• Bulgaria : Road to Schengen. Part One : the EU’s external border.

    On the 31st of March, Bulgaria - alongside Romania - joined Schengen as a partial member by air & sea. The inclusion of land crossings for full accession of these countries was blocked by an Austrian veto over concerns(1) that it would lead to an increase in people wanting to claim asylum in the EU.

    What is significant about Bulgaria becoming a Schengen member is that, what has been seen in the lead up, and what we will see following accession, is a new precedent of aggressively fortified borders set for the EU’s external Schengen borders. Which in turn may shape EU wide standards for border management.

    The EU’s external border between Bulgaria and Turkey has become infamous for a myriad of human rights violations and violence towards people who are forced to cross this border ‘illegally’. People continually face the violence of these crossings due to the lack of safe and legal routes allowing people to fulfill their right to seek asylum in Europe.

    In 2022 it was along this border that live ammunition(2) was first used against people seeking asylum in the EU. Shot by the Bulgarian authorities. In the same year it was reported(3) that people were illegally detained for up to 3 days in a cage-like structure attached to the police station in the border town of Sredets. It was also known that vehicles belonging to the European border force Frontex - who are responsible for border management and supposedly upholding fundamental rights - were present in the vicinity of the cages holding detained people.

    The EU’s illegal border management strategy of pushbacks are also well documented and commonplace along this border. Testimonies of pushbacks in this region are frequent and often violent. Within the past year Collective Aid has collected numerous testimonies from survivors of these actions of the state who describe(4) being stripped down to their underwear, beaten with batons and the butts of guns, robbed, and set on by dogs. Violence is clearly the systematic deterrence strategy of the EU.

    Similar violence occurs and is documented along Bulgaria’s northern border with Serbia. During an assessment of the camps in Sofia in March, outside of the Voenna Rampa facility, our team spoke to an Afghan man who, 6 months prior, was beaten so badly during a pushback that his leg was broken. Half a year later he was still using a crutch and was supported by his friends. Due to the ordeal, he had decided to try and claim asylum in Bulgaria instead of risking another border crossing.

    Despite the widespread and well documented violations of European and international law by an EU member state, at the beginning of March Bulgaria was rewarded(5) with its share of an 85 million Euro fund within a ‘cooperation framework on border and migration management’. The money within this framework specifically comes under the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021 – 2027, designed to ‘enhance national capabilities at the EU external borders’. Within the instrument Bulgaria is able to apply for additional funding to extend or upgrade technology along its borders. This includes purchasing, developing, or upgrading equipment such as movement detection and thermo-vision cameras and vehicles with thermo-vision capabilities. It is the use of this border tech which enables and facilitates the illegal and violent practices which are well documented in Bulgaria.

    Close to the town of Dragoman along the northern border with Serbia, we came across an example of the kind of technology which used a controlled mounted camera that tracked the movement of our team. This piece of equipment was also purchased by the EU, and is used to track movement at the internal border.

    The cooperation framework also outlines(6) a roadmap where Frontex will increase its support of policing at Bulgaria’s border with Turkey. In late February, in the run up to Bulgaria becoming a Schengen member, on a visit to the border with Turkey, Hans Leijtens - Frontex’s executive director - announced(7) an additional 500 - 600 additional Frontex personnel would be sent to the border. Tripling the numbers already operational there.

    Meanwhile Frontex - who have been known(8) to conceal evidence of human rights violations - are again under scrutiny(9) for their lack of accountability in regards to the upholding of fundamental rights. Two days prior to the announcement of additional Frontex staff an investigation(10) by BIRN produced a report from a Frontex whistleblower further highlighting the common kinds of violence and rights violations which occur during pushbacks at this border. As well as the fact that Frontex officers were intentionally kept away from ‘hot spots’ where pushbacks are most frequent. The investigation underlines Frontex’s inability to address, or be held accountable for, human rights violations that occur on the EU’s external borders.

    The awarded money is the next step following a ‘successful’ pilot project for fast-track asylum and returns procedures which was started in March of the previous year. The project was implemented in the Pastrogor camp some 13km from the Turkish border which mostly houses people from the Maghreb region of northwest Africa. A 6 month project report(11) boasts a 60% rejection rate from around 2000 applicants. In line with the EU’s new migration pact, the project has a focus on returns whereby an amendment to national legislation has been prepared to allow a return decision to be made and delivered at the same time as an asylum rejection. As well as the launch of a voluntary return programme supported by the 2021-2027 Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Through which cash incentives for voluntary returns will be increased across the board. These cash incentives are essentially an EU funded gaslighting project, questioning the decisions of people to leave their home countries based on their own survival and safety.

    Our team visited the former prison of the Pastrogor camp in March. Which at the time held only 16 people - some 5% of its 320 capacity.

    The implementation of this pilot project and the fortification of the border with Turkey have been deemed a success by the EU commision(12) who have praised both as indicators of Bulgaria’s readiness to join the Schengen area.

    Unsurprisingly, what we learn from Bulgaria’s accession to becoming a Schengen member is that the EU is not only deliberately ignoring Bulgaria’s dire human rights history in migration and border management. But, alongside the political and economic strengthening brought with Schengen accession, they are actively rewarding the results of such rights violations with exceptional funding that can sustain the state’s human rights infringements. All while the presence of Frontex validates the impunity enjoyed by Bulgaria’s violent border forces who show no respect for human rights law. In early April the European Commision gave a positive report(13) on the results from EU funding which support this border rife with fundamental rights abuses. In a hollow statement Bulgaria’s chief of border police stated: “we are showing zero tolerance to the violation of fundamental rights”.

    What the changes in border management strategies at the EU’s external border to Turkey- in light of Bulgaria’s entry to the Schengen - mean in reality is that people who are still forced to make the crossing do so at greater risk to themselves as they are forced deeper into both the hands of smuggling networks and into the dangerous Strandzha national park.

    The Strandzha national park straddles the Bulgarian-Turkish border. It is in this densely forested and mountainous area of land where people are known to often make the border crossing by foot. A treacherous journey often taking many days, and also known to have taken many lives - lighthouse reports identified 82 bodies of people on the move that have passed through three morgues in Bulgaria. Many of whom will have died on the Strandzha crossing.

    It is reported(14) that morgues in the towns of Burgas and Yambol - on the outskirts of the Strandzha national park - are having difficulty finding space due to the amount of deaths occurring in this area. So much so that a public prosecutor from Yambol explained this as the reason why people are being buried without identification in nameless graves, sometimes after only 4 days of storage. It is also reported that families who tried to find and identify the bodies of their deceased loved ones were forced to pay cash bribes to the Burgas morgue in order to do so.

    Through networks with families in home countries, NGOs based nearby make efforts to alert authorities and to respond to distress calls from people in danger within the Strandzha national park. However, the Bulgarian state makes these attempts nearly impossible through heavy militarisation and the associated criminalisation of being active in the area. It is the same militarisation that is supported with money from the EU’s ‘cooperation framework’. Due to these limitations even the bodies that make it to morgues in Bulgaria are likely to be only a percentage of the total death toll that is effectively sponsored by the EU.

    Local NGO Mission Wings stated(15) that in 2022 they received at most 12 distress calls, whereas in 2023 the NGO stopped counting at 70. This gives a clear correlation between increased funding to the fortification of the EU’s external border and the amount of lives put in danger.

    People are also forced to rely more on smuggling networks. Thus making the cost of seeking asylum greater, and the routes more hidden. When routes become more hidden and reliant on smuggling networks, it limits the interaction between people on the move and NGOs. In turn, testimonies of state violence and illegal practices cannot be collected and violations occur unchallenged. Smuggling networks rely on the use of vehicles, often driving packed cars, vans, and lorries at high speed through the country. Injuries and fatalities of people on the move from car crashes and suffocating are not infrequent in Bulgaria. Sadly, tragic incidents(16) like the deaths of 18 innocent people from Afghanistan in the back of an abandoned truck in February last year are likely only to increase.

    #Bulgarie #frontières #Schengen #migrations #frontières_extérieures #asile #réfugiés #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #violence #Turquie #Sredets #encampement #Frontex #droits_humains #Serbie #Sofia #Voenna_Rampa #Border_Management_and_Visa_Instrument (#BMVI) #aide_financière #technologie #Dragoman #Pastrogor #camps_de_réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #retour_volontaire #Asylum_Migration_and_Integration_Fund (#AMIF) #Strandzha #Strandzha_national_park #forêt #montagne #Burgas #Yambol #mourir_aux_frontières #décès #morts_aux_frontières #identification #tombes #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité #morgue


    ajouté à ce fil de discussion :
    Europe’s Nameless Dead

  • Visa Schengen : Un collectif dénonce la vente de rendez-vous atteignant 400.000f pour certains pays

    Visa Schengen : Un collectif dénonce la vente de rendez-vous atteignant 400.000f pour certains pays
    Pour avoir le visa Schengen c’est la croix est la bannière. Le rendez-vous déjà, il est révélé qu’il faut débourser parfois jusqu’à 400.000f pour certains pays en Europe. L’information comme un couperet est balafrée par le collectif des dépositaires de rendez-vous Schengen pour la France, Espagne, Italie et Portugal.Dans une note sous forme de couverture médiatique de leur marche pacifique prévue le jeudi 02 mai pour dénoncer la vente illégale des rendez –vous Schengen (France, Espagne, Italie et Portugal) à des sommes exorbitantes (200 000 FCFA à 400 000 FCFA …), le collectif fait savoir que la fourchette fixée est entre 10 000 et 20 000 FCFA.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#senegal#UE #schengen#visas#france#italie#espagne#portugal#sante

  • À Strasbourg, l’Europe intensifie discrètement le fichage des migrants

    Dans un bâtiment discret, 350 personnes travaillent à renforcer le #contrôle et le #suivi des personnes entrant dans l’#espace_Schengen. Reportage dans l’agence de l’Union européenne qui renforce le fichage des migrants.

    Dans le quartier du Neuhof à Strasbourg, un bâtiment hautement sécurisé attire l’œil. Dissimulée derrière le gymnase du Stockfeld et entourée de terrains vagues, l’#agence_européenne #eu-Lisa est protégée par deux lignes barbelées surplombées de caméras. Aux alentours du bâtiment, les agents de sécurité portent au cœur un petit drapeau bleu aux douze étoiles. Des véhicules immatriculés en France, au Luxembourg, en Belgique et en Allemagne stationnent sur le parking.

    Créée en 2011 et opérationnelle depuis 2012, l’#agence_européenne_pour_la_gestion_opérationnelle_des_systèmes_d’information à grande échelle eu-Lisa développe et fait fonctionner les #bases_de_données de l’Union européenne (UE). Ces dernières permettent d’archiver les #empreintes_digitales des demandeurs et demandeuses d’asile mais aussi les demandes de visa ou les alertes de personnes portées disparues.

    Le siège d’eu-Lisa est à Tallinn, en Estonie. Un bureau de liaison se trouve à Bruxelles et son centre opérationnel a été construit à Strasbourg. Lundi 26 février, le ministre délégué aux affaires européennes, Jean-Noël Barrot, est venu visiter l’endroit, où sont développés les nouveaux systèmes de suivi et de #filtrage des personnes migrantes et des voyageurs et voyageuses non européen·nes. Le « cœur de Schengen », selon la communication de l’agence.

    Sur les écrans de contrôle, des ingénieur·es suivent les requêtes adressées par les États membres aux différents #systèmes_d’information_opérationnels. L’un d’eux raconte que le nombre de cyberattaques subies par l’agence est colossal : 500 000 tentatives par mois environ. La quantité de données gérées est aussi impressionnante : en 2022, le système #VIS (#Visa_Information_System) a enregistré 57 millions de demandes de #visas et 52 millions d’empreintes digitales. La même année, 86,5 millions d’alertes ont été transmises au système #SIS (#Schengen_Information_System).

