• #Kamena_Vourla : Locals rally against refugee children, close schools in protest

    Residents and local authorities of seaside resort of Kamena Vourla in Central Greece marched and blocked the highway lane to Athens on Wednesday to protest the presence of minor unaccompanied refugee children in their area.

    It was the second protest rally on Wednesday, while they plan a new one on Thursday.

    According to local media, Mayor of Kamena Vourla, Ioannis Sykiotis, announced that as of tomorrow, schools of all levels in the municipality will remain closed in protest.

    He said that that they were not informed by the central government about the arrival of 39 refugee children who are accommodated in a spa hotel.

    “Even the refugee children themselves do not want to stay in this area, this place is not good even for mice,” Sykiotis said adding that the closed hotel was hastily renovated in the last couple of days.

    “It is not possible that others decide for us without us. So far we have no official information from the competent authorities, but information has begun to circulate that 4-5 hotels are ready to receive refugees. This will not pass. Today’s mobilizations were just the beginning…,” the Mayor said.

    The 39 unaccompanied refugee children arrived today in Kamena Vourla are accommodated in the hotel in the town.

    According to information another 32 unaccompanied minors are expected to arrive on Thursday and stay in the spa town until they are relocated to European countries.

    Other local authorities said the arrival of the refugee children was sudden and provoked the reaction of the municipality residents and professional especially because the tourist season continues.

    KTG understands that the unaccompanied minors belong to the group of 400 refugee children that were trasnferred to the mainland right after the fires in the Moria hotspot mid-September.

    It is not the first time and will probably not be the last one that local communities on the mainland oppose government’s actions regarding the settlement of refugees, whether children, families or adults.

    https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/09/23/kamena-vourla-refugee-children-protests-local-community

    #Grèce #asile #migrations #réfugiés #anti-réfugiés #protestation

    –---

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur migrations et tourisme :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/770799

  • Le bateau d’une ONG avec 125 migrants à bord fait route vers Marseille

    La mairie de Marseille a fait savoir de son côté que le « Alan Kurdi » sera accueilli « sans condition ».

    Le bateau « Alan Kurdi » de l’ONG allemande #Sea-Eye, qui a sauvé 133 migrants en mer samedi, fait route vers le port de Marseille en France après avoir vu ses tentatives de rejoindre les côtes italiennes échouer, a annoncé l’ONG mercredi. « L’inaction des autorités italiennes et allemandes nous contraint à cette mesure », a assuré le dirigeant de l’ONG, Gorden Isler, dans un communiqué.

    Depuis mardi soir, l’ « Alan Kurdi » fait donc route vers le port du sud de la France où il devait « comme prévu se rendre pour procéder à un changement d’équipage et se préparer à une nouvelle intervention » en Méditerranée orientale, a précisé Sea-Eye, une ONG basée à Ratisbonne, en Allemagne.

    De son côté, la Ville de Marseille a fait savoir à la mi-journée que « si le Alan Kurdi émet la volonté de venir à Marseille, nous réitérons la position selon laquelle nous ne laisserons personne se noyer en Méditerranée ». #Benoît_Payan, qui assure actuellement l’intérim de la maire de Marseille, Michèle Rubirola, éloignée pour raisons de santé, a par ailleurs précisé avoir appris l’arrivée éventuelle du navire par la presse et a insisté sur le fait que la ville était prête à accueillir ce navire « sans condition ».

    Aucune réponse des Etats

    Mardi matin, les gardes-côtes italiens avaient évacué deux femmes, un homme et cinq enfants, dont un bébé de 5 mois, a indiqué Sea-Eye, qui ajoute sur Twitter que 125 personnes se trouvent encore à l’heure actuelle à bord.

    Sea-Eye explique que jusqu’à mardi soir, « aucun poste de commandement des opérations de sauvetage européen n’a pris en charge la coordination pour les gens sauvés qui se trouvent sur l’ Alan Kurdi », les Italiens renvoyant notamment sur l’Allemagne, pays d’origine de l’ONG.

    Celle-ci a renouvelé mardi soir ses appels aux postes de commandement d’Italie, de Malte, d’Allemagne et de France ainsi qu’au ministère allemand des Affaires étrangères, « mais aucun n’a répondu », souligne Sea-Eye.
    Au moins 300 morts cette année

    L’année 2020 est marquée par une recrudescence d’embarcations en Méditerranée centrale, route migratoire la plus meurtrière du monde pour les candidats à l’exil vers l’Europe, venus pour l’essentiel de Libye et de la Tunisie voisine.

    Entre début janvier et fin juillet, les tentatives de traversée au départ de la Libye ont augmenté de 91 %, comparé à la même période l’an dernier, représentant 14 481 personnes ayant pris la mer. Celles au départ de la Tunisie ont flambé, avec 10 174 personnes concernées, en augmentation de 462 %.

    https://www.leparisien.fr/societe/le-bateau-d-une-ong-avec-125-migrants-a-bord-fait-route-vers-marseille-23.
    #villes-refuge #France #Marseille #sauvetage #Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #port #sans-condition

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur les villes-refuge :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/759145

  • The Frontier Within: The European Border Regime in the Balkans

    In the summer of 2015, the migratory route across the Balkans »entered into the European spotlight, and indeed onto the screen of the global public« (Kasparek 2016: 2), triggering different interpretations and responses. Contrary to the widespread framing of the mass movement of people seeking refuge in Europe as ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹ of unseen proportions, we opt for the perspective of »the long Summer of Migration« (Kasparek/Speer 2015) and an interpretation that regards it as »a historic and monumental year of migration for Europe precisely because disobedient mass mobilities have disrupted the European regime of border control« (Stierl/Heller/de Genova 2016: 23). In reaction to the disobedient mass mobilities of people, a state-tolerated and even state-organized transit of people, a »formalized corridor« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016), was gradually established. To avoid the concentration of unwanted migrants on their territory, countries along the route—sometimes in consultation with their neighboring countries and EU member states, sometimes simply by creating facts—strived to regain control over the movements by channeling and isolating them by means of the corridor (see e.g. Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Speer 2017; Tošić 2017). »Migrants didn’t travel the route any more: they were hurriedly channeled along, no longer having the power to either determine their own movement or their own speed« (Kasparek 2016). The corridor, at the same time, facilitated and tamed the movement of people. In comparison to the situation in Serbia, where migrants were loosely directed to follow the path of the corridor (see e.g. Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017; Kasparek 2016: 6), migrants in other states like North Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia were literally in the corridor’s power, i.e. forced to follow the corridor (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Chudoska Blazhevska/Flores Juberías 2016: 231–232; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47; Petrović 2018). The corridor was operative in different and constantly changing modalities until March 2016. Since then, migration through the Balkan region still takes place, with migrants struggling on a daily basis with the diverse means of tightened border controls that all states along the Balkan route have been practicing since.

    This movements issue wants to look back on these events in an attempt to analytically make sense of them and to reflect on the historical rupture of the months of 2015 and 2016. At the same time, it tries to analyze the ongoing developments of bordering policies and the struggles of migration. It assembles a broad range of articles reaching from analytical or research based papers shedding light on various regional settings and topics, such as the massive involvement of humanitarian actors or the role of camp infrastructures, to more activist-led articles reflecting on the different phases and settings of pro-migrant struggles and transnational solidarity practices. In an attempt to better understand the post-2015 border regime, the issue furthermore presents analyses of varying political technologies of bordering that evolved along the route in response to the mass mobilities of 2015/2016. It especially focuses on the excessive use of different dimensions of violence that seem to characterize the new modalities of the border regime, such as the omnipresent practice of push-backs. Moreover, the articles shed light on the ongoing struggles of transit mobility and (transnational) solidarity that are specifically shaped by the more than eventful history of the region molded both by centuries of violent interventions and a history of connectivity.

    Our transnational editorial group came together in the course of a summer school on the border regime in the Balkans held in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2018. It was organized by the Network for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies (kritnet), University of Göttingen, Department of Cultural Anthropology/European Ethnology (Germany), the Research Centre of the Academy of Sciences and Arts (Slovenia), the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research (Croatia), and the Institute of Ethnography SASA (Serbia). The summer school assembled engaged academics from all over the region that were involved, in one form or another, in migration struggles along the route in recent years.1 The few days of exchange proved to be an exciting and fruitful gathering of critical migration and border regime scholars and activists from different regional and disciplinary backgrounds of the wider Balkans. Therefore, we decided to produce this movements issue by inviting scholars and activists from the region or with a deep knowledge on, and experience with, regional histories and politics in order to share their analyses of the Balkan route, the formalized corridor, and the developments thereafter. These developments have left a deep imprint on the societies and regional politics of migration, but they are very rarely taken into consideration and studied in the West as the centuries long entanglements that connect the Balkan with the rest of Europe.

    In this editorial, we will outline the transnational mobility practices in the Balkans in a historical perspective that includes the framework of EU-Balkan relations. With this exercise we try to historize the events of 2015 which are portrayed in many academic as well as public accounts as ›unexpected‹ and ›new‹. We also intend to write against the emergency and escalation narrative underlying most public discourses on the Balkans and migration routes today, which is often embedded in old cultural stereotypes about the region. We, furthermore, write against the emergency narrative because it erodes the agency of migration that has not only connected the region with the rest of the globe but is also constantly reinventing new paths for reaching better lives. Not only the history of mobilities, migrations, and flight connecting the region with the rest of Europe and the Middle East can be traced back into the past, but also the history of political interventions and attempts to control these migrations and mobilities by western European states. Especially the EU accession processes produce contexts that made it possible to gradually integrate the (Western) Balkan states into the rationale of EU migration management, thus, setting the ground for today’s border and migration regime. However, as we will show in the following sections, we also argue against simplified understandings of the EU border regime that regard its externalization policy as an imperial top-down act. Rather, with a postcolonial perspective that calls for decentering western knowledge, we will also shed light on the agency of the national governments of the region and their own national(ist) agendas.
    The Formalized Corridor

    As outlined above, the formalized corridor of 2015 reached from Greece to Northern and Central Europe, leading across the states established in the 1990s during the violent breakdown of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, today, are additionally stratified vis-à-vis the EU. Slovenia and Croatia are EU member states, while the others are still in the accession process. The candidate states Serbia, North Macedonia and Montenegro have opened the negotiation process. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo—still not recognized as a sovereign state by Serbia and some EU member states—have the status of potential candidates. However, in 2015 and 2016, the states along the corridor efficiently collaborated for months on a daily basis, while, at the same time, fostering separate, sometimes conflicting, migration politics. Slovenia, for example, raised a razor-wire fence along the border to Croatia, while Croatia externalized its border to Serbia with a bilateral agreement (Protokol) in 2015 which stated that the »Croatian Party« may send a »train composition with its crew to the railway station in Šid [in Serbia], with a sufficient number of police officers of the Republic of Croatia as escort« (Article 3 Paragraph 2).

