• Les jeunes femmes sont les premières concernées par le retrait de l’État en milieu rural

    Les soudaines phases d’intérêt politique pour les jeunes ruraux aboutissent habituellement sur des mesures « volontaristes » qui prennent le cadre urbain comme référence et supposent de se projeter vers la ville pour vivre sa jeunesse et se réaliser.

    Ces injonctions unilatérales à la « mobilité » ou à « l’ouverture » pâtissent du manque de connaissances sur des groupes juvéniles que l’on a longtemps uniformisés sous l’image d’une société paysanne immuable.

    Les jeunesses urbaines, plus visibles, font alors office de point de comparaison avec les jeunesses rurales, selon un principe de définition par le manque. Par ce prisme, on tend à méconnaître les conditions d’existences et les visions du monde des jeunes ruraux, mais surtout on gomme les fractures qui existent au sein même de ce large groupe.
    La crainte de la « sale réputation »

    En son sein, on pourrait par exemple évoquer la double relégation, matérielle et symbolique, que subissent les jeunes chômeurs dans des milieux ruraux de forte interconnaissance où la « sale réputation » colle à la peau et au patronyme.

    Ici, nous allons nous évoquer les cas de jeunes femmes des classes populaires rurales, donc issues de familles ouvrières ou employées principalement (les classes populaires étant surreprésentées en milieu rural).

    Peu diplômées et peu dotées en capital économique, elles ont tendance à évoluer dans des sociabilités où ce sont avant tout les jeunes hommes qui peuvent occuper le devant de la scène et profiter des ressources liées à l’autochtonie.

    Dans nos enquêtes de terrain respectives, Les filles du coin et Ceux qui restent (2019) c’est notamment à travers les âges d’entrée sur les marchés professionnels et conjugaux que nous avons pu saisir ces rapports de genre.

    Dans leurs trajectoires individuelles, ou encore le fonctionnement des couples et des groupes d’amis, nous retrouvons les conséquences des inégalités à grande échelle entre femmes et hommes, en premier lieu celles qui structurent le marché de l’emploi rural dans les régions anciennement industrielles où l’on rencontre les jeunes les plus exposés à la précarité.
    Des offres d’emplois dans des secteurs dominés par les hommes

    À rebours de la tendance nationale, ces zones rurales qui ont tendance à se dépeupler concentrent les offres d’emploi dans des secteurs professionnels considérés comme masculins.

    Sur certains territoires, le chômage des jeunes femmes de moins de trente ans s’avère plus élevé que celui des jeunes hommes, et plus largement en milieu rural elles trouvent moins souvent un emploi à l’issue de leurs études que les jeunes hommes (59 % vs 54 %).

    Ce que l’on observe à l’échelle nationale en termes d’inégalités liées au genre sur le marché du travail se trouve dès lors exacerbé par ces effets de lieu.

    Tandis que les jeunes femmes rurales issues de milieux plus aisés partent massivement pour les études supérieures et s’installent en ville, celles qui restent, lorsqu’elles parviennent à avoir un travail proche de chez elles, sont souvent en contrat précaire, à temps partiel, avec des horaires fractionnés dans les secteurs de l’aide à la personne, les ménages, la petite enfance ou les postes d’ouvrières à l’usine, ou encore caissières dans le supermarché du coin.

    Entre autres choses, ces conditions d’emploi les exposent davantage aux contraintes de la route et des différents coûts liés aux déplacements (financiers, organisationnels…).

    De manière plus informelle, les jeunes femmes sont surtout assignées à des tâches moins ou non rémunérées, telles que l’aide et le soin aux personnes fragiles, le travail domestique (notamment les ménages) ou encore la garde des enfants.
    Des formes d’entraides féminines cruciales

    Cette répartition genrée du travail d’aide va de pair avec des formes d’entraides féminines importantes, mais elle participe aussi à distinguer les jeunes femmes entre elles : l’exclusion par la non-sollicitation des unes permettant aux autres d’espérer une place plus centrale dans les réseaux locaux de sociabilité et d’atteindre une relative stabilité économique. Comme le résument deux jeunes femmes :

    « Quand on pense jamais à toi quand y’a un poste quelque part, t’as compris que t’étais pas du bon côté »

    « Quand t’as pas de réseau, c’est pas possible »

    Aussi dans un contexte de rareté de l’emploi, trouver un travail par réseau d’interconnaissance peut aboutir sur des situations de domination inextricable.

    Quand « tout se sait » là où « tout le monde se connaît », « ne pas chercher les problèmes » et « ne pas causer de problèmes » à sa famille ou aux amis qui ont aidés sont les deux principes qui participent à l’indicibilité des violences qui, y compris en milieu professionnel, sont subies par les jeunes femmes.

    Par allers-retours, ces situations précaires des femmes sur le marché du travail déterminent (et sont déterminées par) leur place dans toutes les sphères de vie sociale, en particulier les sociabilités amicales qui sont primordiales en milieu rural, et bien sûr dans les relations amoureuses, conjugales.
    « Couper les ponts » et ne plus « faire n’importe quoi »

    Lors de la mise en couple et la (re)formation des groupes d’amis, les jeunes femmes tendent plus souvent à rejoindre leur conjoint dans un réseau qui était le sien depuis longtemps, généralement depuis l’enfance.

    Elles ont alors, disent-elles, dû « couper les ponts » avec leur « vie d’avant », alors que les jeunes hommes peuvent faire partie des mêmes clubs de loisirs et cercles amicaux, y compris après l’arrivée des enfants.

    Certaines justifient ce « choix de vie » par l’injonction à « se poser », ne plus « faire n’imp(orte quoi) » au moment de l’entrée dans l’âge adulte, afin de se consacrer plutôt à leur rôle conjugal et/ou maternel.

    Généralement plus doté en capital économique, car plus âgé, entré plus tôt en emploi et héritant plus souvent de biens familiaux, le conjoint aura eu aussi davantage de facilités à devenir propriétaire avant la mise en couple, avec l’aide notamment de ses amis pour l’aider à « retaper » une maison à moindre coût.

    Il pourra dans ce cas justifier aisément que sa compagne s’installe « chez lui ». Enfin, il aura toutes les chances d’appartenir à des groupes de loisirs liés à des activités masculines pérennes et valorisées, comme le football, la chasse, le motocross par exemples, qui viendront justifier, avec la proximité de la famille, d’installer le couple là où lui peut bénéficier de capital d’autochtonie, ici lié à son inscription dans les « bandes de potes » et dans la sociabilité professionnelle.

    Dans cette configuration conjugale inégalitaire, majoritairement rencontrée dans nos enquêtes, les sociabilités des couples « tournent autour » des hommes et de leur réseau, tandis que les jeunes femmes sont placées dans des rôles plus ou moins ingrats et isolés dont elles s’accommodent, ou non.

    Bien sûr, des solidarités et amitiés féminines peuvent se recomposer au fil du temps. Néanmoins, elles s’inscrivent rarement (cela varie là aussi selon que l’on se trouve ou non dans une zone rurale en déclin) au sein de collectifs encadrés par des institutions pérennes (de travail, de loisir). On comprend que les jeunes femmes soient attachées au fait de garder leur « meilleure amie » de longue date, alors que les jeunes hommes envisagent davantage la solidarité à l’échelle de toute leur « bande ».
    Mobilité et rapports de pouvoir

    Nos enquêtes ont forcément rencontré l’enjeu de la mobilité, puisque dès l’adolescence, dans des zones rurales appauvries où le maillage des transports en commun (cars, bus, trains régionaux) est faible, voire inexistant, les inégalités face aux possibilités de se déplacer sont grandes entre les jeunes : plus rares sont les jeunes femmes à avoir un deux-roues, d’abord parce que la route leur serait plus risquée (les jeunes hommes sont plus souvent socialisés à la conduite et à la mécanique, y compris des engins agricoles, mais aussi de la voiture familiale par leur père), ensuite en raison de leur milieu social, compte tenu des coûts afférents.

    Le pendant de cet investissement masculin dans les transports résulte dans les risques pris par les jeunes hommes. Cela constitue l’un des coûts d’adaptation à la masculinité conforme à ce milieu social, les jeunes hommes sont davantage exposés aux accidents de la route dont on sait qu’ils touchent tout particulièrement les jeunes de classes populaires rurales.

    Ensuite, il y a toutes les inégalités en matière de déplacements entre jeunes femmes elles-mêmes. D’un côté, celles qui partent vivre en ville pour leurs études vont être amenées à parcourir de grandes distances, à s’autonomiser par la voiture ou simplement rompre avec les sociabilités rurales et acquérir davantage de capital social, d’autant plus qu’elles proviennent des milieux plus dotés en capital économique et culturel. Quant à celles qui restent et qui n’ont pas le permis ou de voiture, elles tendent à dépendre de leur conjoint ou d’un proche pour se déplacer, d’autant plus si elles sont sans travail et plus jeunes que lui, dans un village ou bourg qu’elles n’habitent que depuis la mise en couple.

    La moindre intégration et l’assignation aux rôles genrés dans des collectifs familiaux et amicaux fait écho aux inégalités sur le marché du travail.

    Premières victimes du retrait de l’État, et tout particulièrement depuis le démantèlement engagé des services publics ruraux dans le secteur de la santé ou de l’éducation, les jeunes femmes ont tendance à occuper des emplois plus solitaires et précaires.

    https://theconversation.com/les-jeunes-femmes-sont-les-premieres-concernees-par-le-retrait-de-l

    #femmes #genre #retrait_de_l'Etat #campagne #rural #mobilité #rapports_de_pouvoir #réputation #sale_réputation #emploi #travail #entraide #entraide_féminine #mobilité #rapports_de_pouvoir

  • « Bas les masques ! » : #sociologie des #militants_anti-masques

    L’obligation du port du masque est loin de faire l’unanimité, et aucun pays ne semble échapper à l’émergence de mouvements de contestation, comme à Berlin, le 1er août dernier, où 20 000 personnes ont manifesté. En #France, si le phénomène apparaît d’une ampleur plus modérée, des centaines de personnes se sont réunis à Paris le 29 août aux cris de « Liberté, #liberté ! ». Qui sont ces militants anti-masques ? Peut-on définir un #profil_type ? Après avoir décrypté les soutiens du professeur Raoult, Antoine Bristielle s’est immergé dans les groupes Facebook anti-masques.

    https://jean-jaures.org/nos-productions/bas-les-masques-sociologie-des-militants-anti-masques
    #anti-masques #rapport #masques #covid-19 #coronavirus #profil #profil_sociologique

  • Impact of the use of private military and security services in immigration and border management on the protection of the rights of all migrants

    The present report covers the activities of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination since its previous report to the Council (A/HRC/42/42). It also highlights the impact on the protection of the human rights of all migrants of the increased use of private military and security services in immigration and border management.

    In the report, the Working Group outlines the overall context in which these services are provided and the relevant normative framework. It examines four main categories of services: provision of research and technical expertise; border security technologies and monitoring services; immigration detention, returns and removals; and the implementation of “externalization” policies. It shines a light on the impact of these services on the human rights of all migrants. It then looks at the lack of transparency, oversight and accountability of companies operating in this sector, and the impact on effective remedies for victims of violations and abuses by these companies.

    It concludes that, at times, companies are directly responsible for human rights abuses of migrants, notably in situations of deprivation of liberty; while in other instances, they are complicit in widespread human rights violations and abuse caused by other actors, such as immigration and border authorities.

    The Working Group ends its report with recommendations addressed primarily to States and private military and security companies, aimed at triggering a fundamental evaluation of the role that companies play in reinforcing security over humanitarian approaches to immigration and border management, as well as the specific security services they provide in this sector.

    https://undocs.org/A/HRC/45/9
    #rapport #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #mercenaires #militarisation_des_frontières #droits_humains #armée #armée_privée #privatisation #technologie #rétention #détention #renvois #expulsions

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Sous le sable, la radioactivité !
    http://obsarm.org/spip.php?article341

    L’ONU a décrété le 29 août « Journée internationale contre les #Essais_nucléaires ». À cette occasion, la Fondation Heinrich Böll publie « Sous le sable, la radioactivité ! », une étude sur les déchets des essais nucléaires français en Algérie au regard du Traité sur l’interdiction des armes nucléaires, réalisée par l’Observatoire des armements et ICAN France. La France, avec ses 210 essais nucléaires — dont 17 au Sahara algérien (entre 1960 et 1966) —, n’a pas encore révélé tous ses secrets ! Si en effet on (...) Actualités

    / Essais nucléaires, #Victimes_du_nucléaire

    http://obsarm.org/IMG/pdf/etude_sous_le_sable_29.08.2020.pdf

  • Deportation Union: Rights, accountability and the EU’s push to increase forced removals

    Deportation Union provides a critical examination of recently-introduced and forthcoming EU measures designed to increase the number of deportations carried out by national authorities and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. It focuses on three key areas: attempts to reduce or eliminate rights and protections in the law governing deportations; the expansion and interconnection of EU databases and information systems; and the increased budget, powers and personnel awarded to Frontex.

    There has long-been coordinated policy, legal and operational action on migration at EU level, and efforts to increase deportations have always been a part of this. However, since the ‘migration crisis’ of 2015 there has been a rapid increase in new initiatives, the overall aim of which is to limit legal protections afforded to ‘deportable’ individuals at the same time as expanding the ability of national and EU authorities to track, detain and remove people with increasing efficiency.

    The measures and initiatives being introduced by the EU to scale up deportations will require massive public expenditure on technology, infrastructure and personnel; the strengthening and expansion of state and supranational agencies already-lacking in transparency and democratic accountability; and are likely to further undermine claims that the EU occupies the moral high ground in its treatment of migrants. Anyone wishing to question and challenge these developments will first need to understand them. This report attempts to go some way towards assisting with that task.


    https://www.statewatch.org/deportation-union-rights-accountability-and-the-eu-s-push-to-increase-fo
    #machine_à_expulser #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #UE #EU #rapport #union_européenne #renvois_forcés #rapport #Statewatch #Frontex #database #base_de_données #données_biométriques #Directive_Retour #return-opticon #Joint_return_operations (#JROs) #Collecting_return_operations #National_return_operations #Afghanistan #réfugiés_afghans #European_Centre_for_Returns #statistiques #chiffres #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains

    ping @isskein @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_ @etraces

  • Public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants: Uganda country profile

    This briefing presents an overview of the key features of migration and asylum policy in Uganda, recent trends in migration, refugee and asylum patterns, public perceptions and political narratives on refugees and other migrants:

    Uganda hosts a much higher proportion of refugees and other migrants relative to its population than other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
    Over time, the country’s approach to refugee hosting has shifted from being heavily restrictive towards becoming – at least in theory – one of the most progressive in the world.
    There are several parallel narratives surrounding refugees and other migrants in Uganda. For example, Uganda has long been held up by international actors as an example of good practice for refugee hosting, however this has not always been matched with tangible funding commitments.
    International and regional private sector actors are showing increased interest in investments in Uganda’s refugee-hosting areas. However, in contrast to other regional players such as Kenya, this has so far largely been limited to small-scale initiatives.

    The briefing is part of a wider project, supported by the IKEA Foundation, that aims to engage public and private investors interested in migration and displacement.

    https://www.odi.org/publications/17271-public-narratives-and-attitudes-towards-refugees-and-other-migrants-ugand
    #modèle_ougandais #Ouganda #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport

    Pour télécharger le rapport:
    https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/uganda_migration_country_profile_final.pdf

    ... un rapport “supported by the IKEA Foundation”

    • Oui, un maire à son deuxième mandat et qui a des visées plus hautes désormais...
      C’était des bruits, ça devient petit à petit plus concret...
      Ici une rencontre récente de Piolle avec Mélenchon...

      Merci @JLMelenchon pour l’accueil. Notre pays doit relever d’immenses défis. Identifions nos convergences, travaillons. Notre objectif est commun : gagner et changer la vie, pour la justice sociale et climatique. Notre adversaire est commun : Macron et la droite.

      https://twitter.com/EricPiolle/status/1296845806478282755

      #Piolle #Eric_Piolle #France_insoumise #Mélenchon #EELV #Verts #Les_Verts

    • Éric Piolle, maire EELV de Grenoble, présenté par les médias comme l’adversaire de la ligne libérale de Yannick Jadot chez les Verts. Lui et Jean-Luc Mélenchon ont déambulé à travers les stands avant de monter ensemble sur scène. Le député de Marseille a réaffirmé le combat des insoumis contre la loi du marché. Le tribun a aussi rappelé que les insoumis n’étaient pas seulement « contre » un système. Mais bien également « pour » un programme. Le leader des insoumis a aussi rappelé que l’écologie populaire portait la défense des biens communs : l’air, l’eau, la science, etc., et que ces combats rassemblaient largement le peuple. Il a enfin redit l’attachement des insoumis aux concepts de République et de Nation.

      Éric Piolle a affirmé un même attachement à ces deux concepts et a rappelé qu’il avait été un soutien engagé de Jean-Luc Mélenchon lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2017. Le maire de Grenoble a expliqué vouloir rassembler un arc humaniste tout en affirmant très clairement : « Si nous voulons transformer le pays, nous le transformerons pas avec les 10% d’en haut (…) mais pas non plus juste avec ceux qui sont bien installés, qui viennent me voir et qui me disent : « Ok Éric, on comprend ton projet politique, tu es radical, ok, on est d’accord pour y aller, mais qu’est-ce que tu fais là avec l’extrême gauche, c’est quoi le problème ? ». Et moi je leur dis : « Les amis, c’est juste que je ne changerai pas le monde avec vous. Voilà. Nous changerons le monde ensemble, avec ceux qui sont insoumis, avec ceux qui s’indignent, avec ceux qui ont dans leurs tripes l’envie et le désir de changer le monde. » Le message a sans doutes été bien reçu chez les insoumis.

      https://linsoumission.fr/2020/08/21/piolle-eelv-aux-amfis-nous-changerons-le-pays-avec-ceux-qui-sont-insou

    • #Mélenchon et Piolle s’affichent ensemble pour plaider le dialogue entre LFI et EELV

      Le chef de file de LFI et le maire EELV de Grenoble ne veulent pas se voir comme des concurrents et évoquent un rapprochement

      Ne pas se voir comme des « concurrents ». Le chef de file de La France insoumise, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, et le maire EELV de Grenoble, Eric Piolle, ont ensemble plaidé le dialogue, vendredi aux Amphis d’été des Insoumis à Châteauneuf-sur-Isère (Drôme).

      Les deux hommes se sont entretenus en privé à l’arrivée de l’écologiste avant de traverser ensemble les stands de l’événement et de prendre la parole sur scène, devant les militants Insoumis.
      « Savourer ce sur quoi on est d’accord »

      Jean-Luc Mélenchon a salué en Eric Piolle un « ami » et « l’un des porte-parole les plus notoires » d’EELV, déclarant que « sa présence ici a une signification » : « Il faut aller à l’essentiel, certes discuter sur les désaccords mais aussi savourer ce sur quoi on est d’accord ».

      EELV a remporté plusieurs grandes villes aux élections municipales en juin, tandis que le poids de LFI, très discrète dans la campagne, a été faible. Jean-Luc Mélenchon a cependant envoyé plusieurs signaux, ces dernières semaines, sur une probable candidature à la présidentielle de 2022.