    Dans l’agence du Neuhof, une vingtaine de nationalités sont représentées parmi les 350 travailleurs et travailleuses. En tout, 500 mètres carrés sécurisés abritent les données confidentielles de dizaines de millions de personnes. 2 500 ordinateurs fonctionnent en permanence pour une capacité de stockage de 13 petabytes, soit 13 milliards de gigabytes. Vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre et sept jours sur sept, l’eu-Lisa répond aux demandes de données des pays membres de l’espace Schengen ou de l’Union européenne.

    Traduire la politique en #technologie

    Au-delà de la salle de réunion, impossible de photographier les murs ou l’environnement de travail. L’enclave européenne est sous haute surveillance : pour entrer, les empreintes digitales sont relevées après un passage des sacs au scanner. Un badge connecté aux empreintes permet de passer un premier sas d’entrée. Au-delà, les responsables de la sécurité suivent les visiteurs de très près, au milieu d’un environnement violet et vert parsemé de plantes de toutes formes.

    Moins de six mois avant le début des Jeux olympiques et paralympiques de Paris et deux mois après l’accord européen relatif au Pacte sur la migration et l’asile, l’agence aux 260 millions d’euros de budget en 2024 travaille à mettre en place le système de contrôle des flux de personnes le plus précis, efficace et complet de l’histoire de l’espace Schengen. Le pacte prévoit, par exemple, que la demande d’asile soit uniformisée à travers l’UE et que les « migrants illégaux » soient reconduits plus vite et plus efficacement aux frontières.

    Pour accueillir le ministre, #Agnès_Diallo, directrice de l’eu-Lisa depuis 2023, diffuse une petite vidéo en anglais dans une salle de réunion immaculée. L’ancienne cadre de l’entreprise de services numériques #Atos présente une « agence discrète » au service de la justice et des affaires intérieures européennes. À l’eu-Lisa, pas de considération politique. « Notre agence a été créée par des règlements européens et nous agissons dans ce cadre, résume-t-elle. Nous remplaçons les frontières physiques par des #frontières_numériques. Nous travaillons à laisser passer dans l’espace Schengen les migrants et voyageurs qui sont légitimes et à filtrer ceux qui le sont moins. »

    L’eu-Lisa invente, améliore et fait fonctionner les sept outils informatiques utilisés en réseau par les États membres et leurs institutions. L’agence s’assure notamment que les données sont protégées. Elle forme aussi les personnes qui utiliseront les interfaces, comme les agents de #Frontex, d’#Europol ou de la #police_aux_frontières. Au Neuhof, les personnes qui travaillent n’utilisent pas les informations qu’elles stockent.

    Fichés dès l’âge de 6 ans

    L’agence eu-Lisa héberge les empreintes digitales de 7,5 millions de demandeurs et demandeuses d’asile et « migrants illégaux » dans le système appelé Eurodac. Pour le moment, les données récoltées ne sont pas liées à l’identité de la personne ni à sa photo. Mais avec l’adoption des nouvelles règles relatives au statut de réfugié·e en Europe, Eurodac est en train d’être complètement refondé pour être opérationnel en 2026.

    La réforme décidée en décembre 2023 prévoit que les demandeurs d’asile et « migrants illégaux » devront fournir d’autres informations biométriques : en plus de leurs empreintes, leur photo, leur nom, prénom et date et lieu de naissance seront enregistrés lors de leur entrée dans Schengen. La procédure vaudra pour toute personne dès l’âge de 6 ans (contre 14 avant la réforme). Les #données qui étaient conservées pour dix-huit mois pourront l’être jusqu’à cinq ans.

    La quantité d’informations stockées va donc croître exponentiellement dès 2026. « Nous aurons énormément de données pour #tracer les mouvements des migrants irréguliers et des demandeurs d’asile », se félicite #Lorenzo_Rinaldi, l’un des cadres de l’agence venant tout droit de Tallinn. Eurodac permettra à n’importe quelle autorité policière habilitée de savoir très précisément par quel pays est arrivée une personne, ainsi que son statut administratif.

    Il sera donc impossible de demander une protection internationale dans un pays, puis de s’installer dans un autre, ou de demander une seconde fois l’asile dans un pays européen. Lorenzo Rinaldi explique : « Aujourd’hui, il nous manque la grande image des mouvements de personnes entre les États membres. On pourra identifier les tendances, recouper les données et simplifier l’#identification des personnes. »

    Pour identifier les itinéraires et contrôler les mouvements de personnes dans l’espace Schengen, l’agence travaille aussi à ce que les sept systèmes d’information fonctionnent ensemble. « Nous avions des bases de données, nous aurons désormais un système complet de gestion de ces informations », se réjouit Agnès Diallo.

    L’eu-Lisa crée donc également un système de #traçage des entrées et des sorties de l’espace Schengen, sobrement appelé #Entry-Exit_System (ou #EES). Développé à l’initiative de la France dès 2017, il remplace par une #trace_numérique le tamponnage physique des passeports par les gardes-frontières. Il permet notamment de détecter les personnes qui restent dans Schengen, après que leur visa a expiré – les #overstayers, celles qui restent trop longtemps.

    Frontières et Jeux olympiques

    « Toutes nos équipes sont mobilisées pour faire fonctionner le système EES [entrées-sorties de l’espace Schengen – ndlr] d’ici à la fin de l’année 2024 », précise Agnès Diallo. Devant le Sénat en 2023, la directrice exécutive avait assuré que l’EES ne serait pas mis en place pendant les Jeux olympiques et paralympiques si son influence était négative sur l’événement, par exemple s’il ralentissait trop le travail aux frontières.

    En France et dans onze autres pays, le système EES est testé depuis janvier 2024. L’agence estime qu’il sera prêt pour juillet 2024, comme l’affirme Lorenzo Rinaldi, chef de l’unité chargé du soutien à la direction et aux relations avec les partenaires de l’eu-Lisa : « Lorsqu’une personne non européenne arrive dans Schengen, elle devra donner à deux reprises ses #données_biométriques. Donc ça sera plus long la première fois qu’elle viendra sur le territoire, mais ses données seront conservées trois ans. Les fois suivantes, lorsque ses données seront déjà connues, le passage sera rapide. »

    Ce système est prévu pour fonctionner de concert avec un autre petit nouveau, appelé #Etias, qui devrait être opérationnel d’ici au premier semestre de 2025. Les personnes qui n’ont pas d’obligation d’avoir de visa pour entrer dans 30 pays européens devront faire une demande avant de venir pour un court séjour – comme lorsqu’un·e citoyen·ne français·e demande une autorisation électronique de voyage pour entrer aux États-Unis ou au Canada. La procédure, en ligne, sera facturée 7 euros aux voyageurs et voyageuses, et l’autorisation sera valable trois ans.

    L’eu-Lisa gère enfin le #système_d’information_Schengen (le #SIS, qui gère les alertes sur les personnes et objets recherchés ou disparus), le système d’information sur les visas (#VIS), la base de données des #casiers_judiciaires (#Ecris-TCN) et le #Codex pour la #coopération_judiciaire entre États membres.

    L’agence travaille notamment à mettre en place une communication par Internet entre ces différents systèmes. Pour Agnès Diallo, cette nouveauté permettra une coordination sans précédent des agents aux frontières et des institutions judiciaires nationales et européennes dans les 27 pays de l’espace Schengen.

    « On pourra suivre les migrants, réguliers et irréguliers », se félicite Fabienne Keller, députée européenne Renew et fervente défenseuse du Pacte sur les migrations. Pour la mise en place de tous ces outils, l’agence eu-Lisa devra former les États membres mais également les transporteurs et les voyageurs et voyageuses. L’ensemble de ces systèmes devrait être opérationnel d’ici à la fin 2026.


    #fichage #migrations #réfugiés #biométrie
    via @karine4
    ping @_kg_

  • Voyage : engagé
    Date : mi mai c-a-d dans 2 mois 1/2
    Billets : réservés
    Destination : Prague, (une ville en Europe) *
    Oups : passeport à refaire. On fait tout en ligne maintenant ?
    Constat : Aucun rendez-vous en mairie avant le 17 mai, c-a-d après la date de départ.

    #Schengen #liberté_de_circulation #entraves #macronistes

    *Où plûtot à l’intérieur de cet saloperie d’espace Schengen qui ne laisse ni entrer ni circuler personne.

    • @touti la CNI ne suffit pas ?
      De son coté,notre fille cadette a fini pas trouver un rdv dans une mairie de banlieue à 40 km de là. Tu peux allez n’importe où, si tu paye le carburant et as du temps.

    • Oui, je vais sûrement trouver une solution et je vous remercie de vos témoignages également.
      J’ai écris ce post non tant pour me plaindre de ma situation (privilégiée de pouvoir voyager au regard d’autres problématiques vitales) mais pour témoigner de cette absurdité politique : décider de forcer tout le monde #au_pas_du_numérique et des #services_en_ligne et de la #surveillance_généralisée. J’ai omis de dire que j’ai coché que je n’autorisai pas le ministère de l’intérieur à vérifier mon adresse par exemple (…)
      Et parce que cette question est politique et concerne une #liberté_fondamentale.
      La liberté de circulation est une des bases du droit français depuis la révolution dont se torche allégrement toutes les politiques (à commencer par frontex jusqu’au portillon du métro). Et la dégradation des libertés ne cesse d’empirer, ici, sous prétexte d’imprimerie de l’état incapable de suivre la fabrication des passeports (depuis 10 ans …)

  • Avec la PAF de Roissy, qui traque les candidats à l’immigration irrégulière : « Le risque, pour nous, c’est de ne pas pouvoir les renvoyer »

