• The Protection of Family Unity in Dublin Procedures

    Prof. Maiani discusses the protection of family unity in proceedings arising under the Dublin III Regulation against the backdrop of the Swiss authorities’ practice in this area. His comprehensive analysis is, however, relevant to any national administration applying the regulation and provides important guidance for European legal practitioners in this area.

    The study demonstrates that while there is considerable tension in practice between the operation of the Dublin system and the protection of family unity, if properly interpreted, the Dublin III Regulation could afford effective protection to the families of those to whom it applies. Indeed, “in a system where the protection of family life is a ‘primary consideration,’ preserving or promoting family unity should be the norm rather than the exception and this conclusion is valid a fortiori in situations characterized by particular vulnerabilities” (Maiani § 4.3.3). As demonstrated by the study, where the regulation itself falls short, relevant human rights norms can and must fill in the gaps. These conclusions rest on extensive research including of the jurisprudence of the CJEU and other relevant European and international bodies.

    Finally, the study offers an insightful and unique critique of the underdeveloped jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in this area. Importantly, it discusses the emerging contribution – and largely untapped potential – of the UN Treaty Bodies in closing the protection gaps for families and vulnerable persons caught up in the rigours of Dublin proceedings.


    https://centre-csdm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MAIANI-Dublin-Study-CSDM-14.10.2019.pdf
    #Dublin #rapport #asile #migrations #réfugiés #unité_familiale #famille #familles #Francesco_Maiani #règlement_Dublin

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • British orphans found trapped in Syria IS camp

    The war in Syria has been reignited on new fronts by Turkey’s incursion into the north east of the country.

    In camps across the regions are thousands of terrified children whose parents supported the Islamic State group, but most of their countries don’t want them home.

    In one camp, the BBC has discovered three children, believed to be from London, whose parents joined IS five years ago, and were subsequently killed in the fighting.

    The children - Amira, Heba and Hamza - are stranded, in danger and they want to come home.

    https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-50030567/british-orphans-found-trapped-in-syria-is-camp
    #enfants #enfance #ISIS #EI #Etat_islamique #camps #orphelins #Syrie #conflit #guerre #combattants_étrangers

    • Gli svizzeri della Jihad

      Chi sono gli jihadisti elvetici, di che reti facevano parte e cosa li ha spinti a partire? Da Winterthur a Ginevra, dai palazzi popolari ai quartieri borghesi, siamo andati a cercare i giovani che si sono uniti all’ISIS.

      Sono svizzeri e sono partiti per fare la jihad. Molti di loro hanno combattuto per lo stato islamico, altri sono entrati in contatto con gli attentatori che hanno colpito l’Europa. Sono stati catturati in Siria e adesso si trovano nelle prigioni nel nord del paese.Con loro ci sono donne e bambini. Per ora nessun tribunale sta giudicando i loro crimini, tutti quanti sono in attesa che i rispettivi paesi d’origine decidano come procedere nei loro confronti. Uno stallo che sembra però sbloccarsi: secondo alcune indiscrezioni Berna starebbe considerando l’ipotesi di far rientrare le donne e i bambini.Una squadra di Falò è stata nei campi di prigionia che ospitano donne e bambini dell’ISIS; tendopoli al collasso in cui l’ideologia radicale sta risorgendo. Ma ci sono anche svizzeri che hanno fatto parte dello Stato Islamico e sono già rientrati in Svizzera.Chi sono questi jihadisti elvetici, di che reti facevano parte e cosa li ha spinti a partire? Da Winterthur a Ginevra, dai palazzi popolari ai quartieri borghesi, siamo andati a cercare i giovani che si sono uniti all’ISIS. Alcuni si dicono pentiti, altri sembrano aver mantenuto dei legami con gli ambienti radicalizzati. A che punto stanno i processi nei loro confronti? Chi si occupa di sorvegliare le loro attività? Quanto pericolosi li dobbiamo considerare?

      https://www.rsi.ch/play/tv/falo/video/gli-svizzeri-della-jihad----------?id=12256843
      #documentaire #film #suisse #femmes #al-Hol #camps_de_réfugiés #détention #prison

    • UK special forces may help British orphans escape Syria

      Home Office reverses stance and says it will consider repatriating children in camps.
      https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/d0a1d88ba6202391e12730afd5aac7dc8694af18/0_235_5616_3370/master/5616.jpg?width=620&quality=85&auto=format&fit=max&s=204f73a9482a4debc42258

      Britain will consider repatriating orphans and unaccompanied children in north-east Syria if they are alerted to their presence by local military or aid agencies.

      Home Office officials said the UK would assist British orphans trapped in Syria after the Turkish invasion, reversing a previous policy that children had to be taken out of the country before they might get any help.

      Officials would not say exactly how children might be extracted from the country, implying that SAS or other special forces, still understood to be based in the region, could be involved in the repatriations.

      They said children thought to be British would be assessed on a case-by-case basis once removed from Syria and only orphans and unaccompanied children would be eligible to be brought back to the UK.

      The shift in policy comes after a BBC reporting team found three English-speaking orphans aged 10 or under in a Syria camp over the weekend. The children are believed to have been taken by their parents to live under Islamic State five years ago.

      The eldest, Amira, 10, told the film crew that their parents and other immediate adult family members were killed in an air assault on Baghouz, the last Isis stronghold, which fell in March, and she wanted to return to the UK.

      Save the Children, one of the few charities operating in north-east Syria, said the Home Office developments were a step in the right direction but more detail was required.

      “For this to translate into a real change of policy, we need to know that the government is working on how to bring all British children to the UK while we still can, not just those featured in the media,” the charity said.

      It is not clear how many British unaccompanied children remain in the crowded refugee camps in the Kurdish region of Syria. Some unofficial estimates put the figure at around 30.

      Any child born to a Briton – whether inside or outside the UK – is a British citizen. Before the Turkish invasion the government had said it was too risky to try to attempt any rescue children with a legitimate claim.

      When Shamima Begum was deprived of her UK citizenship in February, the British government said her infant son was still British. After the child died at a Syrian refugee camp at the age of three weeks, Jeremy Hunt, then foreign secretary, said it had been too dangerous for British officials to attempt to a rescue.

      Opposition MPs questioned whether the change in stance would lead to more orphaned children getting help. Stephen Gethins, the SNP’s foreign affairs spokesman, said: “We know the UK government’s record on resettling refugees and vulnerable people leaves a lot to be desired. Beyond the rhetoric there is very little substance from the UK government.”

      On Tuesday the foreign secretary, Dominic Raab, had hinted at a change of policy when, during an urgent debate on the Syrian crisis, he said: “We are looking at whether orphans and unaccompanied minors who bear UK nationality can be given safe passage to return to the UK.”

      Further details were spelled out on Wednesday by the Home Office, which has been leading on repatriations from Syria.

      The government does not want former Isis fighters and adult supporters to return to the UK, although around 450 are thought to have previously done so, and it is suggesting they could be put on trial in the region.

      https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/16/uk-shifts-stance-on-helping-british-orphans-escape-syria?CMP=Share_iOSA
      #orphelins #rapatriement

  • 5 Years Alarmphone

    For our anniversary, we are publishing a booklet, reflecting on our activities and experiences supporting thousands of travellers in the Mediterranean. It is available in three languages (English, German, French) and can be downloaded for free:

    https://alarmphone.org/en/publications/anniversary-booklets

    #alarm_phone #rapport #booklet #migration #méditerranée #sauvetage

  • ’Inhumane’ Frontex forced returns going unreported

    On a late evening August flight last year from Munich to Afghanistan, an Afghan man seated in the back of the plane struggled to breath as a German escort officer repeatedly squeezed his testicles.

    The man, along with another Afghan who had tried to kill himself, was being forcibly removed from Germany and sent back to a country engulfed in war.

    The EU’s border agency Frontex coordinated and helped pay for the forced return operation, as part of a broader bid to remove from Europe unwanted migrants and others whose applications for international protection had been rejected.

    By then, almost 20 years of war and civil conflict had already ravaged Afghanistan - with 2018 registering its worst-ever civilian death rate since counting had started.

    Also seated on the plane for the 14 August flight were independent observers of the anti-torture committee (CPT) of the human rights watchdog, the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe.

    In a report, they describe in detail how six escort officers had surrounded the terrified man in an effort to calm him.

    The ’calming’ techniques involved an officer pulling the man’s neck from behind while yanking his nose upwards.

    His hands and legs had been cuffed and a helmet placed on him. Another knelt on the man’s knees and upper legs, using his full weight to keep him seated.

    After 15 minutes, the kneeling officer “then gripped the returnee’s genitals with his left hand and repeatedly squeezed them for prolonged periods.”

    Another 503 have been sent to Afghanistan in flights coordinated by Frontex since the start of this year.

    Vicki Aken, the International Rescue Committee’s Afghanistan country director, says those returned are invariably put in harm’s way.

    “You cannot say that Kabul is ’conflict-free’. Kabul is actually one of the most dangerous places in Afghanistan,” she said, noting Afghanistan has the highest number of child casualties in the world.

    The day after the Munich flight landed on 14 August 2018, a blast ripped through a high school in the capital city, Kabul, killing 48 people, including over 30 students.
    Accountability

    The flight journey from Munich highlights a stunning omission from Frontex responsibilities - adding to concerns the EU agency is failing to maintain standards when it comes to coordinating forced-returns in a humane manner.

    For one, all return operations must be monitored in accordance with EU law, and a forced-return monitor is required to deliver a report to Frontex and to all the member states involved.

    Such reports, handed over to Frontex’s executive director, are supposed to act as an internal check and balance to stem alleged abuse by escort guards in a system that has been in place since the start of 2017.

    These monitors come from a “pool of forced-return monitors”, as required under the 2016 European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and the 2008 Return Directive, and are broadly sourced from the member states themselves.

    The CPT in their report noted that the flight on 14 August 2018 had also been monitored by Frontex staff itself, and concluded that its “current arrangements cannot be considered as an independent external monitoring mechanism”.

    When the agency compiled its own internal report spanning the latter half of 2018, which included the 14 August flight, no mention was made of the Afghan man who had been manhandled by six officers.

    Asked to explain, the Warsaw-based agency whose annual budget for 2020 is set to increase to €420.6m, has yet to respond to Euobserver.

    Instead, the report, which had been written up by Frontex’s fundamental rights officer, highlighted other issues.

    It demanded escorts not place restraints on children. It said minors who are alone cannot be sent back on a forced-return flight, which is exactly what had happened on two other operations.

    No one on the 14 August flight had issued a “serious incident report” label, used by Frontex whenever a particularly bad incident has been deemed to have transpired.

    During 2018 Frontex coordinated and helped fund 345 such return operations, by charter flights during which only one “serious incident report” was filed - posing questions on the reliability and independence of the monitors and return escorts, as well as the sincerity of internal Frontex efforts to stem any abuse.

    The accountability gap was highlighted by the outgoing head of the Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, who in his farewell speech earlier this month, deliberately singled out Frontex.

    “Frontex is bound by EU laws that prohibit torture and any form of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” he said, in reference to reports of alleged human rights violations that occurred during Frontex support operations observed since mid-2018.
    Monitoring the monitors

    For Markus Jaeger, a Council of Europe official who advises the Frontex management board, the agency’s monitoring system for forced return is meaningless.

    “The internal system of Frontex produces close to nil reports on serious incidents, in other words, the internal system of Frontex, says there is never a human rights incident,” he told EUobserver, earlier this month.

    He said Frontex’s pool of 71 monitors is overstretched and that in some cases, only one is available for a flight that might have 150 people being returned.

    “One monitor doesn’t suffice,” he said, noting Frontex has been able to delegate any blame onto member states, by positioning itself merely as a coordinator.

    But as Frontex expands - with the ability to lease planes, pilots and staff - its direct involvement with the returns also increases and so does its accountability, says Jaeger.

