• Refusés « injustement » en deuxième année de #médecine : à Paris, des bons élèves victimes de l’oral crient leur colère et leur désarroi | Le Quotidien du médecin
    https://www.lequotidiendumedecin.fr/internes/etudes-medicales/refuses-injustement-en-deuxieme-annee-de-medecine-paris-des-bon

    Des #étudiants parisiens se sont réunis ce lundi 12 juillet, pour un sit-in organisé devant les locaux de l’Université de Paris. En première année d’accès aux études de santé (filière PASS), ils protestent contre la méthode de calcul jugée « injuste » du classement final qui leur donne accès à la deuxième année de médecine.

    De fait, quelques jours après l’annonce des résultats définitifs, une cinquantaine d’étudiants très bien notés à l’écrit ont été relégués, perdant parfois plusieurs centaines de places, et finalement exclus de l’admission après l’oral. « C’est un #scandale sans nom  ! », réagit la mère d’un étudiant.

    Notes de rang

    Pour comprendre pourquoi des étudiants brillants en arrivent à être privés de la deuxième année de médecine, il convient de revenir au système de notation mis en place par l’Université de Paris – ex-Paris V. En lieu et place de la note réelle, la fac a mis en place des « notes de rang ». Une note factice, attribuée en fonction du classement. Ainsi, « le premier aura 20/20, le deuxième 19,99/20, et le dernier 0/20 », détaille la mère de l’étudiant.

    Un système censé éviter les ex aequo. « J’étais classé 309 sur 1 760 avec 14,5 de moyenne, mais ma note de rang est de 16/20, c’est cette note qui compte pour ma moyenne », témoigne un étudiant rencontré ce lundi devant la faculté.

    Puis, les choses se compliquent. En plus de l’épreuve écrite, les étudiants sont invités à passer un examen oral d’admission, nouveauté de la réforme. Sur les 1 760 étudiants qui ont passé l’épreuve écrite, les 260 premiers sont admis d’office en médecine, sans passer par la case oral. On parle de « grand admis ». Ceux qui passeront l’oral se trouvent entre la 261e et la 935e place. À l’issue de l’épreuve orale, une note de rang est également attribuée. La moyenne des deux notes de rang, écrites et orales, déterminera le classement de l’étudiant et son admissibilité – ou non – en médecine, le numerus apertus étant fixé à 520 places à Paris.

    Un oral qui chamboule tout

    Mais alors que la note de rang de l’écrit s’échelonnait sur 1 760 places, pour l’oral, elle hiérarchise les étudiants sur 675 places. Les écarts sont donc plus grands. Résultat : les étudiants se retrouvent avec des notes de rang totalement décalées par rapport à leur note réelle.

    Lors du sit-in, une étudiante témoigne au « Quotidien » : « J’ai eu 13/20 à l’oral, mais avec la note de rang je me trouve avec 4,5/20  ! » Un autre : « Mon 10,5 s’est transformé en 1,5, alors qu’avec l’écrit j’étais admis en médecine ! »

  • L’ambition folle de Macron : dix géants européens de la tech d’ici à 2030
    https://www.latribune.fr/technos-medias/innovation-et-start-up/l-ambition-folle-de-macron-dix-geants-europeens-de-la-tech-d-ici-a-2030-88

    Après la « startup nation », la « scale-up Europe » ? Mardi 15 mai, à l’occasion du lancement du salon VivaTech, Emmanuel Macron a placé la tech comme l’une des priorités de la prochaine présidence française de l’Union européenne, au premier semestre 2022. A l’Elysée, face à un parterre d’une centaine d’investisseurs et d’entrepreneurs du numérique français et européens, ainsi qu’une dizaine de ministres européens, le président français a présenté des mesures proposées par le mouvement « Scale-Up Europe » (faire grandir l’Europe), lancé début mars à Station F dans le but de décliner des propositions pour guider la présidence française de l’UE.

    Voir : https://seenthis.net/messages/906641

    #technologisme #scale-up #technocrate #déréglement_climatique #catastrophe #macron #paywall

  • Editor’s Corner—The FDA’s decision on aducanumab will drag down innovation for years to come | FierceBiotech
    https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/editors-corner-fda-s-decision-aducanumab-will-drag-down-innovation-fo

    The amyloid theory just won’t die. In fact, by approving Biogen’s new Alzheimer’s disease drug, the FDA has just resurrected it for a long and healthy future.

    This is great news for Biogen, but it will decimate Alzheimer’s research, faith in the agency and the healthcare budget for decades to come.

    In an approval based on amyloid clearance, the FDA gave Biogen the benefit of the doubt in allowing it to market aducanumab, now Aduhelm, in Alzheimer’s, saying it doesn’t need actual proof that it can help patients for many, many years.

    Instead, the FDA said a surrogate endpoint, which substitutes a biomarker that might indicate efficacy for an actual clinical endpoint that demonstrates it directly, was good enough for a drug that could make Biogen $17 billion a year.

  • #Ligue_du_LOL : un an après. C’était il y a un an. L’affaire dite de… | by Vincent Glad | Medium
    https://medium.com/@vincentglad_67276/ligue-du-lol-un-an-apr%C3%A8s-aeee7784cf4d

    Huit mois plus tard, à la faveur d’une rencontre entre Florence P. et un des membres de la Ligue du LOL, je découvrirai l’histoire derrière ces supposées menaces physiques. Le 16 décembre 2011, France 5 tourne dans le 11e arrondissement la 3e édition du Grand Webze, une émission consacrée à la culture web présentée par Vinvin et François Rollin. Florence P. y est chroniqueuse. Il se trouve que par le plus grand des hasards, un membre de la Ligue du LOL habite juste à côté du studio d’enregistrement et que plusieurs membres du groupe y sont réunis ce soir-là pour prendre un verre. Le Grand Webze fait alors l’événement sur Twitter, c’est la première émission de ce genre à la télé française. Quelqu’un propose alors de s’y rendre pour aller saluer leur idole à tous, le professeur Rollin. L’émission vient de se terminer, ils rentrent à trois ou quatre dans le studio en montrant une carte de presse. Ils tombent alors sur Florence P. et lui demandent où se trouve le professeur Rollin. Ils échangent quelques mots amicaux avec celui-ci et repartent. Fin de l’histoire.

    C’est donc cette simple demande de renseignements sur un plateau télé qui deviendra huit ans plus tard « une intimidation physique sur le lieu de travail d’une jeune femme », comme le dénoncera, l’air grave, Patrick Cohen sur France 5 . La question n’est pas de remettre en cause le ressenti de Florence P., qui a visiblement paniqué en voyant des twittos qu’elle connaissait, mais de questionner ses reprises médiatiques. Pourquoi aucun média n’a jamais cherché à éclaircir cette histoire d’agression physique qui a pourtant pesé très lourd dans notre dossier ?

    Il est évident que si je devais réécrire aujourd’hui mon texte d’excuses, je ne le ferais pas de cette manière. Il y a de nombreuses erreurs factuelles et d’analyse. Ce week-end-là, j’ai reçu les témoignages sur Twitter en pleine face. C’était le temps de la libération de la parole et elle était nécessaire. Même si je percevais certaines hypocrisies, je me disais que tous ces témoignages étaient véridiques, les victimes ne pouvaient pas mentir. Et de fait, elles ne mentaient pas, elles ont juste reconstruit leurs souvenirs à la lumière de la légende noire de la Ligue du LOL. Toutes les souffrances endurées sur Internet trouvaient une clé explicative simple et définitive : la Ligue du LOL.

    Dans une interview récente, Iris G. a très bien résumé le problème de cette affaire : « Se souvenir de ces quelques mois relève de l’exploit quand on vous donne quelques jours pour le faire ». Les victimes déclarées ne se souvenaient pas plus que moi des détails de cette époque. On a tous, et moi le premier, refait l’histoire dans nos têtes avec cette nouvelle grille de lecture présentée par Checknews : la Ligue du LOL était la base arrière d’un harcèlement sexiste. J’écris alors et j’y croyais sincèrement : « Je n’ai pas vu que nous avions fait taire, avec nos blagues, les premières paroles féministes quand elles sont apparues sur les réseaux vers 2011–2012. » Un an après, après avoir investigué en détail toute cette affaire, je pense que cette affirmation est fausse. Quelques uns d’entre nous ont eu des clashs personnels avec des féministes, mais il n’y a jamais eu d’effet de meute pour faire taire une parole militante sur ce sujet. Le harcèlement contre les féministes sur les réseaux sociaux est aujourd’hui sans commune mesure avec les quelques blagues qu’il pouvait alors y avoir. En 2010, les blagues les plus récurrentes portaient plutôt sur ceux qu’on appellerait aujourd’hui les boomers. Si je me suis moqué de personnes à l’époque sur Twitter, c’était surtout des “vieux” blogueurs — qui se trouvaient être très majoritairement des hommes.

    • "La publication successive de nos excuses dans la journée du dimanche a creusé notre tombe. Saisis par l’émotion des témoignages, nous nous sommes soumis à un exercice de repentance en prenant à notre compte, pour plusieurs d’entre nous, des erreurs commises par d’autres. Lynchés par la foule vengeresse, on en a tous rajouté avec le vain espoir que nous puissions sortir vivants du grand feu de joie qui se préparait. Funeste erreur. Après les excuses, le lynchage a redoublé de vigueur, les menaces de mort et de représailles physiques ont commencé à déferler. Nos repentirs ont été jugés insincères, non suffisants et tournés en ridicule. Surtout, même s’ils ne le disaient pas, ils sont apparus comme la preuve de notre responsabilité sur tous les faits qu’on a pu nous reprocher par la suite. Quand finalement j’ai pris une avocate, une semaine plus tard, afin de contester mon licenciement, elle semblait incrédule : « Mais pourquoi tu t’es excusé pour des choses commises par d’autres ? ». « Ben, je sais pas », lui répondais-je, penaud. « Les gens me menaçaient si je ne le faisais pas. Alors je l’ai fait »"

    • Une membre de la Ligue du LOL, mère de famille, a elle aussi supprimé des dizaines de tweets anodins, dans un surréaliste moment de parano :

      « Alors que nous étions traqués de toutes parts sur le web et que les journalistes prenaient part au lynchage, j’ai eu l’impression que le monde devenait fou. Au point d’imaginer la possibilité d’être vue comme une mère indigne et donc qu’on me retire mes enfants. Complètement paniquée, j’ai commencé à effacer frénétiquement des tweets, un peu au hasard, dès qu’ils contenaient un mot ou une expression vulgaire. Le seul qui me revient vraiment en tête, c’est celui dans lequel je moquais un service administratif pour sa lenteur. Je l’ai effacé en me disant que l’Etat pourrait se retourner contre moi, que je pourrais être accusée d’avoir, en quelque sorte, “harcelé” la mairie. »

    • Plutôt que par des faits, le « harcèlement » sera souvent étayé par… des théories. C’est une chercheuse québécoise, n’ayant jamais parlé avec aucun des protagonistes, qui offrira à la presse française la grille de lecture de l’affaire. Interviewée dans le Nouvel Obs, Têtu, Le Point, Terra Femina, le Monde, Slate et LCI, Martine Delvaux y développe sa théorie du « boy’s club » et des « schtroumpfettes ». Professeure de littérature, la Québécoise ne peut se prévaloir de travaux sociologiques sur la question. Elle est en revanche très bonne cliente pour les médias, qui ne s’en priveront pas.

    • La rédaction s’est lancée dans un traitement comparable à celui qui avait suivi les révélations sur Weinstein, mais sans l’enquête du New Yorker, et sur des faits qui n’avaient rien à voir. »

    • Le #cyber_harcèlement est un fait social très particulier en ce sens qu’il peut y avoir une vraie victime mais pas de vrais coupables. La meute constituée n’apparaît qu’aux yeux de sa cible. Chacun, pris isolément, a l’impression de ne rien faire de répréhensible. Le harcèlement apparaît rarement comme tel au moment où il a lieu. Sur le moment, la cause semble juste, les railleries ou les insultes sont justifiées par le contexte et peu de monde y trouve à redire.

    • 19 novembre 2019. Une jeune femme nommée Sabrina entre dans une épicerie de Villiers-sur-Marne. Elle a une vive altercation avec la commerçante pour une histoire de monnaie rendue. La vendeuse filme la scène et sa fille la publie sur les réseaux sociaux. La vidéo atteint très vite le million de vues. S’engage alors une véritable vendetta contre la jeune femme, entre Twitter et la vraie vie. Un mec la repère très rapidement et lui donne une première correction physique, publiée en vidéo sur Twitter. Le lendemain, trois jeunes femmes la retrouvent dans son quartier. Elles lui mettent plusieurs gifles et filment la scène, qui devient à nouveau virale

    • Son adresse, son numéro de téléphone, son numéro de sécurité sociale sont publiés sur Twitter. Une sextape circule aussi sur les réseaux. Quelques jours plus tard, elle est internée dans un hôpital psychiatrique. Nombre d’articles dans la presse française : deux (tous deux dans Le Parisien)

    • 26 novembre 2019. Le hashtag #Noisiel apparaît dans les trending topics Twitter, du nom d’une ville en Seine-et-Marne. Sur ce hashtag, on découvre la vidéo d’un habitant de la commune ayant un rapport sexuel avec un autre homme. Des milliers de commentaires homophobes sont postés, les internautes se mettent à la recherche du jeune homme. Il doit quitter la ville immédiatement et se réfugie à l’étranger. Nombre d’articles dans la presse française : une douzaine.

  • Trial report - Lesbos: Mohamad H. sentenced to 146 years in prison

    On Thursday, 13th May 2021, refugee Mohamad H. was sentenced to 146 years in prison in the court of Mytilene, Lesbos. The sentence was passed despite the passengers of the boat testiyfing that they owe their lives to the actions of Mohamad. The lawyers will file an appeal.

    “Why you did not come to Greece with a ferry or by buying a ticket?” - This one single question posed by the judge to Mohamad captures in a shocking way the absurdiy, the cruel cynism and the complete lack of contact with reality that the arrests and subsequent trials of refugees as “smugglers” in Greece but also everywhere else are based on.

    On Thursday, 13th May 2021, the trial of 27-year-old refugee Mohamad H. took place in Mytilene, Lesbos. As previously reported, Mohamad H. was arrested upon arrival for being the “boat driver” of the boat in which he and 33 other passengers tried to reach Greece, and consequently charged with the “transportation of third-country nationals without permission to enter into Greek territory” (smuggling) with the aggravating circumstances of endangering the life of 31 people and causing the death of two. He had tried to save everyone’s life during a shipwreck by somehow steering the boat safely ashore, being a refugee himself with no experience in seafaring. Unfortunately, the boat capsized and two women died (https://www.borderline-europe.de/unsere-arbeit/lesbos-gefl%C3%BCchtetem-droht-zweimal-lebensl%C3%A4nglich-haft-na).