    Despite ruptures and disputes, states nevertheless organized transit in the form of corridor consisting of trains, buses, and masses of walking people that were guarded and directed by the police who forced people on the move to follow the corridor’s direction and speed. The way the movements were speedily channeled in some countries came at the cost of depriving people of their liberty and freedom of movement, which calls for an understanding of the corridor as a specific form of detention: a mobile detention, ineligible to national or EU legislation (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47). In the context of the corridor, camps became convergence points for the heterogeneous pathways of movements. Nevertheless, having in mind both the proclaimed humanitarian purpose of the corridor, and the monumental numbers of people to whom the corridor enabled and facilitated movement, the corridor can be designated as an unprecedented formation in recent EU history. In other words: »The corridor – with all its restrictions – remains a historical event initiated by the movement of people, which enabled thousands to reach central Europe in a relatively quick and safe manner. […] But at the same time it remained inscribed within a violent migration management system« (Santer/Wriedt 2017: 148).

    For some time, a broad consensus can be observed within migration and border studies and among policy makers that understands migration control as much more than simply protecting a concrete borderline. Instead, concepts such as migration management (Oelgemoller 2017; Geiger/Pécoud 2010) and border externalization (as specifically spelled out in the EU document Global Approach to Migration of 2005) have become increasingly important. In a spatial sense, what many of them have in common is, first, that they assume an involvement of neighboring states to govern migration in line with EU migration policies. Second, it is often stated that this leads to the creation of different zones encircling the European Union (Andreas/Snyder 2000). Maribel Casas-Cortes and Sebastian Cobarrubias, for instance, speak of four such zones: the first zone is »formed by EU member states, capable of fulfilling Schengen standards«, the second zone »consists of transit countries« (Casas-Cortes/Cobarrubias 2019), the third zone is characterized by countries such as Turkey, which are depicted by emigration as well as transit, and the fourth zone are countries of origin. While Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias rightly criticize the static and eurocentric perspective of such conceptualizations, they nevertheless point to the unique nature of the formalized corridor because it crisscrossed the above mentioned zones of mobility control in an unprecedented way.

    Furthermore, the corridor through the Balkans can be conceived as a special type of transnational, internalized border. The internalized European borders manifest themselves to a great extent in a punctiform (see Rahola 2011: 96–97). They are not only activated in formal settings of border-crossings, police stations, or detention centers both at state borders and deep within state territories, but also in informal settings of hospitals, hostels, in the streets, or when someone’s legal status is taken as a basis for denying access to rights and services (i.e. to obtain medical aid, accommodation, ride) (Guild 2001; Stojić Mitrović/Meh 2015). With the Balkan corridor, this punctiform of movement control was, for a short period, fused into a linear one (Hameršak/Pleše 2018).

    The rules of the corridor and its pathways were established by formal and informal agreements between the police and other state authorities, and the corridor itself was facilitated by governmental, humanitarian, and other institutions and agencies. Cooperation between the countries along the route was fostered by representatives of EU institutions and EU member states. It would be too simple, though, to describe their involvement of the countries along the route as merely reactive, as an almost mechanical response to EU and broader global policies. Some countries, in particular Serbia, regarded the increasing numbers of migrants entering their territory during the year 2015 as a window of opportunity for showing their ›good face‹ to the European Union by adopting ›European values‹ and, by doing so, for enhancing their accession process to the European Union (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017). As Tošić points out, »this image was very convenient for Serbian politicians in framing their country as ›truly European‹, since it was keeping its borders open unlike some EU states (such as Hungary)« (2017: 160). Other states along the corridor also played by their own rules from time to time: Croatia, for example, contrary to the Eurodac Regulation (Regulation EU No 603/2013), avoided sharing registration data on people in transit and, thus, hampered the Dublin system that is dependent on Eurodac registration. Irregular bureaucracies and nonrecording, as Katerina Rozakou (2017) calls such practices in her analysis of bordering practices in the Greek context, became a place of dispute, negotiations, and frustrations, but also a clear sign of the complex relationships and different responses to migration within the European Union migration management politics itself.

    Within EU-member states, however, the longer the corridor lasted, and the more people passed through it, the stronger the ›Hungarian position‹ became. Finally, Austria became the driving force behind a process of gradually closing the corridor, which began in November 2015 and was fully implemented in March 2016. In parallel, Angela Merkel and the European Commission preferred another strategy that cut access to the formalized corridor and that was achieved by adopting a treaty with Turkey known as the »EU-Turkey deal« signed on 18 March 2016 (see Speer 2017: 49–68; Weber 2017: 30–40).

    The humanitarian aspect for the people on the move who were supposed to reach a safe place through the corridor was the guiding principle of public discourses in most of the countries along the corridor. In Serbia, »Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić officially welcomed refugees, spoke of tolerance, and compared the experience of refugees fleeing war-torn countries to those of refugees during the wars of Yugoslav Succession« (Greenberg/Spasić 2017: 315). Similar narratives could also be observed in other countries along the corridor, at least for some period of time (see, for Slovenia, Sardelić 2017: 11; for Croatia, Jakešević 2017: 184; Bužinkić 2018: 153–154). Of course, critical readings could easily detect the discriminatory, dehumanizing, securitarizing, and criminalizing acts, practices, tropes, and aspects in many of these superficially caring narratives. The profiling or selection of people, ad hoc detentions, and militarization—which were integral parts of the corridor—were, at the time, only denounced by a few NGOs and independent activists. They were mostly ignored, or only temporarily acknowledged, by the media and, consequently, by the general public.

    Before May 2015, ›irregular‹ migration was not framed by a discourse of ›crisis‹ in the countries along the route, rather, the discourse was led by a focus on ›separate incidents‹ or ›situations‹. The discursive framing of ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹, accompanied by reports of UN agencies about ›unprecedented refugee flows in history‹, has been globally adopted both by policy makers and the wider public. »In the wake of the Summer of Migration, all involved states along the Balkan route were quick to stage the events as an ›emergency‹ (Calhoun 2004) and, in best humanitarian fashion, as a major humanitarian ›crisis‹, thus legitimizing a ›politics of exception‹« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). Following the logic that extraordinary situations call for, and justify, the use of extraordinary measures, the emergency framework, through the construction of existential threats, resulted, on the one hand, in a loosely controlled allocation of resources, and, on the other hand, in silencing many critical interpretations, thus allowing various ›risk management activities‹ to happen on the edge of the law (Campesi 2014). For the states along the route, the crisis label especially meant a rapid infusion of money and other resources for establishing infrastructures for the urgent reception of people on the move, mainly deriving from EU funds. Politically and practically, these humanitarian-control activities also fastened the operational inclusion of non-EU countries into the European border regime.

    As Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek have pointed out, the politics of proclaiming a ›crisis‹ is at the heart of re-stabilizing the European border regime, »making it possible to systematically undermine and lever the standards of international and European law without serious challenges to date« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). The authors:

    »have observed carefully designed policy elements, which can be labelled as anti-litigation devices. The design of the Hungarian transit zones is a striking case in point. They are an elementary part of the border fence towards Serbia and allow for the fiction that the border has not been closed for those seeking international protection, but rather that their admission numbers are merely limited due to administrative reasons: each of the two transit zones allows for 14 asylum seekers to enter Hungary every day« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66; on the administrative rationale in Slovenia see e.g. Gombač 2016: 79–81).

    The establishment of transit zones was accompanied by a series of legislative tightenings, passed under a proclaimed ›crisis situation caused by mass immigration‹, which, from a legal point of view, lasts until today. Two aspects are worth mentioning in particular: First, the mandatory deportation of all unwanted migrants that were detected on Hungarian territory to the other side of the fence, without any possibility to claim for asylum or even to lodge any appeal against the return. Second, the automatic rejection of all asylum applications as inadmissible, even of those who managed to enter the transit zones, because Serbia had been declared a safe third country (Nagy/Pál 2018). This led to a completely securitized border regime in Hungary, which might become a ›role model‹, not only for the countries in the region but also for the European border regime as a whole (ECtHR – Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary Application No. 47287/15).
    The Long Genealogy of the Balkan Route and its Governance

    The history of the Balkan region is a multiply layered history of transborder mobilities, migration, and flight reaching back as far as the times of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires connecting the region with the East and Western Europe in many ways. Central transportation and communication infrastructures partially also used by today’s migratory projects had already been established at the heydays of Western imperialism, as the Orient Express, the luxury train service connecting Paris with Istanbul (1883), or the Berlin-Baghdad railway (built between 1903 and 1940) indicate. During World War II, a different and reversed refugee route existed, which brought European refugees not just to Turkey but even further to refugee camps in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine and was operated by the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA).

    The Yugoslav highway, the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity (Autoput bratstva i jedinstva) often simply referred to as the ›autoput‹ and built in phases after the 1950s, came to stretch over more than 1,000 km from the Austrian to the Greek borders and was one of the central infrastructures enabling transnational mobilities, life projects, and exile. In the 1960s, direct trains departing from Istanbul and Athens carried thousands of prospective labor migrants to foreign places in Germany and Austria in the context of the fordist labor migration regime of the two countries. At the end of that decade, Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia, fostering and formalizing decades long labor migrations from Croatia, Serbia, and other countries to Germany (Gatrell 2019, see e.g. Lukić Krstanović 2019: 54–55).

    The wars in the 1990s that accompanied the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the consequent establishment of several new nation states, created the first large refugee movement after the Second World War within Europe and was followed by increasing numbers of people fleeing Albania after the fall of its self-isolationist regime and the (civil) wars in the Middle East, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan since the mid-1990s. As the migratory route did not go north through the Balkan Peninsula, but mainly proceeded to Italy at the time, the label Balkan route was mostly used as a name for a drugs and arms smuggling route well known in the West. Although there was migration within and to Europe, the Balkan migratory route, with the exception of refugee movements from ex-Yugoslavia, was yet predominantly invisible to the broader European public.

