• #Radar, la machine à cash | Documentaires | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/studio/documentaires/france/radar-la-machine-cash
    #reflets #thinkerview

    Les #radars_automatiques ont rapporté 860 millions d’euros à l’État en 2018. Cette machine à PV, c’est l’histoire d’une #privatisation. Car ce sont surtout des entreprises privées qui font tourner le système grâce à des "marchés_publics. « Jusqu’alors, aucun documentaire ne racontait les dessous de ces contrats qui ont représenté en dix ans plus de deux milliards et demi d’euros », raconte Stéphanie Fontaine, l’une des réalisatrices.

  • L’UE veut sophistiquer la surveillance de ses frontières boisées…

    La Commission Européenne veut améliorer la détection des passages à ses frontières densément boisées, difficiles à surveiller par des patrouilles.
    Le projet de recherche sur la sécurité FOLDOUT (through FOliage Detection in the inner and OUTermost regions of the EU) doit tester une combinaison de différentes technologies avec des caméras, des radars, des détecteurs de mouvement, des capteurs électromagnétiques et des microphones.

    Y participent : Autriche, France (Thales), Bulgarie, Finlande, Lituanie, Pologne. Il coute 8 millions d’euros. Les tests commencent en 2021 (frontières bulgaro-turc, puis greco-turc, finlandaise et guyanaise).

    […]
    Die Grenzabschnitte werden zunächst mit konventionellen Systemen überwacht, darunter Kameras, akustische oder Bewegungsdetektoren. Dabei soll etwa „verdächtiger Autoverkehr“ festgestellt werden. Die verschiedenen Sensoren sind in einem gemeinsamen Gehäuse verbaut. Die Behörden wollen sich außerdem die mitgeführten Handys von Geflüchteten zunutze machen. Wird ein Telefon in einer bestimmten Funkzelle festgestellt, erfolgt eine Ortung des Geräts.
    Geostationäre Beobachtung aus 20 Kilometer Höhe
    Anschließend kann eine Kaskade weiterer Maßnahmen in Gang gesetzt werden, darunter die Beobachtung aus dem All und aus der Luft. Dabei sollen auch Radarsatelliten eingesetzt werden, deren Bilder Laub durchdringen können. Werden Personen geortet, können diese mit Drohnen aufgespürt werden. Auch die unbemannten Luftfahrzeuge befördern kleine Radarsensoren oder Wärmebildkameras. Am Ende erfolgt der Zugriff durch die zuständige Grenzpolizei.
    FOLDOUT könnte auch zur dauerhaften Überwachung einer bestimmten Region genutzt werden. Dabei würde die Überwachungstechnik an „stratosphärische Plattformen“ montiert, wie sie von einigen Rüstungsfirmen derzeit entwickelt werden. Die geostationären Anlagen fliegen in rund 20 Kilometer Höhe und bieten daher eine deutlich höhere Auflösung als die Erdbeobachtung per Satellit. Der an FOLDOUT beteiligte Konzern Thales vermarktet ein solches System unter dem Namen „Stratobus“.
    […]

    https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Grenze-zur-Tuerkei-EU-Kommission-will-Gefluechtete-mit-Laubdurchdringung-aufsp
    https://foldout.eu

    #Union_Européenne #frontière #forteresse #surveillance #FOLDOUT #circulation

  • Le ministère de l’Intérieur épinglé par la Cnil pour sa gestion des radars « tronçon »
    https://www.ouest-france.fr/societe/securite-routiere/radars/le-ministere-de-l-interieur-epingle-par-la-cnil-pour-sa-gestion-des-rad

    La Cnil reproche au ministère de l’Intérieur de conserver trop longtemps les photos des plaques des véhicules qui passent devant les radars « tronçon » et de ne pas suffisamment sécuriser les données. Le ministère de l’Intérieur a été épinglé mercredi par la Cnil qui lui reproche de conserver trop longtemps les photos des plaques des véhicules qui passent devant ses radars dits « tronçon ». Ces systèmes de contrôle de vitesse, au nombre d’une centaine en France, ne mesurent pas la vitesse instantanée des (...)

    #radar #data #immatriculation #CNIL #automobilistes #surveillance

    https://media.ouest-france.fr/v1/pictures/MjAxOTEyNTA2MDMxNWYwOTZhZWY0ZjM0Yzg4NjcxYjM5ZmE5M2U

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

  • Stealthy no more? A German radar vendor says it tracked the F-35 jet in 2018 — from a pony farm
    https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/sensors/2019/09/30/stealthy-no-more-a-german-radar-vendor-says-it-tracked-the-f-35-jet-in-201

    The story that follows is a snapshot in the cat-and-mouse game between combat aircraft — designed to be undetectable by radar — and sensor makers seeking to undo that advantage. In the case of the #F-35, the promise of invisibility to radar is so pronounced that it has colored much of the jet’s employment doctrine, lending an air of invincibility to the weapon: The enemy never saw it coming.

    But technology leaps only last so long, and Russia and China are known to be working on technology aimed at nixing whatever leg up NATO countries have tried to build for themselves.

    Now, German radar-maker Hensoldt claims to have tracked two F-35s for 150 kilometers following the 2018 Berlin Air Show in Germany in late April of that year. The company’s passive radar system, named TwInvis, is but one of an emerging generation of sensors and processors so sensitive and powerful that it promises to find previously undetectable activities in a given airspace.

    #radars

  • Un radar pour sanctionner les automobilistes qui dépassent les vélos de trop près
    http://carfree.fr/index.php/2019/08/28/un-radar-pour-sanctionner-les-automobilistes-qui-depassent-les-velos-de-trop

    Un nouveau type de radar est en phase de test dans l’agglomération de #montréal (Canada). Il vise à mesurer la distance entre un #Vélo et une voiture au moment d’un Lire la suite...