    Avec la PAF de Roissy, qui traque les candidats à l’immigration irrégulière : « Le risque, pour nous, c’est de ne pas pouvoir les renvoyer »
    Par Julia Pascual
    A l’aéroport international Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle, « Le Monde » a suivi le quotidien de la police aux frontières qui tente de déjouer l’éventail des stratégies utilisées pour entrer de manière irrégulière dans l’espace Schengen. Un bureau d’où s’échappent les bribes d’une conversation musclée. A l’intérieur, un ressortissant sri-lankais est auditionné. La veille, il a été interpellé par la police aux frontières (PAF) de l’aéroport Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle (CDG), en région parisienne. Il doit s’expliquer en garde à vue, dans les locaux défraîchis de la PAF, qui occupe un vieil immeuble de béton près du terminal 1. L’homme est soupçonné de participer à une filière d’immigration clandestine. « Ça faisait deux mois et demi qu’on était en enquête préliminaire, rapporte le commandant responsable des unités judiciaires de la PAF de Roissy-CDG, qui a souhaité rester anonyme. On pense qu’au moins cinquante-cinq personnes sont passées par le biais de cette filière depuis le Sri Lanka, pour un tarif moyen de 15 000 euros. »
    Le profil des candidats à l’immigration ? Des hommes modestes, souvent agriculteurs, sans diplôme. « Ils veulent échapper au quotidien dans leur pays et sont prêts à occuper n’importe quel emploi en Europe », poursuit le commandant. Pour les faire entrer dans l’espace Schengen, le réseau a employé la technique dite « du swapping » (« échange », en anglais). La manœuvre est la suivante : un Sri-Lankais se rend dans un aéroport, au Qatar ou à Abou Dhabi. Il reste en zone internationale, où il rencontre un « swappeur », un intermédiaire sri-lankais venu, lui, d’Europe, qui lui cède son billet d’avion retour pour Paris ainsi qu’un faux document d’identité pour voyager.
    « L’enquête a commencé quand on a trouvé cinq clandestins à la sortie d’un avion à Roissy. Deux heures plus tard, des personnes arrivaient sur d’autres vols sous la même identité. La même personne qui arrive par deux vols distincts, c’est impossible ! », raconte le commandant, dont les unités ont démantelé, en 2023, une dizaine de filières d’immigration clandestine.
    Le théâtre de leurs investigations : Roissy-CDG, le deuxième aéroport d’Europe en nombre de passagers, et le premier point d’entrée dans l’espace Schengen. En 2023, près de 70 millions de voyageurs ont transité par ce hub qui héberge le plus gros service de police de France : 1 800 agents, dont 800 gardes-frontières. Le défi, pour la PAF : assurer la sécurité de la frontière sans perturber le flux commercial d’un site qui génère 1,5 % du PIB national (agrégat des activités et emplois directs et indirects dans le transport, la logistique, le tourisme…). « On est l’un des rares services de police à avoir une telle imbrication avec une logique économique, explique Julien Gentile, le directeur de la PAF de Roissy. La fluidité, c’est la base pour ADP [Aéroports de Paris] et les compagnies aériennes qui vendent des correspondances d’une heure. »
    Un ressortissant d’un pays tiers doit pouvoir passer la frontière en quarante-cinq minutes, et un ressortissant de l’espace Schengen en une demi-heure. Comment, dans un délai aussi court, réussir à détecter les candidats à l’immigration irrégulière ? Grâce à un logiciel de gestion des files d’attente installé sur sa tablette, le commissaire Régis Orsoni, chef de la division du contrôle transfrontière, peut suivre à la trace des milliers de voyageurs aux abords des aubettes de la PAF. Un moyen de mesurer les temps d’attente et de projeter des équipes en renfort pour éviter que les contrôles ne ralentissent trop le flux des passagers.
    Lire aussi | Article réservé à nos abonnés Immigration : des flux en hausse, tirés par les étudiants, les salariés et les réfugiés
    Dans le contexte d’une baisse du trafic aéroportuaire liée à la pandémie de Covid-19, les effectifs de gardes-frontières ont été réduits, mais, tandis que les besoins sont de nouveau croissants, des administratifs, puis des contractuels, sont venus renflouer les équipes à marche forcée. Ils sont recrutés sans condition de diplôme et postés au terme de deux semaines de formation, à l’image de Marie, 21 ans, et Lena, 19 ans (les personnes citées par leur prénom ont souhaité conserver l’anonymat), arrivées à Roissy en juin 2023. La première est une ancienne adjointe de sécurité, la seconde s’est réorientée après une formation d’auxiliaire de puériculture.
    Régis Orsoni, chef de la division du contrôle transfrontière, à Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle, le 22 novembre 2023.
    Aujourd’hui, dans la petite aubette qu’elles partagent, des heures durant, les deux jeunes femmes contrôlent des voyageurs et interrogent sans interruption des fichiers de police. Quatre bases de données sont systématiquement consultées : le fichier des personnes recherchées, le fichier Schengen des objets recherchés et celui des personnes recherchées, et le fichier Interpol des documents volés ou perdus. En 2023, il y a eu près de 30 000 détections, pouvant être en lien avec une simple déclaration de perte de papiers ou, plus rarement, avec un mandat d’arrêt international. « On détecte une vingtaine de personnes “fichées S” par jour, précise la commandante de police Adeline Trouillet. Mais, la plupart du temps, cela ne nécessite pas une action spécifique autre que de renseigner discrètement leur passage. »
    Les gardes-frontières s’assurent aussi du respect des conditions d’entrée dans l’espace Schengen : un vol de retour, une assurance-maladie, une certaine somme d’argent, un hébergement… « Pourquoi voyagez-vous en France ? Et votre réservation d’hôtel ? » (...)
    Alexandre Goliot est analyste en fraude documentaire et à l’identité, comme tous ses collègues de la brigade mobile d’immigration de la PAF. Les policiers de cette unité sont formés au repérage, sur un document, d’une qualité de papier inadéquate, de l’absence d’un filigrane… Ils agissent en « deuxième rideau », appelés par les gardes-frontières en cas de doute sur un voyageur ou projetés à la porte de certains avions pour passer au tamis, en moins de vingt minutes, les passagers dès leur atterrissage. Une vingtaine d’avions sont contrôlés chaque jour lors du débarquement. « Le but, c’est de déceler le plus rapidement les faux documents et les gens qui ont détruit leurs documents, précise le commissaire Orsoni. On a déjà retrouvé des passeports déchiquetés et cachés dans les toilettes ou dans les housses des sièges d’un avion. C’est comme ça que des gens se présentent aux contrôles aux frontières sans identité et sans provenance, pour qu’on ne puisse pas les réacheminer. »
    Pour brouiller les pistes, des personnes passent même plusieurs jours en zone internationale avant de se présenter aux postes de la PAF. Plus le temps écoulé est long, plus il est difficile de déterminer leur provenance. En 2023, quasiment 22 % des personnes non admises sont demeurées de nationalité « indéterminée ».
    .« Le risque, pour nous, c’est de ne pas pouvoir les renvoyer, reprend le commissaire Orsoni. En les détectant à la porte de l’avion, on sait d’où ils viennent, avec quelle compagnie ils ont voyagé, et on peut savoir quel document a été scanné à l’embarquement. » Les compagnies aériennes qui auraient failli à leur devoir de contrôle documentaire peuvent subir une amende de 10 000 euros par passager. Un moyen de les inciter à redoubler de vigilance lors de l’embarquement.
    Dans un bureau de la brigade mobile d’immigration, à quelques encablures des pistes de Roissy, une collection de documents falsifiés, contrefaits, usurpés ou obtenus indûment déborde des bannettes et remplit les tiroirs. En 2023, près de 870 documents ont été saisis aux arrivées, et 430 aux départs. Ils sont émiratis, espagnols, singapouriens, péruviens, bulgares, italiens, indiens… L’éventail des stratégies pour entrer dans l’espace Schengen par la voie aérienne est large. Des plus rudimentaires – comme le vol, mis au jour il y a quelques mois, de 500 documents de visa dans le coffre-fort du consulat espagnol de Yaoundé – aux plus élaborées, telles que le morphing, une technique qui consiste à imprimer une photo sur un document authentique en mixant les profils du propriétaire et de l’usurpateur. « On peut arriver, par infrarouge, à retrouver une partie de la photo d’origine », explique le lieutenant Gaël Szwec, chef des brigades mobiles de Roissy.
    Les « abus de transit » font partie des techniques parmi les plus éprouvées. Le principe : prévoir un voyage avec une escale dans l’espace Schengen et ne pas prendre sa correspondance. « En ce moment, des Marocains qui transitent par Roissy ne prennent pas leur vol de destination afin de se maintenir en France, illustre M. Orsoni. Ce sont souvent des hommes seuls, âgés de 18 ans à 30 ans, sans bagages. Ils ont des plans de vol peu crédibles, par exemple un Marrakech-Tunis ou un Casablanca-Dakar via Paris, donc on essaye de travailler avec les compagnies pour les bloquer au départ. (...) En cette fin d’année 2023, ils sont plus de quatre-vingts à occuper l’une des chambres de la ZAPI. Parmi eux, une multitude de profils : un Brésilien ignorant qu’il était frappé d’une interdiction d’entrer dans l’espace Schengen pour s’être maintenu en Italie au-delà de la durée autorisée par son visa étudiant il y a quelques années ; un Colombien de 22 ans venu faire du tourisme à Madrid sans avoir réservé de chambre d’hôtel ; un Iranien qui avait pour espoir de rejoindre l’Angleterre avec un faux passeport ; un groupe de cinq Egyptiens qui souhaitent se rendre en Italie pour travailler, certains comme charpentier ou peintre en bâtiment.
    (...) En 2023, quelque 6 250 étrangers ont été maintenus dans les locaux de la ZAPI, attenants aux pistes de décollage. Moins de la moitié d’entre eux repartent. Les autres finissent par entrer sur le territoire, faute d’avoir été réacheminés dans les délais, parce qu’ils sont admis à demander l’asile, parce qu’ils sont libérés par un juge pour un motif juridique de forme ou encore parce qu’ils régularisent leur situation. Une goutte d’eau, cependant, par rapport aux arrivées par voie terrestre. L’avion demeure le privilège des plus fortunés.


  • #Espace_Schengen : l’Union européenne trouve un #accord pour clarifier le cadre des contrôles aux frontières

    Depuis 2015, de nombreux pays ont réintroduit dans l’espace de libre circulation européen des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières, invoquant la #pression_migratoire ou la #menace_terroriste.

    Les négociateurs du Parlement européen et du Conseil (Etats membres) ont trouvé un accord, mardi 6 février, sur une réforme du #code_Schengen destinée à clarifier et renforcer le cadre prévu pour la réintroduction et la prolongation des contrôles aux frontières intérieures de cet espace de libre circulation.

    Au sein de l’espace Schengen, qui regroupe 27 pays − dont 23 Etats membres de l’Union européenne (UE) plus l’Islande, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège et la Suisse −, plus de 400 millions de personnes peuvent en principe circuler sans être soumises à des contrôles. Mais depuis 2015, invoquant la pression migratoire ou la menace terroriste − voire les deux −, de nombreux pays ont réintroduit des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières. Ils sont actuellement plus de la moitié à le faire. L’espace Schengen a aussi été fragmenté par des restrictions de circulation décidées par les Etats membres pendant la pandémie de Covid-19.

    Or, ces contrôles sont autorisés par le code Schengen à titre exceptionnel, en cas de #menace_grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure d’un Etat, mais de manière 3provisoire. Et la Cour de justice de l’UE a rappelé en avril 2022 qu’ils ne devaient pas excéder six mois. En décembre 2021, la Commission européenne a proposé une révision du code Schengen pour tenter de mettre de l’ordre et tirer les leçons de la crise du Covid-19.

    Libre circulation et sécurité

    Selon l’accord trouvé mardi soir, qui devra encore être approuvé formellement par le Parlement européen et le Conseil, en cas de menace grave à sa sécurité, un Etat peut autoriser des contrôles à ses frontières, pour une durée maximale de deux ans, avec une prolongation possible d’un an. Ces Etats devront évaluer la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ces contrôles et déterminer si les objectifs poursuivis ne peuvent être atteints par des mesures alternatives.

    Aux frontières extérieures, la réforme prévoit en cas d’urgence sanitaire de grande ampleur d’harmoniser les règles d’entrée dans l’UE en provenance de pays tiers − les éventuelles mises en quarantaine ou tests notamment. Les citoyens et résidents de l’UE seraient exemptés de telles restrictions d’entrée. Elle prévoit aussi des réponses aux tentatives d’Etat tiers d’« instrumentaliser » les migrants dans le but de déstabiliser un pays de l’UE − comme la Biélorussie et la Russie ont été accusées de le faire −, notamment en limitant les points de passage.

    « La #libre_circulation dans nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord conclu aujourd’hui (…) clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers », a commenté la ministre de l’intérieur belge, Annelies Verlinden, dont le pays assure la présidence semestrielle du Conseil de l’UE.

    L’eurodéputée française Sylvie Guillaume (membre du groupe Alliance progressiste des socialistes & démocrates) s’est déclarée « satisfaite ». « Avec cet accord, nous avons protégé la libre circulation des personnes tout en répondant aux défis auxquels l’espace Schengen a été confronté au cours des dix dernières années », a-t-elle insisté.


    #frontières_intérieures #frontières_internes #frontières #Schengen #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #migrations #asile #réfugiés #exception

    • Border controls: EU updates Schengen rules despite racial profiling concerns

      The Schengen Border Code will be updated as the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU and negotiators from the European Parliament have reached a provisional agreement on the adjustment of the border rules, announced Interior Minister Annelies Verlinden (CD&V).

      The update clarifies the rules on (re)introducing border controls between the 27 European countries who are part of the Schengen area, and ensures that they remain “a last resort,” Verlinden’s office said in a press release.

      “Smooth movement across our internal borders and the security of our external borders are the two cornerstones of the Schengen area,” she said. “This agreement on the revision of the Schengen Borders Code will clarify and strengthen these two pillars.”

      The Schengen Borders Code provides for the absence of internal border controls in the Schengen area, which in principle allows over 420 million people to travel freely between the Member States. From 31 March 2024, Bulgaria and Romania will also become part of the area.

      Introducing border controls

      In recent years, discussions about updating the border rules of the area flared up several times, as a result of the debate around migration but also due to travel restrictions during the Covid-19 pandemic.

      The amended Schengen Borders Code will provide Member States with new opportunities to effectively manage the EU’s external borders in a situation where migrants are used for political gain. “This includes limiting the number of border crossing points or shortening their opening hours.”