      Eric Piolle, un contrepoids aux ambitions de l’eurodéputé Yannick Jadot

      Très applaudi à son arrivée, Eric Piolle, dont la majorité est composée d’Insoumis, a quant à lui rappelé : « si nous avons gagné à Grenoble en 2014, c’est que nous avions la conviction que l’envie de faire ensemble dépassait tout ». « Ce poids, je veux aujourd’hui le mettre au service d’une ambition collective qui aille encore plus loin que ce que tu as fait en 2017 » (lorsque le leader Insoumis avait récolté 19,58 % des voix), a lancé l’édile grenoblois.

      « Si nous voulons transformer le pays, nous le ferons » avec les « foules qui se sont alors levées », a plaidé Eric Piolle. Celui-ci multiplie les apparitions médiatiques depuis quelques mois, apportant un contrepoids au sein d’EELV aux ambitions de l’eurodéputé Yannick Jadot, jugé trop libéral par LFI.
      Une alliance dans au moins quatre régions pour les élections de 2021 ?

      Jean-Luc Mélenchon a affirmé que les Insoumis seraient importants dans les prochaines échéances : « On a besoin de leur capacité d’indignation ». « Certes, nous avons une dette à l’égard du courant historique de l’écologie politique, mais de votre côté, vous ne pouvez pas faire comme si tout vous était réservé », a-t-il insisté.

      Eric Piolle a proposé qu’EELV et LFI « fassent la démonstration qu’ensemble on peut gagner » en s’alliant dans quatre régions pour les élections de 2021. « Piolle est la seule personne (à EELV) qui dit que c’est possible », s’est réjoui Jean-Luc Mélenchon, qui veut cependant aller plus loin : « Il y a 13 régions, nous sommes pour que ce soit la même chose partout ».

      https://www.20minutes.fr/politique/2843939-20200821-melenchon-piolle-affichent-ensemble-plaider-dialogue-entr

    • Pendant ce temps là, à droite, Bruno Retailleau sera candidat à une primaire dans la course à la présidentielle.
      https://twitter.com/BrunoRetailleau/status/1297116992265244674
      Xavier Bertrand se prépare aussi à l’élection présidentielle de 2022 mais, lui, se refuse à l’idée de se plier à une quelconque primaire. selon le Canard il a dit dans « Corse-Matin » 10/08 : « Je ne veux plus de filtre entre le peuple et moi, et je ne me soumettrai pas à des règles fixées par les partis politiques. » Xavier et Jean-Luc, c’est un peu kif-kif bourricot.
      #dans_les_starting_bloks

    • Xavier et Jean-Luc, c’est un peu kif-kif bourricot

      J’essaie, mais j’y arrive pas.
      Je bute par exemple, c’est juste pour illustrer et pour dire qu’il y a des choses qui font que j’y arrive pas au « kif-kif », et donc par exemple, d’un côté, t’as un type qui a été au pouvoir, et qui a démontré sa capacité de nuisance, de l’autre, il a eu des postes de pouvoir et il n’a pas démontré de telle capacité. D’un côté, il y en a un qui explique qu’il veut un programme de droite, privatisation des profits, socialisation des pertes. De l’autre, un type qui parle collectif et progrès humain.

      Après, je comprends. Il y a un cadre institutionnel, et si tu souhaites prendre le pouvoir, t’es bien obligé de t’y soumettre... et de faire avec ses contraintes.

    • Et cet article du Figaro...

      Les folies des nouveaux maires écolos : leurs obsessions, leur idéologie, leurs dégâts

      Élus en juin avec des taux d’abstention records, ils se sont empressés d’imprimer leur marque sur la vie quotidienne de leurs administrés. #Transports, #urbanisme, #alimentation, #rapports_hommes-femmes : pas un domaine n’échappe à leur ardeur réformatrice. Florilège.

      Vite, vite, vite ! Les nouveaux maires estampillés #EELV (Europe Écologie Les Verts) de #Lyon, #Bordeaux, #Strasbourg ou #Besançon, mais aussi leurs collègues de gauche écolo-compatibles de #Marseille ou de #Rennes n’ont pas perdu une minute pour engager le « changement de modèle » dont ils rêvent. Malgré ou parfois grâce à la crise sanitaire, à l’instar d’Anne Hidalgo qui a chassé les voitures de plusieurs grands axes parisiens au nom de la lutte contre le coronavirus, ils ont profité de leurs premières semaines de mandat pour modifier la physionomie de leur ville. C’est que le temps presse : quand on caresse des projets aussi ambitieux que, par exemple, l’autosuffisance énergétique et alimentaire - l’objectif d’Anne Vignot pour Besançon - six ans risquent de ne pas suffire.

      La politique est d’abord affaire de messages. La maire de Paris y avait déclaré l’ « état d’urgence climatique » en 2019. Pierre Hurmic, à Bordeaux, et Jeanne Barseghian, à Strasbourg, l’ont imitée dès leur prise de fonction, et la plupart de leurs collègues écolos ont suivi. Le concept ne repose sur aucune base juridique. Il vise simplement à légitimer une restriction des libertés individuelles au nom d’un intérêt proclamé supérieur. « Défendre une limitation des libertés au nom du changement climatique n’est pas liberticide », a résumé, fin août, devant les Verts, Manon Aubry, ex-tête de liste aux européennes d’une France insoumise qui rivalise de zèle écologiste avec EELV. Le secrétaire national du parti écolo David Cormand a approuvé.

      “Assemblées citoyennes”

      Mais rien n’énerve plus les écologistes que d’être traités de « Khmers verts » . Ne sont-ils pas des apôtres de la « démocratie participative » ? Dans les municipalités qu’ils ont conquises, il n’est question que d’ « assises du pouvoir partagé » (Bordeaux), d’ « assemblées citoyennes » (Besançon) et de « codécision » (Poitiers), de référendums et de « droit de pétition » ou d’ « interpellation citoyenne » . En plus de cette panoplie, Anne Vignot va doter Besançon d’un conseil de scientifiques et d’experts, sur le modèle du Giec (Groupement intergouvernemental d’experts sur les évolutions du climat), appelé à se prononcer sur « tous les projets de la ville » . Elle compte notamment sur lui pour mener à bien le projet d’écoquartier qui doit remplacer les jardins des Vaîtes. Elle le portait déjà au sein de la majorité précédente en tant qu’adjointe à l’environnement, mais il est contesté par… plus écolo qu’elle ! L’avis des experts primera car, a prévenu la maire, « ça serait quand même aberrant que l’on prenne des décisions justes parce que l’on aime bien avoir des jardins autour de soi ! »

      À Tours, Emmanuel Denis n’a consulté personne quand il a interdit les voitures, mi-août, sur le pont Wilson, qui enjambe la Loire dans le centre-ville. Tollé de l’opposition, que le nouveau maire a traitée par le mépris : « C’est le vieux monde qui résiste ! » L’arrêté a été pris pour trois mois, à titre expérimental, mais Emmanuel Denis envisage déjà d’y installer les villages du marché de Noël cet hiver. Des mesures comparables ont été prises cet été dans toutes les villes écolos, sans concertation véritable.

      Quand les commerçants ont protesté, on leur a répondu « expérimentation » ! Et l’expérience n’en finit jamais, comme à Annecy, où le maire écolo sans étiquette François Astorg vient de prolonger la période-test pour des pistes cyclables, au grand dam des ambulanciers qui dénoncent des ralentissements préjudiciables à leurs patients. La méthode Piolle fait des émules. Seul maire écolo d’une ville de plus de 120.000 habitants élu dès 2014, Éric Piolle a déployé à Grenoble des « autoroutes à vélo » à un rythme à faire pâlir de jalousie Anne Hidalgo avec ses « corona pistes » .

      Les maires écologistes ont beau se revendiquer champions du « pluralisme » , ils répugnent à partager les vrais leviers de pouvoir, au niveau de la municipalité comme de la métropole quand ils y sont majoritaires. Pierre Hurmic à Bordeaux, Grégory Doucet à Lyon ou, encore, Jeanne Barseghian à Strasbourg n’ont attribué qu’à des proches les postes de décision stratégiques, notamment les délégations des intercommunalités. Ils ont aussi revisité les attributions de leurs adjoints et, surtout, leurs intitulés. Pour changer la réalité, changeons les mots ! Éric Piolle avait lancé le mouvement en se dotant notamment d’une « adjointe à la tranquillité publique et au temps de la ville » en lieu et place d’une adjointe à la sécurité. Ses émules l’ont parfois dépassé : « transition écologique » , « résilience » et « inclusion » sont partout à l’honneur.

      “Résilience alimentaire”

      À Marseille, où Michèle Rubirola a été élue grâce à un accord tardif avec EELV, l’organigramme municipal a des accents orwelliens : le premier adjoint est « en charge de l’action municipale pour une ville plus juste, plus verte et plus démocratique » et le portefeuille de la culture devient celui de « la culture pour tous et toutes » , entre autres exemples. À Strasbourg, la « ville résiliente » et la « ville inclusive » ont chacune leur adjointe. À Poitiers, Léonore Moncond’huy a une adjointe « à l’économie circulaire et à l’économie de proximité » . Bordeaux annonce la couleur avec une première adjointe « en charge des finances, du défi climatique et de l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes » , une autre « chargée de la démocratie permanente, de la vie associative et de la gouvernance par l’intelligence collective » , un adjoint à « l’urbanisme résilient » , des conseillers municipaux délégués à la « sobriété du numérique » et la « résilience alimentaire » , à l’ « économie circulaire » , au « zéro déchet » et au développement d’une « monnaie locale ». À Annecy, François Astorg a lui aussi décidé de développer une monnaie locale « complémentaire et solidaire » .

      En attendant de donner de la consistance à leurs ambitions, les élus écolos se sont empressés de faire un grand ménage dans les projets de leurs prédécesseurs. Si ce n’est pas de la « décroissance » , concept difficile à vendre à une population qui voit venir l’explosion du chômage, ça y ressemble fort. À Lyon, le projet de bouclage du périphérique et le développement de l’aéroport de Saint-Exupéry sont officiellement abandonnés. Grégory Doucet l’a dit à la Tribune de Lyon avant même de s’installer dans son fauteuil de maire : « Ce que je souhaite, c’est qu’on puisse avoir en valeur absolue beaucoup moins de gens qui viennent à Lyon en avion. » Y compris la clientèle d’affaires internationale, qu’il assume de voir baisser. Plus question, donc, d’ouvrir les lignes prévues avec Montréal et Dubaï. Le nouveau maire aurait aussi voulu en finir avec le projet de LGV Lyon-Turin, qui doit permettre de supprimer des poids lourds au profit du rail, mais il n’en a pas le pouvoir. En revanche, il lui a suffi d’un trait de plume pour annuler le projet de construction de tours à la Part-Dieu de Gérard Collomb. Pierre Hurmic, lui, est allé jusqu’à décréter le gel de tous les programmes immobiliers. À Grenoble, la politique mise en œuvre par Éric Piolle s’est traduite par une dégringolade de près de 40 % des permis de construire des logements depuis 2014.

      À Tours, Emmanuel Denis a promis de ne pas renouveler le contrat qui lie la municipalité à la compagnie Ryanair et qui s’achève en 2021. Des militants de Greenpeace et d’Extinction Rebellion avaient bloqué l’accès à l’aéroport début juillet pour exiger l’arrêt des subventions « écocides » au transport aérien. À Besançon, Anne Vignot a pris position contre le projet de dédoublement de la RN57, qui contourne la ville. Elle entend « travailler avec le préfet » pour trouver des solutions alternatives, au premier rang desquelles « désynchroniser les heures de travail » . Y a qu’à… Toutes les villes « verdies » ont décrété un gel, plus ou moins rigoureux, de l’artificialisation des sols et un moratoire sur l’installation de grandes surfaces sur des terrains non bâtis.

      Haro contre la 5G

      L’objectif général est d’emmener les entreprises sur le chemin de la vertu environnementale, en alternant incitations et contrainte. À Strasbourg, Jeanne Barseghian va flécher sur la rénovation thermique et énergétique l’essentiel des 350 millions d’euros d’emprunt qu’elle a annoncés. À Lyon, Grégory Doucet réservera les aides de la ville aux entreprises qui réduiront leur empreinte carbone. Tous ces maires veulent choyer « l’économie sociale et solidaire » , que le programme de Pierre Hurmic, « Bordeaux respire ! » , promeut en tant qu’ « alternative à la privatisation des profits » .

      Tous, aussi, crient haro contre la 5G, cette technologie « qui sert à regarder du porno en HD dans les ascenseurs » selon Éric Piolle. Le plus virulent sur le sujet est aussi Pierre Hurmic. « Il y a des dangers de la 5G » , a-t-il affirmé à plusieurs reprises, sans s’appuyer sur la moindre donnée scientifique. Et pour cause : il n’en existe pas. Ce qui n’empêche pas le maire de Bordeaux de promettre un moratoire, le temps que la population ait « un vrai débat » sur le passage à la 5G dans sa ville, où l’Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (Arcep) a autorisé des entreprises à l’expérimenter. Pierre Hurmic est un adepte du « low-tech » (par opposition au high-tech), autrement dit d’un progrès technique économe en énergie, peu coûteux et qui produit des outils que des non-spécialistes peuvent réparer, voire construire eux-mêmes. Il a même confié un poste de conseiller municipal délégué à l’un des fondateurs de l’association Low-tech Bordeaux.

      Réélue à Nantes grâce à un accord avec la liste verte, la socialiste Johanna Rolland a dû se rallier elle aussi à la demande d’un moratoire sur la 5G, également réclamé par Anne Vignot à Besançon. Cette campagne a bien peu de chances d’aboutir, puisque le Conseil d’État, saisi, a déjà précisé que les maires ne disposent pas du pouvoir de « réglementer l’installation des antennes relais sur le territoire de leur commune » , qui relève d’ « une compétence exclusive » des « autorités de l’État » . Emmanuel Denis, tout aussi remonté contre la 5G, mais plus pessimiste que ses collègues sur l’issue du bras de fer, a promis aux Tourangeaux de « créer des logements protégés pour les personnes électrosensibles » . Rappelons que si l’OMS a bien identifié une « hypersensibilité électromagnétique » , personne n’a encore réussi à établir un lien entre ces ondes et la liste de symptômes divers et variés que présentent les personnes qui s’en plaignent. Le maire de Tours, lui, est convaincu de la nocivité de la 5G. Il faut dire qu’il a longtemps milité au sein de l’association Robin des toits, qui lutte contre l’expansion du téléphone portable et les installations d’antennes relais…

      De tous les aspects de la vie quotidienne, il en est un qui passionne beaucoup moins les nouveaux élus : la sécurité. Éric Piolle n’a pas réagi la semaine dernière aux vidéos d’autopromotion diffusées par les dealers locaux, mais il a regretté l’opération de police qui s’est ensuivie en parlant de « coup de com’ » du gouvernement. Le maire de Grenoble, où le niveau de délinquance était déjà supérieur de 53 % à celui enregistré en moyenne dans les agglomérations de même taille en 2018 (notre enquête dans Le Figaro Magazine du 17 février 2020), ne s’est pas non plus ému outre mesure des sept fusillades, dont trois mortelles, qui se sont produites dans sa ville depuis fin juin. Son réflexe est toujours le même : pointer les défaillances de l’État. « Nous avons demandé des effectifs supplémentaires au début du confinement parce que nous savions que ça allait créer des tensions, a-t-il affirmé sur BFMTV. Nous n’avons pas eu de réponse. » Ausitôt, Gérald Darmanin a publié le courrier sanglant qu’il lui a envoyé pour lui rappeler que l’État s’est mobilisé mais que la ville, elle, se distingue par « un niveau particulièrement bas d’investissement dans la sécurité » .

      À Lyon, où un policier municipal s’est fait rouer de coups par une bande début juillet, Grégory Doucet envisage d’augmenter les effectifs d’une vingtaine d’agents seulement (ils sont actuellement 335) pendant son mandat. Pendant la campagne, il avait estimé que « la première sécurité des Lyonnaises et des Lyonnais, c’est d’être en bonne santé, d’avoir accès aux soins, mais aussi de ne pas tomber malade du fait des conditions environnementales » car « les incivilités ne forment pas le seul enjeu qui conditionne la paix dans la cité » . Pour améliorer la « tranquillité publique de tous » , il avait parlé de créer un « budget sensible au genre » .

      Conseillère voilée

      À Bordeaux en revanche, Amine Smihi, l’adjoint chargé de la sécurité, espère doubler les effectifs municipaux sur le terrain d’ici à la fin du mandat de Pierre Hurmic. Des « faits graves » dus essentiellement à des « conflits de territoire entre dealers » se sont produits « de façon quasi quotidienne entre le 28 juin et le 28 juillet » dans les quartiers bordelais les plus sensibles, rapporte-t-il. Très sévère pour le bilan du juppéiste Nicolas Florian sous la mandature précédente, où il affirme que « la police municipale était l’un des services les moins dotés » , il s’insurge contre la « caricature des écolos en beatniks » indifférents à la délinquance. « La sécurité est évidemment une préoccupation pour nous, mais pas un étendard » , corrige-t-il. Même s’il juge nécessaire dans certains cas une « réponse sociale » , il reconnaît volontiers que « ce ne sont pas des médiateurs qui vont régler les problèmes de trafic de drogue ! » Pour autant, il n’envisage pas d’armer les policiers municipaux, ni de multiplier les caméras dans les rues « comme Christian Estrosi à Nice » . « Je ne parle pas de vidéosurveillance mais de vidéoprotection, et la nuance sémantique est importante, précise Amine Smihi. Les caméras ont un outil au service d’une police de proximité et d’îlotage que nous souhaitons développer. S’il s’avère qu’il faut les augmenter dans ce but, aucun souci, d’autant que dans le cadre de notre plan “Bordeaux marchable”, la vidéoverbalisation aura toute sa place » . Problème : la Commission nationale informatique et liberté a déjà rappelé àl’ordre plusieurs communes qui abusaient de la vidéoverbalisation par reconnaissance des plaques d’immatriculation, autorisée seulement en cas d’infractions au stationnement payant.

      Selon l’adjoint à la sécurité, les problèmes de radicalisation islamiste, eux, sont « de loin le sujet le moins préoccupant à Bordeaux » . « Nous sommes relativement épargnés, mis à part quelques problèmes très localisés » , affirme-t-il. En matière de communautarisme, sujet connexe, les écolos sont en général très accommodants, surtout quand ils sont alliés à La France insoumise. Les Grenoblois avaient pu apprécier l’embarras et les contorsions d’Éric Piolle sur le port du burkini dans les piscines municipales. Ce défenseur autoproclamé de l’égalité des sexes n’a aucune opinion sur les symboles de la soumission de la femme dans l’islam. Jeanne Barseghian, elle, a été plus claire : les Strasbourgeois ont désormais une conseillère municipale voilée. On peut encore voir sur les réseaux sociaux une vidéo, tournée pendant la campagne, où un soutien de la candidate EELV vante au pied d’une cité « la seule liste avec une daronne voilée » . Comble de l’ironie : il se fait rembarrer par les habitants présents, choqués qu’il utilise le voile comme argument électoral.

      Dans ce domaine comme dans d’autres, les élus écolos ne peuvent encore donner leur pleine mesure, puisqu’ils sont obligés de faire avec les budgets votés par leurs prédécesseurs. Rendez-vous l’an prochain !

      Élucubrations vertes

      • « Dégenrer » les cours de récréation. C’est l’un des grands chantiers lancés cet été par Éric Piolle à Grenoble. Il estime que les cours d’écoles sont « trop réservées aux pratiques des garçons » . Mais au fait, dire que les jeux de ballon sont des jeux de garçon, ce ne serait pas un stéréotype sexiste ?

