small cell with 33 other Syrian men for a night. In the morning, Mustafa said, a jandarma officer came to take detainees separately to another room:

    When my turn came, they took two of us into a room where there were four officials: a jandarma, a plain-clothed man, the [Adana Removal Center] migration director, and a translator. I saw three people sitting on the floor under the table who had been taken earlier from our cell and their faces were swollen.

    The translator asked the man who was with me to sign some papers, but when he saw one was a voluntary return form he didn’t want to sign. The jandarma and the plain-clothed guy started beating him with their hands and their batons and kicked him. After about 10 minutes they tied his hands and moved him next to the men already on the floor under the table. The translator asked me if I wanted to taste what the others had tasted before me. I said no and signed the paper.

    Mustafa was later deported from Cilvegözü/Bab al-Hawa border crossing and is now staying in al-Bab city in northern Aleppo province.

    Syria Remains Unsafe for Returns

    Most people interviewed said they originated from government-controlled areas in Syria. They said they could not cross from the opposition-controlled areas of northern Syria to their places of origin for fear Syrian security agencies would arbitrarily arrest them and otherwise violate their rights. Those deported to northern Syria told Human Rights Watch they felt “stuck” there, unable to go to home or to forge a life amid the instability of clashes in northern Syria.

    “I cannot go back to Damascus because it is too dangerous,” said “Firaz,” 31, in a telephone interview, who is from the Damascus Countryside and was deported from Turkey in July 2022 and is now living in Afrin in northern Syria. “There is fighting and clashes [in Afrin]. What do I do? Where do I go?”

    In October 2021, Human Rights Watch documented that Syrian refugees who returned to Syria between 2017 and 2021 from Lebanon and Jordan faced grave human rights abuses and persecution at the hands of the Syrian government and affiliated militias, demonstrating that Syria is not safe for returns.

    While active hostilities may have decreased in recent years, the Syrian government has continued to inflict the same abuses onto citizens that led them to flee in the first place, including arbitrary detention, mistreatment, and torture. In September, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria once again concluded that Syria is not safe for returns.

    In addition to the fear of arrest and persecution, 10 years of conflict have decimated Syria’s infrastructure and social services, resulting in massive humanitarian needs. Over 13 million Syrians needed humanitarian assistance as of early 2021. Millions of people in northeast and northwest Syria, many of whom are internally displaced, rely on the cross-border flow of food, medicine, and other lifesaving assistance.

    International Law

    Turkey is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights, both of which prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and inhuman and degrading treatment. If Turkey detains a person to deport them but there is no realistic prospect of doing so, including because they would face harm in the destination country, or the person is unable to challenge their removal, the detention is arbitrary.

    Turkey’s treaty obligations under the European Convention, the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture, and the 1951 Refugee Convention also require it to uphold the principle of nonrefoulement, which prohibits the return of anyone to a place where they would face a real risk of persecution, torture or other ill-treatment, or a threat to life.

    Turkey may not use violence or the threat of violence or detention to coerce people to return to places where they face harm. This includes Syrian asylum seekers, who are entitled to automatic protection under Turkish law, including any who have been blocked from registration for temporary protection since late 2017. It is important that it also applies to refugees who have sought employment outside the province in which they are registered. Children should never be detained for reasons solely related to their immigration status, or detained alongside unrelated adults.

    EU Funding of Turkey’s Migration Management

    The implementation of the March 2016 EU-Turkey deal, which aimed to control the number of migrants reaching the EU by sending them back to Turkey, is based on the flawed premise that Turkey would be a safe third country to which to return Syrian asylum seekers. However, Turkey has never met the EU’s safe third country criteria as defined by EU law. The recent violent deportations show that any Syrian forcibly returned from the EU to Turkey would face a risk of onward refoulement to Syria.

    In June 2021, the Greek government adopted a Joint Ministerial Decision determining that Turkey was safe third country for asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Somalia.

    Turkey’s removal centers have been constructed and maintained with significant funding from the European Union. Prior to 2016, under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I and IPA II), the EU provided more than €89 million for the construction, renovation, or other support of removal centers in Turkey. Some €54 million of this funding in 2007 and 2008 was for the construction of seven removal centers in six provinces with a capacity for 3,750 people. In 2014, it provided another €6.7 million for renovation and refurbishment of 17 removal centers. In 2015, the EU provided about €29 million for the construction of six new removal centers with a capacity for 2,400 people.

    Following the first €3 billion committed to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016, the EU’s Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) provided €60 million to the then-Directorate General for Migration Management to “support Turkey in the management, reception and hosting of migrants, in particular irregular migrants detected in Turkey, as well as migrants returned from EU Member States territories to Turkey.” This funding was used for the construction and refurbishment of the Çankırı removal center and for staffing 22 other removal centers.

    The EU provided another €22.3 million to the DGMM for improving services and physical conditions in removal centers, including funding for “the safe and organized transfer of irregular migrants and refugees within Turkey,” and €3.5 million for “capacity-building assistance aimed at strengthening access to rights and services.”

    On December 21, 2021, the European Commission announced a €30 million financing decision to support the Turkish Interior Ministry’s Presidency of Migration Management’s “capacity building and improving the standards and conditions for migrants in Turkey’s hosting centers … to improve the management of reception and hosting centers in line with human rights standards and gender-sensitive approaches” and to ensure “safe and dignified transfer of irregular migrants.”

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/24/turkey-hundreds-refugees-deported-syria

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_syriens #Turquie #renvois #expulsions #retour_au_pays #déportation #arrestations #rétention #détention_administrative

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste Sur le #retour_au_pays / #expulsions de #réfugiés_syriens...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/904710

    • En Turquie entre 3,7 et 5 millions de réfugiés pour 82 à 84 millions d’habitants selon les sources. La Turquie accueille des réfugiés à hauteur de 4 à 6% de sa population.

      En UE 2,9 millions de réfugiés pour une population de 447 millions d’habitants, soit 0,6% de sa population.

      L’UE donne de l’argent à la Turquie mais cet argent doit servir à l’accueil des réfugiés, pas directement au bien être des Turcs...

      Si l’UE prenait sa part de l’accueil des réfugiés (au lieu de mettre tant d’argent dans les expulsions, et dans l’Agence Frontex coupable de crimes ignobles sur les migrants), la Turquie expulserait-elle actuellement une partie de ses réfugiés syriens vers la Syrie ?

      https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_fr

      https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/09/03/en-turquie-l-afflux-de-refugies-crispe-l-opinion_6093220_3232.html

    • Forcibly deportation | 390 refugees deported from Turkey to Syria through Bab Al-Salama crossing in a week

      SOHR sources have reported that Turkish authorities have forcibly deported 90 Syrian refugees, all carrying the temporary protection cards ”Kimlik,” to Azaz city in “Euphrates Shield” area, which is under the control of Turkish forces and their proxy factions in the northern countryside of Aleppo. The refugees, who were deported under the pretext that “they have not completed data needed for residence documents and do not have ID documents,” crossed into Syria via Bab Al-Salam crossing on the Syria-Turkey border.

      Accordingly, the number of Syrian refugees who have been forcibly deported from Turkey to Syria through Bab Al-Salama crossing in less than a week has reached 390.

      It is worth noting that Turkish authorities continue forcible deportation of Syrian refugees from Turkey to the so-called “safe zone” in northern Syria.

      https://www.syriahr.com/en/303083

    • Tägliche Angst vor Abschiebung

      In der Türkei berichten Flüchtlinge von immer größeren Anfeindungen bis hin zu willkürlichen Festnahmen durch die türkische Polizei und Abschiebungen. Das wiederum verstärkt auch die Zahl derer, die nach Europa wollen.

      Wenn Mara in Istanbul aus dem Haus geht, dann hat die Syrerin nicht nur Bauchschmerzen, sondern seit einiger Zeit richtige Angst. Vor mehr als fünf Jahren kam sie mit ihrer Familie in die Türkei. Sie ist offiziell als Flüchtling anerkannt.

      Doch seit einiger Zeit fühlt sie sich nicht mehr sicher. „Ich habe das Gefühl, dass sie jeden Tag irgendwelche neuen Regeln und Schikanen für uns Flüchtlinge aufstellen. Aber das Schlimmste ist: Sie machen uns ganz offen Angst, indem sie uns mit Abschiebungen nach Syrien drohen.“
      Leben in der Fremde

      Mara, Ende 20, heißt eigentlich anders, hat aber große Sorge, Probleme mit den türkischen Behörden zu bekommen, wenn sie hier ihren echten Namen nennt. Sie arbeitet als Übersetzerin, studiert hat sie Physik, doch ihr syrischer Abschluss wurde nicht anerkannt. Dennoch baute sie sich in der Türkei ein Leben in der Fremde auf, fühlte sich akzeptiert - anfangs.

      Denn mittlerweile schlage ihr offener Hass entgegen, sagt sie. „Vor zwei Tagen lief ich mit einer Freundin die Straße entlang. Wir unterhielten uns auf Arabisch. Plötzlich kam eine ältere Frau auf uns zu und rief: ’Ihr Hunde, geht endlich zurück in euer Land!’“

      Hetze gegen Geflüchtete

      Dass Rassismus gegen Syrer und andere Flüchtlinge aus der Region, wie dem Iran oder Afghanistan, in der Türkei in den vergangenen Jahren kontinuierlich zugenommen hat, beobachtet auch Piril Ercoban vom Verein „Mülteci Der“, einer türkischen Flüchtlingsinitiative.

      „Im vergangenen Wahlkampf wurden Flüchtlinge zu einem Instrument der Innenpolitik“, sagt sie. „In so vielen Bereichen ist man sich in der Türkei nicht einig, aber was die negative Sicht auf Flüchtlinge angeht, herrscht Einigkeit.“

      So hetzte auch der vermeintlich sozialdemokratische Oppositionsführer Kemal Kilicdaroglu immer wieder gegen Syrer, sprach von mehr als zehn Millionen Geflüchteten im Land - Zahlen fernab der Realität.

      Großangelegte Rückführungsmaßnahmen

      Das Bündnis um Staatspräsident Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ohnehin rechts-konservativ, stieg auf den Anti-Migrations-Zug auf und kündigte großangelegte Rückführungsmaßnahmen an. Dieses Wahlversprechen scheint nun in Gang gesetzt.

      Mara erzählt, in ihrem Stadtviertel stünden an manchen Tagen an jeder Ecke Polizisten auf der Suche nach Syrern, die illegal im Land sind, oder in einer anderen Stadt in der Türkei gemeldet. „Sie behandeln uns wie Kriminelle“, klagt Mara.

      Flucht weiter nach Europa

      Der türkische Innenminister verkündete Mitte dieser Woche neue Zahlen, die die türkische Bevölkerung beruhigen sollen, Syrer wie Mara dagegen in Angst und Schrecken versetzen. In den vergangenen vier Monaten seien mehr als 105.000 Menschen verschiedenster Nationalitäten ohne gültigen Aufenthalt des Landes verwiesen worden.

      Mara hat zwar einen gültigen Aufenthalt, kennt aber viele Geschichten von Personen, bei denen das keine Rolle gespielt habe und die dennoch festgenommen worden und in Abschiebehaft genommen worden seien.

      Eine Freundin habe diesem Druck und den Anfeindungen nicht mehr standgehalten und die Türkei vor einiger Zeit verlassen. „Sie hat alles zurückgelassen und hat sich in die EU aufgemacht“, erzählt Mara. Seitdem habe sie nichts mehr von ihr gehört. Sie wisse nicht einmal, ob die Freundin noch lebe.

      Milliardenhilfen für Aufnahme

      Ein Blick auf die offiziellen Zahlen der türkischen Regierung zeigt: Die Zahl der registrierten syrischen Flüchtlinge in der Türkei nimmt seit einiger Zeit immer weiter ab. Waren es im März 2020 noch rund 3,6 Millionen, ist der letzte Stand von September 2023 bei unter 3,3 Millionen - das ist der tiefste Stand seit sieben Jahren.

      Damals zeigte das im Frühjahr 2016 geschlossene EU-Türkei-Abkommen Wirkung: Die EU versprach Milliardenhilfen, im Gegenzug verpflichtete sich die Türkei, Fluchtrouten abzuriegeln und die Bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge zu versorgen. Beide Seiten halten sich schon seit mehr als drei Jahren nicht mehr an bestimmte Vereinbarungen.

      Hass und Diskriminierung

      Piril Ercoban vom Flüchtlingsverein erklärt, die türkische Regierung verwehre syrischen Flüchtlingen seit Sommer 2022 die Anerkennung. „Zum anderen treiben sie wirtschaftliche Faktoren, aber auch der Hass ihnen gegenüber und diskriminierende Richtlinien zur Rückkehr in ihr Heimatland oder zur Flucht nach Europa, trotz aller Gefahren.“

      Auch scheint das Recht auf Asyl und Gründe wie Verfolgung im Heimatland keine Rolle mehr zu spielen. „Es gibt Berichte, wo erheblich Druck auf Migranten ausgeübt worden sein soll, Formulare zur freiwilligen Rückkehr zu unterschreiben - in sehr aggressiver Form“, sagt Ercoban.

      „Wir durften niemanden anrufen“

      Davon berichtet auch Hamid aus dem Iran, der aus politischen Gründen nicht dorthin zurück kann. Nach einer Auseinandersetzung mit seinem türkischen Vermieter hätten Polizisten vor seiner Tür gestanden und ihn festgenommen. Er glaubt, er sei denunziert worden. Erst sei er auf eine Polizeiwache gekommen, dann in ein Abschiebezentrum, erzählt er.

      Zwei Tage habe er mit Hunderten anderen Männern im Freien verbracht, auf Beton. „Wir durften niemanden anrufen, weder Familie noch Anwälte. Wir waren da zwei Tage lange eingepfercht in diesem Käfig, es hat immer wieder geregnet und die Polizisten haben uns nur ausgelacht und geflucht.“

      Am dritten Tag sei er in eine überfüllte Zelle gebracht worden. Auf dem Weg dorthin seien ihm EU-Embleme an den Wänden aufgefallen. Im Nachhinein erfährt er: Das Zentrum wurde auch mithilfe von Geldern aus dem EU-Türkei-Abkommen finanziert. Irgendwann sagen ihm Beamte, wenn er ein Formular unterschreibe, komme er sofort raus.

      Das Formular: die Einwilligung zur Abschiebung. Hamid weigert sich. Über die kommenden Tage seien die Drohungen so groß geworden, dass er mit dem Gedanken gespielt habe, zu unterschreiben. Gerade noch rechtzeitig habe ihn seine türkische Freundin ausfindig gemacht und einen Anwalt eingeschaltet. Der habe ihn freibekommen und die Deportation verhindert - vorerst. Die türkische Regierung streitet Fälle wie den von Hamid ab.
      „Türsteher für Europa“

      In der EU, wo es in der Vergangenheit auch wiederholt Berichte über Misshandlungen von Migranten durch Behörden gab, nimmt man die Fälle in der Türkei wahr, mehr nicht. Längst liegen Ideen über ein aktualisiertes Abkommen mit der Türkei auf dem Tisch.

      „Wir sahen diese Vereinbarungen schon immer als unmoralisch an“, sagt Piril Ercoban. „Damals interessierte das niemanden.“ Doch die Zeiten haben sich geändert: Inzwischen lehnen große Teile der türkischen Bevölkerung das Abkommen ab, wenn auch nicht zwangsläufig aus moralischen Gründen.

      „Wir sind die Türsteher für Europa“, schrieb vor einigen Monaten eine junge Türkin in den sozialen Medien. „Und kommen selbst nicht mal rein.“ Ein Versprechen der EU war die Visafreiheit für türkische Staatsbürger, bis heute gibt es sie aus verschiedenen Gründen nicht.
      Tägliche Angst abgeschoben zu werden

      Hamid und Mara sind die politischen Umstände nicht wichtig. Sie leben derzeit von Tag zu Tag und spielen nun beide mit dem Gedanken, die Türkei zu verlassen. Ihre Heimatländer kommen nicht in Frage, es bleibt derzeit nur Europa, sagt Mara. Dass die Anfeindung auch dort stetig zunehmen, wissen beide.

      Auch die Zustände in den Lagern auf den griechischen Inseln kennen sie. Dennoch wägen sie nun ab: Jeden Tag ins Angst leben, abgeschoben zu werden, oder doch eine aus ihrer Sicht bisher ungenutzte Chance auf Freiheit wagen?

      https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/tuerkei-syrien-migration-100.html

  • #Route_des_Balkans : avec #Frontex, l’UE met les grands moyens pour enrayer les migrations

    La route des Balkans des réfugiés s’impose comme une priorité pour l’UE, qui accorde une enveloppe supplémentaire de 39,2 millions d’euros. Frontex va se déployer en #Albanie, en #Bosnie-Herzégovine, au #Monténégro et en #Serbie. La mission européenne vient aussi de signer un accord avec la #Macédoine_du_Nord.

