region:oceania

  • Approximate Bayesian computation with deep learning supports a third archaic introgression in Asia and Oceania.

    The deep learning analysis has revealed that the extinct hominid is probably a descendant of the Neanderthal and Denisovan populations.

    https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-08089-7

    #Préhistoire #Paléolithique #Evolution #Neandertal #Denisova

  • People behind bars in Europe / Data news / News / Home - edjnet
    https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/People-behind-bars-in-Europe

    Globally, since 2000, the prison population “has grown by 24 percent”, the document says.

    Also, the study highlights trends relative to macro-regions. Since the beginning of the century, the variation in absolute numbers are positive in all regions (Africa +29 percent, the Americas +41 percent, Asia +38 percent, Oceania +86 percent), except for Europe (-22 percent).[...]

    A closer look at Europe

    From the outset, it is important to state that in the report the European macro-region includes as well Russia. Crucially, it is stated that the positive trend that has characterised Europe compared to other parts of the globe is due to the performance of Russia over the past 20 years or so (-45 percent in the prison population).

    So what can be said relatively to the Member States of the EU only? We extracted data.


    #prison #incarcération #visualisation #cartographie

  • Migration & gender : Key trends

    The share of female migrants has not changed tremendously in the past 60 years. However, more female migrants are migrating independently for work, education and as heads of households. Despite these improvements, female migrants may still face stronger discrimination, are more vulnerable to mistreatment, and can experience double discrimination as both migrants and as women in their host country in comparison to male migrants. Nonetheless, male migrants are also exposed to vulnerabilities in the migration processes. Therefore, gender-responsive data on migration have potential to promote greater equality and offer opportunities for disadvantaged groups.

    Global
    Women comprise somewhat less than half, 125 million or 48.4 per cent, of the global international migrant stock (UN DESA, 2017). The share of female migrants has declined from 49.1 per cent in 2000 to 48.4 per cent in 2017, whereas the proportion of male migrants grew from 50.7 per cent in 2000 to 51.6 per cent in 2017 (ibid.). There were more male international migrant workers, 83.7 million or 55.7 per cent, than female, 66.6 million or 44.3 per cent, in 2013 (ILO, 2015).

    Asia and Africa
    From 2000-2017, the estimated stock of male international migrants grew tremendously by 73 per cent in Asia, to 46 million (UN DESA, 2017). This growth has been fueled by the increasing demand for male migrant workers in oil-producing countries of Western Asia. Similar developments can be observed in Africa, which experienced more growth among male migrants (41.8% during 2000-2017) than among female migrants (37.1%) (ibid.). The share of female migrants is much lower both in Asia (42.4%) and in Africa (47.1%) (UN DESA, 2017) Thus, male international migrants significantly outnumber female international migrants in these regions.

    Europe and Northern America
    Female migrants comprise slightly more than half of all international migrants in Europe and Northern America. In 2017, the share of females among all international migrants reached 52 per cent in Europe and 51.5 per cent in Northern America (UN DESA, 2017). The larger portion of female migrants in these regions is because of a combination of two factors: the presence of older migrants in the population and the tendency of longer life expectancies of female migrants in comparison with males. Statistics show that women as a group live longer than men. Thus, these estimates show that older female migrants outlive older male migrants.

    Latin America, Oceania and the Caribbean
    In 2017, the number of female international migrants (50.7%) slightly outnumbered the proportion of male international migrants (49.3%) in these major areas. Moreover, during 2000-2017, the stock of female international migrants grew faster than that of male international migrants (UN DESA, 2017).


    https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/gender
    #statistiques #asile #migrations #femmes #genre #monde #chiffres

  • Sampling bias in climate–conflict research
    http://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0068-2

    Critics have argued that the evidence of an association between #climate change and #conflict is flawed because the research relies on a dependent variable sampling strategy. Similarly, it has been hypothesized that convenience of access biases the sample of cases studied (the ‘streetlight effect’). This also gives rise to claims that the climate–conflict literature stigmatizes some places as being more ‘naturally’ violent. Yet there has been no proof of such sampling patterns. Here we test whether climate–conflict research is based on such a biased sample through a systematic review of the literature. We demonstrate that research on climate change and violent conflict suffers from a streetlight effect. Further, studies which focus on a small number of cases in particular are strongly informed by cases where there has been conflict, do not sample on the independent variables (climate impact or risk), and hence tend to find some association between these two variables. These biases mean that research on climate change and conflict primarily focuses on a few accessible regions, overstates the links between both phenomena and cannot explain peaceful outcomes from climate change. This could result in maladaptive responses in those places that are stigmatized as being inherently more prone to climate-induced violence.

