#saf

Oups ... Je pensais avoir effacé ce post. Je trouvais que c’était pénible à lire avec tous ces acronymes. Faudra que je liste tout ça en en faisant un glossaire.

Sinon, rien de bien nouveau dans le monde des transports aériens à part qu’il faudrait que ça « décroisse » puisque :

Même si l’on ignore le (pourtant très important) sujet de justice sociale (est-il légitime d’utiliser de précieuses ressources pour l’aérien alors que 80% des gens ne prennent jamais l’avion), le SAF, d’un point de vue purement environnemental, prête clairement à débat

Au nom de Safia

Une interview inachevée de son père Tayeb Kessas en février 2019 a laissé des questions en suspens. Dans cet échange, l’ombre d’une autre Safia, sa tante, est apparue. Les circonstances de sa mort lors de la guerre d’indépendance algérienne sont restées extrêmement floues.

Il y autour de cette disparition un immense voile de mystère, le poids du #silence, de la mémoire brouillée.

À partir de ce fragment d’histoire familiale que l’autrice porte sur sa carte d’identité, cette série documentaire part sur les #traces de cette autre Safia, sa tante, pour tenter de retracer le fil de cette femme, une vie qui, comme tant d’autres lors de la guerre d’indépendance algérienne, a été silenciée.

Alors qu’on célèbre cette année les 60 ans de l’indépendance de l’Algérie, et pour raconter cette histoire du brouillage mémoriel, de cette #non-transmission de l’histoire, des non-dits, ou des effacements de mémoire, Safia part à la recherche de sa propre histoire familiale pour contrer la transmission des #silences et faire éclore la #vérité, parfois contre les versions officielles de l’Histoire.

▻https://www.binge.audio/podcast/programme-b/au-nom-de-safia
#podcast #audio

Stop considering Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco “safe” countries!

Today, the European Commission is proposing to establish a first  EU list of safe countries of origin, including Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. EuroMed Rights strongly opposes the concept of “safe country of origin” and “safe third country” and is very much concerned about the EU’s move to label 7 countries as “safe countries of origin”. Here’s why this proposal is deeply problematic – and how it risks undermining migrants’ rights.

This practice significantly undermines the prospects for persons in need of international protection to actually receive it in the EU. It places a greater burden of proof on applicants and subjects them to expedited procedures that may violate their rights as outlined in the Refugee Convention. This includes their entitlement to a fair and efficient asylum process.

The decision goes far beyond asylum policy – it also has significant political implications. Designating these countries as safe opens the door to agreements that would make them “safe third countries” too. Under the revised return framework, this could allow the Member States to deport other migrants there — even if they’ve never lived in or passed through them.

The list includes Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt — countries with well-documented rights abuses and limited protections for both their own citizens and migrants. Labelling them “safe” is misleading — and dangerous.

With an estimated 60 thousand political detainees in Egypt, the country remains a “republic of fear” where anyone is at risk of serious human rights violations for expressing dissent, supporting anyone criticizing President El-Sisi or the regime. “The authorities are systematically targeting, intimidating and harassing human rights defenders, asylum seekers, migrants and refugees, lawyers, journalists, bloggers, academics, artists, politicians, students, other activists and their relatives, for peacefully exercising their rights. This repression even extends beyond national borders”, says Moataz El Fegiery, EuroMed Rights’ Vice-President and president of the Egyptian Human Rights Forum (EHRF).

In Tunisia, the authoritarian grip of President Kais Saied has exacerbated the crackdown on political opponents and civil society organisations, while fuelling a hate campaign and physical violence against migrants and refugees. “By arresting opposition figures and misusing the criminal justice system, including extended pre-trial detention periods, to stifle freedom of expression and quash political dissent, the Tunisian authorities are violating international human rights law”, says Monia Ben Jemia, EuroMed Rights’ President.

In Morocco, serious concerns persist around freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and rights of assembly and association. Journalists, activists and protesters are and can still be harassed or imprisoned. When it comes to refugees and migrants, Morocco cannot be considered “safe” as it fails to uphold the fundamental rights of all individuals on its soil. “The living conditions of migrants, often precarious and dangerous, reflect a failure to provide a safe and dignified environment. Makeshift camps, violence, and limited access to essential services such as health and education highlight an inability to protect the most vulnerable”, says Khadija Ainani, Member of EuroMed Rights Executive Committee and Vice-President of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH).

EuroMed Rights calls on the EU and its Member States to reconsider the decision and remove Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia from their lists of “safe countries of origin” and “safe third countries”. The serious human rights concerns outlined above must be central to the EU’s assessment and lead to, ultimately, the abandonment of the listing of countries of origin or third countries as “safe” altogether.

▻https://euromedrights.org/publication/stop-considering-egypt-tunisia-and-morocco-safe-countries

L’UE publie sa première liste commune des pays tiers d’origine sûrs : un tournant dangereux pour le droit d’asile

Ce 16 avril, la Commission européenne a proposé une liste commune de «  pays tiers d’origine sûrs »* qui une fois finalisée et adoptée par le Conseil et le Parlement européens sera applicable à l’ensemble des États membres. Une première dans l’histoire de la politique d’asile de l’Union. La Tunisie, le Maroc et l’Egypte y sont cités, suscitant de vives critiques de la part des organisations de défense des droits humains et du CNCD-11.11.11.