    Sparse ethnographic insights from the beginning of the 2000s point this out. Academic papers on migrant crossings from Turkey to the island of Lesbos mention as follows: »When the transport service began in the late 1980s it was very small and personal; then, in the middle of the 1990s, the Kurds began to show up – and now people arrive from just about everywhere« (Tsianos/Hess/Karakayali 2009: 3; see Tsianos/Karakayali 2010: 379). A document of the Council of the European Union from 1997 formulates this as following:

    »This migration appears to be routed essentially either through Turkey, and hence through Greece and Italy, or via the ›Balkans route‹, with the final countries of destination being in particular Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several suggestions were put forward for dealing with this worrying problem, including the strengthening of checks at external borders, the stepping up of the campaign against illegal immigration networks, and pre-frontier assistance and training assignments in airports and ports in certain transit third countries, in full cooperation with the authorities in those countries« (ibid. quoted in Hess/Kasparek 2020).

    During this time, the EU migration management policies defined two main objectives: to prevent similar arrivals in the future, and to initiate a system of control over migration movements toward the EU that would be established outside the territories of the EU member states. This would later be formalized, first in the 2002 EU Action Plan on Illegal Immigration (see Hayes/Vermeulen 2012: 13–14) and later re-confirmed in the Global Approach to Migration (2005) framework concerning the cooperation of the EU with third states (Hess/Kasparek 2020). In this process, the so-called migratory routes-approach and accompanying strategies of controlling, containing, and taming the movement »through epistemology of the route« (Hess/Kasparek 2020) became a main rationale of the European border control regime. Thus, one can resume that the route was not only produced by movements of people but also by the logic, legislation, investment etc. of EU migration governance. Consequently, the clandestine pathways across the Balkans to Central and Western Europe were frequently addressed by security bodies and services of the EU (see e.g. Frontex 2011; Frontex 2014), resulting in the conceptual and practical production of the Balkan as an external border zone of the EU.

    Parallel to the creation of ›Schengenland‹, the birth of the ›Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‹ inter alia as an inner-EU-free-mobility-zone and EU-based European border and migration regime in the late 1990s, the EU created the Western Balkans as an imaginary political entity, an object of its neighborhood and enlargement policy, which lies just outside the EU with a potential ›European future‹. For the purpose of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) initiated in 1999, the term Western Balkan was launched in the EU political context in order to include, at that moment, ›ex-Yugoslav states minus Slovenia plus Albania‹ and to presumably avoid potential politically sensitive notions. The Western Balkans as a concept represents a combination of a political compromise and colonial imagery (see Petrović 2012: 21–36). Its aim was to stabilize the region through a radical redefinition that would restrain from ethno-national toponyms and to establish a free-trade area and growing partnership with the EU. The SAP set out common political and economic goals for the Western Balkan as a region and conducted political and economic progress evaluations ›on a countries’ own merits‹. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 strengthened the main objectives of the SAP and formally took over elements of the accession process—institutional domains and regulations that were to be harmonized with those existing in the EU. Harmonization is a wide concept, and it basically means adopting institutional measures following specific demands of the EU. It is a highly hierarchized process in which states asked to ›harmonize‹ do not have a say in things but have to conform to the measures set forth by the EU. As such, the adoption of the EU migration and border regime became a central part of the ongoing EU-accession process that emerged as the main platform and governmental technology of the early externalization and integration of transit and source countries into the EU border regime. This was the context of early bilateral and multilateral cooperation on this topic (concerning involved states, see Lipovec Čebron 2003; Stojić Mitrović 2014; Župarić-Iljić 2013; Bojadžijev 2007).

    The decisive inclusion of the Western Balkan states in the EU design of border control happened at the Thessaloniki European Summit in 2003, where concrete provisions concerning border management, security, and combating illegal migration were set according to European standards. These provisions have not been directly displayed, but were concealed as part of the package of institutional transformations that respective states had to conduct. The states were promised to become members of the EU if the conditions were met. In order to fulfill this goal, prospective EU member states had to maintain good mutual relations, build statehoods based on ›the rule of law‹, and, after a positive evaluation by the EU, begin with the implementation of concrete legislative and institutional changes on their territories (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019). The control of unwanted movements toward the EU was a priority of the EU accession process of the Western Balkan states from the very beginning (Kacarska 2012). It started with controlling the movement of their own nationals (to allow the states to be removed from the so-called Black Schengen list) during the visa facilitation process. If they managed to control the movement of their own nationals, especially those who applied for asylum in the EU via biometric passports and readmission obligations (asylum seekers from these states comprise a large portion of asylum seekers in the EU even today), they were promised easier access to the EU as an economic area. Gradually, the focus of movement control shifted to third-country nationals. In effect, the Western Balkan states introduced migration-related legislative and institutional transformations corresponding to the ones already existing in the EU, yet persistent ›non-doing‹ (especially regarding enabling access to rights and services for migrants) remained a main practice of deterrence (Valenta/Zuparic-Iljic/Vidovic 2015; Stojić Mitrović 2019).

    From the very beginning, becoming an active part of the European border regime and implementing EU-centric migration policies, or, to put it simply, conducting control policies over the movements of people, has not been the goal of the states along the Balkan route per se but a means to obtain political and economic benefits from the EU. They are included into the EU border regime as operational partners without formal power to influence migration policies. These states do have a voice, though, not only by creating the image of being able to manage the ›European problem‹, and accordingly receive further access to EU funds, but also by influencing EU migration policy through disobedience and actively avoiding conformity to ›prescribed‹ measures. A striking example of creative state disobedience are the so-called 72-hour-papers, which are legal provisions set by the Serbian 2007 Law on Asylum, later also introduced as law in North Macedonia in June 2015: Their initial function was to give asylum seekers who declared their ›intention to seek asylum‹ to the police the possibility to legally proceed to one of the asylum reception centers located within Serbia, where, in a second step, their asylum requests were to be examined in line with the idea of implementing a functioning asylum system according to EU standards. However, in practice, these papers were used as short-term visas for transiting through North Macedonia and Serbia that were handed out to hundreds of thousands of migrants (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 17–19, 36).

    Furthermore, the introduction of migration control practices is often a means for achieving other political and economic goals. In the accessing states, migration management is seen as services they provide for the EU. In addition, demands created by migration management goals open new possibilities for employment, which are essential to societies with high unemployment rates.

    Besides direct economic benefits, migration has been confirmed to be a politically potent instrument. States and their institutions were more firmly integrated into existing EU structures, especially those related to the prevention of unwanted migration, such as increased police cooperation and Frontex agreements. On a local level, political leaders have increasingly been using migration-related narratives in everyday political life in order to confront the state or other political competitors, often through the use of Ethno-nationalist and related discourses. In recent times, as citizens of the states along the Balkan route themselves migrate in search for jobs and less precarious lives, migration from third states has been discursively linked to the fear of foreigners permanently settling in places at the expense of natives.
    Contemporary Context

    According to a growing body of literature (e.g. Hess/Kasparek 2020; Lunaček Brumen/Meh 2016; Speer 2017), the Balkan route of the year 2015 and the first months of 2016 can be conceptualized in phases, beginning with a clandestine phase, evolving to an open route and formalized corridor and back to an invisible route again. It is necessary to point to the fact that these different phases were not merely the result of state or EU-led top-down approaches, but the consequence of a »dynamic process which resulted from the interplay of state practices, practices of mobility, activities of activists, volunteers, and NGOs, media coverage, etc. The same applies for its closure« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 6).

    The closure of the corridor and stricter border controls resulted in a large transformation of the Balkan route and mobility practices in the recent years, when push-backs from deep within the EU-territory to neighboring non-EU states, erratic movements across borders and territories of the (Western) Balkan states, or desperate journeys back to Greece and then back to the north became everyday realities. In the same period, the route proliferated into more branches, especially a new one via Bosnia and Herzegovina. This proliferation lead to a heightened circulation of practices, people, and knowledge along these paths: a mushrooming of so-called ›jungle camps‹ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an escalation of border violence in Croatia, chain push-backs from Slovenia, significant EU financial investments into border control in Croatia and camp infrastructures in neighboring countries, the deployment of Frontex in Albania, etc. As the actual itineraries of people on the move multiplied, people started to reach previously indiscernible spots, resulting in blurring of the differences between entering and exiting borders. Circular transit with many loops, involving moving forward and backwards, became the dominant form of migration movements in the region. It transformed the Balkan route into a »Balkan Circuit« (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019: 540; see also Stojić Mitrović/Ahmetašević/Beznec/Kurnik 2020). The topography changed from a unidirectional line to a network of hubs, accommodation, and socializing spots. In this landscape, some movements still remain invisible—undetected by actors aiming to support, contain, and even prevent migration. »We have no information about persons who have money to pay for the whole package, transfer, accommodation, food, medical assistance when needed, we have no idea how many of them just went further«, a former MSF employee stressed, »we only see those who reach for aid, who are poor or injured and therefore cannot immediately continue their journey.« Some movements are intentionally invisibilized by support groups in order to avoid unwanted attention, and, consequently, repressive measures have also become a common development in border areas where people on the move are waiting for their chance to cross. However, it seems that circular transnational migration of human beings, resulting directly from the securitarian practices of the European border regime, have also become a usual form of mobility in the region.

    The Balkan route as a whole has been increasingly made invisible to spectators from the EU in the last years. There were no mass media coverage, except for reports on deplorable conditions in certain hubs, such as Belgrade barracks (Serbia), Vučjak camp (Bosnia and Herzegovina), or violent push-backs from Croatia that received global and EU-wide attention. However, this spectacularization was rarely directly attributed to the externalization of border control but rather more readily linked to an presumed inability of the Balkan states to manage migration, or to manage it without the blatant use of violence.