    La #Commission_européenne a donné son #accord à une présence renforcée de Frontex, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, dans quatre pays des Balkans occidentaux. Cette autorisation porte sur les frontières entre l’UE, l’Albanie, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Bruxelles a aussi adopté un nouveau plan d’aides à hauteur de 39,2 millions d’euros, dans le cadre de l’#Instrument_d’aide_de_préadhésion (#IAP) pour le renforcement de la gestion des frontières dans ces pays candidats à l’intégration.

    Selon les accords actuellement en vigueur entre Frontex et l’Albanie, la Serbie et le Monténégro, des effectifs permanents de l’Agence européenne ne peuvent être déployées que sur les frontières de ces pays avec l’UE, sans exercer de compétences exécutives. Désormais, des #effectifs_permanents de Frontex pourront également être déployés sur les frontières de ces pays avec des États tiers. Cela veut dire, par exemple que des agents Frontex pourront patrouiller sur la frontière entre l’Albanie et le Monténégro ou entre la Serbie et la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

    Le plan d’aides financières annoncé servira surtout à financer du #matériel spécialisé (systèmes de #surveillance mobiles, #drones ou appareils biométriques). Ce plan financera aussi de la #formation et une aide à la mise en place et au fonctionnement de #centres_de_coordination_nationaux, dont des #centres_d’accueil et de #rétention des migrants. Ces 39,2 millions d’euros viennent renforcer les dispositifs sécuritaires pour un meilleur contrôle des frontières, dotés jusque là de 171,7 millions d’euros.

    “Nous nous concentrons sur le renforcement de la protection des frontières, la lutte contre les réseaux de trafiquants et l’intensification des #retours depuis la région.”

    La Commissaire aux Affaires intérieures #Ylva_Johansson a souligné que l’UE était très impliquée dans le soutien aux Balkans occidentaux au renforcement de la #coopération pour la gestion des migrations sur le terrain. « Voilà pourquoi nous proposons de négocier des accords de statut conformes au nouveau cadre juridique, qui permettront le déploiement de Frontex dans nos quatre pays partenaires avec la pleine force de son mandat, afin d’assurer que leurs frontières soient respectées et protégées conformément aux meilleures pratiques et normes européennes. »

    De son côté, le Commissaire européen à l’Élargissement #Oliver_Varhelyi estime que ce paquet arrive à point nommé, car les migrations restent, selon lui, un domaine dans lequel la collaboration avec les partenaires des Balkans occidentaux doit être renforcée. « Étant donné la pression migratoire accrue dans la région, nous nous concentrons sur le renforcement de la #protection_des_frontières, la lutte contre les réseaux de trafiquants et l’intensification des retours depuis la région. C’est dans ce but que nous renforçons notre soutien politique et financier. »

    Oliver Varhelyi a annoncé que la Commission avait l’intention d’augmenter ses financements en la matière d’ici 2024 pour les pays candidats des Balkans occidentaux, soit une enveloppe totale d’au moins 350 millions d’euros. Cette somme doit permettre à ces pays candidats de développer un système efficace de gestion des migrations dans tous les domaines, y compris l’asile, l’accueil, la sécurité aux frontières et les procédures de retour.

    https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Route-des-Balkans-avec-Frontex-l-Union-europeenne-veut-mettre-les
    #Balkans #migrations #réfugiés #asile #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #aide_financière #biométrie #militarisation_des_frontières #renvois #expulsions

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

    • Tracking the Pact: EU seeks to seal off Balkan Route with expanded Frontex deployments

      The European Commission wants to launch negotiations with Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania so that EU border agency Frontex can extend its zone of operations. Currently, Frontex operations in those states can only take place at the borders they share with EU member states, in accordance with the 2016 Frontex Regulation. Upgrading the EU’s agreements with the Balkan states to take into account the powers granted to Frontex by the 2019 Regulation will make it possible to deploy EU border guards at non-EU borders - for example, between Bosnia and Serbia, or between Serbia and Montenegro. An agreement with North Macedonia has already been signed. The aim is to halt the irregular movement of people through the Balkans towards “core” EU member states.

      In order to launch negotiations the Commission needs the approval of the Council of the EU, and has thus sent to the Council four recommendations that, once they are signed off, will allow it to enter into negotiations with each of the four states:

      - Albania (COM(2022) 690 final, in Council doc. 14060/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
      – Bosnia and Herzegovina (COM(2022) 691 final, in Council doc. 14061/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
      – Montenegro (COM(2022) 692 final, in Council doc. 14062/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
      – Serbia (COM(2022) 693 final, in Council doc. 14063/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)

      An upgraded agreement with North Macedonia based on the 2019 Frontex Regulation has already been approved.

      Each of the documents contains an explanatory memorandum before coming to the draft text of the proposed Council Recommendations.

      For example, the proposal on Albania notes:

      “Albania lies on the Western Balkans migration route, which sees significant irregular migration towards the core of the European Union, both via land and across the Adriatic Sea...

      Given that Albania is a neighbouring third country that remains an important country of transit for irregular migration to the European Union, the value of cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the relevant authorities of Albania remains high. Albania has been a model for the successful deployment of Frontex joint operations to third countries, and it therefore represents an ideal candidate for the expansion of such cooperation.”

      Amongst other things, the memoranda note bilateral agreements signed by each of the states - for example, Bosnia has signed “readmission agreements with all the Western Balkan countries, Türkiye, Russia, Moldova and Pakistan whose practical implementation started in August 2022.” The intention is that Balkan states will not just prevent people from arriving in “core” EU territory - they will also deport them.

      There is no mention in any of the documents of the controversy the agency is mired in for its failure to uphold fundamental rights standards within the EU, in particular at the Greek-Turkish border, as confirmed by the recently-published report of the European Anti-Fraud Office.

      An annex to each of the above documents contains the negotiating directives for the Commission to follow, subject to possible amendment and then approval by the Council.

      - Albania (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
      - Bosnia and Herzegovina (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
      - Montenegro (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
      - Serbia (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)

      Although marked ’SENSITIVE’ (as are the proposals for recommendations), the annexes merely state that the agreement with each country should meet the standards set out in the model status agreement adopted by the European Commission in December last year.

      The final terms of the agreements are of course subject to negotiations with each state, with the texts then sent to the Council and Parliament for approval (or not).

      This is likely to lead to certain discrepancies. For example, the current status agreements with Balkan states contain differences on the privileges and immunities of officials deployed on Frontex operations:

      “While the agreements with Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia include the provision that the executive director’s decision [on whether to waive criminal immunity or not] will be binding upon the authorities of the host state, no such article is found in the agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.”

      Negotiations on status agreements that would allow Frontex operations in Senegal and Mauritania are also ongoing. When approved, Frontex operations in those two countries will be the first ones outside the European continent.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2022/october/tracking-the-pact-eu-seeks-to-seal-off-balkan-route-with-expanded-fronte

    • Communiqué de presse du Conseil de l’UE du 24 février 2023 au sujet du nouvel accord conclu entre Frontex et la Macédoine du Nord (signé en octobre 2022, déploiement opérationnel à partir du 1er avril 2023: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr).

      Le communiqué refait le point sur les accords entre Frontex et les Etats non UE :

      - Border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules.
      - In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
      - In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.
      - An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.
      - The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

      –---

      Border management: EU concludes agreement with North Macedonia on Frontex cooperation

      The Council gave today its final green light to an agreement with North Macedonia on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The agreement will allow joint operations to be organised and Frontex border management teams to be deployed in North Macedonia, subject to the country’s agreement.

      As of 1st April, Frontex will be able to assist North Macedonia in its efforts to manage migratory flows, counter illegal immigration, and tackle cross-border crime. Reinforcing controls along North Macedonia’s borders will contribute to further enhancing security at the EU’s external borders.

      In line with the European border and coast guard regulation, the agreement also includes provisions for compliance monitoring and for the protection of fundamental rights.

      Background

      In 2019 a new Frontex regulation was adopted, broadening the agency’s mandate on several areas, including cooperation with third countries. The new mandate allows the agency to assist those countries with a status agreement throughout their territory and not only in the regions bordering the EU, as was the case with the previous mandate. It also allows Frontex staff to exercise executive powers, such as border checks and registration of persons. Status agreements allowing for joint operations can now be concluded with a wider range of countries and are no longer limited to neighbouring countries.

      Frontex had border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules. In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

      In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.

      An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.

      The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

      https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr

  • L’#asile au prisme du #terrorisme

    Un dernier épisode sur les évolutions récentes des pratiques juridiques en matière de droit d’asile en France en lien avec le terrorisme, et en particulier le traitement politique et médiatique de ce que l’on a appelé, à tort ou à raison, la "#question_tchétchène".

    Autour du témoignage, à Paris puis à Grenoble où il est aujourd’hui assigné à résidence, d’un jeune homme tchétchène accusé de terrorisme et l’analyse de son avocate Lucie Simon – mise en perspective par un professeur de droit public (Thibaut Fleury-Graff) et une historienne spécialiste de la Russie contemporaine (Anne le Huérou) –,ce dernier épisode est consacré à la question des rapports entre droit d’asile et terrorisme.

    Que ressent un jeune homme qui a grandi en France face à la menace d’#expulsion qui plane sur lui ; “Étant arrivé en France à seulement sept ans, devoir me justifier sur des choses de mon pays d’accueil, c’est très compliqué. C’est vraiment dur de se dire qu’il faille se justifier. Parce que j’ai grandi en France et je suis allé à l’école en France. J’ai tout vécu en France. En réalité, si on regarde bien, ma vie a commencé en France, ce n’était pas vraiment une vie avant cela. Donc devoir se justifier, oui, à ce sujet-là, c’est plutôt compliqué.”

    Quelle évolution récente de l’accueil des personnes réfugiées en France au prisme du terrorisme ? Qu’est-ce qu’une note blanche que l’avocat Gilles Piquois qualifie “d’insupportable” et “de #bobard_politique” ? Et dans quelle mesure ce document discrétionnaire des #services_de_renseignement joue-t-il dorénavant un rôle décisif dans l’examen des demandes d’asile formulées auprès de la Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile (#CNDA) ?

    Plus spécifiquement, peut-on parler d’une #stigmatisation des ressortissants tchétchènes depuis l’assassinat de #Samuel_Patty (octobre 2020) et les affrontements de Dijon (juin 2020) ? Qu’est-ce que l’affaire dite "#Gadaev" ?

    Et enfin, dans quelle mesure peut-on dire, comme l’affirmera Gilles Piquois, que l’importance de la défense du droit des étrangers revient en fin de compte à prendre la défense des droits et du droit plus largement ? En effet, il alerte : “Attention, un train peut en cacher un autre. Il est bien clair que le droit des étrangers est un #laboratoire de ce qui nous attend après nous, les nationaux. On commence les saloperies sur les étrangers et ensuite, ce ne sont plus que les étrangers qui en sont victimes. Et ça, on peut vous démontrer que ça existe, et que ça a toujours existé. C’est pour ça que défendre les #droits_des_étrangers, ce n’est pas un altruisme totalement d’une autre planète, c’est au contraire la défense de nos droits. Nos droits sont les mêmes, il n’y a pas de différence entre national et étranger et c’est la #défense_des_droits et du droit qui doit absolument être menée avec fermeté.”

    https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/lsd-la-serie-documentaire/l-asile-au-prisme-du-terrorisme-9657805

    –—

    Où Me Lucie Simon raconte de la résistance d’un steward (à partir de la min 13’20) :

    « On a un steward, en civil, qui était en passager sur le vol, qui est venu nous voir de lui-même et qui nous a dit : ’J’ai compris, je vais appeler le commandant de bord’. C’est là où on a à nouveau foi en l’humanité, parce qu’on voit ce commandant de bord qui arrive et qui nous dit : ’Moi, je fais du transport de passagers, je ne fais pas du transport de bétail’. Et il ajout qu’il n’est pas dans son avion et il ne montera pas dans son avion. »

    –-> ajouté à la métaliste sur la #résistance de #passagers (mais aussi de #pilotes) aux #renvois_forcés :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/725457

    #Djakhar #anti-terrorisme #justice #droit_d'asile #migrations #réfugiés #CRA #rétention #détention_administrative #réfugiés_tchétchènes #podcast #audio #renvois

  • « Les #réfugiés sont les #cobayes des futures mesures de #surveillance »

    Les dangers de l’émigration vers l’Europe vont croissant, déplore Mark Akkerman, qui étudie la #militarisation_des_frontières du continent depuis 2016. Un mouvement largement poussé par le #lobby de l’#industrie_de_l’armement et de la sécurité.

    Mark Akkerman étudie depuis 2016 la militarisation des frontières européennes. Chercheur pour l’ONG anti-militariste #Stop_Wapenhandel, il a publié, avec le soutien de The Transnational Institute, plusieurs rapports de référence sur l’industrie des « #Safe_Borders ». Il revient pour Mediapart sur des années de politiques européennes de surveillance aux frontières.

    Mediapart : En 2016, vous publiez un premier rapport, « Borders Wars », qui cartographie la surveillance aux frontières en Europe. Dans quel contexte naît ce travail ?

    Mark Akkerman : Il faut se rappeler que l’Europe a une longue histoire avec la traque des migrants et la sécurisation des frontières, qui remonte, comme l’a montré la journaliste d’investigation néerlandaise Linda Polman, à la Seconde Guerre mondiale et au refus de soutenir et abriter des réfugiés juifs d’Allemagne. Dès la création de l’espace Schengen, au début des années 1990, l’ouverture des frontières à l’intérieur de cet espace était étroitement liée au renforcement du contrôle et de la sécurité aux frontières extérieures. Depuis lors, il s’agit d’un processus continu marqué par plusieurs phases d’accélération.

    Notre premier rapport (https://www.tni.org/en/publication/border-wars) est né durant l’une de ces phases. J’ai commencé ce travail en 2015, au moment où émerge le terme « crise migratoire », que je qualifierais plutôt de tragédie de l’exil. De nombreuses personnes, principalement motivées par la guerre en Syrie, tentent alors de trouver un avenir sûr en Europe. En réponse, l’Union et ses États membres concentrent leurs efforts sur la sécurisation des frontières et le renvoi des personnes exilées en dehors du territoire européen.

    Cela passe pour une part importante par la militarisation des frontières, par le renforcement des pouvoirs de Frontex et de ses financements. Les réfugiés sont dépeints comme une menace pour la sécurité de l’Europe, les migrations comme un « problème de sécurité ». C’est un récit largement poussé par le lobby de l’industrie militaire et de la sécurité, qui a été le principal bénéficiaire de ces politiques, des budgets croissants et des contrats conclus dans ce contexte.

    Cinq ans après votre premier rapport, quel regard portez-vous sur la politique européenne de sécurisation des frontières ? La pandémie a-t-elle influencé cette politique ?

    Depuis 2016, l’Europe est restée sur la même voie. Renforcer, militariser et externaliser la sécurité aux frontières sont les seules réponses aux migrations. Davantage de murs et de clôtures ont été érigés, de nouveaux équipements de surveillance, de détection et de contrôle ont été installés, de nouveaux accords avec des pays tiers ont été conclus, de nouvelles bases de données destinées à traquer les personnes exilées ont été créées. En ce sens, les politiques visibles en 2016 ont été poursuivies, intensifiées et élargies.

    La pandémie de Covid-19 a certainement joué un rôle dans ce processus. De nombreux pays ont introduit de nouvelles mesures de sécurité et de contrôle aux frontières pour contenir le virus. Cela a également servi d’excuse pour cibler à nouveau les réfugiés, les présentant encore une fois comme des menaces, responsables de la propagation du virus.

    Comme toujours, une partie de ces mesures temporaires vont se pérenniser et on constate déjà, par exemple, l’évolution des contrôles aux frontières vers l’utilisation de technologies biométriques sans contact.

    En 2020, l’UE a choisi Idemia et Sopra Steria, deux entreprises françaises, pour construire un fichier de contrôle biométrique destiné à réguler les entrées et sorties de l’espace Schengen. Quel regard portez-vous sur ces bases de données ?

    Il existe de nombreuses bases de données biométriques utilisées pour la sécurité aux frontières. L’Union européenne met depuis plusieurs années l’accent sur leur développement. Plus récemment, elle insiste sur leur nécessaire connexion, leur prétendue interopérabilité. L’objectif est de créer un système global de détection, de surveillance et de suivi des mouvements de réfugiés à l’échelle européenne pour faciliter leur détention et leur expulsion.

