• Unpicking the notion of ‘safe and legal’ routes

    Introduction

    The last ten years have brought a growing recognition of the need to address the issue of mixed and irregular migratory movements through the introduction of pathways that enable people to move from one country and continent to another in a safe and legal manner. As well as averting the need for refugees and migrants to embark on dangerous and expensive journeys involving unscrupulous human smugglers, such routes promise to mitigate the negative perceptions of states with respect to the impact of such movements on their sovereignty, security, and social stability.

    This essay examines the context in which the discourse on safe and legal routes has emerged and identifies the different types of organised pathways that have been proposed by states and other stakeholders. Focusing particularly on population movements from the global South to the global North, it discusses the opportunities, difficulties, and dilemmas associated with this approach to the governance of cross-border mobility. More specifically, it scrutinises the increasingly popular assumption that the introduction of such routes will lead to significant reductions in the scale of mixed and irregular migration.
    The context

    In the mid-1980s, the world’s most prosperous states began to express concern about the growing number of foreign nationals arriving irregularly on their territory, many of whom subsequently submitted applications for refugee status. Regarding such movements as a threat to their sovereignty, and believing that many of those applications were unfounded, over the next two decades those countries introduced a range of restrictive measures designed to place new physical and administrative barriers in the way of unwanted new arrivals, especially those originating from the global South.

    The limitations of these measures were dramatically exposed in 2015-16, when up to a million people, initially from Syria but subsequently from several other countries, made their way in an unauthorised manner to the European Union, many of them travelling via Türkiye. Reacting to this apparent emergency, the EU adopted a strategy pioneered in earlier years by Australia and the United States, known as “externalisation”. This involved the provision of financial and other incentives to low- and middle-income states on the understanding that they would obstruct the outward movement of irregular migrants and readmit those deported from wealthier states.

    At the same time, governments in the developed world were beginning to acknowledge that mixed and irregular movements of people could not be managed by exclusionary measures alone. This recognition was due in no small part to the efforts of human rights advocates, who were concerned about the negative implications of externalisation for refugee and migrant protection. They also wanted to highlight the contribution that foreign nationals could make to destination countries in the global North if they were able to move there in a regular and orderly manner. The common outcome of these different discourses was a growing degree of support for the notion that the establishment of safe and legal routes could minimise the scale and mitigate the adverse consequences of mixed and irregular movements.

    This was not an entirely new approach. As then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan had argued in the early 2000s, international migration, if governed in an appropriate manner, could have “win-win outcomes”, bringing benefits to countries of origin, countries of destination, and migrants alike. But to attain those outcomes, certain conditions had to be met. In the words of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCM), a body established by Mr. Annan:

    It is in the interest of both states and migrants to create a context in which people migrate out of choice and in a safe and legal manner, rather than irregularly and because they feel they have no other option. Regular migration programmes could reinforce public confidence in the ability of states to admit migrants into their territory on the basis of labor market needs. Programmes of this kind would also help to create a more positive image of migrants and foster greater public acceptance of international migration.

    Migration governance initiatives

    In recent years, and especially since the so-called “European migration crisis” of 2015-16, this notion has been taken up by a number of different migration governance initiatives. Focusing primarily on labour migration, the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) cited “enhanced availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration,” as one of its key objectives. Endorsed by the majority of UN member states, the GCM extended this approach to the realm of forced migration, encouraging the international community to “develop or build on existing national and regional practices for admission and stay of appropriate duration based on compassionate, humanitarian or other considerations for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin.”

    At the same time, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), also adopted in 2018 and which was even more widely endorsed by the international community, underlined the necessity for people who were fleeing persecution and armed conflict to have access to safe and legal routes. “There is a need,” it said, “to ensure that such pathways are made available on a more systematic, organised and sustainable basis, that they contain appropriate protection safeguards, and that the number of countries offering these opportunities is expanded overall.”

    Similar approaches have emerged in the context of regional migration governance initiatives. The EU’s 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, for example, acknowledged the importance of “preventing and reducing irregular migration and trafficking in human beings” by “organising and facilitating legal migration and mobility.” The more recent EU Pact on Migration and Asylum also “aims to reduce unsafe and irregular routes and promote sustainable and safe legal pathways for those in need of protection.” “Developing legal pathways,” it says, “should contribute to the reduction of irregular migration.”

    In 2022, the Summit of the Americas, a meeting of states that focussed on the issue of human mobility in the western hemisphere, endorsed the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection. Using language similar to that of the EU Pact, it committed participating states to “a shared approach to reduce and manage irregular migration,” and to “promoting regular pathways for migration and international protection.” Signatories expressed their commitment “to strengthen fair labor migration opportunities in the region,” and “to promote access to protection and complementary pathways for asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons.”

    As indicated by the declaration’s reference to “labor migration opportunities”, the recognition of the need for safe and legal pathways to be established is closely linked to another recent development: a growing and global shortage of workers. In many industrialised states, members of the existing labour force are aging, taking retirement, quitting, or changing their jobs. The Covid-19 pandemic prompted those countries to introduce new border controls and stricter limits on immigration. Taking advantage of these circumstances, employees have been able to demand better wages and working conditions, thereby pushing up the cost of producing goods and providing services. Confronted with these threats to their profitability, the private sector has been placing growing pressure on governments to remove such restrictions and to open the door to foreign labour.
    Safe and legal routes

    As demonstrated by the migration governance initiatives described in the previous section, there is now a broad international consensus on the need to provide safe and legal routes for people who wish or feel obliged to leave their own country. There is also an agreement, supported by a growing volume of academic research, that the provision of such routes has a role to play in reducing the scale of mixed and irregular migration and in boosting the economies of destination states. But what specific forms might those safe and legal routes take? The next section of this essay answers that question by describing the principal proposals made and actions taken in that respect.
    Labour migration programmes

    One such proposal has been labour migration programmes established on a permanent, temporary, or seasonal bases. The rationale for such programmes is that they would allow people from poorer countries who are in need of employment to fill gaps in the labour markets of more prosperous states. As well as boosting the economies of destination countries, such programmes would allow the migrants concerned to enhance their skills and to support their countries of origin by means of remittances.

    Until recently, for example, there have been only limited legal opportunities for the citizens of Central and South American countries, especially those with lower levels of skill, to join the US workforce. At the 2022 Summit of the Americas, however, President Biden indicated that he would introduce a package of measures designed to manage northward migration more effectively, including the establishment of safe and legal routes for Latin Americans. According to one US spokesperson, “we will have announcements related to labor pathways as part of the Los Angeles Declaration, designed to ensure that those pathways meet the highest labor standards and are not used for abuse or for a race to the bottom.”

    Mexico, another signatory to the declaration, has already taken steps in this direction, offering border worker visas to Guatemalans and Belizeans wishing to work in the country’s southernmost states—an initiative intended to meet the labour needs of the area while reducing the number of people from those two countries arriving and working in an irregular manner.

    Turning next to Germany, in 2015-16, at a time when the country was receiving large numbers of new arrivals from the Western Balkan states, most of whom submitted unsuccessful asylum claims, a new employment regulation was introduced. This opened the labour market for nationals of those countries, on condition that they had a valid job offer from a German employer.

    Since that time, EU member states more generally have begun to acknowledge the need to recruit employees from outside the bloc. Thus in April 2022, the European Commission launched what it described as “an ambitious and sustainable legal migration policy,” including “specific actions to facilitate the integration of those fleeing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine into the EU’s labour market.” In the emphatic words of the commissioner for home affairs, “legal migration is essential to our economic recovery […] while reducing irregular migration.”

    A more preemptive approach to the issue has been taken by Australia, whose Pacific Labour Mobility Scheme allows businesses to recruit seasonal and temporary workers from ten Pacific island states. The purpose of the scheme is to meet Australia’s domestic labour market needs, to promote regional cooperation and development, and, in doing so, to avert the kind of instability that might provoke unpredictable and irregular movements of people.
    Refugee-related programmes

    When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, large numbers of people displaced by the hostilities began to make their way to neighbouring and nearby member states of the European Union. While the EU has made vigorous and often inhumane efforts to exclude asylum seekers originating from other parts of the world, even if they had strong claims to refugee status, in the case of Ukraine steps were quickly taken to regularise the situation of the new arrivals. Refugees from Ukraine were allowed to enter the EU without a visa, to enjoy residence and work rights there for up to three years, and to move freely from one member state to another.

    This arrangement, known as “temporary protection”, was based on a number of considerations: the geographical proximity of Ukraine to the EU, the great difficulty that the EU would have had in trying to obstruct the movement, a humanitarian concern for people who had been obliged to flee by the conflict, and a particular readiness to support the citizens of a friendly country that was suffering from the aggression committed by Russia, a state with a long history of enmity to the EU and NATO. While it remains to be seen how effectively the Ukrainians can be absorbed into the economies and societies of EU member states, in the short term at least, the temporary protection system provided a means of channeling a very large and rapid movement of people into routes that were safe and legal.

    Looking beyond the specifics of the Ukrainian situation, UNHCR, the UN’s agency for refugees, has in recent years made regular calls for governments—predominantly but not exclusively in the global North—to establish and expand the scale of state-sponsored refugee resettlement programmes. Such efforts enjoy limited success, however, partly because of the serious cuts made to the US resettlement quota by the Trump administration, and partly because of the restrictions on movement introduced by many other countries as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the aftermath of the 2015-16 “migrant crisis”, moreover, European countries were reluctant to consider the admission of additional refugees, even if they were to arrive in an organised manner.

    In a more positive development, the decade since the beginning of the Syrian refugee emergency in 2012 has delivered a new focus on the establishment of privately- sponsored resettlement programmes, enabling families as well as neighbourhood, community, and faith-based groups in the global North to sponsor the reception and initial integration of refugees from countries of asylum in the global South. Canada has taken a particular lead in this respect, establishing private sponsorship programmes for Afghan, Syrian, and Ukrainian refugees, with Australia, the US, and some European countries also experimenting with this particular form of safe and legal route.

    A similar approach can be seen with respect to the notion of “humanitarian corridors”, an initiative taken by Italian church-affiliated groups. Self-funded but closely coordinated with the government in Rome, this programme has enabled religious communities in Italy to welcome hundreds of refugees from Ethiopia, Greece, and Lebanon. Discussions are currently underway with a view to expanding this model to other European states.

    Recent years have seen a growing interest in the notion of labour mobility for refugees, arrangements whereby refugees with specific skills and qualifications are allowed to leave their country of asylum in order to take up pre-arranged employment opportunities in another state. An approach first proposed more than a decade ago but largely unimplemented since that time, the potential of such initiatives has now been recognised by Australia, Canada, and the UK, all of which have recently established pilot programmes of this type.

    In similar vein, humanitarian organisations have promoted the notion that refugees in developing countries of asylum should be able to benefit from scholarship programmes in states that are better equipped to provide them with appropriate education at the secondary and tertiary levels. The implementation of this approach has been boosted considerably by the emergencies in Syria and Ukraine, both of which have prompted universities around the world to make special provisions for refugee students.

    When people move from one country to another in the context of a refugee crisis, a common consequence is for family members to be separated, either because some have been left behind in the country of origin, or because they lose contact with each other during their journey to a safer place. In response to this humanitarian issue, the international community has for many years supported the notion of family reunification programmes, organised with the support of entities such as the International Organization for Migration, UNHCR, and the Red Cross movement. Most recently, there has been a recognition that such programmes also have a role to play in reducing the scale of irregular movements, given the frequency with which people engage in such journeys in an attempt to reunite with their relatives.
    Relocation and evacuation programmes

    Other arrangements have been made to enable refugees and migrants to relocate in a safe and legal manner from countries that are not in a position to provide them with the support that they need. In the EU, efforts—albeit largely unsuccessful—have been made recently to establish redistribution programmes, relocating people from front-line states such as Greece and Italy, which have large refugee and migrant populations, to parts of Europe that are under less pressure in this respect.

    In a more dramatic context, UNHCR has established an evacuation programme for refugees and migrants in Libya, where they are at serious risk of detention and human rights abuses, and where escape from the country by boat also presents them with enormous dangers. A safe and legal alternative has been found in an arrangement whereby the most vulnerable of these people are transferred to emergency transit centres in Niger and Rwanda, pending the time when other countries accept them as permanent residents.

    Finally, proposals have been made with respect to the establishment of arrangements that would allow people who are at risk in their country of origin to move elsewhere in a safe and legal manner. For individuals and families, this objective could be attained by means of humanitarian visas issued by the overseas embassies of states that wish to provide sanctuary to people who are threatened in their homeland.

    On a larger scale, orderly departure programmes might be established for designated categories of people who feel obliged to leave their own country and who might otherwise have no alternative but to move by irregular means. An important—but as yet unreplicated— precedent was set in this respect by a 1980s programme that allowed some 800,000 Vietnamese citizens to relocate to the US and other western countries with the authorisation of the Hanoi government, sparing them from the dangerous journeys that the “boat people” had undertaken in earlier years.
    The potential of regular pathways

    It is not surprising that the notion of safe and legal routes has attracted so much attention in recent years. They are in the interest of refugees and migrants, who would otherwise have to embark on difficult and often dangerous journeys. They are in the interest of states, who have much to gain from the orderly and authorised movement of people. And they are in the interest of international organisations that are struggling to respond to large-scale and unpredicted movements of people, and which are trying to ensure that human mobility is governed in a more effective, human and equitable manner.

    At the same time, there is a need to scrutinise the popular assumption that such measures can substantially reduce the scale of mixed and irregular migratory movements, and to address the many difficulties and dilemmas associated with the establishment of such pathways.
    Scaling up

    Despite all of the rhetorical support given to the notion of regular pathways in recent years, the number of people who are able to access them is still very modest. And there are a number of reasons why they might not be scaled up to any great extent. First, the Covid-19 pandemic, which erupted unexpectedly not long after the GCM and GCR had been negotiated, caused many governments to act with a new degree of caution in relation to the cross-border movement of people. And while the pandemic has subsided, states may well prefer to retain some of the immigration restrictions they introduced in the context of the pandemic.

    Second, and more recently, the need for states in Europe and beyond to admit large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan and Ukraine seems certain to limit their enthusiasm and capacity for the establishment of safe routes for people from other parts of the world. With many thousands of people from those two countries left without jobs and in temporary accommodation, the introduction or expansion of other pathways would simply exacerbate this problem.

    While the admission of overseas workers appears to be a way of addressing the demographic deficits and labour market needs of the industrialised states, are the citizens and politicians of those countries ready to acknowledge the need to admit more foreign nationals, even if they arrive in a managed manner? Immigration has become a toxic issue in many of the world’s more prosperous states, and few governments or opposition parties are willing to run on electoral platforms that advocate an increase in the number of new arrivals from other parts of the world.

    In the context described above, it should come as no surprise that most of the orderly pathway initiatives introduced in recent years (such as privately sponsored resettlement, humanitarian corridors, evacuation, and relocation programmes) have all operated on a modest scale and have often been established on a pilot basis, with no guarantee of them being expanded.

    For example, when in 2021 the British home secretary introduced a new labour mobility programme for refugees, she boldly announced that “those displaced by conflict and violence will now be able to benefit from access to our global points-based immigration system, enabling them to come to the UK safely and legally through established routes”. In fact, only 100 Syrian refugees from Jordan and Lebanon will benefit from the programme over the next two years.

    And the UK is not an isolated case. According to a recent study, in 2019 the OECD countries provided complementary pathways to fewer than 156,000 people from seven major refugee-producing countries. Two-thirds of them were admitted on the basis of family reunion, with the remaining third split equally between people granted visas for work and for educational purposes. That 156,000 constituted just 0.6 percent of the global refugee population.
    Reducing irregular migration

    Even if safe and legal routes could be established and expanded, what impact would that have on the scale of irregular migration? That is a difficult question to answer, partly because the evidence on this issue is so limited, and partly because it is methodologically challenging to establish causal linkages between these two phenomena, as demonstrated by two recent studies.

    With respect to the German labour programme in the Western Balkans, one analyst has suggested that although the number of asylum applications from that region did indeed drop after the new initiative was introduced, “one cannot credibly single out the exact effect the Western Balkan Regulation had on reducing irregular migration from the region to Germany”. The author goes on to say that “the regulation was only one of many policy measures at the time, including many restrictive measures and faster processing times of asylum applications as well as the ‘closure’ of the Western Balkan route.” Consequently, “it is not possible to isolate the exact causal role the Western Balkan Regulation may have played.”

    A case study of Mexico and the US reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting “there is evidence that lawful channels for migration between Mexico and the US have suppressed unlawful migration, but only when combined with robust enforcement efforts,” including the intensification of border controls that facilitated the apprehension and return of migrants crossing the frontier in an irregular manner. This conclusion on the close relationship between safe pathways and enforcement, shared by both studies, is ironic, given that some of the strongest NGO advocates for the former are most vocal in their opposition to the latter!

    A more general review of the evidence on this matter also casts doubt on the notion that an expansion of safe and legal routes will necessarily lead to a reduction in irregular movements. Looking specifically at labour migration programmes, the study says that they are often proposed “on the basis of an assumption of a rerouting effect, whereby migrants who would otherwise arrive and enter the asylum system or stay in a country without legal status will be incentivised to try and access a legal work permit from home rather than migrate illegally.” But the validity of that assumption “will depend on the capacity of legal pathways to accommodate the number of low-skilled workers who want to migrate, but lack permission to enter their desired destination.”

    That statement concerning the number of people who would like to or have been obliged to migrate but who have been unable to do so in a safe and legal manner is readily substantiated in numerical terms. Most estimates suggest that around 15 million irregular migrants are to be found in the US and Europe alone, with millions more in countries such as India, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. According to UNHCR, there are some 30 million refugees worldwide and more than 4.5 million asylum seekers who are waiting for their applications to be processed. A worldwide survey undertaken in 2018 concluded that some 750 million people, 15 percent of all the world’s adults, would move to another country if they had the opportunity to do so.

    Given the growing demand for migration opportunities in poorer regions of the world, coupled with the general reluctance of the industrialised states to facilitate the large-scale admission of people who want to move there, it is difficult to see how this square can be circled. The most likely scenario is that the supply of opportunities for regular migration will be unable to meet the demand, meaning that aspirant migrants who are not selected for regular entry will still have a strong incentive to move in an irregular manner.

    Indeed, it can also be argued that the establishment of safe and legal routes intensifies the social networks linking countries of origin and destination, enabling those migrants who move in a regular manner to inform the compatriots they have left behind of the opportunities that exist in the countries to which they have moved and to send remittances to people at home that can be used to pay the costs of a clandestine journey to the same location. In this respect, instead of reducing levels of irregular migration, the establishment of safe and legal routes might actually contribute to their growth.
    Selection criteria and processes

    In addition to the scale of the routes that might be established and their potential impact on levels of irregular migration, a number of other issues must be considered in the context of this discourse.

    First, the notion of safe and legal pathways is based on the idea that states should control the arrival of foreign nationals on their territory, determining how many should be admitted, what countries they should come from, why they wish or need to move to another country, what their demographic profile is, and what skills they should have. In other words, for safe and legal routes to work effectively, states and other stakeholders have to establish selection criteria and processes that allow the admission of some people who would like to move, while refusing entry to others. This is not a principle accepted by some refugee and migrant advocates, for whom the notion of safe and legal routes has become a disguised proxy for “open borders”.

    Almost inevitably, moreover, different constituencies within receiving states will be pushing for priority to be given to certain categories of people. Humanitarians will want the emphasis to be on refugees. Diaspora families and communities will favour family reunification programmes and community-sponsored resettlement. The private sector will argue the case for the admission of people with the skills and capacity to fill gaps in the labour market in a cost-effective manner. Universities will argue the case for visas to be granted to refugees and other foreign citizens with the necessary qualifications or academic aptitude. The selection process is therefore likely to be a contested and controversial one, potentially limiting governmental enthusiasm for the notion of safe and legal routes.
    Status and rights

    Second, as the attempt to regularise migratory movements proceeds, some important questions will have to be addressed in relation to the status and rights of the new arrivals and the organisation of such programmes. In the context of labour migration programmes, for example, would people be admitted on a temporary or permanent basis, and in the latter case would they eventually be able to acquire permanent resident rights or citizenship? Would they be tied to a single employer or allowed to move freely in the labour market? Would they enjoy the same pay, rights, and working conditions as citizens of the countries in which they are employed?

    A somewhat different set of issues arises in the context of labour mobility initiatives for refugees. Will they be allowed to leave their countries of asylum by the governments of those states and, more importantly, would they be able to return to it if employed abroad on a temporary basis? As some refugee lawyers have mooted, would they be at risk of being deported to their country of origin, and thereby be at risk of persecution, if their country of first asylum refused to readmit them? And if they were readmitted to their country of first asylum, would they have full access to the labour market there, or find themselves returning to a refugee camp or informal urban settlement where only informal and low-income livelihoods opportunities exist?

    With respect to privately sponsored resettlement, there is some evidence, especially from Canada, that refugees who arrive by this route fare better than those who are admitted by means of state-sponsored programmes. But there are also risks involved, especially in emergency situations where the citizens of resettlement countries are, for good humanitarian reasons, eager to welcome refugees into their homes and neighbourhoods, and where the state is only too happy to devolve responsibility for refugees to members of the community.

    A particular case in point is to be found in the UK’s sponsorship scheme for Ukrainian refugees, in which some of the new arrivals have found themselves matched with inappropriate sponsors in isolated rural locations and with few affordable options available with respect to their long-term accommodation.
    State manipulation

    Third, the establishment and expansion of safe and legal routes could have adverse consequences if misused by destination countries. With respect to resettlement, for example, UNHCR has always insisted that refugees should be selected on the basis of their vulnerability, and not in terms of what the organisation describes as their “integration potential”.

    That principle might prove more difficult to uphold in a context where alternative pathways are being discussed, specifically targeted at people on the basis of their skills, qualifications, language abilities, family connections and value to the labour market. Rather than expanding their refugee resettlement programmes, as UNHCR would like them to do, will destination countries prefer to make use of pathways that enable them to cherry-pick new arrivals on the basis of perceived value to the economy and society?

    At the same time, there is a risk that states will use the establishment of organised pathways as a pretext for the exclusion of asylum seekers who arrive in an independent manner and by irregular means. That has long been the approach adopted by Australia, whose policy of interception at sea and relocation to remote offshore processing facilities is justified by the government on the grounds that the country has a substantial refugee resettlement programme. Rather than taking to boats and “ jumping the queue”, the authorities say, refugees should wait their turn to be resettled from their country of asylum, however difficult that might be in practice.

    Taking its cue from Australia, the UK is in the process of establishing a formalised two-tier asylum system. On one hand, “bespoke” admissions programmes will be established for refugees from countries in which the UK has a particular geopolitical interest, most notably Afghanistan and Ukraine. On the other hand, the asylum claims of people arriving in the UK in an irregular manner, such as by boat across the English Channel (including those from Afghanistan and Ukraine) are now deemed inadmissible, and many of those arriving in this way are detained and liable to deportation to Rwanda without the possibility of returning to the UK, even if their refugee claim is recognised by the authorities in Kigali. At the time of writing, however, there is no evidence that this policy will have its intended effect of deterring irregular arrivals, nor indeed whether it will ever be implemented, given the legal challenges to which it is being subjected.
    Regularisation

    Finally, while much of the recent discourse on irregular migration has focused on the extent to which its scale and impact can be minimised by the establishment of safe and legal pathways, it must not be forgotten that many destination countries already have substantial populations of people who are officially not authorised to be there: so-called “illegal immigrants”, unsuccessful asylum seekers, and foreign nationals who have overstayed their visas, to give just three examples.

    No serious attempt to address the issue of irregular migration can avoid the situation and status of such people, although questions relating to their regularisation, whether by means of amnesties or by other measures. have not featured at all prominently in the recent discourse on international mobility.

    Interestingly, the GCM avoids the issue completely, presumably because it is deemed to be a matter that lies within the jurisdiction of sovereign states. If an attempt had been made to include the question of regularisation in the compact, it would almost certainly have been endorsed by fewer states. Nevertheless, any discussion of irregular migration must involve a consideration of those people who are living and working in countries where they do not have a legal status, as countries such as Spain, Ireland, and Italy have started to recognise. It is an issue that warrants much more attention at the national and multilateral levels, irrespective of its controversial nature.
    Conclusion

    A strong case can be made for the introduction and expansion of safe and legal migratory routes, as has been recognised by a plethora of recent initiatives relating to the governance of international mobility. But expectations of them should be modest.

    While such routes may have a limited role to play in reducing the scale and impact of mixed and irregular movements, they appear unlikely to have the transformative effect that some participants in the migration discourse have suggested they might have. Such routes are also likely to be a contentious matter, with some states using the notion of safe and legal routes as a pretext for the introduction of draconian approaches to the issue of irregular migration, and with migrant advocates employing the same concept as a means of avoiding the more controversial slogan of “open borders”.

    As indicated in the introduction, this essay has focused to a large extent on mixed and irregular migration from the global South to the global North, as it is those movements that have prompted much of the recent discourse on safe and legal routes. But it should not be forgotten that most migratory movements currently take place within the global South, and that some 85 percent of the world’s refugees are to be found in low and middle-income countries.

    Looking at the migration and refugee scenario in the developing world, there are perhaps greater grounds for optimism than can be found by focusing on the industrialised states. With some exceptions (South Africa being a prime example), countries in the global South are less exercised by the issue of irregular migration.

    Two regions—South America and West Africa—have established rather successful freedom-of-movement arrangements for their citizens. And despite some restrictive tendencies, encouraged in many instances by the externalisation policies of the global North, developing countries have kept their borders relatively open to refugees, as demonstrated by the presence of so many Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh, South Sudanese in Uganda, Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon, and Venezuelans in a host of neighbouring and nearby states.

    In an ideal world, the cross-border movement of people would indeed take place in an exclusively voluntary, safe, and orderly manner. But that scenario cannot be envisaged in an era that is characterised by failures of global governance, widespread armed conflict, growing regional inequalities, intensifying environmental disasters, and the climate crisis, not to mention the general unwillingness of politicians and the public to countenance large-scale immigration and refugee arrivals. Looking to the future, there is every reason to believe that large numbers of people will have to move out of necessity rather than choice, in an unpredictable and irregular manner.

    https://mixedmigration.org/articles/unpicking-the-notion-of-safe-and-legal-routes

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #voies_sures #voies_légales #frontières #1980s #menace #2015 #externalisation #refugee_compact #pacte_migratoire #global_compact_for_safe_orderly_and_regular_migration #global_compact_on_refugees #global_compact #relocalisation #régularisation #ouverture_des_frontières #Jeff_Crisp #safe_routes #legal_routes

  • Cinq ans plus tard. Une analyse de la situation à la frontière franco-britannique depuis la démolition de la grande « jungle » de Calais

    L’été 2021 marque le cinquième anniversaire de l’apogée du camp de réfugiés de Calais, plus connu sous le nom de la grande « jungle ». Apparu en 2015, le camp a atteint son paroxysme durant l’été 2016 avec près de 10,000 résidents.

    Ce rapport donne un aperçu du contexte politique qui a conduit à la constitution d’un #goulet_d’étranglement dans le nord de la France et à l’émergence du camp de la « Jungle » de Calais. Le rapport raconte à quoi ressemblait le camp, et comment et pourquoi le camp a finalement été démoli. Le rapport résume ensuite les principales tendances qui se sont déroulées dans la région au cours des années 2016-2021, tout en abordant les questions de savoir pourquoi la situation n’a pas encore été résolue et pourquoi la souffrance humaine dans la région persiste. Nous clôturons le rapport avec un chapitre discutant de ce qui doit se passer ensuite et présentons nos remarques de conclusion.

    https://refugee-rights.eu/resources/reports

    Pour télécharger le rapport en pdf :
    https://refugee-rights.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/RRE_CinqAnsPlusTard.pdf

    #rapport #Calais #5_ans_après #asile #migrations #frontières #UK #Angleterre #France #camp #campement #encampement #jungle #grande_jungle
    #Refugee_rights_europe

    ping @isskein @karine4

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    Die Härtefallkommission als Gandeninstanz

    Haft ohne Straftat - aus der Praxis einer Abschiebehaft

    Entrechtung von Geduldeten -die neue Duldung light

    Die griechischen Hospots

    Das Kirchenasyl als ultima ratio

    Zuständigkeiten im Asylverfahren

    Gestzgebung im Asylrecht seit 2015 - rechtsiwedrig und populistisch?

    Was machen Refugee Law Clinics?

    #podcast #audio #RLC #Germany #migration #refugees #EU #Frontex #migration_law #Duldung #trauma #gender #women* #handicap #children #family #asylum #Balkans #church_asylum #Greece #hotspot #Alarmphone #human_rights #Eritrea #Afghanistan

    ping @cdb_77

    https://www.podcast.de/podcast/778497/asyl-im-dialog-der-podcast-der-refugee-law-clinics-deutschland

  • #Refugia : a Utopian solution to the crisis of mass displacement

    And still they come. An apparently endless flotilla of rubber dinghies filled with migrants and refugees making their way across the Mediterranean to Europe. As the numbers and visibility of this migration have gathered pace, even mainstream politicians have expressed their alarm. Antonio Tajani, president of the European Parliament, has talked of an exodus of biblical proportions. Solutions designed for a few thousand people will not work as a strategy for millions, he warned.

    In responsible political circles, let alone in the more feverish popular media, there is an increasing recognition that the three conventional “durable solutions” to displacement – local integration, resettlement and return – cannot meet the scale and speed of the movement of people. The international institutional architecture seems unequal to the task. In 2016, there were no fewer than seven international summits to address the refugee and migrant “crisis”. What is talked about is often a reboot of what has demonstrably failed before.

    Emerging, sometimes from unexpected places, have come a number of imaginative solutions. For example, the proposal to create a separate “refugee nation” was first promoted by a Californian businessman, Jason Buzi. Egyptian telecoms billionaire Naguib Sawiris has also sought to buy an island from Greece or Italy to house those crossing the Mediterranean. The most elaborately worked-out island solution is to create a “Europe-in-Africa” city-state on the Tunisian Plateau – a thin strip of seabed that sits between Tunisia and Italy within the Mediterranean. The concept has been modelled in detail by Theo Deutinger, a respected Dutch architect.

    Other proposals have centred on the creation of “refugee cities” or zones. Drawing from the example of a special economic zone in Jordan near the Za’atari refugee camp, where refugees have been allowed to work rather than languish, migration expert Alex Betts and economist Paul Collier have made the simple but daring point that many refugees can be turned into assets rather than liabilities if the legalities forbidding asylum-seekers seeking paid jobs are set aside.
    Refugia and the Sesame Pass

    My colleague Nicholas Van Hear and I have reviewed most of these proposals and advanced an even more radical plan. Our vision is to create a set of loosely-connected self-governing units we call “Refugia”, brought into being mainly by refugees and displaced people themselves, with some support from sympathisers. Though scattered like an archipelago, Refugia will nonetheless link together many refugee communities – in conflict areas, in neighbouring or transit countries, and in more distant countries of settlement. We are happy to accept the label “utopian” for our scheme, but ours is a more pragmatic idea, a “realistic utopianism” to use a term developed by the philosopher John Rawls.

    We see Refugia as the outcome of a tacit grand bargain – among richer states and emerging countries, nearby countries affected by conflict and, crucially, refugees themselves. After discussions with representatives of Refugia, new constituent zones will be licensed by the nation states within whose territories they lie.

    Refugee camps, hostels, farming communities, self-built housing estates or suburbs of a town might all join Refugia. Though subject to the host states’ laws, zones are created from below. They are self-governing and eventually self-supporting. The upshot is that Refugians hold dual affinities: as well as an affiliation to Refugia they can be long-term residents of the states that license their territories. They can move among different parts of Refugia, and, where negotiated, between sovereign nations.

    Refugians will be issued with a “Sesame Pass”, a super-smart, biometric card that opens up and connects all the nodes and zones of Refugia. This will provide those who have it with a collective identity, the right to vote for a transnational parliament, legal status, entitlements and the facilitation of work, financial transfers and enhanced mobility. The Sesame Pass could also be developed as a machine-readable currency, which will allow tax collection or the administration of a basic income grant for all Refugians.

    There is some sense in which an embryonic form of Refugia already exists. As the length of time in refugee camps has lengthened and more refugees have been accommodated in or near cities, organic urban settlements have developed. A good example is Camp Domiz, a Syrian refugee camp in northern Iraq that has been badged a “Refugee republic”, as its inhabitants have set up community centres, shops and mosques.

    The displaced in control of their future

    In our vision, Refugia is essentially self-organised and self-managed. It does not require political or cultural conformity, rather it subscribes to the principles and deeds of solidarity and mutual aid. But it is absolutely possible that desperation might drive the European Union to come up with a radical blueprint for a dystopian form of Refugia, which does not fit these principles.

    In September 2016, Hungary’s right-wing prime minister Victor Orban suggested that the EU should build a “refugee city” in North Africa. Not only was this explicitly about repression enforced by military might, Orban also declared that “those who came [to Europe] illegally must be rounded up and shipped out”.

    While we must be on the guard for forms of Refugia that are nakedly about subjugation, new territorial units initiated from above should not be discarded in principle. There is no reason why, where these proposals comply with Refugia’s democratic and tolerant values, they should not be incorporated as nodes within the wider idea.

    Precisely because they have been disempowered by their traumatic experiences, those who have been displaced do not need things done to them and may even resist things being done for them. Ideally, Refugians will be in charge of as much of Refugia as is practically possible. This is the promise of the many small initiatives and inventive new solutions in this utopian vision of what could be possible.

    https://theconversation.com/refugia-a-utopian-solution-to-the-crisis-of-mass-displacement-81136
    Je mets ici pour archivage... mais ce projet imaginé par des profs émerites est très douteux !

    #utopie ou, plutôt... #distopie ?!?

    #solution (sic) #alternative (sic) #Jason_Buzi #nation_réfugiée #nation_de_réfugiés #refugee_nation #Naguib_Sawiris #île #Europe-in-Africa #Theo_Deutinger #auto-gouvernance #utopie_réaliste #revenu_de_base #camps_de_réfugiés #Domiz #solidarité #entraide #réseau

    #Sesame_Pass #Nicholas_Van_Hear

    –—
    Le site web de #Refugee_Republic :


    https://refugeerepublic.submarinechannel.com

    Une vidéo introductive :
    https://vimeo.com/113100941

    déjà signalé en 2015 par @fil :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/427762

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Fil de discussion sur le nouveau #pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile

    –—

    Migrants : le règlement de Dublin va être supprimé

    La Commission européenne doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de sa politique migratoire, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée.

    Cinq ans après le début de la crise migratoire, l’Union européenne veut changer de stratégie. La Commission européenne veut “abolir” le règlement de Dublin qui fracture les Etats-membres et qui confie la responsabilité du traitement des demandes d’asile au pays de première entrée des migrants dans l’UE, a annoncé ce mercredi 16 septembre la cheffe de l’exécutif européen Ursula von der Leyen dans son discours sur l’Etat de l’Union.

    La Commission doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de la politique migratoire européenne, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée, alors que le débat sur le manque de solidarité entre pays Européens a été relancé par l’incendie du camp de Moria sur lîle grecque de Lesbos.

    “Au coeur (de la réforme) il y a un engagement pour un système plus européen”, a déclaré Ursula von der Leyen devant le Parlement européen. “Je peux annoncer que nous allons abolir le règlement de Dublin et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration”, a-t-elle poursuivi.
    Nouveau mécanisme de solidarité

    “Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité”, a-t-elle dit, alors que les pays qui sont en première ligne d’arrivée des migrants (Grèce, Malte, Italie notamment) se plaignent de devoir faire face à une charge disproportionnée.

    La proposition de réforme de la Commission devra encore être acceptée par les Etats. Ce qui n’est pas gagné d’avance. Cinq ans après la crise migratoire de 2015, la question de l’accueil des migrants est un sujet qui reste source de profondes divisions en Europe, certains pays de l’Est refusant d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile.

    Sous la pression, le système d’asile européen organisé par le règlement de Dublin a explosé après avoir pesé lourdement sur la Grèce ou l’Italie.

    Le nouveau plan pourrait notamment prévoir davantage de sélection des demandeurs d’asile aux frontières extérieures et un retour des déboutés dans leur pays assuré par Frontex. Egalement à l’étude pour les Etats volontaires : un mécanisme de relocalisation des migrants sauvés en Méditerranée, parfois contraints d’errer en mer pendant des semaines en attente d’un pays d’accueil.

    Ce plan ne résoudrait toutefois pas toutes les failles. Pour le patron de l’Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration, Didier Leschi, “il ne peut pas y avoir de politique européenne commune sans critères communs pour accepter les demandes d’asile.”

    https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/migrants-le-reglement-de-dublin-tres-controverse-va-etre-supprime_fr_

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_dublin #fin #fin_de_Dublin #suppression #pacte #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration #new_pact #nouveau_pacte #pacte_sur_la_migration_et_l'asile

    –---

    Documents officiels en lien avec le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/879881

    –-

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

    ping @reka @karine4 @_kg_ @isskein

    • Immigration : le règlement de Dublin, l’impossible #réforme ?

      En voulant abroger le règlement de Dublin, qui impose la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile au premier pays d’entrée dans l’Union européenne, Bruxelles reconnaît des dysfonctionnements dans l’accueil des migrants. Mais les Vingt-Sept, plus que jamais divisés sur cette question, sont-ils prêts à une refonte du texte ? Éléments de réponses.

      Ursula Von der Leyen en a fait une des priorités de son mandat : réformer le règlement de Dublin, qui impose au premier pays de l’UE dans lequel le migrant est arrivé de traiter sa demande d’asile. « Je peux annoncer que nous allons [l’]abolir et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration », a déclaré la présidente de la Commission européenne mercredi 16 septembre, devant le Parlement.

      Les États dotés de frontières extérieures comme la Grèce, l’Italie ou Malte se sont réjouis de cette annonce. Ils s’estiment lésés par ce règlement en raison de leur situation géographique qui les place en première ligne.

      La présidente de la Commission européenne doit présenter, le 23 septembre, une nouvelle version de la politique migratoire, jusqu’ici maintes fois repoussée. « Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a-t-elle poursuivi. Un terme fort à l’heure où l’incendie du camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, plus de 8 000 adultes et 4 000 enfants à la rue, a révélé le manque d’entraide entre pays européens.

      Pour mieux comprendre l’enjeu de cette nouvelle réforme européenne de la politique migratoire, France 24 décrypte le règlement de Dublin qui divise tant les Vingt-Sept, en particulier depuis la crise migratoire de 2015.

      Pourquoi le règlement de Dublin dysfonctionne ?

      Les failles ont toujours existé mais ont été révélées par la crise migratoire de 2015, estiment les experts de politique migratoire. Ce texte signé en 2013 et qu’on appelle « Dublin III » repose sur un accord entre les membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que la Suisse, l’Islande, la Norvège et le Liechtenstein. Il prévoit que l’examen de la demande d’asile d’un exilé incombe au premier pays d’entrée en Europe. Si un migrant passé par l’Italie arrive par exemple en France, les autorités françaises ne sont, en théorie, pas tenu d’enregistrer la demande du Dubliné.
      © Union européenne | Les pays signataires du règlement de Dublin.

      Face à l’afflux de réfugiés ces dernières années, les pays dotés de frontières extérieures, comme la Grèce et l’Italie, se sont estimés abandonnés par le reste de l’Europe. « La charge est trop importante pour ce bloc méditerranéen », estime Matthieu Tardis, chercheur au Centre migrations et citoyennetés de l’Ifri (Institut français des relations internationales). Le texte est pensé « comme un mécanisme de responsabilité des États et non de solidarité », estime-t-il.

      Sa mise en application est aussi difficile à mettre en place. La France et l’Allemagne, qui concentrent la majorité des demandes d’asile depuis le début des années 2000, peinent à renvoyer les Dublinés. Dans l’Hexagone, seulement 11,5 % ont été transférés dans le pays d’entrée. Outre-Rhin, le taux ne dépasse pas les 15 %. Conséquence : nombre d’entre eux restent « bloqués » dans les camps de migrants à Calais ou dans le nord de Paris.

      Le délai d’attente pour les demandeurs d’asile est aussi jugé trop long. Un réfugié passé par l’Italie, qui vient déposer une demande d’asile en France, peut attendre jusqu’à 18 mois avant d’avoir un retour. « Durant cette période, il se retrouve dans une situation d’incertitude très dommageable pour lui mais aussi pour l’Union européenne. C’est un système perdant-perdant », commente Matthieu Tardis.

      Ce règlement n’est pas adapté aux demandeurs d’asile, surenchérit-on à la Cimade (Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués). Dans un rapport, l’organisation qualifie ce système de « machine infernale de l’asile européen ». « Il ne tient pas compte des liens familiaux ni des langues parlées par les réfugiés », précise le responsable asile de l’association, Gérard Sadik.

      Sept ans après avoir vu le jour, le règlement s’est vu porter le coup de grâce par le confinement lié aux conditions sanitaires pour lutter contre le Covid-19. « Durant cette période, aucun transfert n’a eu lieu », assure-t-on à la Cimade.

      Le mécanisme de solidarité peut-il le remplacer ?

      « Il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a promis Ursula von der Leyen, sans donné plus de précision. Sur ce point, on sait déjà que les positions divergent, voire s’opposent, entre les Vingt-Sept.