      In practice, this means that the deal would allow internal checks and increased policing in situations of so-called “instrumentalisation of migration,” which is when a Member State claims that a non-EU country or ’hostile non-state actor’ is pushing migrants towards external EU borders for political reasons.

      “This is an extremely problematic concept, whose codification into EU law would introduce broad derogations to fundamental rights, including the right to asylum and freedom of movement,” said PICUM, a Brussels-based network of over 160 NGOs working to advance the rights of undocumented people. They added that the new deal would de facto legitimise racial profiling in border checks.

      While the reform of the Schengen Borders Code aims to reduce the amount of temporary generalised internal EU border checks, PICUM stressed that it would escalate checks on specific groups of people. The deal would allow police authorities in joint patrols to carry out “random” document checks near internal EU borders, under the guise of apprehending people without valid travel or residence documents.

      Research has already shown that police tend to stop people for checks based on racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics. It is clear that these checks will depend on the police’s decisions about who “looks like” a person without valid papers, the network said.

      “This agreement embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders without valid documents are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing, while de facto encouraging racial profiling,” said Silvia Carta, Advocacy Officer at PICUM.

      Internal pushbacks, no safeguards

      The new code also introduces “alternative measures” to counter unauthorised movements of third-country nationals staying in the Schengen area. If they are apprehended in the border area, a new procedure will allow Member States to return them to the Member State from which they arrived directly. The arrest must take place in the context of a bilateral partnership, the deal states.

      However, PICUM stressed that this would legalise the violent practice of “internal pushbacks,” which consists of apprehending and detaining people caught without a valid document near an internal border, and transferring them to the Member State the police think the person came from without conducting an individual assessment.

      It is still unclear which “safeguards” have been introduced to protect children, who are not explicitly excluded from such transfer procedures.

      The deal would most likely also escalate the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies that do not apply relevant safeguards and would be at odds with existing EU data protection legislation and fundamental rights.

      If there is a serious threat to public order or internal security, the deal will also allow Member States to exceptionally (re)introduce border controls. However, this will only be possible after assessing “the necessity and proportionality” of this reintroduction, and ensuring that other measures are not sufficient.

      Controls will be able to be introduced immediately if threats to public order or security are unpredictable. In that case, the Commission, Member States and the European Parliament are required to be informed at the same time. “These controls may then be reintroduced for a period of up to one month and extended for up to three months.”

      Internal border controls for foreseeable threats – which have been communicated to the Commission, other Member States and the European Parliament before being reintroduced – can remain in force for a maximum of six months. They can be extended for a renewable period of up to six months, with a maximum duration of two years.

      In serious exceptional situations relating to a persistent threat, internal border controls may be extended after two years for a maximum of six more months, which may then be extended once more (total duration of one year).

      Another health crisis

      In the event of another large-scale public health emergency, the Council can decide to authorise temporary travel restrictions at the EU’s external border. The decision may also include health-related travel restrictions, such as testing, quarantine and self-isolation. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU could only make non-binding recommendations to Member States.

      Certain categories of people – those enjoying the right of free movement, long-term residents and people enjoying international protection – will be exempted from the entry restrictions.

      Now, this provisional agreement will be submitted to the representatives of the Member States in the Council for confirmation. After that, it must still be formally adopted by both institutions.


      #profilage_racial #instrumentalisation_de_la_migration #contrôles_au_faciès #refoulements #refoulements_internes #push-backs

    • Schengen : le Conseil et le Parlement européen conviennent d’une révision du code frontières de l’UE

      La présidence belge du Conseil de l’UE et les négociateurs du Parlement européen sont parvenus aujourd’hui à un accord provisoire sur la modification du droit de l’UE qui fixe les règles de fonctionnement de l’espace Schengen aux frontières extérieures et intérieures. Les modifications convenues, qui devront être approuvées et adoptées formellement par les deux institutions, renforceront la coordination de l’UE et amélioreront les outils dont disposent les États membres pour faire face aux difficultés rencontrées aux frontières de l’UE.

      « Le franchissement sans entrave de nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord intervenu aujourd’hui en vue de la révision du code frontières Schengen clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers. » (Annelies Verlinden, ministre de l’intérieur, des réformes institutionnelles et du renouveau démocratique de la Belgique)

      La mise à jour clarifie en particulier les règles relatives au rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières en veillant à ce qu’ils restent une mesure de dernier recours, propose des solutions pour les situations dans lesquelles les migrants sont instrumentalisés et permet d’introduire des mesures communes pour harmoniser les restrictions de déplacement en cas d’urgence de santé publique.
      Lutte contre l’instrumentalisation des flux migratoires

      Le code frontières Schengen modifié mettra à disposition des États membres de nouvelles mesures pour une gestion efficace des frontières extérieures de l’UE dans les cas d’instrumentalisation des migrants à des fins politiques. Cela passe notamment par une limitation du nombre de points de passage aux frontières ou par la réduction de leurs heures d’ouverture.

      On parle d’instrumentalisation lorsqu’un pays tiers ou un acteur non étatique encourage ou facilite le déplacement de ressortissants de pays tiers vers les frontières extérieures de l’UE afin de déstabiliser l’UE ou un État membre.
      Rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières intérieures

      Le texte approuvé clarifie et renforce le cadre du rétablissement et de la prolongation des contrôles aux frontières intérieures. Les États membres peuvent rétablir des contrôles à titre exceptionnel en cas de menace grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure. Ils devront évaluer la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ce rétablissement et estimer si les objectifs poursuivis ne peuvent pas être atteints par d’autres moyens, notamment par des mesures alternatives.

      Selon les nouvelles règles, si des menaces pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité ont un caractère imprévisible, des contrôles peuvent être mis en place immédiatement en en informant simultanément la Commission, les autres États membres et le Parlement européen. Ces contrôles sont limités à une période d’un mois maximum et ne peuvent être prolongés que pour une durée maximale de trois mois.

      Dans le cas de menaces prévisibles, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures, notifiés à la Commission, aux États membres et au Parlement européen avant d’être rétablis, peuvent rester en place pendant une période de six mois maximum. Ils peuvent être prolongés par périodes renouvelables de six mois maximum, pour une durée n’excédant pas deux ans. Dans des situations exceptionnelles majeures liées à une menace persistante, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures peuvent être prolongés au-delà de deux ans, pour une période maximale de 6 mois supplémentaires, renouvelable une fois, la durée totale n’excédant pas un an.
      Promotion de mesures alternatives

      Une autre mise à jour du code frontières Schengen sur laquelle la présidence et le Parlement européen ont marqué leur accord concerne le recours à des mesures alternatives aux contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

      Le recours à ces mesures alternatives permettra aux États membres de limiter considérablement le rétablissement éventuel des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, en garantissant la sécurité tout en préservant l’espace de libre circulation sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

      Le nouveau code introduit également des mesures alternatives pour lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier dans l’espace Schengen. Une nouvelle procédure permettra à un État membre de transférer des ressortissants de pays tiers arrêtés dans la zone frontalière et séjournant illégalement sur son territoire vers l’État membre d’où ils sont arrivés directement. L’arrestation devrait s’effectuer dans le cadre d’une coopération bilatérale.
      Mesures aux frontières extérieures en cas de crise sanitaire

      En vertu du nouveau code frontières Schengen, le Conseil peut adopter une décision autorisant des restrictions temporaires de déplacement aux frontières extérieures en cas d’urgence de santé publique de grande ampleur. Pendant la pandémie de COVID-19, l’UE n’a pu émettre que des recommandations non contraignantes à l’intention des États membres.

      La décision peut également prévoir des restrictions de déplacement liées à la santé, telles que des tests, une quarantaine et l’isolement à domicile.

      Certaines catégories de personnes seront exemptées des restrictions à l’entrée : les personnes jouissant du droit à la libre circulation, les résidents de longue durée et les bénéficiaires d’une protection internationale.
      Prochaines étapes

      L’accord provisoire intervenu aujourd’hui sera soumis aux représentants des États membres au sein du Conseil (Coreper) pour confirmation. Il devra également être formellement adopté par les deux institutions.

      L’espace Schengen s’étend sur plus de 4 millions de kilomètres carrés, se compose de 27 pays européens et permet à plus de 400 millions de personnes de voyager librement entre les pays membres sans passer par des contrôles aux frontières.

      La coopération entre les forces de police, les autorités douanières et les autorités chargées du contrôle des frontières extérieures des pays de l’espace Schengen contribue à la sécurité de la zone.

      Le code frontières Schengen, qui va être mis à jour par cet accord entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen, constitue le cadre réglementaire qui prévoit l’absence de contrôles aux frontières intérieures et fixe des règles pour le contrôle des personnes aux frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen.

      Le code permet aux États membres de rétablir des contrôles aux frontières intérieures dans des circonstances exceptionnelles mettant en péril le fonctionnement global de l’espace Schengen.


    • Réforme Schengen : le nouveau code rend possible les refoulements aux frontières intérieures

      Un accord a été trouvé, mardi, par les négociateurs du Parlement et du Conseil européens quant à la révision du code Schengen des frontières. Cet accord introduit de nouvelles mesures qui, rendent notamment légal le transfert de migrants depuis une zone frontalière vers le pays dont il arrive. Infomigrants fait le point.

      L’accord a été annoncé mardi soir. Les négociateurs du Parlement européen et du Conseil européen viennent d’aboutir à une version finale de révision du code Schengen des frontières. Ce code régit les pratiques aux frontières intérieures et extérieures de l’espace Schengen, territoire composé par 27 États au sein duquel, en théorie, chacun peut circuler sans contrôle.

      L’accord doit encore être approuvé formellement par le Parlement et le Conseil. Si un communiqué de presse en donne les grandes lignes, le texte détaillé n’a pas encore été rendu public. « La libre circulation dans nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord conclu aujourd’hui (...) clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers », soutient la ministre belge de l’Intérieur, Annelies Verlinden, dont le pays assure la présidence du Conseil de l’UE.

      Depuis 2015, de nombreux États, dont la France, ont réintroduit des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières intérieures. En raison de la menace terroriste, mais aussi des restrictions sanitaires dues au Covid-19. Ils sont actuellement plus de la moitié des États membres de l’espace Schengen à le faire, rappelle l’AFP. Et ce, alors que ces contrôles internes sont contraires au principe de libre circulation dans l’espace Schengen.
      Un an de prolongation supplémentaire pour les contrôles aux frontières intérieures

      Ce type de contrôle est autorisé par le code Schengen « en cas de menace grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure d’un État ». La réintroduction d’un contrôle aux frontières intérieures est d’une période de six mois maximum. Ces périodes sont ensuite renouvelables, sur une durée maximale de deux ans.

      La nouvelle réforme du code Schengen réaffirme le caractère exceptionnel de ces contrôles. La « nécessité et la proportionnalité » de ces derniers devra être argumentée.

      Mais elle ajoute la possibilité de les prolonger encore d’une année supplémentaire. Le nouveau code encadre donc mieux la pratique… Tout en allongeant sa possibilité à trois années maximum.
      Une nouvelle mesure qui légitime les refoulements aux frontières intérieures

      À partir de cette base, les négociateurs ont introduit une nouvelle mesure pour contrôler les mouvements migratoires au sein de l’espace Schengen qui inquiète fortement les ONG et avocats en droit des étrangers. Le nouveau code permettra en effet à un État membre de « transférer les ressortissants de pays tiers appréhendés dans la zone frontalière et séjournant illégalement sur son territoire vers l’État membre d’où ils sont directement arrivés. L’arrestation devra avoir lieu dans le cadre d’un cadre de coopération bilatérale », détaille le communiqué.

      Par exemple : à la frontière franco-italienne, avec cette nouvelle mesure, « toute personne qui se trouve dans la zone frontalière pourra être arrêtée si les autorités françaises soupçonnent que cette personne est en situation irrégulière et venue d’Italie », décrit Ulrich Stege, avocat en droit des étrangers membre du réseau juridique italien ASGI, et enseignant à l’International University de Turin. Il sera possible de la refouler via « une procédure simplifiée, par exemple un unique document indiquant l’identité de la personne. On le lui fait signer, puis on la repousse ». Des pushbacks qui deviendraient légaux, en somme.