    #Alternatives_à_la_voiture #Insécurité_routière #Québec #radars #relations_cyclistes-automobilistes #sécurité_routière

  • Aerei da pattugliamento e #radar. Ecco il piano segreto anti-sbarchi

    Si delinea la strategia del governo per dare supporto alle Guardie costiere di Libia e Tunisia.
    La Marina militare da sola non riesce a tenere sotto controllo il Mediterraneo e perciò si ricorrerà anche all’Aeronautica. Oltre le navi che già presidiano il mare a sud della Sicilia, saranno schierati aerei-radar, droni e aerei da pattugliamento. L’obiettivo sono i soliti barconi e barchini che partono da Libia e Tunisia. Questo il piano segreto di Matteo Salvini, condiviso dall’intero governo, per frenare le partenze dei clandestini e aiutare in maniera sostanziale le due Guardie costiere, quella libica e quella tunisina, le sole che possono operare nelle rispettive acque territoriali, ma non hanno una tecnologia all’altezza, occorre un salto di qualità. E a questo ci penseranno gli italiani con una rete di osservazione dal mare e dal cielo.

    https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2019/07/09/news/aerei-da-pattugliamento-e-radar-nbsp-ecco-il-piano-segreto-anti-sbarchi-1.3
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #frontières #réfugiés #avions #miltiarisation_des_frontières #Méditerranée #Italie #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Tunisie

    –----

    Ajouté à ces métalistes :
    1. Externalisation des contrôles frontaliers en #Libye :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/765324
    2. L’externalisation en #Tunisie (accords avec l’Italie notamment) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765330

    • Commentaire de Sara Prestianni, reçu par email via la mailing-list Migreurop :

      A completer la proposition des 10 motovedette à offrir à la Libye, circulent aujourd’hui autre propositions qui ont été présenté par la presse comme “le secret contre les débarquements” : remplir le ciel de la Méditerranée avec des avion-radar, drones et avions de patrouilles pour aider les Gardes Cotes Libyens Tunisiens pour que ils puissent rejoindre les migrants en mer avant des ong afin que les migrants soient ramenés en Tunisie et Libye et pas en Italie. L’objectif déclaré est que tout bateau soit bloqué avant que il ne rentre en eaux internationales et encore moins nationales italiens.

      Puisque la Marine ne suffirait pas à “garder sous contrôle la mer Méditerranée” le Gouvernement fait appelle donc appelle aussi à l’aéronautique militaire. Seront mis à disposition les avions Atr42 pour le patrouilles maritimes, les drones Predator, les avions radar G550 CAEW. L’ensemble des moyens aériens devront communiquer aux MRCC de compétence (qui dans la tete du Gouvernement sont celui libyen et tunisien”) pour que ils puissent intervenir.
      Selon le Ministre de l’Interieur Italien, Tunisie et Libye ne sont pas suffisamment équipées, elles n’ont pas de technologie à l’hauteur. Technologie qui sera donc fourni par l’Italie.

      Cela explique la grande satisfaction exprimée par Salvini à l’annonce de l’opération de interception mené par les Gardes Cotes Tunisiennes au large de Kerkennah. Mais dans son discours ne manque pas de les accuser “En Tunisie il y a des institutions libres, je ne comprends pas pourquoi ils ne contrôlent par leur frontières” déclare Salvini, ou encore “Puisque en Tunisie il y a un parlement et un Gouvernement qui reçoivent des milliers de euro par l’Europe, il faut que chacun faisse sa part”

      La Ministre de la Defense, Trenta, a donné son feu vert à ce qui a été définis “augmentation de la capacité de surveillance, repérage et intelligence”

      https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2019/07/09/news/aerei-da-pattugliamento-e-radar-nbsp-ecco-il-piano-segreto-anti-sbarchi-1.3

      Face à un nombre très faible de arrivé (3000 en 6 mois), le constat du contexte libyen qui ne peut être considéré un port sure, la Tunisie non plus, la seule préoccupation du Gouvernement italien semble être celle de “sécher dans le temps” les ong, qui respectent le droit maritime ramèneraient les migrants dans un port sure (donc européen).

      Semblent bien loin le temps que l’Italie utilisait des forces militaires pour une mission de sauvetage, comme a été le cas pour Mare Nostrum en 2014 ….

    • Libia, festa della Marina: l’Italia consegna dieci nuove #motovedette

      Sabato scorso a Tripoli, nella base di #Sitta. Promesse dall’ex ministro Salvini a luglio scorso, i libici ne prendono possesso proprio nel giorno della scadenza del Memorandum

      La Marina libica ha festeggiato il 57esimo anniversario della sua fondazione prendendo possesso delle dieci nuove piccole motovedette fornite dall’Italia. La cerimonia e’ avvenuta nella base di Abu Sitta a Tripoli sabato scorso, il 2 novembre, proprio il giorno in cui scadeva il contestato Memorandum Italia-Libia che il governo italiano ha scelto di rinnovare per j prossimi tre anni chiedendo delle modifiche a garanzia del rispetto dei diritti umani delle migliaia di migranti intercettati dalla guardia costiera libica e riportati nei centri di detenzione in cui vengono tenuti in condizioni disumane e sottoposti ad ogni tipo di violenze.