    As Marta Stojić Mitrović and Ana Vilenica (2019) point out, practices, discourses, knowledge, concepts, technologies, even particular narratives, organizations, and individual professionals are following the changed topography. This is evident both in the securitarian and in the humanitarian sector: Frontex is signing or initiating cooperation agreements with non-EU member Balkan states, border guards learn from each other how to prevent movements or how to use new equipment, obscure Orbanist legislative changes and institutionalized practices are becoming mainstream, regional coordinators of humanitarian organizations transplant the same ›best practices‹ how to work with migrants, how to organize their accommodation, what aid to bring and when, and how to ›deal‹ with the local communities in different nation-states, while the emergency framework travels from one space to another. Solidarity groups are networking, exchanging knowledge and practices but simultaneously face an increased criminalization of their activities. The public opinion in different nation states is shaped by the same dominant discourses on migration, far-right groups are building international cooperations and exploit the same narratives that frame migrants and migration as dangerous.
    About the Issue

    This issue of movements highlights the current situation of migration struggles along this fragmented, circular, and precarious route and examines the diverse attempts by the EU, transnational institutions, countries in the region, local and interregional structures, and multiple humanitarian actors to regain control over the movements of migration after the official closure of the humanitarian-securitarian corridor in 2016. It reflects on the highly dynamic and conflicting developments since 2015 and their historical entanglements, the ambiguities of humanitarian interventions and strategies of containment, migratory tactics of survival, local struggles, artistic interventions, regional and transnational activism, and recent initiatives to curb the extensive practices of border violence and push-backs. In doing so, the issue brings back the region on the European agenda and sheds light on the multiple historical disruptions, bordering practices, and connectivities that have been forming its presence.

    EU migration policy is reaffirming old and producing new material borders: from border fences to document checks—conducted both by state authorities and increasingly the general population, like taxi drivers or hostel owners—free movement is put in question for all, and unwanted movements of migrants are openly violently prevented. Violence and repression toward migrants are not only normalized but also further legalized through transformations of national legislation, while migrant solidarity initiatives and even unintentional facilitations of movement or stay (performed by carriers, accommodation providers, and ordinary citizens) are increasingly at risk of being criminalized.

    In line with this present state, only briefly tackled here, a number of contributions gathered in this issue challenge normative perceptions of the restrictive European border regime and engage in the critical analysis of its key mechanisms, symbolic pillars, and infrastructures by framing them as complex and depending on context. Furthermore, some of them strive to find creative ways to circumvent the dominance of linear or even verbal explication and indulge in narrative fragments, interviews, maps, and graphs. All contributions are focused and space- or even person-specific. They are based on extensive research, activist, volunteer or other involvement, and they are reflexive and critical towards predominant perspectives and views.

    Artist and activist Selma Banich, in her contribution entitled »Shining«, named after one of her artistic intervention performed in a Zagreb neighborhood, assembles notes and reflections on her ongoing series of site-specific interventions in Zagreb made of heat sheet (hallmarks of migrants’ rescue boats and the shores of Europe) and her personal notes in which she engages with her encounters with three persons on the move or, rather, on the run from the European border control regime. Her contribution, formulated as a series of fragments of two parallel lines, which on the surface seem loosely, but in fact deeply, connected, speaks of the power of ambivalence and of the complexities of struggles that take place everyday on the fringes of the EU. Andrea Contenta visualizes and analyzes camps that have been mushrooming in Serbia in the recent years with a series of maps and graphs. The author’s detailed analysis—based on a critical use of available, often conflicting, data—shows how Serbia has kept thousands of people outside of the western EU territory following a European strategy of containment. Contenta concludes his contribution with a clear call, stating: »It is not only a theoretical issue anymore; containment camps are all around us, and we cannot just continue to write about it.« Serbia, and Belgrade in particular, is of central importance for transmigration through the Balkans. On a micro-level, the maps of Paul Knopf, Miriam Neßler and Cosima Zita Seichter visualize the so-called Refugee District in Belgrade and shed light on the transformation of urban space by transit migration. On a macro-level, their contribution illustrates the importance of Serbia as a central hub for migrant mobility in the Balkans as well as for the externalization of the European border regime in the region. The collective efforts to support the struggle of the people on the move—by witnessing, documenting, and denouncing push-backs—are presented by the Push-Back Map Collective’s self-reflection. In their contribution to this issue, the Push-Back Map Collective ask themselves questions or start a dialogue among themselves in order to reflect and evaluate the Push-Back map (www.pushbackmap.org) they launched and maintain. They also investigate the potentials of political organizing that is based on making an invisible structure visible. The activist collective Info Kolpa from Ljubljana gives an account of push-backs conducted by the Slovenian police and describes initiatives to oppose what they deem as systemic violence of police against people on the move and violent attempts to close the borders. The text contributes to understanding the role of extralegal police practices in restoring the European border regime and highlights the ingenuity of collectives that oppose it. Patricia Artimova’s contribution entitled »A Volunteer’s Diary« could be described as a collage of diverse personal notes of the author and others in order to present the complexity of the Serbian and Bosnian context. The genre of diary notes allows the author to demonstrate the diachronic line presented in the volunteers’ personal engagements and in the gradual developments occurring in different sites and states along the route within a four-year period. She also traces the effects of her support for people on the move on her social relations at home. Emina Bužinkić focuses on the arrest, detention, and deportation of a non-EU national done by Croatia to show the implications of current securitization practices on the everyday lives and life projects of migrants and refugees. Based on different sources (oral histories, official documentation, personal history, etc.), her intervention calls for direct political action and affirms a new genre one could provisionally call ›a biography of a deportation‹. In her »Notes from the Field« Azra Hromadžić focuses on multiple encounters between the locals of Bihać, a city located in the northwestern corner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people on the move who stop there while trying to cross into Croatia and the EU. Some of the sections and vignettes of her field notes are written as entries describing a particular day, while others are more anthropological and analytical reflections. Her focus lies on the local people’s perspectives, the dynamics of their daily encounters with migrants and alleged contradictions, philigram distinctions, as well as experiences of refugeeness that create unique relationships between people and histories in Bihać. Karolína Augustová and Jack Sapoch, activists of the grassroots organization No Name Kitchen and members of the Border Violence Monitoring Network, offer a systematized account of violence towards people on the move with their research report. The condensed analysis of violent practices, places, victims, and perpetrators of the increasingly securitized EU border apparatus is based on interviews conducted with people on the move in border areas with Croatia, Šid (Serbia) and Velika Kladuša (BiH). They identify a whole range of violence that people on the move are facing, which often remains ignored or underestimated, and thus condoned, in local national settings as well as on the EU and global level. They conclude that border violence against people on the move cannot be interpreted as mere aggression emanating from individuals or groups of the police but is embedded in the states’ structures.

    We also gathered scientific papers discussing and analyzing different aspects of the corridor and the years thereafter. In their article, Andrej Kurnik and Barbara Beznec focus on assemblages of mobility, which are composed of practices of migrants and local agencies that strive to escape what the authors call ›the sovereign imperative‹. In their analysis of different events and practices since 2015, they demonstrate how migratory movements reveal the hidden subalternized local forms of escape and invigorate the dormant critique of coloniality in the geopolitical locations along the Balkan route. In their concluding remarks, the authors ask to confront the decades-long investments into repressive and exclusionary EU migration policies and point to the political potential of migration as an agent of decolonization. The authors stress that post-Yugoslav European borderland that has been a laboratory of Europeanization for the last thirty years, a site of a ›civilizing‹ mission that systematically diminishes forms of being in common based on diversity and alterity is placed under scrutiny again. Romana Pozniak explores the ethnography of aid work, giving special attention to dynamics between emotional and rational dimensions. Based primarily on interviews conducted with humanitarians employed during the mass refugee transit through the Balkan corridor, she analyzes, historizes, and contextualizes their experiences in terms of affective labor. The author defines affective labor as efforts invested in reflecting on morally, emotionally, and mentally unsettling affects. She deals with local employment measures and how they had an impact on employed workers. Pozniak discusses the figure of the compassionate aid professional by it in a specific historical context of the Balkan corridor and by including personal narrations about it. The article of Robert Rydzewski focuses on the situation in Serbia after the final closure of the formalized corridor in March 2016. Rydzewski argues that extensive and multidirectional migrant movements on the doorstep of the EU are an expression of hope to bring a ›stuckedness‹ to an end. In his analysis, he juxtaposes the representations of migrant movements as linear with migrant narratives and their persistent unilinear movement despite militarized external European Union borders, push-backs, and violence of border guards. Rydzewsky approaches the structural and institutional imposition of waiting with the following questions: What does interstate movement mean for migrants? Why do migrants reject state protection offered by government facilities in favor of traveling around the country? In her article, Céline Cantat focuses on the Serbian capital Belgrade and how ›solidarities in transit‹ or the heterogeneous community of actors supporting people on the move emerged and dissolved in the country in 2015/2016. She analyzes the gradual marginalization of migrant presence and migration solidarity in Belgrade as an outcome of imposing of an institutionalized, official, camp-based, and heavily regulated refugee aid field. This field regulates the access not only to camps per se, but also to fundings for activities by independent groups or civil sector organizations. Teodora Jovanović, by using something she calls ›autoethnography of participation‹, offers a meticulous case study of Miksalište, a distribution hub in Belgrade established in 2015, which she joined as a volunteer in 2016. The transformation of this single institution is examined by elaborating on the transformation within the political and social contexts in Serbia and its capital, Belgrade, regarding migration policies and humanitarian assistance. She identifies three, at times intertwined, modes of response to migration that have shaped the development of the Miksalište center in corresponding stages: voluntarism, professionalization, and re-statization. She connects the beginning and end of each stage of organizing work in Miksalište by investigating the actors, roles, activities, and manners in which these activities are conducted in relation to broader changes within migration management and funding.