      Le bloc du nord-ouest (Allemagne, France, Autriche, Benelux) reste ancré sur le principe actuel de responsabilité, mais accepte de l’accompagner d’un mécanisme de solidarité. Sur quels critères se base la répartition du nombre de demandeurs d’asile ? Comment les sélectionner ? Aucune décision n’est encore actée. « Ils sont prêts à des compromis car ils veulent montrer que l’Union européenne peut avancer et agir sur la question migratoire », assure Matthieu Tardis.

      En revanche, le groupe dit de Visegrad (Hongrie, Pologne, République tchèque, Slovaquie), peu enclin à l’accueil, rejette catégoriquement tout principe de solidarité. « Ils se disent prêts à envoyer des moyens financiers, du personnel pour le contrôle aux frontières mais refusent de recevoir les demandeurs d’asile », détaille le chercheur de l’Ifri.

      Quant au bloc Méditerranée (Grèce, Italie, Malte , Chypre, Espagne), des questions subsistent sur la proposition du bloc nord-ouest : le mécanisme de solidarité sera-t-il activé de façon permanente ou exceptionnelle ? Quelles populations sont éligibles au droit d’asile ? Et qui est responsable du retour ? « Depuis le retrait de la Ligue du Nord de la coalition dans le gouvernement italien, le dialogue est à nouveau possible », avance Matthieu Tardis.

      Un accord semble toutefois indispensable pour montrer que l’Union européenne n’est pas totalement en faillite sur ce dossier. « Mais le bloc de Visegrad n’a pas forcément en tête cet enjeu », nuance-t-il. Seule la situation sanitaire liée au Covid-19, qui place les pays de l’Est dans une situation économique fragile, pourrait faire évoluer leur position, note le chercheur.

      Et le mécanisme par répartition ?

      Le mécanisme par répartition, dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, revient régulièrement sur la table des négociations. Son principe : la capacité d’accueil du pays dépend de ses poids démographique et économique. Elle serait de 30 % pour l’Allemagne, contre un tiers des demandes aujourd’hui, et 20 % pour la France, qui en recense 18 %. « Ce serait une option gagnante pour ces deux pays, mais pas pour le bloc du Visegrad qui s’y oppose », décrypte Gérard Sadik, le responsable asile de la Cimade.

      Cette doctrine reposerait sur un système informatisé, qui recenserait dans une seule base toutes les données des demandeurs d’asile. Mais l’usage de l’intelligence artificielle au profit de la procédure administrative ne présente pas que des avantages, aux yeux de la Cimade : « L’algorithme ne sera pas en mesure de tenir compte des liens familiaux des demandeurs d’asile », juge Gérard Sadik.

      Quelles chances pour une refonte ?

      L’Union européenne a déjà tenté plusieurs fois de réformer ce serpent de mer. Un texte dit « Dublin IV » était déjà dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, en proposant par exemple que la responsabilité du premier État d’accueil soit définitive, mais il a été enterré face aux dissensions internes.

      Reste à savoir quel est le contenu exact de la nouvelle version qui sera présentée le 23 septembre par Ursula Van der Leyen. À la Cimade, on craint un durcissement de la politique migratoire, et notamment un renforcement du contrôle aux frontières.

      Quoi qu’il en soit, les négociations s’annoncent « compliquées et difficiles » car « les intérêts des pays membres ne sont pas les mêmes », a rappelé le ministre grec adjoint des Migrations, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, jeudi 17 septembre. Et surtout, la nouvelle mouture devra obtenir l’accord du Parlement, mais aussi celui des États. La refonte est encore loin.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27376/immigration-le-reglement-de-dublin-l-impossible-reforme

      #gouvernance #Ursula_Von_der_Leyen #mécanisme_de_solidarité #responsabilité #groupe_de_Visegrad #solidarité #répartition #mécanisme_par_répartition #capacité_d'accueil #intelligence_artificielle #algorithme #Dublin_IV

    • Germany’s #Seehofer cautiously optimistic on EU asylum reform

      For the first time during the German Presidency, EU interior ministers exchanged views on reforms of the EU asylum system. German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) expressed “justified confidence” that a deal can be found. EURACTIV Germany reports.

      The focus of Tuesday’s (7 July) informal video conference of interior ministers was on the expansion of police cooperation and sea rescue, which, according to Seehofer, is one of the “Big Four” topics of the German Council Presidency, integrated into a reform of the #Common_European_Asylum_System (#CEAS).

      Following the meeting, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, spoke of an “excellent start to the Presidency,” and Seehofer also praised the “constructive discussions.” In the field of asylum policy, she said that it had become clear that all member states were “highly interested in positive solutions.”

      The interior ministers were unanimous in their desire to further strengthen police cooperation and expand both the mandates and the financial resources of Europol and Frontex.

      Regarding the question of the distribution of refugees, Seehofer said that he had “heard statements that [he] had not heard in years prior.” He said that almost all member states were “prepared to show solidarity in different ways.”

      While about a dozen member states would like to participate in the distribution of those rescued from distress at the EU’s external borders in the event of a “disproportionate burden” on the states, other states signalled that they wanted to make control vessels, financial means or personnel available to prevent smuggling activities and stem migration across the Mediterranean.

      Seehofer’s final act

      It will probably be Seehofer’s last attempt to initiate CEAS reform. He announced in May that he would withdraw completely from politics after the end of the legislative period in autumn 2021.

      Now it seems that he considers CEAS reform as his last great mission, Seehofer said that he intends to address the migration issue from late summer onwards “with all I have at my disposal.” adding that Tuesday’s (7 July) talks had “once again kindled a real fire” in him. To this end, he plans to leave the official business of the Interior Ministry “in day-to-day matters” largely to the State Secretaries.

      Seehofer’s shift of priorities to the European stage comes at a time when he is being sharply criticised in Germany.

      While his initial handling of a controversial newspaper column about the police published in Berlin’s tageszeitung prompted criticism, Seehofer now faces accusations of concealing structural racism in the police. Seehofer had announced over the weekend that, contrary to the recommendation of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), he would not commission a study on racial profiling in the police force after all.

      Seehofer: “One step is not enough”

      In recent months, Seehofer has made several attempts to set up a distribution mechanism for rescued persons in distress. On several occasions he accused the Commission of letting member states down by not solving the asylum question.

      “I have the ambition to make a great leap. One step would be too little in our presidency,” said Seehofer during Tuesday’s press conference. However, much depends on when the Commission will present its long-awaited migration pact, as its proposals are intended to serve as a basis for negotiations on CEAS reform.

      As Johansson said on Tuesday, this is planned for September. Seehofer thus only has just under four months to get the first Council conclusions through. “There will not be enough time for legislation,” he said.

      Until a permanent solution is found, ad hoc solutions will continue. A “sustainable solution” should include better cooperation with the countries of origin and transit, as the member states agreed on Tuesday.

      To this end, “agreements on the repatriation of refugees” are now to be reached with North African countries. A first step towards this will be taken next Monday (13 July), at a joint conference with North African leaders.

      https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/germany-eyes-breakthrough-in-eu-migration-dispute-this-year

      #Europol #Frontex

    • Relocation, solidarity mandatory for EU migration policy: #Johansson

      In an interview with ANSA and other European media outlets, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs #Ylva_Johansson explained the new migration and asylum pact due to be unveiled on September 23, stressing that nobody will find ideal solutions but rather a well-balanced compromise that will ’’improve the situation’’.

      European Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has explained in an interview with a group of European journalists, including ANSA, a new pact on asylum and migration to be presented on September 23. She touched on rules for countries of first entry, a new mechanism of mandatory solidarity, fast repatriations and refugee relocation.

      The Swedish commissioner said that no one will find ideal solutions in the European Commission’s new asylum and migration proposal but rather a good compromise that “will improve the situation”.

      She said the debate to change the asylum regulation known as Dublin needs to be played down in order to find an agreement. Johansson said an earlier 2016 reform plan would be withdrawn as it ’’caused the majority’’ of conflicts among countries.

      A new proposal that will replace the current one and amend the existing Dublin regulation will be presented, she explained.

      The current regulation will not be completely abolished but rules regarding frontline countries will change. Under the new proposal, migrants can still be sent back to the country responsible for their asylum request, explained the commissioner, adding that amendments will be made but the country of first entry will ’’remain important’’.

      ’’Voluntary solidarity is not enough," there has to be a “mandatory solidarity mechanism,” Johansson noted.

      Countries will need to help according to their size and possibilities. A member state needs to show solidarity ’’in accordance with the capacity and size’’ of its economy. There will be no easy way out with the possibility of ’’just sending some blankets’’ - efforts must be proportional to the size and capabilities of member states, she said.
      Relocations are a divisive theme

      Relocations will be made in a way that ’’can be possible to accept for all member states’’, the commissioner explained. The issue of mandatory quotas is extremely divisive, she went on to say. ’’The sentence of the European Court of Justice has established that they can be made’’.

      However, the theme is extremely divisive. Many of those who arrive in Europe are not eligible for international protection and must be repatriated, she said, wondering if it is a good idea to relocate those who need to be repatriated.

      “We are looking for a way to bring the necessary aid to countries under pressure.”

      “Relocation is an important part, but also” it must be done “in a way that can be possible to accept for all member states,” she noted.

      Moreover, Johansson said the system will not be too rigid as the union should prepare for different scenarios.
      Faster repatriations

      Repatriations will be a key part of the plan, with faster bureaucratic procedures, she said. The 2016 reform proposal was made following the 2015 migration crisis, when two million people, 90% of whom were refugees, reached the EU irregularly. For this reason, the plan focused on relocations, she explained.

      Now the situation is completely different: last year 2.4 million stay permits were issued, the majority for reasons connected to family, work or education. Just 140,000 people migrated irregularly and only one-third were refugees while two-thirds will need to be repatriated.

      For this reason, stressed the commissioner, the new plan will focus on repatriation. Faster procedures are necessary, she noted. When people stay in a country for years it is very hard to organize repatriations, especially voluntary ones. So the objective is for a negative asylum decision “to come together with a return decision.”

      Also, the permanence in hosting centers should be of short duration. Speaking about a fire at the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos where more than 12,000 asylum seekers have been stranded for years, the commissioner said the situation was the ’’result of lack of European policy on asylum and migration."

      “We shall have no more Morias’’, she noted, calling for well-managed hosting centers along with limits to permanence.

      A win-win collaboration will instead be planned with third countries, she said. ’’The external aspect is very important. We have to work on good partnerships with third countries, supporting them and finding win-win solutions for readmissions and for the fight against traffickers. We have to develop legal pathways to come to the EU, in particular with resettlements, a policy that needs to be strengthened.”

      The commissioner then rejected the idea of opening hosting centers in third countries, an idea for example proposed by Denmark.

      “It is not the direction I intend to take. We will not export the right to asylum.”

      The commissioner said she was very concerned by reports of refoulements. Her objective, she concluded, is to “include in the pact a monitoring mechanism. The right to asylum must be defended.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27447/relocation-solidarity-mandatory-for-eu-migration-policy-johansson

      #relocalisation #solidarité_obligatoire #solidarité_volontaire #pays_de_première_entrée #renvois #expulsions #réinstallations #voies_légales

    • Droit d’asile : Bruxelles rate son « #pacte »

      La Commission européenne, assurant vouloir « abolir » le règlement de Dublin et son principe du premier pays d’entrée, doit présenter ce mercredi un « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile ». Qui ne bouleverserait rien.

      C’est une belle victoire pour Viktor Orbán, le Premier ministre hongrois, et ses partenaires d’Europe centrale et orientale aussi peu enclins que lui à accueillir des étrangers sur leur sol. La Commission européenne renonce définitivement à leur imposer d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile en cas d’afflux dans un pays de la « ligne de front » (Grèce, Italie, Malte, Espagne). Certes, le volumineux paquet de textes qu’elle propose ce mercredi (10 projets de règlements et trois recommandations, soit plusieurs centaines de pages), pompeusement baptisé « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile », prévoit qu’ils devront, par « solidarité », assurer les refoulements vers les pays d’origine des déboutés du droit d’asile, mais cela ne devrait pas les gêner outre mesure. Car, sur le fond, la Commission prend acte de la volonté des Vingt-Sept de transformer l’Europe en forteresse.
      Sale boulot

      La crise de 2015 les a durablement traumatisés. A l’époque, la Turquie, par lassitude d’accueillir sur son sol plusieurs millions de réfugiés syriens et des centaines de milliers de migrants économiques dans l’indifférence de la communauté internationale, ouvre ses frontières. La Grèce est vite submergée et plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes traversent les Balkans afin de trouver refuge, notamment en Allemagne et en Suède, parmi les pays les plus généreux en matière d’asile.

      Passé les premiers moments de panique, les Européens réagissent de plusieurs manières. La Hongrie fait le sale boulot en fermant brutalement sa frontière. L’Allemagne, elle, accepte d’accueillir un million de demandeurs d’asile, mais négocie avec Ankara un accord pour qu’il referme ses frontières, accord ensuite endossé par l’UE qui lui verse en échange 6 milliards d’euros destinés aux camps de réfugiés. Enfin, l’Union adopte un règlement destiné à relocaliser sur une base obligatoire une partie des migrants dans les autres pays européens afin qu’ils instruisent les demandes d’asile, dans le but de soulager la Grèce et l’Italie, pays de premier accueil. Ce dernier volet est un échec, les pays d’Europe de l’Est, qui ont voté contre, refusent d’accueillir le moindre migrant, et leurs partenaires de l’Ouest ne font guère mieux : sur 160 000 personnes qui auraient dû être relocalisées, un objectif rapidement revu à 98 000, moins de 35 000 l’ont été à la fin 2017, date de la fin de ce dispositif.

      Depuis, l’Union a considérablement durci les contrôles, notamment en créant un corps de 10 000 gardes-frontières européens et en renforçant les moyens de Frontex, l’agence chargée de gérer ses frontières extérieures. En février-mars, la tentative d’Ankara de faire pression sur les Européens dans le conflit syrien en rouvrant partiellement ses frontières a fait long feu : la Grèce a employé les grands moyens, y compris violents, pour stopper ce flux sous les applaudissements de ses partenaires… Autant dire que l’ambiance n’est pas à l’ouverture des frontières et à l’accueil des persécutés.
      « Usine à gaz »

      Mais la crise migratoire de 2015 a laissé des « divisions nombreuses et profondes entre les Etats membres - certaines des cicatrices qu’elle a laissées sont toujours visibles aujourd’hui », comme l’a reconnu Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission, dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union du 16 septembre. Afin de tourner la page, la Commission propose donc de laisser tomber la réforme de 2016 (dite de Dublin IV) prévoyant de pérenniser la relocalisation autoritaire des migrants, désormais jugée par une haute fonctionnaire de l’exécutif « totalement irréaliste ».

      Mais la réforme qu’elle propose, une véritable « usine à gaz », n’est qu’un « rapiéçage » de l’existant, comme l’explique Yves Pascouau, spécialiste de l’immigration et responsable des programmes européens de l’association Res Publica. Ainsi, alors que Von der Leyen a annoncé sa volonté « d’abolir » le règlement de Dublin III, il n’en est rien : le pays responsable du traitement d’une demande d’asile reste, par principe, comme c’est le cas depuis 1990, le pays de première entrée.

      S’il y a une crise, la Commission pourra déclencher un « mécanisme de solidarité » afin de soulager un pays de la ligne de front : dans ce cas, les Vingt-Sept devront accueillir un certain nombre de migrants (en fonction de leur richesse et de leur population), sauf s’ils préfèrent « parrainer un retour ». En clair, prendre en charge le refoulement des déboutés de l’asile (avec l’aide financière et logistique de l’Union) en sachant que ces personnes resteront à leur charge jusqu’à ce qu’ils y parviennent. Ça, c’est pour faire simple, car il y a plusieurs niveaux de crise, des exceptions, des sanctions, des délais et l’on en passe…

      Autre nouveauté : les demandes d’asile devront être traitées par principe à la frontière, dans des camps de rétention, pour les nationalités dont le taux de reconnaissance du statut de réfugié est inférieur à 20% dans l’Union, et ce, en moins de trois mois, avec refoulement à la clé en cas de refus. « Cette réforme pose un principe clair, explique un eurocrate. Personne ne sera obligé d’accueillir un étranger dont il ne veut pas. »

      Dans cet ensemble très sévère, une bonne nouvelle : les sauvetages en mer ne devraient plus être criminalisés. On peut craindre qu’une fois passés à la moulinette des Etats, qui doivent adopter ce paquet à la majorité qualifiée (55% des Etats représentant 65% de la population), il ne reste que les aspects les plus répressifs. On ne se refait pas.


      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/09/22/droit-d-asile-bruxelles-rate-son-pacte_1800264

      –—

      Graphique ajouté au fil de discussion sur les statistiques de la #relocalisation :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/605713

    • Le pacte européen sur l’asile et les migrations ne tire aucune leçon de la « crise migratoire »

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la nouvelle Commission européenne a présenté les grandes lignes d’orientation de sa politique migratoire à venir. Alors que cinq ans plutôt, en 2015, se déroulait la mal nommée « crise migratoire » aux frontières européennes, le nouveau Pacte Asile et Migration de l’UE ne tire aucune leçon du passé. Le nouveau pacte de l’Union Européenne nous propose inlassablement les mêmes recettes alors que les preuves de leur inefficacité, leur coût et des violences qu’elles procurent sont nombreuses et irréfutables. Le CNCD-11.11.11, son homologue néerlandophone et les membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à un changement de cap.

      Le nouveau Pacte repose sur des propositions législatives et des recommandations non contraignantes. Ses priorités sont claires mais pas neuves. Freiner les arrivées, limiter l’accueil par le « tri » des personnes et augmenter les retours. Cette stratégie pourtant maintes fois décriée par les ONG et le milieu académique a certes réussi à diminuer les arrivées en Europe, mais n’a offert aucune solution durable pour les personnes migrantes. Depuis les années 2000, l’externalisation de la gestion des questions migratoires a montré son inefficacité (situation humanitaires dans les hotspots, plus de 20.000 décès en Méditerranée depuis 2014 et processus d’encampement aux frontières de l’UE) et son coût exponentiel (coût élevé du contrôle, de la détention-expulsion et de l’aide au développement détournée). Elle a augmenté le taux de violences sur les routes de l’exil et a enfreint le droit international en toute impunité (non accès au droit d’asile notamment via les refoulements).

      "ll est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée"

      La proposition de mettre en place un mécanisme solidaire européen contraignant est à saluer, mais celui-ci doit être au service de l’accueil et non couplé au retour. La possibilité pour les États européens de choisir à la carte soit la relocalisation, le « parrainage » du retour des déboutés ou autre contribution financière n’est pas équitable. La répartition solidaire de l’accueil doit être permanente et ne pas être actionnée uniquement en cas « d’afflux massif » aux frontières d’un État membre comme le recommande la Commission. Il est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée. Le changement annoncé du Règlement de Dublin l’est juste de nom, car les premiers pays d’entrée resteront responsables des nouveaux arrivés.

      Le focus doit être mis sur les alternatives à la détention et non sur l’usage systématique de l’enfermement aux frontières, comme le veut la Commission. Le droit de demander l’asile et d’avoir accès à une procédure de qualité doit être accessible à tous et toutes et rester un droit individuel. Or, la proposition de la Commission de détenir (12 semaines maximum) en vue de screener (5 jours de tests divers et de recoupement de données via EURODAC) puis trier les personnes migrantes à la frontière en fonction du taux de reconnaissance de protection accordé en moyenne à leur pays d’origine (en dessous de 20%) ou de leur niveau de vulnérabilité est contraire à la Convention de Genève.

      "La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix."

      La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix, comme le préconise la Commission.

      La meilleure façon de lutter contre les violences sur les routes de l’exil reste la mise en place de plus de voies légales et sûres de migration (réinstallation, visas de travail, d’études, le regroupement familial…). Les ONG regrettent que la Commission reporte à 2021 les propositions sur la migration légale. Le pacte s’intéresse à juste titre à la criminalisation des ONG de sauvetage et des citoyens qui fournissent une aide humanitaire aux migrants. Toutefois, les propositions visant à y mettre fin sont insuffisantes. Les ONG se réjouissent de l’annonce par la Commission d’un mécanisme de surveillance des droits humains aux frontières extérieures. Au cours de l’année écoulée, on a signalé de plus en plus souvent des retours violents par la Croatie, la Grèce, Malte et Chypre. Toutefois, il n’est pas encore suffisamment clair si les propositions de la Commission peuvent effectivement traiter et sanctionner les refoulements.

      Au lendemain de l’incendie du hotspot à Moria, symbole par excellence de l’échec des politiques migratoires européennes, l’UE s’enfonce dans un déni total, meurtrier, en vue de concilier les divergences entre ses États membres. Les futures discussions autour du Pacte au sein du parlement UE et du Conseil UE seront cruciales. Les ONG membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le Parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à promouvoir des ajustements fermes allant vers plus de justice migratoire.

      https://www.cncd.be/Le-pacte-europeen-sur-l-asile-et

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Critical ‘First Look’ Analysis

      Where does it come from?

      The New Migration Pact was built on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme that the Commission tried to push in 2016. And the least that one can say, is that it shows! The whole migration plan has been decisively shaped by this initial failure. Though the Pact has some merits, the very fact that it takes as its starting point the radical demands made by the most nationalist governments in Europe leads to sacrificing migrants’ rights on the altar of a cohesive and integrated European migration policy.

      Back in 2016, the vigorous manoeuvring of the Commission to find a way out of the European asylum dead-end resulted in a bittersweet victory for the European institution. Though the Commission was able to find a qualified majority of member states willing to support a fair distribution of the asylum seekers among member states through a relocation scheme, this new regulation remained dead letter. Several eastern European states flatly refused to implement the plan, other member states seized this opportunity to defect on their obligations and the whole migration policy quickly unravelled. Since then, Europe is left with a dysfunctional Dublin agreement exacerbating the tensions between member states and 27 loosely connected national asylum regimes. On the latter point, at least, there is a consensus. Everyone agrees that the EU’s migration regime is broken and urgently needs to be fixed.

      Obviously, the Commission was not keen to go through a new round of political humiliation. Having been accused of “bureaucratic hubris” the first time around, the commissioners Schinas and Johansson decided not to repeat the same mistake. They toured the European capitals and listened to every side of the entrenched migration debate before drafting their Migration Pact. The intention is in the right place and it reflects the complexity of having to accommodate 27 distinct democratic debates in one single political space. Nevertheless, if one peers a bit more extensively through the content of the New Plan, it is complicated not to get the feelings that the Visegrad countries are currently the key players shaping the European migration and asylum policies. After all, their staunch opposition to a collective reception scheme sparked the political process and provided the starting point to the general discussion. As a result, it is no surprise that the New Pact tilts firmly towards an ever more restrictive approach to migration, beefs up the coercive powers of both member states and European agencies and raises many concerns with regards to the respect of the migrants’ fundamental rights.
      What is in this New Pact on Migration and Asylum?

      Does the Pact concede too much ground to the demands of the most xenophobic European governments? To answer that question, let us go back to the bizarre metaphor used by the commissioner Schinas. During his press conference, he insisted on comparing the New Pact on Migration and Asylum to a house built on solid foundations (i.e. the lengthy and inclusive consultation process) and made of 3 floors: first, some renewed partnerships with the sending and transit states, second, some more effective border procedures, and third, a revamped mandatory – but flexible ! – solidarity scheme. It is tempting to carry on with the metaphor and to say that this house may appear comfortable from the inside but that it remains tightly shut to anyone knocking on its door from the outside. For, a careful examination reveals that each of the three “floors” (policy packages, actually) lays the emphasis on a repressive approach to migration aimed at deterring would-be asylum seekers from attempting to reach the European shores.
      The “new partnerships” with sending and transit countries, a “change in paradigm”?

      Let us add that there is little that is actually “new” in this New Migration Pact. For instance, the first policy package, that is, the suggestion that the EU should renew its partnerships with sending and transit countries is, as a matter of fact, an old tune in the Brussels bubble. The Commission may boast that it marks a “change of paradigm”, one fails to see how this would be any different from the previous European diplomatic efforts. Since migration and asylum are increasingly considered as toxic topics (for, they would be the main factors behind the rise of nationalism and its corollary, Euroscepticism), the European Union is willing to externalize this issue, seemingly at all costs. The results, however, have been mixed in the past. To the Commission’s own admission, only a third of the migrants whose asylum claims have been rejected are effectively returned. Besides the facts that returns are costly, extremely coercive, and administratively complicated to organize, the main reason for this low rate of successful returns is that sending countries refuse to cooperate in the readmission procedures. Neighbouring countries have excellent reasons not to respond positively to the Union’s demands. For some, remittances sent by their diaspora are an economic lifeline. Others just do not want to appear complicit of repressive European practices on their domestic political scene. Furthermore, many African countries are growing discontent with the forceful way the European Union uses its asymmetrical relation of power in bilateral negotiations to dictate to those sovereign states the migration policies they should adopt, making for instance its development aid conditional on the implementation of stricter border controls. The Commission may rhetorically claim to foster “mutually beneficial” international relation with its neighbouring countries, the emphasis on the externalization of migration control in the EU’s diplomatic agenda nevertheless bears some of the hallmarks of neo-colonialism. As such, it is a source of deep resentment in sending and transit states. It would therefore be a grave mistake for the EU to overlook the fact that some short-term gains in terms of migration management may result in long-term losses with regards to Europe’s image across the world.

      Furthermore, considering the current political situation, one should not primarily be worried about the failed partnerships with neighbouring countries, it is rather the successful ones that ought to give us pause and raise concerns. For, based on the existing evidence, the EU will sign a deal with any state as long as it effectively restrains and contains migration flows towards the European shores. Being an authoritarian state with a documented history of human right violations (Turkey) or an embattled government fighting a civil war (Lybia) does not disqualify you as a partner of the European Union in its effort to manage migration flows. It is not only morally debatable for the EU to delegate its asylum responsibilities to unreliable third countries, it is also doubtful that an increase in diplomatic pressure on neighbouring countries will bring major political results. It will further damage the perception of the EU in neighbouring countries without bringing significant restriction to migration flows.
      Streamlining border procedures? Or eroding migrants’ rights?

      The second policy package is no more inviting. It tackles the issue of the migrants who, in spite of those partnerships and the hurdles thrown their way by sending and transit countries, would nevertheless reach Europe irregularly. On this issue, the Commission faced the daunting task of having to square a political circle, since it had to find some common ground in a debate bitterly divided between conflicting worldviews (roughly, between liberal and nationalist perspectives on the individual freedom of movement) and competing interests (between overburdened Mediterranean member states and Eastern member states adamant that asylum seekers would endanger their national cohesion). The Commission thus looked for the lowest common denominator in terms of migration management preferences amongst the distinct member states. The result is a two-tier border procedure aiming to fast-track and streamline the processing of asylum claims, allowing for more expeditious returns of irregular migrants. The goal is to prevent any bottleneck in the processing of the claims and to avoid the (currently near constant) overcrowding of reception facilities in the frontline states. Once again, there is little that is actually new in this proposal. It amounts to a generalization of the process currently in place in the infamous hotspots scattered on the Greek isles. According to the Pact, screening procedures would be carried out in reception centres created across Europe. A far cry from the slogan “no more Moria” since one may legitimately suspect that those reception centres will, at the first hiccup in the procedure, turn into tomorrow’s asylum camps.

      According to this procedure, newly arrived migrants would be submitted within 5 days to a pre-screening procedure and subsequently triaged into two categories. Migrants with a low chance of seeing their asylum claim recognized (because they would come from a country with a low recognition rate or a country belonging to the list of the safe third countries, for instance) would be redirected towards an accelerated procedure. The end goal would be to return them, if applicable, within twelve weeks. The other migrants would be subjected to the standard assessment of their asylum claim. It goes without saying that this proposal has been swiftly and unanimously condemned by all human rights organizations. It does not take a specialized lawyer to see that this two-tiered procedure could have devastating consequences for the “fast-tracked” asylum seekers left with no legal recourse against the initial decision to submit them to this sped up procedure (rather than the standard one) as well as reduced opportunities to defend their asylum claim or, if need be, to contest their return. No matter how often the Commission repeats that it will preserve all the legal safeguards required to protect migrants’ rights, it remains wildly unconvincing. Furthermore, the Pact may confuse speed and haste. The schedule is tight on paper (five days for the pre-screening, twelve weeks for the assessment of the asylum claim), it may well prove unrealistic to meet those deadlines in real-life conditions. The Commission also overlooks the fact that accelerated procedures tend to be sloppy, thus leading to juridical appeals and further legal wrangling and eventually amounting to processes far longer than expected.
      Integrating the returns, not the reception

      The Commission talked up the new Pact as being “balanced” and “humane”. Since the two first policy packages focus, first, on preventing would-be migrants from leaving their countries and, second, on facilitating and accelerating their returns, one would expect the third policy package to move away from the restriction of movement and to complement those measures with a reception plan tailored to the needs of refugees. And here comes the major disappointment with the New Pact and, perhaps, the clearest indication that the Pact is first and foremost designed to please the migration hardliners. It does include a solidarity scheme meant to alleviate the burden of frontline countries, to distribute more fairly the responsibilities amongst member states and to ensure that refugees are properly hosted. But this solidarity scheme is far from being robust enough to deliver on those promises. Let us unpack it briefly to understand why it is likely to fail. The solidarity scheme is mandatory. All member states will be under the obligation to take part. But there is a catch! Member states’ contribution to this collective effort can take many shapes and forms and it will be up to the member states to decide how they want to participate. They get to choose whether they want to relocate some refugees on their national soil, to provide some financial and/or logistical assistance, or to “sponsor” (it is the actual term used by the Commission) some returns.

      No one expected the Commission to reintroduce a compulsory relocation scheme in its Pact. Eastern European countries had drawn an obvious red line and it would have been either naïve or foolish to taunt them with that kind of policy proposal. But this so-called “flexible mandatory solidarity” relies on such a watered-down understanding of the solidarity principle that it results in a weak and misguided political instrument unsuited to solve the problem at hand. First, the flexible solidarity mechanism is too indeterminate to prove efficient. According to the current proposal, member states would have to shoulder a fair share of the reception burden (calculated on their respective population and GDP) but would be left to decide for themselves which form this contribution would take. The obvious flaw with the policy proposal is that, if all member states decline to relocate some refugees (which is a plausible scenario), Mediterranean states would still be left alone when it comes to dealing with the most immediate consequences of migration flows. They would receive much more financial, operational, and logistical support than it currently is the case – but they would be managing on their own the overcrowded reception centres. The Commission suggests that it would oversee the national pledges in terms of relocation and that it would impose some corrections if the collective pledges fall short of a predefined target. But it remains to be seen whether the Commission will have the political clout to impose some relocations to member states refusing them. One could not be blamed for being highly sceptical.

      Second, it is noteworthy that the Commission fails to integrate the reception of refugees since member states are de facto granted an opt-out on hosting refugees. What is integrated is rather the return policy, once more a repressive instrument. And it is the member states with the worst record in terms of migrants’ rights violations that are the most likely to be tasked with the delicate mission of returning them home. As a commentator was quipping on Twitter, it would be like asking a bully to walk his victim home (what could possibly go wrong?). The attempt to build an intra-European consensus is obviously pursued at the expense of the refugees. The incentive structure built into the flexible solidarity scheme offers an excellent illustration of this. If a member state declines to relocate any refugee and offers instead to ‘sponsor’ some returns, it has to honour that pledge within a limited period of time (the Pact suggests a six month timeframe). If it fails to do so, it becomes responsible for the relocation and the return of those migrants, leading to a situation in which some migrants may end up in a country where they do not want to be and that does not want them to be there. Hardly an optimal outcome…
      Conclusion

      The Pact represents a genuine attempt to design a multi-faceted and comprehensive migration policy, covering most aspects of a complex issue. The dysfunctions of the Schengen area and the question of the legal pathways to Europe have been relegated to a later discussion and one may wonder whether they should not have been included in the Pact to balance out its restrictive inclination. And, in all fairness, the Pact does throw a few bones to the more cosmopolitan-minded European citizens. For instance, it reminds the member states that maritime search and rescue operations are legal and should not be impeded, or it shortens (from five to three years) the waiting period for refugees to benefit from the freedom of movement. But those few welcome additions are vastly outweighed by the fact that migration hardliners dominated the agenda-setting in the early stage of the policy-making exercise and have thus been able to frame decisively the political discussion. The end result is a policy package leaning heavily towards some repressive instruments and particularly careless when it comes to safeguarding migrants’ rights.

      The New Pact was first drafted on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme. Back then, the Commission publicly made amends and revised its approach to the issue. Sadly, the New Pact was presented to the European public when the ashes of the Moria camp were still lukewarm. One can only hope that the member states will learn from that mistake too.

      https://blog.novamigra.eu/2020/09/24/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-a-critical-first-look-analysis

    • #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration : un “nouveau départ” pour violer les droits humains

      La Commission européenne a publié aujourd’hui son « Nouveau Pacte sur l’Asile et la Migration » qui propose un nouveau cadre règlementaire et législatif. Avec ce plan, l’UE devient de facto un « leader du voyage retour » pour les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s en Méditerranée. EuroMed Droits craint que ce pacte ne détériore encore davantage la situation actuelle pour au moins trois raisons.

      Le pacte se concentre de manière obsessionnelle sur la politique de retours à travers un système de « sponsoring » : des pays européens tels que l’Autriche, la Pologne, la Hongrie ou la République tchèque – qui refusent d’accueillir des réfugié.e.s – pourront « sponsoriser » et organiser la déportation vers les pays de départ de ces réfugié.e.s. Au lieu de favoriser l’intégration, le pacte adopte une politique de retour à tout prix, même lorsque les demandeurs.ses d’asile peuvent être victimes de discrimination, persécution ou torture dans leur pays de retour. A ce jour, il n’existe aucun mécanisme permettant de surveiller ce qui arrive aux migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s une fois déporté.e.s.

      Le pacte proposé renforce la sous-traitance de la gestion des frontières. En termes concrets, l’UE renforce la coopération avec les pays non-européens afin qu’ils ferment leurs frontières et empêchent les personnes de partir. Cette coopération est sujette à l’imposition de conditions par l’UE. Une telle décision européenne se traduit par une hausse du nombre de refoulements dans la région méditerranéenne et une coopération renforcée avec des pays qui ont un piètre bilan en matière de droits humains et qui ne possèdent pas de cadre efficace pour la protection des droits des personnes migrantes et réfugiées.

      Le pacte vise enfin à étendre les mécanismes de tri des demandeurs.ses d’asile et des migrant.e.s dans les pays d’arrivée. Ce modèle de tri – similaire à celui utilisé dans les zones de transit aéroportuaires – accentue les difficultés de pays tels que l’Espagne, l’Italie, Malte, la Grèce ou Chypre qui accueillent déjà la majorité des migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s. Placer ces personnes dans des camps revient à mettre en place un système illégal d’incarcération automatique dès l’arrivée. Cela accroîtra la violence psychologique à laquelle les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s sont déjà soumis. Selon ce nouveau système, ces personnes seront identifié.e.s sous cinq jours et toute demande d’asile devra être traitée en douze semaines. Cette accélération de la procédure risque d’intensifier la détention et de diviser les arrivant.e.s entre demandeurs.ses d’asile et migrant.e.s économiques. Cela s’effectuerait de manière discriminatoire, sans analyse détaillée de chaque demande d’asile ni possibilité réelle de faire appel. Celles et ceux qui seront éligibles à la protection internationale seront relocalisé.e.s au sein des États membres qui acceptent de les recevoir. Les autres risqueront d’être déportés immédiatement.

      « En choisissant de sous-traiter davantage encore la gestion des frontières et d’accentuer la politique de retours, ce nouveau pacte conclut la transformation de la politique européenne en une approche pleinement sécuritaire. Pire encore, le pacte assimile la politique de “retour sponsorisé” à une forme de solidarité. Au-delà des déclarations officielles, cela démontre la volonté de l’Union européenne de criminaliser et de déshumaniser les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s », a déclaré Wadih Al-Asmar, Président d’EuroMed Droits.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-nouveau-depart-pour-violer-les-droits

    • Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum

      This Policy Insight examines the new Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the principles and commitments enshrined in the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees (UN GCR) and the EU Treaties. It finds that from a legal viewpoint the ‘Pact’ is not really a Pact at all, if understood as an agreement concluded between relevant EU institutional parties. Rather, it is the European Commission’s policy guide for the duration of the current 9th legislature.

      The analysis shows that the Pact has intergovernmental aspects, in both name and fundamentals. It does not pursue a genuine Migration and Asylum Union. The Pact encourages an artificial need for consensus building or de facto unanimity among all EU member states’ governments in fields where the EU Treaties call for qualified majority voting (QMV) with the European Parliament as co-legislator. The Pact does not abolish the first irregular entry rule characterising the EU Dublin Regulation. It adopts a notion of interstate solidarity that leads to asymmetric responsibilities, where member states are given the flexibility to evade participating in the relocation of asylum seekers. The Pact also runs the risk of catapulting some contested member states practices’ and priorities about localisation, speed and de-territorialisation into EU policy.

      This Policy Insight argues that the Pact’s priority of setting up an independent monitoring mechanism of border procedures’ compliance with fundamental rights is a welcome step towards the better safeguarding of the rule of law. The EU inter-institutional negotiations on the Pact’s initiatives should be timely and robust in enforcing member states’ obligations under the current EU legal standards relating to asylum and borders, namely the prevention of detention and expedited expulsions, and the effective access by all individuals to dignified treatment and effective remedies. Trust and legitimacy of EU asylum and migration policy can only follow if international (human rights and refugee protection) commitments and EU Treaty principles are put first.

      https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/whose-pact

    • First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals

      This week the EU Commission published its new package of proposals on asylum and (non-EU) migration – consisting of proposals for legislation, some ‘soft law’, attempts to relaunch talks on stalled proposals and plans for future measures. The following is an explanation of the new proposals (not attempting to cover every detail) with some first thoughts. Overall, while it is possible that the new package will lead to agreement on revised asylum laws, this will come at the cost of risking reduced human rights standards.

      Background

      Since 1999, the EU has aimed to create a ‘Common European Asylum System’. A first phase of legislation was passed between 2003 and 2005, followed by a second phase between 2010 and 2013. Currently the legislation consists of: a) the Qualification Directive, which defines when people are entitled to refugee status (based on the UN Refugee Convention) or subsidiary protection status, and what rights they have; b) the Dublin III Regulation, which allocates responsibility for an asylum seeker between Member States; c) the Eurodac Regulation, which facilitates the Dublin system by setting up a database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and people who cross the external border without authorisation; d) the Asylum Procedures Directive, which sets out the procedural rules governing asylum applications, such as personal interviews and appeals; e) the Reception Conditions Directive, which sets out standards on the living conditions of asylum-seekers, such as rules on housing and welfare; and f) the Asylum Agency Regulation, which set up an EU agency (EASO) to support Member States’ processing of asylum applications.

      The EU also has legislation on other aspects of migration: (short-term) visas, border controls, irregular migration, and legal migration – much of which has connections with the asylum legislation, and all of which is covered by this week’s package. For visas, the main legislation is the visa list Regulation (setting out which non-EU countries’ citizens are subject to a short-term visa requirement, or exempt from it) and the visa code (defining the criteria to obtain a short-term Schengen visa, allowing travel between all Schengen states). The visa code was amended last year, as discussed here.

      For border controls, the main legislation is the Schengen Borders Code, setting out the rules on crossing external borders and the circumstances in which Schengen states can reinstate controls on internal borders, along with the Frontex Regulation, setting up an EU border agency to assist Member States. On the most recent version of the Frontex Regulation, see discussion here and here.

      For irregular migration, the main legislation is the Return Directive. The Commission proposed to amend it in 2018 – on which, see analysis here and here.

      For legal migration, the main legislation on admission of non-EU workers is the single permit Directive (setting out a common process and rights for workers, but not regulating admission); the Blue Card Directive (on highly paid migrants, discussed here); the seasonal workers’ Directive (discussed here); and the Directive on intra-corporate transferees (discussed here). The EU also has legislation on: non-EU students, researchers and trainees (overview here); non-EU family reunion (see summary of the legislation and case law here) and on long-term resident non-EU citizens (overview – in the context of UK citizens after Brexit – here). In 2016, the Commission proposed to revise the Blue Card Directive (see discussion here).

      The UK, Ireland and Denmark have opted out of most of these laws, except some asylum law applies to the UK and Ireland, and Denmark is covered by the Schengen and Dublin rules. So are the non-EU countries associated with Schengen and Dublin (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). There are also a number of further databases of non-EU citizens as well as Eurodac: the EU has never met a non-EU migrant who personal data it didn’t want to store and process.

      The Refugee ‘Crisis’

      The EU’s response to the perceived refugee ‘crisis’ was both short-term and long-term. In the short term, in 2015 the EU adopted temporary laws (discussed here) relocating some asylum seekers in principle from Italy and Greece to other Member States. A legal challenge to one of these laws failed (as discussed here), but in practice Member States accepted few relocations anyway. Earlier this year, the CJEU ruled that several Member States had breached their obligations under the laws (discussed here), but by then it was a moot point.