      La consegna delle motovedette che va cosi’ ad arricchire la flotta della Guardia costiera fornita e addestrata dall’Italia era stata promessa e annunciata per la fine dell’estate dall’ex ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini in uno degli ultimi comitati nazionale ordine e sicurezza da lui presieduto. Negli ultimi due anni sono stati quasi 40.000 i migranti intercettati e riportati indietro dai libici con interventi nella zona Sar sotto il controllo di Tripoli ma che, dalle indagini dei pm di Agrigento, risulta di fatto gestita dalla Marina italiana. Le foto delle dieci nuove motovedette consegnate durante la cerimonia sono state diffuse dalla Lybian navy e rilanciate dal sito di osservazione Migrant Rescue watch

      Ieri il ministro degli Esteri libico Mohamed Taher Siala ha ricevuto l’ambasciatore italiano Giuseppe Buccino Grimaldi, latore della nota verbale con cui l’Italia ha chiesto l’insediamento del Comitato italo-libico presieduto dai ministri di Interno ed Esteri di entrambi i Paesi, e ha confermato che la Libia esaminera’ gli emendamenti proposti dall’Italia e «decidera’ se approvarli o meno in linea con gli interessi supremi del governo e del popolo libico». Sulle modifiche al Memorandum il ministro dell’Interno Luciana Lamorgese riferira’ alla Camera mercoledi pomeriggio.

      https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/11/04/news/libia_festa_della_marina_l_italia_consegna_dieci_nuove_motovedette-240197

  • En voiture !
    http://carfree.fr/index.php/2019/05/10/en-voiture

    Et voilà, vous avez gagné à la grande tombola de l’été, bravo ! Par contre, vous êtes passé à côté de la croisière sur la Méditerranée et des trottinettes électriques, en Lire la suite...

    #Destruction_de_la_planète #Etalement_urbain #Fin_des_autoroutes #Fin_du_pétrole #Insécurité_routière #humour #radars #sécurité_routière #stationnement #transports_en_commun #vitesse

  • Drone Surveillance Operations in the Mediterranean: The Central Role of the Portuguese Economy and State in EU Border Control

    Much has been written in the past years about the dystopic vision of EU borders increasingly equipped with drone surveillance (see here: http://www.europeanpublicaffairs.eu/high-tech-fortress-europe-frontex-and-the-dronization-of-borde, here: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/10/the-next-phase-of-european-border-and.html, here: https://www.heise.de/tp/features/EU-startet-Langstreckendrohnen-zur-Grenzueberwachung-4038306.html and here: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/11/role-technology). Yet, when the first joint drone surveillance operation of #Frontex, the #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) and Portuguese authorities was launched on 25 September 2018, there was a lack of response both from the media and concerned activists or researchers. Yet, the EMSA offered details about the operation on its website, and Frontex as well. In addition, Frontex mentioned in its press statement parallel operations undertaken in Italy and Greece in the same period.

    These operations were a crucial step for the setup of the joint European information system for border surveillance, #EUROSUR. The drone surveillance program in the context of Frontex operations is a major step in the operational setup of the EUROSUR program that aims to integrate databases and national coordination centres of 24 European countries. EUROSUR was officially introduced with a policy paper in 2008, and the system itself was launched on 1 December 2013 as a mechanism of information exchange among EU member states. But it is not yet fully operational, and drone surveillance is commonly seen as a central component for full operationability. Thus, the cooperation between the EMSA, Frontex and the Portuguese state in the recent operation is a crucial milestone to achieve the aim of EUROSUR to create a unified European border surveillance system.

    This is why the operation launched in Portugal in September 2018 is of higher significance to the ones in Italy and Greece since it includes not only national authorities but also the EMSA, located in Lisbon, as a new key actor for border surveillance. EMSA was founded in 2002 as a response to various shipping disasters that lead to environmental pollution and originally focuses on monitoring the movement of ships, with a focus on the safety of shipping operations, environmental safety at sea and the trading of illegal goods via maritime transport.

    In 2016 the EMSA was allocated 76 million Euros in a bid for the production of drones for the surveillance of the Mediterranenan in the context of Frontex missions. EMSA`s bid foresaw that drones would be hired by EMSA itself. EMSA would run the operation of drones and share real-time data with Frontex. The largest part of this bid, 66 million Euros, went to the Portuguese company #Tekever, while smaller portions went to the Italian defence company #Leonardo and to the Portuguese air force that will operate drones produced by the Portuguese company #UA_Vision. At the same time, the successful bid of Tekever and the integration of Portuguese authorities in surveillance operations catapults Portugal onto the map of the defence and surveillance industry that profits immensely from the recent technological craze around border surveillance (see here, here and here).

    Lisbon-based Tekever set up a factory for the production of drones in the Portuguese mainland in #Ponte_de_Sor, an emerging new hub for the aerospace industry. Together with French #Collecte_Localisation_Service, which specialises in maritime surveillance, Tekever founded the consortium #REACT in order to produce those specific drones. Under the Portuguese operation, ground control, i.e. the technical coordination of the flight of the drones, was located in Portugal under the authority of the Portuguese air force, while the operation was coordinated remotely by Frontex experts and Portuguese authorities in the #Frontex_Situational_Centre in Poland where data were shared in real-time with EMSA. This first operation is a crucial step, testing the technical and administrative cooperation between EMSA and Frontex, and the functionality of the drones that were specifically produced for this purpose. These drones are lighter than the ones used in Greece and Italy, and they are equipped with special cameras and #radars that can detect ship movements and receive emergency calls from the sea. This allows to run data collected by the drones through an algorithm that is programmed to distinguish so-called ´#migrant_vessels´ from other ships and boats.

    The Portuguese government has set up a number of initiatives to foster this industry. For example, a national strategy called #Space_2030 (#Estratégia_Portugal_Espaço_2030) was launched in 2018, and the newly founded #Portuguese_Space_Agency (#Agência_Espacial_Portuguesa) will begin to work in the first months of 2019. The fact that border surveillance is one of the larger European programs boosting the defence and surveillance industry financially has not generated any controversy in Portugal; neither the fact that a center-left government, supported by two radical left parties is propping up surveillance, aerospace and defence industries. The colonial continuities of this industrial strategy are all too visible since narratives like ‘from the discovery of the sea to the technology of space’ are used not only by industry actors, but also, for example, by the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce in the UK on its website. In this way, social and political #domination of non-European territories and the control of the movement of racialized bodies are reduced to the fact of technological capability – in the colonial period the navigation of the seas with optical instruments, astronomic knowledge and ships, and today the electronic monitoring of movements on the sea with drones and integrated computer systems. The Portuguese aerospace industry is therefore presented as a cultural heritage that continues earlier technological achievements that became instruments to set up a global empire.