    At the trial, eight people who were in the same boat with Mohamad H. appeared in court in order to defend him. Two of them were accepted as witnesses and to testify before the court. They stated that Mohamad was one of them who just tried to save everyone’s life, that the smuggler was a Turkish man who abandoned them in the sea and that the shipwreck was caused by the actions of the smuggler and the Turkish Coast Guard that did not save them even though they called for help.

    However, the judge insisted on the fact that in the preliminary hearing two witnesses pointed to the defendant as the “driver” although the defense stressed that during the preliminary hearing the interpretation was problematic, as it was in English and not in Somali, as well as the fact that they did not point out the defendant as the smuggler but as the person who drove the boat in a situation of distress.

    Also Mohamad H. repeated once more that he was a refugee himself and not the smuggler. He explained that he neither knew how to drive a boat nor did he want to and that he only took the wheel in order to save his co-passengers from drowning. He did this without knowing that simply steering a wheel is considered a crime under Greek law.

    To this, the judge responded by asking: “How is it possible you did not know that what you were doing was illegal? Then why you did not come to Greece with a ferry or by buying a ticket?”

    In light of the fact that there are no safe and legal pathways to enter Europe and claim asylum, this question is not just grotesque and completely out of touch with reality, but cynical and cruel. It is the European policy of deterrence and closed borders that forces people onto makeshift boats and perilous journeys and to risk their lives and the lives of their families. Maybe someone should explain to this court how the European ayslum system works before they sentence a refugee to 146 years because he “did not just take the ferry or buy a ticket”.

    The prosecutor’s suggestion on the guilt of the defendant was for him to be found guilty only for the crime of article 30-par.1 point a. (law 4251/2014): “transportation of third-country nationals without permission to enter into Greek territory”. Nevertheless, the judges insisted on the initial accusation of being also guilty of the aggravating circumstances (points c and d of article 30), meaning “endangering people’s lives” and “causing the death of passengers”. They accepted the mitigating circumstance of “prior lawful life” resulting into avoiding the life sentences as well as the money penalty. In more detail, they imposed 15 years incarceration for each deceased person (2 women) and 8 years for each transported person (31 people). Following a procedure called “merging of sentences” in Greek law, this resulted in a final sentence of 146 years.

    The defense, the lawyers Dimitris Choulis and Alexandros Georgoulis, will file an appeal against the decision.

    https://www.borderline-europe.de/unsere-arbeit/lesbos-mohamad-h-zu-146-jahren-haft-verurteilt?l=en
    #passeurs #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Grèce #criminalisation #justice (well...) #Lesbos #Mer_Egée #absurdité #cynisme #scafista #scafisti #procès

  • Friends of the Traffickers Italy’s Anti-Mafia Directorate and the “Dirty Campaign” to Criminalize Migration

    Afana Dieudonne often says that he is not a superhero. That’s Dieudonne’s way of saying he’s done things he’s not proud of — just like anyone in his situation would, he says, in order to survive. From his home in Cameroon to Tunisia by air, then by car and foot into the desert, across the border into Libya, and onto a rubber boat in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, Dieudonne has done a lot of surviving.

    In Libya, Dieudonne remembers when the smugglers managing the safe house would ask him for favors. Dieudonne spoke a little English and didn’t want trouble. He said the smugglers were often high and always armed. Sometimes, when asked, Dieudonne would distribute food and water among the other migrants. Other times, he would inform on those who didn’t follow orders. He remembers the traffickers forcing him to inflict violence on his peers. It was either them or him, he reasoned.

    On September 30, 2014, the smugglers pushed Dieudonne and 91 others out to sea aboard a rubber boat. Buzzing through the pitch-black night, the group watched lights on the Libyan coast fade into darkness. After a day at sea, the overcrowded dinghy began taking on water. Its passengers were rescued by an NGO vessel and transferred to an Italian coast guard ship, where officers picked Dieudonne out of a crowd and led him into a room for questioning.

    At first, Dieudonne remembers the questioning to be quick, almost routine. His name, his age, his nationality. And then the questions turned: The officers said they wanted to know how the trafficking worked in Libya so they could arrest the people involved. They wanted to know who had driven the rubber boat and who had held the navigation compass.

    “So I explained everything to them, and I also showed who the ‘captain’ was — captain in quotes, because there is no captain,” said Dieudonne. The real traffickers stay in Libya, he added. “Even those who find themselves to be captains, they don’t do it by choice.”

    For the smugglers, Dieudonne explained, “we are the customers, and we are the goods.”

    For years, efforts by the Italian government and the European Union to address migration in the central Mediterranean have focused on the people in Libya — interchangeably called facilitators, smugglers, traffickers, or militia members, depending on which agency you’re speaking to — whose livelihoods come from helping others cross irregularly into Europe. People pay them a fare to organize a journey so dangerous it has taken tens of thousands of lives.

    The European effort to dismantle these smuggling networks has been driven by an unlikely actor: the Italian anti-mafia and anti-terrorism directorate, a niche police office in Rome that gained respect in the 1990s and early 2000s for dismantling large parts of the Mafia in Sicily and elsewhere in Italy. According to previously unpublished internal documents, the office — called the Direzione nazionale antimafia e antiterrorismo, or DNAA, in Italian — took a front-and-center role in the management of Europe’s southern sea borders, in direct coordination with the EU border agency Frontex and European military missions operating off the Libyan coast.

    In 2013, under the leadership of a longtime anti-mafia prosecutor named Franco Roberti, the directorate pioneered a strategy that was unique — or at least new for the border officers involved. They would start handling irregular migration to Europe like they had handled the mob. The approach would allow Italian and European police, coast guard agencies, and navies, obliged by international law to rescue stranded refugees at sea, to at least get some arrests and convictions along the way.

    The idea was to arrest low-level operators and use coercion and plea deals to get them to flip on their superiors. That way, the reasoning went, police investigators could work their way up the food chain and eventually dismantle the smuggling rings in Libya. With every boat that disembarked in Italy, police would make a handful of arrests. Anybody found to have played an active role during the crossing, from piloting to holding a compass to distributing water or bailing out a leak, could be arrested under a new legal directive written by Roberti’s anti-mafia directorate. Charges ranged from simple smuggling to transnational criminal conspiracy and — if people asphyxiated below deck or drowned when a boat capsized — even murder. Judicial sources estimate the number of people arrested since 2013 to be in the thousands.

    For the police, prosecutors, and politicians involved, the arrests were an important domestic political win. At the time, public opinion in Italy was turning against migration, and the mugshots of alleged smugglers regularly held space on front pages throughout the country.

    But according to the minutes of closed-door conversations among some of the very same actors directing these cases, which were obtained by The Intercept under Italy’s freedom of information law, most anti-mafia prosecutions only focused on low-level boat drivers, often migrants who had themselves paid for the trip across. Few, if any, smuggling bosses were ever convicted. Documents of over a dozen trials reviewed by The Intercept show prosecutions built on hasty investigations and coercive interrogations.

    In the years that followed, the anti-mafia directorate went to great lengths to keep the arrests coming. According to the internal documents, the office coordinated a series of criminal investigations into the civilian rescue NGOs working to save lives in the Mediterranean, accusing them of hampering police work. It also oversaw efforts to create and train a new coast guard in Libya, with full knowledge that some coast guard officers were colluding with the same smuggling networks that Italian and European leaders were supposed to be fighting.

    Since its inception, the anti-mafia directorate has wielded unparalleled investigative tools and served as a bridge between politicians and the courts. The documents reveal in meticulous detail how the agency, alongside Italian and European officials, capitalized on those powers to crack down on alleged smugglers, most of whom they knew to be desperate people fleeing poverty and violence with limited resources to defend themselves in court.

    Tragedy and Opportunity

    The anti-mafia directorate was born in the early 1990s after a decade of escalating Mafia violence. By then, hundreds of prosecutors, politicians, journalists, and police officers had been shot, blown up, or kidnapped, and many more extorted by organized crime families operating in Italy and beyond.

    In Palermo, the Sicilian capital, prosecutor Giovanni Falcone was a rising star in the Italian judiciary. Falcone had won unprecedented success with an approach to organized crime based on tracking financial flows, seizing assets, and centralizing evidence gathered by prosecutor’s offices across the island.

    But as the Mafia expanded its reach into the rest of Europe, Falcone’s work proved insufficient.

    In September 1990, a Mafia commando drove from Germany to Sicily to gun down a 37-year-old judge. Weeks later, at a police checkpoint in Naples, the Sicilian driver of a truck loaded with weapons, explosives, and drugs was found to be a resident of Germany. A month after the arrests, Falcone traveled to Germany to establish an information-sharing mechanism with authorities there. He brought along a younger colleague from Naples, Franco Roberti.

    “We faced a stone wall,” recalled Roberti, still bitter three decades later. He spoke to us outside a cafe in a plum neighborhood in Naples. Seventy-three years old and speaking with the rasp of a lifelong smoker, Roberti described Italy’s Mafia problem in blunt language. He bemoaned a lack of international cooperation that, he said, continues to this day. “They claimed that there was no need to investigate there,” Roberti said, “that it was up to us to investigate Italians in Germany who were occasional mafiosi.”

    As the prosecutors traveled back to Italy empty-handed, Roberti remembers Falcone telling him that they needed “a centralized national organ able to speak directly to foreign judicial authorities and coordinate investigations in Italy.”

    “That is how the idea of the anti-mafia directorate was born,” Roberti said. The two began building what would become Italy’s first national anti-mafia force.

    At the time, there was tough resistance to the project. Critics argued that Falcone and Roberti were creating “super-prosecutors” who would wield outsize powers over the courts, while also being subject to political pressures from the government in Rome. It was, they argued, a marriage of police and the judiciary, political interests and supposedly apolitical courts — convenient for getting Mafia convictions but dangerous for Italian democracy.

    Still, in January 1992, the project was approved in Parliament. But Falcone would never get to lead it: Months later, a bomb set by the Mafia killed him, his wife, and the three agents escorting them. The attack put to rest any remaining criticism of Falcone’s plan.

    The anti-mafia directorate went on to become one of Italy’s most important institutions, the national authority over all matters concerning organized crime and the agency responsible for partially freeing the country from its century-old crucible. In the decades after Falcone’s death, the directorate did what many in Italy thought impossible, dismantling large parts of the five main Italian crime families and almost halving the Mafia-related murder rate.

    And yet, by the time Roberti took control in 2013, it had been years since the last high-profile Mafia prosecution, and the organization’s influence was waning. At the same time, Italy was facing unprecedented numbers of migrants arriving by boat. Roberti had an idea: The anti-mafia directorate would start working on what he saw as a different kind of mafia. The organization set its sights on Libya.

    “We thought we had to do something more coordinated to combat this trafficking,” Roberti remembered, “so I put everyone around a table.”

    “The main objective was to save lives, seize ships, and capture smugglers,” Roberti said. “Which we did.”

    Our Sea

    Dieudonne made it to the Libyan port city of Zuwara in August 2014. One more step across the Mediterranean, and he’d be in Europe. The smugglers he paid to get him across the sea took all of his possessions and put him in an abandoned building that served as a safe house to wait for his turn.

    Dieudonne told his story from a small office in Bari, Italy, where he runs a cooperative that helps recent arrivals access local education. Dieudonne is fiery and charismatic. He is constantly moving: speaking, texting, calling, gesticulating. Every time he makes a point, he raps his knuckles on the table in a one-two pattern. Dieudonne insisted that we publish his real name. Others who made the journey more recently — still pending decisions on their residence permits or refugee status — were less willing to speak openly.

    Dieudonne remembers the safe house in Zuwara as a string of constant violence. The smugglers would come once a day to leave food. Every day, they would ask who hadn’t followed their orders. Those inside the abandoned building knew they were less likely to be discovered by police or rival smugglers, but at the same time, they were not free to leave.

    “They’ve put a guy in the refrigerator in front of all of us, to show how the next one who misbehaves will be treated,” Dieudonne remembered, indignant. He witnessed torture, shootings, rape. “The first time you see it, it hurts you. The second time it hurts you less. The third time,” he said with a shrug, “it becomes normal. Because that’s the only way to survive.”

    “That’s why arresting the person who pilots a boat and treating them like a trafficker makes me laugh,” Dieudonne said. Others who have made the journey to Italy report having been forced to drive at gunpoint. “You only do it to be sure you don’t die there,” he said.

    Two years after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s government, much of Libya’s northwest coast had become a staging ground for smugglers who organized sea crossings to Europe in large wooden fishing boats. When those ships — overcrowded, underpowered, and piloted by amateurs — inevitably capsized, the deaths were counted by the hundreds.

    In October 2013, two shipwrecks off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa took over 400 lives, sparking public outcry across Europe. In response, the Italian state mobilized two plans, one public and the other private.

    “There was a big shock when the Lampedusa tragedy happened,” remembered Italian Sen. Emma Bonino, then the country’s foreign minister. The prime minister “called an emergency meeting, and we decided to immediately launch this rescue program,” Bonino said. “Someone wanted to call the program ‘safe seas.’ I said no, not safe, because it’s sure we’ll have other tragedies. So let’s call it Mare Nostrum.”

    Mare Nostrum — “our sea” in Latin — was a rescue mission in international waters off the coast of Libya that ran for one year and rescued more than 150,000 people. The operation also brought Italian ships, airplanes, and submarines closer than ever to Libyan shores. Roberti, just two months into his job as head of the anti-mafia directorate, saw an opportunity to extend the country’s judicial reach and inflict a lethal blow to smuggling rings in Libya.

    Five days after the start of Mare Nostrum, Roberti launched the private plan: a series of coordination meetings among the highest echelons of the Italian police, navy, coast guard, and judiciary. Under Roberti, these meetings would run for four years and eventually involve representatives from Frontex, Europol, an EU military operation, and even Libya.

    The minutes of five of these meetings, which were presented by Roberti in a committee of the Italian Parliament and obtained by The Intercept, give an unprecedented behind-the-scenes look at the events on Europe’s southern borders since the Lampedusa shipwrecks.

    In the first meeting, held in October 2013, Roberti told participants that the anti-mafia offices in the Sicilian city of Catania had developed an innovative way to deal with migrant smuggling. By treating Libyan smugglers like they had treated the Italian Mafia, prosecutors could claim jurisdiction over international waters far beyond Italy’s borders. That, Roberti said, meant they could lawfully board and seize vessels on the high seas, conduct investigations there, and use the evidence in court.

    The Italian authorities have long recognized that, per international maritime law, they are obligated to rescue people fleeing Libya on overcrowded boats and transport them to a place of safety. As the number of people attempting the crossing increased, many Italian prosecutors and coast guard officials came to believe that smugglers were relying on these rescues to make their business model work; therefore, the anti-mafia reasoning went, anyone who acted as crew or made a distress call on a boat carrying migrants could be considered complicit in Libyan trafficking and subject to Italian jurisdiction. This new approach drew heavily from legal doctrines developed in the United States during the 1980s aimed at stopping drug smuggling.