      • Interdire la voiture en ville. Ils en rêvent tous, mais Pierre Hurmic a commis la maladresse de le dire tout haut, en précisant que sa stratégie consisterait à « dégoûter progressivement l’automobiliste » de circuler à Bordeaux.

      • Réquisitionner les logements vides. Sur ce sujet-là aussi, Pierre Hurmic s’est montré le plus directif, en pointant du doigt les odieux spéculateurs : « Quand vous êtes investisseur, même un logement vide rapporte de l’argent » , a-t-il affirmé.

      • Le Tour de France indésirable. Officiellement, c’est pour des raisons financières que la maire PS de Rennes a refusé d’accueillir le départ du Tour, mais ses alliés écolos lui reprochent de polluer et de dégrader l’image de la femme. En revanche, la Cyclonudista naturiste et écologiste programmée le 13 septembre est la bienvenue.

      • Lyon zone interdite pour la Patrouille de France. Les Alpha Jet devaient survoler Lyon le 13 juillet avant de participer au défilé le lendemain à Paris, mais Grégory Doucet a décidé de priver les Lyonnais du spectacle, pour ne pas provoquer d’attroupement en période de crise sanitaire. Quand le coronavirus sert d’alibi à l’antimilitarisme.

      • Généraliser l’écriture inclusive. Pourtant dénoncée comme un « péril mortel » pour notre langue par l’Académie française, l’écriture inclusive s’est imposée à tous les étages dans les villes écolos. Les « électeur·rice·s » leur en seront sûrement reconnaissants.

      https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/les-folies-des-nouveaux-maires-ecolos-leurs-obsessions-leurs-ideologies-leu

    • La vague verte a des reflets bleus
      http://cqfd-journal.org/La-vague-verte-a-des-reflets-bleus

      Les nouveaux maires Europe Écologie-Les Verts mettront-ils fin à la surenchère technosécuritaire à l’échelle locale ? L’analyse de leurs programmes, déclarations et premières décisions ne laisse augurer aucun changement majeur. En termes de vidéosurveillance, comme d’armement ou d’effectifs des polices municipales, la désescalade attendra.

      paru dans CQFD n°190 (septembre 2020), par Tom Vieillefond, illustré par Gautier Ducatez

  • Un #rapport de l’ONU s’inquiète de l’augmentation des #violences_sexuelles liées aux #conflits

    Malgré une décennie de lutte, l’#ONU constate que les violences sexuelles restent une #arme_de_guerre dans de nombreux conflits et qu’elles continuent d’augmenter sur toute la planète. L’ONU analyse dans son dernier rapport (https://news.un.org/fr/story/2020/07/1073341) les violations constatées dans 19 pays, principalement contre des jeunes #filles et des #femmes.

    Les violences sexuelles augmentent dans la plupart des #conflits_armés. C’est ce qui ressort du dernier rapport de l’ONU sur les violences sexuelles liées aux conflits publié en juillet dernier.

    Le rapport insiste sur le fait que ce type de violence a un impact direct sur les déplacements en masse de populations, la montée de l’extrémisme, des inégalités et des discriminations entre les hommes et les femmes. Par ailleurs, selon l’ONU, les violences sexuelles sont particulièrement répandues dans des contextes de détention, de captivité et de migration.

    Fin 2019, plus de 79 millions de personnes se trouvaient déplacées dans le monde. Cela signifie que près d’un pourcent de la population mondiale a dû abandonner son domicile à cause d’un conflit ou de persécutiosn. L’an denier, le nombre de déplacés a augmenté, tout comme le niveau de violences sexuelles se produisant sur des sites accueillant des déplacés.

    Ces violences ont notamment lieu quand des femmes et des filles mineures fuient des attaques. Ce 11ème rapport du Secrétaire général de l’ONU (en anglais) sur ce sujet se penche particulièrement sur les violences sexuelles utilisées comme tactiques de guerre ou comme une arme utilisée par les réseaux terroristes.

    Il dresse la situation dans 19 pays, entre janvier et décembre 2019, et se base sur des cas documentés par les Nations unies.

    En tout, 2 838 cas de violences sexuelles ont été rapportés dans ces 19 pays. Dans 110 cas, soit environ 4 % des cas, les victimes sont des hommes ou des garçons.

    #Afghanistan

    En 2019, la Mission d’assistance des Nations unies en Afghanistan (MANUA) a documenté 102 cas de violences sexuelles : 27 étaient liées au conflit qui oppose le pouvoir aux rebelles Talibans, touchant 7 femmes, 7 filles et 13 garçons.

    Alors que la plupart des agressions sont attribuées aux Talibans, les forces de sécurité et des milices pro-gouvernementales ont également été impliquées.

    #Centrafrique

    La Mission des Nations unies en Centrafrique (MINUSCA) a confirmé 322 incidents de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits, affectant 187 femmes, 124 filles, 3 hommes, 2 garçons, et 6 femmes d’âge inconnu. Parmi ces cas, 174 sont des viols ou tentatives de viol et 15 cas sont des mariages forcés.

    Le gouvernement de Bangui a signé avec les groupes armés, en février 2019, un accord de paix qui appelle à la fin de toutes formes de violences liées au sexe. Mais les signataires continuent d’utiliser la violence sexuelle comme moyen de terroriser les civils, conclut le rapport de l’ONU.

    #Colombie

    En 2019, un organisme de l’État venant en aide aux victimes a recensé 356 victimes de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits dans un pays où sévissent de nombreux groupes criminels et armés. Dans quasiment 90 % des cas, il s’agissait de femmes et de filles. Près de la moitié des victimes avaient des origines africaines.

    51 cas d’abus ont été commis sur des enfants (31 filles et 20 garçons). Dans au moins une dizaine de cas, les agresseurs présumés appartenaient au groupe rebelle de l’Armée de libération nationale ou à d’autres groupes armés et organisations criminelles.

    #RDC

    En 2019, la mission de l’ONU en #République_démocratique_du_Congo (MONUSCO), a documenté 1 409 cas de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits, ce qui représente une hausse de 34 % depuis 2018.

    Parmi ces cas, 955 sont attribués à des groupes armés. Mais des membres de l’armée congolaise sont eux aussi impliqués dans 383 agressions. Enfin, la police nationale est responsable dans 62 cas.

    #Irak

    Au cours de l’année 2019, des civils qui étaient détenus par l’organisation de l’État islamique (OEI) en Syrie ont continué à retourner en Irak. Certains sont des survivants de violences sexuelles.

    En novembre dernier, le gouvernement régional du Kurdistan irakien a publié des statistiques sur les cas de disparition dans la communauté des Yazidis depuis 2014. Plus de 6 400 Yazidis ont ainsi été enlevés. Parmi eux près de 3 500 ont été libérés, en grande partie des femmes et des filles.

    Une commission crée en 2014 par les autorités régionales kurdes pour faire la lumière sur les crimes commis par l’OEI a enregistré plus de 1 000 cas de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits. Ces abus ont en grande partie touché les femmes et filles yazidies.

    #Libye

    La mission de l’ONU en Libye (MANUL) n’a pu vérifier que 7 cas de violences sexuelles qui ont touché 4 femmes, deux filles et un homme activiste pour les droits des LGBTQ.

    D’après le rapport, les femmes retenues dans le centre de détention très controversé de #Mitiga n’ont aucune possibilité de contester la légalité de leur détention. Ce centre est contrôlé par la « Force de dissuasion » qui est placée sous la responsabilité du ministère libyen de l’Intérieur.

    Quatre prisonnières ont été violées et forcées de se montrer nues. L’activiste pour les droits des LGBTQ a été victime d’un viol en groupe perpétré par des gardiens de la Force de dissuasion.

    La MANUL a aussi rapporté des schémas de violences et d’exploitation sexuelles, d’extorsion et de trafic de migrants dans des centres de détention de #Zaouïa, #Tadjourah, #Garian, #Tariq_al_Sikka à #Tripoli et #Khoms qui sont liés aux autorités chargées de la lutte contre la migration illégale.

    Certaines femmes et filles migrants sont exposées au risque d’être vendues pour des travaux forcés ou être exploitées sexuellement dans des réseaux criminels internationaux, dont certains sont liés aux groupes armées présents en Libye. A Tariq al-Sikka, deux filles, frappées en public, ont été victimes d’abus sexuels.

    #Mali

    En 2019, la force onusienne au Mali (MINUSMA) a enquêté sur 27 cas de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits, commis contre 15 femmes, 11 filles et un homme. Des accusations d’esclavage sexuel, de mariages forcés, de castration et de grossesses forcées ont également été rapportées.

    #Birmanie (#Myanmar)

    L’absence de responsabilité pour des violences sexuelles perpétrées contre la minorité musulmane #Rohingyas reste de mise.

    Une mission d’enquête sur les violences sexuelles en Birmanie a montré que ce genre d’agressions étaient une marque de fabrique de l’armée birmane lors des opérations qu’elle a menées en 2016 et 2017.

    De plus, comme le rappelle le rapport de l’ONU, les abus sexuels commis contre les femmes et filles Rohingyas étaient une #tactique_de_guerre qui avait pour objectif d’intimider, de terroriser et de punir les populations civiles.

    #Somalie

    La mission de l’ONU en Somalie (ONUSOM) a confirmé près de 240 cas de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits, dont l’immense majorité contre des mineures. Elles sont en majorité attribuées à des hommes armés non identifiés, au groupe des #Shebabs somaliens, mais aussi à des forces de #police locales et à l’armée somalienne. Près de la moitié de ces abus ont été commis dans l’État de #Jubaland, dans le sud-ouest du pays.

    #Soudan_du_Sud

    La mission onusienne de maintien de la paix au Soudan du Sud (MINUSS) a documenté 224 cas de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits, touchant 133 femmes, 66 filles, 19 hommes et 6 garçons.
    Soudan

    En 2019, l’opération de l’ONU au #Darfour (MINUAD) a constaté 191 cas de violences sexuelles contre des femmes et des filles. Les viols et tentatives de viol ont constitué près de 80 % des cas.

    Les agressions ont été attribuées à des nomades armés, des membres de l’#Armée_de_libération_du_Soudan et à des miliciens. Les forces de sécurité du gouvernement, dont les forces armés soudanaises et la police ont également été impliquées.

    #Nigeria

    En 2019, l’ONU a recensé 826 allégations de violences sexuelles liées aux conflits, dont des viols et des #mariages_forcés.

    La quasi-totalité de ces cas sont attribués à des #groupes_armés, dont #Boko_Haram et la #Civilian_Joint_Task_Force, une #milice d’autodéfense. Les forces de sécurité de l’État sont impliquées dans 12% des cas.

    Les efforts de l’ONU restent vains

    En avril 2019, une résolution (https://www.un.org/press/fr/2019/cs13790.doc.htm) adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies reconnait le besoin d’une approche centrée sur les survivants pour informer et mettre en place des mesures pour lutter contre les violences sexuelles liées aux conflits.

    La #résolution ne peut que constater que « malgré le condamnation répétées des violences, dont les violences sexuelles contre des femmes et des enfants dans des situations de conflit, et malgré l’appel à toutes les parties prenantes dans les conflits armés pour qu’elles cessent ce genre d’actes, ces derniers continuent de se produire. »

    Le rapport conclut en rappelant que l’#impunité accompagne souvent les #abus et que les efforts des parties impliquées dans un conflit à suivre les résolutions de l’ONU restent très faibles.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/26635/un-rapport-de-l-onu-s-inquiete-de-l-augmentation-des-violences-sexuell
    #guerres #guerre #viols

    ping @odilon

    • Violence sexuelle liée aux conflits : l’ONU plaide pour une nouvelle décennie d’action

      Il faut continuer à garder les crimes de violence sexuelle dans les conflits et leurs auteurs sous les projecteurs de la communauté internationale, a plaidé vendredi Pramilla Patten, la Représentante spéciale du Secrétaire général de l’ONU sur la violence sexuelle dans les conflits.

      « Comme le dit la célèbre maxime juridique : justice doit être rendue et être vue comme étant rendue. Les survivantes doivent être considérées par leur société comme les détentrices de droits qui seront, en fin de compte, respectés et appliqués », a déclaré Mme Patten lors d’un débat du Conseil de sécurité sur ce thème.

      Outre Mme Patten, l’Envoyée spéciale du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, Angelina Jolie et deux responsables d’ONG, Khin Omar, fondatrice et présidente de Progressive Voice s’exprimant au nom du groupe de travail des ONG sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité, et Nadia Carine Thérèse Fornel-Poutou, présidente de l’Association des femmes juristes de la République centrafricaine, ont pris la parole devant le Conseil.

      Selon la Représentante spéciale, le débat au Conseil de sécurité ouvre la voie à une nouvelle décennie d’action décisive, selon trois axes :

      Premièrement, l’autonomisation des survivantes et des personnes à risque grâce à des ressources accrues et à une prestation de services de qualité, afin de favoriser et de créer un environnement propice dans lequel elles peuvent signaler les violations en toute sécurité et demander réparation.

      Deuxièmement, agir sur la base des rapports et des informations reçus pour faire en sorte que les parties prenantes respectent les normes internationales.

      Troisièmement, le renforcement de la responsabilité en tant que pilier essentiel de la prévention et de la dissuasion, garantissant que lorsque les parties prenantes ne respectent pas leurs engagements, elles sont dûment tenues de rendre des comptes.

      « La prévention est la meilleure réponse. Pourtant, nous avons du mal à mesurer - ou même à définir - les progrès du pilier prévention de ce programme. Le respect est un exemple concret : la violence sexuelle persiste non pas parce que les cadres et obligations existants sont inadéquats, mais parce qu’ils sont mal appliqués », a souligné Mme Patten.

      « La résolution 1820 de 2008 ne demandait rien de moins que ‘la cessation immédiate et complète par toutes les parties aux conflits armés de tous les actes de violence sexuelle contre les civils’. Cette résolution a écrit une nouvelle norme et a tracé une ligne rouge. Maintenant, nous devons démontrer clairement quelles sont les conséquences quand elle est franchie », a-t-elle ajouté.
      Aller au-delà de la rhétorique

      De son côté, Angelina Jolie a rappelé la résolution 2467 adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité l’an dernier.

      « C’était la première à placer les survivantes, leurs besoins et leurs droits au centre de toutes les mesures. Mais les résolutions, les mots sur papier, ne sont que des promesses. Ce qui compte, c’est de savoir si les promesses sont tenues », a dit l’actrice américaine devant les membres du Conseil de sécurité.

      Celle qui est également réalisatrice de films a noté que la résolution 2467 a promis des sanctions, la justice et des réparations pour les victimes et la reconnaissance des enfants nés de viol.

      « Ce sont toutes des promesses qui doivent être tenues. Je vous exhorte donc tous à vous réengager aujourd’hui à tenir ces promesses : aller au-delà de la rhétorique et mettre en œuvre vos décisions », a dit Angelina Jolie.

      « Je vous prie de demander des comptes aux auteurs, d’aborder les causes profondes et structurelles de la violence et de la discrimination sexistes dans vos pays. Et s’il vous plaît, augmentez d’urgence le financement des programmes qui répondent aux besoins de tous les survivants, et en particulier des victimes invisibles - les enfants », a ajouté la star du cinéma qui a fait preuve ces 20 dernière années d’un engagement pour les causes humanitaires, notamment en faveur des réfugiés et des droits des femmes et enfants.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/26635/un-rapport-de-l-onu-s-inquiete-de-l-augmentation-des-violences-sexuell

  • Profili critici delle attività delle ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione in Libia con fondi A.I.C.S.


    https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Profili-critici-delle-attivita%CC%80-delle-ONG-italiane-nei-centr

    Résumé du rapport en anglais :
    https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ENG-executive-summary.pdf

    –----

    Commentaire sur le site de Melting Pot :

    Profili critici delle attività delle ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione in Libia con fondi #AICS. ASGI presenta il rapporto sugli interventi finanziati dall’#Agenzia_Italiana_per_la_Cooperazione_e_lo_Sviluppo nei centri di detenzione libici

    Tra queste troviamo: #Emergenza_Sorrisi, #Helpcode (già #CCS), #CEFA, #CESVI, #Terre_des_Hommes_Italia, #Fondation_Suisse_de_Deminage, #GVC (già #We_World), #Istituto_di_Cooperazione_Universitaria, #Consorzio_Italiano_Rifugiati (#CIR), #Fondazione_Albero_della_Vita.
    I progetti, alcuni dei quali sono ancora in corso di realizzazione, sono stati finanziati con 6 milioni di euro dall’Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo (AICS).

    L’iniziativa ha suscitato, sin dall’emanazione del primo bando a novembre 2017 molto scalpore nell’opinione pubblica, sia perché il sistema di detenzione per migranti in Libia è caratterizzato da gravissimi e sistematici abusi (“è troppo compromesso per essere aggiustato”, aveva detto il Commissario ONU per i diritti umani) sia per la vicinanza temporale con gli accordi Italia-Libia del febbraio 2017. I centri di detenzione libici infatti, soprattutto quelli ubicati nei dintorni di Tripoli che sono destinatari della maggior parte degli interventi italiani, sono destinati ad ospitare anche migranti intercettati in mare dalla Guardia Costiera Libica, a cui l’Italia ha fornito e tuttora fornisce un decisivo appoggio economico, politico e operativo.

    Il rapporto si interroga quindi sulle conseguenze giuridiche degli interventi attuati, a spese del contribuente italiano, nei centri di detenzione libici.

    Anzitutto, si mette in discussione la logica stessa dell’intervento ideato dall’AICS, mostrando come in larga misura le condizioni disumane nei centri, che i Bandi mirano in parte a migliorare, dipendano da precise scelte del governo di Tripoli (politiche oltremodo repressive dell’immigrazione clandestina, gestione affidata a milizie, assenza di controlli sugli abusi, ubicazione in strutture fatiscenti, mancata volontà di spesa, ecc.). I Bandi non condizionano l’erogazione delle prestazioni ad alcun impegno da parte del governo libico a rimediare a tali criticità, rendendo così l’intervento italiano inefficace e non sostenibile nel tempo.

    In secondo luogo, il rapporto osserva come nei centri nei pressi di Tripoli le ONG italiane svolgano un’attività strutturale, che si sostituisce in parte alle responsabilità di gestione quotidiana dei centri che spetterebbe al governo libico. Inoltre, alcuni interventi non sono a beneficio dei detenuti ma della struttura detentiva, preservandone la solidità strutturale e la sua capacità di ospitare, anche in futuro, nuovi prigionieri.

    In terzo luogo, alcuni interventi sono volti a mantenere in efficienza infrastrutture anche costrittive, come cancelli e recinzioni, cosicché potrebbe profilarsi un contributo al mantenimento di detenuti nella disponibilità di soggetti notoriamente coinvolti in gravissime violazioni di diritti fondamentali.

    Infine, il rapporto si interroga sulla destinazione effettiva dei beni e dei servizi erogati. L’assenza di personale italiano sul campo e il fatto che i centri siano in gran parte gestiti da milizie indubbiamente ostacolano un controllo effettivo sulla destinazione dei beni acquistati. L’approssimativa rendicontazione da parte di alcune ONG delle spese sostenute sembra avvalorare il quadro di scarso o nullo controllo su quanto effettivamente attuato dagli implementing partner libici sul campo. Non può così escludersi che di almeno parte dei fondi abbiano beneficiato i gestori dei centri, ossia quelle stesse milizie che sono talora anche attori del conflitto armato sul territorio libico nonché autori delle già ricordate sevizie ai danni dei detenuti.