    The lack of any mention about the start of the drone surveillance programme does not only demonstrate that border surveillance goes largely unquestioned in Europe, but also that the sums spent for surveillance and defence by EU agencies create incentives to engage more in the defence and surveillance industry. This goes all the more for countries that have been hit hard by austerity and deindustrialisation, such as Portugal. The recent increase of 9.3 billion Euros for the period 2021 to 2027 for border surveillance funding in the EU with the creation of the #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund focused on border protection, is a telling example of the focus of current EU industrial policies. For the same period, the European Commission has earmarked 2.2 billion Euro for Frontex in order to acquire, operate and maintain surveillance assets like drones, cameras, fences, and the like. In this situation, the political consensus among EU governments to restrict migration reinforces the economic interests of the defence industry and vice versa, and the interest of national governments to attract #high-tech investment adds to this. Those lock-in effects could probably only be dismantled through a public debate about the selective nature of the entrepreneurial state whose funding has decisive influence on which industries prosper.

    While the Portuguese government does not currently have a single helicopter operating in order to control and fight forest fires that have caused more than 100 deaths in the past two years, much EU and national public funding goes into technology aimed at the control of racialized bodies and the observation of earth from space. At the same time, there is considerable concern among experts that surveillance technology used for military means and border security will be rolled out over the entire population in the future for general policing purposes. For this reason, it remains important to keep an eye on which technologies are receiving large public funds and what are its possible uses.


    https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/02/drone
    #drones #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel #technologie_de_la_surveillance #externalisation #business #algorithme #colonialisme #néo-colonialisme #impérialisme #héritage_culturel #austérité #désindustrialisation

    ping @daphne @marty @albertocampiphoto @fil

    • Des drones en renfort dans l’#opération_Sophia

      Pour renforcer la surveillance aérienne, après le départ des navires, l’opération Sophia déployée en Méditerranée (alias #EUNAVFOR_Med) va bénéficier d’un renfort d’au moins un drone #Predator de l’aeronautica militare.

      L’#Italie a indiqué sa disponibilité à fournir un drone à l’opération Sophia, selon nos informations confirmées à bonne source. Ce pourrait être un #MQ-9A Predator B, la version la plus avancée et la plus récente du drone, d’une longueur de 10,80 m avec une envergure de plus de 20 mètres, qui peut voler à 445 km / heure. De façon alternative, selon les moyens disponibles, un MQ-1C Predator A, plus modeste (longueur de 8,20 m et envergure de 14,80 m), pouvant voler à 160 km/heure, pourrait aussi être déployé.

      http://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/04/09/des-drones-en-renfort-dans-loperation-sophia
      #operation_Sophia

  • Dégradations. Remplacer un radar coûte entre 60 000 et 200 000 € Le télégramme - 17 Décembre 2018
    https://www.letelegramme.fr/france/degradations-remplacer-un-radar-coute-entre-60-000-et-200-000-eur-17-12

    En cas de dégradation d’un radar nécessitant son remplacement, la facture peut monter jusqu’à 200 000 €.
    Qui répare un radar vandalisé ? C’est la société de maintenance ayant remporté le marché public qui gère l’entretien de la machine et donc les éventuelles réparations. De plus, une partie des amendes des radars automatiques (249 M€ en 2017) est reversée à la Sécurité routière : pour la prévention, la gestion des points du permis de conduire, l’entretien (et donc les réparations aussi) du parc. Ce n’est donc pas le contribuable qui paye directement les réparations mais « le fait qu’une partie de l’argent des infractions serve à payer les réparations empêche de financer d’autres projets, comme l’amélioration du réseau routier », précise-t-on à la Délégation à la sécurité routière (DSR).


    Combien coûte la réparation d’un radar ? La DSR distingue deux types d’infractions : le vandalisme léger et le vandalisme lourd. Dans le premier cas, qui va du tag à la vitre cassée, le montant de la réparation est de 500 € en moyenne et le temps est évalué à une semaine. Dans le second cas (cabine détruite, à remplacer), un mois est nécessaire pour remplacer l’appareil et la facture dépend du type d’appareil dégradé. Mais les coûts de remplacement d’un équipement radar peuvent grimper très vite : entre 60 000 et 80 000 € (30 000 à 40 000 pour la cabine) pour un radar discriminant, entre 120 000 et 200 000 € pour un radar fixe, 75 000 € pour un radar autonome.

    Que risque-t-on en dégradant un radar ? C’est un délit qui relève des articles 322-1 et 322-2 du Code pénal et une simple tentative est punie des mêmes peines (article 322-4). Une dégradation légère est passible d’une amende de 3 750 €, assortie d’une peine de travaux d’intérêt général, alors qu’une dégradation lourde est passible d’une amende de 30 000 à 75 000 € en fonction des circonstances de la dégradation et l’amende encourue vient s’ajouter aux réparations des dommages.
    #radar #surveillance #maintenance

  • #métaliste (qui va être un grand chantier, car il y a plein d’information sur seenthis, qu’il faudrait réorganiser) sur :
    #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #migrations #réfugiés

    Des liens vers des articles généraux sur l’externalisation des frontières de la part de l’ #UE (#EU) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/569305
    https://seenthis.net/messages/390549
    https://seenthis.net/messages/320101