    Cela contribue à créer une nouvelle forme d’« apartheid ». Ces fichiers sont destinés certes à accélérer les processus de contrôles aux frontières pour les citoyens nationaux et autres voyageurs acceptables mais, surtout, à arrêter ou expulser les migrantes et migrants indésirables grâce à l’utilisation de systèmes informatiques et biométriques toujours plus sophistiqués.

    Quelles sont les conséquences concrètes de ces politiques de surveillance ?

    Il devient chaque jour plus difficile et dangereux de migrer vers l’Europe. Parce qu’elles sont confrontées à la violence et aux refoulements aux frontières, ces personnes sont obligées de chercher d’autres routes migratoires, souvent plus dangereuses, ce qui crée un vrai marché pour les passeurs. La situation n’est pas meilleure pour les personnes réfugiées qui arrivent à entrer sur le territoire européen. Elles finissent régulièrement en détention, sont expulsées ou sont contraintes de vivre dans des conditions désastreuses en Europe ou dans des pays limitrophes.

    Cette politique n’impacte pas que les personnes réfugiées. Elle présente un risque pour les libertés publiques de l’ensemble des Européens. Outre leur usage dans le cadre d’une politique migratoire raciste, les technologies de surveillance sont aussi « testées » sur des personnes migrantes qui peuvent difficilement faire valoir leurs droits, puis introduites plus tard auprès d’un public plus large. Les réfugiés sont les cobayes des futures mesures de contrôle et de surveillance des pays européens.

    Vous pointez aussi que les industriels qui fournissent en armement les belligérants de conflits extra-européens, souvent à l’origine de mouvements migratoires, sont ceux qui bénéficient du business des frontières.

    C’est ce que fait Thales en France, Leonardo en Italie ou Airbus. Ces entreprises européennes de sécurité et d’armement exportent des armes et des technologies de surveillance partout dans le monde, notamment dans des pays en guerre ou avec des régimes autoritaires. À titre d’exemple, les exportations européennes au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord des dix dernières années représentent 92 milliards d’euros et concernent des pays aussi controversés que l’Arabie saoudite, l’Égypte ou la Turquie.

    Si elles fuient leur pays, les populations civiles exposées à la guerre dans ces régions du monde se retrouveront très certainement confrontées à des technologies produites par les mêmes industriels lors de leur passage aux frontières. C’est une manière profondément cynique de profiter, deux fois, de la misère d’une même population.

    Quelles entreprises bénéficient le plus de la politique européenne de surveillance aux frontières ? Par quels mécanismes ? Je pense notamment aux programmes de recherches comme Horizon 2020 et Horizon Europe.

    J’identifie deux types d’entreprises qui bénéficient de la militarisation des frontières de l’Europe. D’abord les grandes entreprises européennes d’armement et de sécurité, comme Airbus, Leonardo et Thales, qui disposent toutes d’une importante gamme de technologies militaires et de surveillance. Pour elles, le marché des frontières est un marché parmi d’autres. Ensuite, des entreprises spécialisées, qui travaillent sur des niches, bénéficient aussi directement de cette politique européenne. C’est le cas de l’entreprise espagnole European Security Fencing, qui fabrique des fils barbelés. Elles s’enrichissent en remportant des contrats, à l’échelle européenne, mais aussi nationale, voire locale.

    Une autre source de financement est le programme cadre européen pour la recherche et l’innovation. Il finance des projets sur 7 ans et comprend un volet sécurité aux frontières. Des programmes existent aussi au niveau du Fonds européen de défense.

    Un de vos travaux de recherche, « Expanding the Fortress », s’intéresse aux partenariats entre l’Europe et des pays tiers. Quels sont les pays concernés ? Comment se manifestent ces partenariats ?

    L’UE et ses États membres tentent d’établir une coopération en matière de migrations avec de nombreux pays du monde. L’accent est mis sur les pays identifiés comme des « pays de transit » pour celles et ceux qui aspirent à rejoindre l’Union européenne. L’Europe entretient de nombreux accords avec la Libye, qu’elle équipe notamment en matériel militaire. Il s’agit d’un pays où la torture et la mise à mort des réfugiés ont été largement documentées.

    Des accords existent aussi avec l’Égypte, la Tunisie, le Maroc, la Jordanie, le Liban ou encore l’Ukraine. L’Union a financé la construction de centres de détention dans ces pays, dans lesquels on a constaté, à plusieurs reprises, d’importantes violations en matière de droits humains.

    Ces pays extra-européens sont-ils des zones d’expérimentations pour les entreprises européennes de surveillance ?

    Ce sont plutôt les frontières européennes, comme celle d’Evros, entre la Grèce et la Turquie, qui servent de zone d’expérimentation. Le transfert d’équipements, de technologies et de connaissances pour la sécurité et le contrôle des frontières représente en revanche une partie importante de ces coopérations. Cela veut dire que les États européens dispensent des formations, partagent des renseignements ou fournissent de nouveaux équipements aux forces de sécurité de régimes autoritaires.

    Ces régimes peuvent ainsi renforcer et étendre leurs capacités de répression et de violation des droits humains avec le soutien de l’UE. Les conséquences sont dévastatrices pour la population de ces pays, ce qui sert de moteur pour de nouvelles vagues de migration…

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/040822/les-refugies-sont-les-cobayes-des-futures-mesures-de-surveillance

    cité dans l’interview, ce rapport :
    #Global_Climate_Wall
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/global-climate-wall
    déjà signalé ici : https://seenthis.net/messages/934948#message934949

    #asile #migrations #complexe_militaro-industriel #surveillance_des_frontières #Frontex #problème #Covid-19 #coronavirus #biométrie #technologie #Idemia #Sopra_Steria #contrôle_biométrique #base_de_données #interopérabilité #détection #apartheid #informatique #violence #refoulement #libertés_publiques #test #normalisation #généralisation #Thales #Leonardo #Airbus #armes #armements #industrie_de_l'armement #cynisme #Horizon_Europe #Horizon_2020 #marché #business #European_Security_Fencing #barbelés #fils_barbelés #recherche #programmes_de_recherche #Fonds_européen_de_défense #accords #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #Égypte #Libye #Tunisie #Maroc #Jordanie #Liban #Ukraine #rétention #détention_administrative #expérimentation #équipements #connaissance #transfert #coopérations #formations #renseignements #répression

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

    • Le système électronique d’#Entrée-Sortie en zone #Schengen : la biométrie au service des #frontières_intelligentes

      Avec la pression migratoire et la vague d’attentats subis par l’Europe ces derniers mois, la gestion des frontières devient une priorité pour la Commission.

      Certes, le système d’information sur les #visas (#VIS, #Visa_Information_System) est déployé depuis 2015 dans les consulats des États Membres et sa consultation rendue obligatoire lors de l’accès dans l’#espace_Schengen.

      Mais, depuis février 2013, est apparu le concept de « #frontières_intelligentes », (#Smart_Borders), qui recouvre un panel ambitieux de mesures législatives élaborées en concertation avec le Parlement Européen.

      Le système entrée/sortie, en particulier, va permettre, avec un système informatique unifié, d’enregistrer les données relatives aux #entrées et aux #sorties des ressortissants de pays tiers en court séjour franchissant les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne.

      Adopté puis signé le 30 Novembre 2017 par le Conseil Européen, il sera mis en application en 2022. Il s’ajoutera au « PNR européen » qui, depuis le 25 mai 2018, recense les informations sur les passagers aériens.

      Partant du principe que la majorité des visiteurs sont « de bonne foi », #EES bouleverse les fondements mêmes du #Code_Schengen avec le double objectif de :

      - rendre les frontières intelligentes, c’est-à-dire automatiser le contrôle des visiteurs fiables tout en renforçant la lutte contre les migrations irrégulières
      - créer un #registre_central des mouvements transfrontaliers.

      La modernisation de la gestion des frontières extérieures est en marche. En améliorant la qualité et l’efficacité des contrôles de l’espace Schengen, EES, avec une base de données commune, doit contribuer à renforcer la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme ainsi que les formes graves de criminalité.

      L’#identification de façon systématique des personnes qui dépassent la durée de séjour autorisée dans l’espace Schengen en est un des enjeux majeurs.

      Nous verrons pourquoi la reconnaissance faciale en particulier, est la grande gagnante du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Dans ce dossier web, nous traiterons des 6 sujets suivants :

      - ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection
      - La remise en cause du code « frontières Schengen » de 2006
      - EES : un accès très réglementé
      - La biométrie faciale : fer de lance de l’EES
      - EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité
      - Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Examinons maintenant ces divers points plus en détail.

      ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection

      Les activités criminelles telles que la traite d’êtres humains, les filières d’immigration clandestine ou les trafics d’objets sont aujourd’hui la conséquence de franchissements illicites de frontières, largement facilités par l’absence d’enregistrement lors des entrées/ sorties.

      Le scénario de fraude est – hélas – bien rôdé : Contrôle « standard » lors de l’accès à l’espace Schengen, puis destruction des documents d’identité dans la perspective d’activités malveillantes, sachant l’impossibilité d’être authentifié.

      Même si EES vise le visiteur « de bonne foi », le système va constituer à terme un puissant dispositif pour la prévention et la détection d’activités terroristes ou autres infractions pénales graves. En effet les informations stockées dans le nouveau registre pour 5 ans– y compris concernant les personnes refoulées aux frontières – couvrent principalement les noms, numéros de passeport, empreintes digitales et photos. Elles seront accessibles aux autorités frontalières et de délivrance des visas, ainsi qu’à Europol.

      Le système sera à la disposition d’enquêtes en particulier, vu la possibilité de consulter les mouvements transfrontières et historiques de déplacements. Tout cela dans le plus strict respect de la dignité humaine et de l’intégrité des personnes.

      Le dispositif est très clair sur ce point : aucune discrimination fondée sur le sexe, la couleur, les origines ethniques ou sociales, les caractéristiques génétiques, la langue, la religion ou les convictions, les opinions politiques ou toute autre opinion.

      Sont également exclus du champ d’investigation l’appartenance à une minorité nationale, la fortune, la naissance, un handicap, l’âge ou l’orientation sexuelle des visiteurs.​

      La remise en cause du Code frontières Schengen

      Vu la croissance attendue des visiteurs de pays tiers (887 millions en 2025), l’enjeu est maintenant de fluidifier et simplifier les contrôles.

      Une initiative particulièrement ambitieuse dans la mesure où elle remet en cause le fameux Code Schengen qui impose des vérifications approfondies, conduites manuellement par les autorités des Etats Membres aux entrées et sorties, sans possibilité d’automatisation.

      Par ailleurs, le Code Schengen ne prévoit aucun enregistrement des mouvements transfrontaliers. La procédure actuelle exigeant seulement que les passeports soient tamponnés avec mention des dates d’entrée et sortie.

      Seule possibilité pour les gardes-frontières : Calculer un éventuel dépassement de la durée de séjour qui elle-même est une information falsifiable et non consignée dans une base de données.

      Autre contrainte, les visiteurs réguliers comme les frontaliers doivent remplacer leurs passeports tous les 2-3 mois, vue la multitude de tampons ! Un procédé bien archaïque si l’on considère le potentiel des technologies de l’information.

      La proposition de 2013 comprenait donc trois piliers :

      - ​La création d’un système automatisé d’entrée/sortie (Entry/ Exit System ou EES)
      - Un programme d’enregistrement de voyageurs fiables, (RTP, Registered Traveller Program) pour simplifier le passage des visiteurs réguliers, titulaires d’un contrôle de sûreté préalable
      – La modification du Code Schengen

      Abandon de l’initiative RTP

      Trop complexe à mettre en œuvre au niveau des 28 Etats Membres, l’initiative RTP (Registered Travelers Program) a été finalement abandonnée au profit d’un ambitieux programme Entry/ Exit (EES) destiné aux visiteurs de courte durée (moins de 90 jours sur 180 jours).

      Précision importante, sont maintenant concernés les voyageurs non soumis à l’obligation de visa, sachant que les détenteurs de visas sont déjà répertoriés par le VIS.

      La note est beaucoup moins salée que prévue par la Commission en 2013. Au lieu du milliard estimé, mais qui incluait un RTP, la proposition révisée d’un EES unique ne coutera « que » 480 millions d’EUR.

      Cette initiative ambitieuse fait suite à une étude technique menée en 2014, puis une phase de prototypage conduite sous l’égide de l’agence EU-LISA en 2015 avec pour résultat le retrait du projet RTP et un focus particulier sur le programme EES.

      Une architecture centralisée gérée par EU-LISA

      L’acteur clé du dispositif EES, c’est EU-LISA, l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle dont le siège est à Tallinn, le site opérationnel à Strasbourg et le site de secours à Sankt Johann im Pongau (Autriche). L’Agence sera en charge des 4 aspects suivants :

      - Développement du système central
      - Mise en œuvre d’une interface uniforme nationale (IUN) dans chaque État Membre
      - Communication sécurisée entre les systèmes centraux EES et VIS
      - Infrastructure de communication entre système central et interfaces uniformes nationales.

      Chaque État Membre sera responsable de l’organisation, la gestion, le fonctionnement et de la maintenance de son infrastructure frontalière vis-à-vis d’EES.

      Une gestion optimisée des frontières

      Grâce au nouveau dispositif, tous les ressortissants des pays tiers seront traités de manière égale, qu’ils soient ou non exemptés de visas.

      Le VIS répertorie déjà les visiteurs soumis à visas. Et l’ambition d’EES c’est de constituer une base pour les autres.

      Les États Membres seront donc en mesure d’identifier tout migrant ou visiteur en situation irrégulière ayant franchi illégalement les frontières et faciliter, le cas échéant, son expulsion.

      Dès l’authentification à une borne en libre–service, le visiteur se verra afficher les informations suivantes, sous supervision d’un garde-frontière :

      - ​Date, heure et point de passage, en remplacement des tampons manuels
      - Notification éventuelle d’un refus d’accès.
      - Durée maximale de séjour autorisé.
      - Dépassement éventuelle de la durée de séjour autorisée
      En ce qui concerne les autorités des Etats Membres, c’est une véritable révolution par rapport à l’extrême indigence du système actuel. On anticipe déjà la possibilité de constituer des statistiques puissantes et mieux gérer l’octroi, ou la suppression de visas, en fonction de mouvements transfrontières, notamment grâce à des informations telles que :

      - ​​​Dépassements des durées de séjour par pays
      - Historique des mouvements frontaliers par pays

      EES : un accès très réglementé

      L’accès à EES est très réglementé. Chaque État Membre doit notifier à EU-LISA les autorités répressives habilitées à consulter les données aux fins de prévention ou détection d’infractions terroristes et autres infractions pénales graves, ou des enquêtes en la matière.

      Europol, qui joue un rôle clé dans la prévention de la criminalité, fera partie des autorités répressives autorisées à accéder au système dans le cadre de sa mission.

      Par contre, les données EES ne pourront pas être communiquées à des pays tiers, une organisation internationale ou une quelconque partie privée établie ou non dans l’Union, ni mises à leur disposition. Bien entendu, dans le cas d’enquêtes visant l’identification d’un ressortissant de pays tiers, la prévention ou la détection d’infractions terroristes, des exceptions pourront être envisagées.​

      Proportionnalité et respect de la vie privée

      Dans un contexte législatif qui considère le respect de la vie privée comme une priorité, le volume de données à caractère personnel enregistré dans EES sera considérablement réduit, soit 26 éléments au lieu des 36 prévus en 2013.

      Il s’agit d’un dispositif négocié auprès du Contrôleur Européen pour la Protection des Données (CEPD) et les autorités nationales en charge d’appliquer la nouvelle réglementation.

      Très schématiquement, les données collectées se limiteront à des informations minimales telles que : nom, prénom, références du document de voyage et visa, biométrie du visage et de 4 empreintes digitales.

      A chaque visite, seront relevés la date, l’heure et le lieu de contrôle frontière. Ces données seront conservées pendant cinq années, et non plus 181 jours comme proposé en 2013.

      Un procédé qui permettra aux gardes-frontières et postes consulaires d’analyser l’historique des déplacements, lors de l’octroi de nouveaux visas.
      ESS : privacy by design

      La proposition de la Commission a été rédigée selon le principe de « respect de la vie privée dès la conception », mieux connue sous le label « Privacy By Design ».

      Sous l’angle du droit, elle est bien proportionnée à la protection des données à caractère personnel en ce que la collecte, le stockage et la durée de conservation des données permettent strictement au système de fonctionner et d’atteindre ses objectifs.

