Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes
How much money exactly does Europe spend trying to curb migration from Nigeria? And what’s it used for? We tried to find out, but Europe certainly doesn’t make it easy. These flashy graphics show you just how complicated the funding is.
In a shiny new factory in the Benin forest, a woman named Blessing slices pineapples into rings. Hundreds of miles away, at a remote border post in the Sahara, Abubakar scans travellers’ fingerprints. And in village squares across Nigeria, Usman performs his theatre show about the dangers of travelling to Europe.
What do all these people have in common?
All their lives are touched by the billions of euros European governments spend in an effort to curb migration from Africa.
Since the summer of 2015,
Read more about the influx of refugees to Europe in 2015 on the UNHCR website.
when countless boats full of migrants began arriving on the shores of Greece and Italy, Europe has increased migration spending by billions.
Read my guide to EU migration policy here.
And much of this money is being spent in Africa.
Within Europe, the political left and right have very different ways of framing the potential benefits of that funding. Those on the left say migration spending not only provides Africans with better opportunities in their home countries but also reduces migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Those on the right say migration spending discourages Africans from making the perilous journey to Europe.
However they spin it, the end result is the same: both left and right have embraced funding designed to reduce migration from Africa. In fact, the European Union (EU) plans to double migration spending under the new 2021-2027 budget, while quadrupling spending on border control.
The three of us – journalists from Nigeria, Italy and the Netherlands – began asking ourselves: just how much money are we talking here?
At first glance, it seems like a perfectly straightforward question. Just add up the migration budgets of the EU and the individual member states and you’ve got your answer, right? But after months of research, it turns out that things are nowhere near that simple.
In fact, we discovered that European migration spending resembles nothing so much as a gigantic plate of spaghetti.
If you try to tease out a single strand, at least three more will cling to it. Try to find where one strand begins, and you’ll find yourself tangled up in dozens of others.
This is deeply concerning. Though Europe maintains a pretence of transparency, in practice it’s virtually impossible to hold the EU and its member states accountable for their migration expenditures, let alone assess how effective they are. If a team of journalists who have devoted months to the issue can’t manage it, then how could EU parliament members juggling multiple portfolios ever hope to?
This lack of oversight is particularly problematic in the case of migration, an issue that ranks high on European political agendas. The subject of migration fuels a great deal of political grandstanding, populist opportunism, and social unrest. And the debate surrounding the issue is rife with misinformation.
For an issue of this magnitude, it’s crucial to have a clear view of existing policies and to examine whether these policies make sense. But to be able to do that, we need to understand the funding streams: how much money is being spent and what is it being spent on?
While working on this article, we spoke to researchers and officials who characterised EU migration spending as “opaque”, “unclear” and “chaotic”. We combed through countless websites, official documents, annual reports and budgets, and we submitted freedom of information requests
in a number of European countries, in Nigeria, and to the European commission. And we discovered that the subject of migration, while not exactly cloak-and-dagger stuff, is apparently sensitive enough that most people preferred to speak off the record.
Above all, we were troubled by the fact that no one seems to have a clear overview of European migration budgets – and by how painfully characteristic this is of European migration policy as a whole.
Nigeria – ‘a tough cookie’
It wasn’t long before we realised that mapping out all European cash flows to all African countries would take us years. Instead, we decided to focus on Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the continent’s strongest economy, as well as the country of origin of the largest group of African asylum seekers in the EU. “A tough cookie” in the words of one senior EU official, but also “our most important migration partner in the coming years”.
But Nigeria wasn’t exactly eager to embrace the role of “most important migration partner”. After all, migration has been a lifeline for Nigeria’s economy: last year, Nigerian migrants living abroad sent home $25bn – roughly 6% of the country’s GNP.
It took a major European charm offensive to get Nigeria on board – a “long saga” with “more than one tense meeting”, according to a high-ranking EU diplomat we spoke to.
The European parliament invited Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, to Strasbourg in 2016. Over the next several years, one European dignitary after another visited Nigeria: from Angela Merkel,
the German chancellor, to Matteo Renzi,
the Italian prime minister, to Emmanuel Macron,
the French president, to Mark Rutte,
the Dutch prime minister.
Three guesses as to what they all wanted to talk about.
‘No data available’
But let’s get back to those funding streams.
The EU would have you believe that everything fits neatly into a flowchart. When asked to respond to this article, the European commission told us: “We take transparency very seriously.” One spokesperson after another, all from various EU agencies, informed us that the information was “freely available online”.
But as Wilma Haan, director of the Open State Foundation, notes: “Just throwing a bunch of stuff online doesn’t make you transparent. People have to be able to find the information and verify it.”
Yet that’s exactly what the EU did. The EU foundations and agencies we contacted referred us to dozens of different websites. In some cases, the information was relatively easy to find,
but in others the data was fragmented or missing entirely. All too often, our searches turned up results such as “data soon available”
or “no data available”.
The website of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – worth around €3.1bn – is typical of the problems we faced. While we were able to find a list of projects funded by AMIF online,
the list only contains the names of the projects – not the countries in which they’re carried out. As a result, there’s only one way to find out what’s going on where: by Googling each of the project names individually.
This lack of a clear overview has major consequences for the democratic process, says Tineke Strik, member of the European parliament (Green party). Under the guise of “flexibility”, the European parliament has “no oversight over the funds whatsoever”. Strik says: “In the best-case scenario, we’ll discover them listed on the European commission’s website.”
At the EU’s Nigerian headquarters, one official explained that she does try to keep track of European countries’ migration-related projects to identify “gaps and overlaps”. When asked why this information wasn’t published online, she responded: “It’s something I do alongside my daily work.”
Getting a feel for Europe’s migration spaghetti
“There’s no way you’re going to get anywhere with this.”
This was the response from a Correspondent member who researches government funding when we announced this project several months ago. Not exactly the most encouraging words to start our journey. Still, over the past few months, we’ve done our best to make as much progress as we could.
Let’s start in the Netherlands, Maite’s home country. When we tried to find out how much Dutch tax money is spent in Nigeria on migration-related issues, we soon found ourselves down yet another rabbit hole.
The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, which controls all funding for Dutch foreign policy, seemed like a good starting point. The ministry divides its budget into centralised and decentralised funds. The centralised funds are managed in the Netherlands administrative capital, The Hague, while the decentralised funds are distributed by Dutch embassies abroad.
Exactly how much money goes to the Dutch embassy in the Nigerian capital Abuja is unclear – no information is available online. When we contacted the embassy, they weren’t able to provide us with any figures, either. According to their press officer, these budgets are “fragmented”, and the total can only be determined at the end of the year.
The ministry of foreign affairs distributes centralised funds through its departments. But migration is a topic that spans a number of different departments: the department for stabilisation and humanitarian aid (DSH), the security policy department (DVB), the sub-Saharan Africa department (DAF), and the migration policy bureau (BMB), to name just a few. There’s no way of knowing whether each department spends money on migration, let alone how much of it goes to Nigeria.
Not to mention the fact that other ministries, such as the ministry of economic affairs and the ministry of justice and security, also deal with migration-related issues.
Next, we decided to check out the Dutch development aid budget
in the hope it would clear things up a bit. Unfortunately, the budget isn’t organised by country, but by theme. And since migration isn’t one of the main themes, it’s scattered over several different sections. Luckily, the document does contain an annex (▻https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/begrotingen/2019/09/17/hgis---nota-homogene-groep-internationale-samenwerking-rijksbegroting-) that goes into more detail about migration.
In this annex, we found that the Netherlands spends a substantial chunk of money on “migration cooperation”, “reception in the region” and humanitarian aid for refugees.
And then there’s the ministry of foreign affairs’ Stability Fund,
the ministry of justice and security’s budget for the processing and repatriation of asylum seekers, and the ministry of education, culture and science’s budget for providing asylum seekers with an education.
But again, it’s impossible to determine just how much of this funding finds its way to Nigeria. This is partly due to the fact that many migration projects operate in multiple countries simultaneously (in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for example). Regional projects such as this generally don’t share details of how funding is divided up among the participating countries.
Using data from the Dutch embassy and an NGO that monitors Dutch projects in Nigeria, we found that €6m in aid goes specifically to Nigeria, with another €19m for the region as a whole. Dutch law enforcement also provides in-kind support to help strengthen Nigeria’s border control.
But hold on, there’s more. We need to factor in the money that the Netherlands spends on migration through its contributions to the EU.
The Netherlands pays hundreds of millions into the European Development Fund (EDF), which is partly used to finance migration projects. Part of that money also gets transferred to another EU migration fund: the EUTF for Africa.
The Netherlands also contributes directly to this fund.
But that’s not all. The Netherlands also gives (either directly or through the EU) to a variety of other EU funds and agencies that finance migration projects in Nigeria. And just as in the Netherlands, these EU funds and agencies are scattered over many different offices. There’s no single “EU ministry of migration”.
To give you a taste of just how convoluted things can get: the AMIF falls under the EU’s home affairs “ministry”
(DG HOME), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) falls under the “ministry” for international cooperation and development (DG DEVCO), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) falls under the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU border agency, Frontex, is its own separate entity, and there’s also a “ministry” for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO).
Still with me?
Because this was just the Netherlands.
Now let’s take a look at Giacomo’s country of origin, Italy, which is also home to one of Europe’s largest Nigerian communities (surpassed only by the UK).
Italy’s ministry of foreign affairs funds the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), which provides humanitarian aid in north-eastern Nigeria, where tens of thousands of people have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. AICS also finances a wide range of projects aimed at raising awareness of the risks of illegal migration. It’s impossible to say how much of this money ends up in Nigeria, though, since the awareness campaigns target multiple countries at once.
This data is all available online – though you’ll have to do some digging to find it. But when it comes to the funds managed by Italy’s ministry of the interior, things start to get a bit murkier. Despite the ministry having signed numerous agreements on migration with African countries in recent years, there’s little trace of the money online. Reference to a €92,000 donation for new computers for Nigeria’s law enforcement and immigration services was all we could find.
Things get even more complicated when we look at Italy’s “Africa Fund”, which was launched in 2017 to foster cooperation with “priority countries along major migration routes”. The fund is jointly managed by the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of the interior.
Part of the money goes to the EUTF for Africa, but the fund also contributes to United Nations (UN) organisations, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as to the Italian ministry of defence and the ministry of economy and finance.
Like most European governments, Italy also contributes to EU funds and agencies concerned with migration, such as Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).
And then there are the contributions to UN agencies that deal with migration: UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), IOM, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to name just a few.
Now multiply all of this by the number of European countries currently active in Nigeria. Oh, and let’s not forget the World Bank,
which has only recently waded into the waters of the migration industry.
And then there are the European development banks. And the EU’s External Investment Plan, which was launched in 2016 with the ambitious goal of generating €44bn in private investments in developing countries, with a particular focus on migrants’ countries of origin. Not to mention the regional “migration dialogues”
organised in west Africa under the Rabat Process and the Cotonou Agreement.
This is the European migration spaghetti.
How we managed to compile a list nonetheless
By now, one thing should be clear: there are a staggering number of ministries, funds and departments involved in European migration spending. It’s no wonder that no one in Europe seems to have a clear overview of the situation. But we thought that maybe, just maybe, there was one party that might have the overview we seek: Nigeria. After all, the Nigerian government has to be involved in all the projects that take place there, right?
We decided to ask around in Nigeria’s corridors of power. Was anyone keeping track of European migration funding? The Ministry of Finance? Or maybe the Ministry of the Interior, or the Ministry of Labour and Employment?
We then tried asking Nigeria’s anti-trafficking agency (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI).
No luck there, either. When it comes to migration, things are just as fragmented under the Nigerian government as they are in Europe.