    Finishing this editorial in the aftermath of brutal clashes at the borders of Turkey and Greece and in the wake of the global pandemic of COVID-19—isolated in our homes, some of us even under curfew—we experience an escalation and normalization of restrictions, not only of movement but also of almost every aspect of social and political life. We perceive a militarization, which pervades public spaces and discourses, the introduction of new and the reinforcement of old borders, in particular along the line of EU external borders, a heightened immobilization of people on the move, their intentional neglect in squats and ›jungles‹ or their forceful encampment in deplorable, often unsanitary, conditions, where they are faced with food reductions, violence of every kind, and harrowing isolation. At the same time, we witness an increase of anti-migrant narratives not only spreading across obscure social networks but also among high ranked officials. Nonetheless, we get glimpses of resistance and struggles happening every day inside and outside the camps. Videos of protests and photos of violence that manage to reach us from the strictly closed camps, together with testimonies and outcries, are fragments of migrant agency that exist despite overwhelming repression.

    https://movements-journal.org/issues/08.balkanroute
    #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #revue #humanitarisme #espoir #attente #mobilité #Belgrade #Serbie #solidarité #Miksaliste #Bihac #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #encampement #corridor #cartographie #visualisation

  • Petites erreurs du réel
    http://liminaire.fr/palimpseste/article/petites-erreurs-du-reel

    La place située entre la #Gare de l’Est et le Centre des Recollets, à #Paris dans le 10ème arrondissement, a été réaménagée et végétalisée en 2012 et porte depuis le nom de la résistante et femme politique Madeleine Braun, première femme vice-président de l’Assemblée nationale. En 1951, écartée du Parti Communiste, elle s’éloigne de la politique et devient co-directrice avec Louis Aragon des Éditeurs français réunis, où elle publie de nombreux auteurs comme Paul Valéry, Paul Eluard ou Vladimir Maïakovski. Cet (...) #Palimpseste / #Photographie, Paris, #Paysage, #Ville, #Regard, #Quotidien, Société, #Solitude, #Traces, #Rêve, #Poésie, (...)

    #Société
    http://museedelaresistanceenligne.org/media5438-Place-Madeleine-Braun-Paris-Xe
    https://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/le-propre-du-langage-voyages-au-pays-des-noms-communs-jean-christophe-bailly/9782020315623
    http://liminaire.fr/IMG/mp4/place.mp4

  • UN official: Bosnia authorities expose migrants to suffering

    With harsh weather fast approaching, the number of migrants and refugees who are sleeping rough in Bosnia keeps rising because of the persistent refusal by authorities at different levels of government in the country to coordinate their work and embrace “rational” solutions, a U.N. migration official said Thursday.

    Peter Van der Auweraert, the Western Balkans coordinator and Bosnia representative of the International Organization for Migration, told The Associated Press that instead of helping the U.N. agency to expand accommodation for migrants, some local authorities in the country are now even restricting access to housing that is already available.

    Of around 8,500 migrants stuck in Bosnia, 2,500 are forced to sleep outside “in squats, forests, streets (and) abandoned buildings,” mostly in the northwestern Krajina region, which shares a highly porous 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) border with European Union member Croatia.

    “What is the sad part of this is that this is absolutely unnecessary in the sense that we have financial resources, provided mostly by the European Union, to provide (for) and take care of all those people,” Van der Auweraert told the AP in an interview.

    “I have a center (in Krajina) for 1,500 people. Local authorities only allow me to have 500. I could get 1,000 people tomorrow from the street, inside this center, but I am not allowed to do so,” he added.

    Bosnian authorities weren’t immediately available for comment.

    In 2017, Bosnia became a bottleneck for thousands of migrants from the Middle East, Asia and North Africa seeking better lives in Europe when other nations closed off their borders.

    The EU has so far provided Bosnia with 60 million euros ($70 million) in emergency funding, most notably for seven migrant centers, including six in Krajina, which can house more than 7,000 people.

    For its part, Bosnia has repeatedly promised, and failed, to identify additional suitable public properties for temporary accommodation of migrants. Instead, decrying an alleged failure by other parts of the country to share the load of the lingering crisis, Krajina authorities recently begun emptying some of the existing reception centers there. They pushed people on the move out of urban areas and abandoned them in forests to fend for themselves. In response, police forces of adjacent regions started blocking migrants from walking back to their areas.

    The sight of thousands of homeless people, with no access to medical care or sometimes even food, increases a sense of insecurity among the local population and has apparently led to a proliferation of vigilante groups that are threatening the migrants with violence.

    Van der Auweraert said Bosnia had “a few weeks to come together” to decide “in a rational manner” to deal with the migration situation at hand.

    “If we do not do that, we will have a humanitarian crisis in a month’s time ... we will have people sleeping in the snow, including this time families and children,” he said.

    Forced to stay in a makeshift camp set up by some 300 migrants and refugees in a forest not far from the northwestern town of Velika Kladusa, where they had been dropped off and abandoned by local police, Amin Hasan Han, a migrant from Bangladesh, echoed those concerns.

    “Winter is coming, people are living under tents,” Han said, adding: “Also, we are starving … people cannot get food.”

    https://apnews.com/article/europe-united-nations-d60adc0b6742c3c1299cee4308312adb
    #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #logement #hébergement #SDF #sans-abri #Krajina #aide_financière

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Cellule de renseignement Demeter : quand la gendarmerie se met au service de l’agro-industrie - Basta !
    https://www.bastamag.net/cellule-de-renseignement-Demeter-lutte-agribashing-quand-la-gendarmerie-se

    Voilà bientôt un an qu’une cellule de renseignement a été mise en place par le ministère de l’Intérieur, dédiée aux « atteintes au monde agricole », en partenariat avec la FNSEA, le syndicat majoritaire. Les « actions de nature idéologique » sont dans le viseur et plusieurs militants écologistes ont déjà été inquiétés. Critiquer le modèle agro-industriel et ses pollutions deviendra-t-il un délit ?

    #DEMETER #gendarmerie #renseignements #FNSEA #répression #criminalisation_des_luttes

  • Profanation d’un monument historique de la #Macronie : Un CV de #Lallement bien documenté. Le préfet de police de la ville de Paris est un fusible qui supporte sans surchauffe les très fortes intensités.

    Didier Lallement, le préfet de police qui se prend pour un Maréchal | Désarmons-les !
    https://desarmons.net/2020/04/29/didier-lallement-le-prefet-de-police-qui-se-prend-pour-un-marechal

    « Le type fait des pieds et des mains pour incarner l’ordre et la précision, et, quand il l’ouvre, c’est pour tirer de travers »
    Le type en question, c’est Didier Lallement, préfet de police de Paris depuis mars 2019. Et l’auteur de cette petite phrase (Le Canard enchainé, 8/04/20) n’est autre que le Premier ministre Édouard Philippe. À l’origine, la fameuse sortie de Lallement, le 3 avril, devant les caméras de télé à propos des personnes en réanimation pour cause de covid-19 : « Ceux qui sont aujourd’hui hospitalisés, ceux qu’on trouve dans les réanimations, ce sont ceux qui, au début du confinement, ne l’ont pas respecté, c’est très simple, il y a une corrélation très simple. »

    D’autres hauts fonctionnaires du même grade se seraient faits limoger pour moins que ça. Un préfet de police est programmé pour griller comme un vulgaire fusible au moindre court-circuit avec l’exécutif. Lui, c’est même « un vrai paratonnerre » (Le Monde, 23/02/20). Après cette saillie, il garde toute la confiance du trio Macron-Philippe-Castaner. Le président a tenu à faire le savoir : c’est lui qui a demandé au préfet, le jour même, de s’excuser platement (« Je regrette d’avoir tenu ces propos, je comprends les réactions qu’ils suscitent et je présente mes excuses »). À vrai dire, ce petit manège du préfet gaffeur recadré par le grand sage (bad cop / good cop) n’est qu’une diversion. Monsieur le préfet joue son rôle à la perfection. Ses écarts de langage font partie du scénario. Le paratonnerre n’a pas encore fait son temps…

    Dans la préfectorale, on apprend avant toute chose à faire acte d’allégeance. La compétence première n’est pas la soumission mais l’obséquiosité — savant mélange de servilité et de bassesse —, tout en sachant avilir et humilier ses propres subordonnés, comme le ferait un monarque face à ses sujets.

    #violences_policières #répression #droit_de_manifester #méritocratie #pétainisme

  • Considérations sur les temps qui courent (IV)

    Georges Lapierre

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Considerations-sur-les-temps-qui-courent-IV

    Après tout ce temps, le coronavirus reste d’actualité, nous pouvons y voir le prétexte pour l’État de garder la haute main sur la société en dictant des mesures d’autorité assez vaines mais qui ont cependant le consentement d’une grande partie de la population, maintenue dans un climat de peur par la propagande gouvernementale. Nous nous rendons compte aussi que le virus persiste et continue à mettre en échec le monde scientifique convoqué à grand renfort de tambours et de trompettes pour l’étudier et mettre fin à sa nocivité. Le désarroi de la haute autorité scientifique, visible à travers les points de vue contradictoires qu’elle a l’occasion d’exprimer, remet en question sa toute-puissance et sa position de juge suprême dans la société que l’opinion publique lui avait données de bonne foi. Nous nous rendons compte que l’avis des scientifiques varie selon leur attachement à tel ou tel laboratoire (ou de leur attachement à l’État contre la société) et que la fameuse objectivité scientifique, planant au-dessus des intérêts privés, n’est qu’un leurre. Ce virus inattendu aura eu le mérite de mettre en lumière certaines zones d’ombre soigneusement camouflées et des intérêts inavouables qui s’opposent à l’intérêt général, cette notion d’intérêt général n’ayant été mise en avant que pour imposer des mesures arbitraires dont le bien-fondé était loin d’être acquis comme le port du masque ou l’interdiction des parcs et des plages. (...)

    #sorcellerie #cosmovision #nature #culture #cosmovision #coronavirus #État #science #désarroi #intériorité #apparence #refoulé #impuissance

  • À force de se focaliser sur l’idée de « sauver l’économie », j’ai vraiment l’impression qu’on passe justement à côté de cet aspect, précisément…

    – La seconde vague, visiblement mal préparée et mal gérée, ça va une fois de plus coûter extrêmement cher ; à nouveau, dans le but de faire des économies de manière monomaniaque, on a toutes les chances de se cogner une seconde vague qui va coûter très très cher. Si on prend la question de l’éducation, on a la situation italienne, où l’on nous dit qu’il y a eu un effort massif pour limiter les risques sanitaires dans les écoles. Ici en France, on a considéré qu’embaucher des profs et investir dans l’école c’est un poids morts pour l’économie ; résultat on transforme les écoles et les universités en usines à clusters. Dans le même ordre d’idée, on a retardé toutes les précautions pendant l’été (« sauver » la saison touristique ?), et on n’a imposé le port du masque en entreprise qu’à la rentrée de septembre, alors que les chiffres remontaient depuis un mois.

    C’est-à-dire qu’on en est à tout décider en fonction d’économies à la petite semaine, ce qui revient en fait à tout faire mal, en « pire », et à ainsi subir une deuxième vague qui va coûter beaucoup plus cher que chez nos voisins.