      EES sera un système centralisé avec coopération des Etats Membres ; d’où une architecture et des règles de fonctionnement communes.​

      Vu cette contrainte d’uniformisation des modalités régissant vérifications aux frontières et accès au système, seul le règlement en tant que véhicule juridique pouvait convenir, sans possibilité d’adaptation aux législations nationales.

      Un accès internet sécurisé à un service web hébergé par EU-LISA permettra aux visiteurs des pays tiers de vérifier à tout moment leur durée de séjour autorisée.

      Cette fonctionnalité sera également accessible aux transporteurs, comme les compagnies aériennes, pour vérifier si leurs voyageurs sont bien autorisés à pénétrer dans le territoire de l’UE.

      La biométrie faciale, fer de lance du programme EES

      Véritable remise en question du Code Schengen, EES permettra de relever la biométrie de tous les visiteurs des pays tiers, alors que ceux soumis à visa sont déjà enregistrés dans le VIS.

      Pour les identifiants biométriques, l’ancien système envisageait 10 empreintes digitales. Le nouveau combine quatre empreintes et la reconnaissance faciale.

      La technologie, qui a bénéficié de progrès considérables ces dernières années, s’inscrit en support des traditionnelles empreintes digitales.

      Bien que la Commission ne retienne pas le principe d’enregistrement de visiteurs fiables (RTP), c’est tout comme.

      En effet, quatre empreintes seront encore relevées lors du premier contrôle pour vérifier que le demandeur n’est pas déjà répertorié dans EES ou VIS.

      En l’absence d’un signal, l’autorité frontalière créera un dossier en s’assurant que la photographie du passeport ayant une zone de lecture automatique (« Machine Readable Travel Document ») correspond bien à l’image faciale prise en direct du nouveau visiteur.

      Mais pour les passages suivants, c’est le visage qui l’emporte.

      Souriez, vous êtes en Europe ! Les fastidieux (et falsifiables) tampons sur les passeports seront remplacés par un accès à EES.

      La biométrie est donc le grand gagnant du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Certains terminaux maritimes ou postes frontières terrestres particulièrement fréquentés deviendront les premiers clients de ces fameuses eGates réservées aujourd’hui aux seuls voyageurs aériens.

      Frontex, en tant qu’agence aidant les pays de l’UE et les pays associés à Schengen à gérer leurs frontières extérieures, va aider à harmoniser les contrôles aux frontières à travers l’UE.

      EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité

      Le dispositif EES est complexe et ambitieux dans la mesure où il fluidifie les passages tout en relevant le niveau des contrôles. On anticipe dès aujourd’hui des procédures d’accueil en Europe bien meilleures grâce aux eGates et bornes self-service.

      Sous l’angle de nos politiques migratoires et de la prévention des malveillances, on pourra immédiatement repérer les personnes ne rempliss​​ant pas les conditions d’entrée et accéder aux historiques des déplacements.

      Mais rappelons également qu’EES constituera un puissant outil de lutte contre la fraude à l’identité, notamment au sein de l’espace Schengen, tout visiteur ayant été enregistré lors de son arrivée à la frontière.

      Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Thales est particulièrement attentif à cette initiative EES qui repose massivement sur la biométrie et le contrôle des documents de voyage.

      En effet, l’identification et l’authentification des personnes sont deux expertises majeures de Thales depuis plus de 20 ans. La société contribue d’ailleurs à plus de 200 programmes gouvernementaux dans 80 pays sur ces sujets.

      La société peut répondre aux objectifs du programme EES en particulier pour :

      - Exploiter les dernières technologies pour l’authentification des documents de voyage, l’identification des voyageurs à l’aide de captures et vérifications biométriques, et l’évaluation des risques avec accès aux listes de contrôle, dans tous les points de contrôle aux frontières.
      - Réduire les coûts par l’automatisation et l’optimisation des processus tout en misant sur de nouvelles technologies pour renforcer la sécurité et offrir davantage de confort aux passagers
      - Valoriser des tâches de gardes-frontières qui superviseront ces dispositifs tout en portant leur attention sur des cas pouvant porter à suspicion.
      - Diminuer les temps d’attente après enregistrement dans la base EES. Un facteur non négligeable pour des frontaliers ou visiteurs réguliers qui consacreront plus de temps à des activités productives !

      Des bornes d’enregistrement libre-service comme des frontières automatiques ou semi-automatiques peuvent être déployées dans les prochaines années avec l’objectif de fluidifier les contrôles et rendre plus accueillant l’accès à l’espace Schengen.

      Ces bornes automatiques et biométriques ont d’ailleurs été installées dans les aéroports parisiens d’Orly et de Charles de Gaulle (Nouveau PARAFE : https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/europe/france/dis/gouvernement/controle-aux-frontieres).

      La reconnaissance faciale a été mise en place en 2018.

      Les nouveaux sas PARAFE à Roissy – Septembre 2017

      Thales dispose aussi d’une expertise reconnue dans la gestion intégrée des frontières et contribue en particulier à deux grand systèmes de gestion des flux migratoires.

      - Les systèmes d’identification biométrique de Thales sont en particulier au cœur du système américain de gestion des données IDENT (anciennement US-VISIT). Cette base de données biographiques et biométriques contient des informations sur plus de 200 millions de personnes qui sont entrées, ont tenté d’entrer et ont quitté les États-Unis d’Amérique.

      - Thales est le fournisseur depuis l’origine du système biométrique Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy System) qui est le plus important système AFIS multi-juridictionnel au monde, avec ses 32 pays affiliés. Le système Eurodac est une base de données comportant les empreintes digitales des demandeurs d’asile pour chacun des états membres ainsi que des personnes appréhendées à l’occasion d’un franchissement irrégulier d’une frontière.

      Pour déjouer les tentatives de fraude documentaire, Thales a mis au point des équipements sophistiqués permettant de vérifier leur authenticité par comparaison avec les modèles en circulation. Leur validité est aussi vérifiée par connexion à des bases de documents volés ou perdus (SLTD de Interpol). Ou a des watch lists nationales.

      Pour le contrôle des frontières, au-delà de ses SAS et de ses kiosks biométriques, Thales propose toute une gamme de lecteurs de passeports d’équipements et de logiciels d’authentification biométriques, grâce à son portefeuille Cogent, l’un des pionniers du secteur.

      Pour en savoir plus, n’hésitez pas à nous contacter.​

      https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/europe/france/dis/gouvernement/biometrie/systeme-entree-sortie
      #smart_borders #Thales #overstayers #reconnaissance_faciale #prévention #détection #fraude_à_l'identité #Registered_Traveller_Program (#RTP) #EU-LISA #interface_uniforme_nationale (#IUN) #Contrôleur_Européen_pour_la_Protection_des_Données (#CEPD) #Privacy_By_Design #respect_de_la_vie_privée #empreintes_digitales #biométrie #Frontex #bornes #aéroport #PARAFE #IDENT #US-VISIT #Eurodac #Gemalto

  • Gaining Ground: Promising Practice to Reduce & End Immigration Detention

    Immigration detention represents one of the most flagrant human rights violations of our time. In recent years, IDC has seen a number of governments begin to recognise that effective and feasible #alternatives_to_detention (#ATD) do exist. This paper was written to provide an overview of practical examples and recent developments in the field of alternatives to detention (ATD), in order to highlight promising practice and encourage further progress in this area. It aims to inspire and embolden governments, local authorities, international organisations, civil society and community actors and other stakeholders, with steps they can take to move away from the use of immigration detention. This report includes an Annex compiling short country profiles for the 47 countries included in the research mapping.

    https://idcoalition.org/publication/gaining-ground-promising-practice-to-reduce-end-immigration-detention
    #rétention #détention_administrative #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #IDC #alternatives #exemples

  • A la frontière avec la Turquie, des migrants enrôlés de force par la police grecque pour refouler d’autres migrants

    Une enquête du « Monde » et de « Lighthouse Reports », « Der Spiegel », « ARD Report Munchen » et « The Guardian » montre que la police grecque utilise des migrants pour renvoyer les nouveaux arrivants en Turquie.

    Dans le village de #Neo_Cheimonio, situé à dix minutes du fleuve de l’Evros qui sépare la Grèce et la Turquie, les refoulements de réfugiés, une pratique contraire au droit international, sont un secret de Polichinelle. A l’heure de pointe, au café, les habitants, la cinquantaine bien passée, évoquent la reprise des flux migratoires. « Chaque jour, nous empêchons l’entrée illégale de 900 personnes », a affirmé, le 18 juin, le ministre grec de la protection civile, Takis Theodorikakos, expliquant l’augmentation de la pression migratoire exercée par Ankara.
    « Mais nous ne voyons pas les migrants. Ils sont enfermés, sauf ceux qui travaillent pour la police », lance un retraité. Son acolyte ajoute : « Eux vivent dans les conteneurs du commissariat et peuvent aller et venir. Tu les rencontres à la rivière, où ils travaillent, ou à la tombée de la nuit lorsqu’ils vont faire des courses. » Ces nouvelles « recrues » de la police grecque ont remplacé les fermiers et les pêcheurs qui barraient eux-mêmes la route, il y a quelques années, à ceux qu’ils nomment « les clandestins ».

    « Esclaves » de la police grecque

    D’après les ONG Human Rights Watch ou Josoor, cette tendance revient souvent depuis 2020 dans les témoignages des victimes de « pushbacks » [les refoulements illégaux de migrants]. A la suite des tensions à la frontière en mars 2020, lorsque Ankara avait menacé de laisser passer des milliers de migrants en Europe, les autorités grecques auraient intensifié le recours à cette pratique pour éviter que leurs troupes ne s’approchent trop dangereusement du territoire turc, confirment trois policiers postés à la frontière. Ce #travail_forcé des migrants « bénéficie d’un soutien politique. Aucun policier n’agirait seul », renchérit un gradé.

    Athènes a toujours démenti avoir recours aux refoulements illégaux de réfugiés. Contacté par Le Monde et ses partenaires, le ministère grec de la protection civile n’a pas donné suite à nos sollicitations.

    Au cours des derniers mois, Le Monde et ses partenaires de Lighthouse Reports – Der Spiegel, ARD Report Munchen et The Guardian avec l’aide d’une page Facebook « Consolidated Rescue Group » –, ont pu interviewer six migrants qui ont raconté avoir été les « esclaves » de la #police grecque, contraints d’effectuer des opérations de « pushbacks » secrètes et violentes. En échange, ces petites mains de la politique migratoire grecque se sont vu promettre un #permis_de_séjour d’un mois leur permettant d’organiser la poursuite de leur voyage vers le nord de l’Europe.

    Au fil des interviews se dessine un mode opératoire commun à ces renvois. Après leur arrestation à la frontière, les migrants sont incarcérés plusieurs heures ou plusieurs jours dans un des commissariats. Ils sont ensuite transportés dans des camions en direction du fleuve de l’Evros, où les « esclaves » les attendent en toute discrétion. « Les policiers m’ont dit de porter une cagoule pour ne pas être reconnu », avance Saber, soumis à ce travail forcé en 2020. Enfin, les exilés sont renvoyés vers la Turquie par groupe de dix dans des bateaux pneumatiques conduits par les « esclaves ».

    Racket, passage à tabac des migrants

    Le procédé n’est pas sans #violence : tous confirment les passages à tabac des migrants par la police grecque, le racket, la confiscation de leur téléphone portable, les fouilles corporelles, les mises à nu.
    Dans cette zone militarisée, à laquelle journalistes, humanitaires et avocats n’ont pas accès, nous avons pu identifier six points d’expulsion forcée au niveau de la rivière, grâce au partage des localisations par l’un des migrants travaillant aux côtés des forces de l’ordre grecques. Trois autres ont aussi fourni des photos prises à l’intérieur de #commissariats de police. Des clichés dont nous avons pu vérifier l’authenticité et la localisation.

    A Neo Cheimonio, les « esclaves » ont fini par faire partie du paysage. « Ils viennent la nuit, lorsqu’ils ont fini de renvoyer en Turquie les migrants. Certains restent plusieurs mois et deviennent chefs », rapporte un commerçant de la bourgade.

    L’un de ces leaders, un Syrien surnommé « Mike », a tissé des liens privilégiés avec les policiers et appris quelques rudiments de grec. « Son visage n’est pas facile à oublier. Il est passé faire des emplettes il y a environ cinq jours », note le négociant.
    Mike, mâchoire carrée, coupe militaire et casque de combattant spartiate tatoué sur le biceps droit, a été identifié par trois anciens « esclaves » comme leur supérieur direct. D’après nos informations, cet homme originaire de la région de Homs serait connu des services de police syriens pour des faits de trafic d’essence et d’être humains. Tout comme son frère, condamné en 2009 pour homicide volontaire.

    En contact avec un passeur basé à Istanbul, l’homme recruterait ses serviteurs, en leur faisant croire qu’il les aidera à rester en Grèce en échange d’environ 5 000 euros, selon le récit qu’en fait Farhad, un Syrien qui a vite déchanté en apprenant qu’il devrait expulser des compatriotes en Turquie. « L’accord était que nous resterions une semaine dans le poste de police pour ensuite continuer notre voyage jusqu’à Athènes. Quand on m’a annoncé que je devais effectuer les refoulements, j’ai précisé que je ne savais pas conduire le bateau. Mike m’a répondu que, si je n’acceptais pas, je perdrais tout mon argent et que je risquerais de disparaître à mon retour à Istanbul », glisse le jeune homme.
    Les anciens affidés de Mike se souviennent de sa violence. « Mike frappait les réfugiés et il nous disait de faire de même pour que les #commandos [unité d’élite de la police grecque] soient contents de nous », confie Hussam, un Syrien de 26 ans.

    De 70 à 100 refoulements par jour

    Saber, Hussam ou Farhad affirment avoir renvoyé entre 70 et 100 personnes par jour en Turquie et avoir été témoins d’accidents qui auraient pu mal tourner. Comme ce jour où un enfant est tombé dans le fleuve et a été réanimé de justesse côté turc… Au bout de quarante-cinq jours, Hussam a reçu un titre de séjour temporaire que nous avons retrouvé dans les fichiers de la police grecque. Théoriquement prévu pour rester en Grèce, ce document lui a permis de partir s’installer dans un autre pays européen.
    Sur l’une des photos que nous avons pu nous procurer, Mike prend la pose en treillis, devant un mobile-home, dont nous avons pu confirmer la présence dans l’enceinte du commissariat de Neo Cheimonio. Sur les réseaux sociaux, l’homme affiche un tout autre visage, bien loin de ses attitudes martiales. Tout sourire dans les bras de sa compagne, une Française, en compagnie de ses enfants ou goguenard au volant de sa voiture. C’est en France qu’il a élu domicile, sans éveiller les soupçons des autorités françaises sur ses activités en Grèce.

    Le Monde et ses partenaires ont repéré deux autres postes de police où cette pratique a été adoptée. A #Tychero, village d’environ 2 000 habitants, c’est dans le commissariat, une bâtisse qui ressemble à une étable, que Basel, Saber et Suleiman ont été soumis au même régime.
    C’est par désespoir, après neuf refoulements par les autorités grecques, que Basel avait accepté la proposition de « #collaboration » faite par un policier grec, « parce qu’il parlait bien anglais ». Apparaissant sur une photographie prise dans le poste de police de Tychero et partagée sur Facebook par un de ses collègues, cet officier est mentionné par deux migrants comme leur recruteur. Lors de notre passage dans ce commissariat, le 22 juin, il était présent.
    Basel soutient que les policiers l’encourageaient à se servir parmi les biens volés aux réfugiés. Le temps de sa mission, il était enfermé avec les autres « esclaves » dans une chambre cachée dans une partie du bâtiment qui ne communique pas avec les bureaux du commissariat, uniquement accessible par une porte arrière donnant sur la voie ferrée. Après quatre-vingts jours, Basel a obtenu son sésame, son document de séjour qu’il a gardé, malgré les mauvais souvenirs et les remords. « J’étais un réfugié fuyant la guerre et, tout d’un coup, je suis devenu un bourreau pour d’autres exilés, avoue-t-il. Mais j’étais obligé, j’étais devenu leur esclave. »

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/06/28/a-la-frontiere-avec-la-turquie-des-migrants-enroles-de-force-par-la-police-g

    #Evros #Thrace #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Turquie #Grèce #push-backs #refoulements #esclavage #néo-esclavage #papier_blanc #détention_administrative #rétention #esclavage_moderne #enfermement

    • “We were slaves”

      The Greek police are using foreigners as “slaves” to forcibly return asylum seekers to Turkey

      People who cross the river Evros from Turkey to Greece to seek international protection are arrested by Greek police every day. They are often beaten, robbed and detained in police stations before illegally being sent back across the river.