    “The [return] figures are supposedly going up, the capacity is supposedly going up, the procedures are being shortened, and deportations are going to happen by deployed guest officers and or by Frontex officers and so the independence of the monitors is crucial,” he pointed out.

    For its part, the European Commission says Frontex’s pool of monitors is set to expand.
    Nafplion Group

    Jaeger, along with other national authorities from a handful of member states, which already contribute to Frontex’s pool of monitors, are now putting together a new group to keep the forced-returns organised by Frontex better in check.

    Known as the Nafplion Group, and set up as a pilot project last October by the Greek ombudsman, it describes itself as a “remedy to the absence of an external, independent governance of the pool of forced-return monitors” in Frontex forced-return flights.

    The plan is to get it up and running before the end of the year, despite having no guarantee they will ever be selected by Frontex to help monitor a forced-return flight.

    “This is how de facto the Nafplion Group can be avoided,” said Jaeger, noting that they plan to go public should they not be picked.

    Asked to comment, the European Commission says it is not in discussions with any institutions on the establishment of a new, parallel monitoring system.

    https://euobserver.com/migration/146090
    #renvois #expulsions #Frontex #Allemagne #réfugiés #réfugiés_afghans #asile #migrations #violence #responsabilité #retours_forcés #renvois #expulsions #déboutés #Kaboul #directive_retour #Nafplion_Group #monitoring #monitorage

    • Germany: Visit 2018 (return flight)

      CPT/Inf (2019) 14 | Section: 12/18 | Date: 03/12/2018

      A. The removal operation: preparation, execution and handover / 5. Use of force and means of restraint

      50.The use of force and means of restraint in the context of pick-up and transport of irregular migrants by the different Länder police authorities is regulated in the respective Länder police legislation.[1] In the context of the transfer to the airport, most of the returnees were not subjected to any means of restraint. However, a number of returnees were restrained (handcuffed, hand- and foot-cuffed, or even body-cuffed) during their transfer and upon arrival at Terminal F. The use of means of restraint was based on an individual risk assessment.

      51.During the different stages in the preparation of the removal operation by air from a German airport as well as on board a stationary aircraft on German territory, the use of force and means of restraint falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal Police. In-flight, the aircraft commander[2] is – with the assistance of the Federal Police[3] – entitled to apply the necessary preventive and coercive measures to ensure flight security. In particular, means of restraint can be applied if there is a risk that the returnee might attack law enforcement officers or a third party, or if he/she resists.[4]

      The internal instruction of the Federal Police contains detailed provisions on the use of force and means of restraint. In particular, coercive measures are only applied based both on an individual risk assessment and on the returnee’s conduct. Further, the principle of proportionality must be observed. During removal operations, the following means of restraint may be applied: steel, plastic or Velcro hand- and foot-cuffs as well as body-cuffs and head- (i.e. a helmet) and bite-protective devices; the last three means of restraint may only be applied by specially trained police officers and precise instructions have to be followed. Every application of use of force or means of restraint is documented. Further, according to another internal instruction and the operational instructions for this return operation, other weapons (i.e. firearms, tear gas, batons) are prohibited.

      This approach is in line with the means of restraint agreed upon with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), as specified in the implementation plan and its Annex I (operational overview). The implementation plan also underlines that the “use of force is always a last resort and must be the minimum level required to achieve the legitimate objective”.

      Moreover, the internal instruction explicitly mentions by way of clear guidelines the risks related to the use of force and/or means of restraint capable of causing positional asphyxia, including a detailed list of possible related symptoms, and prohibits the use of means likely to obstruct the airways as well as “techniques directed against the person’s neck or mouth”. Further, the forced administration of medication (i.e. sedatives or tranquilisers) as a means of chemical restraint to facilitate removal is strictly forbidden. Such an approach fully reflects the Committee’s position on this issue.

      52.According to information provided by letter of 18 October 2018, the German authorities, in the context of return operations, applied means of restraint 1,098 times for a total of 21,904 foreign nationals returned in 2017, and 673 times for a total of 14,465 persons returned in the period between January and August 2018.

      53.In the course of the return flight on 14 August 2018, coercive measures were applied by the Federal Police to two returnees who attempted to forcefully resist their return.

      One returnee, who had previously attempted to commit suicide and to resist his transfer by the Länder police authorities (see paragraph 28), became agitated during the full-body search in the airport terminal, when Federal Police officers attempted to remove his body-cuff in order to replace it with a more appropriate model (i.e. with Velcro straps rather than metal handcuffs). Further, the wounds on his left forearm had re-opened, requiring the medical doctor to dress them. The returnee was temporarily segregated from other returnees and embarked separately, during which resort to physical force was required to take him inside the aircraft.

      Once seated in the rear of the aircraft (surrounded by five escort officers seated on either side of him, in front and behind), he continued resisting, including by banging his head against the seat, and two of the escorts had to stand up to contain him manually during take-off. Apart from two further minor episodes of agitation, he calmed down as the flight progressed. However, at the moment of handover, he resisted being removed from the aircraft. Consequently, he was immobilised and carried out of the aircraft by a team of up to seven escort officers. Once on the tarmac, he was placed in a separate police vehicle, his body-cuff was removed, and he was handed over to three Afghan police officers, one of whom filmed his handover.

      54.The second returnee complied with the embarkation procedure until the moment when he was seated in the aircraft, at which point he became agitated, started shouting and hitting out in all directions, and attempted to stand up. The two escorts seated on either side of him attempted to keep him seated by holding his arms; they were supported by a back-up team of four escorts, three of whom took up positions behind his seat. One of these escort officers put his arm around the returnee’s neck from behind and used his other hand to pull the returnee’s nose upwards thus enabling his colleague to insert a bite protection into the returnee’s mouth.

      The reaction of the returnee was to increase his resistance, and a second escort officer from the back-up team intervened pulling the returnee’s head down onto an adjacent seat and placing his knee on the returnee’s head in order to exert pressure and gain compliance while the returnee’s hands were tied behind his back with a Velcro strap. Another escort officer applied pressure with his thumb to the returnee’s temple. A second Velcro strap was applied below the returnee’s knees to tie his legs. A helmet was placed on the returnee’s head, additional Velcro straps were applied to his arms and legs, and force was used in order to contain him manually. At this stage, three escorts were holding the returnee from behind his seat and an escort officer was seated either side of him. A sixth escort officer knelt on the returnee’s knees and upper legs, using his weight to keep the returnee seated. After some 15 minutes, this sixth escort officer gripped the returnee’s genitals with his left hand and repeatedly squeezed them for prolonged periods to gain the returnee’s compliance to calm down. When the aircraft took off some ten minutes later, two escorts were still standing upright behind the returnee’s seat to ensure that he remained seated. Shortly thereafter, the returnee calmed down when told that, if he remained compliant, most means of restraint would be removed. He remained cuffed, with his hands tied behind his back, for about one hour. As he remained calm, he was untied.

      55.In the course of this intervention, the delegation observed that, when the first escort officer from the back-up team put his arm around the returnee’s neck, the returnee started struggling to breath and became even more agitated, given that the pressure applied around his throat obstructed his respiratory tract momentarily. The CPT considers that any use of force must avoid inducing a sensation of asphyxia on the person concerned. As is reflected in the relevant internal instructions of the Federal Police, no control technique which impedes a person’s capacity to breath is authorised for use by escort officers.

      Moreover, the delegation observed that, each time the sixth escort officer applied pressure to squeeze the returnee’s genitals, he physically reacted by becoming more agitated. The CPT acknowledges that it will often be a difficult task to enforce a removal order in respect of a foreign national who is determined to stay on a State’s territory. Escorts may on occasion have to use force and apply means of restraint in order to effectively carry out the removal; however, the force used should be no more than is absolutely necessary. To ill-treat a person by squeezing the genitals, a technique which is clearly aimed at inflicting severe pain to gain compliance, is both excessive and inappropriate; this is all the more so given that the person was being restrained by six escorts.

      The CPT recommends that the German authorities take immediate action to end the application of these two techniques by Federal Police escort officers.

      56.The wearing of identification tags by staff involved in removal operations is also an important safeguard against possible abuse. The delegation noted that escort police officers from the Bavarian State Police and from the Federal Police did not wear any identification tag. The CPT recommends that all police escorts from the Federal Police as well as from all Länder police authorities wear a visible identification tag to make them easily identifiable (either by their name or an identification number).

      https://hudoc.cpt.coe.int/eng#{%22sort%22:[%22CPTDocumentDate%20Descending,CPTDocumentID%20Ascending,CPTSectionNumber%20Ascending%22],%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22CPTSectionID%22:[%22p-deu-20180813-en-12%22]}
      #rapport

  • Je découvre ces deux articles qui se focalisent sur les #réfugiés et les #animaux... un regard assez nouveau...

    The important role of animals in refugee lives

    Refugees are people who have been forcibly displaced across a border. What do animals have to do with them? A lot.

    Companion animals, for example, are important to many people’s emotional wellbeing. “For people forced to flee,” the Norwegian Refugee Council recently noted, “a pet can be a vital source of comfort.” At the sterile and hyper-modern Azraq refugee camp in Jordan, Syrian refugees would pay a high price for caged birds (30-40 Jordanian dinars each, roughly €35-50). In Syria, many people keep a bird at home. At Azraq keeping a bird is one way of making a plastic and metal shelter into a home.

    In many contexts, refugees also depend on animals for their livelihoods. Humanitarian assistance understandably focuses on supporting people, but if refugees’ working animals and livestock perish then their experience of displacement can worsen drastically: they lose the means to support themselves in exile, or to return home and rebuild their lives.

    Ever since the earliest days of modern refugee camps, at the time of the First World War, agencies responsible for refugees have had to think about animals too. When the British army in the Middle East built a camp at Baquba near Baghdad in 1918 to house nearly 50,000 Armenian and Assyrian refugees, there were some animals that they needed to keep out. Fumigation procedures and netting were used against lice and mosquitos, carriers of typhus and malaria respectively. But refugee agencies also needed to let larger animals in. The people in the camp, especially the Assyrians, were accompanied by seven or eight thousand sheep and goats, and about six thousand larger animals like horses and cattle. Many of the people depended on their animals for their livelihood and for any prospect of permanent settlement, so they all needed to be accommodated and cared for.

    There are similar examples around the world today, like the longstanding camps for Sahrawi refugees in southwestern Algeria. There, goats and camels are socially and economically significant animals: goat barns, enclosures often made of scrap metal, are a prominent part of the camps’ increasingly urban landscape, while camel butcheries are important shops.

    This helps us understand why the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees now has programmes to support refugees’ animals. For example, in 2015, with funding from the IKEA Foundation, the organization assisted 6,000 Malian refugees in Burkina Faso and their 47,000 animals: helping animals helps the people too, in this case to earn a living (and achieve economic integration) through small-scale dairy farming. It also helps us understand how conflicts can arise between refugees and host communities when refugees’ animals compete for grazing or water with local animals, or damage local farmers’ crops.

    Starting in 2011, nearly 125,000 people from Blue Nile state in Sudan fled from a government offensive into Maban country, South Sudan, with hundreds of thousands of animals (about half of whom soon died, stressed by the journey). Peacefully managing their interactions with local residents and a community of nomadic herders who also regularly migrated through the county was a complex task for the South Sudanese government and humanitarian agencies. It required careful negotiations to allocate grazing zones as far as 60km from the camps where the refugees lived, schedule access to watering points, and agree a different route for the nomads’ migration.

    In Bangladesh, meanwhile, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature has recently been involved in efforts to prevent conflict between refugees and wild animals. Nearly a million Rohingya refugees from state persecution in Myanmar live in semi-formal camps near Cox’s Bazar that have grown up since 2017, but these block the migration routes of critically endangered Asian elephants. The International Union’s conflict mitigation programme includes building lookout towers, training Rohingya observers, and running an arts-based education project.