    • A growing number of policymakers, journalists and scholars are linking climate change to violent conflict9. Nevertheless, scientific evidence of this relationship remains elusive due to heterogeneous research designs, variables, data sets and scales of analysis10,11. Amid the array of disparate findings is a core of meta-analyses that are based on statistical methods12,13 as well as several in-depth studies linking climate change to highly prominent conflicts such as those in Darfur or Syria14,15.

      Critics of this research point to an array of methodological problems, and to a lesser extent a deeper underlying problem with a study design that selects only cases where conflict is present or where data are readily available1,2,3,4,10. Researchers have, for instance, intensively studied the impact of a multi-year drought on the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, while there is little analysis of responses to the same drought in Jordan or Lebanon, where no large-scale violence erupted16. So, if the evidence of a causal association between climate and violent conflict is informed only by exceptional instances where violent conflict arises and climate also varies in some way, it is unable to explain the vastly more ubiquitous and continuing condition of peace under a changing climate.

      Other critics of the research claiming a link between climate change and violent conflict have pointed to the way it stigmatizes some places—most often ‘Africa’ or a few African countries—as being more naturally violent than others. It does this ignoring the many similar and/or proximate places where peaceful responses are the norm, and the complex political, economic and institutional factors that cause violence and peace4,6,8,17. Such ‘mappings of danger’ can undermine the confidence of investors, local people and international donors and hence undermine sustainable development. They change the climate policy challenge from being one of adaptation with and in the interests of local people, to one of interventions to secure peace in the interests of those who fear the risk of contagious conflict and instability6,18.

      So, it is important to understand whether the research claiming a link between climate change and violent conflict is based on a biased sampling strategy. Yet the extent to which this is the case remains untested. We therefore survey the relevant academic literature for the period 1990–2017 using the Scopus database and a systematic review—a method often used to analyse large bodies of literature with a high degree of rigour and replicability, and which is described in the Methods section with data provided in Supplementary Datasets 1 and 219,20.

      The analysis of the relevant literature shows that Africa is by far the most frequently mentioned continent (77 mentions), followed by Asia (45) (see Table 1). The dominant focus on Africa in the literature is largely stable over time (see Fig. 1). This is surprising given that Asia is also home to places that are politically fragile and highly vulnerable to climate change21,22, but much more populous. Other continents with significant vulnerabilities to climate change (and that are at least in some places also prone to violent conflict), such as South America or Oceania, are hardly considered at all21.
      Table 1 Most frequently mentioned continents and world regions in climate–conflict publications
      Full size table
      Fig. 1: Frequency of mentions of continents in the climate–conflict literature per year.
      Fig. 1

      The bars illustrate how frequently a continent was mentioned in the climate–conflict literature per year (2007–2017). No bar indicates that the continent was not mentioned in this year.
      Full size image

      With respect to world regions, Sub-Saharan Africa was by far most frequently mentioned in the literature analysed (44 times), although the Middle East (22) and the Sahel (22) were also discussed often (see Table 1). At the country level, Kenya and Sudan were most frequently analysed by climate–conflict researchers (11 mentions), followed by Egypt (8) as well as India, Nigeria and Syria (7). Complete lists of the continents, world regions and countries discussed in climate–conflict research can be found in Supplementary Dataset 1.

      To check whether the selection of cases is biased towards the dependent variable, we run a number of Poisson regressions (see Supplementary Tables 1–3 for the full results) using data on, among others, the number of times a country is mentioned in the literature and on battle-related deaths between 1989 and 201522. Although the battle-related deaths data set is far from perfect and tends to underestimate small-scale violence (which many scholars believe is likely to be the most affected by climate change), it is currently the best global data set on violent conflict prevalence available.