    Il rapporto conclude osservando che l’intervento italiano è direttamente funzionale alla strategia di contenimento dei flussi irregolari di migranti attraverso meccanismi per la loro intercettazione, trasferimento in Libia, detenzione e successiva rimozione dal territorio libico attraverso rimpatrio nel paese di origine o resettlement in Paesi terzi.

    Il rapporto, pur ponendo alcuni interrogativi cruciali, non fornisce un quadro esaustivo, in quanto l’AICS ha sempre negato l’accesso ad alcuni documenti-chiave, quali i testi dei progetti, necessari a comprendere appieno la situazione.

    https://www.meltingpot.org/Profili-critici-delle-attivita%CC%80-delle-ONG-italiane-nei.html

    #Libye #asile #migrations #centres_de_détention #détention #ONG #ONG_italiennes #rapport #aide_du_développement #développement #coopération_au_développement #financement

    –---

    Ajouté à la métaliste migrations et développement :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

    • La realtà libica raccontata attraverso un rapporto sugli interventi finanziati da fondi AICS nei centri di detenzione

      Il rapporto presentato da ASGI nell’ambito del progetto Sciabaca e Oruka

      Il 15 luglio nell’ambito del progetto Sciabaca e Oruka è stato pubblicato dall’ASGI un interessante rapporto sugli interventi attuati da alcune ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione per stranieri in Libia.

      Il rapporto «Profili critici delle attività delle ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione in Libia con fondi A.I.C.S.» [1] rappresenta un’analisi critica sull’operato in Libia dei progetti di alcune ONG finanziate dal nostro Paese. Si tratta di un’analisi che evidenzia soprattutto le grandi contraddizioni che si celano dietro tali interventi, le enormi lacune e soprattutto le pesanti violazioni dei diritti umani da parte del governo di Tripoli.

      Si parla di progetti, alcuni dei quali ancora in corso, finanziati con 6 milioni di euro dall’Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo (AICS). Progetti che non hanno sicuramente migliorato le condizioni dei tanti migranti detenuti presso i centri libici.

      In particolare, il rapporto osserva come “nei centri nei pressi di Tripoli le ONG italiane svolgano un’attività strutturale, che si sostituisce in parte alle responsabilità di gestione quotidiana dei centri che spetterebbe al governo libico”, ma purtroppo tale attività non serve a superare le mancanze del governo libico e a migliorare la condizione generale dei soggetti detenuti. Infatti, vi sono delle pre-condizioni che non permettono di cambiare lo stato delle cose neppure con gli interventi che arrivano attraverso questi progetti.

      A tale proposito, è significativo il contesto generale in cui si inseriscono i progetti presi in considerazione dal rapporto pubblicato da ASGI. Non va infatti dimenticato che in Libia la detenzione di cittadini stranieri nei centri è disposta da un’autorità amministrativa (il Ministero dell’Interno) e che tale decisione non è soggetta ad alcun vaglio da parte delle autorità giurisdizionali. La detenzione, poi, è disposta per un tempo indeterminato e si accompagna alla pratica dei lavori forzati.
      Ma non solo.

      Le autorità libiche, con la limitata eccezione di alcune nazionalità, non distinguono tra migranti irregolari e richiedenti asilo bisognosi di protezione internazionale e, in ultimo, non sono previsti meccanismi successivi di controllo sulla legalità della detenzione disposta. Un quadro molto chiaro che si pone in netta violazione dei più elementari principi di tutela dei diritti umani e in aperto contrasto con il diritto internazionale.

      In questo quadro generale, si inseriscono gli interventi finanziati dal Governo italiano con i Bandi che vengono specificamente analizzati nel rapporto in commento. E, la descrizione che ne viene data è, a dir poco, drammatica. Una situazione, quella nei centri libici, “non determinata dalla temporanea impossibilità di un governo in difficoltà nel fornire assistenza volta a salvare le vite delle persone più vulnerabili”.

      Infatti, le condizioni in cui sono detenute migliaia di cittadini stranieri in Libia sembrano essere dovute non da circostanze esterne indipendenti dalla volontà del governo libico ma da sue precise scelte in merito alla:
      – mancata erogazione di servizi di base (cibo, medicine, ecc.), a fronte di una non trascurabile capacità di spesa pubblica;
      – detenzione di un numero di persone eccessivo rispetto agli spazi disponibili;
      – ubicazione in strutture intrinsecamente inadeguate allo scopo;
      – detenzione di persone vulnerabili quali donne e bambini anche in assenza di garanzie ed appositi servizi loro dedicati;
      – detenzione di persone in modo arbitrario (per durata indefinita, senza alcuna procedura legale, controllo giurisdizionale, registrazione formale o possibilità di accesso ad un avvocato);
      – gestione solo nominale da parte del Ministero libico di molti centri, di fatto gestiti da milizie;
      – assenza di meccanismi di prevenzione o controllo sugli abusi commessi in tali centri.

      Nello specifico, il rapporto fa emergere una serie di contraddizioni che sono intrinseche alla situazione politica della Libia e rispetto alle quali gli aiuti economici e logistici approvati con gli accordi tra Libia ed Italia del 2017 nulla possono.

      La ragione di questi accordi allora è da rinvenire esclusivamente nella volontà di limitare l’afflusso di migranti verso il continente europeo, senza alcuna considerazione di quelle che sono le condizioni in cui versano coloro che vengono trattenuti nel paese libico.

      Come più volte sottolineato dai più attenti osservatori, assistiamo ad un fenomeno di “esternalizzazione” delle frontiere europee con l’aggravante che in questi nuovi territori ove si esercita il controllo si ha una vera e propria sospensione del diritto internazionale e continue violazioni dei diritti umani. Non interessa se chi viene trattenuto sia un richiedente asilo o possa essere iscritto ad una categoria protetta. Non vi è distinzione tra uomini, donne e bambini. Sono tutti semplicemente migranti destinati a vivere la stessa drammatica situazione di detenzione arbitraria e indefinita, di violenze e di torture.

      In più, dalla lettura del rapporto, viene in evidenza l’esistenza di un problema a monte che concerne le politiche migratorie europee che sono, purtroppo, finalizzare esclusivamente al contenimento dei flussi migratori. Si tratta di una impostazione del discorso da parte dei Paesi europei che influenza pesantemente le scelte legislative che vengono compiute e gli interventi concreti che vengono fatti. Una errata impostazione delle politiche migratorie che si aggiunge ai tanti problemi concreti presenti in Libia. Non possiamo infatti dimenticare che la Libia è un paese politicamente instabile, caratterizzato da un controllo del territorio da parte di milizie armate che estromettono lo Stato e si sostituiscono a questo. Milizie rispetto alle quali è impossibile intervenire da parte delle ONG che non possono neppure effettuare un controllo sull’utilizzo effettivo che viene fatto dei beni acquistati con il denaro pubblico.

      Stando così le cose, non stupisce lo stato dei centri di detenzione libici. Una situazione di grande precarietà, di sovraffollamento, di carenza di cibo, di carenze strutturali degli edifici utilizzati, di mancanza di attenzione alle donne e ai bambini, di assenza di assistenza sanitaria.

      Nelle conclusioni del Rapporto, i ricercatori che si sono dedicati a questa attenta analisi dei progetti delle ONG italiane in Libia evidenziano quanto già abbiamo avuto modo di dire in precedenza. Tali progetti sono uno dei tasselli di cui si compone il complesso mosaico che riguardo i rapporti bilaterali tra Italia e Libia.

      Una stagione di accordi che prende le mosse dal noto memorandum del mese di febbraio 2017 e che mira soprattutto a limitare l’afflusso di migranti privi di visto di ingresso dal territorio libico a quello italiano.

      Un altro tassello è sicuramente costituito dalle missioni (peraltro rifinanziate dal nostro Parlamento pochi giorni fa) di addestramento e sostegno alla Guardia Costiera libica sempre da parte del nostro Stato.

      Lo scopo di questi accordi è quello di bloccare o riportare in Libia i migranti irregolari, detenerli in questo Paese e, poi, eventualmente smistarli verso altri paese terzi come il Niger o il Ruanda (o rimpatriarli nei paesi di origine).

      Tutto quello che accade durante e dopo non interessa. Non interessano gli strumenti che vengono utilizzati per bloccare le partenze, non interessano i metodi che vengono adoperati dalla Guardia costiera per bloccare i migranti, non interessa lo stato di detenzione a cui sono sottoposti. In vista del contenimento dei flussi migratori tutto è consentito alla Libia.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-realta-libica-raccontata-attraverso-un-rapporto-sugli.html

  • La #répression_pénale de la #traite des êtres humains à des fins d’#exploitation du #travail en #Suisse

    Le CSDH identifie des problèmes et formule des recommandations

    La traite des êtres humains reste souvent impunie du fait de l’absence de témoignages des victimes. Il arrive en effet fréquemment que ces dernières ne soient pas en mesure, en raison de leur situation extrêmement précaire, de faire une déclaration juridiquement valable ou qu’elles ne soient plus en Suisse pour le faire. De plus, l’article 182 du code pénal, qui sanctionne la traite, fournit peu d’éléments aidant à appliquer ce concept juridique à une situation concrète. Tels sont les résultats d’une nouvelle étude que le CSDH a réalisée sur le sujet.

    En Suisse, les #condamnations pour traite d’êtres humains à des fins d’exploitation du travail sont rares. Pour connaître les raisons de cette situation, le CSDH avait analysé en 2019, dans une première étude, les jugements prononcés dans ce domaine et les #bases_légales qui le régissent. Il approfondit maintenant ses conclusions dans sa nouvelle étude, «  La répression pénale de la traite des êtres humains à des fins d’exploitation du travail en Suisse  », pour laquelle il a interrogé directement des spécialistes de l’inspection du travail, de la police, des tribunaux et des ministères publics.

    Une procédure trop dépendante du témoignage des victimes

    Il ressort de l’étude que le principal obstacle est l’importance centrale conférée au témoignage des victimes lors de l’administration des preuves durant la procédure pénale. Selon les professionnels interrogés, il est pratiquement impossible d’obtenir une condamnation sans ce témoignage. Les victimes ne sont toutefois souvent pas à même de fournir des déclarations utilisables en tribunal en raison de leur vulnérabilité et de leur vécu traumatisant. De plus, au moment du procès, si celui-ci a finalement lieu, il est fréquent qu’elles ne soient plus en Suisse, soit qu’elles en aient été expulsées, soit qu’elles l’aient quittée de leur propre chef.
    Entre clichés trompeurs et un article de loi très vague

    Des clichés persistants, qui voient par exemple dans les victimes de traite des individus forcément retenus par la contrainte et victimes de violence, constituent une autre difficulté. Une sorte de réaction en chaîne s’enclenche lorsqu’un cas ne correspond pas à ce stéréotype : la police craint qu’il ne soit difficile de rendre la traite des êtres humains plausible aux yeux du ministère public, et ce dernier nourrit la même crainte envers les juges. Les autorités préfèrent alors souvent qualifier les faits d’usure plutôt que de traite, pour augmenter les chances d’aboutir à une condamnation pénale.

    Ces difficultés s’expliquent en grande partie par la formulation vague de la disposition légale applicable, l’article 182 du code pénal suisse (CP), qui fait référence à des traités internationaux peu connus, ou pas systématiquement consultés par les autorités.
    Recommandation  : octroyer des autorisations de séjour, reformuler l’article 182 CP et obliger les autorités à collaborer entre elles

    L’étude se conclut sur plusieurs recommandations à l’intention des pouvoirs exécutifs, législatifs et judiciaires. Outre la sensibilisation des autorités compétentes, il s’agit avant tout d’améliorer la situation des victimes, en particulier en leur délivrant des autorisations de séjour et en les soutenant dans leur collaboration avec les instances de poursuite pénale, afin de les encourager à poursuivre la procédure, comme le prévoient les traités internationaux.

    Les auteures recommandent aussi de modifier l’art. 182 CP et d’adapter ses notions aux instruments internationaux, afin de pouvoir mieux détecter et réprimer les cas de traite d’êtres humains. De plus, pour faciliter l’instruction pénale de cas d’exploitation du travail qui n’entrent pas dans le champ de la définition de la traite d’êtres humains, elles conseillent de créer une nouvelle norme pénale spécifique à cette infraction, indépendante de la traite des êtres humains.

    Enfin, pour améliorer le travail en réseau, l’étude recommande de prévoir dans chaque canton une base légale qui formalise la nécessité de collaborer entre les différentes autorités concernées contre la traite des êtres humains, à des fins notamment d’exploitation du travail.

    https://www.skmr.ch/frz/domaines/migration/publications/exploitation-du-travail-empirique.html?zur=105

    –---

    #Rapport :


    https://www.skmr.ch/cms/upload/pdf/2020/200810_Etude_empirique__exploitation__travail.pdf
    #traite_d'êtres_humains #justice

  • 40 000 enfants travaillent toujours dans les mines pour les batteries des véhicules électriques.
    https://institutnr.org/40-000-enfants-travaillent-toujours-dans-les-mines-pour-nos-batteries

    Mais cette production est aussi critique en ce qui concerne les conditions sociales et environnementales dans lesquelles elle se déroule.

    Le rapport indique par exemple, que la majeure partie du #cobalt fourni sur les marchés mondiaux provient de la #République_démocratique_du_Congo, dont 20% proviennent de mines artisanales où le #travail_des_enfants et le non respect des droits de l’homme sont nombreux.

    On estime que jusqu’à 40 000 #enfants travaillent dans des conditions extrêmement dangereuses, avec un équipement de sécurité inadéquat, pour très peu d’argent dans les mines du sud du #Katanga.

    le rapport
    https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditccom2019d5_en.pdf

    #batterie #véhicule_électrique

    Et une tite carte

  • On s’était dit rendez-vous dans quinze ans
    https://infokiosques.net/spip.php?article1751

    Retour sur une quinzaine d’années au sein des mouvements radicaux des années 2000 et 2010, en mode auto-analyse critique. « Ça se passe il y a quinze ans déjà, si c’est pas un peu plus. À cette époque, on était complètement anarchistes. On croyait en rien. Toutes les lois, toutes les normes nous semblaient sans fondement. On riait de tout. On se moquait de tout. On écrivait aux journaux de gauche pour leur dire qu’on les détestait. On collait des affiches dadaïstes sur les murs de la ville. On proclamait l’absurdité du monde. On faisait un journal et on y marquait tout ce qui nous passait par la tête, on dénonçait les injustices, on était drôles et méchants et l’avis des adultes nous indifférait. On rencontrait des gens, on semait la pagaille.(...) Mais alors c’était tellement la fête ? Oui et non, parce (...)

    #O #Infokiosque_fantôme_partout_ #Expérimentations_collectives
    https://infokiosques.net/IMG/pdf/onsetaitditrendezvousdans15ans-cahier.pdf
    https://infokiosques.net/IMG/pdf/onsetaitditrendezvousdans15ans-pageparpage.pdf

    • Parce que, évidemment, on était tous d’ailleurs, on était tous des produits d’importation, qui nous étions retrouvés dans cette ville sans y avoir de famille, sans y avoir tous ces liens qui se tissent quand on a été gamin dans un bled, quand on a été à l’école, au bahut avec cette diversité de gens qu’on ne rencontre ensuite plus nulle part. Et c’est pas en organisant un « repas de quartier » dans le squat qu’on vient d’ouvrir dans un quartier qu’on ne connaissait pas trois semaines avant qu’on rencontre ses voisins.

      […]

      Car, en toute honnêteté, je me pose la question : les libertaires/radicaux/etc (nous) sont-ils une force politique conséquente en France en 2018 ? Une force avec laquelle il faut nécessairement compter ? À part ce que NDDL représente ou a pu représenter, avons-nous la moindre influence au niveau national ? Je ne vous parle pas d’avoir des députés mais de constituer une force qui influe sur les choix de société, qui essaime des idées, un bâton dans les roues du Pouvoir. Ma réponse, c’est : non. On existe, on fait des trucs super-chouettes, parfois des trucs super-moins-chouettes, voire parfois carrément glauques mais globalement on fait des trucs chouettes. Par contre on est complètement marginaux dans l’espace politique. Je veux dire : d’une part on est minoritaires numériquement. Au vu des querelles de milieu j’ai parfois l’impression que tout le monde chez nous n’en a pas conscience, mais en France celles et ceux qui se reconnaissent dans les problématiques anti-capitalistes, libertaires et féministes ça doit culminer à moins de 1% de la population. Être minoritaires c’est pas grave. Ça arrive. Ça peut changer. Mais surtout, en plus de notre minorité numérique on n’a qu’un impact hyper-limité sur l’espace politique. Comparés – par exemple – à la Manif pour tous ou à l’association française transhumaniste (qui ont toutes deux ce point commun avec nous d’être des mouvements politiques qui ne s’inscrivent pas dans le champ politique traditionnel et d’être très minoritaires) on est des rigolos. Ce qu’on fait reste bien souvent dans la bubulle, on reste des extra-terrestres pour ma grande-tante et mes voisins d’en face. Nos pratiques et nos idées sont bien souvent tellement en décalage avec le Restedumonde qu’on n’arrive pas à communiquer.

      […]

      Soit on prend « les gens » pour des cons, et on part s’acheter une ferme en Ardèche pour y lire Benjamin ou Debord en attendant que le système s’écroule ; soit on postule que nous sommes « des gens » comme les autres et on essaye de faire bouger les lignes par le pouvoir de la discussion et de l’écriture. On essaye de rallier des gens à nos positions, de constituer une fraction non-négligeable du champ des idées.

      J’ai écrit « soit ». C’est à dire que je pense bien qu’on peut intervenir dans le débat politique tout en habitant en Ardèche. Mais le fait d’habiter en Ardèche ne constitue pas pour moi une option politique, juste un mode de vie. J’ai pas mal de pratiques quotidiennes en dissidence avec le Français moyen. Mais mon implication politique ne repose pas là-dessus. Au contraire, elle repose sur mes points communs avec mes concitoyens. L’apologie de la marge je m’en méfie (pourtant, un sociologue-flic pourrait aisément démontrer que j’en fais partie, de la marge). Parce que pour changer la société, pour changer les rapports sociaux, on a besoin de connaître la diversité du monde et de s’appuyer dessus. De s’appuyer sur nos singularités, mais aussi de ne pas perdre le contact avec nos semblables.

      #anarchisme #autonomie #bulle #politique #pouvoir #rapport_de_force #forme_de_vie

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Rapport 2019 sur les #incidents_racistes recensés par les #centres_de_conseil

    La plupart des incidents racistes recensés par les centres de conseil en 2019 sont survenus dans l’#espace_public et sur le #lieu_de_travail, le plus souvent sous la forme d’#inégalités_de_traitement ou d’#insultes. Pour ce qui est des motifs de #discrimination, la #xénophobie vient en tête, suivie par le #racisme_anti-Noirs et l’#hostilité à l’égard des personnes musulmanes. Le rapport révèle aussi une augmentation des incidents relevant de l’#extrémisme_de_droite.

    La plupart des #discriminations signalées en 2019 se sont produites dans l’espace public (62 cas). Les incidents sur le lieu de travail arrivent en deuxième position (50 cas), en diminution par rapport à 2018. Les cas de #discrimination_raciale étaient aussi très fréquents dans le #voisinage, dans le domaine de la #formation et dans les contacts avec l’#administration et la #police.