    And this highlights a final issue. The elephants at Cox’s Bazar are endangered because of ecological pressures caused by humans. But increasingly, humans too are endangered—and displaced—by ecological pressures. In the late 2000s, a years-long drought in Syria, worsened by human-caused climate change, pushed over a million rural Syrians off the land. (The country’s total livestock fell by a third.) The political and economic pressure that this generated was a significant factor in the crisis that ignited into war in 2011, in turn displacing millions more people. Hundreds of thousands of them fled to Jordan, one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, where the increased extraction of groundwater has lowered the water table, drying out oases in the Jordanian desert. Wild birds migrating across the desert have to fly further to find water and rest, meaning fewer survive the journey. In the Syrian war, and in many other conflicts around the world, human and animal displacements are intersecting under environmental stress. If we want to understand human displacement and respond to it adequately, we need to be thinking about animals too.

    https://blog.oup.com/2019/10/the-important-role-of-animals-in-refugee-lives
    #rapport_aux_animaux #animaux_de_compagnie

    • ‘Tusk force’ set up to protect refugees and elephants in #Bangladesh

      UNHCR and the International Union for Conservation of Nature are working together to mitigate incidents between elephants and humans in the world’s largest refugee settlement.

      Battered and badly bruised, Anwar Begum, a Rohingya refugee, surveys the damage around her bamboo shelter.

      Sleeping mats ripped apart; plastic buckets and even metal cooking pots and plates torn and dented. Her shelter was toppled – but neighbours in Kutupalong refugee settlement near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, have helped her re-erect it.

      “I’m very grateful, thanks to the almighty, to be alive,” the 45-year-old said. “But I’m terrified.”

      Just a few days earlier, in the middle of the night, a wild elephant entered her small shelter and killed her husband, 50-year-old Yakub Ali. It was one of several elephants that wandered into the camp, damaging shelters and injuring their occupants, following their usual migratory path.

      Anwar and her family fled their home in Myanmar six months ago, settling in the vast Kutupalong refugee settlement. “We weren’t aware of any elephant presence here,” she said. “I remember once seeing elephants back home in Myanmar, but in the distance – never close up like this.”

      Clearly shaken, Anwar recounted the events that occurred that night. “It was around 1 a.m. I heard a heavy sound and felt the roof falling onto us. It was quick and loud. I started screaming. It all went very fast and my husband was killed”.

      Anwar was treated in hospital for three days. By the time she came back to the settlement, neighbours had helped to rebuild her shelter. UNHCR’s partners have now provided her with new household items, and Anwar has received counselling from UN Refugee Agency protection staff.

      UNHCR and its partner IUCN – the International Union for Conservation of Nature – have now launched an action plan to try to prevent incidents like this, which have resulted in the deaths of at least 10 refugees, including young children, in Kutupalong settlement.

      “This partnership is critical not only to ensure the conservation of elephants, but to protect refugees.”

      The highly congested site, which used to be forest land, lies along one of the migratory routes between Myanmar and Bangladesh for critically endangered Asian elephants.

      The so-called ‘tusk force’ will work with both the local host community and refugees, in close consultation with the Bangladesh Forest Department and the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner’s Office.

      Mitigation plans include installing watch-towers in key spots around the settlement, as well as setting up Elephant Response Teams who can sound the alarm if elephants enter the site. Elephant routes and corridors will be clearly marked, so that people will know which areas to avoid. Campaigns will also be carried out to create better awareness of the risks.

      “This partnership is critical not only to ensure the conservation of elephants, but to protect refugees, a number of whom have tragically already lost their lives,” said Kevin Allen, UNHCR’s head of emergency operations in Cox’s Bazar district.

      The project is part of a wider initiative by UNHCR and the IUCN, in support of government activities, to mitigate some of the environmental impacts linked to the establishment of refugee settlements in Cox’s Bazar.

      Other plans include carrying out environmental education and awareness among refugees and the host communities about the importance of forest resources as well as taking steps to improve the environment in the refugee settlement areas and nearby surroundings.

      The project leaders will also advocate for reforestation programmes to ensure that natural resources and a shared environment are better protected.

      https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2018/3/5a9801d64/tusk-force-set-protect-refugees-elephants-bangladesh.html
      #éléphants #IUCN #sécurité

    • Bangladesh elephant rampage highlights dangers for refugees

      A refugee prays on a hill overlooking Kutupalong camp after another Rohingya burial.

      After fleeing flames and gunfire in Myanmar, Rohingya refugee Jane Alam thought danger was behind him in Bangladesh.

      But as he slept last night in a fragile shelter in a forested area near Kutupalong refugee camp, rampaging elephants crashed in on top of his family.

      The 18-year-old’s father and a seven-month-old baby were killed in the attack, which also injured seven of his relatives.

      “We thought we would be safe here.”

      Grazed on the cheek, neck and hip, he trekked barefoot up a hillside overlooking the makeshift camp this morning to bury them.

      “We thought we would be safe here,” he says, numb with disbelief, standing beside his father’s grave, marked with small bamboo stakes.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cy_fkc5qRt8

      A few paces away, the tiny body of his infant relative lies on the muddy ground, wrapped in a white cloth. A man scoops out her shallow grave with a farm tool as a group of men stand solemnly by.

      The deaths highlight one of the unexpected dangers facing refugees and the risks as humanitarian actors respond to the arrival in Bangladesh of at least 429,000 people who have fled the latest outbreak of violence that erupted in Myanmar on August 25.

      As two formal refugee camps in Bangladesh are overwhelmed, thousands are seeking shelter where they can - some in an uninhabited forested area outside Kutupalong camp.

      “The area is currently completely wild, so the people who are settling-in where there is wildlife,” says Franklin Golay, a staff member for UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, who is working to provide water, sanitation and shelter at the informal camp.

      “There are elephants roaming around that pose a threat,” he says.

      Asian elephants are considered a critically endangered species in Bangladesh, where conservationists estimate there are presently just 239 living in the wild. Many roam in the Chittagong area in the southeast of the country, where the refugee influx is concentrated.

      Local residents say the elephants are drawn to populated areas in the Monsoon season, when fruit including mangos and jackfruit ripen.

      Securing the rugged and partially forested area to mitigate the risk could be achieved with lights or electric fencing, Golay says.

      But for Alam’s grieving family, who fled persecution across the border in Myanmar, the attack is a stark reminder that their trials are not yet over.

      “We ran from danger, and we are still in a dangerous situation now,” says Ali Hussein, the dead man’s uncle. “This cannot be forgotten.”

      https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/9/59c37c0f16/bangladesh-elephant-rampage-highlights-dangers-refugees.html

  • Dublin : l’urgence de mettre fin à un règlement kafkaïen

    Dans un rapport publié le mardi 24 septembre, élaboré en collaboration avec des demandeurs d’asile, le Secours Catholique explique le règlement de Dublin et les conséquences de son application en France. L’association demande au gouvernement de cesser de se dégager de sa #responsabilité et de prendre en compte le choix exprimé par des milliers de personnes exilées de vivre en sécurité sur son territoire.

    https://www.secours-catholique.org/actualites/dublin-lurgence-de-mettre-fin-a-un-reglement-kafkaien
    #rapport #Dublin #France #règlement_dublin #secours_catholique #asile #migrations #réfugiés #échec #dysfonctionnement #migrerrance #ADA

    Et autour de la question du #logement #hébergement :

    Pour télécharger le rapport en pdf :
    https://www.secours-catholique.org/sites/scinternet/files/publications/rapport_dublin.pdf

    ping @karine4

  • Villes européennes et réfugiés : un laboratoire du logement abordable et de la #résilience_urbaine

    Comment les villes européennes, et plus particulièrement allemandes et suédoises, sont-elles parvenues à loger les demandeurs d’asile arrivés à partir de 2015 ? En 2017, La Fabrique de la Cité menait un projet d’étude international et pluridisciplinaire consacré à la résilience des villes européennes au choc démographique qu’a constitué l’arrivée de ces demandeurs d’asile. Le rapport né de ces travaux, en répertoriant les solutions apportées par #Berlin, #Hambourg, #Stockholm, #Stuttgart, #Munich et #Dresde, constitue un #guide pratique à l’usage des villes confrontées à une crise semblable ou à celles qui le seront dans les années à venir.


    https://www.lafabriquedelacite.com/projets/villes-europeennes-et-refugies-un-laboratoire-du-logement-aborda
    #logement #villes #urban_matter #accueil #réfugiés #asile #migrations #rapport #résilience #Allemagne #Suède #accueil #hébergement

    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Obstacles to Excellence: Academic Freedom & China’s Quest for World Class Universities

    Obstacles to Excellence is a new report from Scholars at Risk mapping threats to academic freedom that jeopardize China’s higher education ambitions.

    “For decades now, the Chinese government has invested heavily in academic institutions and programs designed to compete with the world’s finest,” says SAR executive director Robert Quinn. “This positive ambition is undermined, however, by state policies and practices that fail to protect academic freedom. This poses grave personal and professional risks for Chinese scholars and students,” as documented in the report, “and serious academic, reputational, and financial risks for foreign academic institutions with partnerships with Chinese counterparts, in China or abroad.”

    Drawing on academic literature, legislative and regulatory texts, media, human rights reports, interviews with Chinese and foreign experts, and data from SAR’s Academic Freedom Monitoring Project, Obstacles to Excellence identifies pressures and threats to academic freedom in China and where China has extraterritorial academic connections, including:

    Systematic and targeted tactics employed by state and university authorities in mainland China to constrict academic activity and to intimidate, silence, and punish outspoken academics and students;
    Heightened pressures on scholars and students in the Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions including language policies that limit equitable access to higher education, heightened surveillance, and the imprisonment of a growing number of minority scholars and students at so-called “re-education camps;”
    Erosion of university autonomy in Hong Kong and Macau under Beijing’s growing influence over China’s Special Administrative Regions;
    Academic freedom and autonomy challenges facing foreign higher education institutions operating joint ventures with Chinese universities on the mainland;
    Extra-territorial pressures by the Chinese Party-state and supporters, through Confucius Institutes and other activities, to restrict academic inquiry and expression at universities outside China; and
    Vague, unsubstantiated, and overbroad foreign government rhetoric and policies that impede academic inquiry and risk stigmatizing innocent overseas Chinese academics and students.

    As noted in the report, a small but growing number of international universities have responded to academic freedom concerns by scaling back or terminating partnerships with institutions in mainland China and with China-supported institutes on their own campuses. Others have stayed out of the public dialogue. Obstacles to Excellence urges nuanced, public discussion of the issues, with the goal of identifying practices which recognize China’s legitimate higher education ambitions while fully protecting academic freedom.

    “Pressures on academic freedom in China mirror those we see around the world, as documented in our annual Free to Think reports,” says SAR’s advocacy director Clare Robinson. “But given the size of its higher education sector, and China’s important and growing position on the global academic stage, it is more important than ever to discuss the issues raised publicly and to work together to institutionalize policies and practices that safeguard academic freedom and recognize its central role in world-class universities and scholarship.”

    Obstacles to Excellence, available in English and simplified Chinese versions, invites readers to consider these important issues and to discuss them publicly, including at conferences, annual association meetings, and in international partnerships. It includes recommendations for Chinese state authorities, university leadership, and civil society in China aimed at strengthening understanding of and respect for academic freedom. It also urges state authorities, higher education leaders, and civil society outside of China to demonstrate their commitment to academic freedom by supporting at-risk Chinese scholars and students, wherever they may be, and by ensuring that their international partnerships—with Chinese and non-Chinese partners alike—respect academic freedom and other core university values.

    https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/resources/obstacles-to-excellence-academic-freedom-chinas-quest-for-world-clas
    #liberté_académique #Chine #université #rapport #scholars_at_risk #éducation #Tibet #Mongolie #Xinjiang_Uyghur #Macau #Hong_Kong #Confucius_Institutes

    Ce mot d’#excellence qui me dérange beaucoup...