      The asylum seekers are moved from the detention sites towards the river bank in police trucks where they are forced onto rubber boats by men wearing balaclavas, with Greek police looking on. Then these masked men transport them back to the other side.

      In recent years there have been numerous accounts from the victims, as well as reports by human rights organisations and the media, stating that the men driving these boats speak Arabic or Farsi, indicating they are not from Greece. A months-long joint investigation with The Guardian, Le Monde, Der Spiegel and ARD Report München has for the first time identified six of these men – who call themselves slaves– interviewed them and located the police stations where they were held. Some of the slaves, who are kept locked up between operations, were forcibly recruited themselves after crossing the border but others were lured there by smugglers working with a gangmaster who is hosted in a container located in the carpark of a Greek police station. In return for their “work” they received papers allowing them to stay in Greece for 25 days.

      The slaves said they worked alongside regular police units to strip, rob and assault refugees and migrants who crossed the Evros river into Greece — they then acted as boatmen to ferry them back to the Turkish side of the river against their will. Between operations the slaves are held in at least three different police stations in the heavily militarised Evros region.

      The six men we interviewed weren’t allowed to have their phones with them during the pushback operations. But some of them managed to take some pictures from inside the police station in Tychero and others took photos of the Syrian gangmaster working with the police. These visuals helped us to corroborate the stories the former slaves told us.

      Videos and photographs from police stations in the heavily militarised zone between Greece and Turkey are rare. One slave we interviewed provided us with selfies allegedly taken from inside the police station of Tychero, close to the river Evros, but difficult to match directly to the station because of the lack of other visuals. We collected all visual material of the station that was available via open sources, and from our team, and we used it to reconstruct the building in a 3D model which made it possible to place the slave’s selfies at the precise location in the building. The 3D-model also tells us that the place where the slaves were kept outside their “working” hours is separate from the prison cells where the Greek police detain asylum seekers before they force them back to Turkey.

      We also obtained photos of a Syrian man in military fatigues in front of a container. This man calls himself Mike. According to three of the six sources, they worked under Mike’s command and he in turn was working with the Greek police. We were able to find the location of the container that serves as home for Mike and the slaves. It is in the parking lot of the police station in Neo Cheimonio in the Evros region.

      We also obtained the papers that the sources received after three months of working with the Greek police and were able to verify their names in the Greek police system. All their testimonies were confirmed by local residents in the Evros region.
      STORYLINES

      Bassel was already half naked, bruised and beaten when he was confronted with an appalling choice. Either he would agree to work for his captors, the Greek police, or he would be charged with human smuggling and go to prison.

      Earlier that night Bassel, a Syrian man in his twenties, had crossed the Evros river from Turkey into Greece hoping to claim asylum. But his group was met in the forests by Greek police and detained. Then Bassel was pulled out of a cell in the small town of Tychero and threatened with smuggling charges for speaking English. His only way out, they told him, was to do the Greeks’ dirty work for them. He would be kept locked up during the day and released at night to push back his own compatriots and other desperate asylum seekers. In return he would be given a travel permit that would enable him to escape Greece for Western Europe. Read the full story in Der Spiegel

      Bassel’s story matched with three other testimonies from asylum seekers who were held in a police station in Neo Cheimonio. All had paid up to €5,000 euros to a middleman in Istanbul to cross from Turkey to Greece with the help of a smuggler, who said there would be a Syrian man waiting for them with Greek police.

      Farhad, in his thirties and from Syria along with two others held at the station, said they too were regularly threatened by a Syrian man whom they knew as “Mike”. “Mike” was working at the Neo Cheimonio station, where he was being used by police as a gangmaster to recruit and coordinate groups of asylum seekers to assist illegal pushbacks, write The Guardian and ARD Report Munchen.
      Residents of Greek villages near the border also report that it is “an open secret” in the region that fugitives carry out pushbacks on behalf of the police. Farmers and fishermen who are allowed to enter the restricted area on the Evros have repeatedly observed refugees doing their work. Migrants are not seen on this stretch of the Evros, a local resident told Le Monde, “Except for those who work for the police.”

      https://www.lighthousereports.nl/investigation/we-were-slaves

  • Schengen borders code: Council adopts its general approach

    As part of the work carried out under the French presidency to reform and strengthen the Schengen area in the face of new challenges, the Council today adopted its general approach on the reform of the Schengen borders code.

    This reform: (i) provides new tools to combat the instrumentalisation of migrant flows; (ii) establishes a new legal framework for external border measures in the event of a health crisis, drawing on the lessons learned from the experience with COVID-19; (iii) updates the legal framework for reintroducing internal border controls in order to safeguard the principle of free movement while responding to persistent threats; (iv) introduces alternative measures to these controls.

    The general approach now enables the Council to start negotiations with the European Parliament, once the Parliament has adopted its own position.
    The fight against the instrumentalisation of migration flows

    The text defines the instrumentalisation of migrants as a situation in which a third country or non-state actor encourages or facilitates the movement of third-country nationals towards the EU’s external borders or to a member state in order to destabilise the EU or a member state. It introduces new measures to combat this phenomenon, including limiting the number of crossing points at the external border or limiting their opening hours, and intensifying border surveillance.
    External border measures in the event of a health crisis

    The text provides for the possible swift adoption of binding minimum rules on temporary travel restrictions at the external borders in the event of a threat to public health. This will strengthen the currently available tools applied during the COVID-19 pandemic, which have been based on non-binding recommendations.

    The binding implementing regulation to be adopted by the Council in such situations will include minimum restrictions, with the possibility for member states to apply stricter restrictions if the conditions so require. It will also include a list of essential travellers to be exempted from certain measures, which will be decided on a case by case basis.
    Reintroduction of internal border controls

    The text sets out more structured procedures for the reintroduction of internal border controls, with stronger safeguards. It takes into account a recent judgment by the European Court of Justice, which confirmed the principle of freedom of movement within the Schengen area, while specifying the conditions for the reintroduction of internal border controls. In this regard, it offers possible responses to persistent threats to public policy and internal security.

    If a continued need for internal border controls is confirmed beyond two years and six months, the member state concerned will need to notify the Commission of its intention to further prolong internal border controls, providing justification for doing so and specifying the date on which it expects to lift controls. The Commission will then issue a recommendation, also relating to that date, and with regard to the principles of necessity and proportionality, to be taken into account by the member state.
    Promotion of alternative measures

    The text updates the Schengen borders code by providing for alternative measures to internal border controls, in particular by proposing a more effective framework for police checks in member states’ border regions.

    The text introduces a new procedure to address unauthorised movements of irregular migrants within the EU. In the context of a bilateral cooperation framework based on voluntary action by the member states concerned, this mechanism will allow a member state to transfer third-country nationals apprehended in the border area and illegally staying in its territory to the member state from which they arrived, in the context of operational cross-border police cooperation.

    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/10/schengen-area-council-adopts-negotiating-mandate-reform-schengen-bo

    en français:
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2022/06/10/schengen-area-council-adopts-negotiating-mandate-reform-schengen-bo

    #Schegen #code_frontières_Schengen #frontières #frontières_extérieures #frontières_intérieures #frontières_internes #migrations #asile #réfugiés #réforme #menaces #liberté_de_circulation #surveillance_frontalière #instrumentalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #mouvements_secondaires #coopération_policière_opérationnelle_transfrontière

    • Joint Civil Society statement on the Schengen Borders Code

      The undersigned civil society organisations would like to express their concerns with regard to several aspects of the Commission’s proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code.

      Overall, the proposal embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders irregularly are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing and curtailing safeguards. At the same time, the proposal fails to recognise the lack of regular pathways for asylum seekers, who are often forced to turn to irregular border crossings in order to seek international protection within the EU, and further complicates access to asylum. The measures put forward by the Commission would have a detrimental impact on the right to freedom of movement within the EU, the principle of non-discrimination, access to asylum and the harmonisation of procedures under EU law. Furthermore, the proposal would increase the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, without any adequate safeguards.

      Freedom of movement within the EU and violation of the principle of non-discrimination

      Several provisions of the proposed amended Schengen Borders Code would encroach the right to freedom of movement within the EU (art. 3(2) TEU, art. 21 and 77 TFEU) by expanding the possibility to reintroduce internal border controls and facilitating the application of so-called “alternative measures” which in practice amount to discriminatory border controls. The discretionary nature of these border checks is very likely to disproportionately target racialised communities, and practically legitimise ethnic and racial profiling and expose people to institutional and police abuse.

      While the amended Schengen Borders Code reiterates that internal border controls are prohibited in the Schengen area, it also introduces the possibility to carry out police checks in the internal border areas with the explicit aim to prevent irregular migration, when these are based on “general information and experience of the competent authorities” (rec. 18 and 21 and art. 23). In addition, the proposal clarifies the meaning of “serious threat” which justifies the temporary reintroduction of border controls (which was already possible under art. 25 of the 2016 SBC). Problematically, the proposed definition of “serious threat” also includes “a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals between member states, putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control” (art. 25).[1]

      Such provisions, together with the new procedure set by article 23a and analysed below, will in practice legalise systematic border controls which target people based on their racial, ethnic, national, or religious characteristics. This practice is in clear violation of European and international anti-discrimination law and a breach to migrants’ fundamental rights.

      Research from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 2021 shows that people from an ‘ethnic minority, Muslim, or not heterosexual’ are disproportionately affected by police stops, both when they are walking and when in a vehicle. In addition, another study from 2014 showed that 79% of surveyed border guards at airports rated ethnicity as a helpful indicator to identify people attempting to enter the country in an irregular manner before speaking to them.

      The new provisions introduced in the amended Schengen Borders Code are likely to further increase the discriminatory and illegal practice of ethnic and racial profiling and put migrant communities at risk of institutional violence, which undermines the right to non-discrimination and stands at odds with the European Commission’s commitments under the recent Anti-Racism Action Plan.

      Lack of individual assessment and increased detention

      The proposed revisions to the Schengen Borders Code set a new procedure to “transfer people apprehended at the internal borders”. According to the proposed new rules, if a third country national without a residence permit or right to remain crosses the internal borders in an irregular way (e.g., from Germany to Belgium, or from Italy to France) and if they are apprehended “in the vicinity of the border area,” they could be directly transferred back to the competent authorities in the EU country where it is assumed they just came from, without undergoing an individual assessment (art. 23a and Annex XII). This provision is very broad and can potentially include people apprehended at train or bus stations, or even in cities close to the internal borders, if they are apprehended as part of cross-border police cooperation (e.g. joint police patrols) and if there is an indication that they have just crossed the border (for instance through documents they may carry on themselves, their own statements, or information taken from migration or other databases).

      The person will be then transferred within 24 hours.[2] During these 24 hours, Annex XII sets that the authorities might “take appropriate measures” to prevent the person from entering on the territory – which constitutes, in practice, a blanket detention provision, without any safeguards nor judicial overview. While the transfer decision could be subject to appeal, this would not have a suspensive effect. The Return Directive would also be amended, by introducing an obligation for the receiving member state to issue a return decision without the exceptions currently listed in article 6 (e.g., the possibility to issue a residence permit for humanitarian or compassionate reasons). As a consequence, transferred people would be automatically caught up in arbitrary and lengthy detention and return procedures.[3]

      Courts in Italy, Slovenia and Austria have recently ruled against readmissions taking place under informal or formal agreements, recognising them as systematic human rights violations with the potential to trigger so-called chain pushbacks. The courts found the plaintiffs were routinely returned from Italy or Austria through Slovenia to Croatia, from where they had been illegally pushed back to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

      In practice, this provision would legalise the extremely violent practice of “internal pushbacks” which have been broadly criticised by civil society organisations across the EU and condemned by higher courts. The new procedure, including the possibility to detain people for up to 24 hours, would also apply to children, even though this has been deemed illegal by courts and despite international consensus that child detention constitutes a human rights violation.

      Access to asylum

      The new Code introduces measures which member states can apply in cases of “instrumentalisation of migrants”, which is defined as “a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the Union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders” (art. 2). In such cases, member states can limit the number of border crossing points and their opening hours, and intensify border surveillance including through drones, motion sensors and border patrols (art. 5(4) and 13(5)). The definition of instrumentalisation of migrants should also be read in conjunction with the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, which provides member states with numerous derogations to the asylum acquis.

      These measures unjustifiably penalise asylum seekers by limiting access to the territory and de facto undermining art. 31 of the Refugee Convention which prohibits States from imposing penalties on refugees on account of their entry or presence in their territory without authorization, and are therefore in violation of international law.

      Harmonisation of procedures under EU law and asylum acquis

      The proposal lifts the standstill clause introduced by the 2008 Return Directive (art. 6(3)) which prohibits member states from negotiating new bilateral readmission agreements. When negotiating the 2008 Return Directive, both the Commission and the European Parliament had clarified that bilateral readmission agreements should remain an exception, as they undermine the objective of harmonising procedures under EU law.

      By incentivising states to adopt new bilateral agreements, and proposing a new internal transfer procedure, the Commission’s proposal promotes the proliferation of exceptional procedures, which are outside the framework set by the Return Directive and the asylum acquis, and circumvents the procedural safeguards included in the Dublin Regulation.

      The proposed provisions undermine the substantive and procedural guarantees for third country nationals, such as the right to request asylum, the respect of the principle of non-refoulement, and the right to an effective remedy.

      As mentioned above, several national-level courts have ruled on the unlawfulness of readmissions carried out under formal and informal agreements, which often led to instances of chain-refoulement. There is a serious risk that readmission agreements, if they remain a part of the current legislative proposal, could be further abused to perpetrate chain refoulement and collective expulsions, which are in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

      Use of monitoring and surveillance technologies

      Lastly, the proposal also facilitates a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, by clarifying that these are part of member states’ responsibility to patrol borders (art. 2). In addition, article 23, analysed above, clarifies that internal checks, including to prevent irregular migration, can be carried out “where appropriate, on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory”.

      By removing obstacles for a more extensive use of monitoring and surveillance technologies, these provisions would create a loophole to introduce technologies which would otherwise be discouraged by pre-existing EU legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation.[4]

      Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other automated decision-making systems, including profiling, are increasingly used in border control and management for generalised and indiscriminate surveillance. Insofar as such systems are used to ‘detect human presence’ for the purpose of ‘combating irregular migration’, there is serious concern that such systems can facilitate illegal interdiction, violence at border crossings, and further limit access to asylum and other forms of protection.

      Furthermore, these technologies disproportionately target racialised people, thus further exacerbating the risks of increased racial and ethnic profiling. Indeed, monitoring and surveillance technologies which make use of artificial intelligence by nature violate the right to non-discrimination insofar as they are trained on past data and decision-making, and therefore codify assumptions on the basis of nationality and other personal characteristics, which is prohibited by international racial discrimination law.[5]

      Recommendations

      In light of the concerns discussed above, the undersigned civil society organisations:

      – Express their concerns on the harmful impact of narratives which consider people crossing borders irregularly as a threat, and recommend the European Parliament and the Council to delete such references from recital 29, article 23 and article 25(1)(c);
      – Call on the EU institutions to uphold the right to freedom of movement and the principle of non-discrimination, including by prohibiting the use of technologies which make use of artificial intelligence and other automated decision-making systems. In this regard, we recommend the European Parliament and the Council to amend article 23, paragraph (a) by deleting the reference to “combat irregular residence or stay, linked to irregular migration” in point (ii) and deleting point (iv) on monitoring and surveillance technologies;
      – Urge the EU institutions to uphold the right to apply for asylum, and recommend deleting the definition of ‘instrumentalisation of migration’ in article 2, paragraph 27 and all the ensuing provisions which would apply in this circumstance;
      – Condemn the proliferation of exceptional procedures which undermine the right to an individual assessment, and recommend deleting article 23a, annex XII, and the proposed amendment to art. 6(3) of the Return Directive;
      – Express their concerns at the glaring inconsistency between some of the proposed provisions and the European Commission’s commitments under the EU Action Plan against Racism, i.e. with respect to ending racial profiling, and call on the EU institutions to uphold their commitment to address and to combat structural and institutional discrimination and include explicit references to the Action Plan against Racism in the text of the Schengen Borders Code.

      https://picum.org/joint-civil-society-statement-schengen-borders-code

      #discrimination #non-discrimination #détention #rétention #détention_administrative #réadmission

  • Poland: Detained Syrian asylum seekers continue hunger strike

    A hunger strike by a group of Syrian asylum seekers being detained in a closed center south of Warsaw is into its ninth day. The men say they have been treated “like criminals”.

    Munzer, Ghith, Shadee, Rami and Mousa began their protest at the Lesznowola Guarded Center for Foreigners in Poland on April 19. It was a move prompted by frustration and loss of hope, they said.