      The correlation between the number of mentions and a high death toll is positive and significant in all models (Fig. 2). This suggests that studies on climate–conflict links that research one or a few individual countries are disproportionally focusing on cases that are already experiencing violent conflict. Holding other factors constant, we estimate that countries with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths are mentioned almost three times as often as countries with a lower death toll. This is further supported by a comparison of the top ten countries of each list (Table 2). Six of the ten most-often-mentioned countries are also among the ten countries with the most battle-related deaths. The four remaining countries are also characterized by significant numbers of battle-related deaths, ranging from 2,775 (Egypt) to 8,644 (South Sudan).
      Fig. 2: Changes in the frequency of mentions in the climate–conflict literature depending on country characteristics.
      Fig. 2

      Relative changes in the frequency with which countries are mentioned in the climate–conflict literature depending on climatic and other characteristics (estimated incidence rate ratios are shown, with 95% confidence intervals in grey). Estimated changes are not significant at the 5% level where confidence intervals cross the dashed line. Model 1 analyses the full sample. Model 2 includes English-speaking country instead of former British colony. Model 3 replaces Agriculture>25% of GDP with Agriculture>25% of employment. Model 4 uses high vulnerability rather than high exposure to climate change. Model 5 drops Kenya and Sudan from the analysis. Model 6 includes only African countries.
      Full size image
      Table 2 Countries most often mentioned in climate–conflict literature and countries with most battle-related deaths
      Full size table

      In contrast, the sampling of countries to be studied seems to be barely informed by the independent variable. A high exposure and a high vulnerability to climate change according to the ND-GAIN index23 are negatively, but not significantly, correlated with the number of times a country is mentioned (Fig. 2). The same holds true for the correlation with our climate risk measure based on the Global Climate Risk Index (CRI)24, although correlations are mostly significant here (Fig. 2), indicating that countries less at risk from climate change are more often discussed in the climate–conflict literature.

      Table 3 adds further evidence to this claim. None of the ten most climate change-affected countries according to the ND-GAIN exposure score or the CRI are among the top ten countries considered in the climate–conflict literature. Further, the literature on climate change and conflict does not discuss 11 of these 20 high-climate risk-countries at all (Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Seychelles, Tuvalu and Yemen), despite many of them being characterized by significant political instability. There may be several reasons for these disparities, which include a greater interest in conflict-prone countries, issues of accessibility (discussed in the next paragraph) and a preference for studying countries with a higher global political relevance.
      Table 3 Countries most often mentioned in the climate–conflict literature compared with the countries most exposed to and at risk from climate change
      Full size table

      The literature largely agrees that climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ that aggravates existing tensions. It would hence make little sense to focus predominantly on countries that are politically very stable. Also, several analyses explicitly select their cases based on a number of scope conditions that are hypothesized to make climate–conflict links more likely16,25. But if studies (especially when analysing a small number of cases) focus on places that are already suffering from intense violent conflict, while highly vulnerable countries receive little attention, results may be distorted and significant knowledge gaps left unaddressed. In line with this, we find that further climate sensitivity measures such as the contribution of the agricultural sector to employment (negative, insignificant effect) and to gross domestic product (GDP; slightly positive and significant, but not robust effect) are weak predictors for the number of mentions (Fig. 2).

      Our results further indicate a streetlight effect in climate–conflict research, that is, researchers tend to focus on particular places for reasons of convenience5. On the continent level, the availability of conflict data might have played an important role, especially as statistical analyses are very widespread in climate–conflict research10. Large geo-referenced conflict data sets spanning several countries and longer time periods were until very recently only available for Africa26. Indeed, when just considering statistical studies (n = 35 in our sample), the focus on Africa as a continent (65%) and Sub-Saharan Africa as a region (57%) is even stronger than in the full sample.

      On the country level, all models reveal a positive and significant correlation between the numbers of mentions in the literature and countries that are former British colonies (Fig. 2). A likely explanation for this finding is that countries formerly colonized by Great Britain have better data (for example, historic weather records), which makes research more convenient5. Further, in four of the six most-mentioned countries (Sudan, Kenya, India and Nigeria). English is an official language (which makes research more practicable for many Western scholars). However, the positive correlation between these two factors indicated by model 2 (Fig. 2) is not significant. The presence of a streetlight effect in climate–conflict research is a reason for concern as it suggests that case selection (and hence knowledge production) is driven by accessibility rather than concerns for the explanation or practical relevance27.

      One should note that the database we used for the literature search (Scopus) mainly captures journal articles that are written in English. Including French and Spanish language journals would probably yield a different picture of countries and regions most frequently mentioned.

      The statistical findings provided by this study are robust to the use of different model specifications, the inclusion of further control variables, and the removal of the two most frequently mentioned countries (Kenya and Sudan) from the analysis (see Fig. 2 and the Supplementary Information for further information). Results also hold when analysing Africa only, hence suggesting that the detected sampling biases occur not only on a global scale, but are also valid for the continent most intensively discussed in climate–conflict research.