    European leaders were scrambling to find a solution to what they saw as a looming migration crisis. Italian officials thought they had the answer and publicly justified their decisions as a way to prevent future drownings.

    But according to the minutes of the 2013 anti-mafia meeting, the new strategy predated the Lampedusa shipwrecks by at least a week. Sicilian prosecutors had already written the plan to crack down on migration across the Mediterranean but lacked both the tools and public will to put it into action. Following the Lampedusa tragedy and the creation of Mare Nostrum, they suddenly had both.

    State of Necessity

    In the international waters off the coast of Libya, Dieudonne and 91 others were rescued by a European NGO called Migrant Offshore Aid Station. They spent two days aboard MOAS’s ship before being transferred to an Italian coast guard ship, Nave Dattilo, to be taken to Europe.

    Aboard the Dattilo, coast guard officers asked Dieudonne why he had left his home in Cameroon. He remembers them showing him a photograph of the rubber boat taken from the air. “They asked me who was driving, the roles and everything,” he remembered. “Then they asked me if I could tell him how the trafficking in Libya works, and then, they said, they would give me residence documents.”

    Dieudonne said that he was reluctant to cooperate at first. He didn’t want to accuse any of his peers, but he was also concerned that he could become a suspect. After all, he had helped the driver at points throughout the voyage.

    “I thought that if I didn’t cooperate, they might hurt me,” Dieudonne said. “Not physically hurt, but they could consider me dishonest, like someone who was part of the trafficking.”

    To this day, Dieudonne says he can’t understand why Italy would punish people for fleeing poverty and political violence in West Africa. He rattled off a list of events from the last year alone: draught, famine, corruption, armed gunmen, attacks on schools. “And you try to convict someone for managing to escape that situation?”

    The coast guard ship disembarked in Vibo Valentia, a city in the Italian region of Calabria. During disembarkation, a local police officer explained to a journalist that they had arrested five people. The journalist asked how the police had identified the accused.

    “A lot has been done by the coast guard, who picked [the migrants] up two days ago and managed to spot [the alleged smugglers],” the officer explained. “Then we have witness statements and videos.”

    Cases like these, where arrests are made on the basis of photo or video evidence and statements by witnesses like Dieudonne, are common, said Gigi Modica, a judge in Sicily who has heard many immigration and asylum cases. “It’s usually the same story. They take three or four people, no more. They ask them two questions: who was driving the boat, and who was holding the compass,” Modica explained. “That’s it — they get the names and don’t care about the rest.”

    Modica was one of the first judges in Italy to acquit people charged for driving rubber boats — known as “scafisti,” or boat drivers, in Italian — on the grounds that they had been forced to do so. These “state of necessity” rulings have since become increasingly common. Modica rattled off a list of irregularities he’s seen in such cases: systemic racism, witness statements that migrants later say they didn’t make, interrogations with no translator or lawyer, and in some cases, people who report being encouraged by police to sign documents renouncing their right to apply for asylum.

    “So often these alleged smugglers — scafisti — are normal people who were compelled to pilot a boat by smugglers in Libya,” Modica said.

    Documents of over a dozen trials reviewed by The Intercept show prosecutions largely built on testimony from migrants who are promised a residence permit in exchange for their collaboration. At sea, witnesses are interviewed by the police hours after their rescue, often still in a state of shock after surviving a shipwreck.

    In many cases, identical statements, typos included, are attributed to several witnesses and copied and pasted across different police reports. Sometimes, these reports have been enough to secure decadeslong sentences. Other times, under cross-examination in court, witnesses have contradicted the statements recorded by police or denied giving any testimony at all.

    As early as 2015, attendees of the anti-mafia meetings were discussing problems with these prosecutions. In a meeting that February, Giovanni Salvi, then the prosecutor of Catania, acknowledged that smugglers often abandoned migrant boats in international waters. Still, Italian police were steaming ahead with the prosecutions of those left on board.

    These prosecutions were so important that in some cases, the Italian coast guard decided to delay rescue when boats were in distress in order to “allow for the arrival of institutional ships that can conduct arrests,” a coast guard commander explained at the meeting.

    When asked about the commander’s comments, the Italian coast guard said that “on no occasion” has the agency ever delayed a rescue operation. Delaying rescue for any reason goes against international and Italian law, and according to various human rights lawyers in Europe, could give rise to criminal liability.

    NGOs in the Crosshairs

    Italy canceled Mare Nostrum after one year, citing budget constraints and a lack of European collaboration. In its wake, the EU set up two new operations, one via Frontex and the other a military effort called Operation Sophia. These operations focused not on humanitarian rescue but on border security and people smuggling from Libya. Beginning in 2015, representatives from Frontex and Operation Sophia were included in the anti-mafia directorate meetings, where Italian prosecutors ensured that both abided by the new investigative strategy.

    Key to these investigations were photos from the rescues, like the aerial image that Dieudonne remembers the Italian coast guard showing him, which gave police another way to identify who piloted the boats and helped navigate.

    In the absence of government rescue ships, a fleet of civilian NGO vessels began taking on a large number of rescues in the international waters off the coast of Libya. These ships, while coordinated by the Italian coast guard rescue center in Rome, made evidence-gathering difficult for prosecutors and judicial police. According to the anti-mafia meeting minutes, some NGOs, including MOAS, routinely gave photos to Italian police and Frontex. Others refused, arguing that providing evidence for investigations into the people they saved would undermine their efficacy and neutrality.

    In the years following Mare Nostrum, the NGO fleet would come to account for more than one-third of all rescues in the central Mediterranean, according to estimates by Operation Sophia. A leaked status report from the operation noted that because NGOs did not collect information from rescued migrants for police, “information essential to enhance the understanding of the smuggling business model is not acquired.”

    In a subsequent anti-mafia meeting, six prosecutors echoed this concern. NGO rescues meant that police couldn’t interview migrants at sea, they said, and cases were getting thrown out for lack of evidence. A coast guard admiral explained the importance of conducting interviews just after a rescue, when “a moment of empathy has been established.”

    “It is not possible to carry out this task if the rescue intervention is carried out by ships of the NGOs,” the admiral told the group.

    The NGOs were causing problems for the DNAA strategy. At the meetings, Italian prosecutors and representatives from the coast guard, navy, and Interior Ministry discussed what they could do to rein in the humanitarian organizations. At the same time, various prosecutors were separately fixing their investigative sights on the NGOs themselves.

    In late 2016, an internal report from Frontex — later published in full by The Intercept — accused an NGO vessel of directly receiving migrants from Libyan smugglers, attributing the information to “Italian authorities.” The claim was contradicted by video evidence and the ship’s crew.

    Months later, Carmelo Zuccaro, the prosecutor of Catania, made public that he was investigating rescue NGOs. “Together with Frontex and the navy, we are trying to monitor all these NGOs that have shown that they have great financial resources,” Zuccaro told an Italian newspaper. The claim went viral in Italian and European media. “Friends of the traffickers” and “migrant taxi service” became common slurs used toward humanitarian NGOs by anti-immigration politicians and the Italian far right.

    Zuccaro would eventually walk back his claims, telling a parliamentary committee that he was working off a hypothesis at the time and had no evidence to back it up.

    In an interview with a German newspaper in February 2017, the director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, refrained from explicitly criticizing the work of rescue NGOs but did say they were hampering police investigations in the Mediterranean. As aid organizations assumed a larger percentage of rescues, Leggeri said, “it is becoming more difficult for the European security authorities to find out more about the smuggling networks through interviews with migrants.”

    “That smear campaign was very, very deep,” remembered Bonino, the former foreign minister. Referring to Marco Minniti, Italy’s interior minister at the time, she added, “I was trying to push Minniti not to be so obsessed with people coming, but to make a policy of integration in Italy. But he only focused on Libya and smuggling and criminalizing NGOs with the help of prosecutors.”

    Bonino explained that the action against NGOs was part of a larger plan to change European policy in the central Mediterranean. The first step was the shift away from humanitarian rescue and toward border security and smuggling. The second step “was blaming the NGOs or arresting them, a sort of dirty campaign against them,” she said. “The results of which after so many years have been no convictions, no penalties, no trials.”

    Finally, the third step was to build a new coast guard in Libya to do what the Europeans couldn’t, per international law: intercept people at sea and bring them back to Libya, the country from which they had just fled.

    At first, leaders at Frontex were cautious. “From Frontex’s point of view, we look at Libya with concern; there is no stable state there,” Leggeri said in the 2017 interview. “We are now helping to train 60 officers for a possible future Libyan coast guard. But this is at best a beginning.”

    Bonino saw this effort differently. “They started providing support for their so-called coast guard,” she said, “which were the same traffickers changing coats.”
    Rescued migrants disembarking from a Libyan coast guard ship in the town of Khoms, a town 120 kilometres (75 miles) east of the capital on October 1, 2019.

    Same Uniforms, Same Ships

    Safe on land in Italy, Dieudonne was never called to testify in court. He hopes that none of his peers ended up in prison but said he would gladly testify against the traffickers if called. Aboard the coast guard ship, he remembers, “I gave the police contact information for the traffickers, I gave them names.”

    The smuggling operations in Libya happened out in the open, but Italian police could only go as far as international waters. Leaked documents from Operation Sophia describe years of efforts by European officials to get Libyan police to arrest smugglers. Behind closed doors, top Italian and EU officials admitted that these same smugglers were intertwined with the new Libyan coast guard that Europe was creating and that working with them would likely go against international law.

    As early as 2015, multiple officials at the anti-mafia meetings noted that some smugglers were uncomfortably close to members of the Libyan government. “Militias use the same uniforms and the same ships as the Libyan coast guard that the Italian navy itself is training,” Rear Adm. Enrico Credendino, then in charge of Operation Sophia, said in 2017. The head of the Libyan coast guard and the Libyan minister of defense, both allies of the Italian government, Credendino added, “have close relationships with some militia bosses.”

    One of the Libyan coast guard officers playing both sides was Abd al-Rahman Milad, also known as Bija. In 2019, the Italian newspaper Avvenire revealed that Bija participated in a May 2017 meeting in Sicily, alongside Italian border police and intelligence officials, that was aimed at stemming migration from Libya. A month later, he was condemned by the U.N. Security Council for his role as a top member of a powerful trafficking militia in the coastal town of Zawiya, and for, as the U.N. put it, “sinking migrant boats using firearms.”

    According to leaked documents from Operation Sophia, coast guard officers under Bija’s command were trained by the EU between 2016 and 2018.

    While the Italian government was prosecuting supposed smugglers in Italy, they were also working with people they knew to be smugglers in Libya. Minniti, Italy’s then-interior minister, justified the deals his government was making in Libya by saying that the prospect of mass migration from Africa made him “fear for the well-being of Italian democracy.”

    In one of the 2017 anti-mafia meetings, a representative of the Interior Ministry, Vittorio Pisani, outlined in clear terms a plan that provided for the direct coordination of the new Libyan coast guard. They would create “an operation room in Libya for the exchange of information with the Interior Ministry,” Pisani explained, “mainly on the position of NGO ships and their rescue operations, in order to employ the Libyan coast guard in its national waters.”

    And with that, the third step of the plan was set in motion. At the end of the meeting, Roberti suggested that the group invite representatives from the Libyan police to their next meeting. In an interview with The Intercept, Roberti confirmed that Libyan representatives attended at least two anti-mafia meetings and that he himself met Bija at a meeting in Libya, one month after the U.N. Security Council report was published. The following year, the Security Council committee on Libya sanctioned Bija, freezing his assets and banning him from international travel.

    “We needed to have the participation of Libyan institutions. But they did nothing, because they were taking money from the traffickers,” Roberti told us from the cafe in Naples. “They themselves were the traffickers.”
    A Place of Safety

    Roberti retired from the anti-mafia directorate in 2017. He said that under his leadership, the organization was able to create a basis for handling migration throughout Europe. Still, Roberti admits that his expansion of the DNAA into migration issues has had mixed results. Like his trip to Germany in the ’90s with Giovanni Falcone, Roberti said the anti-mafia strategy faltered because of a lack of collaboration: with the NGOs, with other European governments, and with Libya.

    “On a European level, the cooperation does not work,” Roberti said. Regarding Libya, he added, “We tried — I believe it was right, the agreements [the government] made. But it turned out to be a failure in the end.”

    The DNAA has since expanded its operations. Between 2017 and 2019, the Italian government passed two bills that put the anti-mafia directorate in charge of virtually all illegal immigration matters. Since 2017, five Sicilian prosecutors, all of whom attended at least one anti-mafia coordination meeting, have initiated 15 separate legal proceedings against humanitarian NGO workers. So far there have been no convictions: Three cases have been thrown out in court, and the rest are ongoing.

    Earlier this month, news broke that Sicilian prosecutors had wiretapped journalists and human rights lawyers as part of one of these investigations, listening in on legally protected conversations with sources and clients. The Italian justice ministry has opened an investigation into the incident, which could amount to criminal behavior, according to Italian legal experts. The prosecutor who approved the wiretaps attended at least one DNAA coordination meeting, where investigations against NGOs were discussed at length.

    As the DNAA has extended its reach, key actors from the anti-mafia coordination meetings have risen through the ranks of Italian and European institutions. One prosecutor, Federico Cafiero de Raho, now runs the anti-mafia directorate. Salvi, the former prosecutor of Catania, is the equivalent of Italy’s attorney general. Pisani, the former Interior Ministry representative, is deputy head of the Italian intelligence services. And Roberti is a member of the European Parliament.

    Cafiero de Raho stands by the investigations and arrests that the anti-mafia directorate has made over the years. He said the coordination meetings were an essential tool for prosecutors and police during difficult times.

    When asked about his specific comments during the meetings — particularly statements that humanitarian NGOs needed to be regulated and multiple admissions that members of the new Libyan coast guard were involved in smuggling activities — Cafiero de Raho said that his remarks should be placed in context, a time when Italy and the EU were working to build a coast guard in a part of Libya that was largely ruled by local militias. He said his ultimate goal was what, in the DNAA coordination meetings, he called the “extrajudicial solution”: attempts to prove the existence of crimes against humanity in Libya so that “the United Nation sends troops to Libya to dismantle migrants camps set up by traffickers … and retake control of that territory.”

    A spokesperson for the EU’s foreign policy arm, which ran Operation Sophia, refused to directly address evidence that leaders of the European military operation knew that parts of the new Libyan coast guard were also involved in smuggling activities, only noting that Bija himself wasn’t trained by the EU. A Frontex spokesperson stated that the agency “was not involved in the selection of officers to be trained.”