    “We are sorry we are doing this,” the men wrote in a letter in English to the Office for Foreigners and the manager of the center, as they began the hunger strike.

    The letter said they were feeling intense psychological pressure and exhaustion “especially with … the harsh experience that we went through in Syria and Belarus.”

    They crossed the Polish border from Belarus “illegally”, the letter continued, because they had no other option. They have been given no convincing reason for their detention at the facility, where they have remained for more than two months.

    “The conditions in Lesznowola are not bad, but it is not about the conditions, but about the fact that we are treated like criminals,” one of the men told OKO.press. The 39-year-old left Syria in 2021 because he did not want to be drafted into the army, he said. He gave the Polish authorities all the information they requested and he could not understand why he was being locked up.

    The Lesznowola center is in a relatively isolated area about 15 kilometers south of the Polish capital Warsaw. Social media videos and photos by the Polish Border Guard (Straż Graniczna) show a well-equipped and clean facility with a gym, computer rooms, prayer rooms, a library and large areas outside for sport and relaxation.

    In a tweet this week the border guard said that EU commissioner Ylva Johansson had “positively assessed the conditions in the center” during a visit in February.

    In fact what Commissioner Johansson wrote was that her visit to the center showed there was “a possibility [our emphasis] to apply humane living conditions,” which, she continued, “Must be matched with efficient, fair asylum processes.”

    Grupa Granica, a network of human rights NGOs monitoring the Polish borders, called the facility a ’prison’. Activists linked to Grupa Granica said Wednesday that none of the five Syrians should be in the center, since it is against Polish law to hold people who have suffered torture in closed facilities. They note that the men have fled a violent civil war and experienced pushbacks when they attempted to cross the border to Poland.

    Posting on social media, the Polish aid group ’With Bread and Salt’ (Chlebem i Solą) said they had met two of the Syrian men last year in the woods on the border with Belarus. “We helped them to apply to the European Court of Human Rights, thanks to which they received a document that forbade the Polish authorities to once again deport them to Belarus. It was just when we knew they were safe that we called Straż Graniczna,” the group wrote. Unfortunately for the men, they were taken to closed facilties, some to the notorious Wędrzyn center, and have remained in detention ever since.

    Now into its 9th day, the hunger strike led a Polish MP, Katarzyna Piekarska, to intervene. Piekarska, from the Democratic Left Alliance, visited the center and spoke to one of the Syrian protesters, who said he was having problems with his nerves and trouble sleeping, she told OKO.press.

    According to Piekarska, the courts in Poland agree to request from the Border Guard to detain asylum seekers partly because it is “simply easier that way.”

    A spokesperson for the border guard told OKO.press that the Syrians were in detention “on the basis of a court order in connection with their illegal stay in our country.”

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/40162/poland-detained-syrian-asylum-seekers-continue-hunger-strike

    #Pologne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_syriens #grève_de_la_faim #rétention #détention #Lesznowola

  • Migrants, Asylum Seekers Locked Up in Ukraine

    Scores of migrants who had been arbitrarily detained in Ukraine remain locked up there and are at heightened risk amid the hostilities, including military activity in the vicinity, Human Rights Watch said today. Ukrainian authorities should immediately release migrants and asylum seekers detained due to their migration status and allow them to reach safety in Poland.

    “Migrants and asylum seekers are currently locked up in the middle of a war zone and justifiably terrified,” said Nadia Hardman, refugee and migrant rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. “There is no excuse, over a month into this conflict, for keeping civilians in immigration detention. They should be immediately released and allowed to seek refuge and safety like all other civilians.”

    In early March 2022, Human Rights Watch interviewed four men by telephone who are being held in the Zhuravychi Migrant Accommodation Center in Volyn’ oblast. The detention site is a former military barracks in a pine forest, one hour from Lutsk, a city in northwestern Ukraine. All interviewees said that they had been detained in the months prior to the Russian invasion for irregularly trying to cross the border into Poland.

    The men asked that their nationalities not be disclosed for security reasons but said that people of up to 15 nationalities were being held there, including people from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria.

    Zhuravychi and two other migrant detention facilities in Ukraine are supported with EU funding. The Global Detention Project has confirmed that the center in Chernihiv has now been emptied but the center in Mykolaiv is operating. Human Rights Watch has been unable to verify whether anyone is still detained there. The men said that at the time of the interviews more than 100 men and an unknown number of women were detained at the Zhuravychi MAC. Some have since been able to negotiate their release, in some cases with help from their embassies. Lighthouse Reports, which is also investigating the issue, has estimated that up to 45 people remain there. It has not been possible to verify this figure or determine whether this includes men and women.

    Three of the men said they were in Ukraine on student visas that had expired. All four had tried to cross the border into Poland but were intercepted by Polish border guard forces and handed directly to Ukrainian border guards. The men said they were sentenced to between 6 and 18 months for crossing the border irregularly after summary court proceedings for which they were not provided legal counsel or given the right to claim asylum.

    Whatever the original basis for their detention, their continued detention at the center is arbitrary and places them at risk of harm from the hostilities, Human Rights Watch said.

    While interviewees said that conditions in the #Zhuravychi detention center were difficult prior to the conflict, the situation significantly deteriorated after February 24. In the days following the Russian invasion, they said, members of the Ukrainian military moved into the center. The detention center guards moved all migrant and asylum seekers into one of the two buildings in the complex, freeing the second building for Ukrainian soldiers.

    A video, verified and analyzed by Human Rights Watch, shows scores of Ukrainian soldiers standing in the courtyard of the Zhuravychi MAC, corroborating the accounts that the Ukrainian military is actively using the site. Another video, also verified by Human Rights Watch, shows a military vehicle slowly driving on the road outside the detention center. Recorded from the same location, a second video shows a group of approximately 30 men in camouflage uniforms walking on the same road and turning into the compound next door.

    On or around the date after the full-scale invasion, the people interviewed said a group of detainees gathered in the yard of the detention center near the gate to protest the conditions and asked to be allowed leave to go to the Polish border.

    The guards refused to open the gate and instead forcibly quelled the protest and beat the detainees with their batons, they said. Human Rights Watch analyzed a video that appears to show the aftermath of the protest: a group of men crowd around an unconscious man lying on the ground. People interviewed said that a guard had punched him. A group of guards are also visible in the video, in black uniforms standing near the gate.

    “We came out to peacefully protest,” one of those interviewed said. “We want to go. We are terrified.… We tried to walk towards the gate … and after we were marching towards the gate.… They beat us. It was terrible. Some of my friends were injured.”

    Interviewees said that guards said they could leave Zhuravychi if they joined the Ukrainian war effort and added they would all immediately be granted Ukrainian citizenship and documentation. They said that no one accepted the offer.

    On March 18, five men and one woman were released when officials from their embassy intervened and facilitated their evacuation and safe travel to the border with Poland. Ukraine should release all migrants and asylum seekers detained at the Zhuravychi detention center and facilitate their safe travel to the Polish border, Human Rights Watch said.

    The European Union (EU) has long funded Ukraine’s border control and migration management programs and funded the International Center for Migration Policy Development to construct the perimeter security systems at Zhuravychi MAC. The core of the EU’s strategy has been to stop the flow of migrants and asylum seekers into the EU by shifting the burden and responsibility for migrants and refugees to countries neighboring the EU, in this case Ukraine. Now that Ukraine has become a war zone, the EU should do all it can to secure the release and safe passage of people detained in Ukraine because of their migration status. United Nations agencies and other international actors should support this call to release civilians at Zhuravychi and any other operational migrant detention centers and provide assistance where relevant.

    “There is so much suffering in Ukraine right now and so many civilians who still need to reach safety and refuge,” Hardman said. “Efforts to help people flee Ukraine should include foreigners locked up in immigration detention centers.”

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/04/migrants-asylum-seekers-locked-ukraine
    #Ukraine #réfugiés #migrations #asile #détention_administrative #rétention #emprisonnement

    • Migrants trapped in Ukrainian detention center while war rages on

      Several dozen irregular migrants were reportedly trapped in a detention center in northwestern Ukraine weeks into the Russian invasion, an investigation by several media outlets found. An unconfirmed number of migrants appear to remain in the EU-funded facility, from where migrants are usually deported.

      Imagine you are detained without being accused of a crime and wait to be deported to somewhere while an invading army bombs the neighboring town. This horrific scenario has been the reality for scores of migrants in northwestern Ukraine for weeks.

      A joint investigation between Dutch non-profit Lighthouse Reports, which specializes on transnational investigations, Al Jazeera and German publication Der Spiegel found that over five weeks after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Afghani, Pakistani, Indian, Sudanese and Bangladeshi migrants were still detained in a EU-funded detention center near the northwestern Ukrainian city of #Lutsk.

      Although several people were recently released with the support of their embassies, Der Spiegel reported there were still dozens of who remained there at the end of March.

      According to the wife of one detainee who was released last week, the detention center offered no air raid shelter. Moreover, guards “ran down the street when the siren sounded,” both Der Spiegel and Al Jazeera reported.

      “The guards took away the detainees’ phones,” the woman told reporters. She also said that power outlets in the cells were no longer working and the whole situation was extremely dangerous. In fact, the nearby city of Lutsk has repeatedly come under attack since March 12.

      According to the investigation, the Zhuravychi Migrant Accommodation Centre is located in a pine forest in the Volyn region, near the Belarusian border. Constructed in 1961 as an army barracks, the facility was converted into a migrant detention center in 2007 with EU funds, Al Jazeera reported.

      Reporters involved in the investigation spoke with recently released detainees’ relatives. They also analyzed photos and documents, which “verified the detainees’ presence in Ukraine before being placed in the center,” according to Al Jazeera.
      Calls for release of detainees

      Some detainees have been released since the beginning of the Russian invasion, including several Ethiopian citizens and an Afghan family, Al Jazeera reported. But politicians and NGOs have voice fear over those who remain in the Zhuravychi Migrant Accommodation Center.

      “It is extremely concerning that migrants and refugees are still locked up in detention centers in war zones, with the risk of being attacked without any possibility to flee,” Tineke Strik, a Dutch member of the European Parliament from the Greens/EFA Group told reporters involved in the investigation.

      Human Rights Watch (HRW) also decried the ongoing detention of migrants at the facility during the war. In a report published on Monday (April 4), HRW said its staff interviewed four men by telephone who are being held in that Zhuravychi in early March. According to HRW, all four men said they had been detained in the months prior to the Russian invasion for irregularly trying to cross the border into Poland.

      “Migrants and asylum seekers are currently locked up in the middle of a war zone and justifiably terrified,” said Nadia Hardman, a refugee and migrant rights researcher with HRW. “There is no excuse, over a month into this conflict, for keeping civilians in immigration detention. They should be immediately released and allowed to seek refuge and safety like all other civilians.”

      According to the four interviewees, people from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria and four other nationalities were being held at the facility.

      Michael Flynn from the Global Detention Project told Der Spiegel that the Geneva Conventions (not to be confused with the Geneva Refugee Convention) “obliges all warring parties to protect civilians under their control from the dangers of the conflict.” He stressed that the detainees needed to be released as soon as possible.
      The EU’s bouncer

      According to the investigation, the European Union has funded at least three detention centers in Ukraine “for years,” effectively making the non-EU country a gatekeeper. The facility in question near Lutsk that’s apparently still in operation received EU support “to confine asylum seekers, many of them pushed back from the EU,” according to Lighthouse Reports.

      Der Spiegel reported that up to 150 foreigners were detained in the facility last year. Most of them tried in vain to reach the European Union irregularly and have to stay in deportation detention for up to 18 months.

      Since the turn of the millennium, according to Der Spiegel, the EU has invested more than €30 million in three detention centers.

      At the facility in Zhuravychi, Der Spiegel reported, the EU provided €1.7 million for electronic door locks and protection elements on the windows. While the EU called it an “accommodation”, Der Spiegel said was a refugee prison in reality.

      The European Commission did not respond to a request for comment about the facility and the detained migrants, Al Jazeera said. Ukrainian authorities also did not answer any questions.

      In early March, InfoMigrants talked to several Bangladeshi migrants who had been given deportation orders and were stuck inside detention centers, including in said Zhuravychi Migrant Accommodation Centre. Around a hundred migrants were staying there back then, according to Bangladeshi and Indian citizens detained there. They were released a few days later.

      “Russia has been particularly bombing military bases. That’s why we have been living in constant fear of getting bombed,” Riadh Malik, a Bangladeshi migrant told InfoMigrants. According to the New York Times, the military airfield in Lutsk was bombed on March 11.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/39678/migrants-trapped-in-ukrainian-detention-center-while-war-rages-on

    • Immigration Detention amidst War: The Case of Ukraine’s Volyn Detention Centre

      A Global Detention Project Special Report

      In early March, shortly into Russia’s war on Ukraine, the Global Detention Project (GDP) began receiving email messages and videos from individuals claiming to know people who remained trapped in an immigration detention centre inside Ukraine, even as the war approached. We also received messages from a representative of the humanitarian group Alight based in Poland, who said that they too were receiving messages from detainees at Volyn, as well as identity documents, photos, and videos.

      The information we received indicated that there were several dozen detainees still at the Volyn detention centre (formally, “#Volyn_PTPI,” but also referred to as the “#Zhuravychi_Migrant_Accommodation_Centre”), including people from Pakistan, India, Eritrea, Sudan, Afghanistan, among other countries. They had grown particularly desperate after the start of the war and had held a demonstration to demand their release when the nearby town was shelled, which reportedly was violently broken up by detention centre guards.

      The GDP located a webpage on the official website of Ukraine’s State Secretariat of Migration that provided confirmation of the operational status of the Volyn facility as well as of two others. Although the official webpage was subsequently taken down, as of late March it continued to indicate that there were three operational migration-related detention centres in Ukraine, called Temporary Stay for Foreigners or #PTPI (Пункти тимчасового перебування іноземців та осіб без громадянства): Volyn PTPI (#Zhuravychi); #Chernihiv PTPI; and #Nikolaev PTPI (also referred to as the Mykolaiv detention centre).

      We learned that the Chernihiv PTPI, located north of Kyiv, was emptied shortly after the start of the war. However, as of the end of March 2022, it appeared that both the Volyn PTPI and Nikolaev PTPI remained operational and were holding detainees. We understood that the situation at the detention centres had been brought to the attention of relevant authorities in Ukraine and that the embassies of at least some of the detainees—including India—had begun arranging the removal of their nationals. Detainees from some countries, however, reportedly indicated that they did not want assistance from their embassies because they did not wish to return and were seeking asylum.

      In our communications and reporting on this situation, including on social media and through direct outreach to officials and media outlets, the GDP consistently called for the release of all migrants trapped in detention centres in Ukraine and for international efforts to assist migrants to seek safety. We highlighted important international legal standards that underscore the necessity of releasing detainees in administrative detention in situations of ongoing warfare. Important among these is Additional Protocol 1, Article 58C, of the Geneva Conventions, which requires all parties to a conflict to take necessary measures to protect civilians under their control from the effects of the war.

      We also pointed to relevant human rights standards pertaining to administrative detention. For example, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in their seminal Revised Deliberation No. 5 on the deprivation of liberty of migrants, conclude that in “instances when the obstacle for identifying or removal of persons in an irregular situation from the territory is not attributable to them … rendering expulsion impossible … the detainee must be released to avoid potentially indefinite detention from occurring, which would be arbitrary.” Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly found that when the purpose of such detention is no longer possible, detainees must be released (see ECHR, “Guide on Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to Liberty and Security,” paragraph 149.).

      In April, a consortium of press outlets—including Lighthouse Reports, Al Jazeera English, and Der Spiegel—jointly undertook an investigation into migrants trapped in detention in Ukraine and published separate reports simultaneously on 4 April. Human Rights Watch (HRW) also published their own report on 4 April, which called on authorities to immediately release the detainees. All these reports cited information provided by the GDP and interviewed GDP staff.

      HRW reported that they had spoken to some of the detainees at Volyn (Zhuravychi) and were able to confirm numerous details, including that “people of up to 15 nationalities were being held there, including people from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria.” According to HRW, the detainees claimed to have “been detained in the months prior to the Russian invasion for irregularly trying to cross the border into Poland.” They said that there were more than 100 men and women at the facility, though according to Lighthouse Reports only an estimated 45 people remained at the centre as of 21 March.

      The interviewees said that conditions at the detention centre deteriorated after 24 February when members of the Ukrainian military moved into the centre and guards relocated the detainees to one of the two buildings in the complex, freeing the second building for the soldiers. When detainees protested and demanded to be released, the guards refused, forcibly putting an end to the protest and beating detainees. Some detainees claimed to have been told that they could leave the centre if they agreed to fight alongside the Ukrainian military, which they refused.