In the meantime, we contacted each of the European embassies in Nigeria.
This proved to be the most fruitful approach and yielded the most complete lists of projects. The database of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)
was particularly useful in fleshing out our overview.
So does that mean our list is now complete? Probably not.
More to the point: the whole undertaking is highly subjective, since there’s no official definition of what qualifies as a migration project and what doesn’t.
For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?
What about efforts to improve border control in northern Nigeria? Would they fall under counterterrorism? Security? Institutional development? Or is this actually a migration-related issue?
Each country has its own way of categorising projects.
There’s no single, unified standard within the EU.
When choosing what to include in our own overview, we limited ourselves to projects that European countries themselves designated as being migration related.
While it’s certainly not perfect, this overview allows us to draw at least some meaningful conclusions about three key issues: where the money is going, where it isn’t going, and what this means for Nigeria.
1) Where is the money going?
In Nigeria, we found
If you’d like to work with the data yourself, feel free to download the full overview here.
50 migration projects being funded by 11 different European countries, as well as 32 migration projects that rely on EU funding. Together, they amount to more than €770m in funding.
Most of the money from Brussels is spent on improving Nigerian border control:
more than €378m. For example, the European Investment Bank has launched a €250m initiative
to provide all Nigerians with biometric identity cards.
The funding provided by individual countries largely goes to projects aimed at creating employment opportunities
in Nigeria: at least €92m.
Significantly, only €300,000 is spent on creating more legal opportunities to migrate – less than 0.09% of all funding.
We also found 47 “regional” projects that are not limited to Nigeria, but also include other countries.
Together, they amount to more than €775m in funding.
Regional migration spending is mainly focused on migrants who have become stranded in transit and is used to return them home and help them to reintegrate when they get there. Campaigns designed to raise awareness of the dangers of travelling to Europe also receive a relatively large proportion of funding in the region.
2) Where isn’t the money going?
When we look at the list of institutions – or “implementing agencies”, as they’re known in policy speak – that receive money from Europe, one thing immediately stands out: virtually none of them are Nigerian organisations.
“The EU funds projects in Nigeria, but that money doesn’t go directly to Nigerian organisations,” says Charles Nwanelo, head of migration at the NCFRMI.
See their website here.
“Instead, it goes to international organisations, such as the IOM, which use the money to carry out projects here. This means we actually have no idea how much money the EU is spending in Nigeria.”
We hear the same story again and again from Nigerian government officials: they never see a cent of European funding, as it’s controlled by EU and UN organisations. This is partially a response to corruption within Nigerian institutions – Europe feels it can keep closer tabs on its money by channelling it through international organisations. As a result, these organisations are growing rapidly in Nigeria. To get an idea of just how rapidly: the number of people working for the IOM in Nigeria has more than quadrupled over the past two years.
Of course, this doesn’t mean that Nigerian organisations are going unfunded. Implementing agencies are free to pass funding along to Nigerian groups. For example, the IOM hires Nigerian NGOs to provide training for returning migrants and sponsors a project that provides training and new software to the Nigerian immigration service.
Nevertheless, the system has inevitably led to the emergence of a parallel aid universe in which the Nigerian government plays only a supporting role. “The Nigerian parliament should demand to see an overview of all current and upcoming projects being carried out in their country every three months,” says Bob van Dillen, migration expert at development organisation Cordaid.
But that would be “difficult”, according to one German official we spoke to, because “this isn’t a priority for the Nigerian government. This is at the top of Europe’s agenda, not Nigeria’s.”
Most Nigerian migrants to Europe come from Edo state, where the governor has been doing his absolute best to compile an overview of all migration projects. He set up a task force that aims to coordinate migration activities in his state. The task force has been largely unsuccessful because the EU doesn’t provide it with any direct funding and doesn’t require member states to cooperate with it.
3) What are the real-world consequences for Nigeria?
We’ve established that the Nigerian government isn’t involved in allocating migration spending and that local officials are struggling to keep tabs on things. So who is coordinating all those billions in funding?
Each month, the European donors and implementing agencies mentioned above meet at the EU delegation to discuss their migration projects. However, diplomats from multiple European countries have told us that no real coordination takes place at these meetings. No one checks to see whether projects conflict or overlap. Instead, the meetings are “more on the basis of letting each other know”, as one diplomat put it.
One German official noted: “What we should do is look together at what works, what doesn’t, and which lessons we can learn from each other. Not to mention how to prevent people from shopping around from project to project.”
Other diplomats consider this too utopian and feel that there are far too many players to make that level of coordination feasible. In practice, then, it seems that chaotic funding streams inevitably lead to one thing: more chaos.
And we’ve only looked at one country ...
That giant plate of spaghetti we just sifted through only represents a single serving – other countries have their own versions of Nigeria’s migration spaghetti. Alongside Nigeria, the EU has also designated Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger as “priority countries”. The EU’s largest migration fund, the EUTF, finances projects in 26 different African countries. And the sums of money involved are only going to increase.
When we first started this project, our aim was to chart a path through the new European zeal for funding. We wanted to track the flow of migration money to find answers to some crucial questions: will this funding help Nigerians make better lives for themselves in their own country? Will it help reduce the trafficking of women? Will it provide more safe, legal ways for Nigerians to travel to Europe?
Or will it primarily go towards maintaining the international aid industry? Does it encourage corruption? Does it make migrants even more vulnerable to exploitation along the way?
But we’re still far from answering these questions. Recently, a new study by the UNDP
called into question “the notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses”.
Nevertheless, European programming and policy responses will only increase in scope in the coming years.
But the more Europe spends on migration, the more tangled the spaghetti becomes and the harder it gets to check whether funds are being spent wisely. With the erosion of transparency comes the erosion of democratic oversight.
So to anyone who can figure out how to untangle the spaghetti, we say: be our guest.
#externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nigeria #EU #EU #Union_européenne #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Frontex #Trust_fund #Pays-Bas #argent #transparence (manque de - ) #budget #remittances #AMIF #développement #aide_au_développement #European_Development_Fund (#EDF) #EUTF_for_Africa #European_Neighbourhood_Instrument (#ENI) #Development_Cooperation_Instrument (#DCI) #Italie #Banque_mondiale #External_Investment_Plan #processus_de_rabat #accords_de_Cotonou #biométrie #carte_d'identité_biométrique #travail #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #emploi #réintégration #campagnes #IOM #OIM
World migration report 2020
#rapport #IOM #OIM #migrations #cohésion sociale #santé #enfants #enfance #climat #changement_climatique #réfugiés_climatiques #réfugiés_environnementaux #statistiques #chiffres #travailleurs_étrangers #réfugiés #réinstallation #remittances #genre #IDPs #déplacés_internes #apatrides #apatridie #monde #Afrique
Quelques graphiques et visualisations tirés du rapport :
ATLAS OF MIGRATIONS. Facts and figures about people on the move
Dictionnaire des migrations internationales
Armand Colin, 2015
#PLAIDOYER POUR L’OUVERTURE DES FRONTIÈRES ET LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES ÊTRES HUMAINS À L’ÉCHELLE MONDIALE : CAS DE LA DIASPORA DE LA RD CONGO.
#RDC #Congo #République_démocratique_du_congo #ouverture_des_frontières #libre_circulation
signalé par @karine4, qui commente :
dans ce plaidoyer pour l’ouverture des frontières écrit par un Congolais de la diaspora, beaucoup d’éléments sur les #transferts_financiers, notamment en comparaison avec l’#aide_publique_au_développement.
Development and migration : POLICIES AND OUTCOMES IN THE NETHERLANDS
#Pays-Bas #développement #migrations #réfugiés #asile #aide_au_développement #rapport #migrations #économie #travail #welfare #remittances #discriminations #welfare_state #marginalisation #réfugiés #asile #brain-drain #fuite_de_cerveaux #armes #commerce_d'armes #SDG #SDGs
Particularité de ce rapport : il regarde la contribution des migrations à la fois au développement des pays d’origine des migrants résidents aux Pays-Bas et au développement des Pays-Bas par la présence de migrants...
La migration contribue au développement
Tant pour le développement de la #Belgique que celui du pays d’origine des migrants, la migration a des effets positifs. Telle est la leçon principale du dernier rapport de Caritas International, réalisé en partenariat avec deux chercheurs universitaires. Rien que pour vous, nous en avons extrait ses conclusions principales et recommandations politiques.
Encore un rapport ? Oui ! Car nous pensons que le débat et le discours public belge en matière de migration et de développement doit être plus équilibré et fondé sur des données fiables. Par cette publication, nous souhaitons reconnaître, et faire connaître, la contribution vitale des migrants au développement et au bien-être de nos sociétés.
Une contribution diversifiée
La littérature s’accorde : la migration contribue au développement économique tant du pays de résidence des migrants que de celui d’origine. Les effets principaux sont les suivants :
Plus de biens et services disponibles sur le marché belge ;
Une source importante de main d’œuvre – un apport d’autant plus important pour les secteurs en pénurie et dans un contexte de vieillissement de la population ;
Des effets positifs pour les finances publiques – 0,8% du PIB belge ;
Plus d’échanges bilatéraux entre la Belgique et les pays d’origine ;
Des transferts de fonds pour les pays d’origine – quelque 4,16 milliards d’euros ont été transférés par des migrants depuis la Belgique en 2017.
La contribution sociale des migrants est également fondamentale, puisque la migration permet aux idées de circuler. Ainsi par exemple, de nombreux transferts financiers servent à financer l’éducation – et particulièrement celle des filles – dans les pays d’origine. La migration promeut ainsi l’égalité des genres.
Au niveau politique, la migration a une influence profonde sur la sphère politique belge, comme en témoigne la présence d’immigrés d’origine italienne, mais également l’influence grandissante d’immigrés de première génération et de leurs descendants d’origine turque, marocaine et congolaise.
La migration participe enfin à façonner l’identité culturelle de la Belgique. De multiples artistes et sportifs aux horizons divers – tels que le chanteur Stromae ou certains joueurs des Diables Rouges pour ne citer qu’eux – exercent une influence durable sur la scène publique belge.
Une contribution malgré les obstacles
Les résultats du rapport illustrent l’urgence de répondre aux obstacles conséquents qui empêchent la migration – et les migrants eux-mêmes – de contribuer pleinement au développement de la Belgique.
Le premier obstacle renvoie à l’absence de voies légales et sûres tant pour les migrants désirant travailler, étudier ou vivre en famille que pour les personnes qui pourraient bénéficier d’un statut (protection subsidiaire ou réfugié). Cela explique pourquoi certaines personnes n’ont d’autre choix que d’emprunter des routes informelles, qui coûtent la vie à certains et affectent les autres. « Ce n’est qu’en respectant la dignité des personnes migrantes – durant tout leur parcours migratoire – qu’elles pourront s’épanouir et faire partie intégrante de la société » explique Elise Kervyn, chargée de plaidoyer.
Certains migrants ne voient également pas leurs besoins fondamentaux remplis. En raison de certaines politiques et pratiques, il est plus difficile pour les migrants que les natifs de vivre en famille, d’avoir un logement de qualité et abordable et un travail où leurs droits sont respectés autant que ceux des natifs. Les causes sont diverses : obstacles administratifs, absence de réseaux, discriminations sur base ethnique, etc.