      Cette pratique a pourtant été épinglée, pas plus tard qu’en septembre 2023, par la Cour de Justice de l’UE. « La volonté est clairement de codifier et généraliser, dans la législation européenne, une pratique qui est en ce moment même en place notamment entre la France et l’Italie », confirme Ulrich Stege.
      Risques accrus de contrôles au faciès

      Edwige*, une exilée ivoirienne rencontrée à Vintimille en octobre, avait raconté à Infomigrants le déroulement des contrôles de police menant à des refoulements, dans les trains entre l’Italie et la France. « Les policiers nous ont dit de sortir. Directement, sans regarder nos documents. Moi, j’étais aux toilettes à ce moment-là : ils sont rentrés, ils m’ont tirée dehors. Je ne comprenais pas ce qu’il se passait », témoignait-elle. « C’est là que je me suis rendue compte qu’ils avaient fait sortir tous les Noirs du train. »

      « Rappelons que, dès que l’on parle de contrôles aux frontières intérieures, on ne peut pas imaginer autre chose que ce que l’on voit depuis 2015 : c’est-à-dire des contrôles avec un profilage racial des personnes. Cela ne peut pas se faire autrement », met en garde Ulrich Stege.

      Avec cette nouvelle mesure, « on s’oriente vers une systématisation de ces contrôles basées sur du profilage racial », soutient l’avocat et professeur d’université italien. Pour rappel, ces contrôles au faciès sont bien entendus illégaux... Car discriminatoires. "Il est clair que les contrôles « aléatoires » de documents dépendront des décisions de la police quant à savoir qui « ressemble » à une personne sans-papiers", abonde l’ASGI dans son analyse de la réforme, parue mi 2022.

      « Jusqu’ici, on avait des pratiques basées sur des accords bilatéraux. Cette fois, il y aurait une loi européenne qui régularise et légitime ces pratiques. Or, ce sont des pratiques violentes, de refoulements et de discriminations raciales », tranche Silvia Carta, chargée de plaidoyer politique migratoire pour le réseau PICUM (Plateforme pour la coopération internationale sur les migrants sans papiers), également interrogée par Infomigrants.
      Pas d’exception pour les mineurs, les demandeurs d’asile ou les familles ?

      Plusieurs questions restent en suspens. Existera-t-il un droit au recours, pour les personnes soumises à cette nouvelle mesure ? Mais aussi : combien de temps les personnes pourront-elles être placées dans des locaux de rétention, en attendant leur refoulement ? Par-dessus tout : y aura-t-il des exceptions pour les catégories protégées, à savoir les mineurs non-accompagnés, les familles avec enfants, ou encore les demandeurs d’asile - qui ont le droit imprescriptible de déposer une demande d’asile partout dans l’UE ?

      « Notre crainte, c’est que cette mesure favorise, entre autres, la rétention illégale des personnes », pointe Silvia Carta. « Le Parlement avait envisagé des garde-fous. Mais nous ne savons pas exactement ce qui a été retenu dans le texte, d’autant que le Conseil était, à l’inverse, réticent à les intégrer dans l’accord... »

      Or, « sans précision, sans règle claire, chacun fait un peu comme il le veut. On le voit bien à la frontière franco-italienne, où des demandeurs d’asile sont refoulés », insiste Ulrich Stege.

      De manière globale, le nouveau code Schengen vise à promouvoir et créer d’autres « mesures alternatives pour lutter contre les mouvements non autorisés de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier dans l’espace Schengen », assume le communiqué européen.

      Sans publication du texte, difficile de savoir pour le moment ce que recouvre ce champ des « mesures alternatives ». Les ONG craignent une intensification du recours aux technologies de surveillance. Avec l’idée de « faciliter les détections et les interceptions des gens de façon de plus en plus systématique. Via des drones, des caméras, l’intelligence artificielle... », souligne Silvia Carta.
      Des mesures face aux tentatives « d’instrumentalisation » de migrants

      La révision du code Schengen concerne aussi les frontières extérieures. Il est prévu une harmonisation des règles d’entrée dans l’UE « en cas d’urgence sanitaire », avec des « éventuelles mises en quarantaine ou tests », laisse entrevoir le communiqué.

      Surtout, l’accord prévoit des mesures face aux tentatives d’Etats tiers d’"instrumentaliser" les migrants « dans un but politique » de déstabilisation - comme le Bélarus ou encore la Russie ont été accusés par l’UE de le faire, en 2023. Il s’agira de « limiter le nombre de points de passage, ou de réduire leurs horaires d’ouverture », annonce le communiqué.

      "Ce concept d’"instrumentalisation" est problématique et inquiétant", réagit Silvia Carta. "Il associe la migration à une menace sécuritaire. Et puis, qui rentrera dans cette définition de l’"instrumentalisation" ? Est-ce qu’à terme, cela pourrait viser aussi les missions de sauvetage des personnes exilées menées par des ONG ?"

      Le rôle de l’agence de garde-frontières Frontex s’en verra renforcé, souligne dans son analyse détaillée le réseau Border Violence Monitoring. Dans les moments de tension aux frontières extérieures, comme entre la Finlande et la Russie fin 2023, des agents sont envoyés sur place, en mission.

      « C’est un constat que l’on fait pour tous les textes sur les migrations, y compris le nouveau Pacte migratoire européen : l’UE produit des nouvelles règles qui se basent sur une approche sécuritaire, avec la criminalisation de la figure du migrant », conclut Ulrich Stege. « Et cela nuit aux droits fondamentaux qui devraient s’appliquer ».


    • Racial profiling and « internal pushbacks » in new Schengen borders legislation

      Statewatch is publishing the final compromise text of the revised Schengen Borders Code, which is due for adoption soon by the Council and the Parliament. The text has been heavily criticised for encouraging racial profiling through the increased use of police patrols and checks at internal borders in the Schengen area, as well as legitimating “internal pushbacks”, with the aim of avoiding the full-blown reintroduction of internal border controls.

      The proposed Regulation, which comes hot on the heels of other new legislation as part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, has a number of goals, as explained in the compromise text document (pdf):

      a) establish a new mechanism which should allow for a timely adoption by the Council of a binding instrument setting out temporary travel restrictions at the external borders in case of a pandemic,

      b) address the instrumentalisation of migrants, where a third country actor is using human beings to destabilise the Union or its Member States,

      c) create a new mechanism allowing for a European response to problems affecting a majority of Member States at the same time and thus putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk,

      d) clarify and expand the list of elements that must be assessed by a Member State when taking the decision on temporary reintroduction of border controls,

      e) provide that safeguards should always be applied, to limit the negative impact of the temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders, should this reintroduction be inevitable.

      The Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migration has said that the text will increase the use of police checks at internal borders that will be based on “racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics,” whilst warning that it also legalises “the violent practice of ‘internal pushbacks’, which consists in apprehending and detaining people caught without a valid document near an internal border, and transferring them to the member state the police think the person came from without conducting an individual assessment.”

      The document includes an explanation from the Presidency of “the key elements of the compromise text”:

      – Travel restrictions – The definition and concept of “large-scale public health emergency” were agreed and the Parliament accepted that Member States can apply stricter measures than those agreed at EU level. A supplementary list of categories of travellers that could be exempted from travel restrictions was included from which categories of essential travellers could be added to Annex XI by means of an implementing act.

      – Alternative police measures – These measures are intended to enable Member States to avoid having to resort to the reintroduction of internal border controls. These provisions were largely maintained in the final agreement. This is an important element since it will expand the toolbox available to Member States to deal with threats before reintroducing internal border controls.

      – Transfer procedure – The procedure will take place in the context of a bilateral cooperation framework. Minors will not be exempted from the procedure, but procedural safeguards will be included.

      – Instrumentalisation – A cross-reference was made to the definition of instrumentalisation as contained in the Crisis Regulation

      – Attempt to cross the external border en masse and using force – The wording of a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights was maintained.

      – Reintroduction/prolongation of internal border controls – On the issue of a maximum duration for which Member States can reintroduce internal border controls, an agreement was reached for a total period of two years, with possibility of two additional prolongations of 6 months each. In the case of a situation putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border controls that affects several Member States, the application of the provision will be restricted to large scale public health emergencies.


    • Asylum and migration reform: EU member states’ representatives green light deal with European Parliament

      Today, EU member states’ representatives (Coreper) approved the provisional deal that was reached between the Council presidency and the European Parliament on 20 December 2023, constituting a pact of five key laws which will reform the EU’s asylum and migration system.

      “The member states today confirmed their commitment to improve the European asylum and migration system. These new rules will make the European asylum system more effective and increase solidarity between member states. This agreement will fundamentally change the way in which we deal with migration and asylum on the ground, at the borders and within our territories. The agreement will not change the situation on the ground from day one after its adoption, but now we have to be fully committed to implement what we have decided.” (Nicole de Moor, Belgian State Secretary for Asylum and Migration)

      Pact on asylum and migration

      The five EU laws of the pact touch upon all stages of asylum and migration management.

      The update of the Eurodac regulation (the EU fingerprint database) will make it possible to better tackle irregular movements and monitor the paths of asylum seekers and persons in an irregular situation throughout the EU.

      The screening regulation’s aim is to strengthen controls of persons at external borders. It also ensures fast identification of the correct procedure – such as return to their country of origin or start of an asylum procedure – when a person enters the EU without fulfilling the right entry conditions.

      The asylum procedure regulation (APR) establishes a common procedure that member states need to follow when people seek international protection. It streamlines the procedural arrangements and sets standards for the rights of the asylum seeker. It introduces a mandatory border procedure, with the aim of quickly assessing at the EU’s external borders whether applications for asylum are unfounded or inadmissible.

      The asylum and migration management regulation (AMMR) will replace the current Dublin regulation. It sets out rules determining which member state is responsible for the examination of an asylum application. To balance the current system whereby a few member states are responsible for the vast majority of asylum applications, a new solidarity mechanism will be established. The new rules combine mandatory solidarity to support member states who cannot cope with the number of irregular arrivals into their territory with flexibility for member states as regards the choice of their contributions

      The fifth leg of the Pact is a new law that establishes a framework allowing member states to address situations of crisis in the field of asylum and migration. They would be authorised to adjust certain rules, for instance concerning the registration of asylum applications or the asylum border procedure. On the other hand these countries would be able to request solidarity and support measures from the EU and its member states.
      Reception conditions, qualification and resettlement

      The permanent representatives committee also gave the thumbs up to three asylum and migration laws on which Council and Parliament had already reached agreement in 2022. These three laws comprise a revision of the reception conditions directive, an update of the qualification regulation and a regulation establishing an EU resettlement framework.

      A return border regulation was also approved which allows the pact to apply to those European countries with differing Schengen rules.
      Next steps

      The laws approved today will have to be formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.


      The asylum procedure regulation, asylum and migration management regulation, Eurodac regulation, screening regulation and crisis regulation are components of the new pact on migration and asylum, which the Commission proposed on 23 September 2020.

      The reception conditions directive, qualification regulation and EU resettlement framework were proposed in 2016.


  • L’erosione di Schengen, sempre più area di libertà per pochi a danno di molti

    I Paesi che hanno aderito all’area di libera circolazione strumentalizzano il concetto di minaccia per la sicurezza interna per poter ripristinare i controlli alle frontiere e impedire così l’ingresso ai migranti indesiderati. Una forzatura, praticata anche dall’Italia, che scatena riammissioni informali e violazioni dei diritti. L’analisi dell’Asgi

    Lo spazio Schengen sta venendo progressivamente eroso e ridotto dagli Stati membri dell’Unione europea che, con il pretesto della sicurezza interna o di “minacce” esterne, ne sospendono l’applicazione. Ed è così che da spazio di libera circolazione, Schengen si starebbe trasformando sempre più in un labirinto creato per isolare e respingere le persone in transito e i cittadini stranieri.