Auparavant, chaque Etat membre de l’UE disposait de sa liste nationale, permettant de traiter de façon accélérée les demandes d’asile en se basant sur le fait que ces pays sont sûrs et que les ressortissants de ces pays n’ont pas besoin de protection internationale. A l’avenir, une liste commune contraignante à l’ensemble des Etats membres sera intégrée dans le droit européen. L’UE prétend ainsi harmoniser ses politiques d’asile. En réalité, elle donne un blanc-seing aux Etats membres pour vider de sa substance le droit d’asile.

Selon Cécile Vanderstappen, chargée de plaidoyer sur la justice migratoire au CNCD-11.11.11, « classer un pays comme “sûr”, c’est fermer les yeux sur la réalité. En Égypte, en Tunisie, au Maroc, les droits humains sont piétinés. Où est la “sûreté” dont parle l’Europe ? »

En adoptant cette liste commune, l’Union européenne prend le risque de banaliser les violations des droits humains dont les persécutions et les traitements inhumains et dégradants dans des pays tiers qualifiés à tort de « sûrs ».

Cette mesure s’inscrit dans une logique plus large d’externalisation et de durcissement des politiques migratoires, au mépris des engagements internationaux en matière de protection des personnes réfugiées. C’est également le cas avec le concept de « pays tiers sûrs » actuellement en cours de révision et qui vise ici à permettre aux Etats membres de renvoyer des personnes demandeuses d’asile dans des « pays tiers sûrs » pouvant traiter leur demande d’asile et leur accorder une protection si besoin. Il est également question de pouvoir renvoyer des personnes migrantes dans des « hubs de retours » dans ces mêmes pays tiers sûrs

Les listes de « pays tiers d’origine sûr » permettent aux Etats membres européens d’accélérer le traitement des demandes d’asile, partant du principe que les ressortissants de ces pays n’ont pas besoin de protection internationale. Cela diminue les garanties d’une procédure équitable et d’un examen de qualité des demandes de protection. La liste européenne sera finalisée d’ici le 12 juin 2025 et ajoutée au corpus législatif du Pacte UE sur la migration et l’asile récemment adopté en 2024.

Le concept de « pays tiers sûr » permet de renvoyer les demandeurs d’asile dans un pays tiers jugé « sûr » plutôt que de leur permettre de rester dans le pays où la demande a été déposée. Ce concept est envisagé dans le cadre de l’externalisation de la gestion des questions migratoires. Il est révisé actuellement au sein de la réforme de la Directive retour et de la mise en œuvre du Pacte UE sur la migration et l’asile dès 2026 (Règlement sur les procédures). Une liste de pays tiers sûrs sera également proposée par la Commission d’ici le 12 juin 2025.

L’Egypte n’est sûre ni pour les voix critiques du pouvoir, ni pour les personnes migrantes. La dernière élection présidentielle en décembre 2023 s’est tenue dans un climat de répression de l’opposition. De nombreux défenseurs des droits humains, avocats, journalistes continuent d’être arbitrairement emprisonnés. Les personnes migrantes, en particulier les Soudanais et Soudanaises qui sont 1,5 million à chercher un refuge en Egypte, font face à des nombreuses difficultés pour obtenir un droit de séjour. Elles risquent souvent d’être refoulées et vivent dans des conditions déplorables.

En Tunisie, le président Kais Saied a suspendu le parlement depuis le 25 juillet 2021, et gouverne depuis lors par décrets. Les attaques de plus en plus nombreuses contre la magistrature, la société civile, les médias démontrent en outre une véritable dérive autoritaire du pays. Le 21 février 2023, Kais Saied a prononcé un discours raciste qui entraine depuis lors répression et racisme contre les personnes afrodescendantes et les organisations qui les défendent. Les personnes migrantes d’origine sub-saharienne sont régulièrement déportées aux frontières par les autorités tunisiennes, et laissées à elles-mêmes dans le désert.

Au Maroc enfin, la liberté d’expression est particulièrement mise à mal. Journalistes, leaders des mouvements sociaux et autres voix critiques font régulièrement face à des arrestations arbitraires et des procès iniques destinés à les faire taire. Les droits des personnes migrantes sont également régulièrement bafoués : lenteur et lacunes de la politique d’asile, détentions et refoulements aux frontières. L’impunité prévaut encore pour le massacre des 37 migrants et migrantes qui avaient tenté de franchir la frontière entre le Maroc et l’enclave espagnole de Melilla le 24 juin 2022.

▻https://www.cncd.be/L-UE-publie-sa-premiere-liste

Jumping the Gun? The proposed early application of some of the EU’s new asylum pact – and a common list of supposedly ‘safe countries of origin’

The EU’s asylum pact was adopted less a year ago, and mostly won’t apply for over another year – and yet the EU Commission has already proposed to amend it, in order to bring forward some of the rules in the procedural part of the pact, and to adopt a common list of ‘safe countries of origin’ to apply when the rest of the pact enters into force. The aim is to speed up consideration of asylum claims, and in particular to help to ‘save’ the Italy/Albania deal on asylum processing. The following blog post looks in turn at the background to the new proposal, and then the different elements of it, followed by an assessment.