    Pour ce qui est des motifs de discrimination, la xénophobie en général arrive en tête (145 cas), suivie par le racisme anti-Noirs (132 incidents) et l’hostilité à l’égard des personnes musulmanes (55 cas). Enfin, le rapport fait état d’une augmentation significative des cas relevant de l’extrémisme de droite (36 cas). À cet égard, il mentionne notamment l’exemple d’un centre de conseil confronté dans une commune à différents incidents extrémistes commis par des élèves : diffusion de symboles d’extrême droite, gestes comme le #salut_hitlérien et même #agressions_verbales et physiques d’un jeune Noir. Le centre de conseil est intervenu en prenant différentes mesures. Grâce à ce travail de sensibilisation, il a réussi à calmer la situation.

    En 2019, les centres de conseil ont également traité différents cas de #profilage_racial (23 cas). Ainsi, une femme a notamment dénoncé un incident survenu à l’#aéroport alors qu’elle revenait d’un voyage professionnel : à la suite d’un contrôle effectué par la #police_aéroportuaire et les #gardes-frontières, cette femme a été la seule passagère à être prise à part. Alors même que tous ses documents étaient en ordre et sans aucune explication supplémentaire, elle a été emmenée dans une pièce séparée où elle a subi un interrogatoire musclé. Sa valise a également été fouillée et elle a dû se déshabiller. Le rapport revient plus en détail sur cet exemple – parmi d’autres – en lien avec un entretien avec la coordinatrice du Centre d’écoute contre le racisme de Genève.

    Au total, le rapport 2019 dénombre 352 cas de discrimination raciale recensés dans toute la Suisse par les 22 centres de conseil membres du réseau. Cette publication n’a pas la prétention de recenser et d’analyser la totalité des cas de #discrimination_raciale. Elle vise plutôt à donner un aperçu des expériences vécues par les victimes de racisme et à mettre en lumière la qualité et la diversité du travail des centres de conseil. Ceux-ci fournissent en effet des informations générales et des conseils juridiques, offrent un soutien psychosocial aux victimes et apportent une précieuse contribution à la résolution des conflits.

    https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/documentation/communiques.msg-id-78901.html

    –—

    Pour télécharger le rapport :


    http://network-racism.ch/cms/upload/200421_Rassismusbericht_19_F.pdf

    #rapport #racisme #Suisse #statistiques #chiffres #2019
    #islamophobie #extrême_droite

    ping @cede

  • #Santé_mentale des #migrants : une #étude sonne l’alarme

    Une étude réalisée par le Comité pour la santé des exilés (Comede), portant sur la violence, la vulnérabilité sociale et les troubles psychiques chez les migrants, souligne l’importance d’une meilleure prise en compte des questions de santé mentale des exilés et de leur accompagnement.

    « La santé mentale des migrants/exilés constitue un enjeu important de santé publique », alerte le Comede. Dans son étude publiée ce mardi 5 septembre dans le #Bulletin_épidémiologique_hebdomadaire, le Comité pour la santé des exilés analyse les violences qu’ont subies les exilés, leurs conditions de vulnérabilité sociale et les troubles psychiques graves dont ils sont atteints. Et montre à quel point ces trois phénomènes sont étroitement liés. La question est rarement évoquée ; elle constitue pourtant un problème majeur dans les conditions de vie des migrants et leur intégration.

    Hébergé au sein de l’hôpital du Kremlin-Bicêtre, en banlieue parisienne, voilà près de 40 ans que le Comede vient en aide aux personnes exilées, en leur proposant des soins et un accompagnement dans leurs démarches administratives. Le traitement des troubles psychologiques et psychiatriques représente une part non négligeable de son activité. L’étude rapporte ainsi que sur les 16 095 personnes reçues entre 2007 et 2016 pour un bilan de santé, 16,6% affichaient des troubles psychiques graves. Il s’agissait pour les deux tiers de syndromes psychotraumatiques et de traumas complexes, mais aussi de troubles anxieux et de psychoses. Des pathologies lourdes qui se manifestent par des troubles du sommeil, de la mémoire et de la concentration, des idées suicidaires, et qui nécessitent souvent plusieurs mois de suivi thérapeutique.

    Ces troubles psychiques graves constituent ainsi « la première maladie qui affecte les exilés passés par le Comede, bien loin devant le VIH et la tuberculose », indique Arnaud Veïsse, l’un des auteurs de l’étude.

    Violences

    « Chez les exilés récemment arrivés en France, les psychotraumatismes résultent en premier lieu des causes ayant provoqué leur départ, ainsi que des conséquences immédiates de l’exil », remarquent les auteurs de l’étude. Or, 62% des quelque 5 000 personnes reçues en consultation médicale au Comede entre 2012 et 2016, originaires pour la grande majorité d’Afrique et d’Asie du Sud, ont dit avoir été victimes de violence, 14 % de torture et 13 % de violences liées au genre et à l’orientation sexuelle (viols, mariages forcés, excisions…).

    Au-delà des souffrances physiques immédiates, ces violences peuvent provoquer à long terme une vulnérabilité sociale. Selon l’étude du Comede, 98% des personnes interrogées n’avaient pas de logement personnel, 81% étaient dépourvus de protection maladie, 38% ne pouvaient pas communiquer en français, 23% ne pouvaient pas manger à leur faim. Une vulnérabilité sociale elle-même susceptible de renforcer les troubles psychiques. « C’est un cercle vicieux, analyse Arnaud Veïsse : les violences subies sont susceptibles de générer des psychotraumatismes qui peuvent conduire à un isolement social, qui accroît le risque d’être exposé à des violences… » L’étude observe ainsi que les traumatismes complexes, les idées suicidaires, les troubles de la mémoire et de la concentration ainsi que les troubles dépressifs sont plus nombreux chez les personnes en situation de détresse sociale.

    Le cercle vicieux des procédures administratives

    La situation administrative des exilés est également pointée comme pouvant constituer un facteur aggravant. « Les psychothérapeutes témoignent fréquemment de décompensations, de syndromes psychotraumatiques et de dépressions lors de la détérioration de la situation socio-administrative des patients », rapportent ainsi les auteurs de l’étude. Et de préciser : « Les structures de soins spécialisés constatent que les thérapies des personnes déboutées de l’asile sont plus longues. Le rejet de la demande d’asile, qui représente pour certains exilés un déni de reconnaissance des violences subies, provoque la peur d’être reconduit dans le pays d’origine et entraîne le plus souvent une précarisation des conditions de vie (perte d’hébergement, absence de ressources, impossibilité d’exercer un emploi). »

    Or le rejet de la demande d’asile peut être lui-même la conséquence de ces troubles psychiques et de l’incapacité de ceux qui en souffrent à se présenter aux convocations de l’administration, ou à raconter en détail les raisons qui les ont poussés à fuir leur pays. Comment en effet répondre à un interrogatoire ultra pointilleux sur les violences subies lorsqu’on souffre de pertes de mémoire ? Se profile alors le risque d’un autre cercle vicieux : incapables de tenir un récit solide et cohérent, les exilés voient leur demande d’asile rejetée, ce qui provoque une aggravation des symptômes.

    Apparemment conscient de l’ampleur du phénomène et de ses enjeux, l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (Ofpra), qui statue sur les demandes d’asile, affirme avoir pris des mesures pour y répondre. Des mesures qui passent notamment par la formation de son personnel et des interprètes.

    Face à un constat alarmant, Arnaud Veïsse du Comede juge donc indispensable d’améliorer l’accueil des exilés en France, et plus spécifiquement l’accès à la santé mentale et à l’interprétariat. Et de déconstruire les idées reçues. « Souvent, les structures de santé publique nous renvoient des patients en disant qu’elles ne sont pas spécialisées dans le soin aux exilés. En réalité, elles manquent de temps et de moyens. »

    #mental_health #migration #France #rapport #Comede #violence #vulnerability #trauma #public_health #BEH

    Rapport : http://beh.santepubliquefrance.fr/beh/2017/19-20/index.html

    https://www.rfi.fr/fr/france/20170905-sante-mentale-migrants-une-etude-sonne-alarme

  • Greece: Investigate Pushbacks, Collective Expulsions

    Greek law enforcement officers have summarily returned asylum seekers and migrants at the land and sea borders with Turkey during the Covid-19 lockdown, Human Rights Watch said today. The officers in some cases used violence against asylum seekers, including some who were deep inside Greek territory, and often confiscated and destroyed the migrants’ belongings.

    In reviewing nine cases, Human Rights Watch found no evidence that the authorities took any precautions to prevent the risk of transmission of Covid-19 to or among the migrants while in their custody. These findings add to growing evidence of abuses collected by nongovernmental groups and media, involving hundreds of people intercepted and pushed back from Greece to Turkey by Greek law enforcement officers or unidentified masked men over the last couple of months. Pushbacks violate several human rights norms, including against collective expulsion under the European Convention on Human Rights.

    “Greek authorities did not allow a nationwide lockdown to get in the way of a new wave of collective expulsions, including from deep inside Greek territory, ” said Eva Cossé, Greece researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of protecting the most vulnerable people in this time of global crisis, Greek authorities have targeted them in total breach of the right to seek asylum and in disregard for their health.”

    Human Rights Watch interviewed 13 victims and witnesses who described incidents in which the Greek police, the Greek Coast Guard, and unidentified men in black or commando-like uniforms, who appeared to be working in close coordination with uniformed authorities, violently pushed migrants back to Turkey in March and April 2020.

    Six of those interviewed said Greek police officers rounded up people in the Diavata camp for asylum seekers in Thessaloniki, 400 kilometers from the land border with Turkey. This is the first time Human Rights Watch has documented collective expulsions of asylum seekers from deep inside Greece, through the Evros river.

    Six asylum seekers, from Syria, Palestine, and Iran, including a 15-year-old unaccompanied girl from Syria, described three incidents in March and April in which Greek Coast Guard personnel, Greek police, and armed masked men in dark clothing coordinated and carried out summary returns to Turkey from the Greek islands of Rhodes, Samos, and Symi. All of them said they were picked up on the islands soon after they landed, placed on larger Coast Guard boats, and once they were back at the sea border, were forced onto small inflatable rescue rafts, with no motor, and cast adrift near Turkish territorial waters.

    Another asylum seeker described a fourth incident, in which the Greek Coast Guard and unidentified men dressed in dark uniforms wearing balaclavas used dangerous maneuvers to force a boat full of migrants back to Turkey.

    On June 10, the International Organization for Migration reported that they had received allegations of migrants being arbitrarily arrested in Greece and pushed back to Turkey and asked Greece to investigate. On June 12, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) urged Greece to investigate multiple reports of pushbacks by Greek authorities at the country’s sea and land borders, possibly returning migrants and asylum seekers to Turkey after they had reached Greek territory or territorial waters.

    In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Greek government instituted nationwide restrictions on public movement from March 13 until early May. Migrants and asylum seekers were locked down in some camps, mainly on the Greek islands, where restrictions on freedom of movement continue, and where the closing of government offices has left them in legal limbo.

    Human Rights Watch sent letters to the Greek police and the Greek Coast Guard on June 29, presenting authorities with a summary of findings but received no response. The Greek Coast Guard indicated they would reply but at the time of publication, we had received no communication.

    Greek judicial authorities should conduct a transparent, thorough, and impartial investigation into allegations that Greek Coast Guard and Greek police personnel are involved in acts that put the lives and safety of migrants and asylum seekers at risk, Human Rights Watch said. Any officer engaged in illegal acts, as well as their commanding officers, should be subject to disciplinary sanctions and, if applicable, criminal prosecution.

    The Greek parliament should urgently establish an inquiry into all allegations of collective expulsions, including pushbacks, and violence at the borders, and determine whether they amount to a de facto government policy.

    The Greek Ombudsman, an independent national authority, should examine the issue of summary and collective expulsions, and issue a report with recommendations to the Greek authorities, Human Rights Watch said.

    The European Commission, which provides financial support to the Greek government for migration control, including in the Evros region and the Aegean Sea, should urge Greece to end all summary returns and collective expulsions of asylum seekers to Turkey, press the authorities to investigate allegations of violence, and ensure that none of its funding contributes to violations of fundamental rights and EU laws. The European Commission should also open legal proceedings against Greece for violating EU laws prohibiting collective expulsions.

    On July 6, during a debate at the European Parliament on fundamental rights at the Greek border, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, said that incidents should be investigated and indicated that the European Commission may consider a new system to monitor and verify reports of pushbacks amid increased allegations of abuse at the EU’s external borders. The Commission should take concrete measures to set up an independent and transparent investigation in consultation with members of civil society, Human Rights Watch said.

    Everyone seeking international protection has a right to apply for asylum and should be given that opportunity.

    Returns should follow a procedure that provides access to effective remedies and safeguards against refoulement – return to a country where they are likely to face persecution – and ill-treatment, Human Rights Watch said.

    “Greece has an obligation to treat everyone humanely and not to return refugees and asylum seekers to persecution, or anyone to the real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment or worse,” said Cossé. “Putting a stop to these dangerous incidents should be a priority for the Greek government and the European Commission as well.”

    For more information and accounts from migrants and asylum seekers, please see below.

    Sea Pushbacks to Turkey

    Between May 29 and June 6, 2020, Human Rights Watch interviewed six men from Iran, Palestine, and Syria, and one 15-year-old unaccompanied girl from Syria, who were in Turkey and who described three incidents in which they said the Greek Coast Guard, Greek police officers, and unidentified men in black or commando-like uniforms coordinated summary returns from Symi, Samos, and Rhodes in March and April. In the fourth incident, the Greek Coast Guard and unidentified men in uniforms wearing balaclavas used dangerous maneuvers to force the boat full of migrants back to Turkey from the Aegean Sea.

    Marwan (a pseudonym), 33, from Syria, said that on March 8, the Greek Coast Guard engaged in life-threatening maneuvers to force the small boat carrying him and 22 other passengers, including women and children, back to Turkey:

    “[W]e saw a Greek Coast Guard boat. It was big and had the Greek flag on it…. They started pushing back our boat, by creating waves in the water making it hard for us to continue…. It was like a battle – like living in Syria, we thought we were going to die.”

    In the three cases involving summary returns of people who had reached land, Greek law enforcement officers apprehended them within hours after they landed, and summarily expelled them to Turkey. All of those interviewed said that they were forced first onto large Coast Guard boats and then onto small inflatable rescue rafts, with no motor, and cast adrift near the Turkish sea border. In all cases, they said the Greek officers stole people’s belongings, including personal identification, bags, and money.

    These findings add to growing evidence of abuses collected by nongovernmental groups, including Alarm Phone and Aegean Boat Report, and the reputable German media outlet Deutsche Welle. Human Rights Watch was able to identify 26 reported incidents published by others, that occurred between March and July, involving at least 855 people. In 2015 Human Rights Watch documented that armed masked men were disabling boats carrying migrants and asylum seekers in the Aegean Sea and pushing them back to Turkish waters.

    Karim (a pseudonym), 36, from Syria, said that he arrived by boat to Symi island on March 21, along with approximately 30 other Syrians, including at least 10 children. He said that the Greek police approached the group within hours after they arrived. They explained that they wanted to claim asylum, but the officers detained them at an unofficial port site and summarily returned them to Turkey two days later, he said. They were taken on a military ship to open water, where the asylum seekers – including children and people with disabilities – were violently thrown from the ship’s deck to an inflatable boat:

    [T]hey [Greek police] put us in a military boat and pushed us [from the deck] to a small [inflatable] boat that doesn’t have an engine. They left us on this boat and took all our private stuff, our money, our IDs. We were on the boat and we were dizzy. We were vomiting. They [the Greek Coast Guard] didn’t tell us anything…. [W]e were in the middle of the sea. We called the Turkish Coast Guard. They came and took our boat.

    Karim and his extended family were detained in the Malatya Removal Center in the Eastern Anatolia region of Turkey, and in three other detention centers in Turkey, for seven weeks. They were released on May 7.

    In another incident at the end of March, 17 men and women and an unaccompanied girl from Iran, Palestine, and Syria were intercepted on a highway on the island of Rhodes, an hour after landing and forced back to the shore. They were detained in a tent for two days, without food and water, and then forced onto what they believe was a Greek Coast Guard boat on the third day, then dumped at sea in a small motor-less rescue raft. Human Rights Watch gathered four separate witness statements about the same incident, in which interviewees gave similar accounts. The Turkish Coast Guard rescued them.

    Leila L. (a pseudonym), 15, a Syrian girl traveling alone, said:

    On the third day, it was night, we don’t know what time, they told us to move … they looked like army commandoes and they had weapons with them. There were six of them, wearing masks … they pointed their weapons at us. We were pushed in a horrible way and they pushed our bags in the sea. Before getting on the first boat, they took everything from us – our phones, our IDs, our bags … everything, apart from the clothes we were wearing. We were very scared. Some people were vomiting. Think what you would feel if you’re in the middle of the sea and you don’t know what would happen to you. We stayed between two to three hours [in the sea]. The boat had no engine. It was a rescue boat. It was like a dinghy. After two to three hours, the Turkish Coast Guard drove us to shore.

    In another incident, Hassan (a pseudonym), 29, a Palestinian refugee from Gaza, said that the police apprehended him and his group of approximately 25 people about three hours after they arrived on the island of Samos, during the third week of March. He said the police took them to the shore, where another group of police and Greek Coast Guard officers were waiting:

    The Greek Coast Guard put us in a big boat…. We drove for three hours but then they put us in a small boat. It was like a raft. It was inflatable and had no motor. Like a rescue boat they keep on big boats in case there is an emergency. They left us in the sea alone. There was no food or water. They left us for two nights. We had children with us….

    Hassan said that a Greek Coast Guard boat came back on the third day, threw them a rope, and “drove around for two hours in the sea,” leaving them closer to Turkish waters. The Turkish Coast Guard rescued them.

    Video footage analyzed by Human Rights Watch from an incident that allegedly took place in the sea between Lesbos and Turkey on May 25, shows what appears to be women, men, and children drifting in an orange, tent-like inflatable life raft while three other rafts can be seen in the background. The rafts appear to be manufactured by the Greek company Lalizas, which according to publicly available information is a brand that the Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy purchases. The person speaking in the video alleges they were placed on those rafts by the Greek Coast Guard to force them back to Turkey.

    Human Rights Watch contacted the Lalizas company through email with questions on the use of the life rafts by the Greek Coast Guard, but received no response.

    In its June 10 statement, the International Organization for Migration notes that “footage showing the use of marine rescue equipment to expel migrants across the Eastern Aegean Sea are [sic] especially disturbing.”

    Collective Expulsions Across Land Border

    In May, Human Rights Watch interviewed six men from Afghanistan who described five separate incidents in which they were summarily returned from Greece to Turkey in March and April. They gave detailed accounts of the Greek police apprehending them in the Diavata camp, a reception facility in Thessaloniki.

    They said the police took them to what they thought were police stations that they could not always identify or to an unofficial detention site that they said was like a small jail, close to the Greek-Turkish border, robbed them of their personal belongings including their ID, phone, and clothes, and beat them with wooden or metal rods – then summarily expelled them to Turkey.

    In one case, a 19-year-old man from Kapisa, in Afghanistan, gave Human Rights Watch a photo of injuries – red strip-like marks across his back – he said were caused by beatings by people he believed were police officers.

    Reporting by Human Rights Watch and other groups suggests that collective expulsions of people with documents allowing them to be in Greece, from deep inside the mainland, appear to be a new tactic by Greek law enforcement.

    Five of the men had obtained a document from police authorities in Thessaloniki granting the right to remain in Greece for up to 30 days. While the document is formally a deportation order, the person should have the chance to apply for asylum during the 30-day period if they wish to and the document may, under certain circumstances, be renewed.