    In 2019, the European migration strategy changed again. Now, the vast majority of departures are intercepted by the Libyan coast guard and brought back to Libya. In March of that year, Operation Sophia removed all of its ships from the rescue area and has since focused on using aerial patrols to direct and coordinate the Libyan coast guard. Human rights lawyers in Europe have filed six legal actions against Italy and the EU as a result, calling the practice refoulement by proxy: facilitating the return of migrants to dangerous circumstances in violation of international law.

    Indeed, throughout four years of coordination meetings, Italy and the EU were admitting privately that returning people to Libya would be illegal. “Fundamental human rights violations in Libya make it impossible to push migrants back to the Libyan coast,” Pisani explained in 2015. Two years later, he outlined the beginnings of a plan that would do exactly that.

    The Result of Mere Chance

    Dieudonne knows he was lucky. The line that separates suspect and victim can be entirely up to police officers’ first impressions in the minutes or hours following a rescue. According to police reports used in prosecutions, physical attributes like having “a clearer skin tone” or behavior aboard the ship, including scrutinizing police movements “with strange interest,” were enough to rouse suspicion.

    In a 2019 ruling that acquitted seven alleged smugglers after three years of pretrial detention, judges wrote that “the selection of the suspects on one side, and the witnesses on the other, with the only exception of the driver, has almost been the result of mere chance.”

    Carrying out work for their Libyan captors has cost other migrants in Italy lengthy prison sentences. In September 2019, a 22-year-old Guinean nicknamed Suarez was arrested upon his arrival to Italy. Four witnesses told police he had collaborated with prison guards in Zawiya, at the immigrant detention center managed by the infamous Bija.

    “Suarez was also a prisoner, who then took on a job,” one of the witnesses told the court. Handing out meals or taking care of security is what those who can’t afford to pay their ransom often do in order to get out, explained another. “Unfortunately, you would have to be there to understand the situation,” the first witness said. Suarez was sentenced to 20 years in prison, recently reduced to 12 years on appeal.

    Dieudonne remembered his journey at sea vividly, but with surprising cool. When the boat began taking on water, he tried to help. “One must give help where it is needed.” At his office in Bari, Dieudonne bent over and moved his arms in a low scooping motion, like he was bailing water out of a boat.

    “Should they condemn me too?” he asked. He finds it ironic that it was the Libyans who eventually arrested Bija on human trafficking charges this past October. The Italians and Europeans, he said with a laugh, were too busy working with the corrupt coast guard commander. (In April, Bija was released from prison after a Libyan court absolved him of all charges. He was promoted within the coast guard and put back on the job.)

    Dieudonne thinks often about the people he identified aboard the coast guard ship in the middle of the sea. “I told the police the truth. But if that collaboration ends with the conviction of an innocent person, it’s not good,” he said. “Because I know that person did nothing. On the contrary, he saved our lives by driving that raft.”

    https://theintercept.com/2021/04/30/italy-anti-mafia-migrant-rescue-smuggling

    #Méditerranée #Italie #Libye #ONG #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité #solidarité #secours #mer_Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #violence #passeurs #Méditerranée_centrale #anti-mafia #anti-terrorisme #Direzione_nazionale_antimafia_e_antiterrorismo #DNAA #Frontex #Franco_Roberti #justice #politique #Zuwara #torture #viol #Mare_Nostrum #Europol #eaux_internationales #droit_de_la_mer #droit_maritime #juridiction_italienne #arrestations #Gigi_Modica #scafista #scafisti #état_de_nécessité #Giovanni_Salvi #NGO #Operation_Sophia #MOAS #DNA #Carmelo_Zuccaro #Zuccaro #Fabrice_Leggeri #Leggeri #Marco_Minniti #Minniti #campagne #gardes-côtes_libyens #milices #Enrico_Credendino #Abd_al-Rahman_Milad #Bija ##Abdurhaman_al-Milad #Al_Bija #Zawiya #Vittorio_Pisani #Federico_Cafiero_de_Raho #solution_extrajudiciaire #pull-back #refoulement_by_proxy #refoulement #push-back #Suarez

    ping @karine4 @isskein @rhoumour

  • Planter plutôt que réduire les émissions : le lobby sort du bois
    https://reporterre.net/Planter-plutot-que-reduire-les-emissions-le-lobby-sort-du-bois

    Le Global forest summit a, en effet, laissé la part belle aux #multinationales. Empêtré dans des #scandales liés à l’huile de palme et au travail forcé, Procter & Gamble a vanté au cours de la journée ses programmes de #reboisement. L’entreprise américaine Salesforces a aussi déclaré vouloir planter cent millions d’arbres en dix ans.

    « Planter un arbre est devenu une caution verte, à prix cassé, pour des entreprises qui refusent de s’engager à réduire leur pollution », regrette Sylvain Angerand, le porte-parole de Canopée. « La compensation carbone crée une diversion, poursuit Cécile Leuba de Greenpeace. Elle véhicule l’illusion qu’une solution qui ne nécessiterait pas d’efforts de réduction d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre serait possible ».

    • « Pourquoi Macron fait-il appel à McKinsey pour sa stratégie vaccinale alors que ce cabinet est co-responsable d’un immense #scandale_sanitaire outre-Atlantique, celui des #opioïdes ? »

      Marie, ex-consultante pour KPMG, ne comprend pas non plus pourquoi Macron a fait appel au cabinet #McKinsey pour mener sa campagne vaccinale : “En plus, il se vante d’avoir des élus de tout bord, des mecs qui ont travaillé dans des entreprises… et pourquoi on va payer des boîtes privées, en plus un cabinet qui n’est même pas français, et qui sort d’un énorme scandale ?”

      Cet énorme scandale, c’est celui qu’a traversé McKinsey aux Etats-Unis. Cette année, le cabinet va devoir verser une amende de 573 millions de dollars en raison du rôle joué au début des années 2010 auprès du laboratoire Purdue Pharma. Cette entreprise a commercialisé l’#Oxycontin, opiacé terriblement addictif qui aurait tué jusqu’à 200 000 américains par overdose. Cet antidouleur a été sur-prescrit sur tout le territoire grâce à une vaste stratégie d’influence menée par le laboratoire, avec les bons conseils de Mc Kinsey. Les consultants avaient même anticipé le nombre potentiel d’overdoses afin de conseiller à Purdue Pharma une stratégie d’indemnisation susceptible de maintenir les ventes et la réputation du produit.

      Le cabinet qui conseille le gouvernement sur sa stratégie vaccinale est donc le même que celui qui a conseillé l’un des principaux acteurs du plus grand et mortel scandale sanitaire des trente dernières années. Mais ce “petit” détail n’a certainement pas dû décourager Emmanuel Macron de continuer à travailler avec un partenaire de longue date. L’idylle entre le président de la République et le cabinet multinational remonte à la commission Attali. Ce groupe de travail, lancé par Nicolas Sarkozy en 2007 et dont notre énarque de président fut membre, avait reçu gratuitement l’aide de consultants de McKinsey, nous révèle le Monde. Depuis, ils fonctionnent main dans la main. La petite élite technocratique qui entoure le président depuis son arrivée au ministère de l’économie sous Hollande ne l’a pas quitté, avec des exs de Mckinsey et une façon de faire de la politique “en mode consultant”. En 2016, l’un des bras droits de Macron, Thomas Cazenave, coécrit avec un consultant de McKinsey un livre manifeste au titre évocateur « L’État en mode start up”. Au moment du lancement de la campagne de Macron, une dizaine de consultants de McKinsey planche officiellement pour lui, toujours selon le Monde..

      Ce soutien dévoué au futur président est récompensé. Une fois élu, Macron engage une réforme de l’Etat qui passe relativement inaperçue : une direction interministérielle à la transformation publique (DITP) est créée, avec Thomas Cazenave à sa tête. Alors que jusqu’à présent chaque ministère passait ses propres appels d’offres, notamment en termes de consultants et prestataires, la commande publique est désormais centralisée entre les mains de ce grand ami de McKinsey. Depuis, les grands cabinets de consultants profitent bien du système : la campagne vaccinale bien sûr (2 millions d’euros par mois pour McKinsey), mais aussi l’élaboration d’un plan d’économie dans la fonction publique (18 millions d’euros la facture).

      Ce n’est pas tout. Le magazine Reporterre a révélé que le Boston Consulting Group s’était vu confier par le gouvernement l’évaluation des impacts de la loi Climat, ce projet au rabais émanant de la convention citoyenne. Et, surprise, son analyse est très favorable, car ce serait un projet ambitieux sur le plan écologique. Peut-on croire un cabinet qui a classé l’entreprise de pesticides BASF comme “l’une des 50 entreprises les plus innovantes du monde” ou qui conseille les constructeurs automobiles ? Reporterre en doute, et nous aussi.

    • 573,9 millions de dollars en réparation d’une décennie de conseils aux fabricants d’opioïdes, ces antalgiques accusés d’avoir rendu des centaines de milliers d’Américains dépendants : voilà la substance de l’accord à l’amiable annoncé le 4 février entre McKinsey et 49 procureurs généraux d’États fédéraux des États-Unis, le District de Columbia et cinq autres territoires des États-Unis.

      En annonçant cet accord le 4 février, Maura Healey, la procureure générale du Massachusetts, tête de pont dans ce dossier, a pointé « la faute de McKinsey » responsable selon elle d’un travail extensif auprès des producteurs d’opiacés dont il a tiré profit.

      En France, un « non-sujet total »

      Du moins, en France, McKinsey, quand bien même le cabinet est au pilori dans l’opinion publique pour son rôle auprès du ministère de la Santé dans la campagne de vaccination covid, ne semble pas inquiété dans les réseaux qui pourraient être clients.

      Ce dont témoigne Fabrice Le Saché, le porte-parole du Medef, vice-président du mouvement patronal : « McKinsey ? Je n’en ai jamais entendu débattre dans aucune fédération professionnelle. C’est un non-sujet total. »

      https://www.consultor.fr/devenir-consultant/actualite-du-conseil/6375-mckinsey-et-les-opioides-l-effet-lance-armstrong.html

    • utiliser McKinsey présente plusieurs avantages :

      – McKinsey recommande ce qui convient au client (ici : Macron)
      – McKinsey garantit l’opacité du processus de réforme
      – les cibles - les fonctionnaires, les usagers - sont écartés des discussions et mis devant le fait accompli (stratégie du choc)

      Par ailleurs, remplir les poches des amis avec de l’argent public permet de saigner un peu plus la cible.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/901052

  • Les scanners chinois utilisés par les douanes belges pointés du doigt : « Avec ça, ils peuvent infiltrer nos aéroports »
    https://www.lalibre.be/belgique/societe/les-scanners-chinois-utilises-par-les-douanes-belges-pointes-du-doigt-avec-c

    Les douanes belges utilisent des scanners fabriqués par une société chinoise pourtant interdits dans d’autres pays pour des raisons de sécurité. Si les douanes elles-mêmes n’y voient aucun problème, les critiques se multiplient, à en croire l’édition de vendredi du journal De Standaard. Les scanners fixes et mobiles en question, fabriqués par la société chinoise Nuctech, sont utilisés dans les ports, certaines gares et aéroports belges. Cependant, de plus en plus de questions se posent à propos de cette (...)

    #scanner #biométrie #données #empreintes #surveillance #

    ##_

  • Nous sommes dimanche et nous avons un peu de temps pour nous occuper des âmes perdues de l’internet.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidence_trick

    C’est vieux comme le monde.
    A lire de bas en haut. Pauvre scammeur.

    Evidemment. Ce mail contient juste du texte. Le virus est déjà dans ton cerveau, pas dans le mien.
    X-Virus-Scanned : Debian amavisd-new at mail.myserver.tld
    On t’inspecte.
    Received : from mail.myserver.tld ([127.0.0.1])
    by localhost (mail.myserver.tld [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
    with LMTP id H29SV_GRIcOE for <a2cd976d2268a50@mydomain.tld> ;
    Sun, 24 Jan 2021 07:49:00 +0100 (CET)
    Salut cher ami d’Afrique du Sud. Tu utilises un poste chez Vodacom PTY (Ltd), phone :+27-21-940-9498
    https://whois.urih.com/record/105.247.103.253
    O.K. Postfix marche.
    Received : from [105.247.103.253] (unknown [105.247.158.78])
    by mail.myserver.tld (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02A544174D0C
    for <a2cd976d2268a50@mydomain.tld> ; Sun, 24 Jan 2021 07:48:54 +0100 (CET)
    Tu crois que je dors encore.
    Date : 24 Jan 2021 09:41:51 +0100

    Parole de spammeur : just testing . Mais oui, je n’ai jamais utilisé cette adresse. Tu écris à mon pot de miel.
    From : <a2cd976d2268a50@mydomain.tld>

    Mais non, tu n’as pas mis la main sur mes identifiants. Tu crois que tu écris à une gourde. Vas te recoucher. Merci d’avoir vérifié que mes systèmes fonctionnent. Enfin, je crois que tu es un bot qui s’est installé confortablement dans un café internet de Kaapstad .
    https://af.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaapstad

    Hallo!Haben Sie bemerkt, dass ich Ihnen von Ihrem Konto aus eine E-Mail geschickt habe?Ja, das bedeutet einfach, dass ich vollst&#228;ndigen Zugriff auf Ihr Ger&#228;t habe.In den letzten paar Monaten habe ich Sie beobachtet.Haben Sie sich gefragt, wie? Nun, Sie wurden von einer Erwachsenen-Webseite, die Sie besucht haben, mit Malware infiziert.Vielleicht ist Ihnen das nicht bekannt, aber ich werde versuchen, es Ihnen zu erkl&#228;ren.Durch den Trojaner-Virus habe ich vollst&#228;ndigen Zugang zu einem PC oder einem anderen Ger&#228;t.Das bedeutet einfach, dass ich Sie jederzeit auf Ihrem Bildschirm sehen kann, wenn ich Ihre Kamera und Ihr Mikrofon einschalte und Sie k&#246;nnen es nicht bemerken.Au&#223;erdem habe ich Zugang zu Ihrer Kontaktliste und Ihrer gesamten Korrespondenz.Sie fragen sich vielleicht: "Aber mein PC hat ein aktives Antivirenprogramm, wie ist das &#252;berhaupt m&#246;glich? Warum habe ich keine Benachrichtigung erhalten?"Nun, die Antwort ist einfach: Meine Malware verwendet Treiber, bei denen ich alle vier Stunden die Signaturen aktualisiere, so dass sie nicht auffindbar ist und Ihr Antivirusprogramm nichts bemerkt.Ich habe ein Video vom Onanieren; auf dem linken Bildschirm und auf dem rechten Bildschirm das Video, das Sie sich beim Masturbieren angesehen haben.Sie fragen sich, wie schlimm das noch werden kann? Mit einem einzigen Mausklick kann dieses Video an alle Ihre sozialen Netzwerke und E-Mail-Kontakte gesendet werden.Ich kann auch Zugang zu Ihrer gesamten E-Mail-Korrespondenz und zu den von Ihnen benutzten Messengern gew&#228;hren.Alles, was Sie tun m&#252;ssen, um das zu verhindern, ist einfach:&#220;berweisen Sie Bitcoins im Wert von 1450 US Dollar an meine Bitcoin-Adresse (wenn Sie keine Ahnung haben, wie Sie das machen k&#246;nnen, suchen Sie einfach in Ihrem Internet-Browser: „Bitcoin kaufen“).Meine Bitcoin-Adresse (BTC Wallet) lautet: 1FEAFBa5L496PsNHZLZ8UmAJqRkzefJ6Lq Nachdem sie Ihre Zahlung best&#228;tigt haben, werde ich das Video l&#246;schen und das war’s, Sie werden nie wieder von mir h&#246;ren.Sie haben 2 Tage (48 Stunden) Zeit, um diese Transaktion abzuschlie&#223;en.Sobald Sie diese E-Mail &#246;ffnen, erhalte ich eine Benachrichtigung und mein Timer beginnt zu ticken.Jeder Versuch, eine Beschwerde einzureichen, wird zu nichts f&#252;hren, da diese E-Mail nicht wie meine Bitcoin-ID zur&#252;ckverfolgt werden kann.Ich habe so lange wie m&#246;glich darauf hingearbeitet; ich biete keine Chance f&#252;r einen Fehler. Wenn ich durch irgendein Ereignis herausfinde, dass Sie diese Nachricht jemand anderem mitgeteilt haben, werde ich, wie oben erw&#228;hnt, ihr Video versenden.