  • Refugee Education #2030: A Strategy for Refugee Inclusion

    The strategy arises from lessons learned about parallel education provision for refugees reflected in the 2011 Review of refugee education, and from the experience of shifting to national education service provision across a wide range of distinct contexts as a result of the guidance provided in the 2012-2016 UNHCR Refugee Education Strategy. It is also informed by partner and UNHCR collaboration and innovations, new or amplified partnerships with ministries of education and planning, refugee youth, civil society, development and humanitarian donors and the private sector, greater UNHCR internal capacity and significant international commitments related to the Global Compact on Refugees.

    As the lead for refugee protection, UNHCR maintains its commitment to and support for refugees and host governments until solutions for all refugees are identified. UNHCR has nearly 70 years of experience developing legal frameworks, policy, guidance and programming informed by monitoring and evaluation results, annual participatory assessments and research about and with refugee communities. It works daily and directly with refugees, governments and partners at field, country, regional and global levels. It therefore assumes a global leadership role to ensure that decisions and actions related to education for refugees in emergency and protracted situations are considered through the lenses of legal frameworks, historical experience and emerging displacement trends. UNHCR aims to draw attention to education needs in hosting communities, create conditions for partnership and action that result in strengthened education systems that benefit all learners, leverage the comparable strengths of various partners in mixed situations for improved coherence across population groups and make meaningful and collaborative contributions to the goals of the 2030 #Global_Agenda_for_Education (#2030_Agenda).


    https://www.unhcr.org/5d651da88d7

    #rapport #éducation #HCR #réfugiés #asile #migrations #inclusion

    • Redoubler d’efforts. L’éducation des réfugiés en crise

      Ce rapport raconte l’histoire de quelques-uns des 7,1 millions d’enfants réfugiés dans le monde qui sont en âge d’aller à l’école et relèvent de la compétence du HCR. De plus, il examine les espoirs en matière d’éducation que nourrissent de jeunes réfugiés désireux de poursuivre leurs études au-delà de l’enseignement secondaire. Il met également en lumière la nécessité de partenariats robustes pour lever les obstacles à l’éducation de millions d’enfants réfugiés.

      Les chiffres sur la scolarisation des réfugiés et la population réfugiée sont tirés de la base de données démographiques du HCR, des outils d’établissement des rapports et des enquêtes sur l’éducation. Ils se rapportent à 2018. On ne dispose pas de données ventilées par âge pour l’ensemble de la population réfugiée. Lorsque ces données ne sont pas disponibles, elles ont été estimées sur la base de données ventilées par âge disponibles. Le rapport fait aussi référence aux données sur la scolarisation dans le monde de l’Institut de statistique de l’UNESCO concernant 2017.


      https://www.unhcr.org/5d651cbd4
      #enfants #enfance

  • Malawi to evacuate citizens from South Africa

    Malawi says it will repatriate its nationals from South Africa, following an upsurge in xenophobic violence.

    At least five foreigners, including a 14-year-old boy, have been killed in attacks in South Africa’s coastal city of Durban since last week.

    Some foreign-owned shops in the main city Johannesburg have shut amid fears that the violence could spread.

    Zimbabwe has also condemned the attacks, blamed on locals who accuse foreigners of taking their jobs.

    Tens of thousands of foreigners, mostly from other African states and Asia, have moved to South Africa since white-minority rule ended in 1994.

    At least 62 people died in xenophobic attacks that swept South Africa in 2008.

    Malawi is the only country which has so far decided to repatriate its citizens.

    Information Minister Kondwani Nankhumwa said the first group would return at the weekend.

    About 420 Malawians are reportedly living in refugee camps in Durban after fleeing the violence, he said.

    The BBC’s Raphael Tenthani reports from Blantyre that he received a call from a Malawian in Durban who said saw he some Malawians being killed - including a close friend who was burned alive.

    Mr Nankhumwa called on the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) to intervene to help protect foreigners.

    “This is unfortunate coming at a time we are working on regional integration,” he said at a press conference.

    “We urge the government of South Africa to protect foreigners,” he added.

    At the scene: Milton Nkosi, BBC News

    Standing in the middle of a football field that has been turned into a refugee camp overnight in Durban’s Chatsworth township, one cannot help but feel ashamed of being South African.

    There are white and green tents dotted around housing destitute African migrant families who fled the violence meted out to them by their South African hosts.

    Two weeks ago locals began attacking and looting properties owned by fellow Africans, calling them “kwerekwere”, a derogatory word for African migrants.

    I did not even have to ask Memory Mahlatini, a Zimbabwean who works as a nanny, what happened to her because her story was written all over her face.

    Her eyes alone made me look down in shame as she explained how a group of South Africans came to her rented home last Monday evening just as they were preparing to sleep and demanded that they go back to where they came from.

    Fear and shame in South Africa

    In total, the violence has left about 5,000 foreigners homeless in Durban, the main city in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, local media reports.

    On Wednesday, the violence spread to the province’s second city, Pietermaritzburg, where foreign-owned shops were looted.

    Verulam, a town about 30km (18 miles) north of Durban, has been hit by similar violence.

    The government has ordered police to step up patrols to prevent the violence from escalating.

    The governing African National Congress (ANC) said in a statement that South Africans should “hang our heads in shame in the face of these misguided and misplaced assaults”.

    Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini has been accused of fuelling xenophobia after he was widely quoted as saying at a meeting last month that foreigners should “please go back to their countries”.

    He denied being xenophobic and claimed he had been mistranslated.

    South Africa’s official unemployment rate stands at 24%, but some analysts believe that it is much higher.

    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32316731
    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #Malawi #Afrique_du_Sud #réfugiés_malawiens #renvois #rapatriement #expulsion

  • Balkan Region - Report July 2019

    The Border Violence Monitoring Network has just published it’s August report summarizing the current situation regarding pushbacks and police violence in the Western Balkans, primarily in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Se​rbian borders with Croatia and Hungary, but also including Italy, Slovenia, North Macedonia and Greece.

    This report analyzes, among other things:

    – Torture: Recurrence of extreme violence and abuse
    – Pushback from Italy
    – Beyond police: Actors within the pushback framework
    – Further dispersion of pushback sites in NW Bosnia
    – Trends in pushback sites to and from Greece

    More broadly, monitoring work continues to note the trans-national and bilateral cooperation between EU member states in the north of the Balkan route. Instances of chain pushbacks from Italy to Bosnia and Herzegovina, though relatively rare, offer insight into the web of actors engaged in the refoulement of groups across multiple borders, and liminality of due process in these cases. The intersection of unlawful acts also raises key concerns about aiding and abetting of pushbacks by Brussels. Specifically, analysis from this month elaborates on the involvement of Frontex in facilitating pushbacks.

    https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/August-Report.pdf
    #rapport #migrations #réfugiés #Balkans #route_des_balkans #asile #frontières

    • Je mets ici les passages qui m’intéressent particulièrement... et notamment sur la #frontière_sud-alpine

      Push-back from Italy

      Chain push-backs from Italy are comparatively rare. Yet notably one report (see 1.1: https://www.borderviolence.eu/violence-reports/august-5-2019-0700-fernetti-italy conducted last month provided evidence of this sequential phenomena of expulsion from Italy back to BiH, via Slovenia and Croatia; drawing into question why such uncommon and illegal procedure was conducted by Italian police officers. The transit group was initially apprehended by Italian police officers in a small village on theoutskirts of Trieste from where they described being brought to a government building. Both in Italy and later in Slovenia, the transit group in question was detained, made to give their fingerprints, had their pictures taken and were asked to sign paperswritten in languages that they did not understand.

      “We asked the woman, what was on the paper because it was in Italian. She didn’t translate and we didn’t understand what we signed.” “I told the translator that they have to find a solution. They can’t just bring us back to Slovenia, knowing that we were in Italy. And they said, we are just migrants, we are not tourists.”Once they arrived in Croatia, the transit group was detained in a police station and interviewed one at a time before being brought to the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina where the group had their phones individually broken with a hammer by a Croatian police officer. They were then told to walk through a forest into Bosnia-Herzegovina. The chronology of events above alludes also to the complicit nature of preliminary actors within the wider pushbacks. Arguably initiators such as Slovenia and Italy -who often afford groups with translators and legal documents -have an intimate relationship to the violence and terror that accompanies subsequent push-backs from Croatia to BiH. The feigning of due process by these countries, despite prior knowledge of violent chain refoulement, forms a central part of their conceit. Italy and Slovenia mask their actions in a malaise of procedures (regularly untranslated or explained), in order to hide the institutionalisation of illegal chain pushbacks. The nature of chain pushbacks are defined by these bit-part processes, which simultaneously imitate regular procedures, while providing ample space for state authorities to deviate from legal obligations.

      (pp.6-7)
      #Italie #push-back #Slovénie #refoulement

    • And on the

      Construction of further fencing along Slovenian-Croatian border

      This August the Slovenian government authorized the construction (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-slovenia/slovenia-erects-more-border-fence-to-curb-migrant-inflow-idUSKCN1VC19Q) of a fence 40 kms long on the banks of the river Kolpa, on the border with Croatia. The security device, installed by Serbian firm LEGI SGS, will add up to an already existing fence, making the barrier a total of 219km long. The exact location of the construction was not made public, and a spokeswoman for the interior ministry said itwill be a temporary measure to prevent people crossing the border. She did however directly cite migration as a threat to the security of citizens’ in her statement, arguably reinforcing the ideological bordering that accompanies this further fencing. Theconstruction is part of an escalating approach to border security which includes the deployment of military (https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2019/07/slovenia-deploy-soldiers-boost-border-patrols-migrants-190721191235190.ht), stationed on the border since 2016, and bolstered this year alongside regular police forces.

      The opposition party NSi demanded tighter control (https://balkaninsight.com/2019/07/05/slovenia-opposition-demands-tighter-border-controls-with-croatia) sat the border with Croatia in July, and there seems little, or no will to challenge the mainstream rhetoric on migration. These demands, as BVMN reported last month (http://www.nonamekitchen.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Final-Report-July-2019.pdf), coincided with concerns of Italy building a wall on the border with Slovenia, were the ongoing joint border not to stem movement from Slovenia into Italy. Thus it seems somewhat ironic to observe the construction of a barrier on Slovenia’s Southern border, preempting the machinations of Italian interior minister, Matteo Salvini.

      Unfortunately, the domino effect being played out between these states only feeds into Croatia’s intensifying security measures. While interior minister David Bozinovic was plethoric, stating that “what Slovenians are doing, is their own decision” (https://www.total-croatia-news.com/politics/38042-migrants), his assertion that a joint European solution would be more welcome rings fairly hollow when viewed in tandem with the heightened repression around pushbacks this month and the already complicit role of Frontex. To this end, there seems to be no escape from the vicious circle of reborderization and loss of human rights in Europe, shown most recentlyby Slovenia’s harder borders.

      Allegations of smuggling made against asylum centerstaff in Ljubljana

      A statement (https://push-forward.org/novica/izjava-iniciative-prosilcev-za-azil-la-lutte-de-la-liberte-6-8-2019-az) by the asylum seekers initiative La lutte de la Liberté, and released at the beginning of August highlights what may be a serious case of abuse by security personnel in the asylum seekers camp Vič, Slovenia. According to the group, a resident in the camp called Ibrahim witnessed a number of security guards smuggling migrants out of the camp with cars in exchange for money. After the incident, which took place at the beginning of July, Ibrahim told the director of the camp who flatly denied the allegations, yet simultaneously removed two guards from their posts, causing great suspicion. In retaliation, other guards started to mob Ibrahim resulting in a series of episodes of violence culminating in a fight, for which Ibrahim was taken to a detention centre in #Postojna.

      Ibrahim has now been released and three security guards in the camp are under investigation, a source from InfoKolpa shared. Even though the actual occurrence of smuggling remains a supposition, the event highlights an important grey zone in which camp staff are operating, and the potential for systemic abuse of the asylum system. It can be argued that such cases can only emerge in the void left by inaccessible procedures and it is well known that extremely long waiting times are built into the asylum system in Slovenia. The behaviorof the security guards, in a position of absolute power over the migrants, can be explained by the fact that they are virtually invisible to the outside world, unless the migrants can organizethemselves as in this case. There has already been proof of violent behaviorby the guards in Vic, as shown in this video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4GP0qLTsg0

      ) taken some six months ago.