    The men said they had either not understood their rights or had been unable to apply for asylum, or to renew this document, due to Covid-19 related shutdown of government institutions. They said that before they were returned to Turkey, in the weeks following the nationwide lockdown due to Covid-19, they saw Greek police forces visiting the Diavata camp almost daily to identify and return to Turkey residents whose documents had expired.

    Greece suspended the right to lodge asylum applications for those who arrived irregularly between March 1 and 31, following tensions on the Greek-Turkish land borders at the end of February due to a significant and rapid increase in people trying to cross the border. The Emergency Legislative order said that these people were to be returned to their country of origin or transit “without registration.”

    Making the situation worse, the Asylum Service suspended services to the public between March 13 and May 15 to protect against the spread of the Covid-19 virus. During this period, applications for international protection were not registered, interviews were not conducted, and appeals were not registered. The Asylum Service resumed full operations on May 18 but the Greek Council of Refugees, a non-governmental group providing legal assistance to asylum seekers, said that no new asylum applications had been lodged by the end of May with the exception of people under administrative detention.

    Greek law requires authorities to provide for the reception of third-country nationals who are arrested due to unlawful entry or who stay in Greece under conditions that guarantee human rights and dignity in accordance with international standards. During the reception and identification procedure, authorities should provide socio-psychological support and information on the rights of migrants and asylum seekers, including the right to apply for asylum, and refer vulnerable people such as unaccompanied children and victims of torture to social services.

    Mostafa (a pseudonym), 19, from Afghanistan, said that in mid-April, Greek police rounded him up from Diavata camp, took him to a police station near the camp, and then transferred him to another small detention site near the border, where he was detained for a night, then forced onto a boat and expelled to Turkey:

    When they [the police] came to check my papers [at Diavata camp] I told them I couldn’t renew them because the office was closed but they didn’t listen to me…. They didn’t allow us any time. They just took us to the bus and said: “We will take you to renew the papers.” They were beating us the whole time…. [T]hey took us to the police station near the camp, there were more people, 10 people altogether…. [T]hey kept us in the rain for a few hours and then they transferred us to the border. There were two children with us – around 15 or 16 years old….When they took us to the police station, they took my coat, I was just with pants and a t-shirt and then at the border, they took these too. They took everything, my money, ID, phone.

    Mostafa gave the following description of the detention site near the border and the secret expulsion that followed:

    It was like a small police station. There were toilets. There were other migrants there. It was around four and a half hours away from the border. They carried us in a bus like a prison. We stayed in this small jail for one night, no food was given. It was at 10 or 11 o’clock at night when they took us to the border. I crossed with the boat. There were 18 people in one boat. It took six or seven minutes – then we arrived on the Turkish side. [T]he police were standing at the border [on the Greek side] and looking at us.

    Two men giving accounts about two separate incidents, said that the police took them to an unofficial detention site near the border. They described the detention locations as “small jails” and said they were detained there for a day or two.

    Four out of the six asylum seekers said that Greek security forces had abused them, throughout their summary deportation, beating them with heavy metal, plastic, or wooden sticks.

    Mohamed (a pseudonym), 24, from Afghanistan, said:

    They had a stick that all the police have with them…. The stick was made of plastic, but it was very heavy. They had black uniforms. I couldn’t see all of the uniform – I couldn’t see their faces – if I looked up they would beat us. They beat one migrant for five minutes…. There were eight of them – they asked us if we came from Thessaloniki and we said yes and then they started beating us.

    All of those interviewed said the Greek security forces stripped them of their clothes, leaving them in either just their underwear or just a basic layer, and took their possessions, including personal identification documents, money, telephones, and bags before pushing them back to Turkey.

    In a report published in March, Human Rights Watch documented that Greek security forces and unidentified armed men at the Greece-Turkey land border detained, assaulted, sexually assaulted, robbed, and stripped asylum seekers and migrants, then forced them back to Turkey. At the end of June, Greece’s Supreme Court Prosecutor opened a criminal investigation initiated by the Greek Helsinki Monitor, a nongovernmental group, into the pushbacks and violence documented by Human Rights Watch and others, as well as into the shooting and deaths of two people in Evros in March.

    Human Rights Watch documented similar situations in 2008 and 2018. In March 2019, the Public Prosecutor of Orestiada in Evros, initiated an investigation regarding the repeated allegations of systematic violence against migrants and asylum seekers at the Evros river, based on the Human Rights Watch 2018 report, and a report by three nongovernmental groups, including the Greek Council for Refugees.

    Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), a nongovernmental group, has built an extensive database of testimony of people being pushed back from Greece to Turkey over the Evros river. Between March 31 and April 28, BVMN has reported at least 7 incidents involving more than 306 people. Among these cases, at least six people had legal documents regularizing their stay in Greece when they were summarily expelled.

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/16/greece-investigate-pushbacks-collective-expulsions

    #refoulements_collectifs #migrations #asile #réfugiés #life_rafts #Grèce #refoulement #push-backs #refoulements #frontières

    –—

    sur les #life_rats :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/840285
    #life_raft #liferafts

    • Press Release: New Legal Centre Lesvos report details collective expulsions in the Aegean Sea

      Greek authorities are unlawfully expelling migrants who have arrived in Greece, and abandoning them at sea on motorless, inflatable vessels. In a report released today by Legal Centre Lesvos, testimonies from 30 survivors detail the systematic, unlawful and inherently violent nature of these collective expulsions.

      Since the Greek authorities’ one month suspension of the right to seek asylum on 1 March 2020, the Greek government has adopted various unlawful practices that are openly geared towards the deterrence and violent disruption of migrant crossings, with little regard for its obligations deriving from international law and specifically from the non refoulement principle – and even less for the lives of those seeking sanctuary.

      While collective expulsions from Greece to Turkey are not new, in recent months Greek authorities have been using rescue equipment – namely inflatable, motorless life rafts – in a new type of dystopic expulsion. Migrants are violently transferred from Greek islands, or from the dinghy upon which they are travelling, to such rafts, which are then left adrift in open water.

      In addition to the well-documented practice of non-assistance to migrant dinghies, the Greek authorities have damaged the motor or gasoline tank of migrant dinghies before returning the vessel – and the people on board – to open waters, where they are subsequently abandoned.

      These collective expulsions, happening in the Aegean region, are not isolated events. Direct testimonies from survivors, collected by the Legal Centre Lesvos, demonstrate that they are part of a widespread and systematic practice, with a clear modus operandi implemented across various locations in the Aegean Sea and on the Eastern Aegean islands.
      The information shared with the Legal Centre Lesvos is from 30 survivors, and testimonies from 7 individuals who were in direct contact with survivors, or were witness to, a collective expulsion. These testimonies, related to eight separate collective expulsions, were collected between March and June 2020, directly by the Legal Centre Lesvos.

      Collective expulsions are putting peoples’ lives at risk, are contrary to Greece’ international legal obligations and violate survivors’ fundamental and human rights, including their right to life and the jus cogens prohibitions on torture and refoulement. When carried out as part of a widespread and systematic practice, as documented in our report, these amount to a crime against humanity.

      Collective expulsions should undoubtedly be condemned, in the strongest possible terms; however, this is not sufficient: it is only through the immediate cessation of such illegal practices that the protection of human rights and access to asylum will be restored at the European Union’s external borders.

      Lorraine Leete, attorney and one of the Legal Centre Lesvos’ coordinators, said that:
      “The Greek authorities are abandoning people in open water, on inflatable and motorless life rafts – that are designed for rescue – with no regard for their basic safety, let alone their right to apply for asylum. Such audacious acts show the violence at the core of the European border regime, and the disregard that it has for human life.

      Greek authorities have denied reports of collective expulsions as “fake news”, despite a plethora of undeniable evidence, from survivors and various media outlets. This is untenable: evidence shared with the Legal Centre has shown that collective expulsions are happening in the Aegean sea, with a systematic and widespread modus operandi that amounts to crimes against humanity. They are being carried out in the open, in plain view – if not with the participation – of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. European Authorities are complicit in these crimes as they have thus far failed to act to prevent further pushbacks, or hold Greek authorities accountable.”

      https://legalcentrelesvos.org/2020/07/13/press-release-new-legal-centre-lesvos-report-details-collective-e

      –---

      Pour télécharger le #rapport:


      http://legalcentrelesvos.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Collective-Expulsions-in-the-Aegean-July-2020-LCL.pdf

      #Mer_Egée #Méditerranée

    • BVMN Visual Investigation: Analysis of Video Footage Showing Involvement of Hellenic Coast Guard in Maritime Pushback

      The following piece is a product of a joint-investigation by Josoor and No Name Kitchen on behalf of the Border Violence Monitoring Network.

      Introduction

      Since the spring, consistent and well-documented reports have shown masked men aggressively pursuing boats full of refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers in the Aegean Sea, before either destroying or off-loading the boats and initiating illegal return operations to Turkey.

      One investigation which Josoor contributed to, analyzed a set of materials documenting masked men operating from an inflatable boat off the island of Lesvos in early June. Testimonies recorded on the BVMN database [June 5th; June 3rd] as well as other media reports describe a series of incidents where Hellenic Coast Guard [HCG] vessels approach boats carrying men, women and children in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece and variably drove them back, intimidated them, or destroyed and removed their engines. Several of these operations have been marked by direct physical violence at the hands of the HCG. A more recent report from the New York Times referenced at least 1,072 asylum seekers being abandoned at sea by Greek officials in at least 31 separate expulsions since March.

      The consistency of these reports underscore a broader pattern of maritime pushbacks which, in many ways, mirrors the similarly illegal procedures which have become commonplace throughout Greece and along the Balkan Route.

      Despite numerous witness testimonies of this behavior, direct evidence linking specific Hellenic Coast Guard Vessels to these illegal practices remain sparse. New video evidence obtained by the association Josoor [a BVMN-member based in Turkey] from an incident on July 11th, may provide a crucial new perspective in the analysis of this behavior.

      https://giphy.com/gifs/U6MK9HH9ZdM33U74aA

      In this investigation, we will focus on a series of four videos [Link to videos 1, 2, 3, & 4] filmed on July 11th and obtained on the same day, showing masked men on a medium-sized vessel approaching a dingy filled with women and children. The man who filmed this video sent the materials over to Josoor while still on the dinghy, after this he reported being returned to Turkey and held in detention for a period of two weeks. The purpose of this analysis is to better identify the individuals and the vessel involved in the operation which resulted in the pushback of the group.

      Given the initial lack of a witness testimony for this event [which was unable to be obtained for several weeks due to the respondent’s detention in Turkey], we had limited material to work with. In order to address these shortcomings, we utilized various open-source techniques such as geolocating the video using topographic satellite renders, stitching together the scene with compiled images, and conducting research on the origins of the vessel carrying the masked men.

      Geolocating of the 11 July Incident

      An important part of this investigation was the geolocation of the incident in order to better understand the dynamics at play, and verify the pushback element.

      A useful hint in geolocating these videos was the distinct mountain lines featured in the background in two of the clips. In order to do this, we first isolated the ridge-lines shown in the backgrounds of these two clips by using a photo-stitching technique to produce a panorama of the scene.

      Using Google Earth’s topographic satellite renders of the Aegean Sea around the coastlines of Lesvos, we were then able to geolocate these two clips. In the background of the alleged pushback operation is the shore of Lesvos; Mytilini can be seen in the center right as the populated area in the background of the videos. This indicates that the dinghy was being chased east towards Diliki, Turkey as it was intercepted by the HCG vessel.

      This geolocated area matches with information posted from Turkish Coast Guard of a rescue operation on July 11th at 10:00 am off the coast of Dikili, Turkey. This was their only reported rescue of that day.

      Identification Of HCG Vessel Involved in the July 11th Incident

      The vessel in question’s colour is light grey and features a white and blue striped symbol towards the bow on the starboard side: the symbol of the Hellenic Coast Guard.

      Slightly farther towards the bow of the boat on its starboard side, the lettering marking the vehicle’s identification within the HCG can also be seen: ΛΣ-618

      The boat in question is one of two Faiakas-class fast patrol crafts (FPCs) currently operated by the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) – this one being the ΛΣ-618 and the other being ΛΣ-617. Under a contract awarded by the HCG in April 2014, the Montmontaza-Greben shipyard, located on the island of Korcula, Croatia, was awarded a 13.3 million euro ($15.5 million) contract to supply six of these vessels which are listed as POB-24G.

      The POB-24 vessels are 24.6 meters long, and are equipped with two diesel engines that enable a maximum speed of 30 knots and a range of 400 miles. The vessels are staffed by a crew of seven but can be augmented by up to 25 additional personnel if needed.

      Importantly, the acquisition of these vessels by the HCG was majority financed via the European Commission’s External Borders Fund which provided for 75% of the cost, with the rest consisting of domestic funding. The first of POB-24G vessels, ΛΣ-617, was delivered in February 2015 whereas ΛΣ-618 was launched into service several months later in August 2015. These boats have enhanced the operational capacity of the HCG by relieving pressure from its aging Dilos-Class patrol vessels.

      Identification of the officers present in the 11 July Incident

      While the men seen approaching the dinghy on board the ΛΣ-618 took steps to conceal their identities, context clues within the videos allowed us to draw a better picture of who exactly they were and what their behavior was.

      Six men can be counted standing on board the ΛΣ-618. The men wear dark colored clothing with short-sleeved shirts marked with a logo on their upper right torsos and have either dark colored shorts or long trousers on. All six have their faces covered with either black balaclava masks or neck gaiters – an important point to keep in mind when considering that in June, the Hellenic Coast Guard’s spokesperson stated that “under no circumstances do the officers of the Coast Guard wear full face masks during the performance of their duties”.

      The men in the image above are wearing clothes which share similarities with the uniforms worn by the Hellenic Coast Guard, as the picture below shows.

      The man closest to the bow of the boat holds a weapon which appears to be an FN FAL assault rifle whereas the man second from the stern looks at the group with either a camera or a pair of binoculars. FN-FAL rifles have been carried by Greek government forces since the 1970s, thus falling in line with the scene we are shown in the videos.

      Treatment of the refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers on board the dingy

      Our investigation of the events documented in this video, and what happened next to the refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers on board the dingy, prioritized a fact-finding search within the clips themselves. On the day of the incident, a Syrian man on board the dinghy sent four videos to Josoor. He claimed to have sent them from the dinghy as they were being approached by the vessels initially and then later after they were cast afloat into Turkish waters.

      In one of the videos, at least 32 people on board the now motorless dingy can be seen floating in largely calm waters. The video shows a largely mixed passenger demographic with the men, women, and children on the boat having a varied representation of skin colors. Turkish Coast Guard records from their single intervention of the coast of Dikili on July 11th reports a group of 40 refugees assisted of which 21 were Syrian, 8 Congolese, 4 Somali,
 3 Central African, 2 Palestinian, 
1 Senegalese, and 1 Eritrean. Accounting for the boat passengers not shown within the video, these numbers correspond with the video footage inside the dinghy.

      Giving his testimony of the event several weeks later to Josoor, the man who filmed these videos described that upon its initial approach of their dinghy, the AE-618 had a rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) deployed next to it which approached them. Allegedly, one of the officers spoke in English to a member of the dinghy group, who expressed their intention to claim asylum. The officer responded negatively to this request and told them that because of COVID-19, they would not be allowed to enter the island and had to return to Turkey. The respondent described that at first, the driver of the dinghy did not follow that order and subsequently the officers destroyed the engine of the dinghy and beat its driver with batons. As other group members tried to protect the driver, they were also beaten with batons.


      The officers subsequently dragged them to Turkish waters and then left the group floating there with the broken engine. After spending several more hours in the water, the Turkish Coast Guard arrived at the scene to rescue the passengers aboard the dingy. They took them to a quarantine detention center, from where they were released after 15 days.

      With closer analysis, the video footage is able to corroborate this account. In the final video sent by the Syrian dinghy passenger, the dinghy is shown to be floating quietly in the ocean. There is no indication of the ΛΣ-618 being present at this point and the group inside the dinghy appears uncertain. At one point in the video, the cameraman pans towards the stern of the boat and briefly shows its motor. When comparing a still of the motor in the final video to a still from the dinghy’s motor during its initial flight from the ΛΣ-618, it becomes clear that it was tampered with in the intervening time. Given the many substantiated reports of boat motor destruction at the hands of the HCG, it is most likely that the balaclava-clad men on the ΛΣ-618 destroyed the dinghy’s motor before setting it adrift towards Turkey

      Contextualizing the incident on 11 July

      In contextualizing the incident of 11 July in the broader practices of the HCG in the Aegean, it is important to look at the documented history of aggression of the ΛΣ-618. On March 7th, 2020 the boat ΛΣ-618 was involved in an incident with a Turkish Coast Guard boat wherein the Greek boat entered Turkish waters and was chased in close proximity at high speeds by the Turkish boat. More recently, in the early morning hours of August 15th, the boat was documented participating in an incident along with Nato and Frontex vessels [and several helicopters], blocking a boat carrying women and children from entering into Greek waters.

      Pushbacks in the Aegean Sea have been reported on a daily basis these past few months. Given the persistence of pushbacks in the area as well as the strong presence of Frontex vessels on the Aegean Sea, the tacit support that the European Union lends to the Hellenic Coastguard in these illegal practices must be considered. The EU-funded acquisition of the ΛΣ-618 represents just a portion of the close to 40 million euros which the EU has afforded the HCG to procure new vessels within the last five years. These boats, as it has been shown in this investigation, are being used to illegally push vulnerable people back to Turkish waters – a gross misuse of power.

      https://giphy.com/gifs/J4ClIZSSzrAUjmFySd

      Conclusion

      This investigation began by analysing a series of four videos showing masked men in a vessel approaching a small dinghy filled with refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers on the Aegean Sea who later claimed to be pushed back to Turkey from Greek waters. Using Earth Studio and photo-stitching techniques, we were first able to geolocate the video to somewhere on the Aegean between Mytilini, Greece and Diliki, Turkey. We were then able to identify the vessel as the Hellenic Coast Guard’s ΛΣ-618 Faiakas-class fast patrol craft by highlighting the clear HCG emblem visible on its side and it’s ship identification number. This allowed us to make a strong conclusion that the masked men on this boat, who wore uniforms identical to those previously worn by the vessel’s crew-members, were acting in an official capacity. Finally, we were also able to contextualize the ΛΣ-618 documented history of aggressive pursuits of boats carrying refugees and asylum seekers in Greek waters and also highlighted the vessel’s EU-linked acquisition from a Croatian boatbuilder.

      When put together, this analysis clearly links the materials shown in the videos to the well documented trend of maritime push-backs by the HCG in the last months. To be clear, the findings of this investigation directly contradicts the claims of the Hellenic Coast Guard’s spokesperson who recently stated that “under no circumstances do the officers of the Coast Guard wear full face masks during the performance of their duties”. Going even further, this investigation disproves the statement of Greek government spokesman Stelios Petsas who told the New York Times in August that “Greek authorities do not engage in clandestine activities.” This investigation also further confirms the conclusion of previous investigations that the Hellenic Coastguard is engaging in pushbacks, casting strong doubt on Prime Minister Mitsotakis statement from August 19 that “it has not happened.”Pushbacks, whether they be on land or on sea, are illegal procedures, emboldened and made more efficient by EU funding mechanisms.

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/bvmn-investigations-analysis-of-video-footage-showing-involvement-of-
      #analyse_visuelle #architecture_forensiques

  • Automated suspicion: The EU’s new travel surveillance initiatives

    This report examines how the EU is using new technologies to screen, profile and risk-assess travellers to the Schengen area, and the risks this poses to civil liberties and fundamental rights.