      To conclude, critics have warned for some time that environmental security and climate–conflict research tend to choose cases on the dependent variable2,3,28. Our study provides the first systematic, empirical evidence that such claims are warranted. Studies focusing on one or a few cases tend to study places where the dependent variable (violent conflict) is present and hardly relate to the independent variable (vulnerability to climate change). In addition, climate–conflict research strongly focuses on cases that are most convenient in terms of field access or data availability.

      To be clear, we do not intent to criticize individual studies, which often have good reasons to focus on specific regions, countries and phenomena. However, the sampling biases of the climate–conflict research field as a whole are deeply problematic for at least four reasons.

      First, they convey the impression that climate–conflict links are stronger or more prevalent than they actually are3. This is especially the case for studies using few cases. Large-N studies usually contain a large number of non-conflict cases in their sample, although they draw all of these cases from a few regions or countries (see below).

      Second, focusing strongly on cases of violent conflict limits the ability of (qualitative) researchers to study how people adapt peacefully to the impacts of climate change or carry out the associated conflicts non-violently4,29. Such knowledge, however, would be particularly valuable from a policy-making perspective.

      Third, evidence of climate–conflict links comes primarily from few regions and countries that are convenient to access, such as (Sub-Saharan) Africa. This is even more of an issue in large-N, statistical analyses. While such a bias is not problematic per se as considerable parts of (Sub-Saharan) Africa are vulnerable to both climate change and conflict, this also implies that other very vulnerable regions, for instance in Asia and especially in South America and Oceania, receive little scholarly attention.

      Finally, over-representing certain places leads to them being stigmatized as inherently violent and unable to cope with climate change peacefully4,6. This is particularly the case for Africa as a continent, the world regions Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, and countries such as Kenya, Sudan or Egypt. Such stigmatization might contribute to the re-production of colonial stereotypes, especially as 81% of the first authors in our sample were affiliated with institutions in countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). And it can also provide legitimation for the imposed security responses in certain places at the expense of co-produced adaptation responses in all places at risk from climate change17,18,30.

  • Mapping empires | 7th International Symposium on the History of Cartography

    http://mappingempires.icaci.org

    The ICA Commission on the History of Cartography, the ICA Commission on Topographic Mapping and the Bodleian Libraries of the University of Oxford are happy to invite you to their joint international symposium ‘Mapping Empires – Colonial Cartographies of Land and Sea’. This is already the 7th event in a series of two-yearly symposia on the History of Cartography, this tame taking place from Thursday 13 September till Saturday 15 September 2018 in the Bodleian’s Weston Library in the heart of Oxford (UK). To explore the city, its surroundings and its cartographic heritage, optional technical and social tours are planned.

    The organizers invite contributions (papers and posters) investigating the cartography of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the Americas as influenced by cosmopolitan exploration and imperialistic activity during, but not limited to, the ‘long nineteenth century’ (mid-18th to mid-20th centuries). The rise of European hegemony coincided with a scientific turn that underpinned the evolution of topographic mapping and hydrographic charting, and led to the emergence of thematic mapping. These colonial cartographies brought forth a rich legacy of mapping that continues to influence the aesthetics and authority of mapmaking today.

    #cartographie #empire #colonialisme

  • African migration : is the continent really on the move ?*
    –-> La migration africaine : s’agit-il vraiment d’un « continent en
    mouvement » ?*

    African migration is often perceived as massive and increasing, mainly directed toward Europe, and driven by poverty and violence (Lessault and Beauchemin 2009). However, these assumptions are not based on empirical evidence. We now have a much better ability to assess the volume and geographical orientation of African emigration, thanks to the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) on the presence of emigrants abroad (migration stocks; World Bank and University of Sussex ).¹ African migration is first and foremost intra-continental. In 2000, 75 percent of all African migrants lived in another African country, while 16 percent were in Europe, 5 percent in America, 4 percent in Oceania and 0.3 per cent in Asia. In fact, African extra-continental emigrant rates seem to be the lowest of all world regions.

    http://www.niussp.org/article/639
    #Afrique #migrations #statistiques #chiffres #émigration #cartographie #visualisation #migrations_intra-africaines #circulation #mobilité
    cc @reka

  • Show #347
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/l-etranger/show-347

    Ou•tré (uˈtreɪ) adj. Scrambling radio art/art of radio, social imaginary significations, collective fictional spaces, post-economic music, queer diasporas. A relational outburst of ...