    Ici une tentative (très mal réussie, car évidement, la divergence entre pratiques et les discours à un moment donné, ça se voit !) de l’UE de faire une brochure pour déconstruire les mythes autour de la migration...
    La question de l’externalisation y est abordée dans différentes parties de la brochure :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/765967

    Petit chapitre/encadré sur l’externalisation des frontières dans l’ouvrage « (Dé)passer la frontière » :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/769367

    Les origines de l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers (maritimes) : accord #USA-#Haïti de #1981 :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/768694

    L’externalisation des politiques européennes en matière de migration
    https://seenthis.net/messages/787450

    "#Sous-traitance" de la #politique_migratoire en Afrique : l’Europe a-t-elle les mains propres ?
    https://seenthis.net/messages/789048

    Partners in crime ? The impacts of Europe’s outsourced migration controls on peace, stability and rights :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/794636
    #paix #stabilité #droits #Libye #Niger #Turquie

  • L’histoire secrète du radar offert par Xavier Bertrand aux chasseurs Lucile Leclair (avec Yves Adaken) - 31 août 2018 - Médiacités
    https://www.mediacites.fr/lille/enquete-lille/2018/08/31/lhistoire-secrete-du-radar-offert-par-xavier-bertrand-aux-chasseurs

    Les chasseurs de Hauts de France disposent depuis quelques mois d’un radar d’observation des oiseaux financé en grande partie par le Conseil régional, malgré les objections des services techniques et les doutes sur l’objectif recherché. Mediacités dévoile les dessous d’un cadeau très politique.

    Le jour de l’inauguration du radar ornithologique de la fédération régionale des chasseurs des Hauts-de-France, le 12 avril dernier, Willy Schraen est tout sourire. Le grand chef des chasseurs français, triple président à l’échelon départemental, régional et national, tient là son symbole « d’une science au service d’une chasse durable ». Il a réuni des adhérents et des élus locaux, en tout une centaine de personnes, autour d’un invité d’honneur, Xavier Bertrand. Le président de la Région Hauts-de-France, financeur principal du radar, n’aurait manqué le déplacement pour rien au monde. En costume-baskets et sans cravate, il est venu en ami de la confrérie des fusils. « Cet outil est la preuve de l’apport des chasseurs à la connaissance de la biodiversité », approuve-t-il.

    Inauguration d’un radar en Baie de Canche de la fédération régionale de chasse qui mesurera les flux et trajets migratoires des oiseaux. Cet outil est la preuve de l’apport des chasseurs à la connaissance de la #biodiversité !
    Oui, la #chasse fait partie de notre patrimoine ! pic.twitter.com/ceAWyGxFiP
    Xavier Bertrand (@xavierbertrand) 12 avril 2018

    Peut-être (nous reviendrons sur cette affirmation ci-après)… mais pas seulement. Le radar est surtout la manifestation concrète d’une alliance politique qui a vu Xavier Bertrand faire entrer plusieurs responsables de fédérations de chasseurs au sein de l’assemblée régionale afin de leur confier la politique de l’environnement. « Restez comme vous êtes, avec votre fraîcheur, avec parfois aussi vos maladresses », a encore encouragé le président de la Région. Les chasseurs sont en effet désormais au pouvoir, et ils ne se privent pas de le faire savoir.. . . notamment aux associations anti chasse.

    Le reste de l’article payant, mais le début est explicatif

    #chasse #chasseurs xavier_bertrand #Hauts_de_France #Oiseaux conseil_régional #radar #biodiversité #fusils #patrimoine #Baie_de_la_Canche

  • #Google is funding a new software project that will automate writing local news - Recode
    https://www.recode.net/2017/7/7/15937436/google-news-media-robots-automate-writing-local-news-stories

    Appelé “radar project”,

    The #Radar_project, [...], plans to cover issues of local importance, digging into government datasets to find stories that matter. That kind of news judgement takes a deep understanding of social, political and local contexts, which humans are better suited to determine than software. The team of journalists who work on the project will likely be key to making it a success.

    Still, Clifton says that this type of automated reporting can go a long way at a time of extreme financial pressures on media outlets, helping to cover important local stories — albeit with fewer people involved in the process.

    #ia

  • Goodbye #AWACS, hello distributed sensors network ?
    https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20170605_air_c2_proof_3_jm.pdf #radar #défense_aérienne #EW #guerre_électronique

    It is unclear that a capability sustainment programme of the E-3D based on the mid-life upgrade made by the USAF and FAF during the 2000s, which extended their E-3 fleets to 2035, is still the optimal path for the RAF to take today. First, recent technological developments – such as missiles and aircraft employing radar cross section (RCS) reduction features or hypersonic speeds – have cast doubt on the ability of the E-3D fleet to detect some potential threats. Second, fifth and 4.5th-generation fighters are increasingly capable of generating higher fidelity situational awareness in their operating areas than an E-3, thus undermining its role for the first of the primary missions outlined above. Finally, the proliferation of threat technologies – in particular very long range air defence systems and very long range air-to-air ‘AWACS-killer’ missiles, as well as the introduction of non-Western fifth-generation fighters – will force large support enabler platforms such as E-3s and tankers to operate at much greater standoff ranges from the main battlespace than in previous conflicts. This is likely to degrade the usefulness of the E-3’s primary sensor suite due to range limitations.

  • Le fondateur d’Oculus revient avec une technologie de surveillance des frontières
    http://www.01net.com/actualites/le-fondateur-d-oculus-revient-avec-une-technologie-de-surveillance-des-fronti

    Palmer Luckey se lance dans une nouvelle entreprise : développer un système de surveillance des frontières et des zones sensibles grâce à des capteurs et des radars Lidar. Quelques mois après avoir « quitté » Facebook, Palmer Luckey, fondateur d’Oculus, a créé une nouvelle start-up dans un domaine où on ne l’attendait pas forcément : la défense. Le New York Times rapporte qu’on y développe une technologie de surveillance qui pourrait être déployée aux frontières et autour des bases (...)