      Longer term, the Commission proposed overhauls of the law in 2016: a) a Qualification Regulation further harmonising the law on refugee and subsidiary protection status; b) a revised Dublin Regulation, which would have set up a system of relocation of asylum seekers for future crises; c) a revised Eurodac Regulation, to take much more data from asylum seekers and other migrants; d) an Asylum Procedures Regulation, further harmonising the procedural law on asylum applications; e) a revised Reception Conditions Directive; f) a revised Asylum Agency Regulation, giving the agency more powers; and g) a new Resettlement Regulation, setting out a framework of admitting refugees directly from non-EU countries. (See my comments on some of these proposals, from back in 2016)

      However, these proposals proved unsuccessful – which is the main reason for this week’s attempt to relaunch the process. In particular, an EU Council note from February 2019 summarises the diverse problems that befell each proposal. While the EU Council Presidency and the European Parliament reached agreement on the proposals on qualification, reception conditions and resettlement in June 2018, Member States refused to support the Presidency’s deal and the European Parliament refused to renegotiate (see, for instance, the Council documents on the proposals on qualification and resettlement; see also my comments on an earlier stage of the talks, when the Council had agreed its negotiation position on the qualification regulation).

      On the asylum agency, the EP and Council agreed on the revised law in 2017, but the Commission proposed an amendment in 2018 to give the agency more powers; the Council could not agree on this. On Eurodac, the EP and Council only partly agreed on a text. On the procedures Regulation, the Council largely agreed its position, except on border procedures; on Dublin there was never much prospect of agreement because of the controversy over relocating asylum seekers. (For either proposal, a difficult negotiation with the European Parliament lay ahead).

      In other areas too, the legislative process was difficult: the Council and EP gave up negotiating amendments to the Blue Card Directive (see the last attempt at a compromise here, and the Council negotiation mandate here), and the EP has not yet agreed a position on the Returns Directive (the Council has a negotiating position, but again it leaves out the difficult issue of border procedures; there is a draft EP position from February). Having said that, the EU has been able to agree legislation giving more powers to Frontex, as well as new laws on EU migration databases, in the last few years.

      The attempted relaunch

      The Commission’s new Pact on asylum and immigration (see also the roadmap on its implementation, the Q and As, and the staff working paper) does not restart the whole process from scratch. On qualification, reception conditions, resettlement, the asylum agency, the returns Directive and the Blue Card Directive, it invites the Council and Parliament to resume negotiations. But it tries to unblock the talks as a whole by tabling two amended legislative proposals and three new legislative proposals, focussing on the issues of border procedures and relocation of asylum seekers.

      Screening at the border

      This revised proposals start with a new proposal for screening asylum seekers at the border, which would apply to all non-EU citizens who cross an external border without authorisation, who apply for asylum while being checked at the border (without meeting the conditions for legal entry), or who are disembarked after a search and rescue operation. During the screening, these non-EU citizens are not allowed to enter the territory of a Member State, unless it becomes clear that they meet the criteria for entry. The screening at the border should take no longer than 5 days, with an extra 5 days in the event of a huge influx. (It would also be possible to apply the proposed law to those on the territory who evaded border checks; for them the deadline to complete the screening is 3 days).

      Screening has six elements, as further detailed in the proposal: a health check, an identity check, registration in a database, a security check, filling out a debriefing form, and deciding on what happens next. At the end of the screening, the migrant is channelled either into the expulsion process (if no asylum claim has been made, and if the migrant does not meet the conditions for entry) or, if an asylum claim is made, into the asylum process – with an indication of whether the claim should be fast-tracked or not. It’s also possible that an asylum seeker would be relocated to another Member State. The screening is carried out by national officials, possibly with support from EU agencies.

      To ensure human rights protection, there must be independent monitoring to address allegations of non-compliance with human rights. These allegations might concern breaches of EU or international law, national law on detention, access to the asylum procedure, or non-refoulement (the ban on sending people to an unsafe country). Migrants must be informed about the process and relevant EU immigration and data protection law. There is no provision for judicial review of the outcome of the screening process, although there would be review as part of the next step (asylum or return).

      Asylum procedures

      The revised proposal for an asylum procedures Regulation would leave in place most of the Commission’s 2016 proposal to amend the law, adding some specific further proposed amendments, which either link back to the screening proposal or aim to fast-track decisions and expulsions more generally.

      On the first point, the usual rules on informing asylum applicants and registering their application would not apply until after the end of the screening. A border procedure may apply following the screening process, but Member States must apply the border procedure in cases where an asylum seeker used false documents, is a perceived national security threat, or falls within the new ground for fast-tracking cases (on which, see below). The latter obligation is subject to exceptions where a Member State has reported that a non-EU country is not cooperating on readmission; the process for dealing with that issue set out under the 2019 amendments to the visa code will then apply. Also, the border process cannot apply to unaccompanied minors or children under 12, unless they are a supposed national security risk. Further exceptions apply where the asylum seeker is vulnerable or has medical needs, the application is not inadmissible or cannot be fast-tracked, or detention conditions cannot be guaranteed. A Member State might apply the Dublin process to determine which Member State is responsible for the asylum claim during the border process. The whole border process (including any appeal) must last no more than 12 weeks, and can only be used to declare applications inadmissible or apply the new ground for fast-tracking them.

      There would also be a new border expulsion procedure, where an asylum application covered by the border procedure was rejected. This is subject to its own 12-week deadline, starting from the point when the migrant is no longer allowed to remain. Much of the Return Directive would apply – but not the provisions on the time period for voluntary departure, remedies and the grounds for detention. Instead, the border expulsion procedure would have its own stricter rules on these issues.

      As regards general fast-tracking, in order to speed up the expulsion process for unsuccessful applications, a rejection of an asylum application would have to either incorporate an expulsion decision or entail a simultaneous separate expulsion decision. Appeals against expulsion decisions would then be subject to the same rules as appeals against asylum decisions. If the asylum seeker comes from a country with a refugee recognition rate below 20%, his or her application must be fast-tracked (this would even apply to unaccompanied minors) – unless circumstances in that country have changed, or the asylum seeker comes from a group for whom the low recognition rate is not representative (for instance, the recognition rate might be higher for LGBT asylum-seekers from that country). Many more appeals would be subject to a one-week time limit for the rejected asylum seeker to appeal, and there could be only one level of appeal against decisions taken within a border procedure.

      Eurodac

      The revised proposal for Eurodac would build upon the 2016 proposal, which was already far-reaching: extending Eurodac to include not only fingerprints, but also photos and other personal data; reducing the age of those covered by Eurodac from 14 to 6; removing the time limits and the limits on use of the fingerprints taken from persons who had crossed the border irregularly; and creating a new obligation to collect data of all irregular migrants over age 6 (currently fingerprint data for this group cannot be stored, but can simply be checked, as an option, against the data on asylum seekers and irregular border crossers). The 2020 proposal additionally provides for interoperability with other EU migration databases, taking of personal data during the screening process, including more data on the migration status of each person, and expressly applying the law to those disembarked after a search and rescue operation.

      Dublin rules on asylum responsibility

      A new proposal for asylum management would replace the Dublin regulation (meaning that the Commission has withdrawn its 2016 proposal to replace that Regulation). The 2016 proposal would have created a ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry, requiring that State to examine first whether many of the grounds for removing an asylum-seeker to a non-EU country apply before considering whether another Member State might be responsible for the application (because the asylum seeker’s family live there, for instance). It would also have imposed obligations directly on asylum-seekers to cooperate with the process, rather than only regulate relations between Member States. These obligations would have been enforced by punishing asylum seekers who disobeyed: removing their reception conditions (apart from emergency health care); fast-tracking their substantive asylum applications; refusing to consider new evidence from them; and continuing the asylum application process in their absence.

      It would no longer be possible for asylum seekers to provide additional evidence of family links, with a view to being in the same country as a family member. Overturning a CJEU judgment (see further discussion here), unaccompanied minors would no longer have been able to make applications in multiple Member States (in the absence of a family member in any of them). However, the definition of family members would have been widened, to include siblings and families formed in a transit country. Responsibility for an asylum seeker based on the first Member State of irregular entry (a commonly applied criterion) would have applied indefinitely, rather than expire one year after entry as it does under the current rules. The ‘Sangatte clause’ (responsibility after five months of living in a second Member State, if the ‘irregular entry’ criterion no longer applies) would be dropped. The ‘sovereignty clause’, which played a key part in the 2015-16 refugee ‘crisis’ (it lets a Member State take responsibility for any application even if the Dublin rules do not require it, cf Germany accepting responsibility for Syrian asylum seekers) would have been sharply curtailed. Time limits for detention during the transfer process would be reduced. Remedies for asylum seekers would have been curtailed: they would only have seven days to appeal against a transfer; courts would have fifteen days to decide (although they could have stayed on the territory throughout); and the grounds of review would have been curtailed.

      Finally, the 2016 proposal would have tackled the vexed issue of disproportionate allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers by setting up an automated system determining how many asylum seekers each Member State ‘should’ have based on their size and GDP. If a Member State were responsible for excessive numbers of applicants, Member States which were receiving fewer numbers would have to take more to help out. If they refused, they would have to pay €250,000 per applicant.

      The 2020 proposal drops some of the controversial proposals from 2016, including the ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry (the current rule, giving Member States an option to decide if a non-EU country is responsible for the application on narrower grounds than in the 2016 proposal, would still apply). Also, the sovereignty clause would now remain unchanged.

      However, the 2020 proposal also retains parts of the 2016 proposal: the redefinition of ‘family member’ (which could be more significant now that the bottleneck is removed, unless Member States choose to apply the relevant rules on non-EU countries’ responsibility during the border procedure already); obligations for asylum seekers (redrafted slightly); some of the punishments for non-compliant asylum-seekers (the cut-off for considering evidence would stay, as would the loss of benefits except for those necessary to ensure a basic standard of living: see the CJEU case law in CIMADE and Haqbin); dropping the provision on evidence of family links; changing the rules on responsibility for unaccompanied minors; retaining part of the changes to the irregular entry criterion (it would now cease to apply after three years; the Sangatte clause would still be dropped; it would apply after search and rescue but not apply in the event of relocation); curtailing judicial review (the grounds would still be limited; the time limit to appeal would be 14 days; courts would not have a strict deadline to decide; suspensive effect would not apply in all cases); and the reduced time limits for detention.

      The wholly new features of the 2020 proposal are: some vague provisions about crisis management; responsibility for an asylum application for the Member State which issued a visa or residence document which expired in the last three years (the current rule is responsibility if the visa expired less than six months ago, and the residence permit expired less than a year ago); responsibility for an asylum application for a Member State in which a non-EU citizen obtained a diploma; and the possibility for refugees or persons with subsidiary protection status to obtain EU long-term resident status after three years, rather than five.

      However, the most significant feature of the new proposal is likely to be its attempt to solve the underlying issue of disproportionate allocation of asylum seekers. Rather than a mechanical approach to reallocating responsibility, the 2020 proposal now provides for a menu of ‘solidarity contributions’: relocation of asylum seekers; relocation of refugees; ‘return sponsorship’; or support for ‘capacity building’ in the Member State (or a non-EU country) facing migratory pressure. There are separate rules for search and rescue disembarkations, on the one hand, and more general migratory pressures on the other. Once the Commission determines that the latter situation exists, other Member States have to choose from the menu to offer some assistance. Ultimately the Commission will adopt a decision deciding what the contributions will be. Note that ‘return sponsorship’ comes with a ticking clock: if the persons concerned are not expelled within eight months, the sponsoring Member State must accept them on its territory.

      Crisis management

      The issue of managing asylum issues in a crisis has been carved out of the Dublin proposal into a separate proposal, which would repeal an EU law from 2001 that set up a framework for offering ‘temporary protection’ in a crisis. Note that Member States have never used the 2001 law in practice.

      Compared to the 2001 law, the new proposal is integrated into the EU asylum legislation that has been adopted or proposed in the meantime. It similarly applies in the event of a ‘mass influx’ that prevents the effective functioning of the asylum system. It would apply the ‘solidarity’ process set out in the proposal to replace the Dublin rules (ie relocation of asylum seekers and other measures), with certain exceptions and shorter time limits to apply that process.

      The proposal focusses on providing for possible exceptions to the usual asylum rules. In particular, during a crisis, the Commission could authorise a Member State to apply temporary derogations from the rules on border asylum procedures (extending the time limit, using the procedure to fast-track more cases), border return procedures (again extending the time limit, more easily justifying detention), or the time limit to register asylum applicants. Member States could also determine that due to force majeure, it was not possible to observe the normal time limits for registering asylum applications, applying the Dublin process for responsibility for asylum applications, or offering ‘solidarity’ to other Member States.

      Finally, the new proposal, like the 2001 law, would create a potential for a form of separate ‘temporary protection’ status for the persons concerned. A Member State could suspend the consideration of asylum applications from people coming from the country facing a crisis for up to a year, in the meantime giving them status equivalent to ‘subsidiary protection’ status in the EU qualification law. After that point it would have to resume consideration of the applications. It would need the Commission’s approval, whereas the 2001 law left it to the Council to determine a situation of ‘mass influx’ and provided for the possible extension of the special rules for up to three years.

      Other measures

      The Commission has also adopted four soft law measures. These comprise: a Recommendation on asylum crisis management; a Recommendation on resettlement and humanitarian admission; a Recommendation on cooperation between Member States on private search and rescue operations; and guidance on the applicability of EU law on smuggling of migrants – notably concluding that it cannot apply where (as in the case of law of the sea) there is an obligation to rescue.

      On other issues, the Commission plan is to use current legislation – in particular the recent amendment to the visa code, which provides for sticks to make visas more difficult to get for citizens of countries which don’t cooperate on readmission of people, and carrots to make visas easier to get for citizens of countries which do cooperate on readmission. In some areas, such as the Schengen system, there will be further strategies and plans in the near future; it is not clear if this will lead to more proposed legislation.

      However, on legal migration, the plan is to go further than relaunching the amendment of the Blue Card Directive, as the Commission is also planning to propose amendments to the single permit and long-term residence laws referred to above – leading respectively to more harmonisation of the law on admission of non-EU workers and enhanced possibilities for long-term resident non-EU citizens to move between Member States (nb the latter plan is separate from this week’s proposal to amend this law as regards refugees and people with subsidiary protection already). Both these plans are relevant to British citizens moving to the EU after the post-Brexit transition period – and the latter is also relevant to British citizens covered by the withdrawal agreement.

      Comments

      This week’s plan is less a complete restart of EU law in this area than an attempt to relaunch discussions on a blocked set of amendments to that law, which moreover focusses on a limited set of issues. Will it ‘work’? There are two different ways to answer that question.

      First, will it unlock the institutional blockage? Here it should be kept in mind that the European Parliament and the Council had largely agreed on several of the 2016 proposals already; they would have been adopted in 2018 already had not the Council treated all the proposals as a package, and not gone back on agreements which the Council Presidency reached with the European Parliament. It is always open to the Council to get at least some of these proposals adopted quickly by reversing these approaches.

      On the blocked proposals, the Commission has targeted the key issues of border procedures and allocation of asylum-seekers. If the former leads to more quick removals of unsuccessful applicants, the latter issue is no longer so pressing. But it is not clear if the Member States will agree to anything on border procedures, or whether such an agreement will result in more expulsions anyway – because the latter depends on the willingness of non-EU countries, which the EU cannot legislate for (and does not even address in this most recent package). And because it is uncertain whether they will result in more expulsions, Member States will be wary of agreeing to anything which either results in more obligations to accept asylum-seekers on their territory, or leaves them with the same number as before.

      The idea of ‘return sponsorship’ – which reads like a grotesque parody of individuals sponsoring children in developing countries via charities – may not be appealing except to those countries like France, which have the capacity to twist arms in developing countries to accept returns. Member States might be able to agree on a replacement for the temporary protection Directive on the basis that they will never use that replacement either. And Commission threats to use infringement proceedings to enforce the law might not worry Member States who recall that the CJEU ruled on their failure to relocate asylum-seekers after the relocation law had already expired, and that the Court will soon rule on Hungary’s expulsion of the Central European University after it has already left.

      As to whether the proposals will ‘work’ in terms of managing asylum flows fairly and compatibly with human rights, it is striking how much they depend upon curtailing appeal rights, even though appeals are often successful. The proposed limitation of appeal rights will also be maintained in the Dublin system; and while the proposed ‘bottleneck’ of deciding on removals to non-EU countries before applying the Dublin system has been removed, a variation on this process may well apply in the border procedures process instead. There is no new review of the assessment of the safety of non-EU countries – which is questionable in light of the many reports of abuse in Libya. While the EU is not proposing, as the wildest headbangers would want, to turn people back or refuse applications without consideration, the question is whether the fast-track consideration of applications and then appeals will constitute merely a Potemkin village of procedural rights that mean nothing in practice.

      Increased detention is already a feature of the amendments proposed earlier: the reception conditions proposal would add a new ground for detention; the return Directive proposal would inevitably increase detention due to curtailing voluntary departure (as discussed here). Unfortunately the Commission’s claim in its new communication that its 2018 proposal is ‘promoting’ voluntary return is therefore simply false. Trump-style falsehoods have no place in the discussion of EU immigration or asylum law.

      The latest Eurodac proposal would not do much compared to the 2016 proposal – but then, the 2016 proposal would already constitute an enormous increase in the amount of data collected and shared by that system.

      Some elements of the package are more positive. The possibility for refugees and people with subsidiary protection to get EU long-term residence status earlier would be an important step toward making asylum ‘valid throughout the Union’, as referred to in the Treaties. The wider definition of family members, and the retention of the full sovereignty clause, may lead to some fairer results under the Dublin system. Future plans to improve the long-term residents’ Directive are long overdue. The Commission’s sound legal assessment that no one should be prosecuted for acting on their obligations to rescue people in distress at sea is welcome. The quasi-agreed text of the reception conditions Directive explicitly rules out Trump-style separate detention of children.

      No proposals from the EU can solve the underlying political issue: a chunk of public opinion is hostile to more migration, whether in frontline Member States, other Member States, or transit countries outside the EU. The politics is bound to affect what Member States and non-EU countries alike are willing to agree to. And for the same reason, even if a set of amendments to the system is ultimately agreed, there will likely be continuing issues of implementation, especially illegal pushbacks and refusals to accept relocation.

      https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/09/first-analysis-of-eus-new-asylum.html?spref=fb

    • Pacte européen sur les migrations et l’asile : Le rendez-vous manqué de l’UE

      Le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile présenté par la Commission ce 23 septembre, loin de tirer les leçons de l’échec et du coût humain intolérable des politiques menées depuis 30 ans, s’inscrit dans la continuité des logiques déjà largement éprouvées, fondées sur une approche répressive et sécuritaire au service de l’endiguement et des expulsions et au détriment d’une politique d’accueil qui s’attache à garantir et à protéger la dignité et les droits fondamentaux.

      Des « nouveaux » camps européens aux frontières pour filtrer les personnes arrivées sur le territoire européen et expulser le plus grand nombre

      En réaction au drame des incendies qui ont ravagé le camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, affirmait le 17 septembre devant les députés européens qu’« il n’y aurait pas d’autres Moria » mais de « véritables centres d’accueil » aux frontières européennes.

      Si le nouveau pacte prévoie effectivement la création de « nouveaux » camps conjuguée à une « nouvelle » procédure accélérée aux frontières, ces derniers s’apparentent largement à l’approche hotspot mise en œuvre par l’Union européenne (UE) depuis 2015 afin d’organiser la sélection des personnes qu’elle souhaite accueillir et l’expulsion, depuis la frontière, de tous celles qu’elle considère « indésirables ».

      Le pacte prévoie ainsi la mise en place « d’un contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire pour toutes les personnes qui se présentent aux frontières extérieures ou après un débarquement, à la suite d’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage ». Il s’agira, pour les pays situés à la frontière extérieure de l’UE, de procéder – dans un délai de 5 jours et avec l’appui des agences européennes (l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes – Frontex et le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile – EASO) – à des contrôles d’identité (prise d’empreintes et enregistrement dans les bases de données européennes) doublés de contrôles sécuritaires et sanitaires afin de procéder à un tri préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire, permettant d’orienter ensuite les personne vers :

      Une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière pour celles possédant une nationalité pour laquelle le taux de reconnaissance d’une protection internationale, à l’échelle de l’UE, est inférieure à 20%
      Une procédure d’asile normale pour celles considérées comme éligibles à une protection.
      Une procédure d’expulsion immédiate, depuis la frontière, pour toute celles qui auront été rejetées par ce dispositif de tri, dans un délai de 12 semaines.

      Pendant cette procédure de filtrage à la frontière, les personnes seraient considérées comme n’étant pas encore entrées sur le territoire européen ce qui permettrait aux Etats de déroger aux conventions de droit international qui s’y appliquent.

      Un premier projet pilote est notamment prévu à Lesbos, conjointement avec les autorités grecques, pour installer un nouveau camp sur l’île avec l’appui d’une Task Force européenne, directement placée sous le contrôle de la direction générale des affaires intérieure de la Commission européenne (DG HOME).

      Difficile de voir où se trouve l’innovation dans la proposition présentée par la Commission. Si ce n’est que les États européens souhaitent pousser encore plus loin à la fois la logique de filtrage à ces frontières ainsi que la sous-traitance de leur contrôle. Depuis l’été 2018, l’Union européenne défend la création de « centres contrôlés au sein de l’UE » d’une part et de « plateformes de débarquement dans les pays tiers » d’autre part. L’UE, à travers ce nouveau mécanisme, vise à organiser l’expulsion rapide des migrants qui sont parvenus, souvent au péril de leur vie, à pénétrer sur son territoire. Pour ce faire, la coopération accrue avec les gardes-frontières des États non européens et l’appui opérationnel de l’agence Frontex sont encore et toujours privilégiés.
      Un « nouvel écosystème en matière de retour »

      L’obsession européenne pour l’amélioration du « taux de retour » se retrouve au cœur de ce nouveau pacte, en repoussant toujours plus les limites en matière de coopération extérieure et d’enfermement des personnes étrangères jugées indésirables et en augmentant de façon inédite ses moyens opérationnels.

      Selon l’expression de Margaritis Schinas, commissaire grec en charge de la « promotion du mode de vie européen », la nouvelle procédure accélérée aux frontières s’accompagnera d’« un nouvel écosystème européen en matière de retour ». Il sera piloté par un « nouveau coordinateur de l’UE chargé des retours » ainsi qu’un « réseau de haut niveau coordonnant les actions nationales » avec le soutien de l’agence Frontex, qui devrait devenir « le bras opérationnel de la politique de retour européenne ».

      Rappelons que Frontex a vu ses moyens décuplés ces dernières années, notamment en vue d’expulser plus de personnes migrantes. Celle-ci a encore vu ses moyens renforcés depuis l’entrée en vigueur de son nouveau règlement le 4 décembre 2019 dont la Commission souhaite accélérer la mise en œuvre effective. Au-delà d’une augmentation de ses effectifs et de la possibilité d’acquérir son propre matériel, l’agence bénéficie désormais de pouvoirs étendus pour identifier les personnes « expulsables » du territoire européen, obtenir les documents de voyage nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de leurs expulsions ainsi que pour coordonner des opérations d’expulsion au service des Etats membres.

      La Commission souhaite également faire aboutir, d’ici le second trimestre 2021, le projet de révision de la directive européenne « Retour », qui constitue un recul sans précédent du cadre de protection des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : L’expulsion au cœur des politiques migratoires européennes, 22 mai 2019
      Des « partenariats sur-mesure » avec les pays d’origine et de transit

      La Commission étend encore redoubler d’efforts afin d’inciter les Etats non européens à participer activement à empêcher les départs vers l’Europe ainsi qu’à collaborer davantage en matière de retour et de réadmission en utilisant l’ensemble des instruments politiques à sa disposition. Ces dernières années ont vu se multiplier les instruments européens de coopération formelle (à travers la signature, entre autres, d’accords de réadmission bilatéraux ou multilatéraux) et informelle (à l’instar de la tristement célèbre déclaration entre l’UE et la Turquie de mars 2016) à tel point qu’il est devenu impossible, pour les États ciblés, de coopérer avec l’UE dans un domaine spécifique sans que les objectifs européens en matière migratoire ne soient aussi imposés.

      L’exécutif européen a enfin souligné sa volonté de d’exploiter les possibilités offertes par le nouveau règlement sur les visas Schengen, entré en vigueur en février 2020. Celui-ci prévoie d’évaluer, chaque année, le degré de coopération des Etats non européens en matière de réadmission. Le résultat de cette évaluation permettra d’adopter une décision de facilitation de visa pour les « bon élèves » ou à l’inverse, d’imposer des mesures de restrictions de visas aux « mauvais élèves ». Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Expulsions contre visas : le droit à la mobilité marchandé, 2 février 2020.

      Conduite au seul prisme des intérêts européens, cette politique renforce le caractère historiquement déséquilibré des relations de « coopération » et entraîne en outre des conséquences désastreuses sur les droits des personnes migrantes, notamment celui de quitter tout pays, y compris le leur. Sous couvert d’aider ces pays à « se développer », les mesures « incitatives » européennes ne restent qu’un moyen de poursuivre ses objectifs et d’imposer sa vision des migrations. En coopérant davantage avec les pays d’origine et de transit, parmi lesquelles des dictatures et autres régimes autoritaires, l’UE renforce l’externalisation de ses politiques migratoires, sous-traitant la gestion des exilées aux Etats extérieurs à l’UE, tout en se déresponsabilisant des violations des droits perpétrées hors de ses frontières.
      Solidarité à la carte, entre relocalisation et expulsion

      Le constat d’échec du système Dublin – machine infernale de l’asile européen – conjugué à la volonté de parvenir à trouver un consensus suite aux profonds désaccords qui avaient mené les négociations sur Dublin IV dans l’impasse, la Commission souhaite remplacer l’actuel règlement de Dublin par un nouveau règlement sur la gestion de l’asile et de l’immigration, liant étroitement les procédures d’asile aux procédures d’expulsion.

      Les quotas de relocalisation contraignants utilisés par le passé, à l’instar du mécanisme de relocalisation mis en place entre 2015 et 2017 qui fut un échec tant du point de vue du nombre de relocalisations (seulement 25 000 relocalisations sur les 160 000 prévues) que du refus de plusieurs Etats d’y participer, semblent être abandonnés.

      Le nouveau pacte propose donc un nouveau mécanisme de solidarité, certes obligatoire mais flexible dans ses modalités. Ainsi les Etats membres devront choisir, selon une clé de répartition définie :

      Soit de participer à l’effort de relocalisation des personnes identifiées comme éligibles à la protection internationale depuis les frontières extérieures pour prendre en charge l’examen de leur demande d’asile.
      Soit de participer au nouveau concept de « parrainage des retours » inventé par la Commission européenne. Concrètement, il s’agit d’être « solidaire autrement », en s’engageant activement dans la politique de retour européenne par la mise en œuvre des expulsions des personnes que l’UE et ses Etats membres souhaitent éloigner du territoire, avec la possibilité de concentrer leurs efforts sur les nationalités pour lesquelles leurs perspectives de faire aboutir l’expulsion est la plus élevée.

      De nouvelles règles pour les « situations de crise et de force majeure »

      Le pacte prévoie d’abroger la directive européenne relative à des normes minimales pour l’octroi d’une protection temporaire en cas d’afflux massif de personnes déplacées, au profit d’un nouveau règlement européen relatif aux « situations de crise et de force majeure ». L’UE et ses Etats membres ont régulièrement essuyé les critiques des acteurs de la société civile pour n’avoir jamais activé la procédure prévue par la directive de 2001, notamment dans le cadre de situation exceptionnelle telle que la crise de l’accueil des personnes arrivées aux frontières sud de l’UE en 2015.

      Le nouveau règlement prévoie notamment qu’en cas de « situation de crise ou de force majeure » les Etats membres pourraient déroger aux règles qui s’appliquent en matière d’asile, en suspendant notamment l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant un durée d’un mois maximum. Cette mesure entérine des pratiques contraires au droit international et européen, à l’instar de ce qu’a fait la Grèce début mars 2020 afin de refouler toutes les personnes qui tenteraient de pénétrer le territoire européen depuis la Turquie voisine. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Frontière Grèce-Turquie : de l’approche hotspot au scandale de la guerre aux migrant·e ·s, 3 mars 2020

      Cette proposition représente un recul sans précédent du droit d’asile aux frontières et fait craindre de multiples violations du principe de non refoulement consacré par la Convention de Genève.

      Bien loin d’engager un changement de cap des politiques migratoires européennes, le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile ne semble n’être qu’un nouveau cadre de plus pour poursuivre une approche des mouvements migratoires qui, de longue date, s’est construite autour de la volonté d’empêcher les arrivées aux frontières et d’organiser un tri parmi les personnes qui auraient réussi à braver les obstacles pour atteindre le territoire européen, entre celles considérées éligibles à la demande d’asile et toutes les autres qui devraient être expulsées.

      De notre point de vue, cela signifie surtout que des milliers de personnes continueront à être privées de liberté et à subir les dispositifs répressifs des Etats membres de l’Union européenne. Les conséquences néfastes sur la dignité humaine et les droits fondamentaux de cette approche sont flagrantes, les personnes exilées et leurs soutiens y sont confrontées tous les jours.

      Encore une fois, des moyens très importants sont consacrés à financer l’érection de barrières physiques, juridiques et technologiques ainsi que la construction de camps sur les routes migratoires tandis qu’ils pourraient utilement être redéployés pour accueillir dignement et permettre un accès inconditionnel au territoire européen pour les personnes bloquées à ses frontières extérieures afin d’examiner avec attention et impartialité leurs situations et assurer le respect effectif des droits de tou∙te∙s.

      Nous appelons à un changement radical des politiques migratoires, pour une Europe qui encourage les solidarités, fondée sur la protection des droits humains et la dignité humaine afin d’assurer la protection des personnes et non pas leur exclusion.

      https://www.lacimade.org/pacte-europeen-sur-les-migrations-et-lasile-le-rendez-vous-manque-de-lue

    • EU’s new migrant ‘pact’ is as squalid as its refugee camps

      Governments need to share responsibility for asylum seekers, beyond merely ejecting the unwanted

      One month after fires swept through Europe’s largest, most squalid refugee camp, the EU’s migration policies present a picture as desolate as the blackened ruins of Moria on the Greek island of Lesbos. The latest effort at overhauling these policies is a European Commission “pact on asylum and migration”, which is not a pact at all. Its proposals sharply divide the EU’s 27 governments.

      In an attempt to appease central and eastern European countries hostile to admitting asylum-seekers, the commission suggests, in an Orwellian turn of phrase, that they should operate “relocation and return sponsorships”, dispatching people refused entry to their places of origin. This sort of task is normally reserved for nightclub bouncers.

      The grim irony is that Hungary and Poland, two countries that would presumably be asked to take charge of such expulsions, are the subject of EU disciplinary proceedings due to alleged violations of the rule of law. It remains a mystery how, if the commission proposal moves forward, the EU will succeed in binding Hungary and Poland into a common asylum policy and bend them into accepting EU definitions of the rule of law.

      Perhaps the best thing to be said of the commission’s plan is that, unlike the UK government, EU policymakers are not toying with hare-brained schemes of sending asylum-seekers to Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. Such options are the imagined privilege of a former imperial power not divested of all its far-flung possessions.

      Yet the commission’s initiative still reeks of wishful thinking. It foresees a process in which authorities swiftly check the identities, security status and health of irregular migrants, before returning them home, placing them in the asylum system or putting them in temporary facilities. This will supposedly decongest EU border zones, as governments will agree how to relocate new arrivals. But it is precisely the lack of such agreement since 2015 that led to Moria’s disgraceful conditions.

      The commission should not be held responsible for governments failing to shoulder their responsibilities. It is also justified in emphasising the need for a strong EU frontier. This is a precondition for free movement inside the bloc, vital for a flourishing single market.

      True, the Schengen system of border-free internal travel is curtailed at present because of the pandemic, not to mention restrictions introduced in some countries after the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis. But no government wants to abandon Schengen. Where they fall out with each other is over the housing of refugees and migrants.

      Europe’s overcrowded, unhygienic refugee camps, and the paralysis that grips EU policies, are all the more shameful in that governments no longer face a border emergency. Some 60,800 irregular migrants crossed into the EU between January and August, 14 per cent less than the same period in 2019, according to the EU border agency.

      By contrast, there were 1.8m illegal border crossings in 2015, a different order of magnitude. Refugees from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria made desperate voyages across the Mediterranean, with thousands drowning in ramshackle boats. Some countries, led by Germany and Sweden, were extremely generous in opening their doors to refugees. Others were not.

      The roots of today’s problems lie in the measures devised to address that crisis, above all a 2016 accord with Turkey. Irregular migrants were kept on Moria and other Greek islands, designated “hotspots”, in the expectation that failed asylum applicants would be smoothly returned to Turkey, its coffers replenished by billions of euros in EU assistance. In practice, few went back to Turkey and the understaffed, underfunded “hotspots” became places of tension between refugees and locals.

      Unable to agree on a relocation scheme among themselves, EU governments lapsed into a de facto policy of deterrence of irregular migrants. The pandemic provided an excuse for Italy and Malta to close their ports to people rescued at sea. Visiting the Greek-Turkish border in March, Ursula von der Leyen, the commission president, declared: “I thank Greece for being our European aspida [shield].”

      The legitimacy of EU refugee policies depends on adherence to international law, as well the bloc’s own rules. Its practical success requires all governments to share a responsibility for asylum-seekers that goes beyond ejecting unwanted individuals. Otherwise the EU will fall into the familiar trap of cobbling together unsatisfactory half-measures that guarantee more trouble in the future.

      https://www.ft.com/content/c50c6b9c-75a8-40b1-900d-a228faa382dc?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754

    • The EU’s pact against migration, Part One

      The EU Commission’s proposal for a ‘New Pact for Migration and Asylum’ offers no prospect of ending the enduring mobility conflict, opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The ’New Pact for Migration and Asylum’, announced by the European Commission in July 2019, was finally presented on September 23, 2020. The Pact was eagerly anticipated as it was described as a “fresh start on migration in Europe”, acknowledging not only that Dublin had failed, but also that the negotiations between European member states as to what system might replace it had reached a standstill.

      The fire in Moria that left more than 13.000 people stranded in the streets of Lesvos island offered a glaring symbol of the failure of the current EU policy. The public outcry it caused and expressions of solidarity it crystallised across Europe pressured the Commission to respond through the publication of its Pact.

      Considering the trajectory of EU migration policies over the last decades, the particular position of the Commission within the European power structure and the current political conjuncture of strong anti-migration positions in Europe, we did not expect the Commission’s proposal to address the mobility conflict underlying its migration policy crisis in a constructive way. And indeed, the Pact’s main promise is to manage the diverging positions of member states through a new mechanism of “flexible solidarity” between member states in sharing the “burden” of migrants who have arrived on European territory. Perpetuating the trajectory of the last decades, it however remains premised on keeping most migrants from the global South out at all cost. The “New Pact” then is effectively a pact between European states against migrants. The Pact, which will be examined and possibly adopted by the European Parliament and Council in the coming months, confirms the impasse to which three decades of European migration and asylum policy have led, and an absence of any political imagination worthy of the name.
      The EU’s migration regime’s failed architecture

      The current architecture of the European border regime is based on two main and intertwined pillars: the Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC, or Schengen II) and the Dublin Convention, both signed in 1990, and gradually enforced in the following years.[1]

      Created outside the EC/EU context, they became the central rationalities of the emerging European border and migration regime after their incorporation into EU law through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/99). Schengen instituted the EU’s territory as an area of free movement for its citizens and, as a direct consequence, reinforced the exclusion of citizens of the global South and pushed control towards its external borders.

      However this profound transformation of European borders left unchanged the unbalanced systemic relations between Europe and the Global South, within which migrants’ movements are embedded. As a result, this policy shift did not stop migrants from reaching the EU but rather illegalised their mobility, forcing them to resort to precarious migration strategies and generating an easily exploitable labour force that has become a large-scale and permanent feature of EU economies.

      The more than 40,000 migrant deaths recorded at the EU’s borders by NGOs since the end of the 1980s are the lethal outcomes of this enduring mobility conflict opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The second pillar of the EU’s migration architecture, the Dublin Convention, addressed asylum seekers and their allocation between member-states. To prevent them from filing applications in several EU countries – derogatively referred to as “asylum shopping” – the 2003 Dublin regulation states that the asylum seekers’ first country of entry into the EU is responsible for processing their claims. Dublin thus created an uneven European geography of (ir)responsibility that allowed the member states not directly situated at the intersection of European borders and routes of migration to abnegate their responsibility to provide shelter and protection, and placed a heavier “burden” on the shoulders of states located at the EU’s external borders.

      This unbalanced architecture, around which the entire Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was constructed, would begin to wobble as soon as the number of people arriving on the EU’s shores rose, leading to crisis-driven policy responses to prevent the migration regime from collapsing under the pressure of migrants’ refusal to be assigned to a country that was not of their choosing, and conflicts between member states.

      As a result, the development of a European border, migration and asylum policy has been driven by crisis and is inherently reactive. This pattern particularly holds for the last decade, when the large-scale movements of migrants to Europe in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 put the EU migration regime into permanent crisis mode and prompted hasty reforms. As of 2011, Italy allowed Tunisians to move on, leading to the re-introduction of border controls by states such as France, while the same year the 2011 European Court of Human Rights’ judgement brought Dublin deportations to Greece to a halt because of the appalling reception and living conditions there. The increasing refusal by asylum seekers to surrender their fingerprints – the core means of implementing Dublin – as of 2013 further destabilized the migration regime.

      The instability only grew when in April 2015, more then 1,200 people died in two consecutive shipwrecks, forcing the Commission to publish its ‘European Agenda for Migration’ in May 2015. The 2015 agenda announced the creation of the hotspot system in the hope of re-stabilising the European migration regime through a targeted intervention of European agencies at Europe’s borders. Essentially, the hotspot approach offered a deal to EU member states: comprehensive registration in Europeanised structures (the hotspots) by so-called “front-line states” – thus re-imposing Dublin – in exchange for relocation of part of the registered migrants to other EU countries – thereby alleviating front-line states of part of their “burden”.

      This plan however collapsed before it could ever work, as it was immediately followed by the large-scale summer arrivals of 2015 as migrants trekked across Europe’s borders. It was simultaneously boycotted by several member states who refused relocations and continue to lead the charge in fomenting an explicit anti-migration agenda in the EU. While border controls were soon reintroduced, relocations never materialised in a meaningful manner in the years that followed.

      With the Dublin regime effectively paralysed and the EU unable to agree on a new mechanism for the distribution of asylum seekers within Europe, the EU resorted to the decades-old policies that had shaped the European border and migration regime since its inception: keeping migrants out at all cost through border control implemented by member states, European agencies or outsourced to third countries.

      Considering the profound crisis the turbulent movements of migrants had plunged the EU into in the summer of 2015, no measure was deemed excessive in achieving this exclusionary end: neither the tacit acceptance of violent expulsions and push-backs by Spain and Greece, nor the outsourcing of border control to Libyan torturers, nor the shameless collaboration with dictatorial regimes such as Turkey.

      Under the guise of “tackling the root causes of migration”, development aid was diverted and used to impose border externalisation and deportation agreements. But the external dimension of the EU’s migration regime has proven just as unstable as its internal one – as the re-opening of borders by Turkey in March 2020 demonstrates. The movements of illegalised migrants towards the EU could never be entirely contained and those who reached the shores of Europe were increasingly relegated to infrastructures of detention. Even if keeping thousands of migrants stranded in the hell of Moria may not have been part of the initial hotspot plan, it certainly has been the outcome of the EU’s internal blockages and ultimately effective in shoring up the EU’s strategy of deterrence.

      The “New Pact” perpetuating the EU’s failed policy of closure

      Today the “New Pact”, promised for Spring 2020 and apparently forgotten at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, has been revived in a hurry to address the destruction of Moria hotspot. While detailed analysis of the regulations that it proposes are beyond the scope of this article,[2] the broad intentions of the Pact’s rationale are clear.

      Despite all its humane and humanitarian rhetoric and some language critically addressing the manifest absence of the rule of law at the border of Europe, the Commission’s pact is a pact against migration. Taking stock of the continued impasse in terms of internal distribution of migrants, it re-affirms the EU’s central objective of reducing, massively the number of asylum seekers to be admitted to Europe. It promises to do so by continuing to erect chains of externalised border control along migrants’ entire trajectories (what it refers to as the “whole-of-route approach”).

      Those who do arrive should be swiftly screened and sorted in an infrastructure of detention along the borders of Europe. The lucky few who will succeed in fitting their lives into the shrinking boxes of asylum law are to be relocated to other EU countries in function of a mechanism of distribution based on population size and wealth of member states.

      Whether this will indeed undo the imbalances of the Dublin regime remains an open question[3], nevertheless, this relocation key is one of the few positive steps offered by the Pact since it comes closer to migrants’ own “relocation key” but still falls short of granting asylum seekers the freedom to choose their country of protection and residence.[4] The majority of rejected asylum seekers – which may be determined on the basis of an extended understanding of the “safe third country” notion – is to be funnelled towards deportations operated by the EU states refusing relocation. The Commission hopes deportations will be made smoother after a newly appointed “EU Return Coordinator” will have bullied countries of origin into accepting their nationals using the carrot of development aid and the stick of visa sanctions. The Commission seems to believe that with fewer expected arrivals and fewer migrants ending up staying in Europe, and with its mechanism of “flexible solidarity” allowing for a selective participation in relocations or returns depending on the taste of its member states, it can both bridge the gap between member states’ interests and push for a deeper Europeanisation of the policy field in which its own role will become more central.