    Two hours locked in the Russo sway. Shout out to Nadia for this one. Remember “Oceania had always been at war with Eurasia”.

    Scrambled :

    1. #experimental Brain Modification - Invisible Slavery from ’Анатомический атлас’ net release [UIS, #russia, 2016] 2. Агата Кристи - Инспектор по... from ’Второй фронт’ cassette (No Label, USSR, 1988) 3. Cold War Echo: Unraveling mysterious radiowave UVB-76 from You Tube video, 2011 4. Sergey Kuryokhin - The situation of the Asian proletariat in America from ’Just Opera’ CD (Long Arms, Russia, 1997) 5. Последний Патрон - Над Полями from ’Флаг’ CD (Bull Terrior Records, Russia, (...)

    #underground #post-punk
    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/l-etranger/show-347_03389__1.mp3

  • African migration: is the continent really on the move?

    African migration is often perceived as massive and increasing, mainly directed toward Europe, and driven by poverty and violence (Lessault and Beauchemin 2009). However, these assumptions are not based on empirical evidence. We now have a much better ability to assess the volume and geographical orientation of African emigration, thanks to the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD) on the presence of emigrants abroad (migration stocks; World Bank and University of Sussex ).¹ African migration is first and foremost intra-continental. In 2000, 75 percent of all African migrants lived in another African country, while 16 percent were in Europe, 5 percent in America, 4 percent in Oceania and 0.3 per cent in Asia. In fact, African extra-continental emigrant rates seem to be the lowest of all world regions.


    http://www.niussp.org/2016/03/29/639
    #Migrations #Afrique #cartographie #visualisation #statistiques #chiffres
    cc @reka

  • Immigration to Berlin - immigration_to_berlin.pdf
    https://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/lb-integration-migration/fremdsprachig/immigration_to_berlin.pdf?start&ts=1433500348&file=immigration_to_berlin.pdf

    Immigration to Berlin
    Around one million of the 3.4 million inhabitants of Berlin have a
    migration background. This is to say that either they themselves or
    one of their parents were not born in Germany. This is good for
    Berlin. The constant influx of active and especially mobile new
    citizens and the diversity that results from this unleash the dynamism of urban societies, which are essential for social progress. Hitherto unknown qualifications, new cultural stimulus, surprising perspectives no metropolis can do without these productive forces.
    Anyone who wants to understand what is so special about Berlin
    should not look only at the current migration trends. These can be
    summed up quickly: today foreign citizens are coming from a total of 186 states. Almost three quarters of them are Europeans. Every
    eighth migrant is from an Asiatic state, only about six percent are
    from America, almost four percent are from Africa and 0.5 percent of the foreigners come from Australia and Oceania. And since the
    financial crisis immigration from Spain has risen too. As a result of
    freedom of movement within the European Union the number of
    immigrants from countries like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria is
    noticeably increasing.
    How deeply a city is marked by migration can be seen not only in the number of legally registered foreigners. Hundreds of thousands of people can live in an international metropolis, but they leave only marginal traces if they stay in the city for a short time – for a few months or one or two years for business or political activities.

  • Mapping Immigrant America
    http://personal.tcu.edu/kylewalker/immigrant-america/about.html

    Mapping Immigrant America is a project I am working on for my upcoming talk September 19 at Dallas’s Old Red Museum, “Visualizing the Changing Landscape of US Immigration.” The map is a dot-density representation of the US immigrant population, with dots colored by immigrants’ general region of origin. The regions include:

    Mexico (red);
    Latin America and the Caribbean, other than Mexico (blue);
    East and Southeast Asia (green);
    South & Central Asia (aqua);
    Sub-Saharan Africa (purple);
    North Africa & Southwest Asia (pink);
    Europe (orange);
    Oceania (yellow);
    Canada (brown)

    Demographic data are from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey at the Census tract level; both geographic and demographic Census data come from the National Historical Geographic Information System1. I use ACS table B05006, “Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population in the United States.” Each dot represents approximately 20 immigrants in that Census tract from a given region, and the dots are placed randomly within Census tracts. The project was inspired by other interactive dot map implementations including The Racial Dot Map at the University of Virginia; Ken Schwenke’s Where the renters are; and Robert Manduca’s Where Are The Jobs?.

    Feel free to explore! Also, I welcome comments and feedback; I’m available on the web and on Twitter. A few additional points about the map are below.