Une ligne de conduite à adopter
Avant que la migration ne voie son potentiel valorisé, les migrants doivent jouir de conditions de vie dignes. Cette nécessité ne répond pas uniquement à un impératif d’ordre moral. Les personnes contraintes de lutter quotidiennement pour satisfaire leurs besoins fondamentaux ne peuvent guère, au-delà, valoriser leurs compétences et connaissances et en faire bénéficier la société. Nos recommandations répondent à ces préoccupations majeures et à l’objectif de construire une société plus juste et plus solidaire. En voici les principales :
Élargir les voies d’entrée sûres et légales
Garantir un accueil de qualité aux demandeurs et bénéficiaires de protection internationale
Protéger les droits fondamentaux de tous les migrants
Concevoir et mettre en œuvre des politiques visant une meilleure insertion des migrants
Lutter contre la discrimination et la xénophobie
Soutenir la contribution des migrants envers les pays d’origine
Une place pour toutes et tous
Ce rapport insiste donc sur les besoins et la dépendance de la Belgique vis-à-vis de la migration. Caritas International est toutefois convaincue que la solidarité que nous devons manifester aux personnes migrantes ne doit en aucun cas être tributaire de leur niveau de contribution. Nous croyons en effet que tous et toutes, des personnes hautement qualifiées aux moins qualifiées, peuvent être des acteurs de développement si la société leur donne les moyens et la chance d’y parvenir.
Pour télécharger le rapport sur la Belgique :
Et pour l’#Allemagne...
Gemeinsam Heimat sein
Studie zum Zusammenhang zwischen Migration und Entwicklung am Beispiel Deutschlands hier herunterladen.
Migration und Entwicklung sind zwei Begriffe, die populärer nicht sein könnten. Dass es eine Beziehung zwischen den beiden Prozessen gibt, ist inzwischen ein gängiges Thema in der Diskussion unter Forschern, Politikern und Praktikern. Dennoch ist es recht schwierig nachzuvollziehen, wie sie sich gegenseitig beeinflussen.
Dem Landes-Caritasverband Bayern ist es, im Rahmen des EU-Projekts MIND, gelungen einen wissenschaftlichen Beitrag zu dieser Thematik zu leisten. Gemeinsam mit Dr. Annett Fleischer, Caritas Europa und Global Migration Policy Associates, ist die Publikation „Das gemeinsame Zuhause“ in der Edition Common Home für Deutschland entstanden. Anhand der Quellen und durch eine Vielzahl an Interviews mit Praktikerinnen und Praktikern aus diesen Bereichen, will die Studie eine Grundlage schaffen, um das öffentliche Verständnis für den Zusammenhang zwischen universeller nachhaltiger Entwicklung und Migration in Deutschland und in ausgewählten Entwicklungsländern zu verbessern. Des Weiteren werden deutsche Beiträge zur Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und das verstärkte Engagement von Regierungsbehörden aller Ebenen, zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen (CSOs), Einzelpersonen und anderen Akteuren bei der Bewältigung von Ursachen und Faktoren der Migration erläutert. Und schließlich rückt sie Migranten und Flüchtlinge als wichtige Entwicklungsakteure in den Vordergrund. Dabei geht es nicht nur um Zahlen, Daten und Fakten, sondern auch welche Hürden, Chancen und Möglichkeiten sich Migranten in Deutschland stellen müssen. Die Publikation schließt mit Empfehlungen, um Themen mit Migrationsbezug zukünftig erfolgreich zu gestalten:
Diskriminierung und Fremdenfeindlichkeit verhindern!
Gewährleistung des Schutzes aller Migranten und Flüchtlinge durch die Menschenrechte.
Anwendung und Durchsetzung des Arbeitsrechts, der Normen für menschenwürdige Arbeit sowie des Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutzes für alle Migranten.
Ersetzung des negativen Diskurses durch eine zutreffende und positive Erzählung über Migration.
Ausbau sicherer und legaler Wege der Migration.
Verstärktes Engagement der Städte und lokalen Akteure bei der Integration.
Stärkung und Ermöglichung der Teilnahme von Migranten und Flüchtlingen in der lokalen Gemeinschaft und Städten sowie am politischen Dialog.
Bewältigung der Fluchtursachen.
Verbesserung der Datenerhebung und Wissensbestände zur Stärkung des Zusammenhangs zwischen Migration und Entwicklung.
Stärkung des deutschen Engagements für die regionale, nationale und ganzheitliche menschliche Entwicklung im Ausland.
Neben der deutschen Veröffentlichung werden auch die MIND Partnerländer (Österreich, Belgien, Bulgarien, Tschechien, Italien, Holland, Portugal, Slowakei Slowenien und Schweden) eine Publikation in der Edition Common Home veröffentlichen. Das Gelingen dieses Projekts ist ein gutes Beispiel für europäische Zusammenarbeit. Im Rahmen des MIND-Projekts hoffen wir, dass wir durch die europäischen Publikationen und den verschiedenen landesspezifischen Facetten wichtige Akzente zu den zukunftsweisenden Themen Migration und Entwicklung setzen können.
Pour télécharger le rapport en anglais :
Interlinks between migration and development
The EU and its Member States have reshaped their external policies, including development cooperation, to place more focus on migration-related issues. Widely used in this context, political rhetoric on ’addressing root causes of migration’ has been questioned by academics as creating unrealistic expectations. Indeed, a positive correlation between migration and narrowly understood economic development persists until countries reach middle-income country level. However,several key drivers of migration are related to discrepancies in levels of human development. Demographic pressures, youth unemployment, job opportunities in the country of destination, the growth of migrant networks and the desire to reunite families, all play roles in migration. A complex interaction between aid and migration also exists, which is far from a simple one-way causality. In general, poverty alleviation, the primary objective of development aid, tends to enhance rather than deter the realisation of the aspiration to migrate, in the short- and medium-term, by increasinghousehold incomes. A more global approach to cooperation with third countries, such as the EU’s already well-established assistance focusing on good governance, infrastructure, rural development and strengthening resilience, as well as going beyond development assistance to include trade and investment, appears promising in terms of deterring migration. On the other hand, studies confirm that international migration is an important path for development: remittances constitute a tool forpoverty reduction, while diaspora skills and networks provide resources for economic and social progress. Nevertheless, EU policy integrating development aid as an instrument for curbing irregular migration is criticised by development stakeholders as undermining aid effectiveness, principles, and risks diverting aid from the most needy and indirectly prompting human rights violations. To avoid such outcomes, a contextual analysis must be the basis for identifying genuine synergies to be reinforced between development and migration management.
What is home ?
MIND ist ein Projekt, das von der Europäischen Kommission für drei Jahre finanziert wird. Es wird umgesetzt von zwölf Caritas-Organisationen in elf EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, nämlich Österreich, Bayern, Bulgarien, in der Tschechischen Republik, den Niederlanden, Belgien, Italien, Portugal, der Slowakei, Slowenien und Schweden. Außerdem wirkt Caritas Europa als Dachorganisation mit. Wir möchten gemeinsam mit unseren Partnern mehr Aufmerksamkeit auf Prozesse in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und das Wissen um nachhaltige Entwicklung lenken. Die europaweite Webseite ist unter ▻https://www.whatishome.eu zu finden.
Remittances to low- and middle-income countries reached a record high in 2018, according to the World Bank’s latest Migration and Development Brief.
The Bank estimates that officially recorded annual remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries reached $529 billion in 2018, an increase of 9.6 percent over the previous record high of $483 billion in 2017. Global remittances, which include flows to high-income countries, reached $689 billion in 2018, up from $633 billion in 2017.
Regionally, growth in remittance inflows ranged from almost 7 percent in East Asia and the Pacific to 12 percent in South Asia. The overall increase was driven by a stronger economy and employment situation in the United States and a rebound in outward flows from some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the Russian Federation. Excluding China, remittances to low- and middle-income countries ($462 billion) were significantly larger than foreign direct investment flows in 2018 ($344 billion).
Among countries, the top remittance recipients were India with $79 billion, followed by China ($67 billion), Mexico ($36 billion), the Philippines ($34 billion), and Egypt ($29 billion).
In 2019, remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries are expected to reach $550 billion, to become their largest source of external financing.
The global average cost of sending $200 remained high, at around 7 percent in the first quarter of 2019, according to the World Bank’s Remittance Prices Worldwide database. Reducing remittance costs to 3 percent by 2030 is a global target under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.7. Remittance costs across many African corridors and small islands in the Pacific remain above 10 percent.
Banks were the most expensive remittance channels, charging an average fee of 11 percent in the first quarter of 2019. Post offices were the next most expensive, at over 7 percent. Remittance fees tend to include a premium where national post offices have an exclusive partnership with a money transfer operator. This premium was on average 1.5 percent worldwide and as high as 4 percent in some countries in the last quarter of 2018.
On ways to lower remittance costs, Dilip Ratha, lead author of the Brief and head of KNOMAD, said, “Remittances are on track to become the largest source of external financing in developing countries. The high costs of money transfers reduce the benefits of migration. Renegotiating exclusive partnerships and letting new players operate through national post offices, banks, and telecommunications companies will increase competition and lower remittance prices.”
The Brief notes that banks’ ongoing de-risking practices, which have involved the closure of the bank accounts of some remittance service providers, are driving up remittance costs.
The Brief also reports progress toward the SDG target of reducing the recruitment costs paid by migrant workers, which tend to be high, especially for lower-skilled migrants.
“Millions of low-skilled migrant workers are vulnerable to recruitment malpractices, including exorbitant recruitment costs. We need to boost efforts to create jobs in developing countries and to monitor and reduce recruitment costs paid by these workers,” said Michal Rutkowski, Senior Director of the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice at the World Bank. The World Bank and the International Labour Organization are collaborating to develop indicators for worker-paid recruitment costs, to support the SDG of promoting safe, orderly, and regular migration.
Regional Remittance Trends
Remittances to the East Asia and Pacific region grew almost 7 percent to $143 billion in 2018, faster than the 5 percent growth in 2017. Remittances to the Philippines rose to $34 billion, but growth in remittances was slower due to a drop in private transfers from the GCC countries. Flows to Indonesia increased by 25 percent in 2018, after a muted performance in 2017.
After posting 22 percent growth in 2017, remittances to Europe and Central Asia grew an estimated 11 percent to $59 billion in 2018. Continued growth in economic activity increased outbound remittances from Poland, Russia, Spain, and the United States, major sources of remittances to the region. Smaller remittance-dependent countries in the region, such as the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, benefited from the sustained rebound of economic activity in Russia. Ukraine, the region’s largest remittance recipient, received a new record of more than $14 billion in 2018, up about 19 percent over 2017. This surge in Ukraine also reflects a revised methodology for estimating incoming remittances, as well as growth in neighboring countries’ demand for migrant workers.
Remittances flows into Latin America and the Caribbean grew 10 percent to $88 billion in 2018, supported by the strong U.S. economy. Mexico continued to receive the most remittances in the region, posting about $36 billion in 2018, up 11 percent over the previous year. Colombia and Ecuador, which have migrants in Spain, posted 16 percent and 8 percent growth, respectively. Three other countries in the region posted double-digit growth: Guatemala (13 percent) as well as Dominican Republic and Honduras (both 10 percent), reflecting robust outbound remittances from the United States.
Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa grew 9 percent to $62 billion in 2018. The growth was driven by Egypt’s rapid remittance growth of around 17 percent. Beyond 2018, the growth of remittances to the region is expected to continue, albeit at a slower pace of around 3 percent in 2019 due to moderating growth in the Euro Area.
Remittances to South Asia grew 12 percent to $131 billion in 2018, outpacing the 6 percent growth in 2017. The upsurge was driven by stronger economic conditions in the United States and a pick-up in oil prices, which had a positive impact on outward remittances from some GCC countries. Remittances grew by more than 14 percent in India, where a flooding disaster in Kerala likely boosted the financial help that migrants sent to families. In Pakistan, remittance growth was moderate (7 percent), due to significant declines in inflows from Saudi Arabia, its largest remittance source. In Bangladesh, remittances showed a brisk uptick in 2018 (15 percent).
Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa grew almost 10 percent to $46 billion in 2018, supported by strong economic conditions in high-income economies. Looking at remittances as a share of GDP, Comoros has the largest share, followed by the Gambia , Lesotho, Cabo Verde, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Togo, Ghana, and Nigeria.
#Rapport ici :
Immigrati, boom di rimesse: più di 6 miliardi all’estero. Lo strano caso dei cinesi «spariti»
Bangladesh, Romania, Filippine: ecco il podio delle rimesse degli immigrati che vivono e lavorano in Italia. Il trend è in forte aumento: nel 2018 sono stati inviati all’estero 6,2 miliardi di euro, con una crescita annua del 20, 7 per cento.
A registrarlo è uno studio della Fondazione Leone Moressa su dati Banca d’Italia, dopo il crollo del 2013 e alcuni anni di sostanziale stabilizzazione, oggi il volume di rimesse rappresenta lo 0,35% del Pil.
Il primato del Bangladesh
Per la prima volta, nel 2018 il Bangladesh è il primo Paese di destinazione delle rimesse, con oltre 730 milioni di euro complessivi (11,8% delle rimesse totali).
Il Bangladesh nell’ultimo anno ha registrato un +35,7%, mentre negli ultimi sei anni ha più che triplicato il volume.
Il secondo Paese di destinazione è la Romania, con un andamento stabile: +0,3% nell’ultimo anno e -14,3% negli ultimi sei.
Da notare come tra i primi sei Paesi ben quattro siano asiatici: oltre al Bangladesh, anche Filippine, Pakistan e India. Proprio i Paesi dell’Asia meridionale sono quelli che negli ultimi anni hanno registrato il maggiore incremento di rimesse inviate. Il Pakistan ha registrato un aumento del +73,9% nell’ultimo anno. Anche India e Sri Lanka sono in forte espansione.
Praticamente scomparsa la Cina, che fino a pochi anni fa rappresentava il primo Paese di destinazione e oggi non è nemmeno tra i primi 15 Paesi per destinazione delle rimesse.
Mediamente, ciascun immigrato in Italia ha inviato in patria poco più di 1.200 euro nel corso del 2018 (circa 100 euro al mese). Valore che scende sotto la media per le due nazionalità più numerose: Romania (50,29 euro mensili) e Marocco (66,14 euro). Tra le comunità più numerose il valore più alto è quello del Bangladesh: ciascun cittadino ha inviato oltre 460 euro al mese. Anche i senegalesi hanno inviato mediamente oltre 300 euro mensili.
Could #facebook and #whatsapp Become Major Players in the Remittance Market with #crypto?
It is safe to assume that anyone with a working internet connection has heard of Facebook and its subsidiary, Whatsapp. Bloomberg reported on Dec 21, 2018, that Facebook is working on a cryptocurrency that will let users transfer money on its Whatsapp messaging app. Are Cryptocurrencies at the precipice of mass adoption?Facebook boasts of the largest active user base of 1.7 billion after more than a decade of existence. That number could have been more if countries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Bangladesh had not banned Facebook. On the other hand, Whatsapp has 1.5 billion users in 109 countries. The most popular countries include India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and many other countries. Facebook is primed to become a major player in the remittance market due to the sheer number (...)
Remittance & Blockchain — Match Made In Heaven ?
Remittance & Blockchain — Match Made In Heaven?Remittance is the transfer of money from a migrant worker to someone back in their home country. People have always moved in search of better work prospects in high-income (or high currency value as compared to home) countries. Based on the World Migration Report 2018, there are currently an estimated 244 million international migrants living in other countries. This number has either directly or indirectly contributed to the global remittance’s $689 billion dollar industry with India being top of the pile, contributing $80 Billion or 11.6% of its entirety. The global remittance industry is expected to grow by more than 3% in 2019.Traditional Remittance MarketCompanies such as Western Union and MoneyGram come to mind when we talk about (...)
Accelerated remittances growth to low- and middle-income countries in 2018
Remittances to low- and middle-income countries grew rapidly and are projected to reach a new record in 2018, says the latest edition of the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief, released today.
The Bank estimates that officially recorded remittances to developing countries will increase by 10.8 percent to reach $528 billion in 2018. This new record level follows robust growth of 7.8 percent in 2017. Global remittances, which include flows to high-income countries, are projected to grow by 10.3 percent to $689 billion.
Remittance flows rose in all regions, most notably in Europe and Central Asia (20 percent) and South Asia (13.5 percent), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (9.8 percent), Latin America and the Caribbean (9.3 percent), the Middle East and North Africa (9.1 percent), and East Asia and the Pacific (6.6 percent). Growth was driven by a stronger economy and employment situation in the United States and a rebound in outward flows from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the Russian Federation.
Among major remittance recipients, India retains its top spot, with remittances expected to total $80 billion this year, followed by China ($67 billion), Mexico and the Philippines ($34 billion each), and Egypt ($26 billion).
As global growth is projected to moderate, future remittances to low- and middle-income countries are expected to grow moderately by 4 percent to reach $549 billion in 2019. Global remittances are expected to grow 3.7 percent to $715 billion in 2019.
The Brief notes that the global average cost of sending $200 remains high at 6.9 percent in the third quarter of 2018. Reducing remittance costs to 3 percent by 2030 is a global target under #Sustainable_Development_Goals (SDG) 10.7. Increasing the volume of remittances is also a global goal under the proposals for raising financing for the SDGs.
#Rapport : Migration and Remittances
This Migration and Development Brief reports global trends in migration and remittance flows. It highlights developments connected to migration-related Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators for which the World Bank is a custodian: increasing the volume of remittances as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (SDG indicator 17.3.2), reducing remittance costs (SDG indicator 10.c.1), and reducing recruitment costs for migrant workers (SDG indicator 10.7.1). This Brief also presents recent developments on the Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and proposes an implementation and review mechanism.
Pour télécharger le rapport :
International Remittances Headline ACP-EU-IOM Discussions in #Ghana
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the flow of remittances is on the rise, but the cost to transfer these funds is far higher than the global average, making the region the most expensive place in the world to send money.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and partners focused on improving the use of migrant remittances, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa at a three-day regional thematic meeting starting today (19/02) in Accra, Ghana.
International remittances have been taking on increasing weight in the global policy agenda in recent years according to Jeffrey Labovitz, IOM Regional Director for East and Horn of Africa, who is speaking at the event.
“This in part reflects the growing understanding that improving and harnessing the flow of remittances can have a substantial impact on development,” he said.
Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa grew from USD 34 billion in 2016 to USD 38 billion in 2017, an increase of over 11 per cent. Despite this increase – a trend which is expected to continue through 2019 – Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most expensive place in the world to send money with an average cost of 9.4 per cent of the transfer amount, a figure that was 29 per cent above the world average in 2017. This is far short of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) target 10.C.3 to reduce the transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3 per cent by 2030.
“Almost 75 per cent of remittances are spent on consumption which greatly benefit the receiving households and communities,” said Claudia Natali, Regional Specialist on Labour Mobility and Development at the IOM Regional Office for West and Central Africa.
“But more could be done to maximize the remaining 25 per cent. Fostering financial inclusion and promoting initiatives that help people manage the funds can go a long way to harness development impacts of remittances,” she added.
The meeting, which runs through Thursday (21/02), is providing a platform for communication, exchange and learning for 80 participants involved in IOM’s “ACP-EU Migration Action", including migration experts and representatives from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) governments, regional organizations, the European Union (EU), UN agencies and NGOs working in remittances and diaspora mobilization.
Given that remittances are at the heart of the joint ACP Group of States and European Union Dialogue’s recommendations on migration, discussions also aim to generate thematic recommendations for the Sub-Saharan region and establish links between the outcomes of the ACP-EU Migration Action programme, and processes relevant to the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and Development at the regional and global levels.
The meeting is organized by IOM’s country office for Ghana and the IOM Regional Office in Brussels in partnership with the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) and Making Finance Work for Africa Partnership (MFW4A).
IOM’s ACP-EU Migration Action, launched in June 2014, provides tailored technical support on migration to ACP countries and regional organizations. To date it has received 74 technical assistance requests from 67 ACP governments and 7 regional organizations, a third of which directly concern remittances.
The programme is financed by the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) and supported by the ACP Secretariat and the EU. For more information on the ACP-EU Migration Action, go to: www.acpeumigrationaction.iom.int.
The cost of cross-border payments needs to drop
FOR MOST of human history, sending money across borders has cost the earth. Thankfully for globetrotters and e-shoppers in the rich world, that has changed in the past decade. A shift from cash and travellers’ cheques towards digital payments has cut the cost of moving funds around. And a new generation of fintech firms has broken the stranglehold that big banks used to have on money transfers (see article). As a result, fees have fallen. The cost of a transfer between consumers or small firms who are both in G7 countries can now cost 2% or less. This year some $10trn will pass across borders. As prices fall further, the sums will grow.
#ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and Methodology
If the right policies are in place, labour migration can help countries respond to shifts in labour supply and demand, stimulate innovation and sustainable development, and transfer and update skills. However, a lack of international standards regarding concepts, definitions and methodologies for measuring labour migration data still needs to be addressed.
This report gives global and regional estimates, broken down by income group, gender and age. It also describes the data, sources and methodology used, as well as the corresponding limitations.
The report seeks to contribute to the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and to achieving SDG targets 8.8 and 10.7.
Global migrant numbers up 20 percent
Migrants of working age make up 4.2 percent of the global population, and the number is growing. A UN report notes how poorer countries are increasingly supplying labor to richer ones to their own detriment.
There are 277 million international migrants, 234 million migrants of working age (15 and older) and 164 million migrant workers worldwide, according to a UN report.
Figures for 2017 from the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA) published on Wednesday show that migrants of working age make up 4.2 percent of the global population aged 15 and older, while migrant workers constitute 4.7 percent of all workers.
The numbers rose by almost 20 percent between 2013 and 2017 for international migrants, 13 percent for migrants of working age and 9 percent for migrant workers.
Of the 164 million migrant workers worldwide, 111.2 million (67.9 percent) are employed in high-income countries, 30.5 million (18.6 percent) in upper middle-income countries, 16.6 million (10.1 percent) in lower middle- income countries and 5.6 million (3.4 percent) in low-income countries.
From 2013 to 2017, the concentration of migrant workers in high-income countries fell from 74.7 to 67.9 percent, while their share in upper middle-income countries increased, suggesting a shift in the number of migrant workers from high-income to lower-income countries.
The report noted that this growing number could be attributed to the economic development of some lower-income nations, particularly if these countries are in close proximity to migrant origin countries with close social networks.
The share of migrant workers in the labor force of destination countries has increased in all income groups except for lower middle-income countries.
In high-income countries, falling numbers of migrant workers were observed simultaneously with a higher share in the labor force as a result of the sharp fall in the labor force participation of non-migrants, due to a variety of factors such as changes in demographics, technology and immigration policies.
“Stricter migration policies in high-income countries and stronger economic growth among upper middle-income countries may also contribute to the trends observed,” the report noted.
Some 60.8 percent of all migrant workers are found in three subregions: Northern America (23.0 percent), Northern, Southern and Western Europe (23.9 percent) and Arab States (13.9 percent). The lowest number of migrant workers is hosted by Northern Africa (less than 1 percent).
The subregion with the largest share of migrant workers as a proportion of all workers is Arab States (40.8 percent), followed by Northern America (20.6 percent) and Northern, Southern and Western Europe (17.8 percent).