    Confidence trick
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidence_trick

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    (Redirected from Scam)
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    “Con man” and “Scam” redirect here. For other uses, see Con Man (disambiguation), Confidence man (disambiguation), and Scam (disambiguation).
    “Confidence game” redirects here. For the 2016 film, see Confidence Game.
    “Ripoff artist” redirects here. For counterfeits, see knockoffs.
    “Con artist” redirects here. For other uses, see The Con Artist and The Con Artists.
    Political cartoon by JM Staniforth: Herbert Kitchener attempts to raise £100,000 for a college in Sudan by calling on the name of Charles George Gordon

    A confidence trick is an attempt to defraud a person or group after first gaining their trust. Confidence tricks exploit victims using their credulity, naïveté, compassion, vanity, irresponsibility, and greed. Researchers have defined confidence tricks as “a distinctive species of fraudulent conduct ... intending to further voluntary exchanges that are not mutually beneficial”, as they “benefit con operators (’con men’) at the expense of their victims (the ’marks’)”.

    #internet #serveur #SPAM #SCAM #email #WTF

  • Scaphandre v0.1.1 : mesurer la consommation d’énergie (des coulisses) du numérique - Benoit Petit
    https://bpetit.nce.re/fr/2021/01/scaphandre-v0.1.1-mesurer-la-consommation-d%C3%A9nergie-des-coulisses-du-

    Scaphandre, un logiciel open-source de mesure de la consommation d’énergie d’un serveur informatique ou ordinateur, mais aussi des services et applications qu’il exécute. Plus précisément, scaphandre est à la fois un outil utilisable en ligne de commande et un démon (service).
    Le projet a notamment pour objectif de rendre la mesure de consommation d’énergie suffisamment simple pour que ça devienne “un basique”, au même titre que le nombre de requêtes par seconde ou la latence, le temps CPU consommé ou la RAM, etc…

    Le repo Git : https://github.com/hubblo-org/scaphandre

    Complémentairement sur cette thématique, voir aussi :
    - https://linuxfr.org/nodes/122937/comments/1837930 qui propose une sélection de ressources pour la consommation du côté des terminaux (ordis, smartphones...) et des « coûts CO2 » de la fabrication
    https://nuts.be-ma.fr :

    Nuts est un datalake regroupant les données constructeurs autour des émissions des GES, pour les différentes phase de fabrication d’un équipement : Production & fabrication, Transport, Usage, Recyclage

    – les données de l’ADEME pour les équipements électroniques : https://www.bilans-ges.ademe.fr/documentation/UPLOAD_DOC_FR/index.htm?ordinateurs_et_equuipements_pe.htm

    #scaphandre #consommation_énergie #open-source #ademe

  • Les Suédois victimes de la « coronaskam », la honte de la stratégie du pays face au Covid-19
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/12/31/en-suede-les-habitants-ont-la-coronaskam-la-honte-de-la-strategie-du-pays-fa

    L’année 2019 avait popularisé le mot « flygskam » : en suédois, la honte – « skam » – de prendre l’avion – « flyga » –, ce moyen de transport polluant. L’année 2020 a rapidement réglé le problème, en clouant au sol la majeure partie de la population mondiale. Pour autant, les Suédois ne se sont pas départis de leur sentiment de déshonneur. A la « flygskam » a succédé la « coronaskam » : littéralement, la « honte du corona ». En cause : la stratégie suédoise face à la pandémie due au coronavirus et la décision du gouvernement, à Stockholm, de ne pas confiner sa population. Chez ses voisins, ayant tous adopté des mesures plus restrictives, cette approche tout en douceur a d’abord suscité l’incompréhension, avant de provoquer l’effroi, et parfois, l’hostilité. Car au final, la Suède a enregistré 4,5 fois plus de morts que le Danemark, près de neuf fois plus que la Finlande et l’Islande, et onze fois plus que la Norvège.

    Or, les Nordiques veulent croire qu’ils ont plus de points communs que de différences : une histoire, une culture, des traditions, et même la langue pour certains. Bref, « une identité très forte, pas toujours facile à mesurer de l’étranger », assure Anna Hallberg, ministre suédoise des questions nordiques. Depuis 1952 – et jusqu’à l’arrivée du coronavirus – leurs ressortissants pouvaient même passer d’un pays à l’autre, sans montrer leur passeport. Mais « tout cela n’a rien à voir avec ce qui s’est passé depuis le début de la pandémie », martèle Bertel Haarder, député danois du Parti libéral et président du conseil de la liberté de circulation mis en place par les cinq pays. A partir du 1er janvier 2021, il va prendre la tête du Conseil nordique, dans un contexte complètement inédit.
    Non seulement, depuis le mois mars, les frontières ont fait leur réapparition dans la région, ce qui a causé un traumatisme dans les régions limitrophes, dont l’économie a été durement affectée. Mais de nombreux Suédois affirment être stigmatisés par leurs voisins. C’est le cas notamment d’une partie des 14 000 transfrontaliers qui vivent en Suède et travaillent en Norvège et dont certains disent être ostracisés par leurs collègues ou leurs employeurs. Chaque semaine, ils doivent se faire tester dans un centre de dépistage norvégien.
    « Pourtant, jusqu’à début décembre, les contaminations étaient plus élevées côté norvégien que suédois dans les localités frontalières », rappelle Kjell-Arne Ottosson. Député chrétien-démocrate, vivant dans la province suédoise du Värmland, « à 100 m de la Norvège », il ne décolère pas : « Sur un chantier à Oslo, des ouvriers suédois ont dû porter une veste de couleur orange et manger dans une salle séparée », affirme-t-il. Même ceux qui vivent en Norvège depuis des années font part de leur malaise. « Au printemps, on nous traitait comme des pestiférés », assure Johan Öberg. Habitant à la frontière, côté norvégien, il en a parlé à des journaux locaux. « Depuis, quand je discute avec les parents du club de hockey de ma fille, par exemple, ils me demandent d’abord si cela ne me dérange pas qu’ils me posent des questions sur la Suède. » Des interrogations devenues désormais inévitables pour les Suédois à l’étranger, qui ne savent pas toujours y répondre. (...) Pour certains, la honte finit par être intériorisée : « Quand la frontière a été brièvement ouverte cet été, je suis allé faire du kayak sur mon lac préféré, juste à côté de chez moi en Norvège, raconte Kjell-Arne Ottosson. D’habitude, je vais boire un café après, mais j’y ai renoncé. Je ne me sentais pas bien, j’avais l’impression de violer la loi, d’être un criminel. Pourtant, je ne faisais rien d’illégal. »Des Norvégiens, propriétaires de maisons secondaires en Suède, se sont eux aussi retrouvés exposés à la « coronaskam », après avoir passé la frontière. Un millier d’entre eux a d’ailleurs porté plainte contre l’Etat norvégien, qui leur impose une quarantaine de dix jours, à leur retour de Suède. La ministre suédoise Anna Hallberg va jusqu’à parler de « harcèlement » et s’inquiète d’une polarisation, dont elle craint qu’elle laisse des marques durables, qui « mettront du temps à guérir ». Bertel Haarder regrette pour sa part, « le sentiment de défiance », qui s’est installé dans les régions transfrontalières, compliquant l’intégration des cinq pays nordiques : « A l’avenir, certains pourraient hésiter à chercher du travail ou déménager dans le pays voisin », observe-t-il.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#suede#danemarknorvege#scandinavie#honte#stigmatisation#frontiere#economie#residence#quarantaine

  • France attacks religion secularism radicalism blasphemy
    –-> article retiré:


    https://www.politico.eu/article/france-attacks-religion-secularism-radicalism-blasphemy-islam

    –—

    Copié ici:

    Another string of jihadist attacks has shaken France. The most recent, at a church in Nice, left three people dead, only two weeks after a teacher was beheaded on the outskirts of Paris after he displayed cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in his classroom.

    Why is France targeted, over and over again, by violent extremists? Germany, England, Italy and even Denmark — where cartoons of controversial Mohammed were first published — have not seen comparable violence.

    The reason is simple: France’s extreme form of secularism and its embrace of blasphemy, which has fueled radicalism among a marginalized minority.

    Specifically, the latest round of violence follows the decision earlier this month by the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo to mark the beginning of a trial over a murderous attack on its newsroom in 2015 by republishing the blasphemous cartoons of Mohammed that prompted the original assault.

    This duo — radical secularism and religious radicalism — have been engaged in a deadly dance ever since.

    Traditionally, French secularism requires the state to be neutral and calls for respect for religions in the public space, in order to avoid the rise of religious intolerance.

    In modern times, however, it has become something far more extreme. The moderate secularism that prevailed as recently as the 1970s has been replaced with something more like a civil religion.

    It’s a belief system that has its own priests (government ministers), its pontiff (the president of the republic), its acolytes (intellectuals) and its heretics (anyone who calls for a less antagonistic attitude toward Islam is rejected and branded an “Islamo-leftist”).

    One of the defining features of this new secularism is the promotion of religious blasphemy — and, in particular, its extreme expression in the form of caricatures like those of Mohammed.

    This embrace was on full display following the murder of the teacher who showed cartoons of Mohammed in his classes, when many French intellectuals came out in praise of blasphemy and defended the government’s unequivocal defense of the right to free expression.

    They should have considered their words more carefully.

    In Western Europe the right to blaspheme is legally recognized. But it is one thing to protect the freedom to blaspheme and another to enthusiastically exhort blasphemy, as is the case in France.

    Blasphemy is a non-argumentative and sarcastic form of free speech. It should be used, at best, with moderation in a country where between 6 percent and 8 percent of the population is Muslim, most of whose parents or grandparents emigrated from French colonies in North Africa.

    Defenders of blasphemy invoke freedom of expression, but what blasphemy does, in fact, is trap France in a vicious cycle of reactivity to jihadist terror that makes it less free and less autonomous.

    The immoderate use of caricatures in name of the right to blaspheme ultimately undermines public debate: It stigmatizes and humiliates even the most moderate or secular Muslims, many of whom do not understand French secularists’ obsessive focus on Islam, the veil, daily prayers or Islamic teachings.

    The result is a harmful cycle: provocation, counter-provocation, and a society’s descent into hell. As French secularism has become radicalized, the number of jihadist attacks in the country has multiplied.

    French secularists claim to be fighting for freedom of expression. As they do so, innocent people are dying, Muslims around the world are rejecting French values and boycotting the country’s products, and French Muslims are facing restrictions on their freedom of expression in the name of thwarting Islamist propaganda.

    France is paying a heavy price for its fundamentalist secularism, both inside and outside its own borders.

    https://www.1news.info/european-news/france-s-dangerous-religion-of-secularism-798875

    #Farhad_Khosrokhavar #terrorisme #religion #sécularisme #blasphème #extrémisme #France #violence #minorité_marginalisée #radicalisme #radicalisation #Charlie_Hebdo #radicalisme_religieux #sécularisme_radical #religion_civile #islamo-gauchisme #caricatures #liberté_d'expression #débat_public #provocation #contre-provocation #sécularisme_fondamentaliste

    ping @karine4 @cede @isskein

    • « On a oublié le rôle de l’#humiliation dans l’Histoire », par #Olivier_Abel

      Pour le philosophe, « en sacralisant les #caricatures, nous sommes devenus incapables de percevoir ce que les Grecs anciens désignaient par le #tragique ».

      Quel rapport entre les crimes abjects des djihadistes, le danger que représentent à certains égards les « réseaux sociaux » pour la démocratie et la civilité, la question de la liberté d’expression et du blasphème, le durcissement quasi-guerrier de la laïcité, les gilets jaunes, les majorités dangereuses qui ont porté Trump ou Erdogan au pouvoir, et qui poussent à nos portes ? Nous ne comprenons pas ce qui nous arrive, ces colères qui montent en miroir sans plus rien chercher à comprendre, nous ne savons et sentons plus ce que nous faisons. Je voudrais proposer ici une hypothèse.

      Nous avons globalement fait fausse route. Le drame des caricatures n’est que la partie visible d’un énorme problème. Nous nous sommes enfoncés dans le #déni de l’humiliation, de son importance, de sa gravité, de son existence même. Nous sommes sensibles aux #violences, comme aux #inégalités, mais insensibles à l’humiliation qui les empoisonne. Comme l’observait le philosophe israélien Avishaï Margalit, nous n’imaginons même pas ce que serait une société dont les institutions (police, préfectures, administrations, prisons, hôpitaux, écoles, etc.) seraient non-humiliantes. Dans l’état actuel de rétrécissement des ressources planétaires, on aura beaucoup de mal à faire une société plus juste, mais pourquoi déjà ne pas essayer une société moins humiliante ?

      Ni quantifiable, ni mesurable

      Il faut dire que l’humiliation est une notion – et une réalité - compliquée. L’#offense est subjective, et dépend au moins autant de ceux qui la reçoivent que de ceux qui l’émettent. Ce qui humiliera l’un laissera l’autre indifférent, et cela dépend même du moment où ça tombe. L’humiliation n’est pas quantifiable, mesurable, comme le sont les coups et blessures. D’où la tentation de dire que là où il n’y a pas de #dommage ni #préjudice il n’y a pas de #tort. Ce n’est pas une affaire de #droit mais seulement de #sentiment ou de #morale personnelle, donc circulez, il n’y a rien à dire.