      People on the move, for their part, are in a position of structural and individual disadvantage, susceptible to many types of violence. As the statement correctly underlines, regardless of some staff being amenable, one person abusing a position of power is enough to ruin the life of someone held captive in a protracted asylum system. Infact, evidence would go further to suggest that in this case it seems like the guards were more of an organizedmob, rather than rogue individuals.

      The waiting period for asylum which reaches nine months maximum in theory (with only 18 euros a month granted to applicants by the state), makes the tenure of asylum seekers even more precarious, adding to the poor or nonexistent measures taken to integrate them into society: asylum seekers have no access to welfare, assistance in access to work or social housing and their placement in the detention center in Postojna is decided arbitrarily bythe police. The entire Slovenian asylum system goes thus into inquiry, if viewed through thelensof this case, which both expounds its flaws and the potential corruption within.

      (pp.18-20)

      #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières

    • TLDR : l’article résume quasiment ça au malthusianisme alors que c’est qu’une partie parmi plein d’autres de toutes les informations utilisées par Servigne-Stevens, et du coup la majeure partie de l’article parle uniquement de ça. Ensuite un peu sur le capitalisme pas assez abordé, en rappelant que l’industrie de la guerre s’est développé grace à l’État etc, sauf que… tout ça ce sont des choses dites par Servigne lui-même ou d’autres, et pas qu’une fois, donc toute cette partie ne critique pas grand chose non plus. Du coup tout ça tombe un peu à plat et ne prouve pas grand chose de l’assertion du titre.

    • « La majeure partie de l’article parle uniquement de malthusianisme », c’est quelque peu exagéré : 7 colonnes sur 21. Il est vrai que l’article se consacre à démonter l’inanité de la position malthusianiste, qui est dominante, mais il dit également, voire surtout, beaucoup d’autre chose : que le problème ne tient pas de la nature même des hommes, mais du système de production (qui aujourd’hui détermine tant les échanges que les modes de consommation), le système de production capitaliste. L’article dit aussi, contre le point de vue fataliste des collapsologues – et cela n’est pas fréquent par les temps qui courent –, qu’il existe une solution à défendre : la révolution sociale qui rendra possible la socialisation de ces moyens de production. Rien que pour cela, l’"assertion du titre" se trouve pleinement justifiée.

  • Paperless people of #post-conflict Iraq

    During the conflict with the Islamic State group (IS), six million Iraqi citizens were forced to flee their homes. Since the end of the conflict, more than four million have returned home, while 1.7 million people still live in displacement. These families struggle to access basic services and face often insurmountable roadblocks to either returning home or rebuilding a life elsewhere. Many, whether still in displacement or returned home, are unable to enjoy their rights as Iraqi citizens and fully engage in the recovery and reconstruction of post-conflict Iraq.

    A foundational reason for this is they do not have proof of their legal identity. Some people lost their documents as they fled their homes; others had them confiscated by various parties to the conflict; and yet others were issued IS documentation, which is of no value now. These paperless people, as a result of lacking critical state-issued civil documents, such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, nationality cards and civil IDs, find themselves denied human rights, barred from a range of public services and excluded from recovery and reconstruction efforts.

    Local and international humanitarian agencies like the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) have collectively helped tens of thousands of Iraqis over the last few years obtain, renew, or replace civil documents lost as a result of the most recent crisis. However, an estimated 80,000 families across the country still have family i members missing at least one civil document. The number of children missing documents is likely much higher. At least 45,000 displaced children living in camps alone are estimated to be missing birth certificates. Without these essential civil papers, they are at risk of statelessness and find it incredibly difficult to access services such as education and healthcare.

    This report, based on research conducted by NRC in partnership with DRC and IRC, through the Cash Consortium for Iraq (CCI) shows how a significant portion of Iraqi families living in urban areas formerly under IS control are being denied basic services because they are paperless.


    https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/paperless-people-of-post-conflict-iraq
    #papiers_d'identité #réfugiés #asile #migrations #apatridie #Irak #guerre #conflit #IDPs #déplacés_internes
    #rapport

  • ’Updata-ing’ the narrative about African migration

    Migration has become a staple of the news in many countries, filled with images of desperate Africans fleeing an impoverished continent, poised to descend on the West. These reports are not necessarily false, and they can be valuable in highlighting the human stories of migration but they are not a good basis for helpful action.

    Politicians push myths and half-truths to score points but policymakers interested in addressing the complex issues around migration need data that can help them understand who, where, and why and therefore what an appropriate and targeted response might look like. Surely migration is not the same in Malawi and Morocco?

    In addition to official figures, one source of useful data is ordinary Africans – the source, after all, of all African migration. In its Round 7 public-attitude surveys (2016/2018), the research network Afrobarometer asked more than 45,000 Africans in 34 countries how they see and think about migration.

    Engaging with the data and scratching beneath the surface of existing narratives are essential if we are to move beyond ’stronger borders’ and other simplistic, one-size-fits-all ’solutions’. While statistical data help to reposition the discussion on migration and to cool down debates about ’mass migration’, perception data contribute to understanding intentions and motivations. Together they form a strong basis for informing areas for policy action.

    This co-authored research paper showcases the main findings of Afrobarometer research and the latest facts and figures of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation report “Africa’s youth: jobs or migration?”

    http://afrobarometer.org/fr/publications/updata-ing-narrative-about-african-migration

    #Rapport en pdf:
    http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publications%20conjointes/partenaires/afrobarometer-moibrahim-updata-ing-the-narrative-about-african-migrat

    #émigration #chiffes #statistiques #migrations #réfugiés #Afrique #émigration #cartographie #visualisation

  • Evaluation of #Emergency_Transit_Centres in Romania and the Slovak Republic

    Executive summary

    The Emergency Transit Centres were established to provide emergency protection and the possibility to evacuate refugees who could not be protected in their countries of asylum. Temporary relocation of refugees who required resettlement on an urgent or emergency basis to an Evacuation Transit Facility (ETF) was expected to serve five objectives, namely:

    Provide timely and effective protection to an individual or group of individuals of concern to UNHCR;

    Demonstrate a tangible form of burden‐ and responsibility‐sharing, enabling States not otherwise involved in emergency resettlement to accept cases from an ETF;

    Enable officials from UNHCR and resettlement countries to undertake interviews in a stable, safe and secure environment;

    Promote the subsequent realization of the durable solution of permanent resettlement; and - Encourage States hosting ETFs to become involved in resettlement.

    To date, three ETFs have become operational, namely the Emergency Transit Centres (ETCs) in Romania in 2008 and the Slovak Republic in 2011(although the Tri-Partite Agreement was signed in 2010), and the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in the Philippines in 2009. The ETCs are managed on the basis of Tri-Partite Agreements signed by their hosting governments, UNHCR and IOM. The ETC in Timisoara, Romania, can accommodate a maximum of 200 refugees, whereas the one in Humenné, Slovak Republic, a total of 150 refugees (from mid-2012 onwards). As of 30 September 2015, 1,717 refugees had departed from the ETC in Timisoara, and 797 refugees from Humenné to resettlement countries. Since 2012, the main resettlement countries using the two centres are the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and Finland, with the USA the sole resettlement country using Humenné since 2013.

    At the request of UNHCRs Resettlement Service in the Division of International Protection UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service commissioned an evaluation of the ETCs in Romania and the Slovak Republic. As the ETCs have been in place for seven (Timisoara) and four years (Humenné) respectively, the evaluation presented UNHCR with an opportunity to assess whether the objectives set out at their establishment have been met. A comparative approach was used to assess the functioning of the two ETCs. The evaluation’s main findings should inform the development of strategies to meet emergency resettlement needs. Additionally, the results of the evaluation contribute to reflections on minimum standards and on whether the ETCs should continue with the same or similar objectives, or if there are other objectives that could lead to enhanced protection dividends for refugees.

    The evaluation team was composed of one PDES staff member and one external evaluation consultant.

    The ETCs in Timisoara, Romania, and in Humenné, Slovak Republic, have been relevant and appropriate for UNHCR, IOM, the ETC-hosting governments, resettlement countries and refugees. The ETCs offer a mechanism to UNHCR to provide a safe environment for refugees pending resettlement processing, including those classified under emergency or urgent priority, and to realize the durable solution of resettlement. While the number of refugees with emergency prioritization is small relative to the total number of refugees transferred to the centres, interlocutors described the ETCs as “life-saving” and “indispensable” for those few high-profile or high-risk refugees. This function for the most compelling protection cases is seen as core to UNHCR’s protection mandate.

    The centres also have an advocacy function. This is of pivotal importance to UNHCR and the hosting countries, as the agency must be seen to be able to respond immediately to lifethreatening situations to provide immediate protection. Although the overall contribution to global resettlement figures is small, the positive change brought about by the immediate safety and security (and access to basic services) and the overall realization of resettlement for hundreds of refugees has considerable value. In the evaluation period from the beginning of 2012 until 30 September, 2015 a total of 1,568 refugees were resettled through the two ETCs. The life-saving dimension in compelling protection cases is seen as vital even if there are very few emergency cases.

    Moreover, ETCs provided resettlement countries (and the IOM as part of its Resettlement Service Centre function for the US-government) access to refugees to undertake activities necessary to complete the resettlement process, including the selection of municipalities in resettlement countries. Some countries, in particular the US, are unable to process emergency cases due to long and complicated state procedures. The existence of the ETCs allows the US to process resettlement cases of persons who have been evacuated, and thereby increase accessibility of resettlement to some refugees, even if not on an emergency basis. The centre in Humenné has gradually expanded into one which solely caters to US-government processing, while only Timisoara has received emergency cases due to the shorter Romanian government clearance, and the absence of visa requirements. For the ETC-hosting governments, Romania and the Slovak Republic, the centres provided an opportunity to show their solidarity with countries hosting large refugee case-loads, while neither providing a permanent home to larger groups of refugees nor carrying all the operational costs of these centres.

    While the coverage of the ETCs is in principle global, only refugees of some nationalities and countries of first asylum have been accommodated in the centres. Ad hoc planning and the obstacles experienced by some resettlement countries in the process of adjudication or completion of resettlement procedures, including selecting municipalities, has generally driven the use of ETCs. Most of the refugees transferred to the ETCs were resettled to the USA or the UK.

    Male and female refugees of all age groups have been transferred to the ETCs, although some restrictions have been imposed with respect to refugees with high medical needs, including serious mental health needs due to limitations of the ETCs with respect to providing services to persons with high medical needs. There have also been challenges in providing accommodation to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) refugees. Since 2014, Iraqi refugees from Syria for resettlement to the USA are no longer transferred due to the refusal of already pre-vetted cases during the period 2012 - 2014. This has resulted in traumatic experiences for the concerned refugees, as three of them have remained in Timisoara since 2012 without a durable solution. Although alternative resettlement countries have been found for most of the rejected cases, this created an extra burden for UNHCR as well as delays for the concerned refugees.

    The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.

    The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.

    The centres are respectively under the supervision of the UNHCR Country Representative in Bucharest, and the UNHCR Deputy Regional Representative of the Regional Representative Office for Central Europe (RRCE) in Budapest. The resulting reporting lines and management of the budgets has led to limited coordination to ensure commonalities in approach in terms of staffing and assistance provided. Thus, in Timisoara, three UNHCR staff (with UNHCR or UNOPS contracts) work in the centre. In the Slovak Republic, the only UNHCR staff member manages the centre on a UNOPS contract. The difference in ETC-level staffing cannot be fully justified on the basis of their capacity. The above has also led to different budgets and variations in IP capacity, responsibilities and assistance, with the division of responsibilities between the different actors in Timisoara resulting in an overstretched IP with reduced capacity for counseling and other refugee-oriented activities.