In nine out of 11 subregions, the labor force participation rate of migrants is higher than that of non-migrants. The largest difference is in the Arab States, where the labor force participation rate of migrants (75.4 percent) is substantially higher than that of non-migrants (42.2 percent).
Among migrant workers, 96 million are men and 68 million are women. In 2017, the stock of male migrant workers was estimated to be 95.7 million, while the corresponding estimate for female migrant workers was 68.1 million.
“The higher proportion of men among migrant workers may also be explained by...the higher likelihood of women to migrate for reasons other than employment (for instance, for family reunification), as well as by possible discrimination against women that reduces their employment opportunities in destination countries,” the report noted.
It added that societal stigmatization, the discriminatory impacts of policies and legislation and violence and harassment undermine women’s access to decent work and can result in low pay, the absence of equal pay and the undervaluation of female-dominated sectors.
Prime-age adults (ages 25-64) constitute nearly 87 percent of migrant workers. Youth workers (aged 15-24) and older workers (aged 65 plus) constitute 8.3 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively, of migrant workers. This age composition holds for male and female migrant workers alike.
“The fact that the overwhelming majority of migrant workers consist of prime-age adults suggests that some countries of origin are losing the most productive part of their workforce, which could have a negative impact on their economic growth,” the report noted, but it added that emigration of prime-age individuals may also provide a source of remittances for countries of origin.
Destination countries, meanwhile, benefit from receiving prime-age workers as they are increasingly faced with demographic pressures.
Labor shortage in Germany
Germany’s BDI industry association said skilled labor from abroad was key to Germany’s future economic success. “The integration of skilled workers from other countries contributes significantly to growth and jobs,” BDI President Dieter Kempf said.
The country’s VDE association of electrical, electronic and IT engineering was the latest group in Germany to point to the growing need for foreign experts. Emphasizing that Germany itself was training too few engineers, VDE said there would be a shortage of 100,000 electrical engineers over the next 10 years.
“We will strive to increase the number of engineers by means of migration,” VDE President Gunther Kegel noted.
Al menos uno de cada cuatro movimientos migratorios son retornos a los países de origen
Un estudio estima que entre el 26% y el 31% de los flujos de migración mundiales consisten en regresos a los lugares de partida. En los últimos 25 años apenas ha habido cambios en la proporción de población migrante mundial
GLOBAL MIGRATION INDICATORS
Préparé par le Centre mondial d’analyse des données sur la migration (CMADM) de l’OIM, le rapport 2018 sur les indicateurs de la migration dans le monde résume les principales tendances mondiales en fonction des dernières statistiques, présentant 21 indicateurs dans 17 domaines relatifs à la migration.
Le rapport s’appuie sur des statistiques provenant de sources diverses facilement accessibles sur le Global Migration Data Portal.
Le rapport regroupe les statistiques les plus récentes dans des domaines comme la migration de main-d’œuvre, les réfugiés, les étudiants internationaux, les envois de fonds, le trafic illicite de migrants, la gouvernance des migrations et bien d’autres, permettant aux responsables politiques et au grand public d’avoir un aperçu de l’ampleur et des dynamiques de la migration à travers le monde.
Par ailleurs, le rapport est le premier à faire le lien entre le programme mondial de gouvernance des migrations et les débats sur les données migratoires. Les thèmes choisis sont particulièrement pertinents pour le Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières et pour les Objectifs de développement durable (ODD). Le rapport fait un état des lieux des données sur chaque thème et propose des solutions pour les améliorer.
« Bien que le Pacte mondial sur la migration et les ODD soient des cadres importants pour améliorer la façon dont nous gérons les migrations, des données plus précises et fiables sur les sujets relatifs à la migration sont nécessaires pour tirer parti de cette opportunité. Ce rapport donne un aperçu global de ce que nous savons et ne savons pas sur les tendances de la migration dans le monde », a déclaré Frank Laczko, Directeur du CMADM.
« La communauté internationale prend des mesures pour renforcer la collecte et la gestion des données sur la migration mais il reste beaucoup à faire. Une base de données solide est essentielle pour éclairer les politiques nationales sur la migration et seront plus que jamais nécessaires à la lumière du Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières », a déclaré Antonio Vitorino, le nouveau Directeur général de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations.
Pour télécharger le rapport :
Quelques éléments-clé :
Investment platforms vie to capture a share of global #remittances
Investment platforms are vying to capture a share of global remittances
IN 2016 AYO ADEWUNMI, a Nigerian-born agricultural trader living in London, bought a five-hectare farm in
his homeland. It has produced little since. “I am not in the country, so I have to rely on third parties. It’s just
not good enough,” he says.
Mr Adewunmi has since discovered another, potentially more satisfactory way to make such investments:
through #FarmCrowdy (▻https://www.farmcrowdy.com), a crowdfunding platform that lends to Nigerian farms and provides technical
assistance to their owners. The two-year-old startup, which is considering expanding into Ghana, places high
hopes in the African diaspora as a source of funds.
The case for such platforms goes beyond agriculture. Global remittances are expected to soar from $468bn
in 2010 to $667bn in 2019. They are among the top two foreign-currency sources in several countries,
including Kenya and the Philippines. Yet hardly any of the money is invested.
In part, this is because recipients use three-quarters of the money for basics such as food and housing. But it
is also because emigrants who want to invest back home have few options. New investment channels could
attract lots of extra cash—about $73bn a year in Commonwealth countries alone, according to research by
the 53-country grouping.
Crowdfunding platforms would enable investors to put modest sums directly into smaller businesses in
developing countries, which are often cash-starved. Yet of the emerging world’s 85 debt- and
equity-crowdfunding ventures, only a handful raise money abroad. Several platforms set up in rich countries
over the past decade to invest in developing countries, including Emerging Crowd, Homestrings and Enable
Impact, quickly folded.
A big problem is that few developing countries have rules about crowdfunding. Many have allowed activity
so far chiefly because the industry is so small, says Anton Root of Allied Crowds, a consultancy. Cross-border
transfers using such platforms easily fall foul of rich countries’ rules intended to stop money-laundering and
the financing of terrorism.
Some developing countries have realised that they need to act. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
have all recently passed regulations on equity crowdfunding or peer-to-peer lending. But from a
cross-border perspective, Africa seems most inventive, owing to active entrepreneurs and Western help.
Last month the British government approved a grant of £230,000 ($300,000) to the African Crowdfunding
Association to help it craft model accreditation and investor-protection rules. Elizabeth Howard of
LelapaFund, a platform focused on east Africa, is part of an effort to see such rules adopted across the
continent. That would help reassure sending countries that transfers do not end up in the wrong hands, she
says. She hopes to enlist the support of the Central Bank of West African States, which oversees eight
Francophone countries, at a gathering of crowdfunders and regulators sponsored by the French
government in Dakar, in Senegal, this month.
Thameur Hemdane of Afrikwity, a platform targeting Francophone Africa, says the industry will also study
whether prospective laws could be expanded to the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, a
grouping of six countries. Harmonised rules will not guarantee crowdfunders’ success, but would be a useful
step towards raising the amount of diaspora capital that is put to productive use.
Déconstruction de l’idée : augmentation du #développement pour freiner la migration (et notamment l’émigration), en lien aussi avec la question du #codéveloppement :
Does Development Reduce Migration ?
Ici des liens sur aide au développement comme moyen de freiner l’immigration, mais sans pour autant être critiques sur ce sujet (#root_causes) :
Parmi les leviers dont dispose la France, l’aide publique au développement, dont le budget total doit atteindre 0,55% du PIB en 2022. Environ 2 milliards d’euros de cette aide ont été distribués au Sénégal depuis 2007 : des « efforts » qui doivent « produire des résultats sur l’immigration irrégulière », souligne Matignon.
L’UE va annoncer une enveloppe de 100 millions d’euros d’aide au développement en faveur du #Soudan afin de remédier aux causes profondes de la migration irrégulière et des déplacements forcés
Changement de politique de la #Suisse : l’aide au développement comme instrument de lutte contre la pauvreté à instrument de gestion de la migration :
L’#aide_au_développement peut-elle réguler l’immigration ?
v. aussi, même si je n’ai pas encore lu dans les détails les conditions liées à cette nouvelle enveloppe d’aide :
L’Union européenne renforce son soutien au développement du #Sahel
Dictators as Gatekeepers for Europe : Outsourcing EU border controls to Africa
Increasingly, the billions Europe pays for migration control are described as official development assistance (ODA), more widely known as development aid, supposedly for poverty relief and humanitarian assistance. The EU is spending billions buying African leaders as gatekeepers, including dictators and suspected war criminals. And the real beneficiaries are the military and technology corporations involved in the implementation.
Jammeh’s ousting ended years of severe repression and corruption that had discouraged donor countries from cooperating with The Gambia. When he left, the country quickly established positive relations with the EU which has become its most important development partner (▻https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/gambia_en/58850/A%20comprehensive%20overview%20of%20the%20new%20chapter%20of%20The%20Gam). It provides €55 million in budgetary support and runs three projects (▻https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/gambia_en) to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration. But the moratorium was a stress test for this new relationship.
Et l’opacité des fonds pour le développement, qui, en réalité, sont utilisés en grande mesure pour fermer les frontières :
Au #Soudan notamment, où des fonds pour le développement (et versé par les agences de développement, notamment la #GIZ allemande) sont détournés et utilisés par des #milices pour arrêter les migrants (voire pour alimenter le juteux business du trafic d’êtres humains) :
Sudan does not benefit from any direct EU financial support. No EU funding is decentralized or channeled through the Sudanese government.
“All EU-funded activities in Sudan are implemented by EU member states development agencies, the UN, international organizations and NGOs, who are closely scrutinized through strict and regular monitoring during projects’ implementation,” the spokesperson added.
Et les fonds vers le #Nigeria, avec cette question posée...
For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?
Liens sur les budgets nationaux (européens) de la #coopération_internationale au développement et le fait que dans ce budget les frais d’#accueil des #réfugiés et #demandeurs_d'asile sur le territoire y est inclus :
Quand les Etats financent, via l’aide au développement aussi, des dictateurs...
Eritrea, l’UE finanzia il regime di Afewerki mentre ogni giorno fuggono migliaia di persone
Le Trust fund pour construire des #routes en Erythrée, routes construites via du #travail_forcé (les routes seraient en effet construites par des personnes enrôlées dans le #national_service) :
Gli attivisti eritrei denunciano la Ue : “Finanzia il lavoro forzato”
It Takes a Village: Despite Challenges, Migrant Groups Lead Development in Senegal
For generations, migrants have emigrated from Senegal, particularly from in and around the Senegal River Valley along the country’s borders with Mauritania and Mali. Young people from the Peul (particularly its Toucouleur subgroup) and Soninké ethnic groups first left to pursue economic opportunities around West Africa and Central Africa. Later, migration to France became a popular method for supporting families and improving social status in origin communities, and migrants today contribute a substantial amount in social and financial capital to development in Senegal. Remittances are essential to livelihoods, making up almost 14 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017—the fifth-highest share in Africa.
Widespread Senegalese migration to France first began with temporary workers. As their stays became more permanent, they brought their families to live with them, typically in communities on the outskirts of Paris and other major cities. Once settled in their new communities, they established hometown associations (HTAs), largely to support development back in Senegal.
Increasing barriers to free movement for current and former French colonial subjects that began in the 1970s—and further restrictions on migration more recently—have made life for West African migrants and would-be migrants more difficult. As a result, migrants and their HTAs have been forced to adapt. Meanwhile, in the face of shrinking income flows, some HTAs have begun to professionalize their operations and work more strategically, moving beyond construction projects to ones that seek to foster economic development.