Background

Previous and current rules

Initially, the concept of ‘safe countries of origin’ goes back, at EU-wide level, to ‘soft law’ adopted in the early 1990s (one of the ‘London Resolutions’ of 1992). Subsequently, the principle took on binding legal form at EU level in the first-phase 2005 asylum procedures Directive, which provided for an option for Member States to accelerate considering asylum applications (albeit in accordance with the usual procedural rules), inter alia where the applicant is from a ‘safe country of origin’, as further defined. (Note that these rules refer to non-EU countries of origin; there is a separate, stricter set of rules setting out the near-impossibility of EU citizens making asylum applications in other Member States, because each EU Member State is considered to be a ‘safe country of origin’ too, according to a protocol attached to the EU Treaties).

Currently, a revised version of the principle is set out in the second-phase asylum procedures Directive, adopted in 2013 (the ‘2013 Directive’). Unlike the 2005 Directive, there is no longer a reference to potentially treating only part of a country as ‘safe’, and the previous option for Member States to retain pre-existing lower standards on this issue (along with pre-existing rules on designating part of a country as ‘safe’, or as ‘safe’ for groups of people) was dropped.

The CJEU has ruled on these provisions twice. First, the Court confirmed that Member States had to provide for a ‘safe countries of origin’ rule in national law if they wanted to use apply this principle. Secondly, in October 2024 the Court interpreted the substance of the rule, in particular confirming that it was no longer possible to designate part of country of origin as ‘safe’, given that the EU legislator had dropped that possibility from the text of the 2013 Directive, as compared to the 2005 Directive (see further discussion of that judgment here).

Given that the Italy/Albania treaty on housing asylum applicants in Albania only applied (at least initially) to asylum-seekers from supposed ‘safe countries of origin’, this created a number of potential barriers to the application of that treaty, with multiple Italian courts sending a questions to the CJEU about the rule. The CJEU has fast-tracked two of these cases – Alace and Canpelli – which raise questions in particular about whether Member States can designate a country of origin as ‘safe’ with exceptions for certain groups, and also whether they can designate such countries by means of legislation and must publish the sources of their assessment when they do so. (The case is pending: see earlier blog posts on the background, the hearing, and the Advocate-General’s opinion)

Future rules

The 2024 asylum procedures Regulation (the ‘2024 Regulation’) has amended the ‘safe country of origin’ rules again, although as things stand the 2024 Regulation is only applicable to applications made after June 2026. This upcoming version retains many of the current features of the ‘safe country of origin’ concept (which are set out in more detail below): the definition of human rights standards which must apply before a country can be designated as ‘safe’; the procedure for designation (laying out the sources of information which must be taken into account); and the safeguards (the asylum-seeker must be a national of or a stateless person habitually resident in the country concerned, and must have the possibility to rebut the presumption of safety in their particular circumstances).

But there are several changes in the 2024 Regulation. In particular, it will now again expressly be possible to create an exception to the designation of ‘safety’ for ‘specific parts’ of the non-EU country’s territory and (not only in the context of pre-existing law) for ‘clearly identifiable categories of persons’.

More broadly, the ‘safe country of origin’ rule will remain on the list of possible accelerated procedures, but there is more harmonisation of the rules on time limits and appeals in these cases. There is also a potentially overlapping new ground of accelerated procedures where the country of origin has an international protection recognition rate below 20% at first instance (based on the latest annual Eurostat data), although this is subject to some safeguards, discussed further below.

Another important new development in the 2024 Regulation is the possibility to adopt a common EU list of ‘safe countries of origin’ (there were two earlier failed attempts to do this; see my previous blog post). According to Article 62(1) of the Regulation in its current form, the EU common list must be subject to the same rules as the national list (‘in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 61’). The Commission has to review the EU list with the assistance of the EU Asylum Agency, on the basis of the sources of information applicable to Member States drawing up their lists (Article 62(2)). Also, the EU Asylum Agency must provide information to the Commission when it draws up proposals for the common EU list (Article 62(3); the list must be adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure, ie a qualified majority of Member States, in agreement with the European Parliament). If there are ‘significant changes’ in a country on the common EU list, the Commission must conduct a ‘substantiated assessment’ of the situation in light of the ‘safe country of origin’ criteria, and can suspend a country from the list on a fast-track basis.

As for Member States, they can still designate additional countries as ‘safe countries of origin’, even if those countries are not on the common EU list. But if a country is suspended from the common EU list, Member States need the Commission’s approval to put that country back on a national list for the following two years.

The new proposal

The new proposal has two main elements, each of which can be broken down into two sub-elements. First of all, it would bring forward some of the rules in the 2024 Regulation. This would apply to aspects of the ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘safe third country’ rules on the one hand (which would apply when the newly proposed Regulation, once adopted, enters into force), and to the ‘low recognition rate’ ground of accelerated proceedings on the other (which Member States could apply before the asylum pact otherwise applies).

Secondly, it would establish a common EU list of ‘safe countries of origin’ that would apply as from the main 2026 date to apply the 2024 Regulation as a whole. This would include both candidate countries for accession to the EU (which would be subject to a new set of special rules) and a further list of seven countries to be regarded as ‘safe countries of origin’.

The proposal would apply to all Member States except Denmark and possibly Ireland, which could opt in or out (so far, Ireland has adopted into all of the asylum pact measures that it could). It would not apply to non-EU countries associated with Schengen.