      Thus, the EU Commission’s attempt to square the circle of member states’ conflicting interests has resulted in a European pact against migration, which perpetuates the promises of the EU’s (anti-)migration policy over the last three decades: externalisation, enhanced borders, accelerated asylum procedures, detention and deportations to prevent and deter migrants from the global South. It seeks to strike yet another deal between European member states, without consulting – and at the expense of – migrants themselves. Because most of the policy means contained in the pact are not new, and have always failed to durably end illegalised migration – instead they have created a large precaritised population at the heart of Europe – we do not see how they would work today. Migrants will continue to arrive, and many will remain stranded in front-line states or other EU states as they await deportation. As such, the outcome of the pact (if it is agreed upon) is likely a perpetuation and generalisation of the hotspot system, the very system whose untenability – glaringly demonstrated by Moria’s fire – prompted the presentation of the New Pact in the first place. Even if the Commission’s “no more Morias” rhetoric would like to persuade us of the opposite,[5] the ruins of Moria point to the past as well as the potential future of the CEAS if the Commission has its way.

      We are dismayed at the loss of yet another opportunity for Europe to fundamentally re-orient its policy of closure, one which is profoundly at odds with the reality of large-scale displacement in an unequal and interconnected world. We are dismayed at the prospect of more suffering and more political crises that can only be the outcome of this continued policy failure. Clearly, an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with the movements of migration is called for. One which actually aims to de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict. One which starts from the reality of the movements of migrants and offers a frame for it to unfold rather than seeks to suppress and deny it.

      Notes and references

      [1] We have offered an extensive analysis of the following argument in previous articles. See in particular : Bernd Kasparek. 2016. “Complementing Schengen: The Dublin System and the European Border and Migration Regime”. In Migration Policy and Practice, edited by Harald Bauder and Christian Matheis, 59–78. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani. 2016. “Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s Shifting Practices of (Non-)Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis”. Near Futures Online. No 1. Available here.

      [2] For first analyses see Steve Peers. 2020. “First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals”, EU Law Analysis, 25 September 2020; Sergio Carrera. 2020. “Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum”, CEPS, September 2020.

      [3] Carrera, ibid.

      [4] For a discussion of migration of migrants’ own relocation key, see Philipp Lutz, David Kaufmann and Anna Stütz. 2020. “Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees”, Journal of Common Market Studies 2020 Volume 58. Number 3. pp. 757–775. To compare the actual asylum applications across Europe over the last years with different relocations keys, see the tool developed by Etienne Piguet.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/the-eus-pact-against-migration-part-one

      #whole-of-route_approach #relocalisation #clé_de_relocalisation #relocation_key #pays-tiers_sûrs #EU_Return_Coordinator #solidarité_flexible #externalisation #new_pact

    • Towards a European pact with migrants, Part Two

      We call for a new Pact that addresses the reality of migrants’ movements, the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.

      In Part One, we analysed the EU’s new Pact against migration. Here, we call for an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with migration, one which offers a legal frame for migration to unfold, and addresses the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.Let us imagine for a moment that the EU Commission truly wanted, and was in a position, to reorient the EU’s migration policy in a direction that might actually de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict: what might its pact with migrants look like?

      The EU’s pact with migrants might start from three fundamental premises. First, it would recognize that any policy that is entirely at odds with social practices is bound to generate conflict, and ultimately fail. A migration policy must start from the social reality of migration and provide a frame for it to unfold. Second, the pact would acknowledge that no conflict can be brought to an end unilaterally. Any process of conflict transformation must bring together the conflicting parties, and seek to address their needs, interests and values so that they no longer clash with each other. In particular, migrants from the global South must be included in the definition of the policies that concern them. Third, it would recognise, as Tendayi Achiume has put it, that migrants from the global South are no strangers to Europe.[1] They have long been included in the expansive webs of empire. Migration and borders are embedded in these unequal relations, and no end to the mobility conflict can be achieved without fundamentally transforming them. Based on these premises, the EU’s pact with migrants might contain the following four core measures:
      Global justice and conflict prevention

      Instead of claiming to tackle the “root causes” of migration by diverting and instrumentalising development aid towards border control, the EU’s pact with migrants would end all European political and economic relations that contribute to the crises leading to mass displacement. The EU would end all support to dictatorial regimes, would ban all weapon exports, terminate all destabilising military interventions. It would cancel unfair trade agreements and the debts of countries of the global South. It would end its massive carbon emissions that contribute to the climate crisis. Through these means, the EU would not claim to end migration perceived as a “problem” for Europe, but it would contribute to allowing more people to live a dignified life wherever they are and decrease forced migration, which certainly is a problem for migrants. A true commitment to global justice and conflict prevention and resolution is necessary if Europe wishes to limit the factors that lead too many people onto the harsh paths of exile in their countries and regions, a small proportion of whom reach European shores.
      Tackling the “root causes” of European racism

      While the EU’s so-called “global approach” to migration has in fact been one-sided, focused exclusively on migration as “the problem” rather then the processes that drive the EU’s policies of exclusion, the EU’s pact with migrants would boldly tackle the “root causes” of racism and xenophobia in Europe. Bold policies designed to address the EU’s colonial past and present and the racial imaginaries it has unleashed would be proposed, a positive vision for living in common in diverse societies affirmed, and a more inclusive and fair economic system would be established in Europe to decrease the resentment of European populations which has been skilfully channelled against migrants and racialised people.
      Universal freedom of movement

      By tackling the causes of large-scale displacement and of exclusionary migration policies, the EU would be able to de-escalate the mobility conflict, and could thus propose a policy granting all migrants legal pathways to access and stay in Europe. As an immediate outcome of the institution of right to international mobility, migrants would no longer resort to smugglers and risk their lives crossing the sea – and thus no longer be in need of being rescued. Using safe and legal means of travel would also, in the time of Covid-19 pandemic, allow migrants to adopt all sanitary measures that are necessary to protect migrants and those they encounter. No longer policed through military means, migration could appear as a normal process that does not generate fear. Frontex, the European border agency, would be defunded, and concentrate its limited activities on detecting actual threats to the EU rather then constructing vulnerable populations as “risks”. In a world that would be less unequal and in which people would have the possibly to lead a dignified life wherever they are, universal freedom of movement would not lead to an “invasion” of Europe. Circulatory movement rather then permanent settlement would be frequent. Migrants’ legal status would no longer allow employers to push working conditions down. A European asylum system would continue to exist, to grant protection and support to those in need. The vestiges of the EU’s hotspots and detention centres might be turned into ministries of welcome, which would register and redirect people to the place of their choice. Registration would thus be a mere certification of having taken the first step towards European citizenship, transforming the latter into a truly post-national institution, a far horizon which current EU treaties only hint at.
      Democratizing borders

      Considering that all European migration policies to date have been fundamentally undemocratic – in that they were imposed on a group of people – migrants – who had no say in the legislative and political process defining the laws that govern their movement – the pact would instead be the outcome of considerable consultative process with migrants and the organisations that support them, as well the states of the global South. The pact, following from Étienne Balibar’s suggestion, would in turn propose to permanently democratise borders by instituting “a multilateral, negotiated control of their working by the populations themselves (including, of course, migrant populations),” within “new representative institutions” that “are not merely ‘territorial’ and certainly not purely national.”[2] In such a pact, the original promise of Europe as a post-national project would finally be revived.

      Such a policy orientation may of course appear as nothing more then a fantasy. And yet it appears evident to us that the direction we suggest is the only realistic one. European citizens and policy makers alike must realise that the question is not whether migrants will exercise their freedom to cross borders, but at what human and political cost. As a result, it is far more realistic to address the processes within which the mobility conflict is embedded, than seeking to ban human mobility. As the Black Lives Matter’s slogan “No justice no peace!” resonating in the streets of the world over recent months reminds us, without mobility justice, [3] their can be no end to mobility conflict.
      The challenges ahead for migrant solidarity movements

      Our policy proposals are perfectly realistic in relation to migrants’ movements and the processes shaping them, yet we are well aware that they are not on the agenda of neoliberal and nationalist Europe. If the EU Commission has squandered yet another opportunity to reorient the EU’s migration policy, it is simply that this Europe, governed by these member states and politicians, has lost the capacity to offer bold visions of democracy, freedom and justice for itself and the world. As such, we have little hope for a fundamental reorientation of the EU’s policies. The bleak prospect is of the perpetuation of the mobility conflict, and the human suffering and political crises it generates.

      What are those who seek to support migrants to do in this context?

      We must start by a sobering note addressed to the movement we are part of: the fire of Moria is not only a symptom and symbol of the failures of the EU’s migration policies and member states, but also of our own strategies. After all, since the hotspots were proposed in 2015 we have tirelessly denounced them, and documented the horrendous living conditions they have created. NGOs have litigated against them, but efforts have been turned down by a European Court of Human Rights that appears increasingly reluctant to position itself on migration-related issues and is thereby contributing to the perpetuation of grave violations by states.

      And despite the extraordinary mobilisation of civil society in alliance with municipalities across Europe who have declared themselves ready to welcome migrants, relocations never materialised on any significant scale. After five years of tireless mobilization, the hotspots still stand, with thousands of asylum seekers trapped in them.

      While the conditions leading to the fire are still being clarified, it appears that the migrants held hostage in Moria took it into their own hands to try to get rid of the camp through the desperate act of burning it to the ground. As such, while we denounce the EU’s policies, our movements are urgently in need of re-evaluating their own modes of action, and re-imagining them more effectively.

      We have no lessons to give, as we share these shortcomings. But we believe that some of the directions we have suggested in our utopian Pact with migrants can guide migrant solidarity movements as well , as they may be implemented from the bottom-up in the present and help reopen our political imagination.

      The freedom to move is not, or not only, a distant utopia, that may be instituted by states in some distant future. It can also be seen as a right and freedom that illegalised migrants seize on a day-to-day basis as they cross borders without authorisation, and persist in living where they choose.

      Freedom of movement can serve as a useful compass to direct and evaluate our practices of contestation and support. Litigation remains an important tool to counter the multiple forms of violence and violations that migrants face along their trajectories, even as we acknowledge that national and international courts are far from immune to the anti-migrant atmosphere within states. Forging infrastructures of support for migrants in the course of their mobility (such as the WatchTheMed Alarm Phone and the civilian rescue fleet) – and their stay (such as the many citizen platforms for housing )– is and will continue to be essential.

      While states seek to implement what they call an “integrated border management” that seeks to manage migrants’ unruly mobilities before, at, and after borders, we can think of our own networks as forming a fragmented yet interconnected “integrated border solidarity” along the migrants’ entire trajectory. The criminalisation of our acts of solidarity by states is proof that we are effective in disrupting the violence of borders.

      Solidarity cities have formed important nodes in these chains, as municipalities do have the capacity to enable migrants to live in dignity in urban spaces, and limit the reach of their security forces for example. Their dissonant voices of welcome have been important in demonstrating that segments of the European population, which are far from negligible, refuse to be complicit with the EU’s policies of closure and are ready to embody an open relation of solidarity with migrants and beyond. However we must also acknowledge that the prerogative of granting access to European states remains in the hands of central administrations, not in those of municipalities, and thus the readiness to welcome migrants has not allowed the latter to actually seek sanctuary.

      While humanitarian and humanist calls for welcome are important, we too need to locate migration and borders in a broader political and economic context – that of the past and present of empire – so that they can be understood as questions of (in)justice. Echoing the words of the late Edouard Glissant, as activists focusing on illegalised migration we should never forget that “to have to force one’s way across borders as a result of one’s misery is as scandalous as what founds that misery”.[4] As a result of this framing, many more alliances can be forged today between migrant solidarity movements and the global justice and climate justice movements, as well as anti-racist, anti-fascist, feminist and decolonial movements. Through such alliances, we may be better equipped to support migrants throughout their entire trajectories, and transform the conditions that constrain them today.

      Ultimately, to navigate its way out of its own impasses, it seems to us that migrant solidarity movements must address four major questions.

      First, what migration policy do we want? The predictable limits of the EU’s pact against migration may be an opportunity to forge our own alternative agenda.

      Second, how can we not only oppose the implementation of restrictive policies but shape the policy process itself so as to transform the field on which we struggle? Opposing the EU’s anti-migrant pact over the coming months may allow us to conduct new experiments.

      Third, as long as policies that deny basic principles of equality, freedom, justice, and our very common humanity, are still in place, how can we lead actions that disrupt them effectively? For example, what are the forms of nongovernmental evacuations that might support migrants in accessing Europe, and moving across its internal borders?

      Fourth, how can struggles around migration and borders be part of the forging of a more equal, free, just and sustainable world for all?

      The next months during which the EU’s Pact against migration will be discussed in front of the European Parliament and Council will see an uphill battle for all those who still believe in the possibility of a Europe of openness and solidarity. While we have no illusions as to the policy outcome, this is an opportunity we must seize, not only to claim that another Europe and another world is possible, but to start building them from below.

      Notes and references

      [1] Tendayi Achiume. 2019, “The Postcolonial Case for Rethinking Borders.” Dissent 66.3: pp.27-32.

      [2] Etienne Balibar. 2004. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton: University Press, p. 108 and 117.

      [3] Mimi Sheller. 2018. Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes. London: Verso.

      [4] Edouard Glissant. 2006. “Il n’est frontière qu’on n’outrepasse”. Le Monde diplomatique, October 2006.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/towards-pact-migrants-part-two

    • Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile : Afin de garantir un nouveau départ et d’éviter de reproduire les erreurs passées, certains éléments à risque doivent être reconsidérés et les aspects positifs étendus.

      L’engagement en faveur d’une approche plus humaine de la protection et l’accent mis sur les aspects positifs et bénéfiques de la migration avec lesquels la Commission européenne a lancé le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile sont les bienvenus. Cependant, les propositions formulées reflètent très peu cette rhétorique et ces ambitions. Au lieu de rompre avec les erreurs de la précédente approche de l’Union européenne (UE) et d’offrir un nouveau départ, le Pacte continue de se focaliser sur l’externalisation, la dissuasion, la rétention et le retour.

      Cette première analyse des propositions, réalisée par la société civile, a été guidée par les questions suivantes :

      Les propositions formulées sont-elles en mesure de garantir, en droit et en pratique, le respect des normes internationales et européennes ?
      Participeront-elles à un partage plus juste des responsabilités en matière d’asile au niveau de l’UE et de l’international ?
      Seront-elles susceptibles de fonctionner en pratique ?

      Au lieu d’un partage automatique des responsabilités, le Pacte introduit un système de Dublin, qui n’en porte pas le nom, plus complexe et un mécanisme de « parrainage au retour »

      Le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile a manqué l’occasion de réformer en profondeur le système de Dublin : le principe de responsabilité du premier pays d’arrivée pour examiner les demandes d’asile est, en pratique, maintenu. De plus, le Pacte propose un système complexe introduisant diverses formes de solidarité.

      Certains ajouts positifs dans les critères de détermination de l’Etat membre responsable de la demande d’asile sont à relever, par exemple, l’élargissement de la définition des membres de famille afin d’inclure les frères et sœurs, ainsi qu’un large éventail de membres de famille dans le cas des mineurs non accompagnés et la délivrance d’un diplôme ou d’une autre qualification par un Etat membre. Cependant, au regard de la pratique actuelle des Etats membres, il sera difficile de s’éloigner du principe du premier pays d’entrée comme l’option de départ en faveur des nouvelles considérations prioritaires, notamment le regroupement familial.

      Dans le cas d’un nombre élevé de personnes arrivées sur le territoire (« pression migratoire ») ou débarquées suite à des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, la solidarité entre Etats membres est requise. Les processus qui en découlent comprennent une série d’évaluations, d’engagements et de rapports devant être rédigés par les États membres. Si la réponse collective est insuffisante, la Commission européenne peut prendre des mesures correctives. Au lieu de promouvoir un mécanisme de soutien pour un partage prévisible des responsabilités, ces dispositions tendent plutôt à créer des formes de négociations entre États membres qui nous sont toutes devenues trop familières. La complexité des propositions soulève des doutes quant à leur application réelle en pratique.

      Les États membres sont autorisés à choisir le « parrainage de retour » à la place de la relocalisation de personnes sur leur territoire, ce qui indique une attention égale portée au retour et à la protection. Au lieu d’apporter un soutien aux Etats membres en charge d’un plus grand nombre de demandes de protection, cette proposition soulève de nombreuses préoccupations juridiques et relatives au respect des droits de l’homme, en particulier si le transfert vers l’Etat dit « parrain » se fait après l’expiration du délai de 8 mois. Qui sera en charge de veiller au traitement des demandeurs d’asile déboutés à leur arrivée dans des Etats qui n’acceptent pas la relocalisation ?

      Le Pacte propose d’étendre l’utilisation de la procédure à la frontière, y compris un recours accru à la rétention

      A défaut de rééquilibrer la responsabilité entre les États membres de l’UE, la proposition de règlement sur les procédures communes exacerbe la pression sur les États situés aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et sur les pays des Balkans occidentaux. La Commission propose de rendre, dans certains cas, les procédures d’asile et de retour à la frontière obligatoires. Cela s’appliquerait notamment aux ressortissants de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 20%. Ces procédures seraient facultatives lorsque les Etats membres appliquent les concepts de pays tiers sûr ou pays d’origine sûr. Toutefois, la Commission a précédemment proposé que ceux-ci deviennent obligatoires pour l’ensemble des Etats membres. Les associations réitèrent leurs inquiétudes quant à l’utilisation de ces deux concepts qui ont été largement débattus entre 2016 et 2019. Leur application obligatoire ne doit plus être proposée.

      La proposition de procédure à la frontière repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – notamment sur le fait que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’est pas éligible à un statut de protection et que l’examen des demandes de protection peut être effectué facilement et rapidement. Ni l’une ni l’autre ne sont correctes. En effet, en prenant en considération à la fois les décisions de première et de seconde instance dans toute l’UE il apparaît que la plupart des demandeurs d’asile dans l’UE au cours des trois dernières années ont obtenu un statut de protection. En outre, le Pacte ne doit pas persévérer dans cette approche erronée selon laquelle les procédures d’asile peuvent être conduites rapidement à travers la réduction de garanties et l’introduction d’un système de tri. La durée moyenne de la procédure d’asile aux Pays-Bas, souvent qualifiée d’ « élève modèle » pour cette pratique, dépasse un an et peut atteindre deux années jusqu’à ce qu’une décision soit prise.

      La proposition engendrerait deux niveaux de standards dans les procédures d’asile, largement déterminés par le pays d’origine de la personne concernée. Cela porte atteinte au droit individuel à l’asile et signifierait qu’un nombre accru de personnes seront soumises à une procédure de deuxième catégorie. Proposer aux Etats membres d’émettre une décision d’asile et d’éloignement de manière simultanée, sans introduire de garanties visant à ce que les principes de non-refoulement, d’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, et de protection de la vie privée et familiale ne soient examinés, porte atteinte aux obligations qui découlent du droit international. La proposition formulée par la Commission supprime également l’effet suspensif automatique du recours, c’est-à-dire le droit de rester sur le territoire dans l’attente d’une décision finale rendue dans le cadre d’une procédure à la frontière.

      L’idée selon laquelle les personnes soumises à des procédures à la frontière sont considérées comme n’étant pas formellement entrées sur le territoire de l’État membre est trompeuse et contredit la récente jurisprudence de l’UE, sans pour autant modifier les droits de l’individu en vertu du droit européen et international.

      La proposition prive également les personnes de la possibilité d’accéder à des permis de séjour pour des motifs autres que l’asile et impliquera très probablement une privation de liberté pouvant atteindre jusqu’à 6 mois aux frontières de l’UE, c’est-à-dire un maximum de douze semaines dans le cadre de la procédure d’asile à la frontière et douze semaines supplémentaires en cas de procédure de retour à la frontière. En outre, les réformes suppriment le principe selon lequel la rétention ne doit être appliquée qu’en dernier recours dans le cadre des procédures aux frontières. En s’appuyant sur des restrictions plus systématiques des mouvements dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, la proposition restreindra l’accès de l’individu aux services de base fournis par des acteurs qui ne pourront peut-être pas opérer à la frontière, y compris pour l’assistance et la représentation juridiques. Avec cette approche, on peut s’attendre aux mêmes échecs rencontrés dans la mise en œuvre des « hotspot » sur les îles grecques.

      La reconnaissance de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant comme élément primordial dans toutes les procédures pour les États membres est positive. Cependant, la Commission diminue les garanties de protection des enfants en n’exemptant que les mineurs non accompagnés ou âgés de moins de douze ans des procédures aux frontières. Ceci est en contradiction avec la définition internationale de l’enfant qui concerne toutes les personnes jusqu’à l’âge de dix-huit ans, telle qu’inscrite dans la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant ratifiée par tous les États membres de l’UE.

      Dans les situations de crise, les États membres sont autorisés à déroger à d’importantes garanties qui soumettront davantage de personnes à des procédures d’asile de qualité inférieure

      La crainte d’iniquité procédurale est d’autant plus visible dans les situations où un État membre peut prétendre être confronté à une « situation exceptionnelle d’afflux massif » ou au risque d’une telle situation.

      Dans ces cas, le champ d’application de la procédure obligatoire aux frontières est considérablement étendu à toutes les personnes en provenance de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 75%. La procédure d’asile à la frontière et la procédure de retour à la frontière peuvent être prolongées de huit semaines supplémentaires, soit cinq mois chacune, ce qui porte à dix mois la durée maximale de privation de liberté. En outre, les États membres peuvent suspendre l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant quatre semaines et jusqu’à un maximum de trois mois. Par conséquent, si aucune demande n’est enregistrée pendant plusieurs semaines, les personnes sont susceptibles d’être exposées à un risque accru de rétention et de refoulement, et leurs droits relatifs à un accueil digne et à des services de base peuvent être gravement affectés.

      Cette mesure permet aux États membres de déroger à leur responsabilité de garantir un accès à l’asile et un examen efficace et équitable de l’ensemble des demandes d’asile, ce qui augmente ainsi le risque de refoulement. Dans certains cas extrêmes, notamment lorsque les États membres agissent en violation flagrante et persistante des obligations du droit de l’UE, le processus de demande d’autorisation à la Commission européenne pourrait être considéré comme une amélioration, étant donné qu’actuellement la loi est ignorée, sans consultation et ce malgré les critiques de la Commission européenne. Toutefois, cela ne peut être le point de départ de l’évaluation de cette proposition de la législation européenne. L’impact à grande échelle de cette dérogation offre la possibilité à ce qu’une grande majorité des personnes arrivant dans l’UE soient soumises à une procédure de second ordre.

      Pré-filtrage à la frontière : risques et opportunités

      La Commission propose un processus de « pré-filtrage à l’entrée » pour toutes les personnes qui arrivent de manière irrégulière aux frontières de l’UE, y compris à la suite d’un débarquement dans le cadre des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage. Le processus de pré-filtrage comprend des contrôles de sécurité, de santé et de vulnérabilité, ainsi que l’enregistrement des empreintes digitales, mais il conduit également à des décisions impactant l’accès à l’asile, notamment en déterminant si une personne doit être sujette à une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière, de relocalisation ou de retour. Ce processus peut durer jusqu’à 10 jours et doit être effectué au plus près possible de la frontière. Le lieu où les personnes seront placées et l’accès aux conditions matérielles d’accueil demeurent flous. Le filtrage peut également être appliqué aux personnes se trouvant sur le territoire d’un État membre, ce qui pourrait conduire à une augmentation de pratiques discriminatoires. Des questions se posent également concernant les droits des personnes soumises au filtrage, tels que l’accès à l’information, , l’accès à un avocat et au droit de contester la décision prise dans ce contexte ; les motifs de refus d’entrée ; la confidentialité et la protection des données collectées. Etant donné que les États membres peuvent facilement se décharger de leurs responsabilités en matière de dépistage médical et de vulnérabilité, il n’est pas certain que certains besoins seront effectivement détectés et pris en considération.

      Une initiative à saluer est la proposition d’instaurer un mécanisme indépendant des droits fondamentaux à la frontière. Afin qu’il garantisse une véritable responsabilité face aux violations des droits à la frontière, y compris contre les éloignements et les refoulements récurrents dans un grand nombre d’États membres, ce mécanisme doit être étendu au-delà de la procédure de pré-filtrage, être indépendant des autorités nationales et impliquer des organisations telles que les associations non gouvernementales.

      La proposition fait de la question du retour et de l’expulsion une priorité

      L’objectif principal du Pacte est clair : augmenter de façon significative le nombre de personnes renvoyées ou expulsées de l’UE. La création du poste de Coordinateur en charge des retours au sein de la Commission européenne et d’un directeur exécutif adjoint aux retours au sein de Frontex en sont la preuve, tandis qu’aucune nomination n’est prévue au sujet de la protection de garanties ou de la relocalisation. Le retour est considéré comme un élément admis dans la politique migratoire et le soutien pour des retours dignes, en privilégiant les retours volontaires, l’accès à une assistance au retour et l’aide à la réintégration, sont essentiels. Cependant, l’investissement dans le retour n’est pas une réponse adaptée au non-respect systématique des normes d’asile dans les États membres de l’UE.

      Rien de nouveau sur l’action extérieure : des propositions irréalistes qui risquent de continuer d’affaiblir les droits de l’homme

      La tension entre l’engagement rhétorique pour des partenariats mutuellement bénéfiques et la focalisation visant à placer la migration au cœur des relations entre l’UE et les pays tiers se poursuit. Les tentatives d’externaliser la responsabilité de l’asile et de détourner l’aide au développement, les mécanismes de visa et d’autres outils pour inciter les pays tiers à coopérer sur la gestion migratoire et les accords de réadmission sont maintenues. Cela ne représente pas seulement un risque allant à l’encontre de l’engagement de l’UE pour ses principes de développement, mais cela affaiblit également sa posture internationale en générant de la méfiance et de l’hostilité depuis et à l’encontre des pays tiers. De plus, l’usage d’accords informels et la coopération sécuritaire sur la gestion migratoire avec des pays tels que la Libye ou la Turquie risquent de favoriser les violations des droits de l’homme, d’encourager les gouvernements répressifs et de créer une plus grande instabilité.

      Un manque d’ambition pour des voies légales et sûres vers l’Europe

      L’opportunité pour l’UE d’indiquer qu’elle est prête à contribuer au partage des responsabilités pour la protection au niveau international dans un esprit de partenariat avec les pays qui accueillent la plus grande majorité des réfugiés est manquée. Au lieu de proposer un objectif ambitieux de réinstallation de réfugiés, la Commission européenne a seulement invité les Etats membres à faire plus et a converti les engagements de 2020 en un mécanisme biennal, ce qui résulte en la perte d’une année de réinstallation européenne.

      La reconnaissance du besoin de faciliter la migration de main-d’œuvre à travers différents niveaux de compétences est à saluer, mais l’importance de cette migration dans les économies et les sociétés européennes ne se reflète pas dans les ressources, les propositions et les actions allouées.

      Le soutien aux activités de recherche et de sauvetage et aux actions de solidarité doit être renforcé

      La tragédie humanitaire dans la mer Méditerranée nécessite encore une réponse y compris à travers un soutien financier et des capacités de recherches et de sauvetage. Cet enjeu ainsi que celui du débarquement sont pris en compte dans toutes les propositions, reconnaissant ainsi la crise humanitaire actuelle. Cependant, au lieu de répondre aux comportements et aux dispositions règlementaires des gouvernements qui obstruent les activités de secours et le travail des défendeurs des droits, la Commission européenne suggère que les standards de sécurité sur les navires et les niveaux de communication avec les acteurs privés doivent être surveillés. Les acteurs privés sont également requis d’adhérer non seulement aux régimes légaux, mais aussi aux politiques et pratiques relatives à « la gestion migratoire » qui peuvent potentiellement interférer avec les obligations de recherches et de sauvetage.

      Bien que la publication de lignes directrices pour prévenir la criminalisation de l’action humanitaire soit la bienvenue, celles-ci se limitent aux actes mandatés par la loi avec une attention spécifique aux opérations de sauvetage et de secours. Cette approche risque d’omettre les activités humanitaires telles que la distribution de nourriture, d’abris, ou d’information sur le territoire ou assurés par des organisations non mandatées par le cadre légal qui sont également sujettes à ladite criminalisation et à des restrictions.

      Des signes encourageants pour l’inclusion

      Les changements proposés pour permettre aux réfugiés d’accéder à une résidence de long-terme après trois ans et le renforcement du droit de se déplacer et de travailler dans d’autres Etats membres sont positifs. De plus, la révision du Plan d’action pour l’inclusion et l’intégration et la mise en place d’un groupe d’experts pour collecter l’avis des migrants afin de façonner la politique européenne sont les bienvenues.

      La voie à suivre

      La présentation des propositions de la Commission est le commencement de ce qui promet d’être une autre longue période conflictuelle de négociations sur les politiques européennes d’asile et de migration. Alors que ces négociations sont en cours, il est important de rappeler qu’il existe déjà un régime d’asile européen et que les Etats membres ont des obligations dans le cadre du droit européen et international.

      Cela requiert une action immédiate de la part des décideurs politiques européens, y compris de la part des Etats membres, de :

      Mettre en œuvre les standards existants en lien avec les conditions matérielles d’accueil et les procédures d’asile, d’enquêter sur leur non-respect et de prendre les mesures disciplinaires nécessaires ;
      Sauver des vies en mer, et de garantir des capacités de sauvetage et de secours, permettant un débarquement et une relocalisation rapide ;
      Continuer de s’accorder sur des arrangements ad-hoc de solidarité pour alléger la pression sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et encourager les Etats membres à avoir recours à la relocalisation.

      Concernant les prochaines négociations sur le Pacte, nous recommandons aux co-législateurs de :

      Rejeter l’application obligatoire de la procédure d’asile ou de retour à la frontière : ces procédures aux standards abaissés réduisent les garanties des demandeurs d’asile et augmentent le recours à la rétention. Elles exacerbent le manque de solidarité actuel sur l’asile dans l’UE en plaçant plus de responsabilité sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures. L’expérience des hotspots et d’autres initiatives similaires démontrent que l’ajout de procédures ou d’étapes dans l’asile peut créer des charges administratives et des coûts significatifs, et entraîner une plus grande inefficacité ;
      Se diriger vers la fin de la privation de liberté de migrants, et interdire la rétention de mineurs conformément à la Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant, et de dédier suffisamment de ressources pour des solutions non privatives de libertés appropriées pour les mineurs et leurs familles ;
      Réajuster les propositions de réforme afin de se concentrer sur le maintien et l’amélioration des standards des droits de l’homme et de l’asile en Europe, plutôt que sur le retour ;
      Œuvrer à ce que les propositions réforment fondamentalement la façon dont la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile en UE est organisée, en adressant les problèmes liés au principe de pays de première entrée, afin de créer un véritable mécanisme de solidarité ;
      Limiter les possibilités pour les Etats membres de déroger à leurs responsabilités d’enregistrer les demandes d’asile ou d’examiner les demandes, afin d’éviter de créer des incitations à opérer en mode gestion de crise et à diminuer les standards de l’asile ;
      Augmenter les garanties pendant la procédure de pré-filtrage pour assurer le droit à l’information, l’accès à une aide et une représentation juridique, la détection et la prise en charge des vulnérabilités et des besoins de santé, et une réponse aux préoccupations liées à l’enregistrement et à la protection des données ;
      Garantir que le mécanisme de suivi des droits fondamentaux aux frontières dispose d’une portée large afin de couvrir toutes les violations des droits fondamentaux à la frontière, qu’il soit véritablement indépendant des autorités nationales et dispose de ressources adéquates et qu’il contribue à la responsabilisation ;
      S’opposer aux tentatives d’utiliser l’aide au développement, au commerce, aux investissements, aux mécanismes de visas, à la coopération sécuritaire et autres politiques et financements pour faire pression sur les pays tiers dans leur coopération étroitement définie par des objectifs européens de contrôle migratoire ;
      Evaluer l’impact à long-terme des politiques migratoires d’externalisation sur la paix, le respect des droits et le développement durable et garantir que la politique extérieure migratoire ne contribue pas à la violation de droits de l’homme et prenne en compte les enjeux de conflits ;
      Développer significativement les voies légales et sûres vers l’UE en mettant en œuvre rapidement les engagements actuels de réinstallation, en proposant de nouveaux objectifs ambitieux et en augmentant les opportunités de voies d’accès à la protection ainsi qu’à la migration de main-d’œuvre et universitaire en UE ;
      Renforcer les exceptions à la criminalisation lorsqu’il s’agit d’actions humanitaires et autres activités indépendantes de la société civile et enlever les obstacles auxquels font face les acteurs de la société civile fournissant une assistance vitale et humanitaire sur terre et en mer ;
      Mettre en place une opération de recherche et de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée financée et coordonnée par l’UE ;
      S’appuyer sur les propositions prometteuses pour soutenir l’inclusion à travers l’accès à la résidence à long-terme et les droits associés et la mise en œuvre du Plan d’action sur l’intégration et l’inclusion au niveau européen, national et local.

      https://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/positions/europe/774-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-l-asile-afin-de-garantir-un-no

    • Nouveau Pacte européen  : les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s traité.e.s comme des « # colis à trier  »

      Le jour même de la Conférence des Ministres européens de l’Intérieur, EuroMed Droits présente son analyse détaillée du nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration, publié le 23 septembre dernier (https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Analysis-of-Asylum-and-Migration-Pact_Final_Clickable.pdf).

      On peut résumer les plus de 500 pages de documents comme suit  : le nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration déshumanise les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s, les traitant comme des «  #colis à trier  » et les empêchant de se déplacer en Europe. Ce Pacte soulève de nombreuses questions en matière de respect des droits humains, dont certaines sont à souligner en particulier  :

      L’UE détourne le concept de solidarité. Le Pacte vise clairement à «  rétablir la confiance mutuelle entre les États membres  », donnant ainsi la priorité à la #cohésion:interne de l’UE au détriment des droits des migrant.e.s et des réfugié.e.s. La proposition laisse le choix aux États membres de contribuer – en les mettant sur un pied d’égalité – à la #réinstallation, au #rapatriement, au soutien à l’accueil ou à l’#externalisation des frontières. La #solidarité envers les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s et leurs droits fondamentaux sont totalement ignorés.

      Le pacte promeut une gestion «  sécuritaire  » de la migration. Selon la nouvelle proposition, les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s seront placé.e.s en #détention et privé.e.s de liberté à leur arrivée. La procédure envisagée pour accélérer la procédure de demande d’asile ne pourra se faire qu’au détriment des lois sur l’asile et des droits des demandeur.se.s. Il est fort probable que la #procédure se déroulera de manière arbitraire et discriminatoire, en fonction de la nationalité du/de la demandeur.se, de son taux de reconnaissance et du fait que le pays dont il/elle provient est «  sûr  », ce qui est un concept douteux.

      L’idée clé qui sous-tend cette vision est simple  : externaliser autant que possible la gestion des frontières en coopérant avec des pays tiers. L’objectif est de faciliter le retour et la réadmission des migrant.e.s dans le pays d’où ils/elles sont parti.es. Pour ce faire, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) verrait ses pouvoirs renforcés et un poste de coordinateur.trice européen.ne pour les retours serait créé. Le pacte risque de facto de fournir un cadre juridique aux pratiques illégales telles que les refoulements, les détentions arbitraires et les mesures visant à réduire davantage la capacité en matière d’asile. Des pratiques déjà en place dans certains États membres.

      Le Pacte présente quelques aspects «  positifs  », par exemple en matière de protection des enfants ou de regroupement familial, qui serait facilité. Mais ces bonnes intentions, qui doivent être mises en pratique, sont noyées dans un océan de mesures répressives et sécuritaires.

      EuroMed Droits appelle les Etats membres de l’UE à réfléchir en termes de mise en œuvre pratique (ou non) de ces mesures. Non seulement elles violent les droits humains, mais elles sont impraticables sur le terrain  : la responsabilité de l’évaluation des demandes d’asile reste au premier pays d’arrivée, sans vraiment remettre en cause le Règlement de Dublin. Cela signifie que des pays comme l’Italie, Malte, l’Espagne, la Grèce et Chypre continueront à subir une «  pression  » excessive, ce qui les encouragera à poursuivre leurs politiques de refoulement et d’expulsion. Enfin, le Pacte ne répond pas à la problématique urgente des «  hotspots  » et des camps de réfugié.e.s comme en Italie ou en Grèce et dans les zones de transit à l’instar de la Hongrie. Au contraire, cela renforce ce modèle dangereux en le présentant comme un exemple à exporter dans toute l’Europe, alors que des exemples récents ont démontré l’impossibilité de gérer ces camps de manière humaine.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/nouveau-pacte-europeen%e2%80%af-les-migrant-e-s-et-refugie-e-s-traite

      #paquets_de_la_poste #paquets #poste #tri #pays_sûrs

    • A “Fresh Start” or One More Clunker? Dublin and Solidarity in the New Pact

      In ongoing discussions on the reform of the CEAS, solidarity is a key theme. It stands front and center in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum: after reassuring us of the “human and humane approach” taken, the opening quote stresses that Member States must be able to “rely on the solidarity of our whole European Union”.

      In describing the need for reform, the Commission does not mince its words: “[t]here is currently no effective solidarity mechanism in place, and no efficient rule on responsibility”. It’s a remarkable statement: barely one year ago, the Commission maintained that “[t]he EU [had] shown tangible and rapid support to Member States under most pressure” throughout the crisis. Be that as it may, we are promised a “fresh start”. Thus, President Von der Leyen has announced on the occasion of the 2020 State of the Union Address that “we will abolish the Dublin Regulation”, the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal (examined here) has been withdrawn, and the Pact proposes a “new solidarity mechanism” connected to “robust and fair management of the external borders” and capped by a new “governance framework”.

      Before you buy the shiny new package, you are advised to consult the fine print however. Yes, the Commission proposes to abolish the Dublin III Regulation and withdraws the Dublin IV Proposal. But the Proposal for an Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (hereafter “the Migration Management Proposal”) reproduces word-for-word the Dublin III Regulation, subject to amendments drawn … from the Dublin IV Proposal! As for the “governance framework” outlined in Articles 3-7 of the Migration Management Proposal, it’s a hodgepodge of purely declamatory provisions (e.g. Art. 3-4), of restatements of pre-existing obligations (Art. 5), of legal bases authorizing procedures that require none (Art. 7). The one new item is a yearly monitoring exercise centered on an “European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy” (Art. 6), which seems as likely to make a difference as the “Mechanism for Early Warning, Preparedness and Crisis Management”, introduced with much fanfare with the Dublin III Regulation and then left in the drawer before, during and after the 2015/16 crisis.

      Leaving the provisions just mentioned for future commentaries – fearless interpreters might still find legal substance in there – this contribution focuses on four points: the proposed amendments to Dublin, the interface between Dublin and procedures at the border, the new solidarity mechanism, and proposals concerning force majeure. Caveat emptor! It is a jungle of extremely detailed and sometimes obscure provisions. While this post is longer than usual – warm thanks to the lenient editors! – do not expect an exhaustive summary, nor firm conclusions on every point.
      Dublin, the Undying

      To borrow from Mark Twain, reports of the death of the Dublin system have been once more greatly exaggerated. As noted, Part III of the Migration Management Proposal (Articles 8-44) is for all intents and purposes an amended version of the Dublin III Regulation, and most of the amendments are lifted from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal.

      A first group of amendments concerns the responsibility criteria. Some expand the possibilities to allocate applicants based on their “meaningful links” with Member States: Article 2(g) expands the family definition to include siblings, opening new possibilities for reunification; Article 19(4) enlarges the criterion based on previous legal abode (i.e. expired residence documents); in a tip of the hat to the Wikstroem Report, commented here, Article 20 introduces a new criterion based on prior education in a Member State.

      These are welcome changes, but all that glitters is not gold. The Commission advertises “streamlined” evidentiary requirements to facilitate family reunification. These would be necessary indeed: evidentiary issues have long undermined the application of the family criteria. Unfortunately, the Commission is not proposing anything new: Article 30(6) of the Migration Management Proposal corresponds in essence to Article 22(5) of the Dublin III Regulation.

      Besides, while the Commission proposes to expand the general definition of family, the opposite is true of the specific definition of family applicable to “dependent persons”. Under Article 16 of the Dublin III Regulation, applicants who e.g. suffer from severe disabilities are to be kept or brought together with a care-giving parent, child or sibling residing in a Member State. Due to fears of sham marriages, spouses have been excluded and this is legally untenable and inhumane, but instead of tackling the problem the Commission proposes in Article 24 to worsen it by excluding siblings. The end result is paradoxical: persons needing family support the most will be deprived – for no apparent reason other than imaginary fears of “abuses” – of the benefits of enlarged reunification possibilities. “[H]uman and humane”, indeed.

      The fight against secondary movements inspires most of the other amendments to the criteria. In particular, Article 21 of the Proposal maintains and extends the much-contested criterion of irregular entry while clarifying that it applies also to persons disembarked after a search and rescue (SAR) operation. The Commission also proposes that unaccompanied children be transferred to the first Member State where they applied if no family criterion is applicable (Article 15(5)). This would overturn the MA judgment of the ECJ whereby in such cases the asylum claim must be examined in the State where the child last applied and is present. It’s not a technical fine point: while the case-law of the ECJ is calculated to spare children the trauma of a transfer, the proposed amendment would subject them again to the rigours of Dublin.