    Per l’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi) la sospensione della libera circolazione, che dovrebbe essere una pratica emergenziale da attivarsi solo nel caso di minacce gravi per la sicurezza di un Paese, rischia infatti di diventare una prassi ricorrente nella gestione dei flussi migratori.

    A fine ottobre di quest’anno il governo italiano ha riattivato i controlli al confine con la Slovenia, giustificando l’iniziativa con l’aumento del rischio interno a seguito della guerra in atto a Gaza e da possibili infiltrazioni terroristiche. La decisione è stata anche proposta come reazione alla pressione migratoria a cui è soggetto il Paese. Lo stesso giorno in cui l’Italia ha annunciato la sospensione della libera circolazione -misura prorogata- la stessa scelta è stata presa anche da Slovenia, Austria, Repubblica Ceca, Slovacchia, Polonia e Germania. Una prassi che rischia di agevolare le violazioni dei diritti delle persone in transito. “Questa pratica, così come l’uso degli accordi bilaterali di riammissione, ha di fatto consentito alle autorità di frontiera dei vari Stati membri di impedire l’ingresso nel territorio e di applicare respingimenti ai danni di persone migranti e richiedenti asilo, in violazione di numerose norme nazionali e sovranazionali”, scrive l’Asgi.

    Il “Codice frontiere Schengen” prevede che i confini interni possano essere attraversati in un qualsiasi punto senza controlli sulle persone, in modo indipendente dalla loro nazionalità. Secondo i dati del Consiglio dell’Unione europea, circa 3,5 milioni di persone attraverserebbero questi confini ogni giorno mentre in 1,7 milioni lavorerebbero in un Paese diverso da quello di residenza, attraversando così una frontiera interna. In caso di minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna in uno Stato membro, però, quest’ultimo è autorizzato a ripristinare i controlli “in tutte o in alcune parti delle sue frontiere interne per un periodo limitato non superiore a 30 giorni o per la durata prevedibile della minaccia grave”. Tuttavia, lo stesso Codice afferma che “la migrazione e l’attraversamento delle frontiere esterne di un gran numero di cittadini di Paesi terzi non dovrebbero in sé essere considerate una minaccia per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza”.

    Inoltre, anche nel caso in cui vengano introdotte restrizioni alla libera circolazione, queste vanno applicate in accordo con il diritto delle persone in transito. “La reintroduzione temporanea dei controlli non può giustificare alcuna deroga al rispetto dei diritti fondamentali delle persone straniere che fanno ingresso nel territorio degli Stati membri e, nel caso specifico dell’Italia, attraverso il confine italo-sloveno -ribadisce l’Asgi-. In particolare, il controllo non può esentare le autorità di frontiera dalla verifica delle situazioni individuali delle persone straniere che intendano accedere nel territorio dello Stato e che intendano presentare domanda di asilo”. In particolare, la sicurezza dei confini non può impedire l’accesso alle procedure di protezione internazionale per chi ne fa richieste e di riceve informazioni sulla possibilità di farlo. Infine, i controlli non possono portare a una violazione del diritto di non respingimento, che impedisce l’espulsione di una persona verso Paese dove potrebbe subire trattamenti inumani o degradanti o dove possa essere soggetta a respingimenti “a catena” verso Stati che si macchiano di queste pratiche.

    Le operazioni di pattugliamento lungo il confine tra Italia e Slovenia presentano criticità proprio in tal senso. Secondo le notizie riportate dai media e le recenti dichiarazioni del ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi, l’Italia avrebbe applicato ulteriori misure che hanno l’evidente effetto di impedire alla persona straniera l’accesso al territorio nazionale e ai diritti che ne conseguono. Già a settembre del 2023 il ministro aveva dichiarato, in risposta a un’interrogazione parlamentare, la ripresa dell’attività congiunta tra le forze di polizia di Italia e Slovenia a partire dal 2022. Sottolineando come grazie all’accordo fosse stato possibile impedire, per tutto il 2023, l’ingresso sul territorio nazionale di circa 1.900 “migranti irregolari”. “Preoccupa, inoltre, l’opacità operativa che caratterizza questi interventi di polizia: le modalità, infatti, con le quali vengono condotti sono poco chiare e difficilmente osservabili ma celano evidenti profili di criticità e potenziali lesioni di diritti”.

    Le azioni di polizia, infatti, avrebbero avuto luogo già in territorio italiano oltre il confine: una simile procedura appare in linea con quanto previsto dalle procedure di riammissione bilaterale, ma in contrasto con il Codice frontiere Schengen, che presuppone che i controlli possano essere svolti solo presso i valichi di frontiera comunicati alle istituzioni competenti. Una prassi simile è stata riscontrata lungo il confine italo-francese, dove l’Asgi ha identificato la coesistenza di pratiche legate alla sospensione della libera circolazione con procedure di riammissione informale.

    “La libera circolazione nello spazio europeo è una delle conquiste più importanti dei nostri tempi -è la conclusione dell’Asgi-. Il suo progressivo smantellamento dovrebbe essere dettato da una effettiva emergenza e contingenza, entrambe condizioni che sembrano non rinvenibili nelle motivazioni addotte dall’Italia e dagli altri Stati membri alla Commissione europea. La libertà di circolazione, pilastro fondamentale dell’area Schengen, rivela forse a tutt’oggi la sua vera natura: un’area di libertà per pochi a danno di molti”.


    #Schengen #contrôles_frontaliers #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Europe #frontières_intérieures #espace_Schengen #sécurité #libre_circulation #Italie #Slovénie #terrorisme #Gaza #Slovénie #Autriche #République_Tchèque #Slovaquie #Pologne #Allemagne #accords_bilatéraux #code_frontières #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #droit_d'asile #refoulements_en_chaîne #patrouilles_mixtes #réadmissions_informelles #France #frontière_sud-alpine


    ajouté au fil de discussion sur la réintroduction des contrôles systématiques à la frontière entre Italie et Slovénie :

  • Cet automne c’est une suite d’annonces du rétablissement des #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières dans les pays de l’#Union_européenne (#UE / #EU)... tentative de #métaliste

    La liste complète des demandes de réintroduction des contrôles systématiques à la commission européenne :

    #Schengen #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #2023 #automne_2023

  • Slovenci objavili gdje je na granici najgore stanje. “Koristimo konjicu, helikoptere”

    SLOVENIJA uvodi pojačane kontrole granice s Hrvatskom. Slovenska policija, odmah nakon graničnih prijelaza, postavlja punktove na kojima može zaustavljati vozila.

    Portal 24ur navodi da se radi o sljedećim mjestima: kod željezničkog nadvožnjaka u mjestu Rigonce u blizini prijelaza Harmica, na punktu Trnovec kod Metlike, Obrežje kod Kalina, ali i na granici prema Italiji - u mjestima Rakitovec, Podgorje i Sočerga na području PU Koper. Iza graničnog prijelaza Obrežje, najvećeg cestovnog prijelaza Hrvatske i Slovenije, policija je organizirala motrenje.

    Kako pišu slovenski mediji, nakon ulaska Hrvatske u Schengen početkom godine, broj migranata koji zapadnobalkanskom rutom ilegalno dolaze u Sloveniju, pa tako i preko Bosne i Hercegovine, znatno je porastao. Slovenska policija je od početka godine do kraja kolovoza obradila 36.137 ilegalnih prelazaka državne granice između Slovenije i Hrvatske. U istom razdoblju prošle godine obrađen je 13.601 neovlašteni ulazak.

    Policija primjećuje da je i prije ulaska Hrvatske u šengenski prostor došlo do preusmjeravanja migracijskih tokova s ​​područja Bele krajine na područje Posavja. Jedan od razloga je i to što sve više migranata u Hrvatskoj iskazuje namjeru traženja azila, pa ih se dovozi u azilantske centre na zagrebačkom području, koje je geografski vrlo blizu Posavja, rekao je Bojan Tomc, načelnik Odjela za državnu granicu i strance, pojasnili su prije nekoliko dana iz Policijske uprave (PU) Novo mesto.

    I dok slovenska vlada Roberta Goloba inzistira na koalicijskoj obvezi oko uklanjanja ograde na granici, iz pograničnih općina kažu da šengenski sustav u Hrvatskoj očito ne funkcionira. Od mještana se čuju pozivi da se pojača policijski nadzor i da se prestane s uklanjanjem ograde na granici.
    Slovenci objavili gdje je najgore stanje

    Kako pišu slovenski mediji, trenutno je najgore na području zapadno od Samobora (Bregana-Obrežje) i posebno Zaprešića. S hrvatske strane granice zapadno od Zaprešića nalazi se Šenkovec, a sa slovenske mjesto Rigonce za koje Slovenci kažu da je najpogođenije migracijama.

    Cijelo to područje od Obrežja do Rigonce spada u slovensku regiju Posavje, gdje su najviše pogođena naselja Rigonce, Dobova (nalazi se u nastavku na Rigonce) i Obrežje. Prema riječima ravnatelja PU Novo mesto Igora Juršiča, policija je u Rigoncama, gdje je najkritičnije - trenutno bilježe od 120 do 200 migranata dnevno - pojačala kontrolu i ophodnjama i tehničkim sredstvima. Između ostalog, migrante nastoje presresti što bliže granici kako ne bi ulazili u naselja i izazivali nelagodu kod mještana. Svakodnevno koriste konjicu, vodiče službenih pasa i helikopter. Surađuju s hrvatskom policijom s kojom imaju redovite sastanke, a u mješovitim patrolama zajednički nadziru područje s obje strane granice.

    Ove godine na području PU Novo mesto obrađeno je 32.500 stranaca koji su ilegalno prešli državnu granicu. U istom razdoblju prošle godine takvih je prelazaka bilo oko 5000. Samo u Rigoncama ove je godine granicu ilegalno prešlo 25 tisuća stranaca. Također je uhićeno 177 stranaca, krijumčara, koji su počinili kazneno djelo nedopuštenog prelaska državne granice. Lani je u istom razdoblju uhićen 31.
    “Mještani su vrlo tolerantni”

    Kako javlja STA, zamjenik glavnog ravnatelja policije Robert Ferenc objasnio je na hitnoj sjednici Odbora za unutarnje poslove, državnu upravu i lokalnu samoupravu da se nakon ulaska Hrvatske u šengenski prostor migracije više odvijaju kroz tzv. zelenu granicu nego raznim cestovnim i željezničkim pravcima.

    Zbog toga je policija pojačala prisutnost i počela provoditi mješovite ophodnje sa svim policijama država s kojima Slovenija graniči. Glavni ravnatelj policije Senad Jušić pozvao je hrvatskog kolegu da pojača mješovite ophodnje na području Policijske postaje Brežice.

    Načelnik Općine Brežice Ivan Molan rekao je da je ministar unutarnjih poslova Boštjan Poklukar tijekom posjeta Rigoncama obećao da će ovaj dio ograde biti posljednji koji će biti uklonjen.

    Mještane Rigonca, koji osjećaju izrazito pojačan pritisak ilegalnih prelazaka granice, opisao je kao vrlo tolerantne prema izbjeglicama te, prema njegovim riječima, zbog toga nije bilo sukoba između te dvije skupine. Prema riječima Anje Bah Žibert (SDS), u rujnu je granicu prešlo 6200 migranata u naselju s oko 180 stanovnika.


    Google translation:
    Slovenians announced where the worst situation is on the border. “We use cavalry, helicopters”

    SLOVENIA introduces increased border controls with Croatia. Immediately after the border crossings, the Slovenian police set up checkpoints where they can stop vehicles.

    The 24ur portal states that the following places are involved: near the railway overpass in the town of Rigonce near the Harmica crossing, at the Trnovec point near Metlika, Obrežje near Kalin, but also on the border with Italy - in the towns of Rakitovec, Podgorje and Sočerga in the area of ​​PU Koper. Behind the Obrežje border crossing, the largest road crossing between Croatia and Slovenia, the police organized surveillance.

    According to the Slovenian media, after Croatia’s entry into Schengen at the beginning of the year, the number of migrants who illegally come to Slovenia via the Western Balkans route, including via Bosnia and Herzegovina, has increased significantly. From the beginning of the year to the end of August, the Slovenian police processed 36,137 illegal border crossings between Slovenia and Croatia. In the same period last year, 13,601 unauthorized entries were processed.