    As the host countries’ contributions are different in each of the ETCs, the contribution of UNHCR also differs, the biggest difference being that UNHCR pays the food costs in Timisoara, which amounted to between 40-49% of total expenditures in the period 2012-2014. The overall expenditures for Timisoara, excluding food costs ranged from USD 621,700 in 2012, USD 654,900 in 2013 to USD 657,000 in 2014. If food costs are included, the annual costs are USD 1,031,000 in 2012, USD 1,278,100 in 2013, USD 1,195,800 in 2014 and USD 1,157,000 in 2015. The ETC requires 51% (2015) to 60% (2012, 2013) of the total budget for the Romania operation. The overall expenditure for Humenné was USD 406,700 in 2012, USD 747,800 in 2013, USD 979,900 in 2014, and USD 666,700 in 2015 (first 11 months).

    The underutilization of the ETCs was regularly raised as a concern by interlocutors. Their occupancy rate has historically been relatively low. The average daily occupancy rate for Timisoara is between one third to one half, and for Humenné approximately half of its capacity. Considering the nature of emergency case handling, and the flexibility this requires, the ETCs must always have space available to receive cases with serious protection needs. However, the planning documents for the ETCs do not allocate a specific number of spaces for emergency evacuations. In addition, the turnover of refugees has been slower than envisaged, with some refugees submitted to the US overstaying the maximum period of six months. The overwhelming majority of refugees stay an average of four to five months. Capacity has generally been viewed in terms of the available number of beds instead of in relation to site and shelter space available.

    Minimum standards for ETCs have not been developed. The application of minimum humanitarian standards in the areas of shelter confirms that the centres would not fully comply with these criteria if used to capacity. As the ETCs have become a semi-permanent response mechanism in the resettlement process, it is necessary to consider developing minimum standards for ETCs to guarantee the well-being of refugees. These standards should be based for example on the Sphere minimum humanitarian standards for shelter and non-food items.1 The standards should also take into account the objectives of preparing refugees for life in a resettlement country.

    The Romanian government has received funds from the EU to upgrade an existing facility to house the ETC. Work is expected to begin in 2016 so that refugees could be accommodated in 2017. It is imperative that UNHCR seize the opportunity to be involved at the planning stage of this process in order to ensure that the physical set-up is conducive to providing adequate assistance and protection, and to preparing refugees for resettlement. Some input into planning would also allow cost-savings if, for example, kitchens were included so that refugees could cook for themselves.

    The utilization of the ETCs has also been viewed in connection with the selection of refugees, and the process of obtaining clearances and organizing the transfer to one of the centres. The ETCs are directly linked to UNHCR’s global resettlement operation through the ETC focal point in the Resettlement Service, UNHCR headquarters. UNHCR Field Offices and Regional Resettlement Hubs are vital in identifying refugees for whom transfer to the ETC is an appropriate solution. Yet not all resettlement staff are aware of the existence of these facilities or know how to use these centres. This can be partially attributed to outdated guidance notes and a gap between vision and practice, which has led to different views on the usage of these centres.

    The underutilization of the ETCs is also a consequence of the use of emergency priority quota and/or a direct transfer to the resettlement country, which is the preferred option for all parties. Other obstacles include lengthy exit procedures of some countries of asylum, and a bureaucratic and lengthy process to organize the transfer of cases. Additionally, the part-time nature of the ETC focal point at headquarters does not encourage a more pro-active advocacy role.

    There are some differences in the provision of protection and assistance in the two ETCs. The major protection deficit noted by the evaluation team was the application of “limited freedom of movement” in Romania. Article 2 (2) of the Tri-Partite Agreement states that refugees “shall be required to reside in the ETC facility designated by the Romanian government.” This provision has been implemented in a manner that restricts freedom of movement of refugees as they are not permitted to leave the centre unless escorted by the implementing partner. This limitation is extremely frustrating for refugees and leads to a degree of institutionalization.

    While most of the refugees interviewed during the mission were satisfied with the standards of assistance offered, they felt that their lives in the ETC were on hold and many expressed a desire to have a “normal” life and to move on quickly from the ETC. Especially in Timisoara, concerns were expressed regarding the difficulties arising from living with many other refugees in a relatively small area, including sharing rooms with other families and/or individuals, the limited to no freedom of movement, few opportunities for leisure and language training for adults, and a general sense of boredom. This has produced a living environment in which stress and tensions between individuals can more easily build up. Overall, the services provided in Humenné were more comprehensive than in Timisoara. This was reflected in the level of satisfaction expressed by refugees during the focus group discussions.

    Resettlement is by definition a partnership activity. Cooperation with external stakeholders was generally viewed as efficient and effective by all respondents. Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of Romania was regarded in a positive light, especially with respect to the limited time needed to process clearance requests, and the provision of identification documentation and security in the premises. However, the “limited freedom of movement” for refugees in the town, the lack of maintenance of the premises, and the regular provision of basic household items has led to some concern.

    Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of the Slovak Republic was generally considered efficient and effective by all interlocutors, despite some challenges in obtaining visas from embassies in countries of asylum or neighboring countries. The third partner to the agreements, IOM, has taken effective care of travel logistics, medical assessments and cultural orientation training. Possible challenges were ironed out in the beginning of these local partnerships. Some communication challenges were however noted at the field level in countries of asylum between UNHCR and IOM (and some ICRC delegations) due to staff turnover.

    A similar positive note can be recorded with regard to the cooperation between UNHCR and the nine resettlement countries that used the ETCs in the 2012-2015 period. However, concern was expressed about referring an adequate number of refugees for the US “pipeline” on the one hand, and the US speed of processing, both during the pre-vetting stage and the stay of refugees in the ETCs, on the other hand. The first issue was resolved in 2015 with stronger coordination taking place between the three partners: UNHCR, the US and IOM.

    The two ETCs have been effective to some degree considering the initial objectives established especially considering that a transfer can only be approved if a resettlement country is already identified. Only the centre in Timisoara was used for emergency priority cases in 2013 and 2014. An overall reduction of this function is visible during the period 2012-2015. However, for refugees classified under normal priority, the transfer to an ETC was still viewed as life-saving if evacuated from an unsafe situation.

    The majority of refugees were transferred to the ETCs to support either the processing of resettlement cases by means of interviews, biometrics or to find municipalities in the resettlement country. Providing opportunities for recovery and preparing for the integration process has only been achieved to some degree, depending on the situation in countries of asylum and the protection and assistance provided in the two centres. The centres have however supported the objective “potential for resettlement realized”. The overwhelming majority of refugees arriving in the ETCs actually departed for resettlement. The ETCs have therefore contributed to facilitating the resettlement process of some refugees that otherwise could not have been resettled.

    The main impact of the ETCs has been the provision of immediate and effective protection to refugees. Moreover, as a tangible form of responsibility-sharing, the centres have given Romania and the Slovak Republic the opportunity to present their contribution to the international protection regime in international fora. Romania established a resettlement programme with a quota of 40 refugees per year, with the first group of 38 refugees arriving in 2010, and the second group in 2014. The Slovak Republic also pledged, on a voluntary basis, 100 resettlement places in the period 2015-2017 towards the Council of the European Conclusions on Resettlement of 20 July 2015. However, arrivals under this programme are still pending.

    Given the current situation in Europe it could be argued that more responsibility-sharing could be expected, and the existence of the ETCs should not absolve these governments of the obligation to provide durable solutions to a greater number of refugees. The host governments might also be persuaded to contribute more resources to the running of the ETCs.

    The ETCs have contributed modestly to global resettlement figures and to reducing protracted refugee case-loads in countries of first asylum. But they have provided a safe alternative for cases that could not be transferred directly to resettlement countries, thereby offering the only available durable solution to these refugees. For some refugees, without the ETCs, there would simply be no possibility of resettlement.

    In conclusion, the evolution in the operation of the ETCs shows a move away from their original vision. In the words of one interlocutor “there is nothing emergency about this process.” This has resulted in a situation whereby the policies and practices of resettlement countries to a large extent actually determine the use of the ETCs. Internal factors further impact upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the centres. Thus, replacing the first word of the acronym “ETC” with resettlement (“Resettlement Transit Centres”) would actually give a clearer indication of the main purpose of these centres, namely to support the realization of this durable solution. This could then also cover possible shifts or changes in their functions as RTCs continue to respond to the needs of different stakeholders. The sustainability of these centres must also be viewed in relation to UNHCR’s responsibility to manage the “pipeline” in cooperation with resettlement states.

    The key recommendations of this evaluation are directed to DIP’s Resettlement Service, the RRCE and CO Romania.

    https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/575935d17_0.pdf
    #Roumanie #République_Tchèque #ETC #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #réinstallation #évacuation #protection_d'urgence #Evacuation_Transit_Facility (#ETF) #hub
    –-> document de 2016, mis ici pour archivage

    via @pascaline

  • US : How Abusive, Biased Policing Destroys Lives

    Abusive policing in Tulsa, Oklahoma that targets black people and poor people, diminishes the quality of life in all communities, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Human Rights Watch released the report on the eve of the third anniversary of the killing of Terence Crutcher, an unarmed black man. That killing led Human Rights Watch to investigate everyday police interactions in Tulsa as a window into the larger human rights problems with policing throughout the United States.

    The 216-page report, “‘Get on the Ground!’: Policing, Poverty, and Racial Inequality in Tulsa, Oklahoma,” details how policing affects Tulsa, particularly in the segregated and largely impoverished North Tulsa area. Human Rights Watch found that black people are subjected to physical force, including tasers, police dog bites, pepper spray, punches, and kicks, at a rate 2.7 times that of white people. Some neighborhoods with larger populations of black people and poor people experienced police stops more than 10 times the rate of predominantly white and wealthier neighborhoods. Arrests and citations lead to staggering accumulations of court fees, fines, and costs, often for very minor offenses, that trap poor people in a cycle of debt and further arrests for failing to pay.

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/12/us-how-abusive-biased-policing-destroys-lives
    #police #racisme #USA #Etats-Unis #violences_policières #pauvreté #guerre_contre_les_pauvres #Noirs #Tulsa #Oklahoma #rapport #discriminations #HRW

    #cartographie #visualisation

    ping @karine4 @cede

  • Unaccompanied minors, symbols of a policy of mistreatment

    Young foreign nationals continue to arrive unaccompanied in France and for some, recognition of their minority status can be an arduous process. Médecins Sans Frontières has released a report, Unaccompanied minors: symbols of a policy of mistreatment, based on our experience with vulnerable adolescents at our day centre in Paris. While the full report is available for download in French, the executive summary has been translated into English and is available below.
    Executive summary

    More and more young foreign nationals continue to arrive unaccompanied in France. The majority are from Mali, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire or Afghanistan. In 2017, the Ministry of Justice’s Unaccompanied Minors Department put their number at 14,908, up from 8,054 the previous year.

    For some adolescents, obtaining recognition of their minority status can be a long and gruelling process. As minors with no family in France, they have to turn to France’s départements to be placed in the care of Child Protection services.

    Increasingly often, Départements refuse to take responsibility for these young people whose minority they dispute, forcing them to sleep rough with access to neither child nor adult reception centres. “Neither nors”, i.e. neither minors nor adults, has become a fitting label for these youngsters.

    Young people can initiate court proceedings to obtain recognition as minors and the protection this status affords them, but the process is lengthy and complex. For the thousands of adolescents finding themselves in this situation, the legal process for securing access to accommodation and health care is a veritable obstacle course.

    In the name of the principle of the best interests of the child, the law requires France to protect such young people and provide them accommodation, health care and education until such time as the process is concluded. However, this is far from the case.

    In December 2017, prompted by the distress and vulnerability of these young people, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) opened a programme in north Paris suburb Pantin to offer them a comprehensive range of support services ─ nursing care, mental health support and social and legal assistance. The figures presented in our report are derived from the assistance provided to 787 minors from when the programme first opened on 5 December 2017 to 31 December 2018.