      Again to discourage secondary movements, the Commission proposes – as in 2016 – a second group of amendments: new obligations for the applicants (Articles 9-10). Applicants must in principle apply in the Member State of first entry, remain in that State for the duration of the Dublin procedure and, post-transfer, remain in the State responsible. Moving to the “wrong” State entails losing the benefits of the Reception Conditions Directive, subject to “the need to ensure a standard of living in accordance with” the Charter. It is debatable whether this is a much lesser standard of reception. More importantly: as reception conditions in line with the Directive are seldom guaranteed in several frontline Member States, the prospect of being treated “in accordance with the Charter” elsewhere will hardly dissuade applicants from moving on.

      The 2016 Proposal foresaw, as further punishment, the mandatory application of accelerated procedures to “secondary movers”. This rule disappears from the Migration Management Proposal, but as Daniel Thym points out in his forthcoming contribution on secondary movements, it remains in Article 40(1)(g) of the 2016 Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation. Furthermore, the Commission proposes deleting Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, i.e. the guarantee that persons transferred back to a State that has meanwhile discontinued or rejected their application will have their case reopened, or a remedy available. This is a dangerous invitation to Member States to reintroduce “discontinuation” practices that the Commission itself once condemned as incompatible with effective access to status determination.

      To facilitate responsibility-determination, the Proposal further obliges applicants to submit relevant information before or at the Dublin interview. Late submissions are not to be considered. Fairness would demand that justified delays be excused. Besides, it is also proposed to repeal Article 7(3) of the Dublin III Regulation, whereby authorities must take into account evidence of family ties even if produced late in the process. All in all, then, the Proposal would make proof of family ties harder, not easier as the Commission claims.

      A final group of amendments concern the details of the Dublin procedure, and might prove the most important in practice.

      Some “streamline” the process, e.g. with shorter deadlines (e.g. Article 29(1)) and a simplified take back procedure (Article 31). Controversially, the Commission proposes again to reduce the scope of appeals against transfers to issues of ill-treatment and misapplication of the family criteria (Article 33). This may perhaps prove acceptable to the ECJ in light of its old Abdullahi case-law. However, it contravenes Article 13 ECHR, which demands an effective remedy for the violation of any Convention right.
      Other procedural amendments aim to make it harder for applicants to evade transfers. At present, if a transferee absconds for 18 months, the transfer is cancelled and the transferring State becomes responsible. Article 35(2) of the Proposal allows the transferring State to “stop the clock” if the applicant absconds, and to resume the transfer as soon as he reappears.
      A number of amendments make responsibility more “stable” once assigned, although not as “permanent” as the 2016 Proposal would have made it. Under Article 27 of the Proposal, the responsibility of a State will only cease if the applicant has left the Dublin area in compliance with a return decision. More importantly, under Article 26 the responsible State will have to take back even persons to whom it has granted protection. This would be a significant extension of the scope of the Dublin system, and would “lock” applicants in the responsible State even more firmly and more durably. Perhaps by way of compensation, the Commission proposes that beneficiaries of international protection obtain “long-term status” – and thus mobility rights – after three years of residence instead of five. However, given that it is “very difficult in practice” to exercise such rights, the compensation seems more theoretical than effective and a far cry from a system of free movement capable of offsetting the rigidities of Dublin.

      These are, in short, the key amendments foreseen. While it’s easy enough to comment on each individually, it is more difficult to forecast their aggregate impact. Will they – to paraphrase the Commission – “improv[e] the chances of integration” and reduce “unauthorised movements” (recital 13), and help closing “the existing implementation gap”? Probably not, as none of them is a game-changer.

      Taken together, however, they might well aggravate current distributive imbalances. Dublin “locks in” the responsibilities of the States that receive most applications – traditional destinations such as Germany or border States such as Italy – leaving the other Member States undisturbed. Apart from possible distributive impacts of the revised criteria and of the now obligations imposed on applicants, first application States will certainly be disadvantaged combination by shortened deadlines, security screenings (see below), streamlined take backs, and “stable” responsibility extending to beneficiaries of protection. Under the “new Dublin rules” – sorry for the oxymoron! – effective solidarity will become more necessary than ever.
      Border procedures and Dublin

      Building on the current hotspot approach, the Proposals for a Screening Regulation and for an Asylum Procedures Regulation outline a new(ish) “pre-entry” phase. This will be examined in a forthcoming post by Lyra Jakuleviciene, but the interface with infra-EU allocation deserves mention here.

      In a nutshell, persons irregularly crossing the border will be screened for the purpose of identification, health and security checks, and registration in Eurodac. Protection applicants may then be channelled to “border procedures” in a broad range of situations. This will be mandatory if the applicant: (a) attempts to mislead the authorities; (b) can be considered, based on “serious reasons”, “a danger to the national security or public order of the Member States”; (c) comes from a State whose nationals have a low Union-wide recognition rate (Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal).

      The purpose of the border procedure is to assess applications “without authorising the applicant’s entry into the Member State’s territory” (here, p.4). Therefore, it might have seemed logical that applicants subjected to it be excluded from the Dublin system – as is the case, ordinarily, for relocations (see below). Not so: under Article 41(7) of the Proposal, Member States may apply Dublin in the context of border procedures. This weakens the idea of “seamless procedures at the border” somewhat but – from the standpoint of both applicants and border States – it is better than a watertight exclusion: applicants may still benefit from “meaningful link” criteria, and border States are not “stuck with the caseload”. I would normally have qualms about giving Member States discretion in choosing whether Dublin rules apply. But as it happens, Member States who receive an asylum application already enjoy that discretion under the so-called “sovereignty clause”. Nota bene: in exercising that discretion, Member States apply EU Law and must observe the Charter, and the same principle must certainly apply under the proposed Article 41(7).

      The only true exclusion from the Dublin system is set out in Article 8(4) of the Migration Management Proposal. Under this provision, Member States must carry out a security check of all applicants as part of the pre-entry screening and/or after the application is filed. If “there are reasonable grounds to consider the applicant a danger to national security or public order” of the determining State, the other criteria are bypassed and that State becomes responsible. Attentive readers will note that the wording of Article 8(4) differs from that of Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal (e.g. “serious grounds” vs “reasonable grounds”). It is therefore unclear whether the security grounds to “screen out” an applicant from Dublin are coextensive with the security grounds making a border procedure mandatory. Be that as it may, a broad application of Article 8(4) would be undesirable, as it would entail a large-scale exclusion from the guarantees that applicants derive from the Dublin system. The risk is moderate however: by applying Article 8(4) widely, Member States would be increasing their own share of responsibilities under the system. As twenty-five years of Dublin practice indicate, this is unlikely to happen.
      “Mandatory” and “flexible” solidarity under the new mechanism

      So far, the Migration Management Proposal does not look significantly different from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal, which did not itself fundamentally alter existing rules, and which went down in flames in inter- and intra-institutional negotiations. Any hopes of a “fresh start”, then, are left for the new solidarity mechanism.

      Unfortunately, solidarity is a difficult subject for the EU: financial support has hitherto been a mere fraction of Member State expenditure in the field; operational cooperation has proved useful but cannot tackle all the relevant aspects of the unequal distribution of responsibilities among Member States; relocations have proved extremely beneficial for thousands of applicants, but are intrinsically complex operations and have also proven politically divisive – an aspect which has severely undermined their application and further condemned them to be small scale affairs relative to the needs on the ground. The same goes a fortiori for ad hoc initiatives – such as those that followed SAR operations over the last two years– which furthermore lack the predictability that is necessary for sharing responsibilities effectively. To reiterate what the Commission stated, there is currently “no effective solidarity mechanism in place”.

      Perhaps most importantly, the EU has hitherto been incapable of accurately gauging the distributive asymmetries on the ground, to articulate a clear doctrine guiding the key determinations of “how much solidarity” and “what kind(s) of solidarity”, and to define commensurate redistributive targets on this basis (see here, p.34 and 116).

      Alas, the opportunity to elaborate a solidarity doctrine for the EU has been completely missed. Conceptually, the New Pact does not go much farther than platitudes such as “[s]olidarity implies that all Member States should contribute”. As Daniel Thym aptly observed, “pragmatism” is the driving force behind the Proposal: the Commission starts from a familiar basis – relocations – and tweaks it in ways designed to convince stakeholders that solidarity becomes both “compulsory” and “flexible”. It’s a complicated arrangement and I will only describe it in broad strokes, leaving the crucial dimensions of financial solidarity and operational cooperation to forthcoming posts by Iris Goldner Lang and Lilian Tsourdi.

      The mechanism operates according to three “modes”. In its basic mode, it is to replace ad hoc solidarity initiatives following SAR disembarkations (Articles 47-49 of the Migration Management Proposal):

      The Commission determines, in its yearly Migration Management Report, whether a State is faced with “recurring arrivals” following SAR operations and determines the needs in terms of relocations and other contributions (capacity building, operational support proper, cooperation with third States).
      The Member States are “invited” to notify the “contributions they intend to make”. If offers are sufficient, the Commission combines them and formally adopts a “solidarity pool”. If not, it adopts an implementing act summarizing relocation targets for each Member State and other contributions as offered by them. Member States may react by offering other contributions instead of relocations, provided that this is “proportional” – one wonders how the Commission will tally e.g. training programs for Libyan coastguards with relocation places.
      If the relocations offered fall 30% short of the target indicated by the Commission, a “critical mass correction mechanism” will apply: each Member States will be obliged to meet at least 50% of the quota of relocations indicated by the Commission. However, and this is the new idea offered by the Commission to bring relocation-skeptics onboard, Member States may discharge their duties by offering “return sponsorships” instead of relocations: the “sponsor” Member State commits to support the benefitting Member State to return a person and, if the return is not carried out within eight months, to accept her on its territory.

      If I understand correctly the fuzzy provision I have just summarized – Article 48(2) – it all boils down to “half-compulsory” solidarity: Member States are obliged to cover at least 50% of the relocation needs set by the Commission through relocations or sponsorships, and the rest with other contributions.

      After the “solidarity pool” is established and the benefitting Member State requests its activation, relocations can start:

      The eligible persons are those who applied for protection in the benefitting State, with the exclusion of those that are subject to border procedures (Article 45(1)(a)).Also excluded are those whom Dublin criteria based on “meaningful links” – family, abode, diplomas – assign to the benefitting State (Article 57(3)). These rules suggest that the benefitting State must carry out identification, screening for border procedures and a first (reduced?) Dublin procedure before it can declare an applicant eligible for relocation.
      Persons eligible for return sponsorship are “illegally staying third-country nationals” (Article 45(1)(b)).
      The eligible persons are identified, placed on a list, and matched to Member States based on “meaningful links”. The transfer can only be refused by the State of relocation on security grounds (Article 57(2)(6) and (7)), and otherwise follows the modalities of Dublin transfers in almost all respects (e.g. deadlines, notification, appeals). However, contrary to what happens under Dublin, missing the deadline for transfer does not entail that the relocation is cancelled it (see Article 57(10)).
      After the transfer, applicants will be directly admitted to the asylum procedure in the State of relocation only if it has been previously established that the benefitting State would have been responsible under criteria other than those based on “meaningful links” (Article 58(3)). In all the other cases, the State of relocation will run a Dublin procedure and, if necessary, transfer again the applicant to the State responsible (see Article 58(2)). As for persons subjected to return sponsorship, the State of relocation will pick up the application of the Return Directive where the benefitting State left off (or so I read Article 58(5)!).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is under “migratory pressure”, at the request of the concerned State or of its own motion (Article 50), the mechanism operates as described above except for one main point: beneficiaries of protection also become eligible for relocation (Article 51(3)). Thankfully, they must consent thereto and are automatically granted the same status in the relocation State (see Articles 57(3) and 58(4)).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is confronted to a “crisis”, rules change further (see Article 2 of the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation):

      Applicants subject to the border procedure and persons “having entered irregularly” also become eligible for relocation. These persons may then undergo a border procedure post-relocation (see Article 41(1) and (8) of the Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation).
      Persons subject to return sponsorship are transferred to the sponsor State if their removal does not occur within four – instead of eight – months.
      Other contributions are excluded from the palette of contributions available to the other Member States (Article 2(1)): it has to be relocation or return sponsorship.
      The procedure is faster, with shorter deadlines.

      It is an understatement to say that the mechanism is complex, and your faithful scribe still has much to digest. For the time being, I would make four general comments.

      First, it is not self-evident that this is a good “insurance scheme” for its intended beneficiaries. As noted, the system only guarantees that 50% of the relocation needs of a State will be met. Furthermore, there are hidden costs: in “SAR” and “pressure” modes, the benefitting State has to screen the applicant, register the application, and assess whether border procedures or (some) Dublin criteria apply before it can channel the applicant to relocation. It is unclear whether a 500 lump sum is enough to offset the costs (see Article 79 of the Migration Management Proposal). Besides, in a crisis situation, these preliminary steps might make relocation impractical – think of the Greek registration backlog in 2015/6. Perhaps, extending relocation to persons “having entered irregularly” when the mechanism is in “crisis mode” is meant precisely to take care of this. Similar observations apply to return sponsorship. Under Article 55(4) of the Migration Management Proposal, the support offered by the sponsor to the benefitting State can be rather low key (e.g. “counselling”) and there seems to be no guarantee that the benefitting State will be effectively relieved of the political, administrative and financial costs associated to return. Moving from costs to risks, it is clear that the benefitting State bears all the risks of non implementation – in other words, if the system grinds to a halt or breaks down, it will be Moria all over again. In light of past experience, one can only agree with Thomas Gammelthoft-Hansen that it’s a “big gamble”. Other aspects examined below – the vast margins of discretion left to the Commission, and the easy backdoor opened by the force majeure provisions – do not help either to create predictability.
      Second, as just noted the mechanism gives the Commission practically unlimited discretion at all critical junctures. The Commission will determine whether a Member States is confronted to “recurring arrivals”, “pressure” or a “crisis”. It will do so under definitions so open-textured, and criteria so numerous, that it will be basically the master of its determinations (Article 50 of the Migration Management Proposal). The Commission will determine unilaterally relocation and operational solidarity needs. Finally, the Commission will determine – we do not know how – if “other contributions” are proportional to relocation needs. Other than in the most clear-cut situations, there is no way that anyone can predict how the system will be applied.
      Third: the mechanism reflects a powerful fixation with and unshakable faith in heavy bureaucracy. Protection applicants may undergo up to three “responsibility determination” procedures and two transfers before finally landing in an asylum procedure: Dublin “screening” in the first State, matching, relocation, full Dublin procedure in the relocation State, then transfer. And this is a system that should not “compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications”(recital 34)! Decidedly, the idea that in order to improve the CEAS it is above all necessary to suppress unnecessary delays and coercion (see here, p.9) has not made a strong impression on the minds of the drafters. The same remark applies mutatis mutandis to return sponsorships: whatever the benefits in terms of solidarity, one wonders if it is very cost-effective or humane to drag a person from State to State so that they can each try their hand at expelling her.
      Lastly and relatedly, applicants and other persons otherwise concerned by the relocation system are given no voice. They can be “matched”, transferred, re-transferred, but subject to few exceptions their aspirations and intentions remain legally irrelevant. In this regard, the “New Pact” is as old school as it gets: it sticks strictly to the “no choice” taboo on which Dublin is built. What little recognition of applicants’ actorness had been made in the Wikstroem Report is gone. Objectifying migrants is not only incompatible with the claim that the approach taken is “human and humane”. It might prove fatal to the administrative efficiency so cherished by the Commission. Indeed, failure to engage applicants is arguably the key factor in the dismal performance of the Dublin system (here, p.112). Why should it be any different under this solidarity mechanism?

      Framing Force Majeure (or inviting defection?)

      In addition to addressing “crisis” situations, the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation includes separate provisions on force majeure.

      Thereunder, any Member State may unilaterally declare that it is faced with a situation making it “impossible” to comply with selected CEAS rules, and thus obtain the right – subject to a mere notification – to derogate from them. Member States may obtain in this way longer Dublin deadlines, or even be exempted from the obligation to accept transfers and be liberated from responsibilities if the suspension goes on more than a year (Article 8). Furthermore, States may obtain a six-months suspension of their duties under the solidarity mechanism (Article 9).

      The inclusion of this proposal in the Pact – possibly an attempt to further placate Member States averse to European solidarity? – beggars belief. Legally speaking, the whole idea is redundant: under the case-law of the ECJ, Member States may derogate from any rule of EU Law if confronted to force majeure. However, putting this black on white amounts to inviting (and legalizing) defection. The only conceivable object of rules of this kind would have been to subject force majeure derogations to prior authorization by the Commission – but there is nothing of the kind in the Proposal. The end result is paradoxical: while Member States are (in theory!) subject to Commission supervision when they conclude arrangements facilitating the implementation of Dublin rules, a mere notification will be enough to authorize them to unilaterally tear a hole in the fabric of “solidarity” and “responsibility” so painstakingly – if not felicitously – woven in the Pact.
      Concluding comments

      We should have taken Commissioner Ylva Johansson at her word when she said that there would be no “Hoorays” for the new proposals. Past the avalanche of adjectives, promises and fancy administrative monikers hurled at the reader – “faster, seamless migration processes”; “prevent the recurrence of events such as those seen in Moria”; “critical mass correction mechanism” – one cannot fail to see that the “fresh start” is essentially an exercise in repackaging.

      On responsibility-allocation and solidarity, the basic idea is one that the Commission incessantly returns to since 2007 (here, p. 10): keep Dublin and “correct” it through solidarity schemes. I do sympathize to an extent: realizing a fair balance of responsibilities by “sharing people” has always seemed to me impracticable and undesirable. Still, one would have expected that the abject failure of the Dublin system, the collapse of mutual trust in the CEAS, the meagre results obtained in the field of solidarity – per the Commission’s own appraisal – would have pushed it to bring something new to the table.

      Instead, what we have is a slightly milder version of the Dublin IV Proposal – the ultimate “clunker” in the history of Commission proposals – and an ultra-bureaucratic mechanism for relocation, with the dubious addition of return sponsorships and force majeure provisions. The basic tenets of infra-EU allocation remain the same – “no choice”, first entry – and none of the structural flaws that doomed current schemes to failure is fundamentally tackled (here, p.107): solidarity is beefed-up but appears too unreliable and fuzzy to generate trust; there are interesting steps on “genuine links”, but otherwise no sustained attempt to positively engage applicants; administrative complexity and coercive transfers reign on.

      Pragmatism, to quote again Daniel Thym’s excellent introductory post, is no sin. It is even expected of the Commission. This, however, is a study in path-dependency. By defending the status quo, wrapping it in shiny new paper, and making limited concessions to key policy actors, the Commission may perhaps carry its proposals through. However, without substantial corrections, the “new” Pact is unlikely to save the CEAS or even to prevent new Morias.

      http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-fresh-start-or-one-more-clunker-dublin-and-solidarity-in-the-ne

      #Francesco_Maiani

      #force_majeure

    • European Refugee Policy: What’s Gone Wrong and How to Make It Better

      In 2015 and 2016, more than 1 million refugees made their way to the European Union, the largest number of them originating from Syria. Since that time, refugee arrivals have continued, although at a much slower pace and involving people from a wider range of countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

      The EU’s response to these developments has had five main characteristics.

      First, a serious lack of preparedness and long-term planning. Despite the massive material and intelligence resources at its disposal, the EU was caught completely unaware by the mass influx of refugees five years ago and has been playing catch-up ever since. While the emergency is now well and truly over, EU member states continue to talk as if still in the grip of an unmanageable “refugee crisis.”

      Second, the EU’s refugee policy has become progressively based on a strategy known as “externalization,” whereby responsibility for migration control is shifted to unstable states outside Europe. This has been epitomized by the deals that the EU has done with countries such as Libya, Niger, Sudan, and Turkey, all of which have agreed to halt the onward movement of refugees in exchange for aid and other rewards, including support to the security services.

      Third, asylum has become increasingly criminalized, as demonstrated by the growing number of EU citizens and civil society groups that have been prosecuted for their roles in aiding refugees. At the same time, some frontline member states have engaged in a systematic attempt to delegitimize the NGO search-and-rescue organizations operating in the Mediterranean and to obstruct their life-saving activities.

      The fourth characteristic of EU countries’ recent policies has been a readiness to inflict or be complicit in a range of abuses that challenge the principles of both human rights and international refugee law. This can be seen in the violence perpetrated against asylum seekers by the military and militia groups in Croatia and Hungary, the terrible conditions found in Greek refugee camps such as Moria on the island of Lesvos, and, most egregiously of all, EU support to the Libyan Coastguard that enables it to intercept refugees at sea and to return them to abusive detention centers on land.

      Fifth and finally, the past five years have witnessed a serious absence of solidarity within the EU. Frontline states such as Greece and Italy have been left to bear a disproportionate share of the responsibility for new refugee arrivals. Efforts to relocate asylum seekers and resettle refugees throughout the EU have had disappointing results. And countries in the eastern part of the EU have consistently fought against the European Commission in its efforts to forge a more cooperative and coordinated approach to the refugee issue.

      The most recent attempt to formulate such an approach is to be found in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which the Commission proposed in September 2020.

      It would be wrong to entirely dismiss the Pact, as it contains some positive elements. These include, for example, a commitment to establish legal pathways to asylum in Europe for people who are in need of protection, and EU support for member states that wish to establish community-sponsored refugee resettlement programs.

      In other respects, however, the Pact has a number of important, serious flaws. It has already been questioned by those countries that are least willing to admit refugees and continue to resist the role of Brussels in this policy domain. The Pact also makes hardly any reference to the Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration—a strange omission given the enormous amount of time and effort that the UN has devoted to those initiatives, both of which were triggered by the European emergency of 2015-16.

      At an operational level, the Pact endorses and reinforces the EU’s externalization agenda and envisages a much more aggressive role for Frontex, the EU’s border control agency. At the same time, it empowers member states to refuse entry to asylum seekers on the basis of very vague criteria. As a result, individuals may be more vulnerable to human smugglers and traffickers. There is also a strong likelihood that new refugee camps will spring up on the fringes of Europe, with their residents living in substandard conditions.

      Finally, the Pact places enormous emphasis on the involuntary return of asylum seekers to their countries of origin. It even envisages that a hardline state such as Hungary could contribute to the implementation of the Pact by organizing and funding such deportations. This constitutes an extremely dangerous new twist on the notions of solidarity and responsibility sharing, which form the basis of the international refugee regime.

      If the proposed Pact is not fit for purpose, then what might a more constructive EU refugee policy look like?

      It would in the first instance focus on the restoration of both EU and NGO search-and-rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and establish more predictable disembarkation and refugee distribution mechanisms. It would also mean the withdrawal of EU support for the Libyan Coastguard, the closure of that country’s detention centers, and a substantial improvement of the living conditions experienced by refugees in Europe’s frontline states—changes that should take place with or without a Pact.

      Indeed, the EU should redeploy the massive amount of resources that it currently devotes to the externalization process, so as to strengthen the protection capacity of asylum and transit countries on the periphery of Europe. A progressive approach on the part of the EU would involve the establishment of not only faster but also fair asylum procedures, with appropriate long-term solutions being found for new arrivals, whether or not they qualify for refugee status.

      These changes would help to ensure that those searching for safety have timely and adequate opportunities to access their most basic rights.

      https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/11/5/european-refugee-policy-whats-gone-wrong-and-how-to-make-it-b

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Turning European Union Territory into a non-Territory

      Externalization policies in 2020: where is the European Union territory?

      In spite of the Commission’s rhetoric stressing the novel elements of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (hereinafter: the Pact – summarized and discussed in general here), there are good reasons to argue that the Pact develops and consolidates, among others, the existing trends on externalization policies of migration control (see Guild et al). Furthermore, it tries to create new avenues for a ‘smarter’ system of management of immigration, by additionally controlling access to the European Union territory for third country nationals (TCNs), and by creating different categories of migrants, which are then subject to different legal regimes which find application in the European Union territory.

      The consolidation of existing trends concerns the externalization of migration management practices, resort to technologies in developing migration control systems (further development of Eurodac, completion of the path toward full interoperability between IT systems), and also the strengthening of the role of the European Union executive level, via increased joint management involving European Union agencies: these are all policies that find in the Pact’s consolidation.

      This brief will focus on externalization (practices), a concept which is finding a new declination in the Pact: indeed, the Pact and several of the measures proposed, read together, are aiming at ‘disentangling’ the territory of the EU, from a set of rights which are related with the presence of the migrant or of the asylum seeker on the territory of a Member State of the EU, and from the relation between territory and access to a jurisdiction, which is necessary to enforce rights which otherwise remain on paper.

      Interestingly, this process of separation, of splitting between territory-law/rights-jurisdiction takes place not outside, but within the EU, and this is the new declination of externalization which one can find in the measures proposed in the Pact, namely with the proposal for a Screening Regulation and the amended proposal for a Procedure Regulation. It is no accident that other commentators have interpreted it as a consolidation of ‘fortress Europe’. In other words, this externalization process takes place within the EU and aims at making the external borders more effective also for the TCNs who are already in the territory of the EU.

      The proposal for a pre-entry screening regulation

      A first instrument which has a pivotal role in the consolidation of the externalization trend is the proposed Regulation for a screening of third country nationals (hereinafter: Proposal Screening Regulation), which will be applicable to migrants crossing the external borders without authorization. The aim of the screening, according to the Commission, is to ‘accelerate the process of determining the status of a person and what type of procedure should apply’. More precisely, the screening ‘should help ensure that the third country nationals concerned are referred to the appropriate procedures at the earliest stage possible’ and also to avoid absconding after entrance in the territory in order to reach a different state than the one of arrival (recital 8, preamble of proposal). The screening should contribute as well to curb secondary movements, which is a policy target highly relevant for many northern and central European Union states.

      In the new design, the screening procedure becomes the ‘standard’ for all TCNs who crossed the border in irregular manner, and also for persons who are disembarked following a search and rescue (SAR) operation, and for those who apply for international protection at the external border crossing points or in transit zones. With the screening Regulation, all these categories of persons shall not be allowed to enter the territory of the State during the screening (Arts 3 and 4 of the proposal).

      Consequently, different categories of migrants, including asylum seekers which are by definition vulnerable persons, are to be kept in locations situated at or in proximity to the external borders, for a time (up to 5 days, which can become 10 at maximum), defined in the Regulation, but which must be respected by national administrations. There is here an implicit equation between all these categories, and the common denominator of this operation is that all these persons have crossed the border in an unauthorized manner.

      It is yet unclear how the situation of migrants during the screening is to be organized in practical terms, transit zones, hotspot or others, and if this can qualify as detention, in legal terms. The Court of Justice has ruled recently on Hungarian transit zones (see analysis by Luisa Marin), by deciding that Röszke transit zone qualified as ‘detention’, and it can be argued that the parameters clarified in that decision could find application also to the case of migrants during the screening phase. If the situation of TCNs during the screening can be considered detention, which is then the legal basis? The Reception Conditions Directive or the Return Directive? If the national administrations struggle to meet the tight deadlines provided for the screening system, these questions will become more urgent, next to the very practical issue of the actual accommodation for this procedure, which in general does not allow for access to the territory.

      On the one side, Article 14(7) of the proposal provides a guarantee, indicating that the screening should end also if the checks are not completed within the deadlines; on the other side, the remaining question is: to which procedure is the applicant sent and how is the next phase then determined? The relevant procedure following the screening here seems to be determined in a very approximate way, and this begs the question on the extent to which rights can be protected in this context. Furthermore, the right to have access to a lawyer is not provided for in the screening phase. Given the relevance of this screening phase, also fundamental rights should be monitored, and the mechanism put in place at Article 7, leaves much to the discretion of the Member States, and the involvement of the Fundamental Rights Agency, with guidance and support upon request of the MS can be too little to ensure fundamental rights are not jeopardized by national administrations.

      This screening phase, which has the purpose to make sure, among other things, that states ‘do their job’ as to collecting information and consequently feeding the EU information systems, might therefore have important effects on the merits of the individual case, since border procedures are to be seen as fast-track, time is limited and procedural guarantees are also sacrificed in this context. In the case the screening ends with a refusal of entry, there is a substantive effect of the screening, which is conducted without legal assistance and without access to a legal remedy. And if this is not a decision in itself, but it ends up in a de-briefing form, this form might give substance to the next stage of the procedure, which, in the case of asylum, should be an individualized and accurate assessment of one’s individual circumstances.

      Overall, it should be stressed that the screening itself does not end up in a formal decision, it nevertheless represents an important phase since it defines what comes after, i.e., the type of procedure following the screening. It must be observed therefore, that the respect of some procedural rights is of paramount importance. At the same time, it is important that communication in a language TCNs can understand is effective, since the screening might end in a de-briefing form, where one or more nationalities are indicated. Considering that one of the options is the refusal of entry (Art. 14(1) screening proposal; confirmed by the recital 40 of the Proposal Procedure Regulation, as amended in 2020), and the others are either access to asylum or expulsion, one should require that the screening provides for procedural guarantees.

      Furthermore, the screening should point to any element which might be relevant to refer the TCNs into the accelerated examination procedure or the border procedure. In other words, the screening must indicate in the de-briefing form the options that protect asylum applicants less than others (Article 14(3) of the proposal). It does not operate in the other way: a TCN who has applied for asylum and comes from a country with a high recognition rate is not excluded from the screening (see blog post by Jakuleviciene).

      The legislation creates therefore avenues for disentangling, splitting the relation between physical presence of an asylum applicant on a territory and the set of laws and fundamental rights associated to it, namely a protective legal order, access to rights and to a jurisdiction enforcing those rights. It creates a sort of ‘lighter’ legal order, a lower density system, which facilitates the exit of the applicant from the territory of the EU, creating a sort of shift from a Europe of rights to the Europe of borders, confinement and expulsions.

      The proposal for new border procedures: an attempt to create a lower density territory?

      Another crucial piece in this process of establishing a stronger border fence and streamline procedures at the border, creating a ‘seamless link between asylum and return’, in the words of the Commission, is constituted by the reform of the border procedures, with an amendment of the 2016 proposal for the Regulation procedure (hereinafter: Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation).

      Though border procedures are already present in the current Regulation of 2013, they are now developed into a “border procedure for asylum and return”, and a more developed accelerated procedure, which, next to the normal asylum procedure, comes after the screening phase.

      The new border procedure becomes obligatory (according to Art. 41(3) of the Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation) for applicants who arrive irregularly at the external border or after disembarkation and another of these grounds apply:

      – they represent a risk to national security or public order;

      – the applicant has provided false information or documents or by withholding relevant information or document;

      – the applicant comes from a non-EU country for which the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum decisions is below 20 percent.

      This last criterion is especially problematic, since it transcends the criterion of the safe third country and it undermines the principle that every asylum application requires a complex and individualized assessment of the particular personal circumstances of the applicant, by introducing presumptive elements in a procedure which gives fewer guarantees.

      During the border procedure, the TCN is not granted access to the EU. The expansion of the new border procedures poses also the problem of the organization of the facilities necessary for the new procedures, which must be a location at or close to the external borders, in other words, where migrants are apprehended or disembarked.

      Tellingly enough, the Commission’s explanatory memorandum describes as guarantees in the asylum border procedure all the situations in which the border procedure shall not be applied, for example, because the necessary support cannot be provided or for medical reasons, or where the ‘conditions for detention (…) cannot be met and the border procedure cannot be applied without detention’.

      Also here the question remains on how to qualify their stay during the procedure, because the Commission aims at limiting resort to detention. The situation could be considered de facto a detention, and its compatibility with the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in the Hungarian transit zones case is questionable.

      Another aspect which must be analyzed is the system of guarantees after the decision in a border procedure. If an application is rejected in an asylum border procedure, the “return procedure” applies immediately. Member States must limit to one instance the right to effective remedy against the decision, as posited in Article 53(9). The right to an effective remedy is therefore limited, according to Art. 53 of the Proposed Regulation, and the right to remain, a ‘light’ right to remain one could say, is also narrowly constructed, in the case of border procedures, to the first remedy against the negative decision (Art. 54(3) read together with Art. 54(4) and 54(5)). Furthermore, EU law allows Member States to limit the right to remain in case of subsequent applications and provides that there is no right to remain in the case of subsequent appeals (Art. 54(6) and (7)). More in general, this proposal extends the circumstances where the applicant does not have an automatic right to remain and this represents an aspect which affects significantly and in a factual manner the capacity to challenge a negative decision in a border procedure.

      Overall, it can be argued that the asylum border procedure is a procedure where guarantees are limited, because the access to the jurisdiction is taking place in fast-track procedures, access to legal remedies is also reduced to the very minimum. Access to the territory of the Member State is therefore deprived of its typical meaning, in the sense that it does not imply access to a system which is protecting rights with procedures which offer guarantees and are therefore also time-consuming. Here, efficiency should govern a process where the access to a jurisdiction is lighter, is ‘less dense’ than otherwise. To conclude, this externalization of migration control policies takes place ‘inside’ the European Union territory, and it aims at prolonging the effects of containment policies because they make access to the EU territory less meaningful, in legal terms: the presence of the person in the territory of the EU does not entail full access to the rights related to the presence on the territory.

      Solidarity in cooperating with third countries? The “return sponsorship” and its territorial puzzle

      Chapter 6 of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposes, among other things, to create a conditionality between cooperation on readmission with third countries and the issuance of visas to their nationals. This conditionality was legally established in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code Regulation. The revision (discussed here) states that, given their “politically sensitive nature and their horizontal implications for the Member States and the Union”, such provisions will be triggered once implementing powers are conferred to the Council (following a proposal from the Commission).

      What do these measures entail? We know that they can be applied in bulk or separately. Firstly, EU consulates in third countries will not have the usual leeway to waive some documents required to apply for visas (Art. 14(6), visa code). Secondly, visa applicants from uncooperative third countries will pay higher visa fees (Art. 16(1) visa code). Thirdly, visa fees to diplomatic and service passports will not be waived (Art. 16(5)b visa code). Fourthly, time to take a decision on the visa application will be longer than 15 days (Art. 23(1) visa code). Fifthly, the issuance of multi-entry visas (MEVs) from 6 months to 5 years is suspended (Art. 24(2) visa code). In other words, these coercive measures are not aimed at suspending visas. They are designed to make the procedure for obtaining a visa more lengthy, more costly, and limited in terms of access to MEVs.

      Moreover, it is important to stress that the revision of the Visa Code Regulation mentions that the Union will strike a balance between “migration and security concerns, economic considerations and general external relations”. Consequently, measures (be they restrictive or not) will result from an assessment that goes well beyond migration management issues. The assessment will not be based exclusively on the so-called “return rate” that has been presented as a compass used to reward or blame third countries’ cooperation on readmission. Other indicators or criteria, based on data provided by the Member States, will be equally examined by the Commission. These other indicators pertain to “the overall relations” between the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and a given third country, on the other. This broad category is not defined in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code, nor do we know what it precisely refers to.

      What do we know about this linkage? The idea of linking cooperation on readmission with visa policy is not new. It was first introduced at a bilateral level by some member states. For example, fifteen years ago, cooperation on redocumentation, including the swift delivery of laissez-passers by the consular authorities of countries of origin, was at the centre of bilateral talks between France and North African countries. In September 2005, the French Ministry of the Interior proposed to “sanction uncooperative countries [especially Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria] by limiting the number of short-term visas that France delivers to their nationals.” Sanctions turned out to be unsuccessful not only because of the diplomatic tensions they generated – they were met with strong criticisms and reaction on the part of North African countries – but also because the ratio between the number of laissez-passers requested by the French authorities and the number of laissez-passers delivered by North African countries’ authorities remained unchanged.

      At the EU level, the idea to link readmission with visa policy has been in the pipeline for many years. Let’s remember that, in October 2002, in its Community Return Policy, the European Commission reflected on the positive incentives that could be used in order to ensure third countries’ constant cooperation on readmission. The Commission observed in its communication that, actually, “there is little that can be offered in return. In particular visa concessions or the lifting of visa requirements can be a realistic option in exceptional cases only; in most cases it is not.” Therefore, the Commission set out to propose additional incentives (e.g. trade expansion, technical/financial assistance, additional development aid).

      In a similar vein, in September 2015, after years of negotiations and failed attempt to cooperate on readmission with Southern countries, the Commission remarked that the possibility to use Visa Facilitation Agreements as an incentive to cooperate on readmission is limited in the South “as the EU is unlikely to offer visa facilitation to certain third countries which generate many irregular migrants and thus pose a migratory risk. And even when the EU does offer the parallel negotiation of a visa facilitation agreement, this may not be sufficient if the facilitations offered are not sufficiently attractive.”

      More recently, in March 2018, in its Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for an amendment of the Common Visa Code, the Commission itself recognised that “better cooperation on readmission with reluctant third countries cannot be obtained through visa policy measures alone.” It also added that “there is no hard evidence on how visa leverage can translate into better cooperation of third countries on readmission.”

      Against this backdrop, why has so much emphasis been put on the link between cooperation on readmission and visa policy in the revised Visa Code Regulation and later in the New Pact? The Commission itself recognised that this conditionality might not constitute a sufficient incentive to ensure the cooperation on readmission.

      To reply to this question, we need first to question the oft-cited reference to third countries’ “reluctance”[n1] to cooperate on readmission in order to understand that, cooperation on readmission is inextricably based on unbalanced reciprocities. Moreover, migration, be it regular or irregular, continues to be viewed as a safety valve to relieve pressure on unemployment and poverty in countries of origin. Readmission has asymmetric costs and benefits having economic social and political implications for countries of origin. Apart from being unpopular in Southern countries, readmission is humiliating, stigmatizing, violent and traumatic for migrants,[n2] making their process of reintegration extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially when countries of origin have often no interest in promoting reintegration programmes addressed to their nationals expelled from Europe.

      Importantly, the conclusion of a bilateral agreement does not automatically lead to its full implementation in the field of readmission, for the latter is contingent on an array of factors that codify the bilateral interactions between two contracting parties. Today, more than 320 bilateral agreements linked to readmission have been concluded between the 27 EU Member States and third countries at a global level. Using an oxymoron, it is possible to argue that, over the past decades, various EU member states have learned that, if bilateral cooperation on readmission constitutes a central priority in their external relations (this is the official rhetoric), readmission remains peripheral to other strategic issue-areas which are detailed below. Finally, unlike some third countries in the Balkans or Eastern Europe, Southern third countries have no prospect of acceding to the EU bloc, let alone having a visa-free regime, at least in the foreseeable future. This basic difference makes any attempt to compare the responsiveness of the Balkan countries to cooperation on readmission with Southern non-EU countries’ impossible, if not spurious.

      Today, patterns of interdependence between the North and the South of the Mediterranean are very much consolidated. Over the last decades, Member States, especially Spain, France, Italy and Greece, have learned that bringing pressure to bear on uncooperative third countries needs to be evaluated cautiously lest other issues of high politics be jeopardized. Readmission cannot be isolated from a broader framework of interactions including other strategic, if not more crucial, issue-areas, such as police cooperation on the fight against international terrorism, border control, energy security and other diplomatic and geopolitical concerns. Nor can bilateral cooperation on readmission be viewed as an end in itself, for it has often been grafted onto a broader framework of interactions.

      This point leads to a final remark regarding “return sponsorship” which is detailed in Art. 55 of the proposal for a regulation on asylum and migration management. In a nutshell, the idea of the European Commission consists in a commitment from a “sponsoring Member State” to assist another Member State (the benefitting Member State) in the readmission of a third-country national. This mechanism foresees that each Member State is expected to indicate the nationalities for which they are willing to provide support in the field of readmission. The sponsoring Member State offers an assistance by mobilizing its network of bilateral cooperation on readmission, or by opening a dialogue with the authorities of a given third country where the third-country national will be deported. If, after eight months, attempts are unsuccessful, the third-country national is transferred to the sponsoring Member State. Note that, in application of Council Directive 2001/40 on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions, the sponsoring Member State may or may not recognize the expulsion decision of the benefitting Member State, just because Member States continue to interpret the Geneva Convention in different ways and also because they have different grounds for subsidiary protection.

      Viewed from a non-EU perspective, namely from the point of view of third countries, this mechanism might raise some questions of competence and relevance. Which consular authorities will undertake the identification process of the third country national with a view to eventually delivering a travel document? Are we talking about the third country’s consular authorities located in the territory of the benefitting Member State or in the sponsoring Member State’s? In a similar vein, why would a bilateral agreement linked to readmission – concluded with a given ‘sponsoring’ Member State – be applicable to a ‘benefitting’ Member State (with which no bilateral agreement or arrangement has been signed)? Such territorially bounded contingencies will invariably be problematic, at a certain stage, from the viewpoint of third countries. Additionally, in acting as a sponsoring Member State, one is entitled to wonder why an EU Member State might decide to expose itself to increased tensions with a given third country while putting at risk a broader framework of interactions.