    By developing ‘interoperable’ biometric databases, introducing untested profiling tools, and using new ‘pre-crime’ watchlists, people visiting the EU from all over the world are being placed under a veil of suspicion in the name of enhancing security.

    Watch the animation below for an overview of the report. A laid-out version will be available shortly. You can read the press release here: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/july/eu-to-deploy-controversial-technologies-on-holidaymakers-and-business-tr

    –----

    Executive summary

    The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has raised the possibility of widespread surveillance and location tracking for the purpose of disease control, setting alarm bells ringing amongst privacy advocates and civil rights campaigners. However, EU institutions and governments have long been set on the path of more intensive personal data processing for the purpose of migration control, and these developments have in some cases passed almost entirely under the radar of the press and civil society organisations.

    This report examines, explains and critiques a number of large-scale EU information systems currently being planned or built that will significantly extend the collection and use of biometric and biographic data taken from visitors to the Schengen area, made up of 26 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. In particular, it examines new systems being introduced to track, analyse and assess the potential security, immigration or public health risks posed by non-EU citizens who have to apply for either a short-stay visa or a travel authorisation – primarily the #Visa_Information_System (#VIS), which is being upgraded, and the #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS), which is currently under construction.

    The visa obligation has existed for years. The forthcoming travel authorisation obligation, which will cover citizens of non-EU states who do not require a visa, is new and will massively expand the amount of data the EU holds on non-citizens. It is the EU’s equivalent of the USA’s ESTA, Canada’s eTA and Australia’s ETA.[1] These schemes represent a form of “government permission to travel,” to borrow the words of Edward Hasbrouck,[2] and they rely on the extensive processing of personal data.

    Data will be gathered on travellers themselves as well as their families, education, occupation and criminal convictions. Fingerprints and photographs will be taken from all travellers, including from millions of children from the age of six onwards. This data will not just be used to assess an individual’s application, but to feed data mining and profiling algorithms. It will be stored in large-scale databases accessible to hundreds of thousands of individuals working for hundreds of different public authorities.

    Much of this data will also be used to feed an enormous new database holding the ‘identity data’ – fingerprints, photographs, names, nationalities and travel document data – of non-EU citizens. This system, the #Common_Identity_Repository (#CIR), is being introduced as part of the EU’s complex ‘interoperability’ initiative and aims to facilitate an increase in police identity checks within the EU. It will only hold the data of non-EU citizens and, with only weak anti-discrimination safeguards in the legislation, raises the risk of further entrenching racial profiling in police work.

    The remote monitoring and control of travellers is also being extended through the VIS upgrade and the introduction of ETIAS. Travel companies are already obliged to check, prior to an individual boarding a plane, coach or train, whether they have the visa required to enter the Schengen area. This obligation will be extended to include travel authorisations, with travel companies able to use the central databases of the VIS and ETIAS to verify whether a person’s paperwork is in order or not. When people arrive at the Schengen border, when they are within the Schengen area and long after they leave, their personal data will remain stored in these systems and be available for a multitude of further uses.

    These new systems and tools have been presented by EU institutions as necessary to keep EU citizens safe. However, the idea that more personal data gathering will automatically lead to greater security is a highly questionable claim, given that the authorities already have problems dealing with the data they hold now.

    Furthermore, a key part of the ‘interoperability’ agenda is the cross-matching and combination of data on tens of millions of people from a host of different databases. Given that the EU’s databases are already-known to be strewn with errors, this massively increases the risks of mistakes in decision making in a policy field – immigration – that already involves a high degree of discretion and which has profound implications for peoples’ lives.

    These new systems have been presented by their proponents as almost-inevitable technological developments. This is a misleading idea which masks the political and ethical judgments that lie behind the introduction of any new technology. It would be fairer to say that EU lawmakers have chosen to introduce unproven, experimental technologies – in particular, automated profiling – for use on non-EU citizens, who have no choice in the matter and are likely to face difficulties in exercising their rights.

    Finally, the introduction of new databases designed to hold data on tens of millions of non-citizens rests on the idea that our public authorities can be trusted to comply with the rules and will not abuse the new troves of data to which they are being given access. Granting access to more data to more people inevitably increases the risk of individual abuses. Furthermore, the last decade has seen numerous states across the EU turn their back on fundamental rights and democratic standards, with migrants frequently used as scapegoats for society’s ills. In a climate of increased xenophobia and social hostility to foreigners, it is extremely dangerous to assert that intrusive data-gathering will counterbalance a supposed threat posed by non-citizens.

    Almost all the legislation governing these systems has now been put in place. What remains is for them to be upgraded or constructed and put into use. Close attention should be paid by lawmakers, journalists, civil society organisations and others to see exactly how this is done. If all non-citizens are to be treated as potential risks and assessed, analysed, monitored and tracked accordingly, it may not be long before citizens come under the same veil of suspicion.

    https://www.statewatch.org/automated-suspicion-the-eu-s-new-travel-surveillance-initiatives

    #vidéo:
    https://vimeo.com/437830786

    #suspects #suspicion #frontières #rapport #StateWatch #migrations #asile #réfugiés #EU #UE #Union_européenne
    #surveillance #profiling #database #base_de_données #données_personnelles #empreintes_digitales #enfants #agences_de_voyage #privatisation #interopérabilité

    ping @mobileborders @isskein @etraces @reka

  • La #France acte la #restitution définitive d’objets d’art au #Sénégal et au #Bénin

    Le projet de loi dérogera exceptionnellement au principe d’inaliénabilité pour un sabre et 26 objets culturels pillés lors du sac du palais royal d’Abomey en 1892.

    Le Monde avec AFP Publié hier à 10h30, mis à jour hier à 10h45

    Temps de Lecture 2 min.
    A Dakar, le 17 novembre 2019, l’ancien premier ministre français Edouard Philippe remet au président sénégalais, Macky Sall, le sabre dit d’El-Hadj Oumar Tall, pour un prêt de longue durée avant une restitution définitive.

    La France va officialiser la restitution définitive, avec transfert de propriété, d’un sabre historique au Sénégal et, dans les prochains mois, de 26 objets du trésor des rois d’Abomey au Bénin. Le gouvernement a examiné, mercredi 15 juillet, le premier projet de loi permettant le transfert vers leur pays d’origine d’œuvres culturelles prises pendant la colonisation en Afrique. La volonté d’une refondation du partenariat culturel entre la France et le continent avait été affirmée par le président Emmanuel Macron dans son discours de Ouagadougou, le 28 novembre 2017.
    Lire aussi Au Sénégal, une visite d’Edouard Philippe sous le signe des armes

    Cette restitution définitive « correspond à un engagement très fort pris par le président de la République pour que la jeunesse africaine ait la possibilité d’accéder à son patrimoine, à son histoire, en Afrique », a expliqué le porte-parole du gouvernement Gabriel Attal à l’issue du conseil des ministres. Elle est « l’un des enjeux essentiels pour une relation d’amitié nouvelle entre la France et l’Afrique ».

    Pour cela, le projet de loi autorise, « par une dérogation limitée au principe essentiel d’inaliénabilité applicable aux collections publiques françaises », le transfert au Bénin de la propriété de 26 objets pillés lors du sac du palais des rois d’Abomey par des troupes coloniales françaises en 1892. Ces totems et spectres, actuellement conservés au Musée du quai Branly-Jacques Chirac à Paris, seront exposés dans un lieu public au Bénin.
    Lire aussi « La première œuvre qui est “restituée” à l’Afrique est un objet européen »

    Au Sénégal, la France restitue formellement un sabre que l’ex-premier ministre français Edouard Philippe avait symboliquement remis en novembre 2019 au président Macky Sall à Dakar.

    Cette arme est historiquement significative puisqu’elle a appartenu à l’entourage d’El-Hadj Oumar Tall, un chef de guerre et érudit musulman qui a conquis au XIXe siècle un immense territoire à cheval sur le Sénégal, la Guinée et le Mali, et a lutté contre l’armée coloniale française. « Dans les deux cas, le projet de loi prévoit un délai maximal d’une année pour la remise, par les autorités françaises, de ces œuvres », précise le gouvernement, qui n’a pas indiqué si de nouvelles œuvres allaient être restituées à d’autres pays, tels que la Côte d’Ivoire ou Madagascar.
    Recherches sur l’origine des œuvres

    Emmanuel Macron avait annoncé ces décisions fin 2018 sur la base d’un rapport des universitaires Bénédicte Savoy, du Collège de France, et Felwine Sarr, de l’Université de Saint-Louis au Sénégal, qui ont recensé 90 000 œuvres africaines dans des musées français.

    Les deux spécialistes y avaient posé les jalons d’une restitution à l’Afrique subsaharienne d’œuvres d’art transférées durant la colonisation, recensant des dizaines de milliers d’artefacts, dont beaucoup ont été pillés.
    Trois statues issues du pillage en 1892 du palais des rois d’Abomey par les troupes coloniales et conservés au Musée du quai Branly, à Paris.

    Mais leurs travaux ont été contestés par d’autres spécialistes et des musées comme le Quai Branly, qui dispose de la plus importante collection d’arts premiers. Leurs détracteurs se sont inquiétés d’une politisation du débat et de l’argument selon lequel toutes les œuvres en dépôt chez eux depuis la colonisation ont été malhonnêtement acquises ou pillées, et doivent être rendues. Ils avancent aussi l’argument de l’inaliénabilité des collections françaises, privilégiant la « circulation » des œuvres entre la France et l’Afrique, plutôt que des restitutions définitives avec transfert de propriété, sauf quand, comme c’est le cas pour les statues du palais royal d’Abomey, le pillage par des soldats français à la fin du XIXe siècle a été flagrant.
    Lire aussi Les dessous du retour manqué de la « couronne » de la reine Ranavalona III à Madagascar

    L’origine de certaines œuvres est inconnue, d’autres ont été achetées ou encore collectées lors de missions ethnologiques et religieuses dans des conditions sujettes à caution en raison des rapports de domination qui régissaient les relations coloniales. Pour en finir avec les incertitudes, les auteurs du rapport plaident pour donner des moyens à la recherche afin de lever le doute sur l’origine de ces œuvres quand c’est possible.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/07/16/la-france-acte-la-restitution-definitive-d-objets-d-art-au-senegal-et-au-ben

  • The long road to post-COVID economic recovery in the Middle East - Al Monitor

    Indicators show that economic recovery across the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf following the coronavirus pandemic may take longer and more effort than initially thought.

    #Covid-19#Moyen-Orient#Rapport#Seconde_vague#économie#migrant#migration

    https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/coronavirus

    • Menschenrechtsverletzungen bei Rückkehrprogrammen

      Immer wieder gibt es Berichte über eklatante Verstöße gegen die humanitären Bedingungen bei den Rückkehrprogrammen der IOM. Eine neue Studie von Brot für die Welt und medico international belegt die Vorwürfe.

      Die EU lagert seit Jahren Grenzkontrollen aus und setzt innerhalb von Herkunfts- und Transitregionen auf die Förderung „freiwilliger“ Rückkehr, damit Migrantinnen und Migranten erst gar nicht Europas Außengrenzen erreichen. Eine neue Studie von Brot für die Welt und medico international weist nach, dass die EU dabei Menschenrechtsverletzungen an den Außengrenzen und in den Transitländern Libyen, Niger und Algerien in Kauf nimmt.

      Die EU-Kommission hatte 2015 den Nothilfe-Treuhandfonds für Afrika aufgelegt. Eine gemeinsame Taskforce aus Europäischer Union, Afrikanischer Union und Vereinten Nationen beauftragte die Internationale Organisation für Migration (IOM), ein humanitäres Rückkehrprogramm für Migrantinnen und Migranten durchzuführen.Tatsächlich aber gibt es immer wieder Berichte über eklatante Verstöße gegen die humanitären Bedingungen.In ihrer Studie kann die Autorin Jill Alpes nun belegen, dass die Teilnahme an den Rückkehrprogrammen oftmals unfreiwillig erfolgt und teils erheblicher psychischer und in Einzelfällen auch physischer Druck auf die Migrantinnen und Migranten ausgeübt wird, damit sie der Rückführung zustimmen.

      Zusammenfassung der Studie

      Eine neue von Brot für die Welt und medico international herausgegebene Studie untersuchtbestehende Rückkehrprogramme für Migrantinnen und Migranten in Libyen und Niger entlang der Frage: Sind die Programme tatsächlich geeignete Instrumente zum Schutz der Menschen? Oder werden sie nach ihrer Rückkehr neuen Gefahren ausgesetzt?

      Im November 2017 alarmierte ein Beitrag des Nachrichtensenders CNN die Öffentlichkeit. Die Reporter berichteten über sklavenähnliche und zutiefst menschenunwürdige Verhältnisse in libyschen Internierungslagern. Europäische und afrikanische Regierungen, die zur gleichen Zeit ihr Gipfeltreffen in Abidjan abhielten, sahen sich daraufhin gezwungen, geeignete Schritte zum Schutz und zur Rettung der internierten Migranten und Flüchtlinge zu präsentieren.

      Doch statt eine Evakuierung der Menschen in sichere europäische Länder zu organisieren oder in Erwägung zu ziehen, die Unterstützung der für Menschenrechtsverletzungen verantwortlichen libyschen Küstenwache zu beenden, wurde die Rückführung von Flüchtlingen und Migranten aus Libyen in ihre Herkunftsländer beschlossen. Eine gemeinsame Taskforce aus Europäischer Union, Afrikanischer Union und Vereinten Nationen beauftragte die Internationale Organisation für Migration (IOM) damit, ein humanitäres Rückkehrprogramm aus Libyen durchzuführen.

      Doch in ihrer Studie kann nun die Autorin Jill Alpes belegen, dass es bei der Umsetzung der Rückkehrprogramme teilweise zu erheblichen Verstößen gegen humanitäre und menschenrechtliche Prinzipien kommt. So legen Berichte von Betroffenen nahe, dass die Beteiligung an den Rückkehrprogrammen keineswegs immer freiwillig erfolgt, wie von IOM behauptet, sondern teils erheblicher psychischer und in Einzelfällen auch physischer Druck auf die Migrantinnen und Migranten ausgeübt wird, damit sie ihrer eigenen Rückführung zustimmen. Vielfach erscheint ihnen eine Rückkehr in ihr Herkunftsland angesichts in Libyen drohender Folter und Gewalt als das kleinere Übel, nicht jedoch als eine geeignete Maßnahme, um tatsächlich in Sicherheit und Schutz zu leben. In Niger akzeptierten interviewte Migrantinnen und Migranten ihre Rückführung nach schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen und einer lebensbedrohlichen Abschiebung in die Wüste durch die algerischen Behörden. Häufig finden sich Migrantinnen und Migranten nach ihrer Rückführung mit neuen Gefahren konfrontiert, bzw. genau jenen Gefahren wieder ausgesetzt, die sie einst zur Flucht bewegten.

      Auch die zur Verfügung gestellten Reintegrationshilfen, für die u.a. über den EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) erhebliche finanzielle Mittel aufgewendet werden, bewertet die Autorin kritisch. Libyen allein hat seit 2015 mehr als 280 Millionen Euro für die Rückkehrprogramme bekommen. Offizielle Zahlen bestätigen, dass nur ein Teil der Rückkehrerinnen und Rückkehrer überhaupt Zugang zu den Programmen erhält. Viele scheitern bereits daran, die Kosten für den Transport zum Büro der IOM aufzubringen, um dort Unterstützung zu beantragen. Empfängerinnen und Empfänger von Reintegrationshilfen kritisieren, dass die angebotenen Hilfsmaßnahmen, bspw. Seminare zur Unternehmensgründung, häufig an ihrem eigentlichen Bedarf vorbeigingen und dem formulierten Ziel, nämlich nachhaltige Lebensperspektiven zu entwickeln, nicht ausreichend gerecht werden würden.

      Um tatsächlich zum Schutz von Migrantinnen und Migranten in Nord- und Westafrika beizutragen, zeigt die Autorin politische Handlungsempfehlungen auf. Eine Neuausrichtung der Flüchtlings- und Migrationspolitik müsse sich orientieren an Schadensvermeidung und -verhinderung, Befähigung der Menschen, ihre Rechte einzufordern, Unterstützung der Entwicklung von Selbstschutzkapazitäten und bedarfsgerechter Hilfe.

      Konkret:

      Die Europäische Union und die EU-Mitgliedstaaten müssen die Finanzierung der libyschen Küstenwache einstellen. Stattdessen sollten sie für proaktive Such- und Rettungsaktionen im zentralen Mittelmeer sorgen, Ausschiffungs- und faire Verteilungsmechanismen sowie besseren Zugang zu Asylverfahren schaffen, die Rechte von Migrantinnen, Migranten und Flüchtlingen in der migrations-politischen Zusammenarbeit mit Libyen schützen und sich zu einer globalen Teilung der Verantwortung und zur Förderung regulärer Migrationswege verpflichten.
      Die derzeitige Abschiebepraxis von Staatsangehörigen aus Subsahara-Ländern von Algerien nach Niger stellt eine eklatante Verletzung des Völkerrechts dar und macht Migrantinnen und Migranten extrem verwundbar. Internationale Organisationen, die Europäische Union und die Regierung von Niger müssen eine entschlossene und öffentliche Haltung gegen diese Praktiken einnehmen und die potentiell negativen Auswirkungen der in Niger verfügbaren Rückkehrprogramme auf die Abschiebepraxis aus Algerien kritisch untersuchen.
      Rückkehrprogramme müssen den Rechten von Menschen, die vor oder während ihrer Migration intern vertrieben, gefoltert oder Opfer von Menschenhandel geworden sind, mehr Aufmerksamkeit schenken. Opfer von Menschenhandel und Folter sollten Zugang zu einem Asylverfahren oder einem Umsiedlungsmechanismus in ein Drittland als Alternative zur Rückkehr in die Herkunftsländer haben.
      Humanitäre Akteure (und ihre Geldgeber) sollten die Begünstigten von Programmen ausschließlich auf der Grundlage humanitärer Bedürfnisse definieren und sich nicht von Logiken des Migrationsmanagements beeinflussen lassen. Nur ein kleiner Teil der afrikanischen Migrationsbewegungen hat Europa zum Ziel. Der Entwicklungsbeitrag von Rückkehrerinnen und Rückkehrern ist dann am stärksten, wenn sich die Migrantinnen und Migranten freiwillig zu einer Rückkehr entschlossen haben.
      Gelder der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sollten nur dann für Rückkehr- und Reintegrationsprogramme verwendet werden, wenn eine positive Verbindung zu Entwicklung hergestellt werden kann. Die entwicklungspolitischen Auswirkungen der Reintegrationshilfe müssen untersucht und mit dem Nutzen und den Auswirkungen der Rücküberweisungen von Migrantinnen und Migranten verglichen werden.

      https://www.medico.de/menschenrechtsverletzungen-bei-rueckkehrprogrammen-17805

    • Paying for migrants to go back home: how the EU’s Voluntary Return scheme is failing the desperate

      By the time James boarded a flight from Libya to Nigeria at the end of 2018, he had survived a Mediterranean shipwreck, travelled through a half dozen African states, been shot and spent two years being abused and tortured in Libya’s brutal detention centres.

      In 2020, back home in Benin City, Edo State, James has been evicted from his house after failing to cover his rent and sleeps on the floor of his barbershop.

      He has been shunned by his family and friends for his failure to reach Europe.