This article, based on the author’s Fulbright-funded research in Senegal in 2016-17, explores the impact of policy changes in France on Senegalese migrants and the activities of HTAs, and how these shifts influence development and quality of life in migrants’ origin communities in the Senegal River Valley. As the European Union incorporates support for development into migration partnerships with African countries, in hopes of reducing spontaneous migration to Europe, the work of HTAs holds important lessons for actors on both sides.
From Colonial Ties to Migrant Arrivals
France, which colonized large swaths of West Africa starting in the late 1800s, first became a destination for economic migrants from modern-day Senegal during and after the colonial period. For example, West Africans fought for France in both world wars and many remained in France afterwards. After World War II, France recruited migrants from its colonial empire to reconstruct the country and work in its factories. These pull factors, coupled with droughts in the Sahel region during the 1970s and 1980s, accelerated the number of young, low-skilled West Africans migrating to France during the mid- and late 20th century. As of mid-2017, about 120,000 Senegalese lived in France, according to United Nations estimates. France is the top destination for Senegalese migrants after The Gambia, and it is also the top origin for formal remittances arriving in Senegal.
Economically motivated migration became an important source of income in rural eastern Senegal, with France frequently seen as the ideal destination. Even though migrants in Europe often worked in factories, construction, security, or sanitation, their salaries were substantial compared to those of family members back in Senegal, who generally worked as subsistence farmers or animal herders. As result of remittances, families were able to construct larger, more durable homes, afford healthier diets, and increase their consumption of other goods, particularly electronics such as cellphones, refrigerators, fans, and televisions.
In addition, from the 1960s onward, Senegalese migrants in France began to form HTAs to support their origin communities. HTAs are formal or informal organizations of migrants from the same town, region, or ethnic group living outside their region or country of origin. These organizations sponsor cultural activities in destination communities, foster solidarity among migrants, and/or finance development projects in hometowns. HTA leadership or traditional authorities in the origin community then manage these funds and related projects on the ground. While migrants from many countries form HTAs, West Africans maintain particularly close social, political, and financial ties with their hometowns through these organizations.
For West African migrants, social pressures compel HTA participation and members are also traditionally required to pay dues toward a communal fund. Once enough money has been amassed, the organization funds a public goods project in the hometown, such as the construction of a school, mosque, cemetery, health center, post office, or water system. These migrant-led development projects have been crucial to communities across the Senegal River Valley, which are often far from urban centers, markets, or infrastructure such as paved roads, and rarely receive contact from the central government or assistance from local government actors. As a result, migrant projects often fill the void by providing most of the public goods enjoyed by these communities.
Senegalese HTAs thus contribute immensely to human development and quality of life in communities in this region. The impact of this work, as well as of household-level support provided by remittances, continued motivating young people to leave eastern Senegal for France, as well as regional destinations, during the mid-20th century.
Policy Changes Drive Migration Shifts
Beginning in the early 1980s, France began to enact a series of restrictive policies limiting low-skilled economic immigration and creating barriers to naturalization and family reunification. These changes have continued in recent decades, raising questions about the future of the migration and development cycle now cemented in the Senegal River Valley.
Prior to the mid-1970s, Senegalese migrants freely circulated into and out of France as current, and eventually former, colonial subjects, following independence in 1960. France first introduced limits to Senegalese immigration in 1974 with a law requiring residence permits for all migrant workers.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of laws including the Bonnet and Pasqua Laws restricted entry, family reunification, and naturalization for many immigrants. Although some of these provisions were later abolished, they led to several high-profile deportation operations targeting West Africans and laid the groundwork for future restrictive French immigration legislation.
Several bilateral accords between France and Senegal over the years also focused on limiting economic migration and facilitating return for irregular migrants already in France. The evolution of these policies reflects a shift from promoting low-skilled economic immigration to satisfy labor shortages, to emphasizing high-skilled and temporary immigrants such as students.
During the author’s fieldwork, interviewees cited many of these policies as having substantial effects on migration and development in their communities. The 1990s, the turn of the 21st century, and the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy were the most common turning points identified when migration and development in eastern Senegal first began to shift (see Table 1). Participants emphasized the introduction of French visas and residence permits for Senegalese immigrants as the first major barriers to migration. Subsequent important political moments for participants included deportation operations in the 1980s and then-Interior Minister Sarkozy’s famous 2005 speech on immigration choisie, the government’s policy of carefully selecting immigrants who would best integrate and contribute to the French economy and society.
At the same time, external political changes were not the only factors influencing these phenomena in the Senegal River Valley. Many participants also cited social and economic events in France as having negative consequences for Senegalese migrants and their development activities. The global economic crisis beginning in 2008 led to the disappearance of employment opportunities, including across Europe. This downturn thus decreased incomes and the ability of migrants to send money back to families and contribute to HTA projects.
Participants reported that the mechanization of automobile production and other manufacturing, a source of employment for many West Africans for decades, compounded these effects. In cities such as Paris, with tight and expensive housing markets, these economic conditions created additional challenges to saving money. Individuals in eastern Senegal had traditionally seen France as a promised land offering easy income and employment opportunities to anyone who made the journey, regardless of French skills or education level. However, this view changed for many as challenges became more frequent.
Beyond economic changes, shifts in attitudes within French society also affected the Senegalese diaspora. Participants noted an increase in Islamophobia and a growing climate of mistrust and intolerance toward migrants in recent years, which have only exacerbated difficulties for West Africans in France.
Further, political and economic changes in Senegal also affected diaspora-led projects and migration patterns in the region. The administration of President Macky Sall, who took office in 2012, has decentralized development and other administrative responsibilities, delegating them to regional and local authorities. In addition, Sall’s national development scheme, Plan Sénégal Émergent (PSE), aims to provide alternatives to irregular migration from a country with high youth unemployment and a legacy of emigration. Participants cited these domestic shifts as significant, although many agreed it was too early to judge their influence on the quality of life in their communities.
Migration and Development: Perceptions and Reality
Study participants said they view these international and domestic political, economic, and social shifts as affecting migration flows and development efforts in their communities. Though views on whether emigration is rising or falling varied, many participants agreed that irregular migration was on the rise. Further, most participants predicted continued interest in migration among young people absent alternative employment options in the Senegal River Valley.
Whether because of limits on authorized entry into France, difficulties upon arrival, or other motivations, migrants from eastern Senegal have diversified their destinations in recent years. Some migrants have eschewed traditional receiving countries throughout West and Central Africa or France in favor of destinations such as Italy, Spain, the United States, and even several South American countries including Argentina and Brazil.
Limits on economic migration to France and elsewhere in Europe also impacted migrant-led development in Senegalese municipalities. Interviewees held diverse opinions on whether HTA activities were as frequent or as effective as they had been several years or even decades ago. Some said they observed consistent support for community-wide projects and noted innovative strategies used to combat potential lack of purchasing power or access to funding. However, many study participants who indicated a decrease in HTA support for their villages said they believed that migrants contributed less frequently to community-level projects, instead prioritizing maintaining household remittance levels.
When asked about specific migrant-funded development activities, many cited completed and ongoing public goods initiatives led by their village’s HTA. When HTAs in this region began their work in the mid-20th century, mosques and water systems were frequent initial projects, with water access evolving from simple manual wells to electric- or solar-powered deep-drill wells connected to taps throughout the municipality. Today, many basic needs have been fulfilled thanks to years of HTA support, and some migrants have more recently turned to renovating and expanding these structures.
Some HTAs have stagnated in recent years, while others have moved beyond a public goods focus to new innovative strategies of promoting development in their hometowns. Many interviewees cited a need for income- and job-generating projects to promote local economic growth and incentivize young people to remain in their home communities.
Several HTAs in the author’s study sites piloted this type of project, including the construction of a bakery in one community and a carpentry training center in another. The bakery, built in early 2017 thanks to funds from migrants in France and their French donors, promised to provide the town with affordable, high-quality bread and employment for several people. Meanwhile, the carpentry center offered young men the opportunity to train with experienced carpenters on machines provided by a French donor. This model not only provided professional skills to young people, but also produced locally built furniture for the surrounding community to purchase.
Within migrant households, participants noted that remittances continued to support consumption and home construction. Beyond the purchase of food, electronics, and health care, remittances also defrayed children’s educational costs, including school supplies and fees. Household members, particularly migrants’ wives, perceived both positive and negative impacts of migration on household-level development. On the one hand, remittances finance the purchase of tools and animals, the construction of irrigation infrastructure, or the hiring of employees to expand the scale of the household’s work and thus its earnings. However, the loss of the migrant’s labor to tend to animals or fields also hurts households without enough adolescents, adult children, or other family members to maintain these activities.
Nonmigrant households had their own ideas about changes in migrant-led development. Though they did not receive remittances, individuals in these households largely perceived that community-wide development activities benefited them, as public structures built with HTAs’ support were accessible to everyone. However, despite receiving occasional financial gifts from migrant neighbors or friends, some nonmigrant households expressed feeling dissatisfied with or excluded from development happening around them.
Effective HTA Adaptations and Development Strategies
Certain HTAs and individual migrants have been able to overcome challenges due to decreased income or barriers to authorized employment in France and other host countries. Individuals in origin communities perceived strategies modifying HTA structures, funding sources, and project types as most effective in continuing development efforts.
One particularly effective change was the professionalization of these organizations. HTAs that moved from traditional leadership hierarchies and divisions of labor to more formal, structured ones were better able to form financial and logistical partnerships and expand the scope of their projects. Associations with clearly defined goals, leadership, project plans, and project evaluation were able to attract the cooperation of French government entities such as the Program to Support Solidarity Initiatives for Development (PAISD for its French acronym) or other international donors. Thus, despite a potential decrease in income from individuals, many HTAs began supplementing member dues with larger funding sources. Formalized structures also promoted better project management, evaluation, and long-term sustainability.
Another key HTA adaptation was the idea of becoming community or village associations, as opposed to migrant associations. The frequent use of the term association de migrants can have a top-down connotation, implying that the diaspora unilaterally provides ideas, support, and manpower for development efforts without important input about living conditions from communities in Senegal. For HTAs that started conceptualizing themselves as a unified development organization with a branch abroad and a branch in Senegal, this strategy seemed to improve communication and promote inclusion, thus responding better to current needs and giving the local community more of a stake in projects.
A gradual trend toward more investment- and training-focused projects has also seen success. The basic human development needs of many communities have been satisfied after decades of hard work; still, conditions are not sufficient to keep the next generation from leaving. While the bakery and the carpentry center are key examples of productive initiatives, more support and focus on this type of project could bring meaningful change to local economies and markets. Many local organizations and collectives are already doing quality work in agriculture, herding, or transportation, and increased funding from HTAs could greatly expand the scale of their existing activities.
Meanwhile, women’s associations in rural Senegal do not always receive HTA support, representing a potential area for expansion. West African HTAs are traditionally dominated by men, with male leadership at origin and abroad. In Senegal, economic activity is frequently divided by gender and women run many of their own associations, often focused on agriculture or microsavings. However, these structures do not receive much or any support from female migrants in France, who are less likely to be in the labor force than male Senegalese and thus might not be able to send money back to Senegal. Given these conditions, many well-organized and highly motivated women’s agricultural collectives would greatly benefit from increased migrant support.
Finally, the federalization of community-level HTAs into larger regional organizations is an increasingly common strategy. This approach allows migrants to pool their resources and knowledge to tackle larger-scale development questions, despite economic or administrative challenges they may individually face in their host communities.