      As the graph shows, not all the EU Member States are equally engaged in bilateral cooperation on readmission with third countries. Moreover, a geographical distribution of available data demonstrates that more than 70 per cent of the total number of bilateral agreements linked to readmission (be they formal or informal[n3]) concluded with African countries are covered by France, Italy and Spain. Over the last decades, these three Member States have developed their respective networks of cooperation on readmission with a number of countries in Africa and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

      Given the existence of these consolidated networks, the extent to which the “return sponsorship” proposed in the Pact will add value to their current undertakings is objectively questionable. Rather, if the “return sponsorship” mechanism is adopted, these three Member States might be deemed to act as sponsoring Member States when it comes to the expulsion of irregular migrants (located in other EU Member States) to Africa and the MENA region. More concretely, the propensity of, for example, Austria to sponsor Italy in expelling from Italy a foreign national coming from the MENA region or from Africa is predictably low. Austria’s current networks of cooperation on readmission with MENA and African countries would never add value to Italy’s consolidated networks of cooperation on readmission with these third countries. Moreover, it is unlikely that Italy will be proactively “sponsoring” other Member States’ expulsion decisions, without jeopardising its bilateral relations with other strategic third countries located in the MENA region or in Africa, to use the same example. These considerations concretely demonstrate that the European Commission’s call for “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility”, on which its “return sponsorship” mechanism is premised, is contingent on the existence of a federative Union able to act as a unitary supranational body in domestic and foreign affairs. This federation does not exist in political terms.

      Beyond these practical aspects, it is important to realise that the cobweb of bilateral agreements linked to readmission has expanded as a result of tremendously complex bilateral dynamics that go well beyond the mere management of international migration. These remarks are crucial to understanding that we need to reflect properly on the conditionality pattern that has driven the external action of the EU, especially in a regional context where patterns of interdependence among state actors have gained so much relevance over the last two decades. Moreover, given the clear consensus on the weak correlation between cooperation on readmission and visa policy (the European Commission being no exception to this consensus), linking the two might not be the adequate response to ensure third countries’ cooperation on readmission, especially when the latter are in position to capitalize on their strategic position with regard to some EU Member States.

      Conclusions

      This brief reflection has highlighted a trend which is taking shape in the Pact and in some of the measures proposed by the Commission in its 2020 package of reforms. It has been shown that the proposals for a pre-entry screening and the 2020 amended proposal for enhanced border procedures are creating something we could label as a ‘lower density’ European Union territory, because the new procedures and arrangements have the purpose of restricting and limiting access to rights and to jurisdiction. This would happen on the territory of a Member State, but in a place at or close to the external borders, with a view to confining migration and third country nationals to an area where the territory of a state, and therefore, the European territory, is less … ‘territorial’ than it should be: legally speaking, it is a ‘lower density’ territory.

      The “seamless link between asylum and return” the Commission aims to create with the new border procedures can be described as sliding doors through which the third country national can enter or leave immediately, depending on how the established fast-track system qualifies her situation.

      However, the paradox highlighted with the “return sponsorship” mechanism shows that readmission agreements or arrangements are no panacea, for the vested interests of third countries must also be taken into consideration when it comes to cooperation on readmission. In this respect, it is telling that the Commission never consulted third states on the new return sponsorship mechanism, as if their territories were not concerned by this mechanism, which is far from being the case. For this reason, it is legitimate to imagine that the main rationale for the return sponsorship mechanism may be another one, and it may be merely domestic. In other words, the return sponsorship, which transforms itself into a form of relocation after eight months if the third country national is not expelled from the EU territory, subtly takes non-frontline European Union states out of their comfort-zone and engage them in cooperating on expulsions. If they fail to do so, namely if the third-country national is not expelled after eight months, non-frontline European Union states are as it were ‘forcibly’ engaged in a ‘solidarity practice’ that is conducive to relocation.

      Given the disappointing past experience of the 2015 relocations, it is impossible to predict whether this mechanism will work or not. However, once one enters sliding doors, the danger is to remain stuck in uncertainty, in a European Union ‘no man’s land’ which is nothing but another by-product of the fortress Europe machinery.

      http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum.html

    • Le nouveau Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la Commission européenne a présenté son très attendu nouveau Pacte sur la migration et l’asile.

      Alors que l’Union européenne (UE) traverse une crise politique majeure depuis 2015 et que les solutions apportées ont démontré leur insuffisance en matière de solidarité entre États membres, leur violence à l’égard des exilés et leur coût exorbitant, la Commission européenne ne semble pas tirer les leçons du passé.

      Au menu du Pacte : un renforcement toujours accru des contrôles aux frontières, des procédures expéditives aux frontières de l’UE avec, à la clé, la détention généralisée pour les nouveaux arrivants, la poursuite de l’externalisation et un focus sur les expulsions. Il n’y a donc pas de changement de stratégie.

      Le Règlement Dublin, injuste et inefficace, est loin d’être aboli. Le nouveau système mis en place changera certes de nom, mais reprendra le critère tant décrié du “premier pays d’entrée” dans l’UE pour déterminer le pays responsable du traitement de la demande d’asile. Quant à un mécanisme permanent de solidarité pour les États davantage confrontés à l’arrivée des exilés, à l’instar des quotas de relocalisations de 2015-2017 – relocalisations qui furent un échec complet -, la Commission propose une solidarité permanente et obligatoire mais… à la carte, où les États qui ne veulent pas accueillir de migrants peuvent choisir à la place de “parrainer” leur retour, ou de fournir un soutien opérationnel aux États en difficulté. La solidarité n’est donc cyniquement pas envisagée pour l’accueil, mais bien pour le renvoi des migrants.

      Pourtant, l’UE fait face à beaucoup moins d’arrivées de migrants sur son territoire qu’en 2015 (1,5 million d’arrivées en 2015, 140.00 en 2019)

      Fin 2019, l’UE accueillait 2,6 millions de réfugiés, soit l’équivalent de 0,6% de sa population. À défaut de voies légales et sûres, les personnes exilées continuent de fuir la guerre, la violence, ou de rechercher une vie meilleure et doivent emprunter des routes périlleuses pour rejoindre le territoire de l’UE : on dénombre plus de 20.000 décès depuis 2014. Une fois arrivées ici, elles peuvent encore être détenues et subir des mauvais traitements, comme c’était le cas dans le camp qui a brûlé à Moria. Lorsqu’elles poursuivent leur route migratoire au sein de l’UE, elles ne peuvent choisir le pays où elles demanderont l’asile et elles font face à la loterie de l’asile…

      Loin d’un “nouveau départ” avec ce nouveau Pacte, la Commission propose les mêmes recettes et rate une opportunité de mettre en œuvre une tout autre politique, qui soit réellement solidaire, équitable pour les États membres et respectueuse des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes, avec l’établissement de voies légales et sûres, des procédures d’asile harmonisées et un accueil de qualité, ou encore la recherche de solutions durables pour les personnes en situation irrégulière.

      Dans cette brève analyse, nous revenons sur certaines des mesures phares telles qu’elles ont été présentées par la Commission européenne et qui feront l’objet de discussions dans les prochains mois avec le Parlement européen et le Conseil européen. Nous expliquerons également en quoi ces mesures n’ont rien d’innovant, sont un échec de la politique migratoire européenne, et pourquoi elles sont dangereuses pour les personnes migrantes.

      https://www.cire.be/publication/le-nouveau-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-lasile

      Pour télécharger l’analyse :
      https://www.cire.be/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?juwpfisadmin=false&action=wpfd&task=file.download&wpfd_category_

    • New pact on migration and asylum. Perspective on the ’other side’ of the EU border

      At the end of September 2020, and after camp Moria on Lesvos burned down leaving over 13,000 people in an even more precarious situation than they were before, the European Commission (EC) introduced a proposal for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. So far, the proposal has not been met with enthusiasm by neither member states or human rights organisations.

      Based on first-hand field research interviews with civil society and other experts in the Balkan region, this report provides a unique perspective of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum from ‘the other side’ of the EU’s borders.

      #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #rapport #Refugee_rights #militarisation

    • Impakter | Un « nouveau » pacte sur l’asile et les migrations ?

      Le média en ligne Impakter propose un article d’analyse du Pacte sur l’asile et les migrations de l’Union européenne. Publié le 23 septembre 2020, le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions. L’article pointe l’aspect critique du projet, et notamment des concepts clés tels que : « processus de pré-selection », « le processus accélérée » et le « pacte de retour ». L’article donne la parole à plusieurs expertises et offre ainsi une meilleure compréhension de ce que concrètement ce pacte implique pour les personnes migrantes.

      L’article de #Charlie_Westbrook “A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?” a été publié le 11 février dans le magazine en ligne Impakter (sous licence Creative Commons). Nous vous en proposons un court résumé traduisant les lignes directrices de l’argumentaire, en français ci-dessous. Pour lire l’intégralité du texte en anglais, vous pouvez vous rendre sur le site de Impakter.

      –---

      Le “Nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile”, a été publié le 23 septembre, faisant suite à l’incendie du camp surpeuplé de Moria. Le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions sur lesquelles les États membres de l’UE devront maintenant se mettre d’accord – une entreprise qui a déjà connu des difficultés.

      Les universitaires, les militants et les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme de l’UE soulignent les préoccupations éthiques et pratiques que suscitent nombre des propositions suggérées par la Commission, ainsi que la rhétorique axée sur le retour qui les anime. Charlie Westbrook la journaliste, a contacté Kirsty Evans, coordinatrice de terrain et des campagnes pour Europe Must Act, qui m’a fait part de ses réactions au nouveau Pacte.

      Cet essai vise à présenter le plus clairement possible les problèmes liés à ce nouveau pacte, en mettant en évidence les principales préoccupations des experts et des ONG. Ces préoccupations concernent les problèmes potentiels liés au processus de présélection, au processus accéléré (ou “fast-track”) et au mécanisme de parrainage des retours.

      Le processus de présélection

      La nouvelle proposition est d’instaurer une procédure de contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire européen. L’ONG Human Rights Watch, dénonce la suggestion trompeuse du pacte selon laquelle les personnes soumises à la procédure frontalière ne sont pas considérées comme ayant formellement pénétré sur le territoire. Ce processus concerne toute personne extra-européenne qui franchirait la frontière de manière irrégulière. Ce manque de différenciation du type de besoin inquiète l’affirme l’avocate et professeur Lyra Jakulevičienė, car cela signifie que la politique d’externalisation sera plus forte que jamais. Ce nouveau règlement brouille la distinction entre les personnes demandant une protection internationale et les autres migrants “en plaçant les deux groupes de personnes sous le même régime juridique au lieu de les différencier clairement, car leurs chances de rester dans l’UE sont très différentes”. Ce processus d’externalisation, cependant, “se déroule “à l’intérieur” du territoire de l’Union européenne, et vise à prolonger les effets des politiques d’endiguement parce qu’elles rendent l’accès au territoire de l’UE moins significatif”, comme l’expliquent Jean-Pierre Cassarino, chercheur principal à la chaire de la politique européenne de voisinage du Collège d’Europe, et Luisa Marin, professeur adjoint de droit européen. En d’autres termes, les personnes en quête de protection n’auront pas pleinement accès aux droits européens en arrivant sur le territoire de l’UE. Il faudra d’abord déterminer ce qu’elles “sont”. En outre, les recherches universitaires montrent que les processus d’externalisation “entraînent le contournement des normes fondamentales, vont à l’encontre de la bonne gouvernance, créent l’immobilité et contribuent à la crise du régime mondial des réfugiés, qui ne parvient pas à assurer la protection”. Les principales inquiétudes de ces deux expert·es sont les suivantes : la rapidité de prise de décision (pas plus de 5 jours), l’absence d’assistance juridique, Etat membre est le seul garant du respect des droits fondamentaux et si cette période de pré-sélection sera mise en œuvre comme une détention.

      Selon Jakulevičienė, la proposition apporte “un grand potentiel” pour créer davantage de camps de style “Moria”. Il est difficile de voir en quoi cela profiterait à qui que ce soit.

      Procédure accélérée

      Si un demandeur est orienté vers le système accéléré, une décision sera prise dans un délai de 12 semaines – une durée qui fait craindre que le système accéléré n’aboutisse à un retour injuste des demandeurs. En 2010, Human Rights Watch a publié un rapport de fond détaillant comment les procédures d’asile accélérées étaient inadaptées aux demandes complexes et comment elles affectaient négativement les femmes demandeurs d’asile en particulier.
      Les personnes seront dirigées vers la procédure accélérée si : l’identité a été cachée ou que de faux documents ont été utilisés, si elle représente un danger pour la sécurité nationale, ou si elle est ressortissante d’un pays pour lesquels moins de 20% des demandes ont abouti à l’octroi d’une protection internationale.

      Comme l’exprime le rapport de Human Rights Watch (HRW), “la procédure à la frontière proposée repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’ont pas besoin de protection et que l’évaluation des demandes d’asile peut être faite facilement et rapidement”.

      Essentiellement, comme l’écrivent Cassarino et Marin, “elle porte atteinte au principe selon lequel toute demande d’asile nécessite une évaluation complexe et individualisée de la situation personnelle particulière du demandeur”.

      Tout comme Jakulevičienė, Kirsty Evans s’inquiète de la manière dont le pacte va alimenter une rhétorique préjudiciable, en faisant valoir que “le langage de l’accélération fait appel à la “protection” de la rhétorique nationale évidente dans la politique et les médias en se concentrant sur le retour des personnes sur leur propre territoire”.

      Un pacte pour le retour

      Désormais, lorsqu’une demande d’asile est rejetée, la décision de retour sera rendue en même temps.

      Le raisonnement présenté par la Commission pour proposer des procédures plus rapides et plus intégrées est que des procédures inefficaces causent des difficultés excessives – y compris pour ceux qui ont obtenu le droit de rester.

      Les procédures restructurées peuvent en effet profiter à certains. Cependant, il existe un risque sérieux qu’elles aient un impact négatif sur le droit d’asile des personnes soumises à la procédure accélérée – sachant qu’en cas de rejet, il n’existe qu’un seul droit de recours.

      La proposition selon laquelle l’UE traitera désormais les retours dans leur ensemble, et non plus seulement dans un seul État membre, illustre bien l’importance que l’UE accorde aux retours. À cette fin, l’UE propose la création d’un nouveau poste de coordinateur européen des retours qui s’occupera des retours et des réadmissions.

      Décrite comme “la plus sinistre des nouvelles propositions”, et assimilée à “une grotesque parodie de personnes parrainant des enfants dans les pays en développement par l’intermédiaire d’organisations caritatives”, l’option du parrainage de retour est également un signe fort de l’approche par concession de la Commission.

      Pour M. Evans, le fait d’autoriser les pays à opter pour le “retour” comme moyen de “gérer la migration” semble être une validation du comportement illégal des États membres, comme les récentes expulsions massives en Grèce. Alors, qu’est-ce que le parrainage de retour ? Eh bien, selon les termes de l’UE, le parrainage du retour est une option de solidarité dans laquelle l’État membre “s’engage à renvoyer les migrants en situation irrégulière sans droit de séjour au nom d’un autre État membre, en le faisant directement à partir du territoire de l’État membre bénéficiaire”.

      Les États membres préciseront les nationalités qu’ils “parraineront” en fonction, vraisemblablement, des relations préexistantes de l’État membre de l’UE avec un État non membre de l’UE. Lorsque la demande d’un individu est rejetée, l’État membre qui en est responsable s’appuiera sur ses relations avec le pays tiers pour négocier le retour du demandeur.

      En outre, en supposant que les réadmissions soient réussies, le parrainage des retours fonctionne sur la base de l’hypothèse qu’il existe un pays tiers sûr. C’est sur cette base que les demandes sont rejetées. La manière dont cela affectera le principe de non-refoulement est la principale préoccupation des organisations des droits de l’homme et des experts politiques, et c’est une préoccupation qui découle d’expériences antérieures. Après tout, la coopération avec des pays tiers jusqu’à présent – à savoir l’accord Turquie-UE et l’accord Espagne-Maroc – a suscité de nombreuses critiques sur le coût des droits de l’homme.

      Mais en plus des préoccupations relatives aux droits de l’homme, des questions sont soulevées sur les implications ou même les aspects pratiques de l’”incitation” des pays tiers à se conformer, l’image de l’UE en tant que champion des droits de l’homme étant déjà corrodée aux yeux de la communauté internationale.

      Il s’agira notamment d’utiliser la délivrance du code des visas comme méthode d’incitation. Pour les pays qui ne coopèrent pas à la réadmission, les visas seront plus difficiles à obtenir. La proposition visant à pénaliser les pays qui appliquent des restrictions en matière de visas n’est pas nouvelle et n’a pas conduit à une amélioration des relations diplomatiques. Guild fait valoir que cette approche est injuste pour les demandeurs de visa des pays “non coopérants” et qu’elle risque également de susciter des sentiments d’injustice chez les voisins du pays tiers.

      L’analyse de Guild est que le nouveau pacte est diplomatiquement faible. Au-delà du financement, il offre “peu d’attention aux intérêts des pays tiers”. Il faut reconnaître, après tout, que la réadmission a des coûts et des avantages asymétriques pour les pays qui les acceptent, surtout si l’on considère que la migration, comme le soulignent Cassarino et Marin, “continue d’être considérée comme une soupape de sécurité pour soulager la pression sur le chômage et la pauvreté dans les pays d’origine”.

      https://asile.ch/2021/03/02/impakter-un-nouveau-pacte-sur-lasile-et-les-migrations

      L’article original :
      A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?
      https://impakter.com/a-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum

    • The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees. International Experiences on Containment and Mobility and their Impacts on Trust and Rights

      In September 2020, the European Commission published what it described as a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (emphasis added) that lays down a multi-annual policy agenda on issues that have been central to debate about the future of European integration. This book critically examines the new Pact as part of a Forum organized by the Horizon 2020 project ASILE – Global Asylum Governance and the EU’s Role.

      ASILE studies interactions between emerging international protection systems and the United Nations Global Compact for Refugees (UN GCR), with particular focus on the European Union’s role and the UN GCR’s implementation dynamics. It brings together a new international network of scholars from 13 institutions examining the characteristics of international and country specific asylum governance instruments and arrangements applicable to people seeking international protection. It studies the compatibility of these governance instruments’ with international protection and human rights, and the UN GCR’s call for global solidarity and responsibility sharing.

      https://www.asileproject.eu/the-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-in-light-of-the-united-nations-glob

  • A #Fribourg, un service en ligne fait le lien entre entreprises et réfugiés

    Le canton de Fribourg lance une plateforme en ligne pour mettre en relation les entreprises et les personnes réfugiées sur le marché de l’emploi. Ce service, une première en Suisse, doit permettre de lutter contre la pénurie de main-d’oeuvre et favoriser l’intégration.

    Baptisée FRintegration.ch, cette plateforme a été pensée par et pour les entreprises. Celles-ci ont bénéficié de l’expérience et des bases informatiques de l’Union patronale du canton de Fribourg.

    Sur ce nouveau site internet, les professionnels de l’intégration publient les profils des personnes aptes au travail et répondent aux demandes des entreprises. Si un CV, anonyme, séduit ou colle à une demande, un dossier complet et un entretien suivront.

    « La mise en place de cette plateforme répondait à un besoin, d’une part, des entreprises de pouvoir lutter contre la pénurie de main-d’oeuvre et, d’autre part, des personnes réfugiées ou admises à titre provisoire de pouvoir s’intégrer sur le marché du travail. C’est vraiment une solution win-win », indique Anne-Claude Demierre, conseillère d’Etat en charge de la santé et des affaires sociales, dans le 12h30.
    Coup de pouce du canton

    La plateforme s’adresse à des réfugiés ou à des requérants titulaires d’un permis F ou B, soit des personnes au bénéfice d’un permis de réfugié ou admises à titres provisoire. Actuellement, le canton de Fribourg accueille un peu plus de 822 jeunes femmes et hommes issus de la filière de l’asile. Ils sont âgés de 16 à 25 ans.

    Pour renforcer ce dispositif de soutien à l’intégration, les autorités octroient aux entreprises des subsides à l’embauche jusqu’à hauteur de 6000 francs, en compensation du travail de formation. Par ailleurs, Fribourg se dit prêt à mettre sa nouvelle plateforme à disposition des autres cantons.

    https://www.rts.ch/info/regions/fribourg/10711881-a-fribourg-un-service-en-ligne-fait-le-lien-entre-entreprises-et-refugi
    #plateforme #travail #asile #migrations #Suisse #intégration_professionnelle

    Site web de la plateforme :


    https://www.frintegration.ch

    Et un nouveau #mot :
    #working_refugees
    #terminologie #vocabulaire
    ping @sinehebdo

  • #Refugee_plus

    Refugees Plus is a digital media platform founded by a network of young refugee journalists who have first hand experience of what it means to be displaced. Refugees Plus aims to share the extraordinary success stories and challenges faced by refugees and displaced people.

    From Syria to South Sudan, the world has seen a record number of displaced people, with over 65 million people forced to flee their homes by conflict, persecution and natural disasters.

    This comes at a time of rising populism and xenophobia and rich countries closing their doors to those seeking safety. And the few who make it to destinations like Europe and America are portrayed as a security threat or economic burden by the media.

    International media attention on refuges stories and humanitarian crisis is increasingly becoming limited to geopolitical and strategic interest only instead of drawing attention to the plight of the women and children behind the headlines.

    As refugee journalists with industry standard experience, we come in to fill the gap and give voice to refugees and displaced people using the power of social media. We want to give a platform to the talented refugees contributing to their host countries including the entrepreneurs, the doctors, engineers, athletes and politicians. We also want to tell the stories of those trapped in camps, those making the treacherous sea and Sahara crossings as they flee persecution.

    We basically want to #TellOurOwnStories #WithRefugees


    http://refugeesplus.com

    #Refugeeplus #réfugiés #médias #journalisme #réfugiés_journalistes #journalistes_réfugiés #presse #raconter_sa_propre_histoire
    cc @isskein @reka

    • #ZINE

      ZINE is a platform for expression in the midst of uncertainty, an attempt to control one’s own narrative when circumstances and bureaucracy are wearing away at that right where the refugees of #Leros’ hotspot are concerned. Instead of an identity based in police paperwork, asylum applications, or case numbers, ZINE is composed of poetry, art, and personal narratives. It is that age-old rebel yell for humanity, this time coming from the hotspots of Greece. It is produced by Echo100Plus at The Hub – a community center on the island of Leros – where refugees who reside in RIC facilities (Reception and Identification Centers) are safe and welcome to attend classes and activities.

      https://issuu.com/echo100plus/docs/zine

  • I circuiti dell’umanitario-finanziario tra il filo spinato di Moria

    In particolare, la Grecia è diventato il primo paese UE in cui si sta sperimentando un progetto europeo di finanziarizzazione delle misure di supporto ai richiedenti asilo in cooperazione con UNHCR. #Refugee_cash_assistance programme è il nome della piattaforma unica con cui vengono distribuite carte di debito ai richiedenti asilo dallo scorso aprile; progetto in cui sono state incluse tutte le ONG che operano nei campi di rifugiati o negli hotspot in Grecia. Per parlarne parto dalle gabbie di Moria, l’hotspot più narrato dai media europei e anche quello maggiormente sotto accusa per il sovraffollamento costante e la permanenza forzata di migranti al suo interno, in attesa che le domande di asilo vengano processate. L’ hotspot di Moria, in cui al momento sono bloccate circa 3200 persone, costituisce punto nevralgico delle politiche migratorie europee e, al contempo, lente attraverso cui guardare l’ Europa, è un luogo di confinamento noto per i livelli concentrici di filo spinato, ben visibili anche dall’esterno, che dividono in modo gerarchico i migranti all’interno, in base alla nazionalità. Dall’esterno tuttavia non si riesce a cogliere molto più che questo, oltre ad osservare la complessa economia del campo, che sconfina rispetto al muro esterno dell’hotspot, in particolare da quando ai migranti è stato concesso di uscire durante il giorno.

    L’hotspot, luogo ad accesso ristretto per eccellenza, ha tuttavia i suoi canali di ingresso possibili, in particolare quando si riesce a vestire una casacca di una ONG, che ho indossato per un giorno, con l’obiettivo di assistere alla distribuzione mensile delle #debit_cards ai migranti effettuata dall’organizzazione americana #Mercy_Corps. Appena varcato il cancello principale, l’economia spaziale dell’hotspot è visibilmente scandita dalle gabbie concentriche e dal filo spinato che avvolge ogni settore del campo. Le zone A, B e C, sono destinate ai “soggetti vulnerabili” in maggioranza famiglie siriane, e a donne sole. L’etichetta “vulnerabili” comporta che al cancello di ognuna di queste gabbie-settori vi sia un volontario, dell’ONG #Eurorelief che impedisce ai rifugiati degli altri settori del campo di entrare, e, in nome della protezione, respinge con forza all’interno un minore che prova ad uscire nel cortile antistante. Vulnerabilità che tuttavia, come spiegano gli operatori di MSF, spesso non viene riconosciuta da UNHCR quando resta non-visibile, come nel caso di torture e violenze sessuali subite dalle e dai migranti.

    Oltre ai settori “protetti” anche le altre zone dell’hotspot sono ad accesso limitato: per accedervi, ogni residente dell’hotspot deve mostrare un braccialetto che accerta la propria apparenza a quell’area di tende o containers. I nomi di queste zone del campo – “#Pakistani_sector” e “#African_compound” e “#North_African_sector” – indicano di fatto i criteri di diniego, ovvero di chi, tra gli abitanti di Moria, ha quasi la certezza di non ricevere lo status di rifugiato. Come si può evincere, a giocare un ruolo determinante nelle “selezioni” effettuate dallo European Asylum Support Office (EASO), sono le nazionalità: i cittadini di nazionalità pakistana sono tra i più soggetti alle deportazioni verso la Turchia, e l’aumento visibile di migranti algerini a Lesvos ha significato per loro un tasso diniego pressoché totale Il filo spinato avvolge anche l’ area in cui si trovano i containers di EASO e UNHCR: un filo di protezione, lo definisce il poliziotto che sorveglia la lunga fila di migranti fuori dall’ufficio di #EASO, in seguito alle numerose rivolte avvenute nell’hotspot a fronte delle attese infinite prima che le domande di asilo vengano processate, o addirittura per depositare la domanda di asilo.

    Con l’implementazione dello EU-Turkey Deal, chi viene dichiarato “inammissibile”, e dunque preventivamente escluso dai canali dell’asilo, così come chi riceve il diniego della protezione internazionale, viene trasferito nel #pre-removal_center interno a #Moria, in attesa di essere deportato in Turchia. Una prigione nella prigione, dove si perdono le tracce di chi entra: non ci sono numeri ufficiali sulle persone detenute: richiedenti asilo che venivano seguiti per assistenza medica o che ricevevano la ricarica mensile della carta di debito, improvvisamente spariscono.

    Tuttavia, in parallelo ai circuiti di filo spinato che delimitano i gradi di esclusione differenziale dai canali dell’asilo, vi sono altri circuiti non-visibili e immateriali che convergono negli hotspots e nei centri di accoglienza in Grecia. Questi sono circuiti di dati e informazioni che prendono forma a partire da una presa umanitario-finanziaria sulle vite dei e delle migranti, e in particolare su ciò che UNHCR stesso definisce le “popolazioni transnazionali in transito”. Gli stessi migranti che sono bloccati a Moria da un anno o più e a cui sarà molto probabilmente negata la protezione internazionale e dunque il diritto di restare in Europa, sono al contempo oggetto di misure di estrazione di valore dal loro stesso permanere in quel luogo. Non mi riferisco qui a ciò che in letteratura è stata definita la “migration industry”, ovvero l’economia che ruota attorno alla gestione dei centri di detenzione e di accoglienza, né al profitto ricavato dalle grandi corporation che producono nuove tecnologie per rafforzare i confini o identificare i migranti. I circuiti di cui parlo sono piuttosto l’esito dell’introduzione di nuovi modi di digitalizzazione e finanziarizzazione delle forme di intervento umanitario e di supporto monetario nei confronti dei richiedenti asilo. Questo si concretizza nell’erogazione di carte di debito Mastercard, con il logo di UNHCR e di ECHO, a tutti coloro che all’interno degli hotspots e dei campi greci vengono dichiarati da UNHCR “people of concern”. L’attore finanziario coinvolto è #Pre-Paid_Financial_Services con sede a Londra. Per ogni carta rilasciata, UNHCR paga una commissione di 6 euro a Pre-Paid Financial Services, e una tassa è prevista anche ogni transazione effettuata da ciascun richiedente asilo, cosi come per ogni ricarica mensile. Solo sulle isole, ogni mese vengono rilasciate circa 500 nuove carte, e a Lesvos si ricaricano circa 2500 carte ogni volta.

    90 euro a persona, 340 per nucleo familiare: queste sono le cifre fissate da UNHCR in accordo con le autorità greche, della ricarica mensile delle carte di debito. La cifra sale da 90 a 150 in alcuni campi di rifugiati o centri di accoglienza dove, a differenza di Moria, non viene fornito cibo. Tuttavia, anche nell’hotspot di Moria questa sembra essere la prossima tappa: interrompere la distribuzione di cibo e vestiti e far si che i richiedenti asilo cucinino autonomamente.

    All’interno di Moria una signora siriana mostra la sua asylum card, per ottenere la ricarica mensile della carta di debito: sul suo documento non compare, per sua fortuna, il timbro rosso, che indica le restrizioni geografiche (“geographical restrictions” ) imposte dallo EU-Turkey Deal, secondo cui tutta la procedura di asilo deve essere svolta sulle isole. Per la maggioranza delle persone bloccate da mesi a Moria, quel timbro significa non solo immobilità ma anche alto rischio di trasferimento forzato in Turchia. Mentre procede la registrazione mensile delle carte, tra tende e containers, nella prigione interna all’hotspot 35 dei migranti accusati di aver partecipato alle proteste del 18 luglio contro la lentezza nell’esame delle domande di asilo scompaiono dalla lista di Mercy Corps. La #Fast_Track_Procedure, concepita per espellere più velocemente i migranti dalle isole greche, si scontra e si articola con altri confini temporali che producono contenimento a oltranza, sulle isole.

    http://www.euronomade.info/?p=6338
    #Moria #asile #migrations #hotspots #réfugiés #business #Lesbos #Grèce #camps_de_réfugiés #économie #vulnérabilité #accord_UE-Turquie #expulsions #renvois #migration_industry #argent #cartes_de_crédit #financial_inclusion #nourriture #geographical_restrictions #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation #restrictions_géographiques #confinement #îles

    cc @albertocampiphoto

  • EXCLUSIF : retours « volontaires » du #Royaume-Uni – mesures de #coercition contre les #réfugiés et #complicité des #ONG
    http://www.irinnews.org/fr/investigations/2017/02/21/exclusif%25C2%25A0-retours-%25C2%25AB%25C2%25A0volontaires%25C2%25A0%25C2%

    Le ministère de l’Intérieur s’est refusé à tout commentaire sur les cas individuels [de #violences verbales et d’#intimidation], comme celui d’Hannah, mais l’enquête menée par IRIN a montré que quand ce genre de tactiques échouaient, il faisait appel à des organisations de confiance pour « convaincre » les migrants de quitter le Royaume-Uni volontairement. Comme un cadre dirigeant l’a noté en 2014 : « C’est une question de confiance ; elles [les ONG telles que #Refugee_Action] peuvent parler avec les groupes de #migrants, ce que le ministère de l’Intérieur ne peut pas faire… objectivement, nous savons que le fait d’engager le dialogue directement avec le gouvernement soulève des inquiétudes ».

    L’une des ONG bénéficiant de cette stratégie est Hibiscus Initiatives, une organisation caritative agréée qui a des « équipes » dans les centres de détention de Yarl’s Wood, Colnbrook, et Harmondsworth. Cette organisation caritative mène un projet de « réinstallation internationale » – financé par le ministère de l’Intérieur depuis 2012 – qui offre « des conseils indépendants aux détenus et une aide pratique pour faciliter la réinstallation dans leur pays d’origine ».

    Contrairement à Refugee Action, qui faisait preuve de transparence concernant ses relations financières avec le ministère de l’Intérieur, Hibiscus Initiatives n’a pas inclus le ministère de l’Intérieur dans la liste de ses bailleurs publiée sur son site Internet. Cependant, ses états financiers montrent que, durant l’exercice se terminant en mars 2016, le ministère de l’Intérieur a versé 400 000 livres à l’organisation caritative, ce qui représente 68 pour cent de ses « revenus contractuels ».

  • On the #migration_compact : a few notes

    In the long term the focus on Africa is important for Europe. But I am not talking in terms of curbing migration, rather as an opportunity for Europe. By creating safer environments and more stable (and democratic) institutions in Africa, unauthorised migration flows will decrease as people are likely to stay closer to home especially if they can make a decent living and can move relatively freely back and forth. Libya used to be the economic powerhouse of north Africa and an immigration hub. It will also contribute to a more orderly mobility towards Europe – let’s not forget that Europe needs migrants to rejuvenate the workforce and sustain its welfare systems. And it is not only highly skilled workers that are needed.

    https://nandosigona.wordpress.com/2016/08/31/on-the-migration-compact-a-few-notes
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    • En italien:
      L’esternalizzazione del controllo sull’immigrazione non è la soluzione: alcune riflessioni sul Migration Compact

      Un giornalista mi ha chiamato per pormi qualche domanda sul Migration Compact. Le note qui di seguito sono state buttate giù velocemente domanda per domanda, perciò non vanno lette come un testo coerente quanto piuttosto una serie di spunti da sviluppare.

      http://www.meltingpot.org/L-esternalizzazione-del-controllo-sull-immigrazione-non-e.html

    • Migration Compact : Renzi rilancia il Processo di Khartoum e l’esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera da affidare ai paesi terzi e di origine. Si legittimano accordi di polizia e dittature militari. La fine del diritto di asilo europeo.

      Di fronte all’avanzata dei partiti populisti ed all’effetto domino dei controlli introdotti alle frontiere interne dello spazio Schengen, da ultimo quelli minacciati dall’Austria, mentre si da per chiusa la rotta balcanica, si ritiene erroneamente che i migranti, che non potranno risalire verso i paesi dell’Europa settentrionale, si sobbarcheranno il passaggio in Egitto ed in Libia per raggiungere l’Italia. Da questa errata considerazione si ricava il rischio che dalla Siria o dai campi del Libano e della Giordania, se non addirittura dalla Turchia, milioni di profughi potrebbero riversarsi sull’Italia, attraversando il Mediterraneo. Pochi gli arrivi dalla Turchia, a conferma che non ci potrà essere un travaso dalla rotta balcanica a quella mediterranea.

      http://dirittiefrontiere.blogspot.ch/2016/04/migration-compact-renzi-rilancia-il.html

    • Refugee compacts: Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement

      Compact agreements have emerged as a new approach, bringing together donors and development and humanitarian actors under host-country leadership for multiyear agreements to achieve defined, sustainable outcomes for refugees and host communities. Under a compact framework, diverse actors make mutually reinforcing commitments to resources, policy changes, and projects designed to achieve a shared vision. Three features make the compact model uniquely suited to address today’s refugee crisis:


      https://www.rescue.org/report/refugee-compacts
      #refugee_compact

    • Here to stay? Population displacement in historical context

      This is, undoubtedly, a positive development. The idea that there is an international community — ill-defined though that term is — that shares a responsibility towards displaced persons is without a doubt a cause for celebration (as well as the occasional Nobel Peace Prize). It does strengthen one’s belief in humanity to know that there are people and institutions ready to help those in desperate need and to stand up, quite often, to the political pressures of the moment.

      There is a dark side to the (admittedly imperfect) global compact to assist refugees. To have permanent institutions with highly motivated and professional staff devoted to helping refugees is also an implicit admission that we always will have large-scale forced population displacements. Or to put it another way: the UNHCR has become a permanent institution because finding preventative solutions to the causes of refugee situations has, apparently, been deemed hopeless

      http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/relations-publiques/news-at-the-institute/news-archives.html/_/news/corporate/2017/here-to-stay-population-displace

      #global_compact #Jussi_Hanhimäki

    • U.N. Representative: Migration Compact Will Require Political Courage

      A year into the development of a global compact on migration, the U.N. official coordinating the process, Special Representative for International Migration Louise Arbour, discusses political short-termism and the challenges of international cooperation over migration.

      https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/10/27/u-n-representative-migration-compact-will-require-political-courage

    • Pacto global para las migraciones - RECOMENDACIONES PARA UN PACTO CON ENFOQUE DE DERECHOS

      This joint document between Asylum Access and other civil society organizations offers guiding principles and concrete proposals to UN Member States negotiating the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. The document addresses four main areas: migratory regularization, oversight of expulsions, the non-criminalization of migration, and access to justice. Para leer el informe en español, haz clic aquí.

      http://asylumaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Pacto-Global-Para-Las-Migraciones-2018.pdf

    • Global Compacts on Migration and on Refugees: how they should intersect

      Even though the New York Declaration combines the topics of refugees and migrants (with some commitments applying to both and others exclusively to refugees or to migrants), the compacts are set to be two separate documents.

      Besides deciding on the normative content, discussions on the juridical nature of the documents are also taking place. As such, it is relevant to highlight an aspect that is receiving little attention, but which affects both the structure and content of the compacts: the need for an explicit dialogue between the two documents.

      The compacts are twin initiatives and tackle different aspects of the same phenomenon: human mobility. They should acknowledge their common ground and the fact that they will generate intersections both in terms of themes and of protection needs. This will guarantee that migration governance has an enhanced basis to protect both refugees and other migrants.

      https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/12/compacts-for-migrants-and-refugees-can-be-separate-but-must-reflect-what-th
      #mobilité_humaine

    • For Refugee Compact to Talk Jobs, It Must Listen to Migration Compact

      Opening doors to refugees to make a good living can be positive, but the approach contains risks. Law professor Jennifer Gordon says the refugee and migration pacts must overlap for the sake of refugee workers.


      http://www.develop.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/03/05/for-refugee-compact-to-talk-jobs-it-must-listen-to-migration-com
      #travail

      Et un nouveau mot pour @sinehebdo :
      #refugee_workers —> #travailleurs_réfugiés ou #réfugiés_travailleurs

    • Three reasons for rejecting a ‘Global Compact for Most Migration’

      Despite this inclusivist tradition, the UN is at risk of creating a Global Compact for Migration that specifically excludes refugees. In other words, we may end up with a ‘Global Compact for Most Migration’. Here are three reasons why preventing such a scenario is both important and feasible.

      https://jorgencarling.org/2018/03/11/three-reasons-for-rejecting-a-global-compact-for-most-migration

    • Global compact/3: punti d’azione… e (primi) appunti di bilancio

      Anche a un primo confronto con i “20 punti di azione per i Patti globali” del dicastero vaticano per il Servizio dello sviluppo umano integrale, le due “bozze zero” dell’ONU per i Global compact sui rifugiati e sulla migrazione sembrano aprire, almeno nelle intenzioni, a prospettive di buon respiro. Soprattutto, viene da dire, se si guarda ai discutibili orizzonti su cui si sta muovendo larga parte delle politiche sull’asilo dell’UE. Per non scomodare, oltre Atlantico, la presidenza Trump, che nello scorso autunno ha ritirato gli USA proprio dai colloqui per il Compact sulla migrazione.

      http://viedifuga.org/global-compact-3-punti-dazione-e-primi-appunti-di-bilancio

    • What is the Global Compact on Refugees?

      In 2016 the UN refugee agency began developing a new framework for responding to large movements of refugees. The Global Compact on Refugees will be delivered to the UN general assembly later this year.

      The Global Compact on refugees was conceived in September 2016, when the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which is “a set of commitments to enhance the protection of refugees and migrants.” The New York Declaration called upon the UNHCR to create a “global compact on refugees” which will be presented in the 2018 annual report to the UN General Assembly.

      The Compact aims to strengthen cooperation between UN member states in responding to large movements of refugees. It consists of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, which are the key elements for a thorough response to any large movement of refugees. The Global Compact will also provide a blueprint to “ensure refugees have better access to health, education and livelihood opportunities.”

      When one nation is confronted with a large movement of refugees, the global compact aims to alleviate that burden so that a country does not become overwhelmed. There should be systems in place so governments can share responsibility in a crisis , which is based on the rationale that the members of the international community work better together, than alone.

      Read more here: http://www.unhcr.org/towards-a-global-compact-on-refugees.html

      Amnesty International statement

      Human Rights Organization Amnesty International, in a recent statement released on April 13, called “Amnesty International urges governments to make the global compact on refugees fit for the future,” made several suggestions for governments to keep in mind when discussing the compact. There have been three rounds of discussions between governments this year on the global compact for refugees. Amnesty also pointed out the current refugee crisis in Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the need for the compact to be put into action.

      Amnesty has suggested that wealthier countries should take accept more refugees, pointing out that “84 percent of refugees are hosted by middle and low-income countries.” They also said that more should be done to resettle refugees between UN member states and that, for example, governments should offer more scholarships to bring refugees to their countries.

      Amnesty has praised the scope of the Compact, noting that it includes governments as well as the private sector. It has especially called on businesses to help tackle the problems that refugees face and to identify areas where refugees may be abused by private enterprises.

      Read the statement here: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/8227/2018/en

      http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/8655/what-is-the-global-compact-on-refugees

    • Why We Need International Cooperation on Migration

      “This will be called the Global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration. Therefore, the corollary, it’s that it is an international to curtail, if not eliminate all together, which I consider to be a little too ambitious, unsafe, unregular, disorderly migration. That is to acknowledge the reality that human mobility has always been with us and always will be. I often say that migration is not a good thing, it’s not a bad thing, it’s a thing. It happens. It has always happened. So, we know that human mobility is with us and will stay. And frankly, in terms on how well we’ve done, as a species, in organizing ourselves, this is not a particularly currently success story. We can do a lot better through international cooperation.”