    – Et là, pour les abrutis du gouvernement La REM, ça devrait interpeller un peu plus. Si la première vague était (admettons vaguement) imprévisible, et a touché un peu tout le monde en Europe, ils ont pu faire mine de faire jouer une certain « solidarité » européenne, avec un plan de relance commun. Pas transcendant, mais au moins ils s’accrochent à ça.

    Mais si la deuxième vague, c’est une catastrophe économique en France (disons 5 à 10 points de PIB de recule supplémentaire, en plus des dégâts du premier confinement), pendant qu’une partie de nos voisins (l’Italie) apparaissent comme infiniment mieux préparés à l’affronter, leur histoire de « solidarité européenne », ils vont pouvoir se la rouler derrière l’oreille… Oui, tiens, donnons des sous au gouvernement français qui a décidé de faire n’importe quoi depuis cet été, pendant que les autres gouvernements européens avaient profité du confinement pour se préparer… La cigale et la fourmi, tout ça…

  • Calais : maintien de l’interdiction de distribuer de la nourriture aux migrants

    Le tribunal administratif de Lille a rejeté mardi la demande de 13 associations et ONG de suspendre l’arrêté préfectoral leur interdisant de distribuer de la nourriture et des boissons aux migrants dans le centre de Calais. Leur avocat a annoncé vouloir faire appel.

    Les associations d’aide aux migrants de Calais essuient un nouveau revers. Dans une ordonnance rendue mardi 22 septembre, le tribunal administratif de Lille a rejeté une demande - faite par treize ONG et associations - de suspension d’un arrêté interdisant la distribution gratuite de nourriture et de boissons aux migrants dans certains endroits de Calais.

    La situation des migrants dans cette ville « ne [caractérise] pas des conditions de vie indignes de nature à justifier la suspension en urgence de la mesure prise par le préfet du Pas-de-Calais », peut-on lire dans le résumé de l’ordonnance.

    Selon ladite mesure, toute distribution gratuite par des associations non-mandatées par l’État est interdite jusqu’à fin septembre dans une vingtaine de rues, quais et places du centre-ville. Les autorités ont justifié cette interdiction par les « nuisances » causées par les distributions, les risques sanitaires liés au Covid-19 et le souci de salubrité publique.

    Une semaine après l’entrée en vigueur de cet arrêté, un groupement d’organisations, dont Médecins du Monde, l’Auberge des migrants, le Secours catholique et Emmaüs France, ont saisi le tribunal administratif de Lille le 16 septembre pour demander sa suspension. Selon elles, ce texte est « attentatoire au droit à la dignité, au principe de fraternité, à la possibilité d’aider autrui ».
    « Seul effet de l’interdiction : déplacer les lieux des distributions de quelques centaines de mètres »

    Pour le tribunal toutefois, les arguments des associations ne sont pas suffisamment solides, et la situation n’est d’ailleurs pas si problématique. ’"Le tribunal a constaté qu’une association mandatée par l’État [La Vie Active, NDLR] mettait à disposition d’une population de migrants estimée aujourd’hui à environ mille personnes (...) de l’eau sur la base d’une moyenne de 5,14 litres par personne et par jour et des repas au nombre de 2 402 par jour", est-il écrit dans le résumé de l’ordonnance de ce mardi.

    La Vie Active est en effet présente à Calais, à proximité d’un camp situé près du rond-point de Virval, surnommé l’’’Hospital’’. Mais les associations pointent non seulement le fait que ce lieu se trouve à une heure de marche du centre-ville - où sont contraints de dormir des migrants chassés par les démantèlements - mais aussi que cette association n’est pas, à elle seule, en mesure de s’occuper de tous les migrants de la ville - au nombre de 1 500, selon les militants.

    https://twitter.com/caritasfrance/status/1306878006153994240

    Le tribunal a également minimisé l’impact de cette interdiction sur le travail des humanitaires, estimant que « les associations requérantes continuaient à distribuer des repas et des boissons à proximité du centre-ville ». « L’interdiction édictée [a] eu pour seul effet de déplacer les lieux des distributions qu’elles assurent de quelques centaines de mètres seulement », peut-on lire dans le résumé de l’ordonnance.
    « Une limitation insupportable du droit des associations »

    À la suite de l’interdiction, les associations avaient de leur côté expliqué en être réduites à devoir se cacher pour apporter des vivres à cette population vulnérable. Pire, au moins deux associations, l’Auberge des migrants et Salam, ont assuré avoir été l’objet de ’’harcèlement policier’’ et même de contraventions alors qu’elles menaient des distributions en dehors du périmètre interdit par les autorités.

    Conséquence : ces nouvelles règles assorties à ces ’’entraves aux distributions’’ ont ’’un effet de dissuasion immense sur la solidarité’’, estime Juliette Delaplace, chargée de mission auprès des personnes exilées sur le littoral nord auprès du Secours Catholique, contactée par InfoMigrants. ’’Plein de personnes et de bénévoles ne sont pas à l’aise avec l’idée de se faire contrôler de manière répétée par les forces de l’ordre, cela se comprend’’, explique-t-elle, assurant que le collectif ’’va évidemment faire appel’’ de cette décision.

    « C’est une occasion manquée », a de son côté déploré à l’AFP l’avocat des ONG et associations d’aide aux migrants, Me Patrice Spinosi. Cet arrêté représente « une limitation insupportable du droit des associations à aider les personnes les plus vulnérables », a-t-il fustigé, quelques jours après avoir invoqué le principe de fraternité à l’audience.

    Selon l’avocat, un appel devrait être déposé devant le Conseil d’État pour obtenir un vrai débat sur le fond.

    Dans des observations présentées au tribunal, que l’AFP s’est procurées, la défenseure des Droits Claire Hédon a quant à elle estimé qu’"en privant les exilés de l’accès à un bien - la distribution de repas -, la mesure de police contestée est constitutive d’une discrimination fondée sur la nationalité". Une pratique prohibée par la loi.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27466/calais-maintien-de-l-interdiction-de-distribuer-de-la-nourriture-aux-m

    #Darmanin #Calais #repas #solidarité #distribution #nourriture #migrations #asile #réfugiés

    –—

    voir fil de discussion ici, commencé par @loutre :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/875665

  • #Libye : « Entre la vie et la mort ». Les personnes refugiées et migrantes prises dans la tourmente des #violences en Libye

    En Libye, les personnes réfugiées et migrantes sont piégées dans un cycle de violences caractérisé par de graves atteintes aux #droits_humains, telles que la #détention_arbitraire pendant de longues périodes et d’autres formes de privation illégale de liberté, la #torture et d’autres #mauvais_traitements, les #homicides illégaux, le #viol et d’autres formes de #violences_sexuelles, le #travail_forcé et l’#exploitation aux mains d’agents gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux, dans un climat d’#impunité quasi totale.

    https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/3084/2020/fr
    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #violence #rapport #Amnesty_international #privation_de_liberté #droits_fondamentaux

    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Recherche : la majorité adopte une loi rejetée par le monde universitaire

    Les députés ont adopté jeudi la loi de programmation de la recherche voulue par le gouvernement. Le monde universitaire, qui doit organiser une rentrée en pleine pandémie, est très hostile à un projet qui ne répond en rien aux besoins pressants.

    « Scandaleux, difficile, déprimant. » Voilà comment Marie Sonnette, sociologue à l’université d’Angers et membre active du collectif « Facs et labos en lutte », a vécu le vote par les députés de la loi de programmation pluriannuelle de la recherche, dite LPPR.

    Présenté en juillet devant le conseil des ministres après plusieurs reports, le texte a en effet été adopté jeudi à l’Assemblée nationale en première lecture. Depuis son annonce jusqu’au début de l’actuelle navette parlementaire, il a suscité de vives oppositions, dont l’expression a notamment été favorisée par la mobilisation plus vaste contre la réforme des retraites.

    Cette dernière semaine, un avis quasi unanime et « au vitriol » du Conseil économique, social et environnemental (Cese) a conforté l’hostilité au texte d’une large majorité de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, dont avaient déjà témoigné les prises de position de centaines de directeurs de laboratoires, ou les grèves ayant affecté des dizaines d’universités ainsi que de nombreuses revues académiques. Par contraste, il ne s’est récemment trouvé que cinq professeurs au Collège de France – une des institutions les plus privilégiées – pour défendre explicitement la loi dans une tribune au Monde.

    Pour la maîtresse de conférences contactée par Mediapart, le spectacle est logiquement pénible de voir le même projet adopté « par 68 personnes dans une salle [les députés qui siégeaient – ndlr], en prétendant que la recherche sera géniale sur les dix prochaines années, alors qu’on sait que les financements restent sous-dimensionnés et la précarité toujours aussi massive. Ce dont on a besoin, on le crie depuis longtemps et rien dans la loi n’apporte de réponse. »

    Du côté de la majorité, on reconnaît d’ailleurs la portée limitée du texte. « On ne va pas faire la révolution, mais nous allons quand même lever des blocages », concédait Danièle Hérin, députée LREM et rapporteuse générale du texte cette semaine à l’Assemblée. Une posture sobre en comparaison de l’emphase de Frédérique Vidal, ministre de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, qui a évoqué dans l’hémicycle des « moyens massifs », censés rattraper une « décennie perdue ».

    À première vue, les chiffres peuvent effectivement impressionner. Il s’agit d’engager 25 milliards d’euros de crédits supplémentaires au cours des dix prochaines années. Une perspective cependant très incertaine, ce que n’a pas manqué de relever le Conseil d’État dans son examen préalable. « Avec un tel horizon, la portée de la programmation des crédits budgétaires ne peut être que limitée, spécialement en fin de période », écrit le Conseil, avant de souligner le risque d’insincérité d’un tel engagement.

    « Pourquoi 10 ans ?, renchérit la députée communiste Elsa Faucillon. On ne voit pas la couleur de l’investissement à court terme. Les députés de la majorité entretiennent ce leurre entre engagements pérennes et engagements lointains. » Car pour 2021, seuls 400 millions d’euros supplémentaires sont prévus, et 800 millions en 2022, soit 5 % de l’enveloppe globale.