Earlier application of the asylum pact

‘Safe country’ rules

The proposal would allow the earlier application of key changes to the ‘safe country of origin’ rules set out in the 2024 Regulation, as regards creating exceptions to that concept for part of a country, and for groups of people. As noted above, the CJEU has ruled that the former exception cannot apply under the 2013 Directive, while it will soon rule on whether the latter exception can currently be invoked under that Directive. So if the proposal is adopted, the change as regards exceptions for part of a country will definitely overturn the existing case law, while the change as regards exceptions for a group of people will possibly change the existing law, depending on what the Court rules (it’s likely, but not certain, that the judgment will come before the proposal becomes law).

Of course, these changes will apply anyway once the 2024 Regulation applies in June 2026. But some Member States are anxious to be able to apply these exceptions earlier than that, in particular Italy: both the exceptions are very relevant in practice to whether the Italy/Albania asylum deal is workable earlier than next June.

The proposal would also allow the earlier application of the same changes to the ‘safe third country’ rules set out in the 2024 Regulation (ie the rules on whether asylum seekers can be sent to another country, other than an EU Member State or their country of origin, which should decide upon their asylum application). Presumably the Commission assumes that the CJEU, if asked, would also find that there is no exception for parts of a country or groups of people as regards designation of ‘safe third countries’, by analogy with its existing or possible future judgments on ‘safe countries of origin’ under the 2013 Directive.

Note that only some of the new ‘safe third country’ and ‘safe country of origin’ rules in the 2024 Regulation (ie the possible exceptions for parts of countries or groups of people) would apply early. For instance, the prospect of common EU lists for either concept would not apply early; the proposed common ‘safe country of origin’ list, discussed below, would only apply from June 2026, when the 2024 Regulation generally starts to apply. Furthermore, the Commission will likely soon propose further changes to the ‘safe third country’ rules, in a separate proposal: the 2024 Regulation requires a review of those rules by this June.

Low recognition rate rules

In addition to early application of revised versions of current rules, the proposal would also bring forward the application of a brand new rule set out in the 2024 Regulation: the ‘low recognition rate’ rule, on accelerated procedures where the recognition rate (ie the success rate of asylum applications) of a country’s citizens is below 20% at first instance, ie before appeals (even though a proportion of appeals is successful). This also includes most of the safeguards attached to this new rule: it cannot apply if the Member States’ administration ‘assesses that a significant change has occurred in the third country concerned since the publication of the relevant Eurostat data or that the applicant belongs to a category of persons for whom the proportion of 20 % or lower cannot be considered to be representative for their protection needs, taking into account, inter alia, the significant differences between first instance and final decisions’.

The proposal also provides for early application of the same rule (subject to the same safeguards) as regards unaccompanied minors, although the Commission makes no mention of this point, and so provides no justification for it, in its explanatory memorandum.

However, arguably the proposal does not bring forward the rule (as regards both asylum seekers generally and unaccompanied minors in particular) that the assessment of significant changes must take account of any guidance note on the point issued by the EU Asylum Agency.

Also, the proposal does not bring forward other aspects of the 2024 Regulation related to the ‘low recognition rate’ rule. The Commission expressly points out that the rule will remain optional for Member States, until the 2024 Regulation makes it mandatory from June 2026. Furthermore, while the proposal states that the ‘low recognition rate’ rule can be used in special border procedures (in the 2013 Directive version of border procedures, not the 2024 Regulation version of them, until June 2026), it does not include the important exceptions from border procedures set out in the 2024 Regulation.

In particular, that Regulation excludes the border procedure from applying to unaccompanied minors on ‘low recognition rate’ grounds, and also excludes the border procedure from applying to asylum seekers generally where: the rules on accelerated or inadmissible cases do not apply; support cannot be provided to asylum seekers with ‘special reception needs’ or ‘in need of special procedural guarantees’; there are medical grounds; or detention guarantees cannot be complied with. But none of these exceptions are made applicable (prior to June 2026) by the new proposal. This point is particularly relevant to detaining asylum seekers – which is easier to justify legally when the border procedure applies. So the attempt to widen the use of the borders procedure could widen the use of detention.

Common EU list of ‘safe countries of origin’

EU accession candidates

The proposed Regulation would delete the current Article 62(1) of the 2024 Regulation (which requires any common EU list of ‘safe countries of origin’ to comply with the ‘conditions’ relating to that concept set out in Article 61), replacing it with a statement that candidate countries to join the EU (the Commission does not name them, but they are Serbia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, Georgia and Turkey) are ‘designated as safe countries of origin’ at EU level, save in ‘one or more’ of three circumstances:

(a) there is a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict in the country;

(b) restrictive measures within the meaning of Title IV of Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union have been adopted in view of the country’s actions;

(c) the proportion of decisions by the determining authority granting international protection to the applicants from the country - either its nationals or former habitual residents in case of stateless persons – is higher than 20% according to the latest available yearly Union-wide average Eurostat data.

The first of these tests replicates the wording of one of the grounds for ‘subsidiary protection’ in EU law on qualification for status, although there is no cross-reference to that legislation here in this context. Among the candidate countries, the only one which might be subject to this rule is (obviously) Ukraine, as long as the Russian invasion persists. The CJEU has recently been asked whether individual applications for subsidiary protection are even possible given that those fleeing Ukraine have temporary protection; but arguably the wording of the new proposal raises a different issue, because in this context the existence of the threat would be judged as regards the situation in the country concerned more broadly, rather than in the context of an individual application for protection. Also, if the drafters had wanted an exception regarding temporary protection, they would surely have provided for it expressly; and anyway Ukraine will likely be covered by the third test.