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=31&v=t3blxmLuqLQ


      #Louise_Arbour

    • Global Compact for Migration

      On 19 September 2016, Heads of State and Government from the 193 UN Member States came together at the UN General Assembly to discuss topics related to migration and refugees at the global level. The adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants recognized the need of a comprehensive approach to migration. As a result, UN Member States agreed to cooperate in the elaboration of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, expected to be adopted at an intergovernmental conference on international migration on 10-11 December 2018 in Morocco. The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants also set in motion a separate negotiation process for the Global Compact on Refugees.

      https://migrationdataportal.org/sites/default/files/styles/embedded_845/public/2018-06/Infographic%20second%20draft%20GCM.png?itok=mg6yurya
      https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/global-compact-migration

    • Global Compact on Refugees – a rich countries’ model for keeping others out

      The UN General Assembly is set to vote on the final draft of the global compact on refugees as a basis for a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees. The compact is, however, largely a rich countries’ model designed to protect their borders from unwanted refugees. The outcome will be less protection and more death, as refugees will continue to risk their lives to reach security in the global north.

      Privatising refugee protection

      The compact demonstrates a risky pattern of privatising refugee protection, shifting the responsibility away from the state to the private sector. Its market-driven approach results in a further privatisation of protection and the substitution of insecure private sector ventures for guaranteed public sector commitments. The increasing reliance on the private sector, foreign investment, and support from the World Bank and similar international agencies reduces the guarantees, predictability, and the regularity that are usually expected from states and the public sector.

      In this market-driven structure, the global compact has created a model of refugee protection in the spirit of the dominant neoliberal paradigm. The privatisation of service delivery in rich countries in recent years resulted in labour abuses, price increases, reduction in access, and other problems. Relying on the private sector for delivering refugee protection promises similar failures and access crises.

      Refugees and their rights, and their protection needs are left to the economic calculus of private employers and the laws of markets. For example, the compact seeks “labour mobility for refugees, including through the identification of refugees with skills that are needed in third countries.” In doing so, it practically turns the refugees into de facto economic migrants, reduces protection into access to jobs, and strips refugees of the possibility of resettlement through asylum. This market-based effort to help the refugees that might meet labour markets demands and fit the economic calculus of foreign employers leaves out any possibility of permanent residence, or citizenship for the refugees accepted as labour migrants. The fate of the chosen few refugees will squarely depend on their continuing luck to meet the requirements of the ever-evolving flexible labour markets. The compact is silent on the future of these refugees once their jobs are terminated due to markets considerations.

      International division of labour in refugee protection

      The compact institutionalises an unequal international division of labour in refugee protection by keeping refugees at bay and warehousing them in current host countries. Currently, the global south hosts 85% of the world refugees under UNHCR’s mandate. Subjected to a myriad of economic, social, and other insecurities, refugees face varying, and in many cases severe, protection deficits. Addressing this deficit through predictable burden and responsibility sharing was seemingly the driving force behind the global compact on refugee protection. Many hoped for a change in the international division of labour for refugee protection through the spatial reallocation of refugees (resettlement) and other meaningful schemes.

      However, the agreed compact reinforces the old spatial arrangement. Current host countries are asked to continue providing the space and the bulk of the resources for refugee protection. Rich countries help through development aid, preferential trade agreements, private sector investment, and similar measures. There is little room for spatial reallocation of refugees.

      The compact’s proposed development aid to current host states is designed to stop the future movement of refugees to rich countries in the West. Many have challenged the usefulness of development aid in reducing migration. The model suffers from a faulty understanding of protection, and the causes of refugee’s continuing movement.

      Jobs in current host countries are indeed important for refugee protection. As research shows, access to jobs, however, does not stop refugees’ movement if they lack a sense of overall security and still believe they can reach the desired threshold of safety elsewhere in the world.

      While promoting increased economic involvement of the private sector in securing employment for refugees in current host countries, the compact largely ignores refugees’ labour rights. The omission risks turning refugees into cheap and unprotected labour for private enterprises and large transnational corporations. It subordinates refugee rights to the rationality of market relations and impersonal economic calculus.

      Jobs matter. Regular jobs with a living wage matter more. Renewable or regular residence permit are crucial for refugees. Citizenship in a safe country that provides a secure and sustainable life for refugee families matter more. Political instability and the lack of human rights and civil liberties continue to motivate many refugees to move. Once displaced by war, conflict, or other calamities and insecurities, refugees would continue to move till they reach their desired and projected zone of security.

      The future

      The compact is a sad statement about the shrinking space of refugee protection, and declining appetite of the wealthy states and their citizens in embracing those escaping violence. The call for a global compact for refugees was an attempt by the UNHCR to find a solution to the growing refugee crises in the world. What came out of two years of intense negotiations was a non-binding agreement, with no commitment to more resettlement, and only verbal support for increased aid to current host states.

      Given the political mood on both sides of the Atlantic, persuading rich states to accept and implement a higher resettlement quota that corresponds to the protection needs of the growing refugee population in the world is indeed a daunting task. The difficulties involved in this quest should not, however, compromise the advocacy for resettlement and the centrality of refugee rights.

      Refugee rights and resettlement should be front and centre of any agreement supported by the UNHCR. Predictable burden and responsibility sharing demands a change in the current international division of labour. That is not possible without a substantial increase in resettlement. Uncompromised advocacy regarding rights and resettlement is the only guarantee for refugee protection in the long run. Even from a pragmatic point of view, insisting on what is right is the best way to go.

      https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/19/global-compact-on-refugees-a-rich-countries-model-for-keeping-others-out-v
      #privatisation

    • Bataille rangée pour un pacte migratoire à l’échelle mondiale

      Après la Hongrie et les #Etats-Unis, l’#Autriche et la #Pologne appellent à boycotter le Pacte global sur les migrations. La #Suisse a finalement décidé d’approuver le document, qui propose une liste de meilleures pratiques et une coopération internationale accrue.

      A l’heure d’une forte résurgence populiste, notamment en Europe et aux Etats-Unis, le multilatéralisme et la migration ne font pas toujours bon ménage. C’est le cas en Autriche et en Pologne, mais aussi outre-Atlantique. Mercredi, le vice-chancelier autrichien Heinz-Christian Strache, chef du parti d’extrême droite FPÖ, a exprimé les profondes réserves de son gouvernement au sujet du Pacte global sur des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières : « Il y a des points qui sont en contradiction avec notre programme de gouvernement. » Vienne avance même qu’il serait en train d’élaborer un document commun avec la Suisse. Une déclaration qui tombe pourtant à plat. Mercredi, le Conseil fédéral a décidé d’approuver le Pacte global.

      Un jour plus tôt, le ministre polonais de l’Intérieur, Joachim Brudzinski, appelait à sortir de l’accord adopté par 192 Etats membres, à l’exception des Etats-Unis, en juillet dernier. Motif : le Pacte ne « garantit pas la sécurité de la Pologne » et encouragerait l’immigration illégale. On ne connaît pas encore la position de Prague, mais elle pourrait aller dans le même sens. Quant à la Hongrie, elle a déjà fait savoir de façon tonitruante en juillet à New York son intention de refuser un texte « dangereux ».
      Un instrument multilatéral

      Cette rébellion de l’Europe de l’Est ne surprend pas vraiment tant elle concrétise le fort durcissement constaté en matière d’immigration. L’élaboration du Pacte global sur la migration, qui s’est mise en route à partir de l’été 2016 à l’ONU à New York, est en partie une réponse à la crise migratoire de 2015 liée au conflit en Syrie. Mais le refus de l’Europe orientale repose sur une vision erronée de ce qu’est réellement ce document de 34 pages, très détaillé, qui doit être entériné lors d’un sommet de chefs d’Etat à Marrakech les 10 et 11 décembre.

      Un expert qui souhaite garder l’anonymat le relève : « Ceux qui avancent que le Pacte, c’est ouvrir toutes grandes les portes de l’immigration font de la désinformation. Les Etats restent complètement souverains et le document vise à éviter la migration illégale. Mais ils disposent d’un instrument qui permettra de gérer de façon multilatérale ce qu’aucun Etat n’est capable de régler seul. »
      La Suisse a joué un rôle majeur dans les négociations

      Si la question des réfugiés est régie par une convention datant de 1951, la migration n’a jamais bénéficié d’un instrument multilatéral large. Le Pacte global comble un vide. Il n’est pas contraignant juridiquement, mais propose un catalogue des meilleures pratiques sous la forme de dix principes et de 23 objectifs. Pour Vincent Chetail, professeur au Graduate Institute, « le Pacte est un succès du multilatéralisme et un instrument prometteur. Il propose une approche globale et équilibrée de la migration. » Tous ne le suivent pas. Au sein de la société civile, certains estiment que le document ne va pas assez loin. Un spécialiste de la question réfute l’argument : « Les problèmes migratoires sont si différents d’une région à l’autre qu’il aurait été impossible d’avoir un traité contraignant. »

      En Suisse, on pensait que le Pacte allait passer comme une lettre à la poste. La Confédération a joué un rôle majeur dans les négociations. A partir de 2016, le président de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU a mandaté la Suisse et le Mexique pour cofaciliter le processus. Berne accepte car le processus que codirige l’ambassadeur de Suisse auprès de l’ONU à New York, Jürg Lauber, va dans la droite ligne de la politique migratoire défendue par les conseillers fédéraux Didier Burkhalter et Simonetta Sommaruga.
      Un affront évité

      La Suisse pose même ses conditions : avec le Mexique, elle veut déterminer la structure du processus et surtout rédiger le projet zéro du Pacte. Comme le souhaite la Suisse, des consultations sont engagées d’avril à décembre 2017. Objectif : familiariser les Etats membres avec les faits afin que chacun parle le même langage. A la fin 2017, quatre experts, deux Suisses et deux Mexicains, rédigent un premier projet. Puis à partir de janvier 2018, plusieurs cycles de négociations se mettent en branle.

      Au vu du capital politique que la Suisse a engagé à l’ONU à New York, ne pas approuver le Pacte aurait été un affront. Mais aussi un problème d’image. Berne fait de l’humanitaire l’une des pierres angulaires de la Genève internationale. Or si les négociations ont eu lieu à New York, c’est maintenant Genève qui est aux manettes, en particulier l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations. L’OIM aura un rôle politique et opérationnel nouveau dans la mise en œuvre du Pacte.

      La Suisse, qui signe nombre de partenariats bilatéraux et plurilatéraux en matière migratoire, a un intérêt à une meilleure coopération internationale. Mercredi, le Conseil fédéral a finalement approuvé le Pacte avec quelques réserves. Mais ce fut laborieux. Le conseiller fédéral Ignazio Cassis a demandé une analyse interdépartementale pour éviter toute surprise quant aux incidences du Pacte sur la politique intérieure et extérieure suisse. Il craignait un nouveau « machin bureaucratique ». Sous la Coupole à Berne, on dit surtout qu’il a agi sous la pression de l’UDC qui s’oppose avec véhémence au Pacte.

      https://www.letemps.ch/monde/bataille-rangee-un-pacte-migratoire-lechelle-mondiale
      #boycott

    • Bericht : Wien überlegt Ausstieg aus UNO-Migrationspakt

      Neben Polen erwägt offenbar auch Österreich einen Ausstieg aus dem globalen Migrationspakt der Vereinten Nationen. Wie die „Presse“ (Mittwoch-Ausgabe) schreibt, sollen sich ÖVP und FPÖ einig seien, den Pakt in der jetzigen Form nicht zu unterschreiben.

      Seit Wochen machen laut „Presse“ FPÖ-Medienplattformen gegen den Pakt mobil, und auch Bundeskanzler Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) sehe ihn skeptisch. „Beide Seiten ließen im Außenamt den Wunsch nach Neuverhandlungen deponieren.“ Alternativ könnte Österreich „als zweite Option“ mit „anderen Zweiflern“ einen „Vorbehalt“ formulieren, „in dem es die Unverbindlichkeit des UNO-Papiers unterstreicht“, heißt es.
      Ungarn und USA werden Pakt nicht zustimmen

      Bisher sind die USA und Ungarn die einzigen UNO-Mitglieder, die sich dem Pakt dezidiert verweigern. Aber es gab auch Medienberichte, wonach in Österreich der Widerstand gegen den geplanten Migrationspakt der Vereinten Nationen wachse, der im Dezember in Marokko angenommen werden soll. Eine „finale Entscheidung“ sei noch nicht gefunden worden, hieß es Ende September vonseiten der Bundesregierung.

      Auch die polnische Regierung erwägt einen Ausstieg aus dem Migrationspakt. Der Entwurf könnte zur „illegalen Migration“ ermuntern und biete keine „Sicherheitsgarantien für Polen“, kritisierte Polens Innenminister Joachim Brudzinski. Er werde seiner Regierung deshalb einen Rückzug aus dem Abkommen empfehlen.
      Maßnahmen nicht bindend

      Der von der UNO initiierte „weltweite Pakt für sichere, geordnete und regulierte Migration“ beinhaltet eine Reihe von Leitlinien sowie rund 20 konkrete Maßnahmen, deren Umsetzung allerdings nicht bindend ist. Es geht um eine bessere internationale Zusammenarbeit in der Migrationspolitik und um Standards im Umgang mit Flüchtlingen.

      Zu den Maßnahmen in dem UNO-Pakt zählt unter anderem, dass die Daten von Migrantinnen und Migranten erfasst und ihnen Ausweisdokumente ausgestellt werden sollen, sofern sie keine besitzen. Die UNO-Staaten verpflichteten sich zudem, gegen Diskriminierung von Zuwanderern zu kämpfen und sich insbesondere um die Lage von Frauen und Kindern zu kümmern. Überdies soll Zugang zu den sozialen Sicherungssystemen ermöglicht werden.

      250 Millionen Menschen sind derzeit weltweit auf der Suche nach einem neuen Ort zum Leben. Das entspricht etwa drei Prozent der Weltbevölkerung.

      https://orf.at/stories/3056461

    • The UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: 
Analysis of the Final Draft, 13 July 2018, Objective by Objective

      The New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2016, initiated a process towards two Compacts: the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). The Compacts are non-binding agreements which lay out a set of principles, objectives and partnerships for the governance of refugees and migration. This commentary will focus on the Global Compact on Migration, the first intergovernmental agreement on migration, negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations.

      Every objective of the Global Compact for Migration will be examined in view of human rights obligations and state practices. The contributors will provide for each of the GCM’s objectives a critical assessment, highlight significant changes during the negotiations, and underline future aspirations. The commentaries seek to provide scholars, practitioners and policy-makers alike with accessible substantive analyses in the lead up to the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration at the end of 2018.

      The commentaries will be posted on this blog between September and December 2018, objective by objective.

      https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/themed-content/global-compact-for-migration

    • Déclaration du #FSMM sur le Pacte Mondial migrations

      Le #Forum_Social_Mondial_Migrations (FSMM) réuni à Mexico du 2 au 4 novembre 2018 s’est saisi dans plusieurs de ses ateliers de l’analyse du « Pacte Mondial pour une Migration dite « Sûre, Ordonnée et Régulière » qui sera ratifié par les chefs d’Etats et des gouvernements à Marrakech (Maroc) en décembre prochain. Beaucoup d’espoir ont été mis dans les capacités des Nations Unies à mettre en place des outils de protection des droits des migrant.es et de renforcement de la liberté de circulation. Quelles que soient nos approches respectives par rapport à ce Pacte, nous sommes conscients de la nécessité qu’il doit exister un cadre qui garantit et protège les droits des migrant.es.

      En l’absence d’un droit international spécifique sur les migrations, encore moins un « droit de migrer », le Pacte est censé combler ce vide par la confirmation des principes universels, des Déclarations et autres Pactes en la matière en un moment où se développent les discours et arguments selon lesquels les politiques actuelles, axées sur le contrôle des frontières, ne sont pas seulement dommageables en termes d’atteinte aux droits des personnes, mais qu’elles sont aussi inefficaces au regard même de leurs objectifs.
      Or tel qu’il est proposé dans sa version finale le Pacte s’apparente plus à un instrument, au service des pays riches, des multinationales et du capital, de contrôle des entrées en fonction de leurs intérêts.

      Certes, il réaffirme quelques principes positifs contenus d’ailleurs dans plusieurs conventions internationales, mais son caractère non contraignant pour les Etats vide ce Pacte de tout son sens.
      Au vu des lignes directrices du Pacte, dans sa version actuelle, il ne propose aucune voie permettant de résister aux évolutions inquiétantes des discours et pratiques politiques d’hyper fermeture à la migration. Nous sommes face à un outil qui va, dans de nombreuses régions du monde, faire reculer les droits des migrants. Ce sera surtout le cas pour les précarisés tels que les personnes sans titre de séjour, les mineurs ou les femmes migrantes.

      De plus, plusieurs points sont particulièrement inquiétants, en particulier :

      • La mise à l’écart de la Convention Internationale de Protection des Travailleurs Migrants et de leur Familles ;
      • La mise en exergue d’une gestion uniformisée et commune des données sur les migrations et les personnes migrantes, ceci comprenant des données biométriques ;
      • La légitimation de la détention de migrants et des centres de rétention ;
      • La non remise en cause de politiques ou de lois criminalisant les migrants ;
      • Le principe de « deux poids deux mesures », un outil non contraignant qui favorise de fait le plus fort et ne donne aucune garantie effective aux plus vulnérables ;
      • Un cadre particulièrement adapté pour la mise en place de politiques de migration choisie ;
      • Le fait que, concernant le développement du Sud, cela se résume à un ensemble de bonnes intentions sans objectifs qualitatifs, concrets et sans évaluation des programmes d’aide au développement.

      A l’évidence, tel qu’il est proposé dans sa version finale, le Pacte s’apparente à une recherche de consensus entre des Etats sur la gestion sécuritaire des migrations et une recherche de renforcements des mesures sécuritaires pour mettre fin au principe inaliénable de la liberté de circulation et risque de devenir un outil pour légitimer des reculs au niveau des droits des migrants plutôt qu´un instrument pour une gouvernance respectueuse du droit international et des droits des migrants. Il peut servir, d’une part, pour justifier des politiques d’exclusion et de criminalisation des migrants et, d’autre part, pour concrétiser les rêves des pays du Nord, maintes fois annoncés, à savoir l’immigration choisie (qui vide les pays du Sud de leurs compétences) et l’immigration jetable.

      Face aux défis migratoires d’aujourd’hui, face à la montée des discours et actes populistes, discriminatoires et racistes, nous organisations de la société civile réunies au sein du FSMM à Mexico réaffirmons notre attachement aux droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes et de leurs familles. La seule réponse sensée est celle de la solidarité et de l’égalité des droits pour tous. Une politique juste est celle qui se met au service de la personne, de toutes les personnes indépendamment de leur race, leur religion, leur sexe ou leur nationalité, qui prévoit des solutions adaptées pour garantir la sécurité, le respect des droits, de la justice et de la dignité pour tous, qui sait voir le bien de son propre pays en prenant en compte celui des autres pays, dans un monde toujours plus interconnecté.

      Mexico, le 4 novembre 2018

      –-> reçu via email

    • Words Matter. But Rights Matter More

      The international community has recently taken steps to agree two intergovernmental compacts, which together are intended to revitalise the global governance of migration and asylum. The Global Compact on Refugees seeks to strengthen international cooperation on the refugee regime, while the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration aims to establish principles, commitments and understandings among Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions. The compacts have been brought into existence against a backdrop of widespread and increasingly systematic human rights violations committed against migrants by state officials, traffickers and other criminals, and leading to what has been called ‘one of the greatest human tragedies of our time’. At the same time, the very bifurcation of the compacts into two ‘separate, distinct and independent’ agreements rests on a set of assumptions that could distort rather than illuminate the complex issue of contemporary human mobility.

      http://www.antitraffickingreview.org/index.php/atrjournal/article/view/356
      #catégorisation

    • Pacte mondial sur les migrations des Nations Unies : un pas vers la #justice_migratoire ?

      LA DÉCLARATION DE NEW YORK, MÈRE DES DEUX PACTES MONDIAUX

      Au niveau international, pour faire face aux drames humanitaires qui se jouaient sur les routes de l’exil, l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies a adopté, le 19 septembre 2016, la « Déclaration de New York » pour les réfugiés et les migrants qui stipule : « Nous réaffirmons, et continuerons de protéger pleinement, les droits fondamentaux de tous les réfugiés et migrants, quel que soit leur statut ; tous ont des droits.

       » Le texte ne précisait pas la façon dont ces engagements allaient être réalisés mais spécifiait la volonté d’adopter deux nouveaux pactes mondiaux en 2018 : le Pacte mondial sur les réfugiés et le Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières (en anglais, Global Compact on Migrations ou GCM).

      La Déclaration de New York chargea le Haut-commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) de s’inspirer du Cadre d’action global pour les réfugiés et d’engager des consultations pour élaborer un « Pacte mondial sur les réfugiés ». Le draft final du Pacte a abouti à l’été 2018 en vue d’être présenté à l’Assemblée générale de septembre 2018 puis entériné fin 2018. De l’avis d’Amnesty International celui-ci n’est pas à la hauteur du défi actuel en termes de protection des personnes réfugiées et de partage équitable de l’accueil de celles-ci
      . Concernant le « Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières », des consultations ont été menées par la Représentante spéciale de l’ONU pour les migrations internationales, Louise Arbour, en vue de la publication en janvier 2018 d’un « draft zéro ». Celui-ci a servi de base aux négociations qui ont abouti à un « draft final

       » à adopter, les 10 et 11 décembre 2018, à Marrakech, lors d’une cérémonie officielle des Nations Unies.
      DEUX PACTES POUR UN SUJET GLOBAL

      Le HCR rappelle qu’ « il n’existe pas de régime juridique spécial pour les migrants (au contraire des réfugiés) et [qu’] aucun cadre n’a été adopté pour la prise en charge des mouvements de migrants de grande ampleur.
       » Cependant, comme l’explique Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, directrice de recherche au CNRS, dans « Le glissement des catégories de migrants »
      , il s’avère impossible de mettre les personnes exilées dans des catégories spécifiques et fixes étant donné que les raisons de migrer sont multiples et s’entremêlent. De plus, la situation administrative des exilés et donc leur statut sont mouvants. Le HCR déclare lui-même qu’ « il existe de nombreuses problématiques touchant les réfugiés et les migrants qui nécessitent une réponse internationale commune, et de nombreux domaines où le traitement ne doit pas dépendre du statut des personnes »
      . La distinction personne réfugiée/migrante, si elle a du sens en termes juridiques, est donc dans les faits en bonne partie artificielle. C’est la raison pour laquelle des auteurs comme Alexander Betts et Paul Collier proposent de repenser la notion de réfugié à partir du concept de « force majeure », l’élargissant aux différentes causes de migrations forcées.

      Par ailleurs, les deux pactes sont des instruments de soft law. Leur contenu n’est pas juridiquement contraignant, et n’engage pas directement la responsabilité des États. Néanmoins, comme l’affirme le professeur Alain Pellet, les recommandations non contraignantes qui sont accompagnées par des mécanismes d’examen tendent à être davantage appliquées

      . Soft law et hard law ne sont donc pas incompatibles car le premier peut constituer une étape vers le second.
      CONTENU DU « PACTE MONDIAL POUR DES MIGRATIONS SÛRES, ORDONNÉES ET RÉGULIÈRES »

      Le « draft zéro » de la Représentante spéciale de l’ONU a été accueilli favorablement par la société civile qui a dès lors centré son objectif sur la préservation de la vision et du contenu des propositions présentées par les NU.

      L’architecture du document final repose sur dix lignes directrices exprimant la vision commune des signataires et vingt-trois objectifs accompagnés de leurs actions corollaires pour aboutir à des « migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières ». Au fil des rounds de négociations, la vision initiale commune a été globalement préservée. Elle émane d’une approche globale, multi-acteurs et centrée sur les droits humains, le droit international, un équilibre entre coopération internationale et souveraineté nationale et enfin une attention importante au genre et aux droits des enfants. La vingtaine d’objectifs et leurs actions de mise en œuvre ont, eux, évolué au fil des discussions.

      Les États s’engagent dans le Pacte à soutenir la mise en œuvre de l’agenda 2030 et des Objectifs du développement durable pour lutter contre la pauvreté et les migrations non désirées. Une attention est manifeste pour les migrations environnementales. Les pays les plus touchés par le réchauffement climatique seront soutenus pour s’adapter et éviter les migrations forcées. L’option d’octroi de visas est envisagée dans les cas où une adaptation ou un retour dans le pays d’origine n’est plus possible.

      Les signataires s’engagent, vis-à-vis des exilés, à rendre possible l’accès, dans leur langue, à une information exhaustive sur les diverses possibilités individuelles et pour leurs proches, en termes de voies légales de migrations, de changements de statuts, de régularisation, de droits et services accessibles et de dépôt de plaintes. En cas d’abus, de violences ou de non-respect des droits humains, que ce soit sur les routes de l’exil, aux frontières ou sur les lieux de travail, des mécanismes de plaintes devront toujours être accessibles. Est fait mention également pour les personnes migrantes travailleuses actives dans le travail informel, de l’assurance que le fait de porter plainte ne les plonge pas dans une situation plus vulnérable.

      Concernant la mobilité, un engagement a été pris de faciliter la mise en place de voies légales : pour les migrants dits économiques, quel que soit leur niveau de qualification, pour la réunification familiale et enfin pour favoriser la recherche et la professionnalisation (académiques et étudiants).

      On note également le souhait de faciliter l’accès à des procédures de régularisation pour les personnes en situation irrégulière sur base de critères transparents et clairs en vue de réduire leur vulnérabilité.

      Cependant, dans le texte final, la mention du principe de non refoulement, pourtant issu de la Convention de Genève, a été supprimée pour ce qui concerne les interceptions en mer et sur terre ainsi que les « retours » pour laisser place au « refus des expulsions collectives dans des pays où un risque réel et prévisible de mort, torture ou autre traitement cruel, inhumain et dégradant (...) en accord avec le respect des lois internationales du respect des droits humains ». De même la tendance actuelle à l’externalisation de questions migratoires

      n’est pas remise en cause.

      Bien que présente dans le texte de départ, la demande de la fin de la détention des enfants et demandeurs d’asile n’a pas été préservée. Elle sera autorisée même si préconisée en dernier recours et pour une courte durée ; la recherche d’alternatives à la détention devant rester prioritaire.

      Plus largement, la différenciation entre personnes en séjour régulier et irrégulier persiste et le Pacte ne mentionne pas la nécessité d’assurer un accès égal aux services de base (éducation, aide médicale, aide juridique etc.), ni la garantie de la liberté d’association pour les travailleurs migrants, quel que soit leur statut ni encore la nécessité d’assurer une pare-feu entre les services de justice et d’immigration, pour garantir le respect des droits fondamentaux

      des personnes sans papiers.

      Enfin, la « non criminalisation de la solidarité » formulée telle quelle dans le premier rapport de Mme Arbour se meut finalement en « s’assurer que l’assistance exclusivement humanitaire aux migrants ne soit pas considérée comme illégale ».
      « CE N’EST PAS LA FIN MAIS LE COMMENCEMENT »

      La majorité des associations de la société civile qui ont décidé, dès le départ, de s’impliquer dans les négociations menées autour du Global Compact le considère comme une avancée malgré les limites évoquées ci-dessus. Une première étape d’un long chemin vers une gouvernance internationale des migrations. « Nous reconnaissons l’immense effort investi par les cofacilitateurs, les États, les agences des Nations Unies et la société civile dans le nouveau Pacte mondial des Nations Unies (...). Nous considérons le Pacte mondial comme une étape transitoire, mais pas encore transformatrice »

      , déclare le réseau Women in migration.

      Tous s’accordent sur le fait que c’est la volonté politique des États et leur capacité de concrétiser leurs engagements moraux qui pallieront à l’aspect non contraignant du Pacte et aux incohérences entre ce qui se fait niveau national et les intentions affichées au niveau international.

      Pour la Belgique, cela se traduit, notamment, par le décalage entre la promotion de l’Agenda 2030 et la réduction des budgets de l’APD, qui est de plus en plus instrumentalisée au service des politiques migratoires restrictives. Autre illustration : la priorité donnée à l’enfermement (dont celui des enfants), plutôt qu’à la recherche d’alternatives à la détention. Enfin, l’augmentation des mesures répressives à l’égard des personnes en séjour irrégulier, y compris en transit, qui augmente leur vulnérabilité et génère le phénomène « d’encampement »

      au lieu de privilégier des solutions durables telles que l’établissement de critères clairs et permanents de régularisation et la création de plus de voies sûres et légales de migrations.

      Afin d’assurer un mécanisme de suivi des engagements, une rencontre de haut niveau (International Migration Forum) en marge de l’Assemblée générale des NU, aura lieu tous les quatre ans, dès 2022. Le Pacte encourage les entités régionales à faire de même et les États à établir un plan national d’implémentation avec mécanisme de suivi. L’OIM se chargera de la coordination et du secrétariat de ce processus.

      Il aura fallu deux ans afin d’aboutir à un consensus multilatéral pour un accord sur les migrations à approuver en décembre 2018 au sommet de Marrakech. La plupart des parties prenantes du processus s’accorde pour dire que son utilité dépendra de la volonté politique des États de le mettre en œuvre. Alors que seuls les USA, la Hongrie ainsi que l’Autriche en Europe, ont annoncé refuser de signer le Pacte, les politiques actuelles entrent en contradiction avec son esprit et sa lettre. Partant de ce constat, que peut-on mettre en place pour que nos politiques entrent en adéquation avec ce nouvel engagement international ?

      https://www.cncd.be/cncd-11-11-11-note-polutique-pacte-mondial-migrations

    • Pacte mondial des migrations : les 10 mots-clés d’un accord de pure coopération

      La France s’apprête à signer le Pacte mondial des migrations, qui affole certains « gilets jaunes ». Mediapart s’est plongé dans ce texte non contraignant pour en tirer dix mots-clés, à commencer par « #souveraineté ». Rarement un texte de l’ONU aura engendré autant de bruit et de fureur, pour si peu de normes.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/071218/pacte-mondial-des-migrations-les-10-mots-clef-dun-accord-non-contraignant

    • Che cos’è il Global compact e perché l’Italia vuole rimanerne fuori

      Il Global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration – anche detto semplicemente Global compact sull’immigrazione – è un documento sottoscritto da diversi stati e promosso dalle Nazioni Unite che prevede la condivisione di alcune linee guida generali sulle politiche migratorie, nel tentativo di dare una risposta coordinata e globale al fenomeno. L’idea di aderire a dei princìpi comuni è nata a New York nel settembre del 2016, quando tutti e 193 gli stati membri delle Nazioni Unite hanno firmato la cosiddetta Dichiarazione di New York sui migranti e i rifugiati, dando avvio a due anni di negoziati. La versione finale del Global compact sull’immigrazione dovrebbe essere approvata durante un vertice che si terrà sotto l’egida delle Nazioni Unite il 10 e l’11 dicembre del 2018 a Marrakech, in Marocco.

      Anche se il documento non è vincolante (come è scritto al punto 7 del preambolo) e indica solo la volontà degli stati di seguire alcuni princìpi comuni ispirati a norme internazionali, diversi governi (tra cui quello italiano) hanno annunciato che non parteciperanno al vertice di Marrakech e valuteranno se aderire all’accordo in un secondo tempo. Altri invece hanno già detto che non lo approveranno. Il Global compact è stato protagonista in tutto il mondo di una campagna di comunicazione politica molto aggressiva da parte dei partiti della destra sovranista che l’hanno accusato di favorire “l’invasione” e “l’immigrazione incontrollata”. Ecco cosa prevede il Global compact sull’immigrazione e quali sono le posizioni dei diversi paesi europei alla vigilia del vertice di Marrakech.

      Cosa prevede
      Il Global compact è una “piattaforma non vincolante” che parte dal presupposto che “la migrazione fa parte dell’esperienza umana ed è sempre stato così nel corso della storia” e che il suo impatto può essere migliorato se si renderanno più efficaci “le politiche dell’immigrazione”. Nel preambolo del testo si definisce “cruciale” la cooperazione tra i diversi stati: “Le sfide e le opportunità dell’immigrazione devono unirci, invece di dividerci. Il Global compact getta le basi per una comprensione comune del fenomeno, la condivisione delle responsabilità e l’unità degli obiettivi”.

      Le linee guida individuate nel documento sono: “La centralità delle persone, la cooperazione internazionale, il rispetto della sovranità di ogni stato, il rispetto delle norme internazionali, lo sviluppo sostenibile, il rispetto dei diritti umani, delle differenze di genere e dei diritti dei minori e infine un approccio multilaterale e partecipativo”.

      L’accordo inoltre stabilisce 23 obiettivi che dovrebbero orientare l’operato dei governi attraverso azioni e buone pratiche. Eccoli per esteso:

      Raccogliere e usare dati accurati e disaggregati come base delle politiche.
      Ridurre le cause negative e i fattori strutturali che costringono le persone a lasciare il loro paese di origine.
      Fornire informazioni accurate e tempestive lungo tutte le fasi del percorso migratorio.
      Garantire che tutti i migranti abbiano una prova della loro identità e una documentazione idonea.
      Migliorare la flessibilità e la disponibilità delle vie legali per migrare.
      Agevolare condizioni di assunzione e tutele giuste ed etiche per assicurare un lavoro decente.
      Affrontare e ridurre le vulnerabilità nel percorso migratorio.
      Salvare vite e stabilire degli sforzi internazionali coordinati per i migranti dispersi.
      Rafforzare le risposte transnazionali al traffico di migranti.
      Prevenire, combattere ed eliminare il traffico di esseri umani nel contesto della migrazione internazionale.
      Gestire le frontiere in un modo integrato, sicuro e coordinato.
      Rafforzare la certezza e la prevedibilità delle procedure legate alla migrazione per un esame, una valutazione e una presa in carico adeguate.
      Usare la detenzione solo come misura di ultima istanza e lavorare per possibili alternative.
      Migliorare la protezione, l’assistenza e la cooperazione consolare durante il percorso migratorio.
      Fornire l’accesso ai servizi di base per i migranti.
      Consentire ai migranti e alle società di realizzare la piena inclusione e la coesione sociale.
      Eliminare tutte le forme di discriminazione e promuovere un discorso pubblico basato su dati comprovati per formare la percezione dell’opinione pubblica.
      Investire nello sviluppo delle capacità e facilitare il riconoscimento reciproco delle capacità, delle qualifiche e delle competenze.
      Creare le condizioni per i migranti e per le diaspore per contribuire pienamente allo sviluppo sostenibile in tutti i paesi.
      Promuovere il trasferimento più rapido, più sicuro e più economico delle rimesse e favorire l’inclusione finanziaria dei migranti.
      Cooperare per facilitare rimpatri e riammissioni sicuri e dignitosi e un reinserimento sostenibile.
      Stabilire meccanismi per la trasferibilità dei diritti previdenziali e delle prestazioni maturate.
      Rafforzare la cooperazione internazionale e le partnership globali per una migrazione sicura, ordinata e legale.

      Secondo il ricercatore dell’Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (Ispi) Matteo Villa in ogni caso il Global compact ha soprattutto un valore simbolico, “perché non vincola a fare nulla, non comporta nessun obbligo, dà una direzione alla comunità internazionale e dice che gli stati dovrebbero cooperare per raggiungere degli obiettivi”. Quando non viene sottoscritto di fatto non si riconosce il percorso negoziale degli ultimi due anni, ma senza conseguenze concrete. “Non è un trattato, non può cambiare le leggi internazionali, chiede solo maggiore cooperazione nella gestione delle migrazioni”, spiega Villa. Il documento, prosegue il ricercatore, parla dei diritti dei migranti, ma anche delle prerogative degli stati con precisi riferimenti “ai rimpatri, alla lotta al traffico di migranti e alla tratta di esseri umani”. Il paese che non lo sottoscrive, quindi, rischia di rimanere isolato rispetto alla gestione di un fenomeno globale.

      Qual è la posizione dell’Italia
      L’Italia ha partecipato a tutte le fasi del negoziato nel corso degli ultimi due anni. Rispondendo a un question time alla camera, il 21 novembre il ministro degli esteri Enzo Moavero Milanesi ha difeso il patto dicendo che “non sarà un atto giuridicamente vincolante” e che “nel documento ci sono princìpi di responsabilità condivisa nella gestione degli oneri dell’immigrazione”. Sulla stessa linea si è schierato anche il sottosegretario agli affari esteri Manlio Di Stefano (Movimento 5 stelle): “Siamo fiduciosi che il Global compact sarà uno strumento utile per massimizzare l’impatto delle risorse disponibili nella gestione dei flussi migratori”.

      Eppure, il 27 novembre il ministro dell’interno italiano Matteo Salvini ha dichiarato di essere contrario al Global compact, perché metterebbe sullo stesso piano “i migranti cosiddetti economici e i rifugiati politici”, mentre altri esponenti della Lega hanno sostenuto le posizioni del ministro affermando che il documento implica un rischio di “immigrazione incontrollata”. Infine Fratelli d’Italia ha promosso una raccolta firme per chiedere che il governo non sottoscriva il Global compact, perché finirà con il “sancire l’invasione dell’Italia” e accusando chi lo dovesse sottoscrivere di “schierarsi con Soros”. Secondo Giovanbattista Fazzolari di Fratelli d’Italia, il Global compact “sancisce che l’immigrazione è un diritto fondamentale e che pertanto renderà impossibile per gli stati limitare i flussi migratori”.

      Sul tema sono stati più cauti i cinquestelle che hanno espresso posizioni in alcuni casi favorevoli. Per esempio il presidente della camera Roberto Fico e il presidente della commissione affari costituzionali della camera Giuseppe Brescia hanno detto che il Global compact deve essere assolutamente sottoscritto. Per questo il presidente del consiglio Giuseppe Conte ha rimandato al parlamento l’esame del piano sostenendo che Roma potrebbe accettare l’accordo in un secondo momento, dopo l’esame dell’aula: “Il Global migration compact è un documento che pone temi e questioni diffusamente sentiti anche dai cittadini” e per questo il governo ritiene “opportuno parlamentarizzare il dibattito e rimettere le scelte definitive all’esito di tale discussione, come pure è stato deciso dalla Svizzera”. L’Italia quindi non parteciperà al vertice di Marrakech e per ora non aderirà al Global compact sull’immigrazione.

      Matteo Villa dell’Ispi sostiene che in pochi abbiano letto il testo dell’accordo e che la polemica sull’adesione si sia giocata soprattutto su un piano di propaganda politica: “Il nome in inglese non aiuta a rendere comprensibile l’obiettivo dell’accordo”. L’Italia ha ripiegato su una posizione di mezzo, suggerita dalla Svizzera, che permetterà a Roma di non partecipare al vertice, “e quindi di mandare un segnale politico”, ma anche di “scaricare sul parlamento la responsabilità della decisione”.

      In questo modo l’Italia però sta segnalando la volontà di collocarsi al fianco dei paesi del blocco di Visegrád (Polonia, Repubblica Ceca, Ungheria, Slovacchia), con l’Austria e la Bulgaria: “Stiamo dicendo che siamo sulla stessa linea dei paesi che non condividono la frontiera mediterranea, e che negli anni scorsi non hanno avuto una grande esperienza di flussi migratori. È un segnale di chiusura, invece che di collaborazione”, commenta Villa.

      Gli altri paesi
      I primi a voltare le spalle al Global compact sono stati, prevedibilmente, gli Stati Uniti, che dal 2002 non hanno ratificato nessun trattato internazionale nel campo dei diritti umani. A dicembre del 2017, prima ancora che fosse presentata la bozza iniziale del Global compact, il presidente Donal Trump aveva annunciato che gli Stati Uniti non avrebbero preso parte ai negoziati.

      A luglio è stato il turno dell’Australia, diventata negli ultimi anni un modello di violazione dei diritti umani di migranti e richiedenti asilo. Subito dopo la fine dei negoziati, il ministro dell’interno Peter Dutton ha dichiarato che il paese non avrebbe firmato il documento, criticandone la versione finale e spiegando che “non è nell’interesse nazionale affidare alle Nazioni Unite le nostre politiche di difesa delle frontiere”.

      Sempre a luglio è cominciata quella che il ricercatore dell’Ispi Matteo Villa ha chiamato “la deriva del continente” europeo: uno dopo l’altro, una decina di paesi hanno annunciato che non avrebbero approvato il Global compact o hanno avanzato forti riserve. Il primo è stato, anche qui senza grandi sorprese, l’Ungheria, che in un comunicato del 24 luglio ha parlato di “conflitto irrisolvibile” tra le sue posizioni e l’approccio delle Nazioni Unite: “Per l’Onu la migrazione andrebbe incoraggiata, mentre secondo l’Ungheria dev’essere fermata”.

      A ottobre l’Austria, guidata dal dicembre del 2017 da una coalizione tra il Partito popolare, di centrodestra, e la formazione di estrema destra Partito della libertà, ha criticato il documento, confermando il 31 ottobre che non lo avrebbe approvato. Lo stesso giorno la presidente croata Kolinda Grabar- Kitarović ha annunciato che non intendeva firmare “l’accordo di Marrakech”, ma il governo in seguito ha difeso il Global compact in parlamento e ha dichiarato che parteciperà all’incontro in Marocco.