      An issue addressed in many of these reports is the EU’s role in financing immigration detention centres in Ukraine, which the GDP had previously noted in a report about Ukraine in 2012. According to that report, “In 2011, 30 million Euros were allocated to build nine new detention centres in Ukraine. According to the EU delegation to Ukraine, this project will ‘enable’ the application of the EU-Ukraine readmission by providing detention space for ‘readmitted’ migrants sent back to Ukraine from EU countries.”

      In its report on the situation, Al Jazeera quoted Niamh Ní Bhriain of the Transnational Institute, who said that the EU had allocated 1.7 million euros ($1.8m) for the securitisation of the Volyn centre in 2009. She added, “The EU drove the policies and funded the infrastructure which sees up to 45 people being detained today inside this facility in Ukraine and therefore it must call on Ukraine to immediately release those being held and guarantee them the same protection inside the EU as others fleeing the same war.”

      Efforts to get clarity on EU financing from officials in Brussels were stymied by lack of responsiveness on the part of EU officials. According to Al Jazeera, “The European Commission did not answer questions from Al Jazeera regarding its operation and whether there were plans to help evacuate any remaining people. Ukrainian authorities also did not respond to a request for comment.” The Guardian also reported in mid-April they had “approached the Zhuravychi detention facility and the Ukrainian authorities for comment” but had yet to receive a response as of 12 April.

      However, on 5 April, two MEPs, Tineke Strik and Erik Marquardt, raised the issue during a joint session of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Development (DEVE). The MEPs urged the EU to take steps to assist the release of the detainees.

      In mid-April, reports emerged that some detainees who had been released from the Volyn PTPI in Zhuravychi were later re-detained in Poland. In its 14 April report, The Guardian reported that “some of those that were released from the centre in the first few days of the war are now being held in a detention centre in Poland, after they were arrested attempting to cross the Polish border, but these claims could not be verified.” On 22 April, Lighthouse Reports cited Tigrayan diaspora representatives as saying that two former detainees at the facility were refugees fleeing Ethiopia’s war in the region, where human rights groups report evidence of a campaign of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Despite being provided documents by Ukraine stipulating that they were stateless persons and being promised safe passage, Polish border guards detained the pair, arguing that there was an “extreme probability of escape.”

      Separately, human rights campaigners following the case informed the GDP in late April that they had evidence of immigration detainees still being locked up in Ukraine’s detention centres, including in particular the Nikolaev (Mykolaiv) PTPI.

      The GDP continues to call for the release of all migrants detained in Ukraine during ongoing warfare and for international efforts to help detainees to find safety, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law. Recognizing the huge efforts Poland is making to assist refugees from Ukraine, we nevertheless call on the Polish government to treat all people fleeing Ukraine equally and without discrimination based on race, nationality, or ethnic origin. Everyone fleeing the conflict in Ukraine is entitled to international protection and assistance and no one should be detained on arrival in Poland.

      https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/immigration-detention-amidst-war-the-case-of-ukraines-volyn-

  • Non-white refugees fleeing Ukraine detained in EU immigration facilities

    Non-white students who have fled Ukraine have been detained by EU border authorities in what has been condemned as “clearly discriminatory” and “not acceptable”.

    An investigation by The Independent, in partnership with Lighthouse Reports and other media partners, reveals that Ukraine residents of African origin who have crossed the border to escape the war have been placed in closed facilities, with some having been there for a number of weeks.

    At least four students who have fled Vladimir Putin’s invasion are being held in a long-term holding facility Lesznowola, a village 40km from the Polish capital Warsaw, with little means of communication with the outside world and no legal advice.

    One of the students said they were stopped by officials as they crossed the border and were given “no choice” but to sign a document they did not understand before they were then taken to the camp. They do not know how long they will be held there.

    A Nigerian man currently detained said he was “scared” about what will happen to him after being held in the facility for more than three weeks.

    Polish border police have confirmed that 52 third-country nationals who have fled Ukraine are currently being held in detention facilities in Poland.

    The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) said they were aware of three other facilities in Poland where people non-Ukrainians who have fled the war are being detained.

    Separately, a Nigerian student who fled the Russian invasion is understood to have been detained in Estonia after travelling to the country to join relatives, and is now being threatened with deportation.

    This is despite a EU protection directive dated 4 March which states that third country nationals studying or working in Ukraine should be admitted to the EU temporarily on humanitarian grounds.

    Maria Arena, chair of the EU parliament’s subcommittee on human rights, said: “International students in Ukraine, as well as Ukrainians, are at risk and risking their lives in the country. Detention, deportation or any other measure that does not grant them protection is not acceptable.”

    The findings of the investigation, which was carried out in collaboration with Lighhtouse Reports, Spiegal, Mediapart and Radio France, comes after it emerged that scores of Black and Asian refugees fleeing Ukraine were experiencing racial discrimination while trying to make border crossing last month.
    ‘They took us here to the camp... I’m scared’

    Gabriel*, 29, had been studying trade and economics in Kharkov before war broke out. The Nigerian national left the city and arrived at the border on 27 February, where he says his phone was confiscated by Polish border guards and he was given “no option” but to sign a form he did not understand.

    “It was written in Polish. I didn’t know what I was signing. I said I wouldn’t sign, but they insisted I signed it and that if not I would go to jail for five months,” he said in a recorded conversation with a Nigerian activist.

    The student said he was then taken to court, where there was no interpreter to translate what was being said so that he could understand, and then taken to a detention centre in the small village of Lesznowola.

    “It is a closed camp inside a forest,” said Gabriel, speaking from the facility. “There’s no freedom. Some people have been here more than nine months. Some have gone mad. I’m scared.

    “We escaped Ukraine very horrible experience, the biggest risk of my life [...] Everything was scary and I thought that was the end of it. And now we are in detention.”

    Gabriel said there are at least two other Nigerian students in the camp, along with students from Cameroon, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and French African nations.

    Guards at the centre said inmates have their mobile phones confiscated, with only those who have a second sim card given a phone without a camera.

    Many can only communicate with the outside world via email – and even this is said to be limited to certain times.

    Another individual detained at the centre is Paul, 20, a Cameroonian who had been studying management and language at Agrarian University Bila Tserkva in Kyiv for six months when the war started.

    His brother, Victor, who is in Cameroon, said Paul had told him that he had been apprehended while crossing the border and that on 2 March, a Polish judge ordered that he be transferred to Lesznowola detention centre.

    “From his explanation, the camp doesn’t seem like one that welcomes people fleeing from the war in Ukraine. It’s a camp that has been existing and has people that came to seek for asylum. No one knows why he is being detained,” he said.

    Victor said that Paul was given seven days to appeal the decision to detain him, but that he has been unable to access the internet in order to file the appeal in time.

    “Since that day he filed the appeal, police and guards try to restrict them. He used to get five minutes of internet but on that day they stopped letting them use the internet. The phone he used to communicate with me was blocked. Maybe it’s because they realised that the issue was taking on a legal dimension,” he said.
    ‘He’s not allowed to be in Estonia’

    This investigation has also heard reports that a Nigerian student, Reuben, is facing deportation from Estonia after being detained having fled the war in Ukraine.

    Prior to his arrival in the eastern European country, 32-year-old Reuben emailed the head of International House, a service centre that helps internationals in Estonia to communicate with the state, explaining that he wanted to join his cousin living in the country.

    The head of the organisation Leonardo Ortega responded by letter that he may relocate to Estonia.

    Reuben, who attended Bila Tserkva National Agrarian University in Ukraine and is married to a Ukrainian woman, arrived on 9 March through Poland with his cousin Peter.

    After being delayed for three hours at the Estonia border, the pair were escorted to a police station, according to Peter, 30, who has an Estonian residency permit.

    He said three police officers escorted his cousin away with his luggage and said he would be detained for two days themn deported back to Nigeria.

    The officers reportedly advised that the 32-year-old would be banned from entering any Schengen country for the next five years; his phone was confiscated and he’s been in detention since.

    “A few officers said ‘he’s not allowed to be in Estonia’. Even after asking for international protection, we were told that my cousin needs to have a lawyer to fight his case, but most of the lawyers I initially contacted refused to take my cousin’s case,” said Peter.

    “He received an email in advance saying it was okay to come - and after everything we went through, the next thing they want to deport and ban him for five years. I don’t know why deportation came into the picture.”

    Criney, a London-based campaigner who has been supporting the affected students on a voluntary basis, said there was an “emerging pattern of arbitrary detention of students coming out of Ukraine fleeing the war”.

    “There are other cases in Austria and Germany with regards to students who have applied for asylum or asked for permits to remain,” the campaigner said.
    Detained ‘for the purpose of identity verification’

    The EU directive on 4 March aims to help refugees fleeing the invasion to stay for at least one year in one country and also have access to the labour market and education.

    It states that it also applies to “nationals of third countries other than Ukraine residing legally in Ukraine who are unable to return in safe and durable conditions to their country or region of origin”.

    This can include third-country nationals who were studying or working in Ukraine, it states, adding that this cohort should “in any event be admitted into the union on humanitarian grounds”, without requiring valid travel documents, to ensure “safe passage with a view to returning to their country or region of origin”.

    Michał Dworczyk, a top aide to the Polish prime minister, said when war broke out that “everyone escaping the war will be received in Poland, including people without passports”.

    But the Polish government has admitted that it is sending some of this cohort to closed facilities once they cross the border.

    In a tweet on 2 March, the Polish ministry of internal affairs and administration said: “Ukrainians are fleeing the war, people of other nationalities are also fleeing. All those who do not have documents and cannot prove Ukrainian citizenship are carefully checked. If there is a need, they go to closed detention centres.”

    In a letter to a member of the EU Parliament, Poland’s border police admitted that 52 third country nationals who had fled from Ukraine had been taken to closed detention centres in the first three weeks of the war.

    The letter stated that this was necessary “to carry out administrative proceedings for granting international protection or issuing a decision on obliging a foreigner to return”.

    Ryan Schroeder, press officer at the IOM, said the organisation was aware of three other facilities in Poland where “third-country nationals arriving from Ukraine, who lack proper travel documentation, are brought to for the purpose of identity verification”.

    The Polish government, the Polish police and the Estonian authorities declined to comment on the allegations.

    A spokesperson for the Polish border force said it “couldn’t give any detail about the procedures on foreigners because of the protection on personal data”, adding that it is “the court which takes the decision each time to place people in guarded centres for foreigners”.
    ‘Clearly unsatisfactory and discriminatory’

    Steve Peers, a professor of EU law in the UK, says that even if member states choose not to apply temporary protection to legal residents of Ukraine, they should give them “simplified entry, humanitarian support and safe passage to their country of origin”.

    “In my view this is obviously a case where students could not have applied for a visa and might not meet the other usual criteria to cross the external borders, yet there are overwhelming reasons to let them cross the border anyway on humanitarian grounds. There are no good grounds for immigration detention in the circumstances,” he added.

    Jeff Crisp, a former head of policy, development and evaluation at UNHCR, said it was “clearly unsatisfactory and discriminatory” for third country nationals who have fled from Ukraine to be held in detention centres in EU states, “not least because of the trauma they will have experienced in their efforts to leave Ukraine and find safety elsewhere”.

    He added: “They should be released immediately and treated on an equal basis with all others who have been forced to leave Ukraine.”

    It comes after the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi warned this week that, although he had been “humbled” by the outpouring of support seen by communities welcoming Ukrainian refugees, many minorities – often foreigners who had been studying or working there – had described a very different experience.

    “We also bore witness to the ugly reality, that some Black and Brown people fleeing Ukraine – and other wars and conflicts around the world – have not received the same treatment as Ukrainian refugees,” he said.

    “They reported disturbing incidents of discrimination, violence, and racism. These acts of discrimination are unacceptable, and we are using our many channels and resources to make sure that all people are protected equally.”

    Mr Grandi appealed to countries, in particular those neighbouring Ukraine, to continue to allow entry to anyone fleeing the conflict “without discrimination on grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin and regardless of their immigration status”.

    *Names have been changed

    https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-refugees-detention-international-students-b2041310.html

    #étudiants #Ukraine #rétention #détention_administrative #guerre #guerre_en_Ukraine #Pologne #Estonie #réfugiés_ukrainiens #réfugiés_d'Ukraine

    • I rifugiati “non bianchi” in fuga dall’Ucraina finiscono nei centri di detenzione

      Un’indagine di The Independent in collaborazione con Lighthouse Reports lo dice chiaro e tondo: i residenti ucraini di origine africana che hanno attraversato il confine per sfuggire alla guerra sono stati rinchiusi in centri per l’immigrazione, alcuni di loro si trovano lì da diverse settimane.

      Almeno quattro studenti fuggiti dall’invasione di Vladimir Putin sono detenuti in una struttura di detenzione a lungo termine di Lesznowola, un villaggio a 40 km dalla capitale polacca Varsavia, con pochi mezzi di comunicazione con il mondo esterno e senza consulenza legale. Uno di loro ha detto di essere stato fermato dai funzionari mentre attraversavano il confine e di non aver avuto “scelta”: ha dovuto di firmare un documento che non comprendeva prima di essere trasferito al campo. Un uomo nigeriano attualmente detenuto ha detto di essere “spaventato” per quello che gli accadrà dopo essere stato trattenuto nella struttura per più di tre settimane.

      La polizia di frontiera polacca ha confermato che 52 cittadini di Paesi terzi fuggiti dall’Ucraina sono attualmente detenuti in centri di detenzione in Polonia. L’Organizzazione internazionale per le migrazioni (Oim) ha affermato di essere a conoscenza di altre tre strutture in Polonia dove sono detenute persone non ucraine fuggite dalla guerra. Uno studente nigeriano fuggito dall’invasione russa sarebbe stato detenuto in Estonia dopo essersi recato nel Paese per raggiungere i parenti e ora è minacciato di espulsione.

      Maria Arena, presidente della commissione per i diritti umani del parlamento Ue, ha dichiarato: «Gli studenti internazionali in Ucraina, così come gli ucraini, sono a rischio e rischiano la vita nel Paese. La detenzione, l’espulsione o qualsiasi altra misura che non garantisca loro protezione non è accettabile».

      Jeff Crisp, ex capo della politica, dello sviluppo e della valutazione dell’Unhcr, ha affermato che è «chiaramente insoddisfacente e discriminatorio» che cittadini di Paesi terzi fuggiti dall’Ucraina vengano trattenuti nei centri di detenzione negli Stati dell’Ue. Ha aggiunto: «Dovrebbero essere rilasciati immediatamente e trattati alla pari con tutti gli altri che sono stati costretti a lasciare l’Ucraina».

      L’Alto Commissario delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati Filippo Grandi ha avvertito questa settimana che, sebbene sia soddisfatto dal sostegno dei Paesi che accolgono i rifugiati ucraini, molte minoranze – spesso stranieri che vi hanno studiato o lavorato – hanno descritto un’esperienza molto diversa. «Abbiamo anche testimoniato una pessima realtà: alcuni neri in fuga dall’Ucraina – e altre guerre e conflitti in tutto il mondo – non hanno ricevuto lo stesso trattamento dei rifugiati ucraini», ha spiegato.

      Se ne parla ormai da settimane. Intanto il razzismo continua. Aiutare tutti, ma proprio tutti: questo è il dovere.

      Buon venerdì.

      https://left.it/2022/03/25/i-rifugiati-non-bianchi-in-fuga-dallucraina-finiscono-nei-centri-di-detenzione

    • Des réfugiés fuyant la guerre en Ukraine sont détenus en Pologne

      Selon une enquête menée sous l’égide de Lighthouse Reports – une ONG spécialisée dans l’investigation, à laquelle se sont joints plusieurs médias européens dont Mediapart –, plusieurs étudiants étrangers ayant fui l’Ukraine en guerre séjournent actuellement dans des centres d’accueil fermés en Pologne, en situation de détention.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/230322/des-refugies-fuyant-la-guerre-en-ukraine-sont-detenus-en-pologne

    • "C’est comme si j’étais un criminel" : des étudiants étrangers enfermés en Pologne après avoir fui l’Ukraine

      Une enquête réalisée par Radio France, en partenariat avec plusieurs médias internationaux et avec le soutien de l’ONG Lighthouse Reports, révèle que plusieurs étudiants d’origine africaine qui vivaient en Ukraine sont actuellement détenus dans des centres fermés pour étrangers en Pologne.