    « J’étais favorable à mettre davantage d’argent dès la première année, répond Danièle Hérin, mais comme le plan de relance va permettre d’investir 2 milliards par an supplémentaires, et que des sources de financement régionales et européennes vont arriver, je pense que cela reste raisonnable. » Mais là encore, l’addition est brouillonne puisque les six milliards sur trois ans du plan de relance ne sont pas uniquement dédiés à la recherche mais aussi à l’innovation, en sachant qu’au sein même de la recherche, le privé est concerné autant que le public.

    « On pilote à vue », s’inquiètent également les parlementaires socialistes, qui regrettent l’absence de « trajectoire budgétaire » dans celui adopté jeudi. L’objectif officiel d’investir 1 % du PIB dans la recherche publique ne serait selon eux pas tenu, en raison de simulations budgétaires trop faibles et calculés hors inflation. « On veut construire une belle maison, mais on prend le risque de se retrouver avec un appartement un peu minable à la fin », résume la présidente du groupe des députés PS, Valérie Rabault.

    La majorité n’en démord pas et vante les augmentations salariales concrètes à venir, pour des professions notoirement sous-payées au regard de leur niveau de diplôme. « Plus aucun chercheur ne pourra démarrer sa carrière à moins de deux fois le Smic, contre 1,4 fois le Smic aujourd’hui, soutient la députée LREM Valérie Gomez-Bassac, également rapporteuse du texte. Nous allons aussi verser des primes, entre 1000 et 1300 euros par an pour les titulaires en poste. Les doctorants verront leur allocation de recherche augmenter de 30 % d’ici 2023. Et nous financerons 20 % de thèses en plus. »

    Des salaires légèrement améliorés, par la voie de primes majoritairement, contre un statut encore un peu plus détricoté ? La méthode n’est pas nouvelle, elle guide la transformation de la fonction publique depuis plusieurs décennies, créant des formes nouvelles d’emploi public à tour de bras. « Ces dispositifs sont facultatifs, précise Danièle Hérin. Chacun des établissements sera libre de choisir les outils qui lui conviennent pour remplir ses objectifs. » Libre, mais dans un cadre budgétaire qui restera contraint...

    De nouvelles voies sont donc au programme pour retenir les talents en France, selon le gouvernement. D’une part les « chaires juniors », sur lesquelles pourront postuler les jeunes chercheurs, sur le modèle des « tenure track » du système anglo-américain. Soit un contrat de six ans maximum, parallèle au processus d’intégration comme maître de conférences, et qui pourra, sans obligation, déboucher sur une titularisation comme professeur d’université. « Une procédure de titularisation dérogatoire au droit de la fonction publique », a estimé le CESE, qui risque de mettre encore plus les chercheurs en concurrence.

    D’autre part, les CDI de mission, qui permettront de recruter un chercheur sur la durée d’un projet de recherche. L’exemple souvent brandi par la majorité est celui des études spatiales, où une équipe pourrait recruter quelqu’un sur les vingt années que pourrait durer la mission… si celle-ci est bien financée. Joli tour de passe-passe rhétorique, ce CDI pouvant s’arrêter à tout moment, a glosé l’opposition. « Vous pouvez continuer à nous expliquer qu’il est sécurisant et qu’il n’est pas précaire, a remarqué la députée France insoumise Muriel Ressiguier lors de l’examen de ce point en commission. Ça ne change pas le sens de ce qu’il est réellement : un contrat précaire dont personne ne veut. »

    Sans bouleverser totalement les équilibres, la loi entérine surtout le principe d’une recherche « par projet », où il faut constamment se saisir de son bâton de pèlerin afin de trouver des ressources financières, auprès de l’Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR), de l’Europe, des régions, ou des contributeurs privés. « Nous augmentons aussi la part du soutien de base aux structures de 10 % », plaident les défenseurs du texte au Parlement, sans démentir le fait que l’ANR ne devienne le principal opérateur de financement de la recherche.
    La difficile résistance au rouleau compresseur managérial

    Cette « logique de mise en concurrence des formations et des chercheurs », explique à Mediapart la sociologue Séverine Chauvel, s’inscrit dans « la grande course aux classements » internationaux qui sert de guide à la politique de recherche française. « Il y a de l’argent annoncé dans le LPPR mais on ne souhaite pas qu’il soit injecté de cette façon, et en négligeant autant la question d’enseignement. Le vrai problème, poursuit la maîtresse de conférences à l’Université Paris-Est-Créteil, c’est que nous sommes déjà sous-dotés alors qu’on anticipe une ascension démographique des étudiants. Ce qui manque, ce sont des postes et des financements pérennes. »

    Or, ces dernières années, les crédits pérennes sont déjà passés de 65 à 61 % des sommes totales allouées. « Dans ce texte, on peut tout à faire imaginer que ce ratio s’inverse, prévient la socialiste Valérie Rabault. C’est très grave quand on veut faire de la recherche de long terme. » À cet égard, le PS a d’ailleurs beaucoup à se faire pardonner.

    Pendant sa campagne présidentielle de 2012, François Hollande avait en effet relayé les nombreuses critiques contre une gestion managériale de la recherche, débouchant sur une mise en concurrence généralisée au détriment de la stabilité et des libertés académiques. Loin de contrecarrer la tendance, son quinquennat a pourtant été marqué par une forte continuité avec les années Sarkozy déjà mal vécues par les enseignants-chercheurs.

    Physicien et professeur à l’université Paris-Diderot, Bruno Andreotti confirme que le PS a accumulé un « passif énorme » avec ce mandat présidentiel. Dans les années précédentes, rappelle-t-il, la recherche par projets avait pu paraître séduisante à certains proches du milieu socialiste, et être légitimée dans le contexte d’une réaction contre le mandarinat universitaire, cherchant à émanciper les jeunes chercheurs de titulaires au pouvoir excessif. Depuis, la logique managériale (et la précarisation l’accompagnant) s’est étendue à l’ensemble de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche.

    À l’occasion du vote de la loi LPPR, le groupe socialiste animé par Valérie Rabault s’est donc efforcé d’accomplir un travail de fond, consistant non seulement à porter la critique contre la LPPR mais aussi à formuler « 25 propositions pour la recherche, les chercheurs et les universités », dessinant un contre-projet de loi alternatif à celui de la Macronie. Une démarche facilitée par la présence d’Isabelle This Saint-Jean au secrétariat national des études du PS : elle-même universitaire, elle est une ancienne présidente du collectif « Sauvons la recherche » et fut très mobilisée en 2009 contre la politique de la droite en la matière.

    Les collectifs en lutte contre la LPPR ont par ailleurs vu leurs combats relayés par les députés de la France insoumise et du parti communiste, dénonciateurs d’une loi « mortifère ». La discussion du texte a aussi été l’occasion pour eux de formuler des contre-propositions, Muriel Ressiguier ayant par exemple déposé des amendements en faveur d’« un plan d’investissement dans l’enseignement supérieur », du « recrutement de nouveaux enseignants-chercheurs » et d’« une politique de reconnaissance renforcée du doctorat ».

    Les équilibres à l’Assemblée ne laissaient cependant aucun doute sur l’issue du vote et les marges de négociation du texte. « Il n’y avait aucun moyen de passer quoi que ce soit et on le savait, d’où le faible travail de lobbying des universitaires », constate Bruno Andreotti, qui souligne la différence avec les années Hollande, lorsque les élus écologistes, notamment Isabelle Attard, constituaient des relais possible pour corriger la politique socialiste.

    De façon plus générale, souligne-t-il à Mediapart, les parlementaires ayant une véritable connaissance technique du système et du dossier se compteraient sur les doigts d’une seule main. « Le spectacle de la discussion à l’Assemblée était en dessous de tout, notamment lorsque des rapporteurs lisent des notes préparées par le cabinet de la ministre, dont on s’aperçoit qu’ils ne comprennent rien. »

    La critique d’une ignorance de leur métier revient d’ailleurs souvent dans la bouche des universitaires interrogés par Mediapart. Séverine Chauvel estime ainsi que la LPPR a été l’occasion, de la part de la majorité au pouvoir, de « mensonges » mais aussi de « propos attestant une méconnaissance totale de l’enseignement supérieur ». La pilule passe d’autant plus mal dans le contexte chaotique à l’université, en pleine rentrée marquée par la pandémie (lire notre article sur « la grande débrouille »).

    « On bosse comme des fous pour faire fonctionner nos universités dans des conditions catastrophiques, confirme Marie Sonnette. Et dans cette rentrée que nous avons l’impression de vivre un peu comme sur le Titanic, tout continue comme si de rien n’était, sans consultation des enseignants-chercheurs, hormis des responsables d’instance. » Concentrée sur la recherche plutôt que sur les conditions de travail et d’apprentissage des étudiants, la LPPR apparaît ainsi en décalage profond avec le vécu des premiers concernés, sans dessiner le moins du monde un horizon qui les rassure.

    Outre le découragement de celles et ceux qui auraient pu envisager une carrière dans le milieu (lire ce témoignage), les titulaires en viennent à parler entre eux de « démission », chose impensable il y a quelques années à peine, tant les postes d’enseignement et de recherche sont convoités et exigent de sacrifices avant d’être obtenus. Avant qu’une éventuelle vague d’« exit » se matérialise, les mobilisations devraient se poursuivre, en particulier si un répit s’annonce après les errements de la rentrée. Les réflexions sur les modalités d’action se poursuivent et des résistances sont à attendre, veut croire Séverine Chauvel. En dépit des échecs essuyés, Marie Sonnette relève que sans mobilisation, la LPPR aurait été « encore plus violente » et la réforme des retraites serait déjà passée.

    Il reste que l’enseignement supérieur et la recherche sont des secteurs tellement fragmentés et divisés par ses multiples tutelles et formes de contrats, que le rouleau compresseur managérial peut y faire son œuvre avec d’autant plus de facilité.