      Et pourtant… Si les violences s’attaquent au #corps de l’autre, dans ses capacités et sa #vulnérabilité, l’humiliation fait encore pire : elle s’attaque au visage de l’autre, dans son #estime et son #respect_de_soi : elle le fait blanchir ou rougir, et souvent les deux en même temps.

      Car l’humiliation se présente de deux façons, en apparence contradictoires. Par un côté, elle porte atteinte à l’estime de soi, en faisant #honte à l’individu de son expression, de ce qu’il voudrait montrer et faire valoir, elle le rabroue et l’exclut du cercle de ceux qui sont autorisés à parler. Mais, par un autre côté, elle porte atteinte également au #respect et à la #pudeur, en dévoilant ce qui voulait se cacher, en forçant l’individu à montrer ce qui constitue sa réserve, en le surexposant au #regard_public, en lui interdisant de se retirer.

      L’humiliation s’attaque au sujet parlant. Les humains ne se nourrissent pas de pain et de cirques seulement, mais de #paroles_vives en vis-à-vis : ils n’existent qu’à se reconnaître mutuellement comme des sujets parlants, crédités comme tels, et reconnus dans leur crédibilité. L’humiliation fait taire le sujet parlant, elle lui fait honte de son expression, elle ruine sa confiance en soi.

      Quand le faible est trop faible

      Elle peut également atteindre des formes de vie, des minorités langagières, sexuelles, raciales, religieuses, sociales, etc. Il peut même arriver qu’une majorité endormie dans sa complaisance soit humiliée par une minorité active. Elle devient ce que j’appelais plus haut une majorité « dangereuse », pour elle-même et pour les autres.

      Une #parole_humiliée devient sujette à ces deux maladies du langage que sont la #dévalorisation ou la #survalorisation de soi. Ou, pour le dire autrement : la #dérision ou le #fanatisme. Commençons par la genèse du fanatisme. Simone Weil avait proposé d’expliquer les affaires humaines par cette loi : « on est toujours #barbares avec les faibles ». Il faudrait donc que nul ne soit laissé trop faible et sans aucun #contre-pouvoir, et que le plus fort soit suffisamment « déprotégé » pour rester sensible au faible, bon gagnant si je puis dire, et conscient qu’il ne sera pas toujours le plus fort.

      Mais quand le faible est trop faible pour infliger quelque tort que ce soit au plus fort, le pacte politique posé par Hobbes est rompu. Les faibles n’ont plus rien à perdre, ne sont plus tenus par le souci de la sécurité des biens et des corps, il ne leur reste que l’au-delà et ils basculent dans le #sacrifice_de_soi, dans une parole portée à la folie. Ici la #religion vient juste au dernier moment pour habiller, nommer, justifier cette mutation terrible.

      « C’est à l’humiliation que répond la #barbarie »

      La violence appelle la violence, dans un échange réciproque qui devrait rester à peu près proportionné, même si bien souvent la #violence s’exerce elle-même de manière humiliante, et nous ne savons pas ce que serait une violence vraiment non-humiliante. Avec l’humiliation cependant, le cercle des échanges devient vicieux, les retours sont longuement différés, comme sans rapport, et ils ont quelque chose de démesuré. Ils sont parallèles, mais en négatif, aux circuits de la #reconnaissance dont on sait qu’ils prennent du temps.

      C’est pourquoi les effets de l’humiliation sont si dévastateurs. Ils courent dans le temps, car les humiliés seront humiliants au centuple. Comme le remarquait #Ariane_Bazan, ils peuvent aller jusqu’à détruire méthodiquement toute scène de reconnaissance possible, toute réparation possible : la mère tuera tous ses enfants, comme le fait Médée rejetée par Jason. Lisant Euripide, elle concluait : « c’est à l’humiliation que répond la barbarie ». Les grandes tragédies sont des scènes de la reconnaissance non seulement manquée, mais écrabouillée.

      Pourquoi nos sociétés occidentales sont-elles collectivement aussi insensibles à l’humiliation ? Est-ce la différence avec ce qu’on a appelé les sociétés de honte, le Japon, le monde arabe ? Sans doute est-ce d’abord aujourd’hui parce que nous sommes une société managée par des unités de mesure quantifiable, la monnaie, l’audimat, et par une juridicisation qui ne reconnaît que les torts mesurables, compensables, sinon monnayables.

      Cette évolution a été accélérée par une #morale_libérale, qui est une #morale_minimale, où tout est permis si l’autre est consentant : or on n’a pas besoin du #consentement de l’autre pour afficher sa #liberté, tant que son expression n’est ni violente ni discriminante à l’égard des personnes, et ne porte aucun dommage objectif — les croyances n’existent pas, on peut en faire ce qu’on veut. Le facteur aggravant de l’humiliation, dans une société de réseaux, c’est la diffusion immédiate et sans écrans ralentisseurs des atteintes à la réputation : la #calomnie, la #moquerie, le #harcèlement.

      L’angle mort de notre civilisation

      Mais plus profondément encore, plus anciennement, notre insensibilité à l’humiliation est due à l’entrecroisement, dans nos sociétés, d’une morale stoïcienne de la #modestie, et d’une morale chrétienne de l’#humilité. Celle-ci, en rupture avec les religions de l’imperium, de la victoire, propose en modèle un divin abaissé et humilié dans l’ignominie du supplice de la croix, réservé aux esclaves. Le #stoïcisme est une sagesse dont la stratégie consiste à décomposer l’opinion d’autrui en des énoncés creux dont aucun ne saurait nous atteindre : l’esclave stoïcien n’est pas plus humiliable que l’empereur stoïcien.

      La dialectique hégélienne du maître et de l’esclave est d’ailleurs héritière de ces deux traditions mêlées, quand il fait de l’expérience de l’esclavage une étape nécessaire sur le chemin de la liberté. Cette vertu d’humilité a paradoxalement creusé dans le monde de la chevalerie médiévale, puis dans la société française de cour, et finalement dans le dévouement de l’idéal scientifique, un sillon profond, qui est comme l’angle mort de notre civilisation.

      Et cet angle mort nous a empêchés de voir le rôle de l’humiliation dans l’histoire : c’est l’humiliation du Traité de Versailles qui prépare la venue d’Hitler au pouvoir, celle de la Russie ou de la Turquie qui y maintient Poutine et Erdogan, c’est la manipulation du sentiment d’humiliation qui a propulsé la figure de Trump. Et cette histoire n’est pas finie. Les manipulations machiavéliques des sentiments de peur et les politiques du #ressentiment n’ont jamais atteint, dans tous nos pays simultanément, un tel niveau de dangerosité. Les djihadistes ici jouent sur du velours, car à l’humiliation ancienne de la #colonisation militaire, économique, et culturelle, s’est ajoutée celle des #banlieues et du #chômage, et maintenant les caricatures du prophète, répétées à l’envi.

      #Fanatisme et #dérision

      Car la genèse de la dérision est non moins importante, et concomitante à celle du fanatisme. On a beaucoup entendu parler du #droit_de_blasphémer : curieuse expression, de la part de tous ceux (et j’en suis) qui ne croient pas au #blasphème ! Réclamer le droit de blasphémer, s’acharner à blasphémer, n’est-ce pas encore y croire, y attacher de l’importance ? N’est-ce pas comme les bandes iconoclastes de la Réforme ou de la Révolution qui saccagent les églises, dans une sorte de superstition anti-superstitieuse ?

      Tout le tragique de l’affaire tient justement au fait que ce qui est important pour les uns est négligeable pour les autres. Il faudrait que les uns apprennent à ne pas accorder tant d’importance à de telles #satires, et que les autres apprennent à mesurer l’importance de ce qu’ils font et disent. Ce qui m’inquiète aujourd’hui c’est le sentiment qu’il n’y a plus rien d’important, sauf le droit de dire que rien n’est important.

      Une société où tout est « cool » et « fun » est une société insensible à l’humiliation, immunisée à l’égard de tout scandale, puisqu’il n’y reste rien à transgresser, rien à profaner. Or la fonction du #scandale est vitale pour briser la complaisance d’une société à elle-même. Pire, lorsque l’ironiste adopte un point de vue en surplomb, pointant l’idiotie des autres, il interrompt toute possibilité de #conversation. On peut rire, mais encore faut-il que cela puisse relancer la conversation !

      Sacralisation des caricatures ?

      Le différend tient peut-être aussi au fait que nous ne disposons pas exactement des mêmes genres littéraires. #Salman_Rushdie et #Milan_Kundera observaient que le monde musulman a du mal à comprendre ce que c’est qu’un « roman », comme une forme littéraire typique d’une certaine époque européenne, et qui met en suspens le jugement moral. Nous aussi, nous avons un problème : on dirait parfois que le genre littéraire éminent qui fonde notre culture est la caricature, la dérision, le #comique.

      Ce qui est proprement caricatural, c’est que les caricatures, le #droit_de_rire, soient devenues notre seul sacré. Serions-nous devenus incapables de percevoir ce que les Grecs anciens désignaient par le tragique ? N’avons-nous pas perdu aussi le sens de l’#épopée véritable (celle qui honore les ennemis), et le sens de quoi que ce soit qui nous dépasse nos gentilles libertés bien protégées ?

      Aujourd’hui, aux manipulations de la peur et de la xénophobie par les néonationalistes français, qui sacralisent la #laïcité comme si elle n’était plus le cadre neutre d’une #liberté_d’expression capable de cohabiter paisiblement avec celle des autres, mais la substance même de l’#identité française (une identité aussi moniste et exclusive que jadis l’était le catholicisme pour l’Action française), répond la manipulation cynique du sentiment d’humiliation des musulmans français par les prédicateurs-guerriers du djihadisme, qui n’ont de cesse d’instrumentaliser le ressentiment, dans le monde et en France.

      Liberté d’abjurer et laïcité réelle

      Aux organisations musulmanes françaises, nous dirons : demandez aux pays dominés par l’islam politique d’accorder à leurs minorités les mêmes libertés réelles qui sont celles des musulmans de France, et accordez solennellement à toutes les musulmanes et à tous les musulmans le droit d’abjurer, de se convertir, ou simplement de se marier en dehors de leur communauté.

      Aux néonationalistes, nous dirons : si la laïcité n’est plus que cette identité sacrée, c’est-à-dire le contraire de ce qu’elle a été dans l’histoire réelle (oui, enseignons d’abord l’histoire réelle dans son long cours, ses compromis complexes, et pas les histoires simplistes que nous nous racontons !), le #pacte_laïque sera rompu, et nous ferons sécession, il faudra tout recommencer, ensemble et avec les nouveaux venus.

      Car ce pacte est ce qui, au nom de notre histoire commune, et inachevée, autorise, au sens fort, la #reconnaissance_mutuelle. Il cherche à instituer un théâtre commun d’apparition qui fasse pleinement crédit à la parole des uns et des autres. C’est bien ce qui nous manque le plus aujourd’hui.

      https://www.nouvelobs.com/idees/20201122.OBS36427/on-a-oublie-le-role-de-l-humiliation-dans-l-histoire-par-olivier-abel.htm

  • Police are using fingerprint scanners to target Black Britons
    https://www.wired.co.uk/article/police-fingerprint-scan-uk

    Police use of mobile fingerprint scanners is soaring. But as with stop-and-search, stop-and-scan is disproportionately being used against ethnic minorities Three quarters of police forces in England and Wales now have access to mobile fingerprint scanners issued by the Home Office, new data reveals. In total, 28 of 43 police forces have started using the Strategic Mobile solution technology since it was first trialled, with four conducting their own pilot tests and seven other forces in (...)

    #scanner #activisme #biométrie #empreintes

  • Decentralized Social Networks vs. The Trolls (28mn)
    https://conf.tube/videos/watch/d8c8ed69-79f0-4987-bafe-84c01f38f966

    In the summer of 2019, the alt-right social network Gab migrated to the decentralized “Fediverse” of social networks after being booted from mainstream financial services and hosting solutions. Almost immediately, Gab was met by a dedicated movement to isolate it. The movement was largely successful; within a year, the Gab CTO announced they would leave the Fediverse. This talk will cover how moderators, activists, and developers in the Fediverse used human moderators, strong moderation tools, representative codes of conduct, and no small amount of organization to promote healthy online spaces.

    We’ll review how some of the challenges faced by centralized platforms, which struggle with their own size and scale, have been addressed in networks of smaller, community run, more moderated servers. In the debate over how to make a healthier internet, the open platforms and open protocols in the model of the Fediverse may have some of the best resources to isolate bad actors, including Gab.

    #federation #scale #moderation

  • Contact-tracing data harvested from pubs and restaurants being sold on
    https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/contact-tracing-data-harvested-from-pubs-and-restaurants-being-sold-on-s

    Companies collecting data for pubs and restaurants to help them fulfil their contact-tracing duties are harvesting confidential customer information to sell. Legal experts have warned of a “privacy crisis” caused by a rise in companies exploiting QR barcodes to take names, addresses, telephone numbers and email details, before passing them on to marketers, credit companies and insurance brokers. The “quick response” mobile codes have been widely adopted by the hospitality, leisure and beauty (...)

    #NHS #QRcode #contactTracing #données #COVID-19 #DataBrokers #santé #scam #publicité

    ##santé ##publicité
    https://www.thetimes.co.uk/imageserver/image/%2Fmethode%2Fsundaytimes%2Fprod%2Fweb%2Fbin%2Fc6c91d82-0ba5-11eb-ba08-77

  • Une certaine @bloodtear a posté cette vidéo sur touiteur :
    https://twitter.com/bioodtear/status/1309325280146788352
    https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1309325183229005827/pu/vid/720x720/b46bbzC7LgwbHn2v.mp4

    Pas de contexte, aucune explication, mais je trouve ça absolument terrifiant. Que fait cette saloperie de Boston Dynamics dans la rue, apparemment seule ?

    Va vraiment falloir que quelqu’un travaille sur une télécommande universelle qui désactive ce genre de merdes.

    • Una riflessione sul rapporto tra migrazione e sicurezza a partire dalla questione della iscrizione anagrafica

      Io sono un uomo invisibile. No, non sono uno spettro, come quelli che ossessionavano Edgar Allan Poe; e non sono neppure uno di quegli ectoplasmi dei film di Hollywood. Sono un uomo che ha consistenza, di carne e di ossa, fibre e umori, e si può persino dire che possegga un cervello. Sono invisibile semplicemente perché la gente si rifiuta di vedermi: capito? (…) Quando gli altri si avvicinano, vedono solo quello che mi sta intorno, o se stessi, o delle invenzioni della loro fantasia, ogni e qualsiasi cosa, insomma, tranne me”.
      (R.W. Ellison, L’uomo invisibile - 1952 - Einaudi Torino 2009, p. 3).
      1.