The second test refers to EU foreign policy sanctions. A quick look at the EU sanctions database informs us that arguably none of the countries concerned face sanctions because of the country’s actions: the sanctions as regards Ukraine and Moldova relate to the actions of Russia or Kremlin surrogates; the sanctions as regards Mediterranean drilling concern only certain Turkish businesses; and the sanctions relating to Serbia and Montenegro are expressly described as historic (relating to claims as regards the previous Yugoslav war). (The recent EU sanctions against Georgia are a visa measure, not a foreign policy measure).

The third test flips the new ‘low recognition rate’ ground for accelerated procedures, meaning that neither that ground for accelerated procedures nor the ‘safe country of origin’ ground can apply once the recognition rate goes above 20%. Note that this test only takes account of first instance decision-making; if successful appeals take the recognition rate for nationals of a candidate country above 20%, that country nevertheless remains a ‘safe country of origin’ EU wide. Unlike the ‘low recognition rate’ rule as it usually applies, there is no reference to categories of people who have higher recognition rates, taking into account (for instance) appeal decisions. However, arguably ‘significant changes’ in the country concerned must still be considered – in the context of suspending the country concerned from the common EU list, as discussed below.

Applying the third test in practice, the most recent annual Eurostat asylum statistics (2023) show a first-instance recognition rate of 2.8% for Montenegro, 6.4% for Bosnia, 1.9% for Serbia, 0.6% for North Macedonia, 7.8% for Georgia, 10.2% for Albania, 93.8% for Ukraine, 2.6% for Moldova, and 21.1% for Turkey. So on this basis, Ukraine and Turkey will not be on the EU-wide ‘safe country of origin’ list if the proposal is adopted as it stands – although the position might change on the basis of the annual asylum Eurostat statistics for 2024, which will likely be available by the time it is adopted, and the position for each candidate country may change annually after that.

Although the proposal would, in effect, create a distinct rule applicable to candidate countries as far as being ‘safe countries of origin’ is concerned, it still refers to those countries being designated as having that status. So arguably the rules for suspending that designation in the event of ‘significant changes’, and the corollary limits on Member States subsequently placing the suspended countries on their national ‘safe country of origin’ lists, continue to apply – even though these rules refer back to the general rules on designation of ‘safe countries of origin’, rather than the proposed new lex specialis rules for candidate countries (see Articles 63(1) and 64(3) of the 2024 Regulation).

The proposed specific rules for candidate countries as ‘safe countries of origin’ can be compared to the separate set of rules for EU Member States on the same point, referred to above – although the rules for EU Member States remain much more restrictive (it is far harder for nationals of EU Member States to rebut the presumption of safety, for instance; although as they enjoy free movement rights, the need to apply for international protection status to stay in another Member State will usually be immaterial for them)

The Commission’s rationale for the special rules on candidate countries is that they have already gone through a form of screening, when the European Council decided to confirm their status as candidate countries, applying the ‘Copenhagen criteria’: the ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; the ability to take on the obligations of membership’. Therefore the Commission did not assess these countries against the usual criteria to be designated as ‘safe countries of origin’, as the current Article 62(1) of the 2024 Regulation would require; indeed, as noted already, the proposal would replace the current Article 62(1). However, despite the deletion of that provision, the proposed Regulation still assumes (in the preamble) that the safeguards of being a national of the supposed ‘safe country of origin’ (or a stateless person habitually resident there) and the possibility of rebutting the presumption of safety in individual cases continue to apply.

Other countries

The seven other countries to be designated as ‘safe countries of origin’ EU wide are listed in a proposed new Annex to the 2024 Regulation. These countries are Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco and Tunisia. In each case, the Commission’s explanatory memorandum (and the preamble to the proposed Regulation) attempts to justify the inclusion of these countries on the list individually.

According to the Commission, the process to determine the list was based on the EU Asylum Agency, at the request of the Commission (reflecting the role of the Agency in drawing up the proposal for the common EU list, as set out in Article 62(3) of the 2024 Regulation), setting out a methodology:

to support the identification of the countries that could be considered for possible designation as “safe countries of origin” at Union level, including EU candidate countries and one potential candidate; countries of origin that create a significant asylum caseload in the EU with an EU-wide recognition rate of 5% or lower; visa-free countries that create a significant asylum caseload in the EU with an EU-wide recognition rate of 5% or lower; countries that feature in the existing Member States’ lists of “safe countries of origin” [scare quotes added]

The Commission then asked the Agency to produce country of origin information to support the Commission’s assessment; it claims that the Agency’s analysis is based on a wide range of sources:

comprising, but not limited to: European Commission reports, including the EU enlargement reports; reports by the European External Action Service; reports from the EU Agencies (such as the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights); reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international organisations (e.g., the Council of Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) and non-governmental organisations; political analyses from policy and international relations think-tanks; verified online media articles; newspaper articles, as well as national legislation in the countries concerned.

This can be compared to the list of sources referred to in Article 61(3) of the 2024 Regulation:

The assessment of whether a third country is a safe country of origin in accordance with this Regulation shall be based on a range of relevant and available sources of information, including information from Member States, the Asylum Agency, the European External Action Service, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other relevant international organisations, and shall take into account where available the common analysis of the country of origin information referred to in [the Regulation setting up the Agency].

(Note that the Regulation refers to information from the Member States, but the proposal does not refer expressly to using this source for the assessment) That list of sources must be applied to establishing the EU list too, according to the current Article 62(1) of the 2024 Regulation (EU designations must be ‘in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 61’); although, as discussed above, the Commission proposal would delete this provision.