      A novembre gli abbandoni si sono moltiplicati: la Bulgaria il 12, la Repubblica Ceca il 14, la Polonia il 20 (ma se ne parlava da oltre un mese), la Slovacchia il 25 (e con quest’ultimo annuncio il gruppo di Visegrád era al completo). Sempre a novembre anche Israele si è tirato fuori, dando le stesse ragioni dell’Australia e dell’Ungheria, mentre la Svizzera ha annunciato che non parteciperà all’incontro di Marrakech perché prenderà una decisione solo dopo la fine dei dibattiti parlamentari sul Global compact.

      Ci sono poi dei paesi che potrebbero approvare il documento, allegandovi però una “explanation of position”, una nota che preciserà l’interpretazione del Global compact. È quanto ha annunciato il governo neerlandese, al quale potrebbero unirsi i governi di Danimarca, Estonia, Norvegia e Regno Unito (dove una petizione contro il Global compact ha superato le centomila firme). Un altro paese indeciso è la Nuova Zelanda, che tuttavia sembra propendere per l’approvazione, mentre un caso a parte è quello del Belgio, che sulla questione del Global compact rischia la crisi di governo.

      Il caso del Belgio
      Dal 2014 il Belgio è guidato da una coalizione che per la prima volta, e per ben quattro anni finora, è riuscita a tenere insieme da un lato i liberali francofoni e fiamminghi (Mr e OpenVld) e i cristianodemocratici fiamminghi (Cd&V) e, dall’altro, i nazionalisti fiamminghi della N-Va, alla loro prima esperienza in un governo federale. In questi anni non sono mancate le tensioni, ma la coalizione non è mai stata così vicina alla rottura. Il 14 novembre un portavoce di Theo Francken (N-Va), segretario di stato alle politiche di asilo e migrazione, ha dichiarato che il paese non avrebbe firmato il documento, mettendo in imbarazzo il primo ministro liberale Charles Michel, che il 27 settembre aveva detto l’esatto contrario davanti all’Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite.

      Da allora è stato tutto un frenetico susseguirsi di accuse, smentite, rivelazioni e minacce. Il 30 novembre il quotidiano Le Soir ha pubblicato un documento dell’11 ottobre “che prova che la N-Va era favorevole al Global compact”. Ma, come riferisce il quotidiano, il ministero dell’interno ha ammesso “che la percezione del Global compact a un certo punto si è ribaltata” e che “i dubbi dell’Austria hanno provocato” quelli della N-Va. Il giornalista Bernard Demonty ricorda poi che Francken “aveva avanzato delle riserve sul documento prima del no dell’Austria, al vertice di Sofia nel gennaio del 2018 e poi in diverse altre occasioni. Ma, in seguito alle modifiche del documento, il segretario di stato aveva finito per dare il suo accordo, il che spiega il silenzio della N-Va. Fino a quando l’Austria si è ritirata”.

      Secondo il politologo Dave Sinardet, intervistato dall’agenzia Rtbf, “la crisi dev’essere analizzata alla luce delle elezioni locali del 14 ottobre: ‘La N-Va ha perso dei voti a vantaggio del Vlaams belang – formazione di estrema destra – e il partito sembra voler mettere ancora di più in primo piano la questione migratoria’”. Tanto più che mancano ormai meno di sei mesi alle prossime elezioni federali.

      Dietro le quinte dei negoziati
      Sarebbe riduttivo dire che il Global compact ha diviso l’Europa, perché sono anni che l’Unione europea è spaccata sulla questione migratoria o, meglio, che ogni stato membro – con più o meno disprezzo per i diritti fondamentali dei migranti – cerca di mantenere il controllo delle sue politiche migratorie. Prima ancora che finissero i negoziati sul testo del Global compact, la Commissione europea aveva capito che l’adozione del documento da parte di tutti gli stati membri non era affatto scontata. Il 21 marzo 2018 aveva presentato una proposta in base alla quale la Commissione avrebbe potuto approvare il Global compact per conto dell’Unione europea, proposta respinta dal Consiglio dell’Ue.

      Da quando il Global compact è finito nel mirino dei sovranisti, le Nazioni Unite hanno risposto alle critiche avanzando principalmente due argomenti. Il primo è che il testo non è vincolante. Si tratta di un argomento discutibile, perché anche i trattati non vincolanti, dal momento in cui sono adottati, entrano a far parte degli strumenti che possono orientare non solo le politiche nazionali ma anche le decisioni dei tribunali. Soprattutto, però, non si capisce perché un partito come la Lega o la N-Va dovrebbe approvare un testo di cui non condivide alcuni princìpi, a prescindere dalla sua natura. Insistendo sul carattere non vincolante del documento, i suoi difensori sembrano sminuirne l’importanza. E se non è importante, perché approvarlo?

      Su alcuni punti il documento invita i governi a fare perfino meno di quanto già previsto dal diritto europeo

      L’altro argomento è che, contrariamente a quanto sostenuto dagli avversari del Global compact, quest’ultimo non favorisce “l’immigrazione selvaggia”. Per convincersene basterebbe leggere, oltre al documento stesso, le versioni prodotte nel corso dei negoziati, partendo dalla bozza iniziale. Lo ha fatto un gruppo di studiosi coordinati da Elspeth Guild, docente di legge alla Queen Mary university di Londra, e da Tugba Basaran, ricercatrice del Centre for global human movement dell’università di Cambridge.

      Analizzando l’evoluzione del testo, obiettivo per obiettivo, gli autori osservano che il documento finale è molto meno ambizioso della bozza iniziale. Tra i punti eliminati ci sono per esempio il divieto della detenzione dei minori e il riferimento alle procedure di regolarizzazione. L’importanza del ricongiungimento familiare è stata ridimensionata nella versione finale. Vari obiettivi, sottolineano gli autori, non dicono nulla che non sia già stabilito altrove (perché, anche se alcuni politici europei sembrano ignorarlo, la legge riconosce dei diritti ai migranti, perfino a quelli in soggiorno irregolare).

      Su alcuni punti il documento invita i governi a fare perfino meno di quanto già previsto dal diritto europeo. Per esempio, riguardo all’obiettivo 5 – “migliorare la flessibilità e la disponibilità delle vie legali per migrare” – Kees Groenendijk, docente all’università di Radboud, nei Paesi Bassi, osserva: “Dopo l’eliminazione dei riferimenti al diritto al ricongiungimento familiare e alla conversione flessibile del tipo di visti, il livello di ambizione del testo è chiaramente inferiore ai diritti che le attuali direttive europee già riconoscono ai migranti originari di paesi esterni all’Ue. Il Global compact potrebbe quindi essere usato per giustificare delle politiche migratorie più restrittive”.

      Come spiega Elsepth Guild in un altro articolo, pubblicato ad aprile insieme alla ricercatrice Katharine T. Weatherhead, durante i negoziati la delegazione dell’Unione europea ha insistito perché fosse messo l’accento su alcuni punti: la distinzione tra migranti e rifugiati e tra migranti regolari e irregolari; la prevenzione della cosiddetta migrazione irregolare; la responsabilità degli stati di origine dei migranti nel quadro di rimpatri e riammissioni. Tuttavia, osserva Guild, non esiste nessuna base legale evidente nel diritto internazionale per sostenere che gli stati hanno l’obbligo di riammettere i loro cittadini espulsi da un altro paese. Durante i negoziati, l’Unione europea avrebbe quindi tentato, con successo, “di creare, senza sforzi e su scala globale, un’intesa sull’obbligo legale di riammissione”.

      Sulla pelle dei migranti
      Tutto questo però non interessa ai partiti sovranisti e xenofobi. Gli stati, in particolare quelli di destinazione, hanno a lungo rifiutato di discutere di gestione delle migrazioni in un contesto multilaterale. In un articolo del 2017 intitolato “The history of global migration governance”, Alexander Betts e Lena Kains, del Refugee studies centre dell’università di Oxford, ricordano che ci sono voluti anni di iniziative, rapporti e discussioni più o meno formali per arrivare alla dichiarazione di New York sui migranti e i rifugiati del 2016 e poi al Global compact sull’immigrazione.

      I negoziati, com’era da prevedersi, si sono conclusi con un documento ispirato più alla chiusura dell’Unione europea che alle posizioni progressiste dei paesi dell’America Latina, ma a pochi mesi dalle elezioni europee (e, per alcuni stati membri dell’Ue, delle elezioni politiche) la tentazione è troppo forte: il Global compact è un ottimo pretesto per cominciare a fare campagna elettorale. Forse le Nazioni Unite avrebbero fatto meglio a non dare troppo peso ai governi che si sono ritirati, invece di offrire loro l’occasione di strumentalizzare il dibattito, ancora una volta sulla pelle dei migranti.

      https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2018/12/06/global-compact-migrazione

    • Le Pacte mondial pour les migrations : des polémiques et des avancées

      Les 10 et 11 décembre 2018 se tient à Marrakech (Maroc) une conférence sous l’égide des Nations unies afin d’adopter le Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières Élaboré dans une certaine indifférence depuis 2016, ce Pacte a fait l’objet, tout au long de l’automne 2018, d’une intense politisation et de polémiques virulentes. Pourtant, il suffit de lire ce document pour se rendre compte du caractère modéré de son contenu – du moins par rapport à ses ambitions initiales.

      Comment, dès lors, expliquer le rejet qu’il suscite, et quelle sera l’influence de ce Pacte onusien sur les politiques migratoires nationales ?
      Prendre la mesure de l’enjeu migratoire global

      Selon ses propres termes, l’ONU a pour mission de « prendre des mesures pour résoudre un grand nombre de problèmes auxquels est confrontée l’humanité au XXIème siècle ». Les migrations constituent, à n’en pas douter, un de ces « problèmes ». Qu’il s’agisse des Vénézuéliens fuyant la crise économique dans leur pays, des Honduriens de la « caravane » de migrants bloqués à la frontière entre les États-Unis et le Mexique, des réfugiés Rohingyas qui se sont échappés de Birmanie pour s’installer au Bangladesh, ou encore des dizaines de milliers de migrants noyés en Méditerranée : partout dans le monde, les migrations suscitent crises humanitaires, surenchères sécuritaires et rejets politiques.

      L’intérêt de l’ONU pour les migrations n’est pas nouveau. Dès 2003, Kofi Annan, alors Secrétaire général des Nations unies et fervent partisan de la cause des migrants, met sur pied la Commission mondiale sur les migrations internationales. En 2006 et 2013 sont organisés deux Dialogues de haut niveau sur les migrations dans le cadre de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU, tandis qu’un Forum mondial sur la migration et le développement est organisé annuellement depuis 2007.

      L’objectif de ces réunions multilatérales est d’élaborer des recommandations politiques à destination des États afin de « résoudre » les problèmes posés par les migrations. La crise des migrants dans la région euro-méditerranéenne a accéléré ce processus, avec l’organisation en 2016 d’un Sommet de l’ONU sur les migrations, à l’issue duquel fut prise la décision de préparer le « Pacte de Marrakech ».

      Ce Pacte a été finalisé en juillet 2018, en vue d’une adoption formelle en décembre 2018. C’est avant tout l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) qui a été à la manœuvre, tandis que le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés (HCR) est en parallèle chargé d’un autre Pacte, le Pacte pour les réfugiés, qui semble aujourd’hui en retrait par rapport à celui sur les migrations.
      Objectif : concilier l’inconciliable

      Le caractère feutré de ces débats ne doit pas masquer le caractère périlleux de la tâche. Les migrations constituent un enjeu sensible et les États, très attachés à leur souveraineté, sont réticents à l’élaboration de normes internationales qui viendraient contraindre leurs politiques.

      De plus, les gouvernements n’ont pas les mêmes intérêts ni le même agenda. Ainsi, si le contrôle des frontières est une priorité pour les pays occidentaux, ce n’est pas le cas pour les pays du Sud, qui ont au contraire besoin de l’émigration pour soulager leur marché du travail et contribuer à leur développement. De même, les pays du Nord cherchent à attirer les migrants qualifiés (ingénieurs, professionnels de santé, etc.), alors que ce sont précisément ces derniers que les pays du Sud souhaiteraient retenir chez eux.

      A ces divergences entre États s’ajoutent les critiques d’acteurs non-étatiques, comme les employeurs désireux d’avoir accès à une main d’œuvre étrangère, ou les ONG remontées contre les politiques sécuritaires des pays occidentaux et les violations des droits des migrants.

      De manière plus générale, les pistes avancées par l’ONU se heurtent aux dilemmes presque insurmontables que pose la gouvernance des migrations dans le monde actuel. Comment concilier une économie libérale de marché, fondée sur la circulation du capital et du travail, avec les impératifs de sécurité et de contrôle des frontières ? Comment protéger les droits sociaux des migrants dans des économies dérégulées qui prospèrent sur l’exploitation des travailleurs étrangers ? Comment faire respecter les droits fondamentaux des migrants, et notamment l’article 13 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’Homme qui proclame le droit de quitter son pays, avec le respect de la souveraineté des États ?

      On conçoit que, face à la difficulté de la tâche, l’ONU se réfugie dans un discours aseptisé et parfois ambigu. Le titre du Pacte est éloquent. On ne parle pas de « contrôle » des migrations, mais de migrations « ordonnées » et « régulières ». L’ONU se démarque ainsi de l’obsession sécuritaire des pays riches et envisage des migrations de travail légales, lesquelles bénéficieraient tant aux pays riches – dont la population vieillit et qui manquent de main d’œuvre dans certains secteurs économiques – qu’aux pays de départ qui y trouvent un levier de développement.
      Un pacte non contraignant

      De même, la notion de migrations « sûres » implique la nécessité de protéger les migrants, dans un contexte où nombre d’entre eux perdent la vie en tentant de franchir des frontières, mais sans pour autant insister sur les droits des migrants (comme le droit d’asile), que les États occidentaux perçoivent comme un obstacle à leur souveraineté et à leur volonté d’expulser les migrants.

      Parmi les 23 objectifs affichés par le Pacte de Marrakech se trouvent d’autres enjeux consensuels, comme la lutte contre les causes profondes des migrations (sous-développement, changement climatique) ou le combat contre les « passeurs » et les « trafiquants » coupables d’exploiter les migrants et de les faire traverser les frontières dans des conditions dangereuses.

      C’est également en raison du caractère politiquement sensible que le Pacte, à l’instar des autres documents précédemment adoptés par l’ONU sur le sujet, est un instrument de soft law non-contraignant : il se contente d’énoncer des principes sans obliger juridiquement les États à les mettre en œuvre. On est donc très loin du fantasme d’un « droit de l’homme à la migration » véhiculé par les opposants au Pacte.
      Une fronde inattendue des États

      Mais rien n’y fait : malgré une recherche constante de consensus, le Pacte ploie sous les critiques et semble aujourd’hui davantage creuser les clivages que faciliter la coopération.

      Tout a commencé en décembre 2017, avec le retrait des États-Unis. Cette décision de Donald Trump n’était pas réellement une surprise, étant donné son hostilité à l’égard du multilatéralisme et la tonalité anti-migrants de sa campagne électorale. Mais loin d’être isolé, ce retrait fut suivi d’une spectaculaire cascade d’autres décisions similaires. En novembre 2018, Israël, l’Australie, la Hongrie, la Pologne, la Slovaquie et l’Autriche ont ainsi imité les États-Unis. Étonnement, d’autres Etats-clés du multilatéralisme se posent la question de leur retrait, comme la Belgique ou la Suisse.

      Partout, l’argument est le même : l’ONU empêcherait les États de contrôler leurs frontières, entraverait leur souveraineté et conduirait à un afflux incontrôlable de migrants. Le Pacte est pourtant très clair : il prévoit que les États gèrent leurs frontières « selon le principe de la souveraineté nationale », en « prévenant la migration irrégulière » et « dans le respect des obligations prévues par le droit international »..

      Il respecte donc le droit des États à déterminer leurs politiques migratoires et à contrôler leurs frontières – ce qui est naturel si on considère que l’ONU est une organisation intergouvernementale qui répond aux États, et que le Pacte a fait l’objet de consultations approfondies avec l’ensemble des gouvernements de la planète. Lorsque le Pacte énonce des principes contraignants, comme le respect du droit international, il ne fait que rappeler des obligations auxquelles les États se sont de toute manière déjà astreints.

      Cette fronde est inattendue. En général, les États européens sont parmi les « bons élèves » à l’ONU et soutiennent, tant financièrement que politiquement, les efforts de cette organisation. De plus, les arguments des États récalcitrants sont infondés et surtout, le Pacte étant en gestation depuis 2016 et sa version définitive connue depuis juillet 2018, les gouvernements auraient aisément pu faire valoir leurs arguments plus tôt.

      Certains États ont même joué un rôle clé dans la préparation du Pacte : c’est le cas de la Suisse, très active sur le sujet, mais le travail mesuré et discret des diplomates helvétiques a volé en éclats lorsqu’il a été confronté à un climat politique dominé par les populistes et la méfiance à l’égard des étrangers.

      Le Pacte fait aussi l’objet d’une politisation à des fins électorales. Ce week-end, en Belgique, la N-VA flamande a claqué la porte du gouvernement fédéral pour officiellement s’opposer à la signature du Pacte par le premier ministre Charles Michel. En réalité, elle mobilise une nouvelle fois une rhétorique anti-migratoire pour se préparer aux élections fédérales de mai prochain.

      En France, dans un contexte social agité, le gouvernement dépêchera le secrétaire d’État aux Affaires étrangères pour le signer alors que les réseaux sociaux bruissent de rumeurs fantaisistes sur le Pacte et que Marine Le Pen dénonçait samedi ce « Pacte avec le diable », aux côtés de Steve Bannon et de ses amis du Mouvement pour l’Europe des nations et des libertés (MENL) avec en ligne de mire les élections européennes.
      Un pacte sans ambition ?

      A l’image d’Amnesty International, la société civile pointe, quant à elle, les insuffisances du Pacte et regrette que les États ne se soient pas montrés plus ambitieux : le Pacte justifierait des pratiques comme l’enfermement des migrants et ne défendrait pas assez les droits des migrants. En revanche, les États du Sud restent favorables au Pacte, à l’instar du Maroc, qui organise la conférence à Marrakech.

      L’ONU était, jusqu’à présent, parvenue à contourner l’hostilité à l’égard des migrants qui caractérise un grand nombre de ses États-membres. Depuis près de vingt ans, elle s’activait à développer ses propositions en matière de politiques migratoires qui, malgré leur tiédeur, n’en avait pas moins le mérite de proposer une autre lecture des migrations, axée au moins autant sur la sécurité que sur les droits de l’homme ou le développement. La relative indifférence qui entourait ce processus la protégeait des polémiques, mais au prix d’un décalage grandissant entre ses positions et celles qui dominent le débat public, et au détriment de son influence sur les politiques migratoires des États.

      La donne est clairement en train de changer. Il faudra beaucoup de courage politique à l’ONU et aux États qui soutiennent le Pacte pour affirmer la nécessité d’un changement de politique. On peut craindre que ce courage vienne à manquer et que les critiques à l’égard du Pacte ne sonnent le glas des initiatives de l’ONU.

      Toutefois, la politisation de ce Pacte a le mérite de mettre les États face à leurs responsabilités : à Marrakech, les 10 et 11 décembre, ils auront l’opportunité d’affirmer leur volonté d’ancrer les politiques migratoires dans les valeurs cardinales de la communauté internationale… ou d’offrir aux opposants des migrations une nouvelle victoire symbolique et politique.

      https://theconversation.com/le-pacte-mondial-pour-les-migrations-des-polemiques-et-des-avancees

    • The Global Cop-Out on Refugees

      During the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a non-governmental observer – clearly frustrated by the difficulty of securing firm commitments to protect refugees – commented that:

      decisions had at times given the impression that it was a conference for the protection of helpless sovereign states against the wicked refugee. The draft Convention had at times been in danger of appearing to the refugee like the menu at an expensive restaurant, with every course crossed out except, perhaps, the soup, and a footnote to the effect that even the soup might not be served in certain circumstances.1

      Despite Mr Rees’ pessimistic assessment, two of three key elements of a binding and powerful commitment to refugees were ultimately secured in the Refugee Convention. First, States agreed to a common definition of refugee status, which has largely withstood the test of time. Secondly, and equally importantly, they committed themselves to what remains an extraordinary catalogue of refugee rights – sensibly oriented to the economic empowerment of refugees, yet flexible enough to take real account of the circumstances of the States to which they flee. The major failing of the Convention, however, was the absence of agreement on a third key element: a common operational mechanism, in particular one that would ensure that protection burdens and responsibilities are fairly shared among States.2

      Mr Rees’ unhappy restaurant menu metaphor would actually be more apt to describe the recently completed effort to respond to the missing third (operational) pillar of the Convention: the Global Compact on Refugees (Refugee Compact)3 and its companion Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).4 Despite the grand objective of moving beyond particularized duties to ‘provide a basis for predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing’5 among States, what we’ve been offered is very much a menu of possibly wonderful courses (we’re not sure, however, since the descriptions are vague). Indeed, this is not really a menu so much as an indication of items that might (or might not) be available on a given day. In fact, this is not really even a (quasi-) menu for a restaurant; it’s more about what might be offered in a special function dining hall that will only open if a truly large group of hungry people arrives (although we’re not sure how many have to show up before the chef and serving staff will come in to work). In short, this is not the menu for a restaurant that you’d want to count on when making plans to dine.

      https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/advance-article/doi/10.1093/ijrl/eey062/5310192
      #James_Hathaway

  • For The First Time, A Team Of Refugees Will Compete At The Olympics

    In an Olympic first, 10 members of an unusual team will be competing at the Summer Games in Rio de Janeiro: a squad made up entirely of refugees.

    https://espminetwork.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/gettyimages-524133038-a0bb71b353be95639181a674bc52d585
    https://espminetwork.com/2016/06/07/for-posting-19
    #jeux_olympiques #réfugiés #asile #migrations #post-national #post-nationalisme #sport

  • Saisie des valeurs patrimoniales : la Suisse doit repenser la participation des requérants aux coûts de l’asile
    http://forumasile.org/2016/02/19/saisie-des-valeurs-patrimoniales-la-suisse-doit-repenser-la-participatio

    Une conversation récente avec une collègue de travail, elle-même fille de réfugiée m’a troublée. Je lui disais que, selon moi, une participation des requérants d’asile aux coûts de la procédure me semblait acceptable (1). Mais je savais que mon idée, certainement mal exprimée au départ, allait aussi à contre-courant de l’indignation générale provoquée par la récente […]

    #Actualités_/_Fresh_News #By_Jasmine_Caye #Refugee_Law

  • Saisie des valeurs patrimoniales : la Suisse doit repenser la participation des requérants aux coûts de l’asile
    http://forumasile.org/2016/02/09/saisie-des-valeurs-patrimoniales-la-suisse-doit-repenser-la-participatio

    Une conversation récente avec une collègue de travail, elle-même fille de réfugiée m’a troublée. Je lui disais que, selon moi, une participation des requérants d’asile aux coûts de la procédure me semblait acceptable (1). Mais je savais que mon idée, certainement mal exprimée au départ, allait aussi à contre-courant de l’indignation générale provoquée par la récente […]

    #Actualités_/_Fresh_News #Refugee_Law

  • #Hotspots : La solution miracle ?
    http://forumasile.org/2016/02/02/hotspots-la-solution-miracle

    Article de Luma Pillet publié sur le site asile.ch le 30 janvier 2016. Cliquez ici pour lire l’article sur le site. HOT QUOI ? Présentés comme fers de lance de la nouvelle stratégie adoptée par l’Union européenne (UE), les « hotspots » doivent répondre aux récentes « pressions migratoires ». La Commission européenne les définit comme des centres d’accueil et […]

    #Actualités_/_Fresh_News #Refugee_Law

  • Trouvez votre nouvelle résidence temporaire
    http://www.refugeehero.com/fr

    J’ai lu un petit article dans un journal à propos de cet article, qui décrit le site #Refugee_hero comme étant un « #Airbnb pour les réfugiés ».

    #asile #solidarité #réfugiés #migrations #logement #hébergement #accueil_privé

    Helping a world in crisis: Refugee Hero is ‘Airbnb’ for refugees

    European government institutions cannot handle any more refugees

    The international refugee crisis is reaching an all-time high mankind has not seen since the great migration of World War 2. Shelters and government institutions all over Europe are operating at maximum capacity and cannot handle the increasing inflow of refugees. Unorthodox solutions are needed to solve this humanitarian crisis. Refugee Hero connects heroes – ordinary people and their warm homes – with refugees and facilitates in temporary accommodation and overall facilities.

    Founders Germaine Statia (23), Jamal Oulel (25) and Ayoub Aouragh (24) saw an opportunity in the current crisis. “We want to give back humanity to mankind,” says Germaine Statia. The social start-up does not have a revenue model but is in negotiations with municipalities. “Government institutions in the Netherlands alone spent 495 million Euros in 2014 to accommodate refugees,” says Jamal Oulel.

    Refugee Hero

    Refugee Hero is a – mobile friendly – website with similar functionality to Airbnb. Heroes post a listing to accommodate a refugee. Listings can come from private heroes or from organizations opening up their facilities; such as churches, mosques, schools and universities. Refugees can directly access their data to make an appointment or the volunteers and government officials responsible can use Refugee Hero as an intermediary.

    Providing the refugees with a place to stay is not the long term goal of Refugee Hero. “We want the heroes to help the refugees find their way in a new, strange country,” says Ayoub Aouragh. This means Refugee Hero will grow to become a platform facilitating all important aspects linked to migration. This varies from helping refugees find a new school for their children or even arranging social security and applying for a passport.

    RefugeeHero.com is available worldwide for all refugees. “We want to see how heroes and refugees react on our MVP,” says Germaine Statia.

  • Mise à jour de :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/410458

    Plusieurs articles abordent la question du vocabulaire. Faut-il les appeler migrants, réfugiés, sans-papiers, demandeurs d’asile, exilés...? Les avis sont partagés

    Réfugiés ? Migrants ? Abrités ? Accueillis ? Apatrides ? Arabes ? Aventuriers ? Binationaux ? Capital humain ? Cerveaux en fuite ? Chercheurs de Paix ? Chercheurs de Refuge ? Circulants ? Clandestins ? Clandestins Non Identifiés ? Coupables ? Coupables de voyage ? Criminels ? Criminels Illégaux ? Crimmigrés ? Cueilleurs de Fraises ? Déboutés ? Demandeurs d’asile ? Demandeurs de refuge ? Déplacés ? Déplacés Internes ? Déplacés Poétiques ? Désespérés ? Diamants Noirs ? Dreamers ? Dublinés ? Égarés ? Éjectés ? Éjectés Volontaires ? Emigrants ? Envahisseurs ? Errants ? Esclaves ? Etrangers ? ESIs ? Exilés ? Exodants ? Exode de cerveau ? Expatriés ? Fugitifs ? Héros ? Illégaux ? Illégaux en Transit ? Illégalisés ? Immigrants ? Immigrés ? Immigrés choisis ? INADs ? Indésirables ? Infiltrés ? Intrus ? Invisibles ? Invités ? Irréguliers ? Marcheurs ? Main d’oeuvre ? Maintenus ? Messagers ? Migrants climatiques ? Migrants éco-climatiques ? Migrants économiques ? Migrants environnementaux ? Migrants Internationaux ? Migrants Rapatriés ? Migrants Revenus ? Migrants Secondaires ? Migrants Volatilisés ? Migrérrants ? Mijeurs ? Musulmans ? Naufragés ? Navetteurs ? Nouveaux Européens ? Persécutés ? Personnes en migration ? Population Migratoire ? Rapatriés ? Rapatriés en Bilan ? Réfugiés présumés ? Réfugiés aigus ? Réfugiés climatiques ? Réfugiés environnementaux ? Réfugiés Illégalisés ? Réfugiés Irréguliers ? Réfugiés Sans Papiers ? Réfugiés Travaillant ? Rejoignants ? Rescapés ? Retenus ? Retournés ? Revenus ? Sans Autorisation ? Sans Papiers ? Sans-Paps ? Sans Permission ? Sans Statut ? Survivants ? Terroristes ? Touristes ? Touristes Clandestins ? Transitants ? Transmigrants ? Travailleurs Itinérants ? Travailleurs Migrants ? Travailleurs Réfugiés ? Turcs ? Vacanciers ? Vent du Désert ? Victimes collatérales ? Vocation à Quitter le Territoire ? Voyageurs ? Êtres Humains ?

    Et faut-il ajouter des guillemets à ces termes ?

    ESI = Etrangers en Situation Irrégulière
    INAD = étrangers non-admis sur le territoire français et interpellés à leur descente de l’avion
    Mijeurs = mineurs déclarés majeurs par les autorités

    Aussi : Mineurs Migrants ? Mineurs Migrants Non Accompagnés ? Mineurs Etrangers Non Accompagnés ? Mijeurs ? Migrants Mineurs Isolés ? Mineurs Isolés ? Mineurs Non Accompagnés ? et même Bébés Passeport ?

    D’autres spécifiquement en anglais comme aspiring migrants, climate-movers, deportees, dreamers, ICE_detainee, illegalized refugees, returnable migrants, returnee migrants, returnees, returning migrants, undocumented refugees...

    En italien : capsunari (cueilleurs de fraises)

    Et d’autres mots encore plus spécifiques, comme Habesha qui désignent au Soudan ceux qui ne parlent pas arabe, donc les Abyssins, les Éthiopiens et les Érythréens, donc en fait les migrants...

    Les Libyens appellent les migrants érythréens Dollars ou Euros selon qu’ils ont de la famille (supposée riche) en Europe ou en Amérique du Nord...

    Et Libia, surnom donné aux nouveaux arrivants d’Erythrée par les Erythréens de la diaspora, installés depuis longtemps en Italie...

    Refuweegee : réfugié bien intégré à Glasgow

    Au Vénézuela, certains peuples autochtones n’ont pas de mot pour désigner un migrant, et ils les appellent donc des caminantes, c’est à dire des marcheurs...

    #migrants #réfugiés #sans-papiers #demandeurs_d_asile #exilés #Syrie #Guerre #Tragédie #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots #asile #migrations #mineurs_non_accompagnés #recension

    « Emigration illégale » : une notion à bannir
    Claire Rodier, Libération, le 13 juin 2006
    http://www.migreurop.org/article922.html

    L’archétype rêvé du réfugié
    Karen Akoka, Plein droit, octobre 2011
    http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article2441

    Figures de l’Étranger : quelles représentations pour quelles politiques ?
    GISTI, avril 2013
    http://www.gisti.org/publication_pres.php?id_article=3061

    « Le réfugié est une notion fabriquée au gré des priorités politiques »
    Carine Fouteau, Médiapart, le 12 juin 2013
    http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/120613/le-refugie-est-une-notion-fabriquee-au-gre-des-priorites-politiques

    Le demandeur d’asile n’existe pas
    Michael Pfeiffer, Vivre Ensemble, le 25 juin 2013
    http://www.asile.ch/vivre-ensemble/2013/06/25/le-demandeur-dasile-nexiste-pas

    Are they illegal or illegalized ?
    Nicholas Keung, The Star, le 17 août 2013
    https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2013/08/17/are_they_illegal_or_illegalized.html

    La Cimade et les Portugais en France de 1957 à 1974 : une aide sous le signe des guerres coloniales
    Victor Pereira, Presses universitaires de Paris Ouest, 2013
    http://books.openedition.org/pupo/2561

    Immigrants illégaux, détections, murs de barbelés : le vocabulaire lamentable de FRONTEX commence à déteindre…
    J.Caye, Forum Asile, le 22 mai 2014
    http://forumasile.org/2014/05/22/immigrants-illegaux-detections-murs-de-barbeles-le-vocabulaire-lamentabl

    D’ « opposants » à « clandestins » : le parcours médiatique des personnes migrantes
    Raphaël Rey et Sophie Malka, Vivre Ensemble, le 28 mai 2014
    http://www.asile.ch/vivre-ensemble/2014/05/28/d-opposants-a-clandestins-le-parcours-mediatique-des-personnes-migrantes

    « Les messagers », documentaire d’Hélène Crouzillat et Laetitia Tura (2014).
    http://video.mediapart.fr/html5/videos/outputs/20151005_les-messagers/20151005_les-messagers/20151005_les-messagers-854x480.mp4

    Sans-papiers, sans clichés ! (ou comment écrire de manière éthique sur les migrants)
    Café Babel, le 27 mars 2015
    http://www.cafebabel.fr/article/sans-papiers-sans-cliches-ou-comment-ecrire-de-maniere-ethique-sur-les-mig

    Expatriation. Les Blancs sont des expats, les autres sont des immigrés !
    Silicon Africa, le 29 mai 2015
    http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/expatriation-les-blancs-sont-des-expats-les-autres-sont-des-i

    Le danger d’assimiler trafic de migrants et traite humaine
    Natalia Paszkiewicz, Middle East Eye, le 4 juin 2015
    http://www.middleeasteye.net/node/44345

    Réfugiés ou migrants : faut-il inventer un nouveau terme ?
    IRIN, le 17 juin 2015
    http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101645/r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-ou-migrants-faut-il-inventer-un-nouveau-terme

    Is "Expat" the New White ?
    Denis Colombi, Une Heure de Peine, le 30 juin 2015
    http://uneheuredepeine.blogspot.fr/2015/06/is-expat-new-white.html

    Réfugiés, intrusion, hotspots : le nouveau lexique des migrations
    Carine Fouteau, Médiapart, le 10 août 2015
    http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/100815/refugies-intrusion-hotspots-le-nouveau-lexique-des-migrations?onglet=full

    Europe. Ne les appelez plus des “migrants” !
    Al-Jazira, le 25 août 2015
    http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/europe-ne-les-appelez-plus-des-migrants

    « Migrant » ou « réfugié » : quelles différences ?
    Alexandre Pouchard, Le Monde, le 25 août 2015
    http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/08/25/migrant-ou-refugie-quelles-differences_4736541_4355770.html

    Le « migrant », nouveau visage de l’imaginaire français
    Sylvia Zappi, Le Monde, le 26 août 2015
    http://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2015/08/26/le-migrant-nouveau-visage-de-l-imaginaire-francais_4737104_1654200.html

    « Migrants », « réfugiés » : sur le sujet sensible des migrations, le choix des mots n’est pas neutre
    AFP, le 27 août 2015
    https://www.45enord.ca/2015/08/migrants-refugies-sur-le-sujet-sensible-des-migrations-le-choix-des-mots-nes

    Quand doit-on parler de migrants, de réfugiés ou de demandeurs d’asile ?
    IRIN, le 28 août 2015
    http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101928/quand-doit-on-parler-de-migrants-de-r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-ou-de-demandeurs-d-

    Le débat sur les termes "migrants" et "réfugiés" agite la presse
    RTS, le 28 août 2015
    http://www.rts.ch/info/monde/7034671-le-debat-sur-les-termes-migrants-et-refugies-agite-la-presse.html

    « Réfugiés » au lieu de « migrants » : une terminologie à revoir
    J. Caye, Forum Asile, le 31 août 2015
    http://forumasile.org/2015/08/31/refugies-au-lieu-de-migrants-une-terminologie-a-revoir

    Point de vue du HCR : « Réfugié » ou « migrant » ? Quel est le mot juste ?
    UNHCR, le 31 août 2015
    http://www.unhcr.fr/55e45d87c.html

    Migrants perdus en mer. Ce sont nos enfants
    Aminata D. Traoré, Le Monde Diplomatique, Septembre 2015
    http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/09/TRAORE/53710

    Débat sémantique : une distraction dangereuse ?
    Melissa Phillips, IRIN, le 1er septembre 2015
    http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101940/d%C3%A9bat-s%C3%A9mantique-une-distraction-dangereuse

    Ne dites plus « migrant »
    Jean Quatremer, Libération, le 4 septembre 2015
    http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2015/09/04/ne-dites-plus-migrant_1375999

    La distinction entre réfugiés et migrants économiques ne va pas de soi
    Céline Mouzon, Alter Eco, le 11 septembre 2015
    http://www.alterecoplus.fr/refugies/la-distinction-entre-refugies-et-migrants-economiques-ne-va-pas-de-soi-

    Le discours sur les réfugiés syriens : un analyseur
    Saïd Bouamama, le 11 septembre 2015
    https://bouamamas.wordpress.com/2015/09/14/le-discours-sur-les-refugies-syriens-un-analyseur

    "Migrants" ou "réfugiés" ? L’indignation est mauvaise conseillère
    Michaël Neuman, Médiapart, le 11 septembre 2015
    http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/mikael/200915/migrants-ou-refugies-lindignation-est-mauvaise-conseillere

    "La distinction entre ’bons’ réfugiés et ’mauvais’ migrants n’est pas tenable"
    Laura Thouny, L’Obs, le 12 septembre 2015
    http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20150910.OBS5614/la-distinction-entre-bons-refugies-et-mauvais-migrants-n-est-pa

    Demandeurs d’asile ou sans-papiers ?
    Paris-Luttes Info, le 13 septembre 2015
    https://paris-luttes.info/demandeurs-d-asile-ou-sans-papiers-3761

    Philippe Leclerc : « Le statut de réfugié a été trop difficile à créer pour qu’on risque la confusion »
    Sonya Faure, Libération, le 13 septembre 2015
    http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2015/09/13/philippe-leclercle-statut-de-refugie-a-ete-trop-difficile-a-creer-pour-qu

    Pourquoi je n’userai pas du terme "réfugié"
    Paris-Luttes Info, le 15 septembre 2015
    https://paris-luttes.info/pourquoi-je-n-userai-pas-du-terme-3770

    En Europe, l’accueil des « réfugiés » se fait au détriment des « migrants économiques »
    Carine Fouteau, Médiapart, le 17 septembre 2015
    http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/170915/en-europe-l-accueil-des-refugies-se-fait-au-detriment-des-migrants-economi

    Contre la logique du tri : pour un droit d’asile et au séjour, pour tous et toutes, maintenant !
    Solidaires, le 17 septembre 2015
    http://solidaires.org/article51763.html

    « Le pape appelle à repenser le droit d’asile »
    Michaël Hajdenberg, Médiapart, le 22 septembre 2015
    http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/culture-idees/220915/le-pape-appelle-repenser-le-droit-d-asile?onglet=full

    Migrant, réfugié : quelles différences ?
    Laure Cailloce, Le Journal du CNRS, le 22 septembre 2015
    https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/migrant-refugie-quelles-differences

    La fin du voyage
    Serge Quadruppani, Les Contrées Magnifiques, le 23 septembre 2015
    http://quadruppani.blogspot.fr/2015/09/la-fin-du-voyage.html

    Vivre Ensemble
    Septembre 2015

    NB : et la version réac :

    Migrant ou réfugié ?
    Christian Rioux, Le Devoir (Montréal), le 15 mai 2015
    http://www.ledevoir.com/international/europe/440216/migrant-ou-refugie

    De l’utilité des frontières
    Christian Rioux, Le Devoir (Montréal), le 8 septembre 2017
    http://www.ledevoir.com/international/actualites-internationales/507477/de-l-utilitedes-frontieres

    #recension

  • Government of Latvia supports taking 526 asylum-seekers more voluntary. Latvia will start taking asylum-seekers this fall - in total 776 persons in two-years period.
    At the same time they stress that government is against quota system, as this is not sustainable plan.

    Valdība atbalsta brīvprātīgu papildu 526 bēgļu uzņemšanu | Ziņas | TVNET
    http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/576357-valdiba_atbalsta_brivpratigu_papildu_526_beglu_uznemsanu

    Valdība šodien atbalstīja Iekšlietu ministrijas sagatavoto Latvijas pozīciju bēgļu jautājumā, kas paredz, ka Latvija piekrīt brīvprātīgi uzņemt papildu 526 patvēruma meklētājus, bet iebilst pret obligāto kvotu sistēmas ieviešanu, norādot, ka bēgļu jautājuma risināšanā fiziska personu pārdale ir tikai galējais līdzeklis ārkārtas situācijās.

    #master2016 #quota_system #Juncker #Latvia #asylum-seekers #Government_of_Latvia #refugee_crisis

  • Puisqu’ on a décidé d’accueillir les réfugiés, est-ce qu’on pourrait pas leur épargner l’épreuve dangereuse de la traversée de la Méditerranée sur des radeaux et aller les chercher sur de vrais navires de l’autre côté ? Parce que si on ne le fait pas il me semble que cela veut dire, souterrainement, qu’on espère quand même que la mer Méditerranée va continuer de maintenir les quotas d’arrivée dans ce que l’on croit être raisonnable et acceptable, ce qui pourrait vouloir dire qu’on en arrivera à souhaiter de grosses tempêtes dans le cas où notre accueil ne serait pas si sincère.

  • #Refugee_phrasebook

    The Refugee Phrasebook is a multilingual tool for refugees who just arrived in Europe that provides basic useful vocabulary and sentences related to the most common immediate needs. It currently contains vocabulary in 28 languages, this way it can be of assistance even in case of deportation. The book is a project of Berlin Refugee Help, a collective of volunteers based in Berlin.

    http://www.refugeephrasebook.de/projekt
    #solidarité #asile #réfugiés #migrations #vocabulaire #traductions