    #Oculus #frontières #surveillance

  • Oculus Founder Plots a Comeback With a Virtual Border Wall
    https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/business/oculus-palmer-luckey-new-start-up.html

    Palmer Freeman Luckey was the kind of wunderkind Silicon Valley venerates. When he was just 21, he made an overnight fortune selling his start-up, a company called Oculus VR that made virtual-reality gear, to Facebook for $2 billion in 2014. But the success story took a sideways turn this year when Mr. Luckey was pressured to leave Facebook months after news spread that he had secretly donated to an organization dedicated to spreading anti-Hillary Clinton internet memes. While Mr. Luckey (...)

    #Oculus #frontières #surveillance

  • Le radar de la Brême d’Or couvert de goudron et de plumes Edition de Forbach | Sarrebruck
    http://www.republicain-lorrain.fr/edition-de-forbach/2017/03/28/sarrebruck-le-radar-de-la-breme-d-or-couvert-de-goudron-et-de-pl

    Ce mardi matin, sur la route de Sarrebruck, à quelques mètres de l’entrée du jardin franco-allemand, les passants ont eu une drôle de surprise. Le radar automatique, placé à la Brême d’Or, était entièrement recouvert de goudron et de plumes.


    À midi, le goudron et les plumes recouvraient encore le radar. Photo EP

    #Humour #surveillance #radar #Sarrebruck

  • Radars automatiques : le croisement avec les données des assureurs sur les rails
    http://www.nextinpact.com/news/99853-radars-automatiques-croisement-avec-donnees-assureurs-sur-rails.ht

    Afin de mieux repérer et sanctionner les automobilistes qui roulent sans assurance, le gouvernement vient de déposer un amendement obligeant les sociétés d’assurance à ouvrir leurs fichiers clients aux autorités. Les pouvoirs publics pourront ainsi effectuer des croisements lorsqu’un véhicule sera flashé par un radar automatique. « Si les données relatives à l’assurance pouvaient être intégrées dans le SIV [pour « Système d’immatriculation des véhicules » (SIV), le célèbre fichier des cartes grises, ndlr], (...)

    #radar #surveillance #immatriculation

  • Investigation Frontières La Grande Illusion ?

    Des centaines de milliers de réfugiés affluent en Europe depuis les ’printemps arabes’ et la guerre en Syrie. Aux quatre coins de l’Union, des dispositifs se mettent en place pour bloquer les migrants : #murs, #grillages, #barrières_électroniques, projets de #surveillance par #drones. Des programmes de plusieurs milliards, inspirés des expériences américaines, à la frontière du Mexique.
    Ces remparts sont-ils efficaces ? Économiquement viables ? Enquête sur un mirage : celui d’une Europe ’bunkerisée’, qui parviendrait à contrôler toutes les entrées sur son territoire.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-wzRuuXU0w

    #frontières #business #économie #vidéo #film #documentaire #Frontex #chiffres #statistiques
    cc @albertocampiphoto @daphne @marty @reka

    • Enquête autour d’un chiffre qui circule dans les médias : il y aurait en Europe 8 mio. de personnes en situation irrégulière (#sans-papiers)...
      –-> Les médias citent une source : la Commission européenne. Ce chiffre est notamment présent dans un communiqué de la commission de février 2009...
      Le voici :

      Il est difficile d’obtenir des données chiffrées qui soient précises. Selon les estimations, le nombre d’immigrés en séjour irrégulier dans l’Union européenne se situerait néanmoins dans une fourchette de 4,5 à 8 millions de personnes, avec une augmentation de 350 000 à 500 000 personnes par an. L’économie parallèle génèrerait entre 7 et 16 % du PIB de l’Union européenne, mais ces pourcentages incluent le travail non déclaré effectué par des citoyens de l’Union. Les secteurs du bâtiment, de l’agriculture, des travaux ménagers et du nettoyage, de la restauration et de l’hôtellerie sont les secteurs économiques les plus susceptibles de recourir au travail au noir d’une manière générale et d’attirer les immigrés en séjour irrégulier en particulier.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-298_fr.htm

      Le journaliste appelle la Commission européenne pour savoir l’origine du chiffre, un responsable de la communication lui répond :

      « Je ne vois pas comment on peut estimer le nombre d’illégaux... peut-être la police, c’est cela, non ? »

      Le journaliste : « Je ne sais pas d’où sort ce chiffre »
      Le responsable comm : « Moi non plus. J’espère qu’on n’a pas retransmis des erreurs, ça serait embêtant »

      Enquête du journaliste auprès de Frontex, qui a aussi publié ce chiffre de 8 mio dans son Annual Risk Analysis 2014 :

      Conservative estimates of the number of irregular migrants within the EU vary between 3 and 6 million, according to the results of Clandestino, an EU-sponsored project implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Other estimates put the figure of irregular migrants at 8 million, of which 80% are staying inside the Schengen area, half of them having originally entered it legally.

      http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf

      Le journaliste interroge l’un des auteurs du rapport de Frontex (Denis Destrebecq) :

      « Je crois que je l’ai pris dans un rapport de la commission européenne, ça a circulé un moment. Je ne sais plus. On n’a peut-être pas investi suffisamment de temps dans l’analyse de ces chiffres et dans la rigueur de ces estimations. On les a juste notés pour donner un petit peu de contexte. On rapporte un petit peu la fourchette qui circule, mais ce n’est pas notre travail d’établir la véracité de ces chiffres »

      #guerre_des_chiffres
      @simplicissimus : oh la la...