The Future of Migrant-Led Development in Eastern Senegal
Understanding the complex relationship among emigration, HTA development activities, and political, economic, and social changes in both France and at home is essential to the future of development in eastern Senegal. This study suggests that while HTA activities may be affected by political shifts domestically and abroad, economic changes on the sending and receiving sides are equally important and may be felt more immediately by the population at origin.
Senegalese HTAs can no longer depend on traditional fundraising and project management strategies. These organizations must adapt to current and emerging economic and political conditions hindering legal employment and income accumulation among migrants in France and across Europe. Inclusive project planning that considers the needs and perspectives of the local population, as well as openness to productive investments and collaboration with outside partners are key steps to sustaining the work of HTAs.
Current European efforts such as the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) are incorporating development support into partnerships with countries including Senegal to try to stem migration. While the efficacy of migrant-driven projects and even state-led development activities in preventing emigration remains to be seen—particularly given the social pressures and cycle of dependence at play in this region—harnessing the power, expertise, and motivation of the diaspora is essential for the interests of actors on both continents. EU projects and dialogues that do not include African diasporas and their HTAs may not adequately address the phenomena occurring in regions such as rural Senegal. Building on migrant-led development work is a crucial step in changing conditions that contribute to emigration from this region.
#Sénégal #développement #migrations #remittances #France #politique_migratoire #associations_locales
Scirocco : A Case Against Deportations
EU governments are implementing security-oriented policies to govern migration. Higher walls, more controls, detention, expulsion. Deporting migrants to their country of origin will not tackle nor change people’s needs to migrate. Tunisians re-migrate to Italy short after being deported, as the uncertainty of travel is preferred to the certainty of unemployment and poverty.
This animation tells the story of one to show the movement of many.
Deportation is no deterrent to migration.
Deportation is no deterrent to migration - témoignage d’un migrant sfaxien rencontré à Briancon en janvier 2018 : « J’ai traversé la mer sept fois. Au début j’ai été renvoyé encore et encore. La septième fois le policier italien m’a dit ’Toi encore ? Vas-y ! On ne veut plus te voir ici’ et il m’a laissé rentrer en Italie »
Migration data portal
Created for journalists and others interested in migration, the Global Migration Data Portal makes migration data, data sources and topics more accessible and understandable. Launched in December 2017 and administered by IOM’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, the Portal brings together key facts and figures about global migration trends and topics in one place and communicates global data on migration through visualizations, infographics and videos.
#portail #statistiques #chiffres #base_de_données #trafic_d'êtres_humains #monde #disparitions #morts #décès #réfugiés_environnementaux #réfugiés_climatiques #migrations_forcées #IDPs #déplacés_internes #migrations #asile #réfugiés #étudiants_internationaux #migration_de_retour #smuggling #passeurs #genre #intégration #santé #diaspora #remittances #droits_des_migrants #SDG #sustainable_development_goals #global_compact #opinion_publique
Les migrations au service de la transformation structurelle
Les images de milliers de jeunes Africains se noyant dans la Méditerranée, après avoir été poussés par la pauvreté et la guerre à quitter leur pays et avoir été attirés à l’étranger par l’espoir de trouver un emploi, ont nourri l’idée trompeuse que les migrations étaient plus un mal qu’un bien pour le continent africain. La dernière livraison de la publication phare de la #CNUCED.
Le #développement_économique en Afrique s’attaque à ce préjugé et, par l’observation des faits, met en évidence des stratégies qui permettront de tirer parti des migrations africaines et d’atténuer leurs effets négatifs.
En cette année 2018, la communauté internationale a l’occasion exceptionnelle de conclure le premier pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières. Le Rapport 2018 sur le développement économique en Afrique : « Les migrations au service de la transformation structurelle » est la contribution de la CNUCED à l’élaboration de cet accord intergouvernemental historique, en cours de négociation sous les auspices de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
Les migrations sont bénéfiques à la fois aux pays d’origine et aux pays de destination. Comme il ressort du rapport, elles peuvent jouer un rôle clef dans la transformation structurelle du continent africain. Bien gérées, elles sont aussi un bon moyen de faciliter la réalisation des objectifs de développement durable, en Afrique et dans le reste du monde.
Par une mise en récit innovante et centrée sur l’être humain, le rapport de la CNUCED cherche à déterminer comment les migrants favorisent la transformation structurelle et recense les possibilités pour cette #main-d'œuvre excédentaire d’être absorbée par les différents secteurs économiques à l’échelle du continent. Les migrants africains comptent des personnes de tout niveau de qualification, qui quittent leur pays par des voies légales ou par d’autres moyens. Non seulement ils remédient au déficit de #compétences dans leurs pays de destination, mais aussi ils contribuent au #développement dans leurs pays d’origine.
Grâce à leur parent migrant, les enfants restés au pays reçoivent souvent une meilleure #éducation que leurs camarades. Les liens créés par les migrants entre leur pays d’origine et leur pays de destination ont permis l’apparition de diasporas prospères. Ils ont aussi ouvert de nouvelles perspectives de #commerce et d’#investissement qui peuvent aider les pays de destination et les pays d’origine à diversifier leur économie et à s’orienter vers des activités productives à plus grande valeur ajoutée.
Contrairement à ce que certains pensent, la plupart des flux migratoires africains sont circonscrits à l’intérieur du continent. Selon le présent rapport, ces #migrations_intra-africaines sont indispensables au renforcement de l’intégration de la région et du continent. Dans le même temps, les grands schémas des migrations extracontinentales confirment que les migrants concourent à la transformation structurelle des pays d’origine.
Nous avons la conviction que le présent rapport propose des axes de réflexion nouveaux et innovants, pertinents à la fois pour l’élaboration de politiques à long terme et pour la conception de projets de coopération technique axés sur la demande et à plus court terme, et qu’il aidera les pouvoirs publics et les autres parties prenantes à décider en connaissance de cause des politiques migratoires à appliquer dans le cadre du processus africain d’intégration régionale.
Quelques infographies intéressantes :
Pour télécharger le rapport :
Many more to come? Migration from and within Africa
The report provides an analysis of the past of African migration; the present patterns of migration within and from Africa; the individual intentions to migrate; the macro drivers of migration within and from Africa; the potential impacts of demography and development on migration within and from Africa in a medium term perspective. The main conclusion of this analysis in response to the question in the title of this science for policy report ‘Many more to come?’ is that at the moment there are no signs of an imminent exodus but that in a medium term perspective both development and demographic factors are likely to determine an increase of migratory pressure from Africa. What is not known is if this migratory pressure will manifest itself mostly within Africa or whether it will ’spill over’ in international migrations directed in particular towards Europe due to geographical proximity and existing economic and migration ties.
Pour télécharger le #rapport:
Quelques sélections d’infographies:
Remittance markets and opportunities Asia and the Pacific
Desperate Journeys - January 2017 to March 2018
This report provides a brief overview of trends of movements by refugees and migrants to and through Europe in 2017, highlights some of the key protection challenges associated with these desperate journeys and concludes with recommendations.
Viaggi Disperati: nel rapporto dell’UNHCR una panoramica del cambiamento nei flussi misti verso l’Europa
Nonostante sia diminuito il numero di rifugiati e migranti che lo scorso anno sono entrati in Europa, i pericoli che molti affrontano durante il viaggio sono in alcuni casi aumentati, secondo un nuovo rapporto pubblicato dall’Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati (UNHCR), che illustra il cambiamento dei modelli dei flussi.
Il rapporto Viaggi Disperati rileva come gli arrivi via mare in Italia, provenienti principalmente dalla Libia, siano drasticamente diminuiti dal luglio 2017. Questa tendenza è continuata nei primi tre mesi del 2018, con un calo del 74% rispetto allo scorso anno.
Il viaggio verso l’Italia si è dimostrato sempre più pericoloso: nei primi tre mesi del 2018 il tasso di mortalità tra coloro che partono dalla Libia è salito a 1 decesso ogni 14 persone, rispetto a 1 decesso ogni 29 persone nello stesso periodo del 2017.
Negli ultimi mesi si è inoltre registrato un deterioramento molto preoccupante della salute dei nuovi arrivati dalla Libia: un numero crescente di persone infatti sbarca in precarie condizioni di salute, mostrando segni di estrema debolezza e magrezza.
Mentre il numero complessivo di traversate del Mediterraneo è rimasto molto al di sotto dei livelli del 2016, il rapporto dell’UNHCR rileva anche un aumento degli arrivi in Spagna e in Grecia nell’ultima parte del 2017.
Lo scorso anno, la Spagna ha registrato un aumento del 101% rispetto al 2016, con 28.000 nuovi arrivi. I primi mesi del 2018 mostrano una tendenza simile, con un incremento degli arrivi del 13% rispetto allo scorso anno. A detenere il primato dei flussi migratori sono marocchini e algerini, ma i siriani rimangono il gruppo più numeroso che attraversa le frontiere terrestri della Spagna.
In Grecia, il numero totale di arrivi via mare è diminuito rispetto al 2016; tuttavia si è registrato un aumento del 33% tra maggio e dicembre di quest’anno con 24.600 arrivi rispetto ai 18.300 nello stesso periodo del 2016. La maggior parte proveniva da Siria, Iraq e Afghanistan, compreso un elevato numero di famiglie con bambini. I richiedenti asilo sbarcati in Grecia hanno affrontato lunghi periodi di permanenza sulle isole greche in condizioni drammatiche e di sovraffollamento.
A causa delle maggiori restrizioni imposte in Ungheria, molti rifugiati e migranti ricorrono a rotte alternative per spostarsi all’interno dell’Europa. Ad esempio, alcuni entrano in Romania dalla Serbia, mentre altri partono dalla Grecia e attraversano l’Albania, il Montenegro e la Bosnia-Erzegovina per arrivare in Croazia.
“Per rifugiati e migranti viaggiare verso l’Europa e al suo interno continua a essere molto pericoloso,” ha riferito Pascale Moreau, Direttrice dell’Ufficio per l’Europa dell’UNHCR. Si stima che oltre 3.100 persone abbiano perso la vita in mare l’anno scorso lungo le rotte verso l’Europa, rispetto alle 5.100 del 2016. Altre 501 persone sono morte o risultano disperse dall’inizio del 2018.
Oltre ai decessi in mare, nel 2017 ci sono state almeno altre 75 persone lungo le rotte terrestri che hanno perso la vita alle frontiere esterne dell’Europa o durante il viaggio in Europa, insieme a continue e preoccupanti segnalazioni di respingimenti.
“L’accesso al territorio e a procedure di asilo rapide, eque ed efficienti per chi cerca protezione internazionale sono fondamentali. Gestire le frontiere e garantire protezione ai rifugiati in conformità agli obblighi internazionali degli Stati non si escludono a vicenda né sono incompatibili,” ha dichiarato Moreau.
Il rapporto dell’UNHCR sottolinea anche gli abusi e le estorsioni subite da rifugiati e migranti per mano di trafficanti, contrabbandieri o gruppi armati lungo varie rotte verso l’Europa.
Le donne, soprattutto quelle che viaggiano da sole, e i minori non accompagnati rimangono particolarmente esposti al rischio di violenza sessuale e di genere lungo le rotte verso l’Europa e in alcune località all’interno dell’Europa.
Nel 2017, oltre 17.000 minori non accompagnati sono entrati in Europa. La maggior parte è arrivata via mare in Italia, dove il 13% di tutti gli arrivi è costituito da bambini che viaggiano da soli, una tendenza simile al 2016.
Il rapporto dell’UNHCR mostra tuttavia alcuni progressi positivi nel numero di persone reinsediate in Europa lo scorso anno, con un aumento del 54% dal 2016. La maggior parte di questi 26.400 rifugiati erano di nazionalità siriana (84%) e sono stati reinsediati dalla Turchia, dal Libano e dalla Giordania. Tra i Paesi europei, il Regno Unito, la Svezia e la Germania hanno accolto il maggior numero di rifugiati attraverso il programma del reinsediamento.