However, in any event it is impossible to assess either the country of origin information or the methodology developed by the Agency, because (at time of writing) the text of these documents is neither supplied by the Commission nor available on the Agency’s website. (There are some country of origin reports for some of the countries on the proposed list on the website, but those reports are outdated: 2016 for the Western Balkans; 2022 for Colombia; and May 2024 – before the demise of the previous government – for Bangladesh) This is in spite of the Advocate-General’s opinion in the pending case of Alace and Canpelli, which argued that Member States’ assessments underlying the designations of ‘safe countries of origin’ had to be public. (The Commission does not tell us whether any additional countries were considered for inclusion on the common list, but rejected)

Instead we have the Commission’s brief summary, starting with the assertion that ‘there is, in general, no risk of persecution or serious harm’ in these countries. This reflects part of the criteria for listing non-EU countries as ‘safe countries of origin’ set out in Article 61(1) of the 2024 Regulation (again, as noted above, the current Article 62(1) of that Regulation requires the common EU list to comply with the ‘conditions’ in Article 61; but the Commission proposes to delete the current Article 62(1)). Those criteria require that assessment to take place ‘on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances’ of the countries concerned; Article 61(4) furthermore requires assessment of the application of national law, whether the country concerned complies with the ECHR or the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the expulsion of citizens to unsafe countries and the existence of effective remedies to protect human rights.

The Commission then assesses each country in turn, summarising such factors as national designations, the recognition rates, human rights treaty status, national legal frameworks, democratic standards, judicial independence and impartiality, removal of citizens to unsafe countries, and the existence of persecution, the death penalty and torture. This assessment broadly reflects the criteria set out in the 2024 Regulation, although ‘recognition rates’ are not expressly referred to as part of the criteria for assessing what is a ‘safe country of origin’ (nor are trade issues or the situation of refugees from other countries, which the Commission raises in some cases).

Each of these countries gets the nod as ‘safe’ despite concerns about threats to some groups of people (such as journalists, LGBT people or women). Despite wanting to allow Member States to create exceptions to their ‘safe’ country lists for groups of people or parts of countries, the Commission does not recommend that the EU have any exceptions for any groups, even though the 2024 Regulation expressly provides that the common EU list can include such exceptions (Article 61(2) of that Regulation), and for every country on the proposed list except Kosovo, the Commission admits that there are ‘specific challenges faced by certain groups in the country which may merit particular attention’, and the preamble to the proposal states that ‘certain categories of applicants may find themselves in a specific situation in the third countries designated and may therefore have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or face a real risk of suffering serious harm’. Similarly, although the Commission notes that there are risks in particular parts of Colombia, it simply suggests that potential asylum-seekers should have moved within that country (known as the ‘internal flight alternative’), rather than propose a territorial exception to the designation of Colombia as ‘safe’.

In light of this, it is questionable why there are no exceptions for groups of people or parts of a country, particularly when the same proposal claims that, for Member States, such exceptions ‘offer means of managing likely unfounded applications efficiently while maintaining necessary legal safeguards’ (my emphasis). It seems that sauce for the Member State goose is not sauce for the EU gander; and in fact, it is arguable that the assessment of the ‘safety’ of the countries concerned is inadequate because it did not consider whether such exceptions should be granted. Of course, human rights NGOs may well have further critiques of the details of the Commission’s brief assessments of ‘safety’.

Conclusions

The new proposal is cynical in many respects. First of all, the Commission wants some restrictive rules from the 2024 Regulation to apply in advance, but not some of the safeguards that apply to them – a form of ‘cherry-picking’. This is particularly relevant to the early use of the ‘low recognition rate’ rule in the context of border procedures, without the safeguards applicable to border procedures in the 2024 Regulation, especially the exemption for unaccompanied minors. In fact, as we have seen, the Commission does not even mention or justify its proposed advance application of these rules to unaccompanied minors – still less its attempt to waive an exception that would otherwise apply to them, even when it means they can be detained.

Secondly, the Commission wants to drop the requirement to apply the usual conditions that apply to designation of ‘safe countries of origin’, not only for candidate countries (which will be subject to special rules of their own) but in general. It is possible that this is simply down to poor legislative drafting, as despite the proposed abolition of the current Article 62(1) of the 2024 Regulation, the preamble to the new proposal assumes that key safeguards continue to apply in the context of the EU common list; and the rules on suspension of designation and the corollary limits on national designation of ‘safe countries of origin’, which refer back to the general rules on designation of ‘safe countries of origin’, expressly continue to apply.

So although it is obviously questionable in principle both to drop the requirement that the common EU list is subject to the same conditions as national lists (a blatant double standard), without even replacing it, and to create a separate rule for candidate countries, the overall impact of this change is blunted. Nevertheless, it would be better in principle to retain a single common standard for designation of ‘safe countries of origin’; it is particularly objectionable to have double standards compared to national lists and even more so, no standards at all for the EU list.

The Commission’s lack of transparency of its sources for assessing the group of countries to go on the common list is likewise questionable; and its treatment of the candidate countries is simply opaque. The countries concerned are not even named, and the Commission offers no interpretation of its proposed new criteria relating to these countries, or a discussion of how they would apply in practice. (The application of the ‘low recognition rate’ rules is also opaque, in the absence of a simple list of the recognition rates by country)

All in all, this proposal is both murky and unprincipled: an unimpressive start to the next phase of EU asylum law.