    Unaccompanied and extremely vulnerable minors

    They may have encountered violence in their countries of origin (war, armed conflict, domestic violence), during their journeys (kidnapping, arbitrary detention, torture, traumatising sea crossings, death of a friend or relative), or in the environment young people in distress face when they get to France (forced to sleep rough in inhumane and degrading conditions, psychological trauma caused by the unremitting scepticism they are subjected to when recounting their journeys, to name but a few).

    Eighty-seven per cent of the young people interviewed by the MSF nursing team said they had experienced violence, torture or abuse during their journeys.

    Young people attending minority assessments in France are given no access to medical check-ups, vaccinations or screening services.

    Only those recognised as minors after assessments and placed in the care of Child Protection Services are given access to medical care provided by universal health protection. Young unaccompanied foreign nationals not recognised as minors can only claim State Medical Assistance, which is reserved solely for undocumented adults. Obtaining entitlement of their rights is an uphill struggle for young people who often sleep rough and therefore cannot produce proof of a fixed address.

    Thirty-four per cent of the patients who attended MSF’s mental health unit were suffering from psychotraumatic stress disorders requiring immediate treatment.

    The medical care available to young unaccompanied foreigners is arbitrary and varies from one health facility to the next ─ sometimes they’re treated as minors, and others as adults.

    Fifty-one per cent of the adolescents assisted by MSF were sleeping rough at the time of their first visit to the centre.

    For the most part, legally-recognised organisations, such as socio-medical centres, health centres for people in difficulty and entities that provide addresses, are unable to cope with demand, and their staff do not have the necessary training to be able to assist such a specific, and particularly vulnerable, population. And, when serious illness is diagnosed, obtaining a referral to specialist services can be problematic. The lack of effective coordination of the care pathway can result in a denial of care.
    An inadequate system for protecting unaccompanied minors

    Minority assessments conducted by départements are not standardised at national level and numbers vary substantially from one to another. The requirement to provide unconditional, immediate temporary accommodation for a minimum of five days during the assessment process is often unmet, which condemns vulnerable young people to sleeping on the streets.

    Interviews are often conducted hastily (in the case of 40 per cent of the young people, they lasted less than 30 minutes) and sometimes without the presence of an interpreter. Assessments can be rejected on the grounds that a young person “clearly looks like an adult” (10 per cent of the young people).

    Any at-risk minor can go to court to obtain protection, and in the case of unaccompanied minors, this protection means being placed in the care of Child Protection Services. But for unaccompanied youngsters who understand neither the French language nor the intricacies of the legal system, going to court is a complex process necessitating the assistance of an association.

    It can take a long time, and some young people, who in the interim have neither accommodation nor protection, give up along the way. Additionally, a lack of identity documents can be a barrier to the legal process, with some judges ruling they have no jurisdiction to hear the cases of minors not in the possession of identity documents (11 per cent of rulings).

    Nevertheless, recourse to the courts is essential to protect young people départements refuse ─ wrongly ─ to place in the care of Child Protection Services. In a clear illustration of the shortcomings of the assessment process, 55 per cent of the young people MSF assisted were placed in the care of Child Protection Services, and half of those who applied to the courts benefited from a temporary placement order that enabled them to be provided accommodation while awaiting the court’s decision.

    Identity documents are essential to corroborating the age of unaccompanied minors. However, judges and officers conducting assessments often cast doubt on their authenticity and call on the national fraud agency to analyse them. Its conclusions are not always reliable because of insufficient knowledge of the laws and practices of the countries that issued them.

    https://www.msf.org/unaccompanied-minors-symbols-policy-mistreatment-france-migration
    #rapport #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés #Paris #France
    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Se l’operaio alle dipendenze del cinese è pachistano

    Che ci fa un piccolo imprenditore cinese in ginocchio? Perché solleva davanti alle telecamere e ai giornalisti un artigianalissimo cartello che recita “Cobas Comanda #Prato, Aiuto Istituzioni”? Perché alcuni operai pachistani vengono picchiati e finiscono in ospedale insieme a un sindacalista?

    Benvenuti a Prato, città di frontiera, ieri come oggi, città dove il nuovo lavorativo e imprenditoriale si presenta prima che altrove. Nei decenni del “piccolo è bello” era stato il distretto industriale per eccellenza; dagli anni Novanta è stato il distretto che ha prima accolto e poi criminalizzato l’imprenditoria dei migranti cinesi; dal 2014 è stato il luogo dove la Regione ha introdotto controlli serrati sul lavoro in maniera esplicitamente discriminante: solo le ditte cinesi sarebbero state controllate a tappeto; negli ultimi tempi, gli imprenditori cinesi di Prato – adeguandosi a un modello già in uso tra gli italiani – sono stati i primi imprenditori migranti ad impiegare massicciamente manodopera immigrata non cinese.

    Oggi Prato è la nuova frontiera di quello che si sarebbe tentati di considerare un conflitto tutto etnico: la contrapposizione tra datori di lavoro cinesi e operai pachistani nell’industria tessile e dell’abbigliamento.

    Nel distretto di Prato i cinesi erano arrivati in sordina, alla fine degli anni Ottanta, proponendosi come terzisti nell’abbigliamento per ditte finali dislocate in diverse città del Centro Nord Italia. Come operai impiegavano solo connazionali, introducendo quindi un modello di etnicizzazione del lavoro che, anche grazie al laboratorio usato come luogo di vita e di lavoro insieme, ha permesso di ristrutturare gli spazi e i tempi del lavoro: gli operai cinesi pagati a cottimo, infatti, si spostavano da un laboratorio cinese all’altro seguendo le commesse in arrivo e il bisogno di evaderle urgentemente. A poco a poco una parte dei terzisti cinesi è riuscita a fare il grande balzo imprenditoriale e ad aprire le proprie ditte finali nel “pronto moda”. Nel frattempo e con gradualità, i cinesi sono riusciti anche ad acquisire da imprenditori pratesi le tintorie che tingono per il pronto moda, ricavandosi quindi uno spazio crescente anche nel settore tessile, appannaggio tradizionale dell’imprenditoria autoctona. Oggi ci sono a Prato circa 3.700 imprese cinesi nelle confezioni e 400 nel tessile.

    Negli ultimi anni, l’organizzazione del lavoro sta cambiando drasticamente nelle imprese cinesi. Gli operai non sono più solo cinesi, ma anche pachistani, bangladesi e africani, sia nelle tintorie che nei laboratori di confezioni. A spiegare questa evoluzione contribuisce la difficoltà crescente per gli imprenditori cinesi di trovare e trattenere presso di loro operai cinesi. Questo a sua volta scaturisce dalla fine degli arrivi di manodopera a basso costo dalla Cina, e dal fatto che i cinesi che vivono in Italia da decenni, se possono, cercano impiego fuori dal manifatturiero.

    Ma il processo di multi-etnicizzazione del lavoro non è solo una reazione a questo. Scaturisce anche dalla concreta possibilità per gli imprenditori di accrescere i propri profitti, impiegando una manodopera ancor più vantaggiosa di quella cinese. Se poi sono rifugiati – come lo sono buona parte dei migranti arrivati negli ultimi anni – gli operai diventano ancora più interessanti perché maggiormente vulnerabili.

    Già qualche anno fa, nelle fasi iniziali del processo di multietnicizzazione, la stampa locale aveva mostrato come vi fosse una sorta di gerarchia degli stipendi dei diversi gruppi di immigrati: gli operai cinesi erano al top, con stipendi (perlopiù a cottimo) di circa 1.300 euro, quelli pachistani e bangladesi avevano salari più bassi di circa 300-400 euro, e gli africani guadagnavano ancora meno. Invece, i pochi italiani che lavoravano nelle tintorie cinesi – operai specializzati o consulenti, a volte ex proprietari – ricevevano compensi ben diversi. Differenze nei salari di operai cinesi e altri immigrati non cinesi sono emerse anche da uno studio che ha analizzato l’impiego di manodopera immigrata non cinese nei centri ingrosso gestiti da cinesi nel Veneto (G. D’Odorico e D. Sacchetto, Il commercio all’ingrosso cinese in Italia: prospettive storiche e presenti in un’ottica globale, in Cinesi tra le maglie del lavoro).

    La differenza fondamentale tra gli operai cinesi e gli altri operai immigrati non sta però principalmente nei divari salariali, quanto nel fatto che i gli operai cinesi, a differenza degli altri immigrati, godono di benefit tradizionalmente garantiti agli operai cinesi nelle imprese cinesi: vitto e alloggio a costo zero. Nelle interviste che abbiamo raccolto nel corso dell’estate, gli operai pachistani protestavano per questo trattamento differenziato a parità di mansioni e di ore lavorate, e facevano i calcoli su quanto si alzerebbero le loro entrate mensili se come i cinesi non dovessero pagarsi l’appartamento e il cibo.

    Inoltre, dal nostro recente lavoro sul campo, così come da una ricerca sullo sfruttamento lavorativo finanziata dal Comune di Prato (A. Cagione e G. Coccoloni, Forme di sfruttamento lavorativo a Prato), emerge il potere assoluto dei datori di lavoro cinesi che lasciano a casa all’istante gli operai pachistani o africani quando, da mesi privi di un solo giorno libero, decidono di rimanere a casa per un giorno e quando chiedono di avere un contratto di lavoro, indispensabile per ottenere il permesso di soggiorno per lavoro. Non era mai stata registrata prima tanta rigidità nei rapporti lavorativi; al contrario, un vantaggio molto apprezzato dagli operai cinesi negli ultimi anni era la maggior flessibilità dell’orario di lavoro garantita dai datori di lavoro cinesi rispetto a quelli italiani – seppur in un contesto di forte sfruttamento e auto-sfruttamento. Inoltre, mentre i contratti di lavoro degli operai cinesi sono perlopiù a tempo indeterminato o si adeguano alle esigenze dei lavoratori cinesi di rinnovare il permesso di soggiorno per lavoro o di accedere al ricongiungimento con i familiari, i contratti dei lavoratori immigrati non cinesi sono di breve durata, quando ci sono.

    Il processo di etnicizzazione gerarchizzata in atto permette di fare luce su alcuni importanti mutamenti nel mondo del lavoro. L’idea che gli immigranti facciano i lavori che gli italiani non vogliono fare è in un certo senso superata. Oggi, e sempre di più, sono i datori di lavoro stessi a cercare attivamente gli operai immigrati preferendoli ai cosiddetti autoctoni. Detto altrimenti, il processo di etnicizzazione del lavoro scaturisce (anche) da volontà imprenditoriali di sfruttare al meglio il lavoro dipendente, giocando su tutte le forme di vulnerabilità possibili. E secondo molti il processo di precarizzazione intacca prima le categorie più vulnerabili, come i migranti e i giovani, per poi estendersi a fasce sempre più vaste di lavoratori, inclusi quelli cosiddetti “di concetto”. Allo stesso tempo, questo processo di sfruttamento rapace risponde all’esigenza di contenere sempre più il costo del lavoro in settori dove la concorrenza è serrata e i margini di profitto per i terzisti sono in continuo ribasso.

    Oggi, guidati dai sindacalisti autoctoni di Si Cobas – il sindacato di base che ha condotto lotte di successo tra gli immigrati che lavorano nella logistica – i pachistani impiegati in alcune aziende tessili pratesi gestite da cinesi scendono in sciopero e bloccano la produzione. Chiedono di non lavorare 12 ore al giorno 7 giorni su 7; chiedono di non avere contratti da 2, 4 o 6, ore ma contratti adeguati al numero di ore effettivamente svolte. Gli imprenditori cinesi reagiscono male agli scioperi dei lavoratori. I sindacalisti ci raccontano di imprenditori cinesi increduli, che non sanno spiegarsi come mai gli operai possano scendere in sciopero e addirittura possano bloccare la produzione, ostacolando l’entrata e l’uscita delle merci. A fine giugno, alcuni operai pachistani in sciopero sono stati portati in ospedale perché picchiati da cinesi durante un picchetto davanti alla tintoria dove lavoravano.