    • Eh oui, estimer le nombre de résidents en situation irrégulière est toujours un poème. Ceci dit, en cherchant rapidement des données pas trop anciennes, je tombe sur plusieurs papiers intéressants :
      – un de méthodologie (2004), détaillant justement celles-ci (perso, j’ai toujours eu un faible pour les enquêtes par « capture-recapture », mais il n’y en a pas très souvent dans ce domaine)
      http://www.net4you.com/jandlftp/Estimation-2004.pdf

      – du même auteur (M. Jandi) une présentation avec les mêmes éléments, mais agrémentée d’une estimation pour 12 pays européen pour 2003 (je te laisse découvrir la fourchette)
      http://www.mighealth.net/eu/images/5/5b/Icmpd.pdf

      – et une synthèse du Haut-Commissariat des Nations-Unies au Droits de l’Homme de 2013 avec du myth debunking
      http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/Discussions/2013/DGDMigrationData_PICUM_2013.pdf

    • Ce soir, j’ai continué (mais pas encore fini) la vision du reportage...

      Voici quelques éléments que j’en retire.

      #Clandestino_project (2009)
      http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_147171_en.pdf

      Le site du projet : http://clandestino.eliamep.gr

      Tableau tiré du résumé du policy brief :


      http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/clandestino_policy_brief_comparative_size-of-irregular-migration

      Interview avec Dita Vogel, une des chercheuses qui a écrit le rapport :
      en 2002, entre 3 et 5 mio. de sans-papiers dans l’UE. En 2008, ce chiffre a baissé, il n’y en avait plus que 2 à 4 mio.
      Et pourtant, au même moment que les chiffres de cette baisse sont sortis, l’Europe a commencé à augmenter ses contrôles aux frontières, dit Vogel.

      Source des 8 mio. selon Vogel : « Il a été cité une fois dans une étude irlandaise, rédigé par un chercheur appelé Hubert Krieger » → dans l’étude on dit que ce chiffre a été estimé à partir d’un article du Figaro de 2004, mais nous n’avons jamais trouvé cet article.

      Voici le lien vers l’étude irlandaise :
      https://www.eurofound.europa.eu//sites/default/files/ef_files/docs/areas/populationandsociety/krieger050422.pdf

      Voici ce qui est écrit dans le rapport (p.6) :
      « According to estimates given by Le Figaro (2004 : 4) the nine largest former EU15 Member States would have between 4.4 and 5.5 million illegal migrants. Transposing these figures to the EU25 would give an estimate of between 6 to 8 million undocumented migrants »

      Le journaliste contact Krieger et lui pose cette question : "Le Figaro avait parlé de 4 à 5 mio de clandestins pour l’Europe des 9 et vous avez extrapolé à 8 mio pour l’Euruope des 25…

      Réponse de Kriger : « Oui, c’est vrai, c’était de la pure spéculation et je me sens un peu coupable. Ce chiffre s’est faufilé dans le rapport et c’était clairement pas du très bon travail de ma part »

      Et pourtant c’est ce chiffre, fantaisiste, que tous les médias reprennent depuis des années…

      Vogel : « Je crois que pour les industriels de la protection des frontières c’est bon lorsque des chiffres élevés circulent. Cela renforce l’idée qu’il faudrait investir toujours davantage dans la sécurisation de nos frontières »

      Ceuta et Melilla :
      En 2005, la modernisation des barrières de Ceuta et Melilla a coûté 33 mio d’EUR, soit presque 3 mio d’EUR au km.
      Coûts d’entretien : 14 mio EUR depuis 2005, soit plus de 154’000 EUR par an et par km.

      Si on voulait généraliser le mur de Melilla au 7700 km de frontières de l’Espace Schengen, cela coûterait au mois 2000 millards d’EUR, sans compter les 42’000 km de frontières maritimes ni le coût d’entretien de l’ensemble.

      USA, #Nogales :
      Lien avec événements du 11 septembre 2001 → la perception que les américains se font de l’immigration illégale est bouleversée, désormais un amalgame entre migrant et terroriste s’enracine. George W. Bush lance le #secure_fence_act (2006). Fonds débloqués pour cette nouvelle loi : 2,4 mia. de dollars. Vu l’impossibilité de couvrir toute la longueur de la frontière avec des murs, les USA invente la #barrière_virtuelle : #biométrie, #caméras_thermiques, #radars ou #drones.

      Estimation du poids de l’industrie de surveillance des frontières : 20 mia par an.

      #SBI (#secure_border_initiative), barrière virtuelle installée en 2007 près de Tucson. Fabriquant : BOEING.
      Mais qui n’est apparemment pas très efficace, v. ce rapport : http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-6
      En 2010, même les Républicains reconnaissent l’échec du projet. En 2011, SBI est suspendu (après avoir déjà coûté plus d’1 mia de USD).
      Mais en 2011, l’Arizona met à nouveau 1 mia de USD sur la table pour un nouveau projet de surveillance… Mais en 2014 la cour des comptes a déclaré que cette barrière non plus ne garantissait pas assez d’efficacité.
      (25’55)

    • Et voilà, ce soir... j’ai regardé jusqu’à la fin... voici un résumé...