      “There’s no happiness that you are back. No one seems to care about you [...]. You came back empty-handed,” he told Euronews.

      James was one of around 81,000 African migrants returned to their home nation with the aid of the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM) and paid for by the European Union, as part of the €357 million Joint Initiative. As well as a seat on a flight out of Libya and a number of other transit nations, migrants are also promised cash, support and counselling to allow them to reintegrate in their home countries once they return.

      But a Euronews investigation across seven African nations has revealed massive failings in the programme, considered to be the EU’s flagship response to stopping migrants trying to get to Europe.

      Dozens of migrants that have been through the programme told Euronews that once they returned, no support was forthcoming. Even those who did receive financial support - like James - said it was insufficient.

      Many are considering making a new break for Europe as soon as the chance arises.

      “I feel I don’t belong here,” James said. “If the opportunity comes, I’m taking it. I’m leaving the country.”

      Of the 81,000 migrants returned since 2017, almost 33,000 were flown back from Libya, many of whom have suffered detention, abuse and violence at the hands of people smugglers, militias and criminal gangs. Conditions are so bad in the north African country that the programme is called Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR), rather than the Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programme elsewhere in Africa.

      Mohi, 24, who spent three years in Libya, accepted the offer of a flight back home in 2019. But, once there, his reintegration package never materialised. “Nothing has been provided to us, they keep telling us tomorrow,” he told Euronews from north Darfur, Sudan.

      Mohi is not alone. IOM’s own statistics on returnees to Sudan reveal that only 766 out of over 2,600 have received economic support. It blames high rates of inflation and a shortage of both goods and cash in the market.

      But Kwaku Arhin-Sam, who evaluates development projects as director of the Friedensau Institute for Evaluation, estimates that half of the IOM reintegration programmes fail.

      “Most people are lost after a few days”, he said.
      Two-thirds of migrants don’t complete the reintegration programmes

      The IOM itself lowers this estimate even further: the UN agency told Euronews that so far only one-third of the migrants who have started reintegration assistance have completed the process. A spokesperson said that as the joint initiative is a voluntary process, “migrants can decide to pull out at any time, or not to join at all”.

      He said that reintegrating migrants once they return home goes far beyond the organisation’s mandate, and “requires strong leadership from national authorities”, as well as “active contributions at all levels of society”.

      Between May 2017 and February 2019, IOM had helped over 12,000 people return to Nigeria. Of them, 9,000 were “reachable” when they returned home, 5,000 received business training and 4,300 received “reintegration aid”. If access to counselling or health services is included, IOM Nigeria says, a total of 7,000 out of 12,000 returnees - or 58% - received reintegration support.

      But the number of people classified as having completed the reintegration assistance programme was just 1,289, and research by Jill Alpes, a migration expert and research associate at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, found that surveys to check the effectiveness of these packages were conducted with only 136 returnees.

      Meanwhile, a Harvard study on Nigerian returnees from Libya estimates that 61.3% of the respondents were not working after their return, and an additional 16.8% only worked for a short period of time, not long enough to generate a stable source of income. Upon return, the vast majority of returnees, 98.3%, were not in any form of regular education.

      The European Commissioner for home affairs, Ylva Johansson, admitted to Euronews that “this is one area where we need improvements.” Johansson said it was too early to say what those improvements might be but maintained the EU have a good relationship with the IOM.

      Sandrine, Rachel and Berline, from Cameroon, agreed to board an IOM flight from Misrata, Libya, to Yaounde, Cameroon’s capital in September 2018.

      In Libya, they say they suffered violence and sexual abuse and had already risked their lives in the attempt at crossing the Mediterranean. On that occasion, they were intercepted by the Libyan coastguard and sent back to Libya.

      Once back home, Berline and Rachel say they received no money or support from IOM. Sandrine was given around 900,000 cfa francs (€1,373.20) to pay for her children’s education and start a small business - but it didn’t last long.

      “I was selling chicken by the roadside in Yaounde, but the project didn’t go well and I left it,” she said.

      Sandrine, from Cameroon, recalled giving birth in a Tripoli detention centre to the sound of gunfire.

      All three said that they had no idea where they would sleep when they returned to Cameroon, and they had no money to even call their families to inform them of their journey.

      “We left the country, and when we came back we found the same situation, sometimes even worse. That’s why people decide to leave again,” Berline says.

      In November 2019, fewer than half of the 3,514 Cameroonian migrants who received some form of counselling from IOM were reported as “effectively integrated”.

      Seydou, a Malian returnee, received money from IOM to pay his rent for three months and the medical bills for his sick wife. He was also provided with business training and given a motorbike taxi.

      But in Mali he takes home around €15 per day, compared to the more than €1,300 he was able to send home when he was working illegally in Algeria, which financed the construction of a house for his brother in the village.

      He is currently trying to arrange a visa that would enable him to join another of his brothers in France.

      Seydou is one of the few lucky Malians, though. .Alpes’ forthcoming research, published by Brot für die Welt (the relief agency of the Protestant Churches in Germany) and Medico International, found that only 10% of migrants returned to Mali up to January 2019 had received any kind of support from IOM.

      IOM, meanwhile, claims that 14,879 Malians have begun the reintegration process - but the figure does not reveal how many people completed it.
      The stigma of return

      In some cases the money migrants receive is used to fund another attempt to reach Europe.

      In one case, a dozen people who had reached Europe and been sent home were discovered among the survivors of a 2019 shipwreck of a boat headed to the Canary Islands. “They had returned and they had decided to take the route again,” said Laura Lungarotti, IOM chief mission in Mauritania.

      Safa Msehli, a spokeswoman for the IOM, told Euronews that it could not prevent individuals from attempting to reach Europe again once they had been returned.

      “It is however in the hands of people to decide whether or not they migrate and in its different programme IOM doesn’t plan to prevent people from re-migrating”, she said.

      What is the IOM?

      From 2016, the IOM rebranded itself as the UN Migration Agency, and its budget has ballooned from US$242.2 million (€213 million) in 1998 to exceed US$2 billion (€1.7 billion) for the first time in the autumn of 2019 - an eightfold increase. Though not part of the UN, the IOM is now a “related organisation”, with a relationship similar to that of a private contractor.

      The EU and its member states collectively are the largest contributors to IOM’s budget, accounting for nearly half of its operational funding.

      IOM has been keen to highlight cases of when its voluntary return programme has been successful on its website, including that of Khadeejah Shaeban, a Sudanese returnee from Libya who was able to set up a tailoring shop.

      https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/19/paying-for-migrants-to-go-back-home-how-the-eu-s-voluntary-return-scheme-i

    • Abschottung statt Entwicklung

      Brot für die Welt und medico international kritisieren das EU-Programm zur Rückführung von Flüchtlingen in ihre Heimatländer und fordern eine Neuausrichtung in der Europäischen Flüchtlings- und Migrationspolitik.

      Fünf Jahre nachdem die EU den EU-Nothilfe-Treuhandfonds (EUTF) in Afrika ins Leben rief, ziehen Brot für die Welt und medico international in einer aktuellen Studie eine kritische Zwischenbilanz. Im Zentrum der Untersuchung steht die 2016 mit Mitteln des EUTF ins Leben gerufene Gemeinsame Initiative der EU und der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) für den Schutz und die Wiedereingliederung von Migranten. Ziel des Programms war es insbesondere in Libyen gestrandeten Flüchtlingen eine Rückkehr in ihre Heimatländer zu ermöglichen.
      Insgesamt erfolgreich

      Das zuständige Auswärtige Amt bewertet die EU-IOM Initiative gegenüber dem SWR insgesamt als erfolgreich. Brot für die Welt und medico international kommen in ihrer aktuellen Studie aber zu einem anderen Ergebnis. Demnach ginge es bei der „freiwilligen Rückkehr“ vor allem darum, dass weniger Flüchtlinge und Migranten aus Afrika nach Europa kommen: „Migrationswege zu schließen und Menschen in ihre Herkunftsländer zurückzuschicken, lindert jedoch keine Not und hat daher nichts mit Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu tun. Häufig werden hierdurch sogar neue und größere Probleme für die betroffenen Menschen und Gesellschaften geschaffen, wie die Studie von Jill Alpes zeigt“, erklärt medico international gegenüber dem SWR.

      Drei Monate lang suchte die Migrations-Expertin Jill Alpes im Niger, Nigeria und Mali nach Rückkehrern. Sie sprach auch mit den Vertretern der Hilfsorganisationen und den Verantwortlichen der IOM. Sie traf viele Zurückgekehrte, die bereits mehrfach einen Fluchtversuch unternommen hatten. „Von den Männern wollen die meisten eigentlich wieder raus,“ beschrieb Alpes gegenüber dem SWR die Situation vor Ort. Ihre Perspektive im Heimatland habe sich meist nicht verbessert, sondern verschlimmert, denn viele hätten Schulden aufgenommen, um die gefährliche Flucht anzutreten oder würden nach der Rückkehr stigmatisiert.

      „Während der Feldforschung war es so, dass auch die IOM Schwierigkeiten hatte, mit den Menschen, die sie bei der Rückkehr unterstützt hatte, wieder Kontakt aufzunehmen – kann sein, dass viele von ihnen wieder losgezogen sind.“ Für die meisten von Alpes befragten Betroffenen stelle sich die Notfallrückführung de facto als Abschiebung dar.

      Im Falle der „Rückkehr“ aus Algerien hatten einige Betroffene offenbar sogar bereits einen Flüchtlingsstatus oder hätten aufgrund ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit nicht aus Algerien ausgewiesen werden dürften.
      Ergebnisse der Studie

      Brot für die Welt kommentiert die Ergebnisse der Studie: „Die EU nimmt Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Kauf, insbesondere an den Außengrenzen Europas und den Transitländern wie Libyen, Niger und Algerien sind die Zustände eklatant.“

      Medico international kritisiert zudem, dass mit dem Nothilfe-Treuhandfonds für Afrika „Mittel der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eingeflossen sind, um so genannte irreguläre Migration zu unterbinden“.

      SWR Recherchen zeigen: Über den EU-Haushalt fließen Entwicklungsmittelgelder in die umstrittene Mission. Von den insgesamt 5 Milliarden Euro des Treuhandfond kommt mit 4.4 Milliarden der größte Anteil aus der Europäischen Entwicklungshilfe (EDF). Aus den Protokollen der Board Meetings des EUTF geht hervor, dass Deutschland darauf drängt, die Gelder vor allem im Bereich „Migrationsmanagement“ einzusetzen. „Hierbei geht es eher darum, innenpolitisch Handlungsfähigkeit zu beweisen – auf Kosten der Betroffenen. Eine Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, der es um Menschenrechte und die Bekämpfung von Armut geht, darf sich dafür nicht vereinnahmen lassen,“ kritisiert medico international.

      Brot für die Welt fordert darum einen grundlegenden Kurswechsel und eine Neuausrichtung in der Europäischen Flüchtlings- und Migrationspolitik: „Im Vordergrund müssen die Rechte der Migrant*innen und deren Schutz vor Ausbeutung und Folter stehen. Um tatsächlich zum Schutz beizutragen, müssen die Europäischen Mitgliedstaaten die Finanzierung der libyschen Küstenwache einstellen und für eine proaktive Such – und Rettungsaktion, vorhersehbare Ausschiffungs- und faire Verteilungsmechanismen sowie besseren Zugang zu Asylverfahren sorgen.“

      Die Bundesregierung setzt sich dagegen für eine Fortführung der Gemeinsamen Initiative ein, heißt es aus dem Auswärtigen Amt. Die Finanzierung ist aktuell Gegenstand der noch laufenden Verhandlungen zum mehrjährigen EU-Finanzrahmen.

      Die Studie liegt bisher dem SWR exklusiv vor.

      https://www.swr.de/report/swr-recherche-unit/studie-zur-eu-fluechtlingspolitik/-/id=24766532/did=25311586/nid=24766532/1rbvj1t/index.html

    • Studie: Rückkehrprogramme für Migranten verstoßen oft gegen Menschenrechte

      Die Teilnahme sei oft unfreiwillig, teils werde erheblicher Druck ausgeübt, kritisieren „Brot für die Welt“ und „Medico International“. Die EU, die auf solche Programme setze, nehme das in Kauf.

      Bei Rückkehrprogrammen für Migranten nimmt die EU schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen an den Außengrenzen und in Transitländern in Kauf. Zu diesem Fazit kommt eine Studie von „Brot für die Welt“ und „Medico International“. Immer wieder gebe es Berichte über eklatante Verstöße gegen die humanitären Bedingungen, erklärten die beiden Organisationen. Die neue Studie belege diese Vorwürfe: Die Teilnahme an solchen Programmen erfolge oftmals unfreiwillig, teils werde erheblicher psychischer und in Einzelfällen auch physischer Druck auf die Migrantinnen und Migranten ausgeübt.

      Die EU lagere seit Jahren Grenzkontrollen aus und setze innerhalb von Herkunfts- und Transitregionen auf die Förderung „freiwilliger“ Rückkehr, erklärten die Entwicklungsorganisationen. Bei der Umsetzung von Rückkehrprogrammen komme es jedoch teilweise zu erheblichen Verstößen gegen humanitäre und menschenrechtliche Prinzipien. So sei etwa die Beteiligung keineswegs immer freiwillig - anders als von der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) behauptet, die von der EU für ein humanitäres Rückführprogramm aus Libyen beauftragt worden sei.

      Für die Studie befragte Autorin Jill Alpes den Angaben zufolge Rückkehrer aus Libyen sowie Migranten in Niger und Mali, weiter sprach sie mit Vertretern von IOM, Nichtregierungsorganisationen, nationalen staatlichen Institutionen, EU, UNHCR und europäischen Entwicklungsagenturen.

      Vielfach erscheine den Menschen angesichts drohender Folter und Gewalt in Libyen eine Rückkehr in ihr Herkunftsland letztlich als das kleinere Übel, nicht jedoch als geeignete Maßnahme, um tatsächlich in Sicherheit und Schutz zu leben. Im Niger hätten interviewte Migranten ihre Rückführung nach schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen und einer lebensbedrohlichen Abschiebung in die Wüste durch algerische Behörden akzeptiert. „Häufig finden sich Migrantinnen und Migranten nach ihrer Rückführung mit neuen Gefahren konfrontiert beziehungsweise genau jenen Gefahren wieder ausgesetzt, die sie einst zur Flucht bewegten“, betonen die Entwicklungsorganisationen.

      Die zur Verfügung gestellten Reintegrationshilfen bewertet Studienautorin Alpes ebenfalls kritisch: Libyen allein habe seit 2015 mehr als 280 Millionen Euro für die Rückkehrprogramme bekommen, nur ein Teil der Rückkehrerinnen und Rückkehrer habe aber überhaupt Zugang zu den Programmen erhalten. Von den Empfängern hätten viele bemängelt, dass die Hilfen am Bedarf vorbeigingen und nicht das Ziel erfüllten, nachhaltige Lebensperspektiven zu entwickeln.

      „Wir fordern einen grundlegenden Kurswechsel und eine Neuausrichtung in der europäischen Flüchtlings- und Migrationspolitik“, erklärte Katherine Braun, Referentin für Migration und Entwicklung bei „Brot für die Welt“. Im Vordergrund müssten die Rechte der Migrantinnen und Migranten und der Schutz vor Ausbeutung und Folter stehen.

      https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fluechtlinge-rueckkehr-studie-1.4961909

  • The Fourth Overview of Housing Exclusion in Europe 2019

    Since 2015, FEANTSA and the Fondation Abbé Pierre have released a yearly Overview of Housing Exclusion in Europe. These annual reports look at the latest #Eurostat data (EU-SILC) and assess EU countries’ capacity to adequately house their populations.

    The 2020 deadline is approaching for the European Union’s cohesion policy, yet it’s objective – the fight against poverty and social exclusion by 2020 - remains unattainable. With this 4th report on homelessness and housing exclusion, FEANTSA and the Fondation Abbé Pierre ask: what is meant by "European cohesion” when another Europe, deprived of a home or even a shelter, is being left behind? This report explores the state of emergency housing in Europe, in order to attract the attention of all decision-making bodies in Europe on the overcrowding, precariousness and inadequacy our shelter systems are confronted with.

    https://www.feantsa.org/en/report/2019/04/01/the-fourth-overview-of-housing-exclusion-in-europe-2019?bcParent=27

    Pour télécharger le rapport en pdf :
    https://www.feantsa.org/download/rapport_europe_2019_def_web_06659524807198672857.pdf

    #rapport #SDF #sans-abri #sans-abrisme #Europe #FEANTSA #statistiques #chiffres #urgence #mal-logement #Fondation_Abbé_Pierre #2019 #hébergement_d'urgence #inconditionnalité #dortoirs

    ping @karine4 @isskein

    • A Foot In The Door: Experiences of the #Homelessness_Reduction_Act (2020)

      Key findings:

      - Two years into its implementation, the research has found the change in law has significantly expanded access to homelessness assistance particularly for single people.
      - The research findings suggest that this is one of the most substantial changes observed since the introduction of the HRA and that the change in legislation has had a noticeable impact on widening access to single homeless people.
      – Overwhelmingly people reported a more positive experience when first approaching Housing Options for assistance.
      – Seventy-five per cent of people reported they were treated with respect and were able to communicate confidentially with staff.
      - Despite the majority of participants reporting positive experiences there is still clear examples of people having poor assessments.
      – The intention and ambition of the HRA is being constrained by the housing market, welfare system and funding.
      – Whilst there has been a broadly positive experience of initial contact and engagement with Housing Options staff, the research has shown significant barriers and issues with the support on offer and people’s housing outcomes.
      - Overall only 39 per cent of respondents agreed when asked whether the local authority had helped them to resolve their housing issue.
      - A further 31 per cent of participants reported that they had either supported themselves or with the help of family or friends, and 30 per cent reported that their issue was still ongoing.
      - Overall 56 per cent of survey respondents reported a more positive housing situation when asked to compare their current position with the night before they presented at Housing Options.
      – The research found the most common form of intervention offered is information on accessing the private rented sector.
      – Lack of affordable housing both social and PRS means that local authorities are increasingly constrained in the realistic outcomes that they can achieve.

      Pour télécharger le rapport:
      https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/241742/a_foot_in_the_door_2020.pdf

      https://www.crisis.org.uk/ending-homelessness/homelessness-knowledge-hub/services-and-interventions/a-foot-in-the-door-experiences-of-the-homelessness-reduction-act-2020

      #UK #Angleterre

  • La rotta balcanica. I migranti senza diritti nel cuore dell’Europa

    Lungo la “rotta balcanica” arriva in Italia e in Europa una parte rilevante dei rifugiati del nostro continente. Sono principalmente siriani, afghani, iracheni, iraniani, pakistani che fuggono da persecuzioni e conflitti pluriennali. Lungo tutta la rotta continuano a verificarsi misure che mettono a rischio le persone migranti come violenze, torture, respingimenti e restrizioni arbitrarie.

    Questo dossier rompe il silenzio sulla “rotta balcanica”, denunciando quanto sta avvenendo in quei luoghi e lanciando chiaro il messaggio che i soggetti vulnerabili del “game” non sono più soli.

    Lo ha curato la neonata rete “#RiVolti_ai_Balcani”, composta da oltre 36 realtà, tra cui Altreconomia, e singoli impegnati nella difesa dei diritti delle persone e dei principi fondamentali sui quali si basano la Costituzione italiana e le norme europee e internazionali.

    https://altreconomia.it/prodotto/la-rotta-balcanica
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Balkans #route_des_balkans #game #the_game #rapport

    ping @isskein