    The police note that even before Croatia’s entry into the Schengen area, there was a redirection of migration flows from the area of ​​Bela Krajina to the area of ​​Posavija. One of the reasons is that more and more migrants in Croatia express their intention to seek asylum, so they are brought to asylum centers in the Zagreb area, which is geographically very close to Posavije, said Bojan Tomc, head of the Department for State Borders and Foreigners, explained a few days ago from the Police Administration (PU) Novo mesto.

    And while the Slovenian government of Robert Golob insists on a coalition commitment to remove the fence on the border, the border municipalities say that the Schengen system in Croatia is clearly not working. There are calls from the locals to increase police surveillance and to stop removing the border fence.
    Slovenians announced where the worst situation is

    According to the Slovenian media, it is currently worst in the area west of Samobor (Bregan-Obrežje) and especially Zaprešić. On the Croatian side of the border, west of Zaprešić, is Šenkovec, and on the Slovenian side is Rigonce, which Slovenians say is the most affected by migration.

    The entire area from Obrežje to Rigonce belongs to the Slovenian region of Posavje, where the settlements of Rigonce, Dobova (it is located below Rigonce) and Obrežje are the most affected. According to the director of PU Novo mesto Igor Juršič, the police in Rigonci, where it is most critical - currently recording 120 to 200 migrants per day - has strengthened control with patrols and technical means. Among other things, they try to intercept migrants as close to the border as possible so that they do not enter settlements and cause discomfort among the locals. They use cavalry, service dog handlers and a helicopter on a daily basis. They cooperate with the Croatian police, with whom they have regular meetings, and jointly monitor the area on both sides of the border in mixed patrols.

    This year, 32,500 foreigners who illegally crossed the state border were processed in the territory of the Novo mesto PU. In the same period last year, there were about 5,000 such crossings. Only in Rigonci this year, 25,000 foreigners crossed the border illegally. Also, 177 foreigners, smugglers, who committed the crime of illegally crossing the state border were arrested. Last year, 31 were arrested in the same period.
    “The locals are very tolerant”

    As reported by STA, Deputy Director General of Police Robert Ferenc explained at the emergency meeting of the Committee for Internal Affairs, State Administration and Local Self-Government that after Croatia’s entry into the Schengen area, migration is taking place more through the so-called the green border but by various road and rail routes.

    Because of this, the police increased their presence and began conducting joint patrols with all the police of the countries with which Slovenia borders. Chief Police Director Senad Jušić called on his Croatian colleague to step up mixed patrols in the area of ​​the Brežice Police Station.

    The head of the municipality of Brežice, Ivan Molan, said that the Minister of the Interior, Boštjan Poklukar, promised during his visit to Rigonci that this part of the fence would be the last to be removed.

    He described the locals of Rigonc, who feel the extremely increased pressure of illegal border crossings, as very tolerant towards refugees and, according to him, because of this, there were no conflicts between the two groups. According to Anja Bah Žibert (SDS), in September, 6,200 migrants crossed the border in a settlement with about 180 inhabitants.

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Slovénie #Croatie #militarisation_des_frontières #Rigonice #Harmica
    #Trnovec #Metlika #Obrežje #Kalin #Rakitovec #Podgorje #Sočerga
    #Italie #Schengen #Posavja #Zaprešić #Šenkovec

    via @erim

  • EU judges slam France’s migrant pushbacks

    Ruling examines decision to shut French border to non-EU nationals.

    The EU’s top court ruled against France’s policy of turning away migrants at its borders.

    The European Court of Justice announced on Thursday (https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-09/cp230145en.pdf) that those actions breached the EU’s rules on migrant returns.

    The ruling comes as France closed its border to Italy amid a recent surge in migrant arrivals to the Italian island of Lampedusa.

    France’s center-right Home Affairs Minister Gerard Darmanin had on Monday vowed that “France will not take in a single migrant from Lampedusa” after meeting his Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi in Rome (https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/09/18/darmanin-la-francia-non-accogliera-migranti-da-lampedusa_2f53eae6-e8f7-4b82-9d7).

    But EU rules compel member countries to initiate a formal procedure when expelling an irregular migrant, and give that person sufficient time to leave the country.

    So-called pushbacks of migrants, or forcing a migrant directly back across a border, may only be carried out as a last resort, the judges in Luxembourg ruled.

    They also noted that non-EU citizens who lack permission to stay may not be turned away at internal EU borders.

    Commenting on the ruling, the European Commission’s Home Affairs spokesperson Anitta Hipper told a daily media briefing that “reintroducing [internal EU] border controls must remain an exceptional measure.” (https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-246319)

    She added that the EU executive is in consultations with countries that have sealed their borders.

    This ruling comes as the European Parliament’s home affairs committee on Wednesday backed legislation that allows EU countries to enact border controls only when faced with emergencies such as health or terrorism threats, and only for a limited time period.


    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #Italie #France #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #fermeture_des_frontières #Alpes #justice #C-143/22 #Cour_de_justice_de_l'Union_européenne (#CJUE) #frontières_intérieures

    • JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Border control, asylum and immigration – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 – Article 32 – Temporary reintroduction of border control by a Member State at its internal borders – Article 14 – Refusal of entry – Equation of internal borders with external borders – Directive 2008/115/EC – Scope – Article 2(2)(a))

      In Case C‑143/22,

      REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France), made by decision of 24 February 2022, received at the Court on 1 March 2022, in the proceedings

      Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE),

      Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE),

      Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT),

      Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade),

      Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI),

      Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI),

      Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH),

      Le paria,

      Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF),

      SOS – Hépatites Fédération


      Ministre de l’Intérieur,

      intervening party :

      Défenseur des droits,

      THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

      composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, L.S. Rossi, J.-C. Bonichot, S. Rodin and O. Spineanu-Matei, Judges,

      Advocate General : A. Rantos,

      Registrar : M. Krausenböck, Administrator,

      having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 19 January 2023,

      after considering the observations submitted on behalf of :

      – Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF) and SOS – Hépatites Fédération, by P. Spinosi, lawyer,

      – the Défenseur des droits, by C. Hédon, Défenseure des droits, M. Cauvin and A. Guitton, acting as advisers, and by I. Zribi, lawyer,

      – the French Government, by A.-L. Desjonquères and J. Illouz, acting as Agents,

      – the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, E. Borawska-Kędzierska and A. Siwek-Ślusarek, acting as Agents,

      – the European Commission, by A. Azéma, A. Katsimerou, T. Lilamand and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents,

      after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 30 March 2023,

      gives the following


      1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1, ‘the Schengen Borders Code’), and of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

      2 The request has been made in proceedings between Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le Paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF), SOS – Hépatites Fédération, and Ministre de l’Intérieur (Minister of the Interior, France) regarding the legality of the ordonnance no 2020-1733 du 16 décembre 2020 portant partie législative du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Order No 2020-1733 of 16 December 2020, laying down the legislative part of the Code on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum) (JORF of 30 December 2020, Text No 41).

      Legal context

      European Union law

      The Schengen Borders Code

      3 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code :

      ‘For the purposes of this Regulation the following definitions apply :

      1. “internal borders” means :

      (a) the common land borders, including river and lake borders, of the Member States ;

      (b) the airports of the Member States for internal flights ;

      (c) sea, river and lake ports of the Member States for regular internal ferry connections ;

      2. “external borders” means : the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders ;


      4 Title II of that code, which concerns ‘External Borders’, includes Articles 5 to 21.

      5 Article 14 of the code, entitled ‘Refusal of entry’, states :

      ‘1. A third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of long-stay visas.

      2. Entry may only be refused by a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal. The decision shall be taken by an authority empowered by national law. It shall take effect immediately.

      The substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal shall be given by means of a standard form, as set out in Annex V, Part B, filled in by the authority empowered by national law to refuse entry. The completed standard form shall be handed to the third-country national concerned, who shall acknowledge receipt of the decision to refuse entry by means of that form.

      Data on third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused shall be registered in the EES in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ 2017 L 327, p. 20)].

      3. Persons refused entry shall have the right to appeal. Appeals shall be conducted in accordance with national law. A written indication of contact points able to provide information on representatives competent to act on behalf of the third-country national in accordance with national law shall also be given to the third-country national.

      Lodging such an appeal shall not have suspensive effect on a decision to refuse entry.

      Without prejudice to any compensation granted in accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to the correction of the data entered in the EES or of the cancelled entry stamp, or both, and any other cancellations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry.

      4. The border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned.

      5. Member States shall collect statistics on the number of persons refused entry, the grounds for refusal, the nationality of the persons who were refused entry and the type of border (land, air or sea) at which they were refused entry and submit them yearly to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 23)].

      6. Detailed rules governing refusal of entry are given in Part A of Annex V.’

      6 Title III of the Schengen Borders Code, which concerns ‘Internal Borders’, includes Articles 22 to 35.

      7 Article 25 of that code, entitled ‘General framework for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where, in the area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State, that Member State may exceptionally reintroduce border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders for a limited period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days. The scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat.’

      8 Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, entitled ‘Provisions to be applied where border control is reintroduced at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of Title II shall apply mutatis mutandis.’

      9 Annex V, Part A, of the Schengen Borders Code provides :

      ‘1. When refusing entry, the competent border guard shall :

      (a) fill in the standard form for refusing entry, as shown in Part B. The third-country national concerned shall sign the form and shall be given a copy of the signed form. Where the third-country national refuses to sign, the border guard shall indicate this refusal in the form under the section “comments” ;

      (b) for third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused, register in the EES the data on refusal of entry in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 ;

      (c) annul or revoke the visas, as appropriate, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 34 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1)] ;

      (d) for third-country nationals whose refusals of entry are not to be registered into the EES, affix an entry stamp on the passport, cancelled by a cross in indelible black ink, and write opposite it on the right-hand side, also in indelible ink, the letter(s) corresponding to the reason(s) for refusing entry, the list of which is given on the standard form for refusing entry as shown in Part B of this Annex. In addition, for these categories of persons, the border guard shall record every refusal of entry in a register or on a list stating the identity and nationality of the third-country national concerned, the references of the document authorising the third-country national to cross the border and the reason for, and date of, refusal of entry.

      The practical arrangements for stamping are set out in Annex IV.

      2. If a third-country national who has been refused entry is brought to the border by a carrier, the authority responsible locally shall :

      (a) order the carrier to take charge of the third-country national and transport him or her without delay to the third country from which he or she was brought, to the third country which issued the document authorising him or her to cross the border, or to any other third country where he or she is guaranteed admittance, or to find means of onward transportation in accordance with Article 26 of the Schengen Convention and Council Directive 2001/51/EC [of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 45)] ;

      (b) pending onward transportation, take appropriate measures, in compliance with national law and having regard to local circumstances, to prevent third-country nationals who have been refused entry from entering illegally.


      10 Pursuant to Article 44 of that code, entitled ‘Repeal’ :

      ‘Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1)] is repealed.

      References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex X.’

      11 In accordance with that correlation table, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code corresponds to Article 13 of Regulation No 562/2006.

      Directive 2008/115

      12 Article 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115 states :

      ‘1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State.

      2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who :

      (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of [Regulation No 562/2006], or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State ;

      (b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.’

      13 Article 3 of that directive provides :

      ‘For the purpose of this Directive the following definitions shall apply :

      2. “illegal stay” means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of [Regulation No 562/2006] or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State ;

      3. “return” means the process of a third-country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced – to :

      – his or her country of origin, or

      – a country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or

      – another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted ;


      14 Article 4(4) of the directive provides :

      ‘With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the scope of this Directive in accordance with Article 2(2)(a), Member States shall :

      (a) ensure that their treatment and level of protection are no less favourable than as set out in Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 9(2)(a) (postponement of removal), Article 14(1)(b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into account needs of vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention conditions) and

      (b) respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      15 Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 provides :

      ‘When implementing this Directive, Member States shall take due account of :

      (a) the best interests of the child ;

      (b) family life ;

      (c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned,

      and respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      16 Article 6 of that directive provides :

      ‘1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.