    Se pensiamo alle repressioni degli scioperi in Cina e all’irregimentazione del lavoro in Asia, viene da chiedersi se questo sia un modello tutto cinese di gestione della conflittualità con gli operai.

    Ma pensare che si tratti di un modello cinese è una foglia di fico. Oggi a Prato c’è una manciata di imprenditori pachistani nel settore delle confezioni che dà lavoro a connazionali. I loro operai ci raccontano che non c’è differenza tra i datori di lavoro cinesi e quelli pachistani: i livelli di sfruttamento sono gli stessi. Inoltre, i laboratori terzisti pachistani cuciono vestiti per ditte finali cinesi e italiane. Questo permette di capire che quello che è in atto non è uno scontro etnico, ma un’evoluzione nello sfruttamento del lavoro dove ogni imprenditore sfrutta ogni occasione per massimizzare il profitto. Pensare che si tratti di un modello cinese, inoltre, serve solo a non vedere come nel nostro Paese, da anni ormai, la difesa dei diritti dei lavoratori abbia finito per essere inusuale, inaspettata e perfino demonizzata. Diverse ricerche hanno mostrato come un costante processo di normalizzazione del lavoro precario – con la giustificazione che avrebbe favorito la ripresa dell’occupazione – ha portato a una proliferazione del lavoro povero e sfruttato. Contratti finti, che dichiarano orari di lavoro ridicoli rispetto a quelli effettivi non sono tipicamente cinesi. Paghe sempre più basse, lontane da quelle contrattuali sono la regola anche tra i giovani e meno giovani autoctoni, e ferie, malattia, e maternità sono diventati vocaboli sempre più desueti nel nostro Paese in generale, e non solo tra i lavoratori migranti.

    I cinesi hanno imparato cosa si può fare in questo Paese, lo hanno imparato così bene da dire oggi a chiare lettere – con quel cartello “Istituzioni aiuto!” – che si aspettano che il governo (locale) faccia rispettare il patto (nazionale) secondo cui i sindacati devono restare immobili e gli operai devono essere grati per avere il lavoro, non importa quanto grave sia lo sfruttamento. La cartina tornasole di questo stato di cose sta in un’azione istituzionale preoccupante: il foglio di via che la questura di Prato ha presentato ai due sindacalisti di Si Cobas che mobilitano i lavoratori pachistani in sciopero per avere un lavoro (più) dignitoso.

    https://www.rivistailmulino.it/news/newsitem/index/Item/News:NEWS_ITEM:4847
    #guerre_entre_pauvres #travail #exploitation #Italie #migrations #pakistanais #chinois #industrie_textile #ethnicisation_du_travail #textile #vulnérabilité #inégalités #salaire #ouvriers #précarisation #permis_de_séjour #etnicizzazione_gerarchizzata (#ethnicisation_hiéarchisée) #ethnicisation_du_travail #capitalisme #modèle_chinois #droits_des_travailleurs #working_poors #déportabilité

    ping @albertocampiphoto @wizo

    • Il linguaggio dell’odio è stato ‘normalizzato’ e la manifestazione dell’odio è divenuta accettabile, secondo l’ultimo rapporto dell’#Ohchr

      Che la diffusione del linguaggio dell’odio sia un problema per l’Italia e dell’Italia ce lo dice l’ultimo Rapporto sulla missione dell’Alto commissario per i diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite nel nostro Paese, da poco pubblicato. Una missione incentrata proprio sulle questioni della discriminazione razziale e sull’incitamento all’odio. Il documento traccia un quadro preoccupante di un Paese, segnato nel 2018 da un forte incremento degli episodi di discriminazione e tuttora da una persistente mancanza di attenzione e di analisi del fenomeno nel suo complesso da parte delle istituzioni. A colpire è soprattutto il capitolo sull’incitamento all’odio razziale alla discriminazione e alla violenza. Nel Rapporto, l’Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite evidenzia l’emergere di discorsi razzisti basati su stereotipi negativi contro i migranti, i musulmani, le persone di origine africana, le comunità rom, sinti e caminanti. E ciò avviene – si legge nel documento – soprattutto nei discorsi politici e nei media: a incoraggiare la crescita dell’intolleranza, dell’odio religioso e della xenofobia sono alcuni leader politici e talvolta gli stessi membri del Governo. Sicurezza e difesa dell’identità nazionale, sono le parole chiave di tali discorsi, che si fondano sulla criminalizzazione della migrazione e sul principio “prima gli italiani” di fronte alla crisi economica. Un modo – si legge nel Rapporto – per rendere la discriminazione razziale socialmente più accettabile. Le conseguenze sono evidenti: una escalation di «hate incidents» contro singoli o gruppi per motivi etnici, del colore della pelle, della razza o dello status di immigrato.

      Le stesse leggi, in alcuni casi – secondo il Rapporto dell’Alto Commissario ONU – contribuiscono a rafforzare tale clima, come nel caso del ‘decreto sicurezza’ che stabilisce una relazione tra immigrazione e sicurezza, «rafforzando in tale modo una percezione discriminante che stigmatizza e associa i migranti e le minoranze alla criminalità». Così come preoccupa la campagna contro le associazioni della società civile impegnate nelle operazioni di soccorso nel mare Mediterraneo, campagna che il documento definisce diffamatoria. Tutto ciò non può essere ricondotto a singoli casi. Il linguaggio dell’odio, riporta il documento, è stato ‘normalizzato’ e la manifestazione dell’odio è divenuta accettabile. Perché questo linguaggio è nello stesso tempo espressione ed elemento costruttore di culture diffuse. Ed è proprio sul piano culturale che occorre agire, restituendo significato alle parole, rimettendo al centro le persone, ognuna nella sua singolarità, ricordando che i diritti non sono mai dati una volta per tutte, ma vanno tutelati e rafforzati, va fatta memoria della sofferenza e delle battaglie che sono dietro alla loro conquista. La diffusione di una cultura dei diritti è uno dei terreni su cui si gioca la sfida della prevenzione e della tutela delle persone più vulnerabili. Un terreno su cui sono chiamati a contribuire tutti: le istituzioni pubbliche, le organizzazioni della società civile, il mondo della cultura e dei media. A cominciare dal linguaggio.

      https://www.cartadiroma.org/news/in-evidenza/lincitamento-allodio-razziale-e-un-problema-per-litalia-il-rapporto-onu
      #médias #presse

  • CAMPEMENTS DE MIGRANTS SANS-ABRI : COMPARAISONS EUROPÉENNES ET RECOMMANDATIONS

    Depuis quelques années, les campements de migrants sans-abri défraient la chronique. Présents dans certains quartiers ou à la périphérie des #villes, ils suscitent des réactions indignées ou exaspérées. Désignés comme un retour des #bidonvilles, ils sont principalement habités par des immigrés aux situations variées : demandeurs d’asile et réfugiés aux dossiers incorrectement traités, ressortissants européens roms, sans-papiers… Ces sites sont régulièrement évacués puis repeuplés. #Visibilité et volume du problème distinguent la France, particulièrement #Paris. C’est ce que montre une enquête réalisée en 2018 dans six capitales européennes (#Bruxelles, #Berlin, #Bucarest, #Londres, #Madrid et #Rome). En ce qui concerne les migrations, la prise en charge des dossiers y repose sur le droit national et les moyens de sa mise en oeuvre. Mais, dans ces métropoles, les autorités locales ont davantage la main face aux campements que dans les villes françaises. Il serait judicieux de s’inspirer de leurs réalisations, tant en ce qui concerne le recensement que le traitement des phénomènes. Comparaison et coopération s’imposent d’autant plus que la dimension proprement européenne de l’#errance et de la grande indigence s’avère cruciale. En tout état de cause, la situation et la politique française, singulièrement à Paris, méritent d’être appréciées à l’aune de ce qui se déroule dans d’autres pays européens. La France ne saurait se résoudre à une #banalisation que l’on ne rencontre pas ailleurs.


    http://www.fondapol.org/etude/campements-de-migrants-sans-abri-comparaisons-europeennes-et-recommandatio
    #campements #migrations #sans-abri #sans-abrisme #SDF #réfugiés #asile #France #rapport #urban_matter #migrerrance

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • #collapsologie #autoritarisme #club_de_rome #rapport_meadows
    Dennis meadows Scientifique, coauteur du rapport Meadows (1972) sur les dangers de la croissance « La montée de l’autoritarisme est inévitable » - Libération
    https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/07/29/dennis-meadows-scientifique-coauteur-du-rapport-meadows-1972-sur-les-dang

    « Le dérèglement climatique, combiné avec la réduction des énergies fossiles peu chères au cours du siècle, éliminera les fondations du modèle actuel de civilisation industrielle. Nous observons déjà un chaos croissant, comme des mouvements de populations incontrôlés au sein des pays pauvres et vers les plus riches. Le chaos va empirer surtout car il provoque toujours plus de pénuries alimentaires. Nous avons appris de l’histoire une règle absolue : quand les gens pensent devoir choisir entre l’ordre et la liberté, ils choisiront toujours l’ordre. La montée de l’autoritarisme est inévitable. Je suis personnellement très content de vivre dans une démocratie. Mais nous devons admettre que les démocraties ne résolvent pas les problèmes existentiels de notre temps - dérèglement climatique, réduction des réserves énergétiques, érosion des sols, écart croissant entre riches et pauvres, etc. Doit-on réduire les libertés individuelles pour cela ? Cette question implique que la société a la capacité d’anticiper et de réaliser des changements proactifs. Je ne vois pas de preuve de cela. Les libertés individuelles sont déjà restreintes et je pense que cette tendance va se poursuivre inévitablement. Cela ne résoudra malheureusement pas les problèmes provoquant le chaos, mais accroîtra principalement le pouvoir politique sur le court terme et la richesse financière de ceux qui soutiennent des mesures autoritaires. Tous les gouvernements autoritaires actuels - la Chine, la Corée du Nord, la Russie, etc. - ne résolvent pas non plus les problèmes de notre temps. »

    • Alors, d’abord le titre ici a de drôles de majuscules et de virgules. Le vrai titre est :

      Dennis Meadows, scientifique, coauteur du rapport Meadows (1972) sur les dangers de la croissance : « La montée de l’autoritarisme est inévitable »

      #Dennis_Meadows

      Et il est issu de cet article :

      Effondrement : l’humanité rongée par la fin
      Coralie Schaub et Aude Massiot, Libération, le 29 juillet 2019
      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2019/07/29/effondrement-l-humanite-rongee-par-la-fin_1742749

      La liste donne le tournis : perte de 30 % des oiseaux communs en quinze ans en France, de 40 % des populations de chauves-souris en dix ans, de 80 % des insectes jusque dans le cœur des espaces naturels… Les espèces n’ont jamais disparu à un rythme si rapide, qui est actuellement 100 à 1 000 fois supérieur à celui connu au cours des temps géologiques. A tel point que les chercheurs parlent d’un « anéantissement biologique ».

      Pour les pays occidentaux, le Club de Rome, qui avait commandé le rapport Meadows dans les années 70, évoquait un effondrement vers #2030. Pour l’ancien ministre de l’Ecologie Yves Cochet, qui parle de « fin du monde » à ses petits-enfants, la date fatidique se situe entre #2020 et #2050.

      Avec l’extrait cité, mais aussi :

      Edgar Morin, philosophe : « Je ne vois pas l’effondrement général »
      Delphine Batho, députée Génération Ecologie : « L’effondrement a commencé »
      Jean Jouzel, climatologue  : « Pas besoin d’en rajouter dans le catastrophisme »
      Pascal Canfin, eurodéputé LREM, ex-directeur de WWF France : « Certains points de non-retour ont déjà été franchis »
      Carole Delga, présidente PS de la région Occitanie : « La nécessité de définir un nouveau modèle de société »

      On l’ajoute à la troisième compilation :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/680147

      #effondrement #collapsologie #catastrophe #fin_du_monde #it_has_begun #Anthropocène #capitalocène