▻https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2025/04/jumping-gun-proposed-early-application.html

Droit d’asile : en quoi consiste la liste de « pays sûrs » établit par la Commission européenne ?

La Commission européenne a publié, le 16 avril, une liste de sept pays considérés comme sûrs, applicable à tous les États membres - une fois qu’elle sera approuvée par le Parlement et le Conseil de l’UE. Concrètement, qu’est-ce que cela signifie ? Comment cette liste a-t-elle été élaborée ? Quelles conséquences pour les demandeurs d’asile originaires de ces pays ? Entretien avec un porte-parole de la Commission européenne.

Afin d’accélérer le traitement des demandes d’asile, la Commission européenne a publié, mercredi 16 avril, une liste des pays d’origine dits « sûrs » qui englobe le Kosovo, le Bangladesh, la Colombie, l’Egypte, l’Inde, le Maroc et la Tunisie.

Concrètement, les ressortissants de ces pays qui déposeraient une demande d’asile en Europe n’auraient a priori pas le profil pour être éligibles à une protection internationale - puisqu’ils viendraient de ces États considérés comme « sûrs ». InfoMigrants fait le point avec un porte-parole de la Commission européenne.
InfoMigrants : Comment les pays sûrs ont-ils été identifiés par la Commission européenne pour établir cette liste ?

Porte-parole de la Commission européenne : Notre méthodologie, en coopération avec l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile (AUEA) repose sur des critères spécifiques relatifs, comme le nombre d’arrivées irrégulières ou le taux de reconnaissance [des dossiers d’asile].

À la demande de la Commission, l’AUEA a évalué la situation juridique et politique de certains pays, notamment :

- Les pays candidats à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne [comme la Turquie ou la Géorgie, ndlr]. On peut supposer que ces pays, ayant été jugés conformes aux critères de Copenhague pour l’obtention du statut de candidat, remplissent également les critères de désignation comme pays d’origine sûrs.
- Les pays d’origine qui génèrent un nombre important de demandes d’asile dans l’UE et dont le taux de reconnaissance à l’échelle de l’UE est inférieur ou égal à 5 %.
- Les pays exemptés de visa qui génèrent un nombre important de demandes d’asile dans l’UE et dont le taux de reconnaissance à l’échelle de l’UE est inférieur ou égal à 5 %.

Dans ces deux derniers cas, ce sont des pays partenaires où il n’existe généralement aucun risque de persécution ou de préjudice grave, comme le montrent les très faibles taux de reconnaissance des demandes d’asile de leurs citoyens dans les États membres de l’UE.

– Les pays figurant sur les listes des pays d’origine sûrs des États membres.

Chaque État membre a sa propre liste de pays sûrs. Si la liste de l’UE est adoptée par le Parlement européen et les Vingt-Sept, elle serait la première à voir le jour de manière harmonisée à l’échelle européenne : tous les États membres seront censés la respecter.

Suivant cette méthodologie, l’AUEA a préparé des informations détaillées sur les pays d’origine, basées sur diverses sources. Par exemple : les rapports sur l’élargissement de l’UE, les rapports du SEAE [Service européen pour l’action extérieure, ndlr] et des agences de l’UE, dont l’Agence des droits fondamentaux ; les rapports du Haut-commissariat des Nations unies aux réfugiés (HCR) et d’autres organisations internationales, mais aussi d’ONG et de groupes de réflexion.
IM : Cette liste de pays sûrs est-elle immuable ou pourra-t-elle évoluer en fonction de la situation politique dans les États d’origine ?

Porte-parole : La Commission assurera un suivi régulier de la liste de l’UE, tant au niveau opérationnel que politique.

Au niveau politique, la Commission suivra en permanence l’évolution de la situation dans ces pays partenaires.

Si la Commission constate une détérioration significative de la situation d’un pays figurant sur la liste, elle peut suspendre la désignation d’un État comme pays d’origine sûr pour une durée maximale de six mois (renouvelable une fois).

Sur le plan opérationnel, elle sera assistée par l’AUEA, qui surveille en permanence la situation dans les pays d’origine grâce à des mises à jour régulières des informations spécifiques à chaque pays.

Un pays peut être retiré de la liste par une procédure législative ordinaire (proposition de la Commission et codécision).
IM : Concrètement, comment cela va se dérouler pour les personnes originaires de pays dits sûrs qui déposent une demande d’asile dans un État membre de l’UE ?

Porte-parole : En pratique, l’application de cette liste signifie que les États membres procéderont, dans le cadre d’une « procédure accélérée », à une évaluation individuelle des demandes d’asile présentées par les ressortissants de ces pays.

Lors de ces évaluations individuelles, une attention particulière doit être accordée aux demandeurs qui pourraient néanmoins avoir une crainte fondée d’être persécutés ou être exposés à un risque réel de préjudice grave.

Dans le cadre du Pacte [asile et migration, ndlr], l’AUEA sera également chargée de surveiller l’application des règles d’asile, y compris la notion de pays d’origine sûr.

En mai 2024, le Conseil de l’UE a entériné le Pacte asile et migration. Cette vaste réforme qui durcit le contrôle de l’immigration en Europe entrera en vigueur courant 2026. Le Pacte, âprement négocié par les États membres, met en place une procédure de « filtrage » des migrants aux frontières de l’UE pour les identifier et distinguer plus rapidement ceux qui ont des chances d’obtenir l’asile de ceux qui ont vocation à être renvoyés vers leur pays d’origine.