    « La mobilisation de 2009 avait été la plus importante depuis Mai-68, et elle n’a débouché sur rien, cela a laissé des traces », ajoute Bruno Andreotti, qui estime par ailleurs qu’« on ne se défend ni plus, ni mieux, ni moins mal que les réseaux ferrés, les journalistes du service public, les hôpitaux, qui se font démolir leurs métiers comme nous. Sans innovation politique, il ne peut pas se passer grand-chose. »

    En attendant les futures échéances politiques nationales, la loi de programmation de la recherche doit être discutée à la fin du mois prochain au Sénat.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/260920/recherche-la-majorite-adopte-une-loi-rejetee-par-le-monde-universitaire?on

    #LPPR #recherche #France #université #facs #assemblée_nationale #première_lecture #vote #loi_de_programmation_pluriannuelle_de_la_recherche #adoption #hostilité #financement #budget #salaire #primes #fonction_publique #ESR #enseignement_supérieur #chaires_juniors #tenure_track #titularisation_dérogatoire ##titularisation #concurrence #CDI_de_mission #contrat_précaire #précarisation #recherche_par_projet #ANR #résistance #classements #classements_internationaux #postes #financements_pérennes #libertés_académiques #liberté_académique #logique_managériale #ignorance #mensonges #méconnaissance #conditions_de_travail #découragement #démission

    Ajouté à la métaliste :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/820330

  • Belfast, 1977-1982 : les Troubles à la sauce punk
    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/juke-box/belfast-1977-1982-les-troubles-a-la-sauce-punk

    En #1976, l’Irlande du Nord s’enfonce toujours plus dans la haine et les violences. Tandis que les prisonniers républicains enfermés à Long Kesh entament la fameuse blanket protest, Belfast est gagnée par une brutale fièvre musicale, celle du punk dont le no future parle tout particulièrement à la #jeunesse locale.

    La multiplication des attentats par les groupes paramilitaires engendre un climat de méfiance et de peur, la construction de murs entre les quartiers protestants et catholiques, et la disparition de zones neutres, espaces mixtes où pouvaient jusqu’alors se rencontrer les jeunes des deux communautés. Chacun se retranche désormais dans son territoire. A la suite de l’attaque qui coûte la vie à trois membres du Miami Showband début 1975, les groupes étrangers refusent de venir se produire sur place....

    Le punk va alors engendrer une prolifération de groupes (The Outcasts, Stiff Little Fingers, Rudi, The Undertones, etc) encouragés et produits notamment par Terri Hooley qui ouvre en 1976 dans un immeuble abandonné du centre-ville de #Belfast Good Vibrations, disquaire et label.
    Contestataire, le punk nord irlandais de cette époque ne prête allégeance à aucune idéologie politique. Il est simplement désabusé, prônant une #révolte existentielle et esthétique plutôt que politique. Quoique : l’espace de quelques années, il permettra, via ses salles de concerts et ses lieux de sociabilités, de rapprocher des communautés divisées.

    Merci pour leur aide à Pauline Vermare et Anne Girard Esposito.

    Programmation musicale et archives

    Archive pré-générique : « Cette frontière ubuesque, qui coupe les maisons en deux... » extrait de Sans ordre de bataille, combat sans triomphe, France Culture, 14-10-94 (prod. Jean Daive)
    Midnite Cruiser : Striker (1977) réédité sur la compilation Bloodstains Across Northern Ireland (1998) - fond sonore -
    The Undertones : Teenage kicks (1978)
    Angelic Upstarts : Last night another soldier, réédité sur la compilation Oi ! The album (1980) - fond sonore -
    Stiff Little Fingers : Alternative Ulster (1978)
    John Lennon and Yoko Ono : Sunday bloody sunday, sur l’album Some time in New York City (1972) - fond sonore -
    Archive : incidents à Belfast, France inter, 15-08-1969
    The Outcasts : Just aNother Teenage Rebel (1978), réédité sur la compilation Good vibrations : a record shop, a label, a film soundtrack (2013)
    Clubsound : Belfast, Belfast (1976) - fond sonore -
    Gang of Four : Armalite Rifle (1978)
    Miami Showband : There won’t be anymore (1974) - fond sonore -
    Sex Pistols : Anarchy in the UK, extrait de l’album Never Mind The Bollocks (1977) - fond sonore -
    The Clash : White Riot, extrait de l’album The Clash (1977)
    Niney the Observer : Blood and fire (1971) - fond sonore -
    Rudi : Big time (1978) réédité sur la compilation Bloodstains... (déjà citée)
    Victim : Strange Thing By Night (1978) réédité sur la compilation Bloodstains... (déjà citée) - fond sonore -
    Extrait du film Good Vibrations, réalisé par Glenn Leyburn et Lisa Barros D’Sa et sorti en 2013
    Ruefrex : One by one (1979)
    Loren Connors : Air for Bobby Sands and the hunger strikers, extrait de l’album As Roses Bow- Collected Airs (2007) - fond sonore -
    Archives : Belfast après la mort de Bobby Sands (France inter et Soir 3, 5-5-1981) et déclarations de Margaret Thatcher
    Au Pairs : Armagh, album Playing With A Different Sex (1981)
    Rudi : The pressure’s on (vers 1980)
    The Cranberries : Zombie, extrait de l’album Everybody else is doing it, so why can’t we ? (1993) - fond sonore -
    Stiff Little Fingers : Barbed wire love, de l’album Inflammable material (1979)

    Pour aller plus loin

    Spitrecords, l’excellent site du #punk en #IrlandeduNord réalisé par Sean O’Neill (en anglais).

    Plusieurs articles de Timothy Heron, auteur en 2015 d’une thèse sur le même sujet, ici (en français) ou là (en anglais).

    #podcast #jukebox #franceCulture

  • DHS Admits Facial Recognition Photos Were Hacked, Released on Dark Web
    https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/m7jzbb/dhs-admits-facial-recognition-photos-were-hacked-released-on-dark-web

    Traveler’s faces, license plates, and care information were hacked from a subcontractor called Perceptics and released on the dark web. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) finally acknowledged Wednesday that photos that were part of a facial recognition pilot program were hacked from a Customs and Border Control subcontractor and were leaked on the dark web last year. Among the data, which was collected by a company called Perceptics, was a trove of traveler’s faces, license plates, (...)

    #Perceptics #DHS #CBP #biométrie #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #frontières #hacking #immatriculation #surveillance (...)

    ##_

  • How facial recognition is spreading in Italy : the case of Como
    https://www.privacyinternational.org/case-study/4166/how-facial-recognition-spreading-italy-case-como

    The municipality of Como, Italy, purchased a facial recognition system, which was bought, installed, and tested for months with little transparency and despite the lack of a clear legal framework. To do so it embraced a narrative of technological innovation pushed by Huawei but was forced, after the intervention of the Italian Data Protection Authority, to suspend the system. Key findings Como spent public money on a system that can’t be lawfully used Como used the Data Protection Impact (...)

    #Huawei #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #surveillance (...)

    ##PrivacyInternational

  • Big Data has allowed ICE to dramatically expand its deportation efforts.
    https://slate.com/technology/2020/09/palantir-ice-deportation-immigrant-surveillance-big-data.html

    A New Mexico man gets a call from federal child welfare officials. His teenage brother has arrived alone at the border after traveling 2,000 miles to escape a violent uncle in Guatemala. The officials ask him to take custody of the boy. He hesitates ; he is himself undocumented. The officials say not to worry. He agrees and gives the officials his information. Seven months later, ICE agents arrest him at his house and start deportation proceedings. A family in suburban Maryland gets a (...)

    #Palantir #CBP #ICE #algorithme #biométrie #migration #facial #reconnaissance #BigData #conducteur·trice·s #empreintes (...)

    ##surveillance

  • #VendrediLecture... enfin, si les pigeons m’en laissent l’occasion !
    https://www.flickr.com/photos/valkphotos/50381282738

    Flickr

    ValK. a posté une photo :

    #LesPetitesPhotos
    Reprise de la lecture inachevée de #Ecotopia de Ernest Callenbach, « Carnets de notes et de Rapports de William Weston », roman utopique et dystopique publié en 1975, traduit et réédité par @ruedelechiquier il y a 2 ans (et illustré d’une de mes photos de la série « Que fer ? »)
    .
    ☆ photos : ValK. : http://frama.link/valk
    ☆ audios : https://archive.org/details/@karacole
    ☆ soutien : https://liberapay.com/ValK
    .
    #photo #photography #foto
    #oiseaux #birds #pájaros
    #pigeon #pigeons #paloma
    #livre #book #libro
    #lecture #reading #lectura
    #littérature #literature #literatura
    #fiction #anticipation #ficción
    #automne #autumn #fall #otoño #couleurs #harmonie

  • ‘Aggression Detection’ Is Coming to Facial Recognition Cameras Around the World
    https://onezero.medium.com/aggression-detection-is-coming-to-facial-recognition-cameras-around-

    Russian firm NTech Lab plans to roll emotional detection features worldwide as soon as 2021 NTech Lab, makers of Russia’s expansive real-time facial recognition surveillance system, is set to roll out “aggression detection” as well as “violence detection” features, which will flag law enforcement when the algorithm thinks someone is committing or about to commit violence starting in 2021. The firm recently got an injection of cash from the Russian government and an unnamed Middle Eastern (...)

    #CCTV #algorithme #Ntechlab #biométrie #criminalité #racisme #émotions #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #biais #discrimination #MinorityReport (...)

    ##criminalité ##surveillance

  • Exposing Your Face Isn’t a More Hygienic Way to Pay
    https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/exposing-your-face-isnt-more-hygienic-way-pay

    A company called PopID has created an identity-management system that uses face recognition. Their first use case is as a system for in-store, point of sale payments using face recognition as authorization for payment. They are promoting it as a tool for restaurants, claiming that it is pandemic-friendly because it is contactless. Nonetheless, the PopID payment system is less secure than alternatives, unfriendly to privacy, and is likely riskier than other payment alternatives for anyone (...)

    #Starbucks #Walmart #Paypal #algorithme #CCTV #payement #biométrie #température #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #COVID-19 #pauvreté #santé #surveillance #EFF #FoodTech (...)

    ##pauvreté ##santé ##PopID

  • Égypte et #Tunisie : des révolutions paysannes ?
    https://laviedesidees.fr/Habib-Ayeb-Ray-Bush-Food-insecurity-and-Revolution.html

    À propos de : Habib Ayeb et Ray Bush, Food insecurity and Revolution in the Middle East and North Africa, Anthem Press.. Quel fut le rôle des zones rurales dans les soulèvements de 2011 dans les pays arabes ? En articulant économie politique et géographie sociale, Habib Ayeb et Ray Bush proposent une analyse engagée du paradigme de la « sécurité alimentaire ».

    #International #révolution #Egypte
    https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/docx/20200925_foodinsecurity.docx
    https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/pdf/20200925_foodinsecurity.pdf