      In questi ultimi giorni si è tornato a parlare molto dei c.d. Decreti sicurezza e di una loro possibile revisione. A riaprire il dibattito, da ultimo, la pronuncia della Corte costituzionale dello scorso 9 luglio con la quale è stata dichiarata l’illegittimità costituzionale dell’art. 13 comma 1, lett. a) n. 2 del primo “decreto sicurezza” (Decreto Legge 4 ottobre 2018 n. 113) per violazione dell’art. 3 della Costituzione.

      Prima di dare conto del contenuto della decisione della Corte costituzionale, è opportuno ripercorrere, seppur brevemente, le tappe del percorso che ha portato i giudici della Consulta a intervenire. Per chiarire i termini precisi della discussione che è scaturita in questi anni e il senso della decisione finale assunta il 9 luglio, occorre inquadrare la questione in primo luogo da un punto di vista giuridico.

      Questa importante pronuncia ha riguardato appunto la legittimità costituzionale del primo Decreto Sicurezza approvato nel 2018 che doveva servire a impedire, almeno nelle intenzioni del legislatore, l’iscrizione dei richiedenti asilo, sulla base del titolo di soggiorno provvisorio loro rilasciato, nei registri anagrafici dei Comuni. Una modifica normativa volta a rendere ancor più precario lo status giuridico dei richiedenti asilo presenti nel nostro Paese, negando a costoro anche un legame fittizio con il territorio che avrebbe dovuto accoglierli. Una restrizione dal forte valore simbolico e di carattere tutto politico, frutto dei tempi.

      La nuova previsione normativa introdotta dall’art. 13 cit. ha animato, anche per questo, un forte dibattito e numerose sono state le prese di posizione da parte sia dei commentatori politici che dei tecnici del diritto. Un dibattito che purtroppo si è fermato alle problematiche più strettamente giuridiche sollevate dalla nuova normativa, tralasciando invece la questione della ratio ispiratrice della nuova disciplina. Una ratio che imporrebbe una riflessione più generale sulle problematiche legate ai fenomeni migratori e, nello specifico, sul tema dell’asilo e del rispetto dei diritti umani.

      Il tema della iscrizione anagrafica, infatti, ci consente non solo una riflessione sul contesto normativo che è stato oggetto di modificazione, ma anche sul significato profondo che assume il concetto di “asilo” nel nostro Paese.
      2.

      Negli anni il diritto d’asilo è stato più volte ridefinito generando anche confusione. Un diritto che affonda le sue radici nella storia antica, lo conoscevano bene i greci che riconoscevano al fuggiasco una sorta di inviolabilità per il solo fatto di trovarsi in un determinato luogo. “Veniva chiamata asilia l’inviolabilità a cui quel luogo dava diritto” [1].

      Un diritto che nel corso del tempo ha subito non pochi cambiamenti e che oggi è diventato uno strumento nelle mani dello Stato che ne dispone a proprio piacimento.
      Viene da pensare a quanto scrive la professoressa Donatella Di Cesare proprio a proposito del diritto d’asilo. Nel chiedersi se si tratti di un diritto del singolo che lo chiede o dello Stato che lo concede, la Di Cesare evidenzia come l’asilo sia divenuto “un dispositivo di cui gli Stati si servono per esercitare, anche in concreto, il loro potere sui migranti” [2]. Accade così che si assiste ad una duplice deriva che porta lo Stato a moltiplicare le barriere giuridiche e poliziesche e ad aumentare le restrizioni burocratiche e procedurali, con il fine dichiarato (non celato) di scoraggiare le richieste di asilo politico.

      Questo dibattito, direttamente connesso alla questione della iscrizione anagrafica “negata” ai richiedenti asilo, è stato purtroppo poco presente ed è stato messo in secondo piano rispetto invece alle questioni, non meno importanti, della discriminazione in essere nella normativa introdotta dal Decreto Legge n. 113 del 2018.

      Una precisa “discriminazione” nei confronti di una determinata categoria di soggetti, appunto i richiedenti asilo, rispetto ai quali, secondo i primi commenti, diveniva impossibile procedere all’inserimento nelle liste anagrafiche dei Comuni di residenza.

      Una norma, peraltro che, come osservato da autorevoli commentatori, si poneva in netto contrasto con la logica stessa dell’istituto dell’iscrizione anagrafica e con l’articolo 6 comma 7 del Testo Unico Immigrazione.
      3.

      Le discussioni che sono scaturite e lo scontro tra numerosi Sindaci, da una parte, e il Ministro dell’Interno dell’epoca, dall’altra, con i primi disposti anche a disapplicare la norma sui loro territori, sono state di fatto mitigate dagli interventi dei Tribunali italiani chiamati a decidere sui ricorsi d’urgenza presentati dai richiedenti asilo che si sono visti negato il diritto di procedere all’iscrizione presso i registri suddetti.
      Infatti, nella pratica, la modifica prevista dall’art. 13 del Decreto 113 del 2018 è stata immediatamente disinnescata dagli interventi dei giudici di merito chiamati a pronunciarsi sui ricorsi proposti. Numerose pronunce hanno riconosciuto il diritto del richiedente asilo alla iscrizione anagrafica addivenendo a una interpretazione della norma secondo la quale l’affermazione contenuta nell’art. 13 comma 1 lett. a) n. 2 avrebbe avuto soltanto l’effetto di far venire meno il “regime speciale” introdotto dall’art. 8 D.L. 17.2.17 n. 13 conv. in L. 13.4.17 n. 46 (secondo il quale i richiedenti asilo venivano iscritti all’anagrafe sulla base della dichiarazione del titolare della struttura ospitante) per riportare il richiedente asilo nell’alveo del regime ordinario (quello cioè della verifica della dimora abituale, come previsto anche per il cittadino italiano, al quale lo straniero regolarmente soggiornante è parificato ai sensi dell’art. 6, comma 7 TU immigrazione). Solamente in tre procedimenti i Tribunali di Trento e Torino hanno optato per una interpretazione diversa della norma optando per un divieto di iscrizione.
      4.

      Per rendere più chiara la comprensione dell’operazione compiuta dalla giurisprudenza di merito, proviamo a ricostruire, brevemente, uno dei tanti casi portati all’attenzione dei giudici italiani, nello specifico il caso di un cittadino di nazionalità somala che ha proposto ricorso d’urgenza dinanzi al Tribunale di Firenze contro il diniego all’iscrizione nei registri anagrafici opposto dal Comune di Scandicci. Nel ricorso proposto dal richiedente asilo si evidenziava come il requisito del regolare soggiorno nel territorio dello Stato potesse essere accertato mediante documenti alternativi al permesso di soggiorno rilasciati ai soggetti che hanno presentato domanda di riconoscimento della protezione internazionale, quali, ad esempio, il modello C3 di richiesta asilo presentato in Questura, oppure la ricevuta rilasciata da quest’ultima per attestare il deposito della richiesta di soggiorno o la scheda di identificazione redatta dalla Questura. Il Tribunale di Firenze ha ritenuto di poter accogliere il ricorso esprimendosi in favore del ricorrente.

      Nel motivare la propria decisione, il Tribunale, analizzando il contenuto letterale del nuovo comma 1-bis citato, sottolinea come esso si riferisca al permesso di soggiorno per richiedenti protezione internazionale quale titolo per l’iscrizione anagrafica e che, tuttavia, il sistema normativo di riferimento dalla stessa disposizione richiamato (il DPR n. 223 del 1989 e l’art. 6, comma 7 del T.U.I.), non richieda alcun “titolo” per l’iscrizione anagrafica, ma solo una determinata condizione soggettiva, i.e. quella di essere regolarmente soggiornante nello Stato. Inoltre, riconoscendo che l’iscrizione anagrafica ha natura di attività amministrativa a carattere vincolato, in relazione alla quale il privato ha una posizione di diritto soggettivo, evidenzia come «l’iscrizione anagrafica registra la volontà delle persone che, avendo una dimora, hanno fissato in un determinato comune la residenza oppure, non avendo una dimora, hanno stabilito nello stesso comune il proprio domicilio», sulla base non di titoli, ma delle dichiarazioni egli interessati o degli accertamenti ai sensi degli artt. 13, 15, 18-bis e 19 del citato DPR n. 223/1989. Pertanto, non essendo intervenuta alcuna modificazione dell’art. 6, comma 7, del T.U.I., sulla base del quale «le iscrizioni e variazioni anagrafiche dello straniero regolarmente soggiornante sono effettuate alle medesime condizioni dei cittadini italiani con le modalità previste dal regolamento di attuazione, ritiene il Tribunale che il nuovo comma 1-bis dell’art. 4 D.lgs. n. 142/2015 non possa essere interpretato nel senso di aver introdotto un divieto, neppure implicito, di iscrizione anagrafica per i soggetti che abbiano presentato richiesta di protezione internazionale.

      In conclusione, secondo la giurisprudenza di merito richiamata, se il legislatore avesse voluto introdurre un divieto, avrebbe dovuto modificare il già citato art. 6, comma 7 T.U.I., anche nella parte in cui considera dimora abituale di uno straniero il centro di accoglienza ove sia ospitato da più di tre mesi.
      5.

      Nonostante l’interpretazione prevalente della nuova normativa, la questione è stata portata all’attenzione della Corte costituzionale dai Tribunali di Milano, Ancona e Salerno che hanno comunque ritenuto fondata la questione di illegittimità costituzionale per violazione dei diritti fondamentali dei richiedenti asilo e per violazione del principio di eguaglianza.

      In data 9 luglio 2020 la Corte costituzionale ha così dato l’ultimo colpo alla normativa di cui all’art. 13 sancendone la illegittimità per violazione dell’art. 3 della Costituzione. In effetti, nel comunicato stampa diramato dalla stessa Consulta, in attesa di leggere le motivazioni complete della decisione, è scritto che “la disposizione censurata non è stata ritenuta dalla Corte in contrasto con l’articolo 77 della Costituzione sui requisiti di necessità e di urgenza dei decreti legge. Tuttavia, la Corte ne ha dichiarato l’incostituzionalità per violazione dell’articolo 3 della Costituzione sotto un duplice profilo: per irrazionalità intrinseca, poiché la norma censurata non agevola il perseguimento delle finalità di controllo del territorio dichiarate dal decreto sicurezza; per irragionevole disparità di trattamento, perché rende ingiustificatamente più difficile ai richiedenti asilo l’accesso ai servizi che siano anche ad essi garantiti”.

      I giudici costituzionali sono stati perentori nell’affermare che la norma censurata si pone in contrasto con l’art. 3 della Costituzione sotto molteplici profili e “sostanzialmente perché introdurrebbe una deroga, priva dei requisiti di razionalità e ragionevolezza, alla disciplina dell’art. 6, comma 7, del D.lgs. n. 286 del 1998” [3].

      In particolare il legislatore si troverebbe a contraddire la ratio complessiva del decreto-legge n. 113 del 2018 al cui interno si colloca la disposizione portata all’attenzione della Corte costituzionale. Infatti, “a dispetto del dichiarato obiettivo dell’intervento normativo di aumentare il livello di sicurezza pubblica, la norma in questione, impedendo l’iscrizione anagrafica dei richiedenti asilo, finisce con il limitare le capacità di controllo e monitoraggio dell’autorità pubblica sulla popolazione effettivamente residente sul suo territorio, escludendo da essa una categoria di persone, gli stranieri richiedenti asilo, regolarmente soggiornanti nel territorio italiano” [4].

      In conclusione, finanche l’obiettivo primario perseguito dal legislatore verrebbe contraddetto dalla disposizione in esame che proprio per questa ragione sarebbe paradossalmente in contrasto persino con le esigenze dichiarate di maggiore controllo e sicurezza del fenomeno migratorio.

      Un vero paradosso se pensiamo che l’esclusione dalla registrazione anagrafica di persone che invece risiedono sul territorio comunale accresce anziché ridurre i problemi connessi al monitoraggio degli stranieri che soggiornano regolarmente nel territorio statale anche per lungo tempo.
      6.

      È sulla base di queste ultime osservazioni che è possibile articolare una breve riflessione complementare sulla giustapposizione ideologica e strumentale di “migrazione” e “sicurezza” e considerare la necessità/possibilità di ripensare, ancora rimandando tra gli altri ai lavori di Di Cesare, le modalità di coabitazione e di residenza in un territorio.

      In effetti oggi l’asilo e la “protezione internazionale” sono divenuti strumenti di gestione statale della migrazione (in senso generale) e dei corpi delle persone migranti (in senso più concreto), in un crescendo di categorizzazioni che hanno progressivamente ridotto il numero degli “aventi diritto”: da una parte attraverso processi di “vulnerabilizzazione” che hanno estremizzato le logiche selettive a detrimento del diritto di altri individui a presentare una richiesta di protezione. Non stiamo dicendo che i vulnerabili non vadano protetti, ma che non è possibile escludere gli altri dalla procedura perché non lo sono abbastanza.

      D’altra parte, attraverso un’evoluzione intimamente legata ai processi di esternalizzazione dei controlli e della gestione della migrazione da parte dell’UE, si sono fatti saltare i “fondamentali” del diritto d’asilo come diritto individuale, riducendo la questione a un’economia geopolitica che seleziona e distingue sempre più esplicitamente su base nazionale, a partire da assunti quali i “paesi terzi sicuri”, come l’Afghanistan, o i porti sicuri, come la Libia.

      Lo smantellamento e la limitazione dell’asilo come diritto fondamentale individuale, e il ridimensionamento delle prerogative e dei diritti dei richiedenti asilo che vanno inevitabilmente a minare le loro condizioni di vita e i loro percorsi di integrazione come nel caso dei decreti Salvini, rappresentano tra l’altro soltanto una parte, molto importante anche per la sua valenza simbolica, ma non preponderante di una degenerazione complessiva delle politiche in materia di migrazione in UE. Perché al peggioramento delle condizioni di vita dei richiedenti asilo corrispondono purtroppo anche un progressivo aumento dei dinieghi, e una sempre maggiore “esclusione” dei potenziali aventi diritto (e chiunque dovrebbe averlo) dalla procedura, a causa di pratiche espeditive di espulsione, a causa dei ritardi di compilazione della documentazione necessaria (C3), ecc. Volendo essere espliciti, chi accede alla procedura d’asilo rappresenta, oggi, alla fine, il “resto”, la rimanenza dell’insieme delle persone in migrazione che il dispositivo di controllo e di gestione globale (IOM, UE, Stati europei e paesi vicini collaborativi) non è riuscito a bloccare, nei paesi di partenza, di transito, nel Mediterraneo, negli hotspot, ecc...