    How was the map made?

    Making this map took a lot of experimentation, and in turn a number of tools. I processed the data with a combination of R, QGIS, ArcGIS, and Python; the map itself was designed in Mapbox Studio, and built with Mapbox.js and Bootstrap. I also use Chris Whong’s really cool Legend Buddy to make the legend.

    http://personal.tcu.edu/kylewalker/immigrant-america/#

    #cartographie #États-Unis #migrations

  • The Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence is looking for talented cartographers

    Ça vous tente pas ? :)

    https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/support-professional/cartographer.html

    The Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence is looking for talented cartographers to join the team that produces maps that contribute to complex intelligence analysis for senior policymakers, including the President of the United States. Cartographers are responsible for researching, designing, and producing thematic and reference maps in support of the Agency’s finished intelligence, including presentations, publications, and interactive products. Cartographers work on regional accounts, such as: Africa, Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, Europe, Middle East or South Asia-Oceania. Cartographers are encouraged to participate in internal training as well as external workshops, training, and conferences.

    #cartographie

    • Hélas !

      US citizenship is required.

      Sinon, une formulation intéressante dans les compétences requises :

      Additionally, candidates should be proficient in the use of, or be rapidly gaining expertise with the software, hardware, and platforms necessary for cartographic, graphic, and web production,

      et enfin,

      To be considered suitable for Agency employment, applicants must generally not have used illegal drugs within the last twelve months. The issue of illegal drug use prior to twelve months ago is carefully evaluated during the medical and security processing.

      Important Notice: Friends, family, individuals, or organizations may be interested to learn that you are an applicant for or an employee of the CIA. Their interest, however, may not be benign or in your best interest. You cannot control whom they would tell. We therefore ask you to exercise discretion and good judgment in disclosing your interest in a position with the Agency. You will receive further guidance on this topic as you proceed through your CIA employment processing.

  • Zero Geography: Visualising the locality of participation and voice on #Wikipedia
    http://www.zerogeography.net/2014/12/visualising-locality-of-participation.html

    On the vertical axis of the figure we can see a clear division between regions that are largely able to define themselves and regions that are largely defined by others. The world regions separate into two distinct groups of three (with Asia in the middle): Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & Caribbean receive comparatively few edits from within their territories (around 25 percent). Europe, Oceania and North America on the other hand receive primarily edits from within (around 75 percent). Asia is edited from within and from outside to almost equal degrees. In other words, there are significant parts of the world in which a majority of content is not locally generated.

    (...)

    • Even when editors from Sub-Saharan Africa spend most of their edits within region, their small numbers mean that most content still comes from elsewhere.

    • The global cores of North America and Europe self-represent very effectively by focusing on their own regions.

    • Content appears to be very sensitive to feedback loops. (...)

    Large amounts of geospatial content show no sign of deterring people from further contributions and editing: as more content exists, so too do more articles to amend, augment, update and build upon. (...) A relative lack of content may further reinforce perceptions amongst editors that little content equates to a small audience that is not worth writing for.

  • Map of the Day: Global Homicide Rates | UN Dispatch
    http://www.undispatch.com/map-of-the-day-global-homicide-rates

    There were 468,000 homicides around the world in 2010. More than a third (36 per cent) of those are estimated to have occurred in Africa, 31 per cent in the Americas, 27 per cent in Asia, 5 per cent in Europe and 1 per cent in Oceania. The thing is, when broken down by population size, it turns out that The Americas and Africa have roughly the same homicide rates (between 16 and 17/100,000–which is roughly twice the global average of 6.9 homicides per 100,000 people). Those peaceful Europeans? About half the global average.

  • The Coworking Magazine

    Coworking’s steady growth: 820 spaces now active worldwide

    http://www.deskmag.com/en/820-coworking-spaces-worldwide-statistics

    Coworking’s steady growth: 820 spaces now active worldwide

    Article by Carsten Foertsch

    Published 05/31/2011

    Read all results of the 1st Global Coworking Survey
    When we aren’t writing about coworking spaces, we at Deskmag are counting them. The number of coworking spaces worldwide increased by 17 percent between February and May, Deskmag’s latest analysis shows. That’s the same growth rate experienced in the preceding four months, showing that interest in coworking is expanding at a steady pace. South America and Oceania are still the regions experiencing the biggest boom. Worldwide there are now 820 coworking spaces

    #travail #espacepublics #entreprise