      #Frontière_aérienne #drones
      C’est l’affaire des #drones_prédateurs. Dans les années 2000 ils avaient été employés pour des bombardements en Irak et en Afghanistan. En 2006, leur concepteur, General Atomics, en a recyclé une dizaine en chasseurs d’immigrants clandestins à la frontière mexicaine.
      Coût de chaque drone : 17 mio de USD. Budget total depuis 2006 : 360 mio de USD.
      Problème, les drones seraient peu efficaces.
      Rapport qui le prouve : https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-17_Dec14.pdf
      Découvertes :
      1. Les coûts des patrouilles aériennes ont été sous-estimés :
      « We estimate that, in fiscal year 2013, it cost at least $62.5 million to operate the program, or about $12,255 per hour. The Office of Air and Marine’s calculation of $2,468 per flight hour does not include operating costs, such as the costs of pilots, equipment, and overhead. By not including all operating costs, CBP also cannot accurately assess the program’s cost effectiveness or make informed decisions about program expansion » (p.4)
      Les autorités avaient omis d’inclure les salaires des pilotes…

      2. Les drones sont inefficaces

      Conclusion :
      « Although CBP expected that the UAS program would result in increased apprehensions of illegal border crossers, reduce the cost of border surveillance, and improve the USBP’s efficiency, we found little or no evidence that CBP met those expectations » (p.13)

      Malgré l’échec, les autorités s’entêtent :
      https://www.eff.org/fr/document/customs-border-protection-2010-drone-concept-operations-report-congress

      L’Europe fait aussi utilisation des #frontières_virtuelles.
      Détroit de Gibraltar → première frontière électronique du continent européen.
      Programme #SIVE (#système_intégré_de_vigilance_extérieure)
      Prix de la frontière virtuelle (presque 2000 km de côte espagnole surveillée) : « très élevé, mais je n’ai aucune idée », dit un garde-frontière.
      Mais quelle efficacité ?
      Un rapport du Conseil de l’Europe dit que la majorité des clandestins entre par les aéroports de façon légale avec un visa.

      Programme #aeroceptor, un programme de 5 mio d’EUR avec des drones armés pour immobiliser des véhicules http://www.aeroceptor.eu
      Il y a aussi #patroller construit par le groupe #safran : http://www.sagem.com/fr/aeronautique-et-espace/drones/systeme-patroller

      En 2007, l’UE a décidé de débloquer 1,4 mia. de EUR pour subventionner la recherche liée à la sécurité (7th framework programme, #FP7 : https://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm)
      Qui est derrière les experts qui influencent la politique en rendant des avis, puis transformés en offres publiques par la commission européenne ?


      Qui sont ces experts ?
      Reinhard Kreissl : https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinhard_Kreissl
      Jean-Luc Zolessio de Thales
      Giovanni Barontini de Finmeccanica
      Angelica Staimer de Siemens

      Un seul expert accepte d’être interviewé, le sociologue indépendant Reinhard Kreissl :
      « Le groupe auquel j’ai participé était soi-disant un groupe de personnalités indépendantes des intérêts de l’industrie. Si vous prenez le directeur général ou le responsable marketing d’un industriel de l’armement et que vous dites ’il n’est pas ici pour représenter les intérêts de son employeur, il siège simplement en tant qu’expert intédpendant juste parce qu’il a des connaissances techniques », vous êtes sensé le croire. Mais c’est clair que la plupart des personnes salariées par les industries étaient là pour défendre les intérêts de l’employeur. C’était évident. Mais officiellement c’était un groupe d’experts indépendants"
      Sur les 326 contrats de recherche passés lors du programme FP7 entre 2007 et 2013.
      Par exemple, derrière #Seabilla (http://www.seabilla.eu/cms), il y a #Selex, une filiale de Finmeccanica, l’employeur de Giovanni Barontini.
      Programme #Effisec, c’est Thales qui remporte l’appel d’offre.

      Question à un passeur à Izmir… « Si il n’y avait pas toutes ces barrières, vous ne prendriez pas autant d’argent ? ».
      Réponse : "Bien sûr, plus les Européens mettront de barrières aux passages des migrants et plus les passeurs prendront un prix élevé. Et au final ce sont les réfugiés qui en paient les conséquences.

  • La #Sécurité_routière marque le pas en Europe
    http://fr.myeurop.info/2015/10/06/la-s-curit-routi-re-marque-le-pas-en-europe-14423

    http://cdn3.myeurop.info/sites/default/files/imagecache/third_thumbnail/media/images/SECU+ROUTIERE+2.JPG

    Daniel Vigneron

    Constatant une reprise de la #mortalité_routière, le gouvernement français vient d’annoncer en fin de semaine dernière un nouveau train de 22 mesures. Après avoir divisé par deux en quinze ans le nombre d’accidents mortels, l’ensemble de l’Europe voit également ses résultats marquer le pas. Avec des nuances.

    500 nouveaux #Radars, 10.000 « leurres », drônes pour détecter les conduites « à risques, intensification des tests d’alcoolémie ou lire la (...)

    #EUROFOCUS #Allemagne #Belgique #Espagne #France #Italie #Pays-Bas #Pologne #Royaume-Uni #alcoolémie #autoroutes #éthylotests #RFI #statistiques_européennes

  • Big Data Is For the Birds - Issue 27: Dark Matter
    http://nautil.us/issue/27/dark-matter/big-data-is-for-the-birds

    In Ithaca, New York, a virtual machine in a laboratory at the Cornell Lab of Ornithology sits in the night, humming. The machine’s name is Bubo, after the genus for horned owls. About every five minutes, Bubo grabs an image from Northeast weather radar stations, and feeds it through a pipeline of artificial-intelligence algorithms. What does this radar image show me? Bubo asks. Is it rain? Are these insects? Could it be pollen? Bubo doesn’t care about those things; all it wants to see are birds in flight. To find them, Bubo analyzes the velocity and direction of targets seen by the radar station. Bubo knows birds have a velocity different from wind and insects, and filters those out. Now Bubo sees only birds. But how dense are they? How fast are they going? How high in the sky are they (...)

  • Espace aérien : suivi temps réel d’un vol

    http://www.flightradar24.com

    Déjà connue des seenthisien-nes, cette google map permet de visualiser l’espace aérien et suivre le déplacement d’un vol particulier en affichant des informations temps-réel relatif à celui-ci.

    Très pratique pour :
    – visualiser l’espace aérien
    – tracker un vol particulier et estimer son heure d’arrivée à une destination
    – vérifier qu’un vol est arrivé à destination

    #radar #tracking #aéroports #trafic_aérien #espace_aérien