Ceux qui ont statistiquement le moins de chances d’obtenir l’asile seront retenus dans des centres le temps que leur dossier soit examiné de manière « accélérée », six mois maximum. Les autres demandeurs d’asile suivront la procédure classique.

Ce Pacte établit aussi un mécanisme de solidarité entre les Vingt-Sept dans la prise en charge des demandeurs d’asile.
IM : C’est la première fois que l’UE établit une liste de pays sûrs sur les questions d’asile. C’était une mesure importante qu’il fallait mettre en place rapidement ?

Porte-parole : L’application de cette liste est prévue à partir de juillet 2026, date à laquelle le Pacte deviendra applicable dans son ensemble. Mais nous proposons d’accélérer sa mise en œuvre [une fois que ce nouveau texte sera approuvé par le Parlement européen et le Conseil de l’UE, ndlr].

Ainsi, les États membres pourront appliquer la procédure à la frontière ou une procédure accélérée aux personnes provenant de pays où, en moyenne, 20 % ou moins des demandeurs obtiennent une protection internationale dans l’UE.

Toutefois, des exceptions peuvent être prévues pour la désignation de pays tiers sûrs et de pays d’origine sûrs, ce qui confère aux États membres une plus grande flexibilité en excluant des régions spécifiques ou des catégories de personnes clairement identifiables.

►https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/64173/droit-dasile--en-quoi-consiste-la-liste-de-pays-surs-etablit-par-la-co

EU ’safe countries’ asylum concepts being expanded to limit rights

(#paywall)
▻https://euobserver.com/migration/ar1710c5ab

à partir de cette copie d’écran sur X

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GoE878OXgAAjW__?format=jpg&name=medium#.jpg

probablement venant du rapport ici téléchargeable moyennant identification…
Global SAF Capacity
▻https://view.argusmedia.com/global-saf-capacity-map.html

With mounting pressure from government mandates and directives from the global aviation industry, airlines across the world are being pushed to use more renewable fuels.

As this demand continues to intensify, understanding the market and where SAF capacity lies is essential.

Complete the form to receive the complimentary map showcasing operational and planned capacity. Get a complete global view or select specific regions.

Argus subscribers also have access to the most up-to-date data behind the map, via Data & Downloads on Argus Direct.

►https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carburant_durable_d%27aviation

#SAF

Le XB-1 de Boom passe Mach 1… escorté par un Mirage F1 - Aerobuzz : Aerobuzz
▻https://www.aerobuzz.fr/industrie/le-xb-1-de-boom-passe-mach-1-escorte-par-un-mirage-f1

https://i0.wp.com/www.aerobuzz.fr/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Boom-3-ter.jpg

Moins vite, (moins loin ?) et moins de passagers que le Concorde, vive le gaullisme !

#Overture #transport_aérien #riches

Édito de The Economist

Could supersonic air travel make a comeback?
▻https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2025/01/28/could-supersonic-air-travel-make-a-comeback

https://www.economist.com/content-assets/images/20250201_STP501.jpg

he last commercial supersonic flight was ba002, from New York to London, on October 24th 2003. Blake Scholl, boss of Boom Supersonic, in Denver, hopes people will not have to wait another two decades for the next. Boom’s putative Concorde replacement, Overture, which is intended to carry 64-80 passengers (Concorde carried 100), has not yet been built. But on January 28th xb-1, a one-third-scale demonstrator that the firm is using to test its airframe technology, broke the sound barrier for the first time.
This 34-minute flight, the culmination of 11 previous subsonic ones, took off from Mojave Air and Space Port in California. Its three faster-than-sound legs, maxing out at Mach 1.11, happened in the Bell x-1 Supersonic Corridor—a piece of airspace, designated for such high-speed activities, between Mojave, a civilian facility, and Edwards Air Force Base, one of America’s main centres for testing military aircraft. It was also the xb-1’s penultimate outing. The plan is to fly it once more, next week, and then retire it to concentrate on building Overture.

En complément :

▻https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/bretagne/cotes-d-armor/saint-brieuc/enquete-sur-les-terres-agricoles-promis-jure-crache-la-

Le foncier agricole est limité. Pour obtenir les parcelles désirées, il faut jouer des coudes. Appels téléphoniques répétés, menaces, dénigrement, intimidations, tous les coups sont permis pour éliminer un concurrent. Mais il faut rester discret, pour que, surtout, les services de l’État ne s’en mêlent pas…

De nombreux témoins rapportent des menaces, pressions et intimidations dans leur processus d’installation.
Les services de l’État se reposent sur le voisinage pour déclencher un contrôle.
L’État ne peut intervenir que dans un dossier sur quatre.
Selon le chercheur Ali Romdhani, les intimidations sont monnaie courante et même systémiques dans le milieu agricole.

▻https://reporterre.net/Galeres-paysannes-un-collectif-d-agriculteurs-bio-empeche-de-s-installer

Dans un dossier épineux de vente d’une ferme près d’Angers, un collectif d’agriculteurs bio s’est vu refuser son installation. Au profit de la restructuration de fermes existantes.

#réindustrialisation #sous-traitance #industrie_aéronautique #France #airbus #sous-traitants #défaillance #Safran #aéronautique