      Ils faisaient des études dans les technologies de l’information, dans le management, à Kharkiv, à Lutsk ou encore à Bila Tserkva…et se retrouvent désormais enfermés dans un centre de détention pour étrangers à une quarantaine de kilomètres de Varsovie, après avoir fui la guerre en Ukraine. C’est ce que révèle l’enquête de Radio France, mercredi 23 mars, menée en partenariat avec plusieurs médias internationaux et avec le soutien de l’ONG Lighthouse Reports.

      « Je ne pensais pas me retrouver dans cette situation en fuyant en Pologne, comme si j’étais un criminel », témoigne Samuel (le prénom a été changé) au téléphone, étudiant de Kharkiv, dans le nord-est de l’Ukraine. Après avoir voyagé jusqu’à Kiev, puis Lviv (près de la frontière polonaise), le jeune Nigérian explique avoir traversé la frontière le 27 février avec sa carte d’étudiant, son passeport étant resté à l’université pour des raisons administratives. « Mais quand je suis arrivé en Pologne, les garde-frontières m’ont dit qu’ils ne pouvaient pas me laisser circuler, car je n’ai pas de passeport, et pour cette raison, je devais être détenu », se remémore celui qui a de la famille en Allemagne, enfermé depuis plus de trois semaines.

      Le 25 février, Michał Dworczyk, chef du cabinet du Premier ministre polonais, assurait pourtant que « toute personne fuyant la guerre serait accueilli en Pologne, notamment les personnes sans passeport ». « Difficile de ne pas y voir du racisme », observe Małgorzata Rycharska, de l’ONG Hope & Humanity Poland, qui ajoute « ne pas comprendre pourquoi ces personnes ont été enfermées ». Contactée, l’ambassade du Cameroun à Berlin, qui a identifié pour l’instant trois de ses ressortissants dans ces centres fermés, fait part aussi de sa surprise. Et assure que les étudiants camerounais avaient des documents d’identité valides avec eux.
      52 étrangers fuyant l’Ukraine envoyés dans des centres fermés

      Dans le centre de Lesznowola, une vingtaine de non-Ukrainiens arrivant d’Ukraine sont actuellement détenus, parmi lesquels nous avons identifié pour l’instant quatre étudiants d’origine africaine. En tout, il y aurait 52 personnes étrangères fuyant l’Ukraine envoyées dans ces centres fermés du 24 février au 15 mars, selon une lettre des garde-frontières adressée au député Tomasz Anisko.

      Lettre des garde-frontières polonais indiquant que 52 personnes non-ukrainiennes mais fuyant l’Ukraine ont été envoyés du 24 février au 15 mars dans des centres pour étrangers.

      Contactés, les garde-frontières indiquent ne pas pouvoir donner davantage d’informations, pour des raisons de protection d’identité. De son côté, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) explique « être au courant de trois centres en Pologne où les ressortissants de pays tiers arrivant d’Ukraine, sans documents de voyage adéquats, sont emmenés pour des vérifications d’identité » mais précise ne pas inclure celui de Lesznowola.

      « Nous sommes des étudiants d’Ukraine, nous ne méritons pas d’être ici », dénonce Samuel, qui ajoute ne pas comprendre pourquoi il se retrouve dans un centre où sont enfermés des migrants ayant tenté de traverser illégalement la frontière avec la Biélorussie l’an dernier. Gabriel (le prénom a été changé), un autre étudiant nigérian qui étudiait à l’Institut national du commerce et de l’économie de Kharkiv, raconte lui qu’à son arrivée en Pologne, « les garde-frontières nous ont pris nos téléphones de force ». Dans un entretien téléphonique avec un représentant de la diaspora nigériane - obtenu par Radio France -, Gabriel indique avoir été forcé à demander la protection internationale en Pologne, « sinon ils m’ont dit que j’allais en prison ». Dans l’attente de la décision, il a été envoyé dans ce camp fermé où il séjourne depuis fin février, décrivant « une situation très mauvaise ».

      Si théoriquement, la loi polonaise permet le placement en centres fermés en cas de demande d’asile dans des situations très précises (en cas de risque, par exemple, que la personne s’échappe lors de la procédure), la pratique diffère. Varsovie avait déjà été pointé du doigt par l’ONU pour la détention systématique de migrants et réfugiés lors de la crise à la frontière biélorusse l’an dernier. « Plein de gens ici sont devenus fous, je suis terrifié, il y en a qui sont là depuis neuf mois », s’effraie Gabriel. Pas d’accès à des avocats, téléphones avec caméra retirés, accès internet d’une vingtaine de minutes par jour seulement… L’étudiant, qui indique être passé devant un tribunal, menottes aux poignets, explique ne jamais avoir voulu demander l’asile en Pologne. « Nous étions juste des étudiants, répète-t-il. Ils devraient me déporter et me laisser rentrer au Nigeria, mais même cela, ça peut prendre parfois six mois », s’inquiète-t-il.

      https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/manifestations-en-ukraine/enquete-c-est-comme-si-j-etais-un-criminel-des-etudiants-etrangers-enfe

  • Maroc : plus de 800 migrants parviennent à rentrer dans l’enclave espagnole de Melilla
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/03/04/maroc-plus-de-800-migrants-parviennent-a-rentrer-dans-l-enclave-espagnole-de

    Maroc : plus de 800 migrants parviennent à rentrer dans l’enclave espagnole de Melilla
    Pour le deuxième jour consécutif, jeudi 3 mars, des centaines de migrants ont réussi à pénétrer dans l’enclave espagnole de Melilla, sur la côte nord du Maroc, qui constitue avec celle de Ceuta la seule frontière terrestre de l’Union européenne (UE) avec l’Afrique. Environ 1 200 migrants ont « commencé, vers 7 h 25, à franchir la clôture […] lançant des pierres et utilisant des crochets et des bâtons contre les forces de sécurité » espagnoles « après avoir débordé les forces de sécurité marocaines », a indiqué la préfecture de Melilla. Selon la préfète, Sabrina Moh Abdelkader, 380 sont parvenus à entrer.
    Côté marocain, la situation était calme dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi dans la petite localité de Beni Ansar, qui jouxte l’enclave de Melilla, ont constaté des journalistes de l’AFP. Aucune présence de migrants n’a été remarquée sur les quinze kilomètres de route le long de la barrière frontalière hérissée de barbelés, ni dans le centre de Beni Ansar. « Ils s’éloignent d’habitude dans les forêts des collines avoisinantes », a précisé à l’AFP un membre de la section locale de l’Association marocaine des droits de l’homme (AMDH).
    Cette nouvelle arrivée intervient au lendemain d’une tentative de franchissement d’environ 2 500 migrants africains, la plus massive jamais enregistrée dans cette enclave, selon les autorités : 491 y sont parvenus et étaient toujours jeudi dans l’enclave, dans un centre pour migrants. En deux jours, plus de 800 migrants ont donc réussi à entrer dans cette enclave, contre 1 092 en 2021.
    « L’agressivité à laquelle nous avons assisté, hier comme aujourd’hui […] n’avait pas été constatée en d’autres occasions », a dénoncé la préfète, dont les services ont annoncé l’arrivée jeudi d’une centaine de policiers en renfort. « C’est un fait très préoccupant. Cela fait des mois que ce type d’arrivée ne s’est pas produite. Et quand il y avait des tentatives, elles étaient repoussées, en collaboration avec les autorités marocaines, sans arriver à ce niveau de gravité », s’est inquiété le ministre espagnol des affaires étrangères, José Manuel Albares. A Rabat, le porte-parole du gouvernement marocain a assuré pour sa part que son pays effectuait « un travail colossal pour surveiller ses frontières ».Selon les autorités, 27 membres des forces de l’ordre espagnoles ont été blessés mercredi et 23 jeudi, tout comme 20 migrants mercredi et 32 jeudi. L’AMDH a fait état mercredi d’une trentaine de migrants blessés, dont trois ou quatre grièvement, qui ont été hospitalisés. « Environ 250 migrants refoulés de Melilla ce matin ont été transférés à bord de bus au centre [de détention] d’Arkmane. Il est probable qu’ils sont revenus après l’échec de leur tentative hier », a estimé jeudi un militant de l’AMDH.
    Melilla et Ceuta, à près de 400 km plus à l’ouest, constituent les seules frontières terrestres de l’UE sur le continent africain et font régulièrement l’objet de tentatives d’entrée de la part de migrants cherchant à rejoindre l’Europe. A Melilla, la frontière entre le Maroc et l’Espagne est matérialisée par une triple clôture grillagée d’une longueur d’environ 12 km. Comme celle de Ceuta, elle est équipée de caméras et de miradors.Ces entrées massives de migrants dans l’enclave interviennent moins d’un an après celle, mi-mai 2021 à Ceuta, de plus de 10 000 migrants, en grande majorité des Marocains. A la faveur d’un relâchement des contrôles frontaliers côté marocain, ils étaient alors entrés à la nage par la mer ou au niveau de la digue marquant la frontière dans la Méditerranée. Cette crise avait eu lieu dans un contexte de brouille diplomatique majeure entre Madrid et Rabat, provoquée par l’accueil en Espagne, pour y être soigné du Covid-19, du chef des indépendantistes sahraouis du Front Polisario, Brahim Ghali, ennemi juré des autorités marocaines.
    Si les tensions se sont depuis apaisées, elles n’ont pas pris fin. La récente conversation entre le premier ministre espagnol, Pedro Sanchez, et M. Ghali en marge d’un sommet UE-Union africaine à Bruxelles a fait grincer des dents à Rabat, à en croire les médias proches du pouvoir. « En s’entretenant à Bruxelles avec le chef des séparatistes […] Pedro Sanchez apporte la preuve que le royaume du Maroc a eu raison de ne pas croire en les belles paroles des responsables espagnols », a notamment écrit le site marocain d’information Le360. Rappelée pour consultations lors de la crise de Ceuta, l’ambassadrice du Maroc en Espagne n’est toujours pas revenue à Madrid.
    L’Espagne exerce sa souveraineté sur Ceuta depuis 1580 et sur Melilla depuis 1496. Le Maroc les considère comme partie intégrante de son territoire. Située à 150 km de l’Algérie, Melilla (12,5 km2) compte une population de près de 87 000 habitants.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#espagne#maroc#afrique#sante#emigration#politquemigratoire#UE#retention#politiqueirregulière

  • Lettre ouverte : des cellules de rétention sous les rails

    Nous relayons ici une lettre ouverte à signer si vous voulez exiger l’arrêt d’un projet de "#centre_de_compétences_sécuritaires" géant dans la gare de Lausanne

    Une gare, c’est quoi ?

    C’est un possible infini de rencontre, un lieu qui n’appartient à personne, un lieu où l’on arrive, un lieu où tout peut commencer. Combien de fois dans l’Histoire, les gares ont-elles été des portes ouvertes pour des populations en errance fuyant la guerre ou chassées de chez elles par des jeux géopolitiques qui leur ordonnaient de quitter leur maison ? Combien de vies ont recommencé dans un hall de gare ? Combien de vies se sont croisées dans ces espaces de pur mouvement ? Le monde se croise là et c’est une chose précieuse.

    Aujourd’hui Lausanne est en travaux, des grues de toutes parts, on invente un nouveau visage, on s’enivre d’ambitions, de pôle muséal, de nouvelles places publiques vont sortir de terre. Au milieu, cette nouvelle gare qui va voir le jour. Assez classieuse elle aussi, on sort du langage de province, on cherche à lui donner toutes les tailles : humaine dans son contact avec la rue du Simplon, urbaine au nord et celle d’une ville en pleine croissance, qui craque un peu dans ces vêtements en son centre. On pousse les murs, on surélève la marquise historique. On laisse la place pour accueillir le grand flux grisant de cet arc lémanique en plein âge d’or.

    On laisse la place, mais les chemins sont balisés. On laisse la place, mais on projette déjà celle des personnes qui n’en ont pas. Derrière cette figure de porte se cache celle d’une impasse. On laisse la place, mais seulement pour certain·es. Les “autres” suivront le chemin qu’on leur a dessiné. Prendront la porte qui les attend, suivront des couloirs habilement localisés, des parcours qui se veulent discrets. Ces autres seront soustrait∙es au grand brouhaha et seront conduit∙es au cœur de la gare dans des cellules de rétention.

    Un #centre_de_sécurité est en train de se projeter en plein cœur de la gare de Lausanne : plus de 3000m2 de surface dédiée à la police cantonale et aux douanes notamment.
    Pratique, il n’y aura plus qu’à cueillir tranquillement ces personnes qui se croyaient le droit d’être arrivées. Des #cellules_de_rétention et des #salles_d’audition. Des espaces plus qu’exigus sans aucune vue sur l’extérieur au fond d’un long couloir sous les rails. La belle porte d’entrée que voilà !

    Dans cette Europe qui organise avec tant de tact pour les nantis l’externalisation de ses frontières, Lausanne, la bonne ville de gauche, entre pittoresque, université et grève du climat, n’y voit rien à redire. Lausanne, comme quelques consœurs de charme sur les rives du Léman, s’est pourtant déjà illustrée grâce à sa police comme détentrice d’une éthique et d’un sens de l’ouverture à géométrie variable. Rappelons Mike mort sous les coups de la police à 300 m de la gare de Lausanne il y a 4 ans. Rappelons Lamin mort dans sa cellule de rétention sans que personne ne s’en aperçoive. Il est si facile de cacher ces erreurs quand les espaces sont déjà agencés pour les faire disparaître. Il est si facile de fermer les yeux quand il n’y aura rien à voir. Personne à rencontrer pour secouer nos idées reçues, personne qui pourra par son regard nous rappeler l’autre monde, celui d’où il vient. Personne aussi pour témoigner de la violence faite à leur accueil et à leur existence. Une gare faite de gens d’ici...

    La Gare de Lausanne ainsi projetée, participe du même effort de tact que les centres fédéraux d’asile, du même zèle d’efficacité que les patrouilles libyennes sillonnant les mers. Il n’a pas suffi aux Européen.nes et aux Suisse∙sses d’être entaché∙es par Frontex, les prisons libyennes, les accords de Dublin, les centres fédéraux d’asile, les zones de détention installées dans les aéroports. Maintenant, c’est à la #gare_de_Lausanne à laquelle il nous faudra penser lorsque les mots indignité, racisme, violence étatique, crime occidental raisonneront dans nos têtes face à la misère du monde.

    Sous la terre, quelques dizaines de mètres au sud des grandes salles d’exposition de Plateforme 10, les cellules de rétention. En regardant s’étaler la belle sensibilité créative des artistes contemporains,
    entendrons-nous le murmure, les prières et les cris de ceux et celles qui sous nos pieds, se croyant arrivé.es... chutent ? Non.

    Nous, soussigné∙e∙x∙s, demandons à la Ville de Lausanne, au Canton de Vaud, aux CFF et à la Confédération d’utiliser tous les moyens possibles pour ne pas réaliser ce centre de sécurité. Ne faisons pas de la gare de Lausanne une prison cachée pour des personnes dont pour la plupart, le seul crime est d’être ici.

    https://www.change.org/p/ville-de-lausanne-lettre-ouverte-des-cellules-de-r%C3%A9tention-sous-les-rai
    #Lausanne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sous-terrain #souterrain #gare #rétention #détention_administrative #pétition #lettre_ouverte

  • À l’usage des vivants

    "Fuyant le Nigéria, Semira Adamu est arrivée en Belgique en 1998. Détenue dans un centre fermé proche de l’#aéroport de Bruxelles, elle meurt étouffée avec un coussin lors d’une sixième tentative de rapatriement forcé. Vingt ans après, Pauline Fonsny remet en scène cet « assassinat d’État » qui avait secoué le plat pays et conduit à la démission du ministre de l’Intérieur de l’époque. Le récit de À l’usage des vivants, mené à deux voix, est structuré par le témoignage de Semira – incarnée à l’écran par la peintre nigériane Obi Okigbo – et en voix off, l’adaptation d’un texte que la poétesse belge Maïa Chauvier a écrit après le décès de la jeune femme. Pour contourner l’interdiction de filmer dans les centres, la cinéaste a fait appel à des maquettes qui permettent de visualiser la topographie précise des lieux où sont encore parqués les demandeurs d’asile. Au terme de cette puissante évocation documentaire, le constat est amer. Les « barbelés de la honte » se sont multipliés, des policiers peuvent ouvrir le feu sur une camionnette transportant des exilé-e-s et tuer une fillette de deux ans, sans être inquiétés."

    https://vimeo.com/groups/108294/videos/412703657
    http://www.film-documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_fiche_film/55804_1
    #rétention #détention_administrative #Belgique #migrations #asile #réfugiés #déboutés #décès #mourir_en_rétention #mort
    #Pauline_Fonsny #film #film_documentaire

    ping @isskein @karine4