      Rileggendo il deterioramento del sistema di asilo in questi anni, sia in termini di rispetto dei diritti fondamentali che in termini materiali di accoglienza, divenuta sempre meno una politica etica e sempre più un business e un terreno di confronto elettorale, non possiamo che constatare che il dispositivo di asilo (ideologico e pratico) si riduce sempre più, come conferma Di Cesare, ad uno strumento di gestione della migrazione, allo stesso modo che i regolamenti interni di gestione (Dublino), la gestione emergenziale dell’accoglienza, i dispositivi di gestione della frontiera (Frontex, Eunavformed) i processi di esternalizzazione, ecc. In questo senso, il deterioramento del sistema d’asilo rappresenta l’ultimo anello, il livello finale di una progressiva e generale “lotta alla migrazione”, dissimulata dietro retoriche di approcci globali e pratiche di politiche di esternalizzazione sempre più feroci (si veda il riferimento di Di Maio alla condizionalità negativa migrazione/sviluppo come forma istituzionalizzata di ricatto alla Tunisia) : lotta alla migrazione che ha visto estendersi progressivamente le categorie (e il numero) di indesiderabili, ridotti genericamente a “migranti economici” provenienti da paesi “’sicuri” o comunque “bloccati” dal dispositivo di controllo e gestione della mobilità imposto ai paesi terzi. L’erosione del diritto d’asilo va dunque letta anche all’interno di una più generale dinamica generale di riduzione dei diritti alla mobilità e all’installazione nei confronti di una certa tipologia di persone straniere da parte dei paesi dell’UE.
      7.

      Il presupposto problematico è che questi “diritti” destinati a persone straniere vengono sempre definiti e manovrati da coloro i quali sono nelle condizioni di doverli applicare, e le norme internazionali vengono ignorate, trascurate, aggirate invocando situazioni di “urgenza” e di sicurezza, che evidentemente si sono amplificate in questa stagione pandemica, e che si accompagnano all’armamentario ideologico dei nuovi sovranisti. Questo è vero per quanto riguarda le situazioni di frontiera, ontologicamente più fosche e meno trasparenti, all’interno delle quali norme meno restrittive (Cuttitta etc) si associano a pratiche in esplicita violazione dei diritti fondamentali, ma è vero anche per quanto riguarda l’articolazione dei dispositivi di accoglienza e più in generale la gestione della presenza sul territorio di persone straniere con status amministrativi differenti, e condizioni di marginalità (e sfruttamento) differenti. La difesa della patria, il “prima gli italiani” che si declina a livello regionale, provinciale e iperlocale in un ripiegamento identitario in abisso, rappresentano il corrispettivo ideologico delle politiche di esclusione e di “chiusura” che i paesi dell’UE hanno integrato trasversalmente, con qualche sfumatura più o meno xenofoba. E purtroppo la retorica xenofoba, che mixa ignoranza e paura, paura di invasione e di contagio, si abbatte sulla popolazione con la forza di media conniventi e ripetizione ad oltranza di notizie false, fuorvianti, imprecise, volte ad alimentare diffidenza e timore: “insicurezza”.

      In questo senso, sarebbe utile come accennavamo sopra, provvedere ad una genealogia della convergenza di “immigrazione” e “sicurezza”, al di là dell’assunto antropologico “atavico” che il pericolo arrivi da fuori, da ciò che non si conosce: ma è già possibile, attraverso la vicenda dell’iscrizione anagrafica dei richiedenti asilo legata all’applicazione dei decreti salviniani, osservare che la “geografia” di questi decreti immigrazione e sicurezza è a geometria variabile.

      Come ha parzialmente evidenziato la mappa prodotta dalla geografa Cristina del Biaggio e pubblicata su VisionCarto, che ha recensito le reazioni dei vari sindaci e dei differenti comuni alla stretta di Salvini sull’iscrizione anagrafica dei RA, la logica securitaria “sovranista” a livello nazionale, ossessionata dalla difesa delle patrie frontiere, con toni nazionalisti postfascisti e modi - come prova la vicenda di Open Arms - spesso al limite o oltre la legalità, è sfasata rispetto ad una nozione di “sicurezza” ad un livello territoriale più circoscritto, di comunità urbana e di amministrazione locale. Perché inevitabilmente tanti amministratori locali, di fronte ad un’operazione che ha concretamente destabilizzato la gestione locale dell’accoglienza e dell’integrazione buttando letteralmente per strada o comunque esponendo a situazioni di marginalità estrema un numero estremamente rilevante di persone (il rapporto «La sicurezza dell’esclusione - Centri d’Italia 2019» realizzato da ActionAid e Openpolis parlava di 80.000 persone toccate nei primi mesi di applicazione, con stime di 750.000 persone “irregolarizzate” entro gennaio 2021), hanno reagito sottolineando, a diverso titolo e con toni diversi, che gli effetti reali dei decreti sul territorio avrebbero inevitabilmente prodotto insicurezza e difficoltà (correlando più o meno direttamente una situazione amministrativa marginale/irregolare e l’aumento possibile di situazioni di criminalità, extralegalità, sfruttamento, ecc.).

      Dunque possiamo dedurre che la lettura della relazione tra sicurezza ed immigrazione non è la stessa a livello nazionale e a livello locale, dove, in ragione da una parte della ricaduta concreta e dell’applicazione pratica di normative e politiche che regolano la presenza di cittadini stranieri (a diverso titolo) sul territorio (permessi di soggiorno ecc.), e dall’altra dell’evoluzione delle dinamiche quotidiane di accoglienza/convivenza/integrazione, la presenza di persone migranti (richiedenti asilo etc.) rappresenta un elemento reale, contingente, relazionale e non semplicemente una nozione teorica, astratta, amministrativa. In questo senso, tutte le politiche legate alla migrazione, più o meno inclusive o esclusive, più o meno ammantate di un argomentario ideologico nazionalista/identitario, devono poi fare i conti con le condizioni concrete di coabitazione, con le possibilità e gli strumenti di integrazioni in possesso o da fornire alle persone “in arrivo” e con la volontà, la possibilità e la capacità di una comunità locale di interagire con le persone “straniere”, e più in generale “esterne” ad essa, nel modo più vantaggioso e utile, positivo e ragionevole possibile.
      8.

      Se il pericolo arriva da fuori, da cioè che non si conosce, le alterative sono due: chiudersi a riccio e difendersi a priori da qualsiasi cosa venga a perturbare il nostro quotidiano, la nostra “tradizione”, la nostra “identità”, o conoscere quello che c’è fuori, quello che arriva da fuori: accettando che questa dinamica di apertura e di incontro è stato il fondamento dell’evoluzione delle comunità umane.

      Alla presa di posizione dei sindaci, che osteggiano i decreti Salvini nel nome di una prospettiva accogliente o nel nome di un realismo politico e di organizzazione della vita sociale della comunità distinto dall’ottica di “gestione dell’ordine” dell’ex ministro degli interni e di tante prefetture (basta ricordare che Salvini ha invocato, nel marzo 2019 anche la possibilità di attribuire più poteri straordinari ai prefetti riducendo quelli dei sindaci), corrisponde anche una reazione “accogliente” dal basso, una capacità di adattamento della collettività (autonoma, indotta dall’amministrazione o in antitesi a posizioni di chiusura delle municipalità) : al di là dei comuni impegnati in politiche locali di accoglienza attraverso i dispositivi SPRAR, o di reti come RECOSOL, non sono poche le collettività che sono passate dal “rifiuto” e alla reticenza, legati agli spettri mediatici e politici, alle retoriche di invasione o alle presenze imposte in via straordinaria a livello prefetturale senza consultazione dell’amministrazione - e che hanno creato, quasi fosse una finalità connessa una pressione su comunità locali “impreparate” -, a modalità di apertura, graduali, mediate, progressive che si sono risolte spesso (a livello urbano come rurale) constatando che una presenza accettata, accolta, “accompagnata”, tutelata, sostenuta non è affatto “nociva” per la comunità che accoglie, ma anzi rappresenta un valore aggiunto, arricchisce e offre opportunità, in una logica di reciprocità che si affranca dalle pratiche assistenziali che annullano i potenziali di azione e partecipazione delle persone accolte.

      Il diritto internazionale relativo all’asilo, per ovvie ragioni storiche e geopolitiche, si appoggia alle strutture nazionali e “inevitabilmente” si confronta con le dimensioni dell’appartenenza come la cittadinanza e la “nazionalità”; tuttavia, la discussione è focalizzata sempre essenzialmente sul potenziale beneficiario/destinatario di questo diritto, dell’asilo o della “protezione internazionale”, come più in generale, eticamente, dell’accoglienza/ospitalità. Mentre rimane sempre implicita, troppo spesso data per scontata la soggettività collettiva che accorda questo diritto, che lo elargisce, che lo offre.

      Se il diritto internazionale tende ad inquadrarlo, a concederlo/garantirlo è di solito una comunità politica, un paese che concede asilo ad un cittadino straniero proveniente da un altro paese sulla base di principi “universali” e attraverso strumenti come, per l’Italia, la carta costituzionale.

      Ora, se appare evidente che l’accanimento xenofobo di un Salvini sia strumento elettoralista e strumentale che passa per una lettura quantomeno originale della stessa Costituzione, andando a “scegliersi” qualche articolo conveniente (come quelli che invocano la patria) ma snobbando completamente altri che si riferiscono a diritti fondamentali ( e dunque più “ampi” di quelli legati all’appartenenza nazionale), possiamo anche considerare che nel corso degli ultimi anni la questione “asilo” e più generalmente accoglienza in Italia è rimasta questione tecnica di specialisti nella sua dimensione normativa giuridica (avvocati, Commissioni territoriali ecc.), mentre dal punto di vista etico-politico (la questione) è rimasta sempre secondaria rispetto ad un discorso politico e mediatico focalizzato ossessivamente (come del resto avviene in tutta Europa) sulla difesa delle frontiere e sul controllo della migrazione: la presenza di persone straniere sul territorio diventa visibile solo quando appare “deviante” o “problematica”, mentre le “buone prassi” di integrazione e partecipazione rimangono escluse dalla narrazione quotidiana.

      In sostanza il “popolo” italiano, che attraverso la Costituzione garantisce a individui stranieri la possibilità di ricevere sostegno e protezione sul territorio nazionale, viene chiamato in causa e sollecitato (politicamente e mediaticamente) in concreto quasi esclusivamente in quanto corpo sociale minacciato (economicamente, culturalmente, socialmente, ecc.) dalla migrazione, dalla presenza di stranieri, e praticamente mai in quanto attore implicato in percorsi di accoglienza, impegnato in un percorso di evoluzione sociale e culturale che implica obbligatoriamente un confronto con la migrazione, come con tutti gli altri temi essenziali della convivenza politica.

      La “gestione” tecnica dell’accoglienza rimane invece questione tecnica, esposta a mistificazioni e speculazioni, e “astratta” fino a quando non si materializza sul territorio, spesso “precipitata” dall’alto, come è accaduto dal 2011 attraverso la gestione emergenziale, e inscritta come gestione dell’ordine pubblico piuttosto che all’interno delle politiche sociali: da un punti di vista “sovranista” e più in generale di depotenziamento dei livelli di partecipazione e implicazione critica della collettività, la comunità locale rimane “spettatrice” di processi di gestione che sono finalizzati sempre più solo al controllo delle persone e sempre meno alla loro integrazione (e che va di pari passo con una deresponsabilizzazione generale della popolazione a tutti i livelli).

      Ora, se la teoria costituzionale dell’asilo in Italia ha radici storiche determinate, le pratiche di accoglienza sono quasi sempre locali, territorializzate, e implicano l’investimento più o mendo diretto e esplicito della collettività: un investimento che, attraverso l’implicazione delle amministrazioni locali e percorsi partecipativi riporta la questione dell’accoglienza dell’altro, e la sua potenziale integrazione, nell’alveo di una realtà politica concreta, quotidiana, locale; diventa quindi interessante interrogarsi sulla consapevolezza di questa potenzialità da parte delle comunità locali (come in altri ambiti diversi) di autodeterminarsi politicamente, di impattare in modo significativo su una serie di questioni che le riguardano direttamente, puntualmente o sul lungo periodo.

      Se il diritto d’asilo va tutelato a livello internazionale e nazionale, e iscritto in quadri normativi che possano garantire un accesso inalienabili ai diritti fondamentali, diventa importante sottolineare la capacità delle comunità locali di rivendicare il dovere/diritto di andare oltre, e di integrare questo quadro giuridico con pratiche di accoglienza e partecipazione che, concertate collettivamente, possono rappresentare percorsi di evoluzione comuni, non solamente eticamente gratificanti ma anche vantaggiosi tanto per chi è accolto che per chi accoglie.

      Indipendentemente quindi anche dal parere della Corte Costituzionale che ha contestato una serie di elementi del decreti sicurezza tecnicamente difformi dal mandato costituzionale stesso, diventa estremamente rilevante l’espressione pubblica e politica di comunità locali, di andare oltre e di rivendicare il diritto di garantire l’iscrizione anagrafica - e con essa l’accesso ad un insieme di altri diritti in grado di migliorare sensibilmente le condizioni di esistenza delle persone sul territorio e all’interno della comunità, e di favorire dinamiche di interazione e cooperazione indipendenti da distinzioni legate alla provenienza e alla nazionalità.

      È in questo senso che evolve in questi ultimi anni la configurazione politica delle città rifugio (città accoglienti, città dell’asilo, città santuario, …), che si fonda precisamente sulla volontà e la capacità delle amministrazioni e delle comunità locali di pensare forme di accoglienza che superino le forme di gestione/ricezione legate ad una nozione di asilo sempre più sacrificate all’altare della geopolitica internazionale e delle politiche di esternalizzazione della UE.

      Se da un lato dunque occorre difendere il diritto d’asilo, e anzi incentivarlo ed aggiornarlo rispetto ad un orizzonte globalizzato, dall’altra è necessario resistere alla gestione differenziale della mobilità umana da una parte, rivendicando per tutti il diritto di movimento e di installazione, da combinare all’invenzione di nuove forme di coabitazione e accoglienza legate alla residenza e alla presenza sul territorio più che a origini nazionali e rivendicazioni identitarie.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/Una-riflessione-sul-rapporto-tra-migrazione-e-sicurezza-a.html
      #droit_d'asile #asile #justice #Scandicci #Testo_Unico_Immigrazione #jurisprudence #sécurité #prima_i_nostri #frontières #externalisation #peur #accueil #résistance #citoyenneté #nationalité #menace #droits #villes-refuge #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation

  • Quelques nouvelles de la France « périphérique ».

    Balagny-sur-Thérain : la nouvelle équipe municipale a échoué au crash-test des « rézosocios » :

    Municipales - Oise : l’indignation à Balagny-sur-Thérain après la publication d’une photo obscène de nouveaux élus
    https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/oise/municipales-oise-indignation-balagny-therain-apres-publ

    De là à penser que ces nouveaux élus sont des gens de « terrain » ...

    #terroir #scary_monsters