Un altro sviluppo positivo si è registrato alla fine dello scorso anno, quando l’UNHCR ha iniziato a favorire l’evacuazione dei rifugiati vulnerabili dalla Libia al Niger e dalla Libia verso l’Italia.
“Le operazioni di evacuazione dalla Libia e le maggiori opportunità di reinsediamento che abbiamo visto l’anno scorso sono ottime notizie. Restano ancora seri ostacoli che limitano l’accesso a percorsi sicuri e legali, incluso il ricongiungimento familiare, per le persone bisognose di protezione internazionale e chiediamo pertanto più solidarietà,” ha dichiarato Pascale Moreau.
Il rapporto fornisce infine raccomandazioni supplementari in merito alla necessità di rafforzare la solidarietà tra gli Stati in Europa e con i Paesi di primo asilo e di transito, per migliorare la qualità dell’accoglienza, specialmente nel caso di minori non accompagnati e separati e persone sopravvissute a violenza sessuale e di genere, e per garantire una migliore protezione dei bambini.
nei primi tre mesi del 2018 il tasso di mortalità tra coloro che partono dalla Libia è salito a 1 decesso ogni 14 persone, rispetto a 1 decesso ogni 29 persone nello stesso periodo del 2017.
Si stima che oltre 3.100 persone abbiano perso la vita in mare l’anno scorso lungo le rotte verso l’Europa, rispetto alle 5.100 del 2016. Altre 501 persone sono morte o risultano disperse dall’inizio del 2018.
Nel 2017, oltre 17.000 minori non accompagnati sono entrati in Europa. La maggior parte è arrivata via mare in Italia, dove il 13% di tutti gli arrivi è costituito da bambini che viaggiano da soli, una tendenza simile al 2016.
Annual Report on Migration and Asylum #2017
#arrivées #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés #retours #renvois #expulsions #intégration #regroupement_familial #visas #relocalisation #réinstallation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières_extérieures #remittances #développement #brain_drain #diasporas #taux_de_reconnaissance
The $582bn Industry Thriving on Hidden Fees
In recent years, the introduction of modern technology has powered the rate at which our lives became globalised. Inventions that we now take for granted, such as the commercial airliner, have changed the way we see the world; bringing distant communities closer together. The arrival of the mobile phone, for example, has changed the way we communicate, dismissing distance as an obstruction. These technologies, and many more, have spurred the development of a truly global community. Borders have become more open as people from all backgrounds are free to relocate to practically anywhere. While many industries have evolved quickly in order to assist globalisation, a fundamental industry has remained outdated, and it’s a big one.Whether you’re supporting a family member who’s studying (...)
La force cachée de l’économie globale : les envois d’#argent à la famille
En 2013, les migrants internationaux ont envoyé 413 milliards de dollars chez eux, à leurs familles - soit trois fois plus que le total de l’aide étrangère globale (environ 135 milliards de dollars). Cet argent, connu sous le nom de versements, change la vie de ceux qui le reçoivent et joue un rôle considérable dans l’économie de nombreux pays. L’économiste #Dilip_Ratha raconte la promesse de ces dollars « emballés avec amour » et analyse la manière dont ils sont régis par des règles et des pratiques qui les étouffent.
Gambian migrants’ choice: bury the straggler alive or be killed
Water was running low as the convoy drove through the desert into Libya, so Khadim was given a terrible choice: bury a sickly fellow migrant alive, or be killed by their smugglers.
“They told us to bury him in the sand,” said Khadim, 29. “They started waving their guns. ‘If you refuse, you’re dead.’ We started digging and digging. As we buried him he said, ‘I’m not dead yet, why are you doing this to me?’ ”
Khadim is one of about 2,600 migrants repatriated to the Gambia from Libya on flights paid for by European countries trying to stem crossings of the Mediterranean. The vast majority of those coming home are young men, who arrive at Banjul airport with at most a few belongings in a plastic bag, sometimes after spending years in Libyan detention centres.
They are the among the first to be sent back since footage emerged in November of migrants being sold at slave markets in Libya. African and EU leaders agreed an emergency plan shortly afterwards to repatriate thousands.
Many tell stories of frequent beatings, or of fellow migrants dying from hunger or violence. Others described watching companions drown on sinking boats in the Mediterranean.
Like many others, Khadim was betrayed by smugglers and drivers before he saw the sea. He was kidnapped for ransom, arrested and put in a detention centre before he could reach Tripoli.
He is relieved to have landed back in Banjul, the Gambian capital. Not only is he alive but there are promises of money to help him make a fresh start.
The UN’s migration agency, as part of an EU-funded plan, can support people to go to college, start a business or buy livestock. Other EU help offers grants to those aged 15 to 35, returning or potential migrants, to start businesses.
It likely to be just the beginning. The International Organisation for Migration estimates that up to a million migrants remain in Libya. Since late 2015, the EU has spent more than €2 billion in African countries trying to create jobs in the hope that people will stay.
Those returning to the Gambia, where almost half of the two million population live below the poverty line, are provided with just enough cash to go home and live for a few weeks, after which they can apply for more help.
Last week, a group of former Gambian migrants, with some funding from the German government, began touring the country to warn young people of the dangers of taking the “back way”, as the journey through the desert and across the Mediterranean is called.
“Before we go we knew the risks involved, but we didn’t believe,” said Mustapha Sallah. “Most of the people that talked to us were government officials, activists who are living good. I was thinking they were just trying to discourage us.”
With fellow Gambians who were incarcerated in Libyan detention centres, he has now started Youths Against Irregular Migration. As well as sharing their harrowing experiences, they try to persuade people to stop dreaming of Europe and make a living at home, through education, setting up in business, or agriculture.
The Gambia’s nascent democracy, restored after the former dictator Yahya Jammeh was deposed last year, has prompted many to return from exile, as the fear of arbitrary arrest, detention and torture dissolved.
The economy is growing at about 5 per cent but youth unemployment is about 44 per cent. Rising food prices mean many struggle. “The opportunities are not many and they’re not easy to get right now,” said Mr Sallah.
Paul Jatta, 23, came home on a repatriation flight a few months ago and is trying to put the trauma behind him. Three times he tried and failed to cross to Italy in flimsy boats. On the last attempt he watched five people die as the vessel started to sink. “I seriously cried that day. Because I saw them drown but I couldn’t do anything to help,” he said.
He said he had not received any support and was back doing what he used to, working in a computer repair shop and cleaning swimming pools in his spare time. He works up to 12 hours a day most days but earns less than £100 a month, and most of that goes to support his extended family.
After spending his savings of more than £1,000 trying to reach Europe, he is now in a worse financial situation than he was two years ago, and has even less to lose. “I still want to go to Europe. I’m waiting for a miracle,” he said. “There are no opportunities here.”
#retour_volontaire #Libye #asile #migrations #réfugiés #retour_au_pays #renvois #Gambie
Possible/probable future #migrerrance:
After spending his savings of more than £1,000 trying to reach Europe, he is now in a worse financial situation than he was two years ago, and has even less to lose. “I still want to go to Europe. I’m waiting for a miracle,” he said. “There are no opportunities here.”
Freed from Libyan jails, frustrated migrants pose challenge to new Gambia
Thousands of thwarted migrants are returning to Gambia, straining its government as officials scramble to get European-funded reintegration projects up and running
Gambia’s Migration Paradox: The Horror and Promise of the Back Way
Since democracy returned to The Gambia last year, many Gambians are coming home, including from Libya with E.U. aid. Some returnees are warning others against the journey, but many are frustrated that returns and deterrence took precedence over reintegration and jobs.
By November 2017, IOM received 3.9 million euro ($4.8 million) for a three-year returns and reintegration project in The Gambia, part of a region-wide project funded by the E.U. Trust Fund for Africa (#EUTF). IOM’s office in Banjul only had two staff before the EUTF project; it now has around two dozen.
In the year since February 2017, some 2,210 Gambian migrants returned from Libya and 520 others from Niger with IOM assistance. Among them, 1,375 arrived under the new EUTF project.
The deportation of Gambians from E.U. countries remained stubbornly low under the Jammeh government: 12,000 Gambians arrived in Italy in 2016 and just 15 returned, according to latest available Eurostat figures. (2017 figures reflecting the returns under the Barrow government will be published in May.)
Gambie : back home
Ils s’appellent Mustapha et Karamo. Torturés, réduits en esclavage, ils ont vécu les pires sévices en essayant de se rendre en Europe.
Dans une geôle libyenne, ils se font fait une promesse : celle de rentrer chez eux et de dissuader leurs compatriotes de se rendre en Europe de façon illégale à travers le « #backway », cette route de tous les périls qui passe par la Libye. Des centaines de Gambiens y ont perdu la vie. La Gambie, ex-colonie britannique, est le plus petit pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest. C’est pourtant l’un des plus importants contributeurs au flot de migrants traversant la Méditerranée.
Une quinzaine d’ex-migrants bénévoles, parcourt en caravane les régions rurales du nord du pays. Là où sévissent la pauvreté et le chômage, là où les enfants grandissent avec la seule perspective de quitter leur pays. Dans des écoles, au cours de séances de cinéma en plein air ou encore lors de rencontres avec les chefs locaux, les rapatriés vont partager leur calvaire pour essayer de mettre un terme à cette hémorragie humaine. Ils espèrent aussi convaincre les forces vives du pays du potentiel de cette « Nouvelle Gambie » et des ressources à développer.
Mais la route risque d’être longue. Malgré la récente stabilité politique, les promesses d’essor économique du nouveau gouvernement et les aides internationales, les changements radicaux se font attendre. Le tourisme et l’agriculture, asphyxiés par l’ancienne dictature de Jammeh, ne suffisent pas à donner de perspectives à cette nouvelle génération.
G20: Launch of Africa Partnership and supporting protection in “regions of origin”
Last week’s G20 meeting concluded with two initiatives towards migration and displacement. The first is the launch of the #G20_Africa_Partnership, the second, a commitment to step up “Coordination and Cooperation on Displacement and Migration.”
Among the objectives of the G20 Africa Partnership is to address root causes of migration by improving inclusive economic growth and employment, developing quality infrastructure, especially in the energy sector and strengthening the framework for private finance in the form of investment compacts. Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia have already presented their commitments for entering “#Investment_Compacts.”
The G20 Africa partnership has received criticism among others by Barbara Sennholz- Weihard of Oxfam Germany who stated: “The narrative is: More investment will lead to jobs being created and then people stay in their home countries. However, it is wrong to see private investment and development cooperation as a way to contain migration. (As it) dismisses many lessons learned during the past decades on how sustainable development cooperation should be done. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that migration makes a positive contribution to development due to migrants’ #remittances.”
#externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Afrique #G20 #développement #investissements #infrastructure #croissance_économique #économie #travail #énergie #emploi #remises
Des « bonnes asiatiques » victimes malgré elles d’un système bien rôdé
Incitées à s’exiler pour travailler comme domestiques, des millions de femmes se retrouvent réduites à une forme d’esclavage moderne, invisible et impuni, encouragée par les Etats eux-mêmes.
#travail #travail_domestique #esclavage #femmes #migrations #film #documentaire #remittances #remises #esclavage_moderne
Petit guide – Lutter contre les préjugés sur les migrants
La Cimade, le 12 octobre 2016
Much of What We Think We Know Is Wrong
The debate over migration is plagued by a variety of inaccuracies and misunderstandings — on both the right and the left. Here is what the research really shows.