      2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to the territory of that other Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance by the third-country national concerned with this requirement, or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security, paragraph 1 shall apply.

      3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1.


      17 The first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application.’

      18 Article 15(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when :

      (a) there is a risk of absconding or

      (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process.

      Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.’

      French law

      19 Article L. 213-3-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum), in the version resulting from the loi no 2018-778, du 10 septembre 2018, pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie (Law No 2018-778 of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration) (JORF of 11 September 2018, Text No 1) (‘the former Ceseda’), stated :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders provided for in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code], the decisions referred to in Article L. 213-2 may be taken in respect of foreign nationals who have arrived directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention signed on 19 June 1990, who have entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and were checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres behind it. The procedures for these checks are defined by decree in the Conseil d’État [(Council of State, France)].’

      20 Order No 2020-1733 recast the legislative part of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. Article L. 332-2 of that code, as amended (‘the amended Ceseda’) provides :

      ‘The decision refusing entry, which shall be in writing and substantiated, shall be taken by an officer belonging to a category prescribed by regulations.

      The notification of the decision refusing entry shall state that the foreign national has the right to inform, or cause to be informed, the person he or she has indicated that he or she intended to visit, his or her consulate or the adviser of his or her choice. It shall state that the foreign national has the right to refuse to be repatriated before one clear day has passed, under the conditions laid down in Article L. 333-2.

      The decision and the notification of rights which accompanies it shall be provided to him in a language he or she understands.

      Particular attention shall be paid to vulnerable persons, especially minors whether accompanied by an adult or not.’

      21 Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda provides :

      ‘The procedure laid down in Article L. 332-2 is applicable to the decision to refuse entry taken against the foreign national pursuant to Article 6 of the [Schengen Borders Code]. It shall also apply to checks carried out at an internal border in the event of the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code].’

      The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

      22 The associations referred to in paragraph 2 of the present judgment are challenging the validity of Order No 2020-1733 before the Conseil d’État (Council of State), in an action for annulment of that order, on the grounds, inter alia, that Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda resulting from it infringes Directive 2008/115 in that it allows decisions to refuse entry at internal borders where checks have been reintroduced.

      23 The referring court observes that the Court held, in its judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others (C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220), that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, does not apply to the situation of an illegally staying third-country national who was apprehended in the immediate vicinity of an internal border of a Member State, even where that Member State has reintroduced border control at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or to internal security in that Member State.

      24 The Conseil d’État (Council of State) points out that, in its Decision No 428175 of 27 November 2020, it held that the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda, which provided that in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, a foreign national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 and which entered into force on 26 March 1995 (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19, ‘the Schengen Convention’), could be refused entry under the terms of Article L. 213-2 of the former Ceseda if he or entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and was checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres inside that border, were contrary to Directive 2008/115.

      25 Admittedly, according to the Conseil d’État (Council of State), Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda does not repeat the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda. However, Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda again provides only for the adoption of a refusal of entry while carrying out border checks at internal borders in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the Schengen Borders Code.

      26 That court therefore considers it necessary to determine whether, in such a case, a third-country national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention who presents themselves at an authorised stationary or mobile border crossing point, without being in possession of documents justifying an authorisation to enter or right to stay in France, may be refused entry on the basis of Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, without Directive 2008/115 being applicable.

      27 In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of [the Schengen Borders Code], can foreign nationals arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention … be refused entry, when entry checks are carried out at that border, on the basis of Article 14 of that [code], without [Directive 2008/115] being applicable ?’

      Consideration of the question referred

      28 By its question referred for a preliminary ruling, the national court asks, in essence, whether the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out, a decision refusing entry, within the meaning of Article 14 of that code, without being subject to compliance with that directive.

      29 Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code allows, exceptionally and under certain conditions, a Member State to reintroduce temporarily border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in that Member State. Under Article 32 of the code, where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of the Title II of the code relating to external borders shall apply mutatis mutandis.

      30 That is the case with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, which provides that a third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States.

      31 However, it is important to remember that a third-country national who, after entering the territory of a Member State illegally is present on that territory without fulfilling the conditions for entry, stay or residence is, therefore, staying illegally, within the meaning of Directive 2008/115. Under Article 2(1) of that directive, and without prejudice to Article 2(2) of the directive, that third-country national falls within the scope of the directive, without his or her presence in the territory of the Member State concerned being subject to a condition as to minimum duration or intention to remain in that territory. He or she must therefore, in principle, be subject to the common standards and procedures laid down by the directive for the purpose of his or her removal, as long as his or her stay has not, as the case may be, been regularised (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

      32 This also applies where the third-country national has been apprehended at a border crossing point, provided that the border crossing point is on the territory of that Member State. In that respect, it should be noted that a person may have entered the territory of a Member State even before crossing a border crossing point (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 February 2020, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Signing-on of seamen in the port of Rotterdam), C‑341/18, EU:C:2020:76, paragraph 45).

      33 It should also be specified, by way of example, that when checks are carried out on board a train between the time when the train leaves the last station located on the territory of a Member State sharing an internal border with a Member State that has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, and the moment when that train enters the first station situated on the territory of the latter Member State, the check on board that same train must, unless otherwise agreed between those two Member States, be regarded as a check carried out at a border crossing point situated on the territory of the Member State which has reintroduced such checks. A third-country national who has been checked on board this train will necessarily remain on the territory of the latter Member State following the check, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/115.

      34 However, it should also be noted that Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States to exclude, exceptionally and under certain conditions, third-country nationals who are staying illegally on their territory from the scope of that directive.

      35 Thus, on the one hand, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States not to apply that directive, subject to the provisions of Article 4(4) thereof, in two specific situations, namely that of third-country nationals who are the subject to a refusal of entry at an external border of a Member State, in accordance with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, or that of third-country nationals who are apprehended or intercepted in connection with the irregular crossing of such an external border and who have not subsequently obtained authorisation or a right to reside in that Member State.

      36 However, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that those two situations relate exclusively to the crossing of an external border of a Member State, as defined in Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code, and do not therefore concern the crossing of a border common to Member States forming part of the Schengen area, even where checks have been reintroduced at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or the internal security of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 45 and 67).

      37 It follows, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 35 of his Opinion, that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 does not authorise a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders to derogate from the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive in order to remove a third-country national who has been intercepted, without a valid residence permit, at one of the border crossing points situated in the territory of that Member State where such checks are carried out.

      38 On the other hand, although Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2008/115 authorises Member States not to apply that directive to third-country nationals who are subject to a criminal penalty providing for or resulting in their return, in accordance with national law, or who are subject to extradition proceedings, it must be noted that such a case is not the one referred to by the provision at issue in the main proceedings.

      39 It follows from the foregoing, first, that a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders may apply, mutatis mutandis, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code and paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex V to that code in respect of a third-country national who is intercepted, without a legal residence permit, at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out.

      40 On the other hand, where the border crossing point is located on the territory of the Member State concerned, the latter must ensure that the consequences of such application, mutatis mutandis, of the provisions referred to in the previous point do not result in disregard of the common standards and procedures laid down in Directive 2008/115. The fact that this obligation on the Member State concerned is likely to render ineffective to a large extent any decision to refuse entry to a third-country national arriving at one of its internal borders is not such as to alter that finding.

      41 With regard to the relevant provisions of that directive, it should be recalled, in particular, that it follows from Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 that any third-country national staying illegally on the territory of a Member State must, without prejudice to the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of that article and in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 5 of that directive, be the subject of a return decision, which must identify, among the third countries referred to in Article 3(3) of that directive, the country to which he or she must return (judgment of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 53).

      42 In addition, a third-country national who is the subject of such a return decision must still, in principle, be given, under Article 7 of Directive 2008/115, a certain period of time in which to leave the territory of the Member State concerned voluntarily. Forced removal is to take place only as a last resort, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, and subject to Article 9 thereof, which requires Member States to postpone removal in the cases it sets out (judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection), C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 252).

      43 Furthermore, it follows from Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 that the detention of an illegally staying third-country national may only be imposed in certain specific cases. However, as the Advocate General pointed out, in essence, in point 46 of his Opinion, that article does not preclude a national from being detained, pending his or her removal, where he or she represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or domestic security, provided that such detention complies with the conditions set out in Articles 15 to 18 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, C‑18/19, EU:C:2020:511, paragraphs 41 to 48).

      44 Furthermore, Directive 2008/115 does not rule out the possibility for Member States to impose a prison sentence for offences other than those relating solely to illegal entry, including in situations where the return procedure established by that directive has not yet been completed. Consequently, that directive also does not preclude the arrest or placing in police custody of an illegally staying third-country national where such measures are adopted on the ground that that national is suspected of having committed an offence other than simply entering the national territory illegally, and in particular an offence likely to threaten public policy or the internal security of the Member State concerned (judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraph 66).

      45 It follows that, contrary to what the French Government maintains, the application, in a case such as that referred to in the reference for a preliminary ruling, of the common standards and procedures laid down by Directive 2008/115 is not such as to make it impossible to maintain public order and safeguard internal security within the meaning of Article 72 TFEU.

      46 In light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that code, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.


      47 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

      On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules :

      Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals,

      must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that regulation, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down in that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.


    • Contrôle des frontières : le gouvernement contraint de sortir de l’illégalité

      Communiqué commun signé par la LDH

      Après 8 ans de pratiques illégales du gouvernement français en matière de contrôle et d’enfermement des personnes en migration aux frontières intérieures, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) confirme, dans un arrêt du 21 septembre, qu’elles sont contraires au droit.

      La CJUE rappelle à la France qu’elle doit se conformer au droit de l’Union européenne, et il appartient au gouvernement français de prendre des mesures immédiates sans attendre que le Conseil d’État en tire toutes les conséquences.

      Associations signataires : Avocats pour la Défense des Droits des Etrangers (ADDE), Alliance-DEDF, Amnesty International France, Anafé (association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les personnes étrangères), Bizi migrant.es, Emmaüs Roya, Federation Etorkinekin Diakité, Gisti, La Cimade, LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme), Médecins du Monde, Roya citoyenne, Syndicat des avocats de France (Saf), Syndicat de la magistrature (SM), Tous Migrants, Tous Migrants 73, Utopia 56 (antenne Toulouse)

      Paris, le 21 septembre 2023


    • Corte di giustizia UE: vietato il respingimento sistematico alle frontiere interne

      La sentenza della Corte nella causa #C-143/22 promossa da diverse associazioni francesi

      Il 21 settembre 2023 una sentenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea (CGUE) ha dichiarato che, anche se un Paese UE ha introdotto controlli alle sue frontiere, non ha il diritto di effettuare respingimenti sistematici. Deve rispettare la direttiva europea «rimpatri» che prevede che a un cittadino extraeuropeo possa “essere concesso un certo periodo di tempo per lasciare volontariamente il territorio“.

      Tutto era partito dal ricorso di varie associazioni francesi 1 che hanno contestato dinanzi al Consiglio di Stato francese la legittimità di un’ordinanza che ha modificato il codice sull’ingresso e sul soggiorno degli stranieri e sul diritto d’asilo (Ceseda).

      Esse hanno sostenuto che, consentendo alle autorità francesi di rifiutare l’ingresso di cittadini di paesi terzi alle frontiere con altri Stati membri (ossia le «frontiere interne»), alle quali sia stato temporaneamente ripristinato un controllo di frontiera in forza del codice frontiere Schengen in ragione di una minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna della Francia, il Ceseda contravverrebbe alla direttiva «rimpatri». Secondo tale direttiva, qualsiasi cittadino di un paese terzo il cui soggiorno è irregolare deve, di norma, essere oggetto di una decisione di rimpatrio. Tuttavia, l’interessato deve, in linea di principio, beneficiare di un certo termine per lasciare volontariamente il territorio. L’allontanamento forzato avviene solo in ultima istanza.

      Il Consiglio di Stato ha quindi interrogato la CGUE sulla questione dichiarando che «in una situazione del genere, un provvedimento di respingimento può essere adottato sulla base del codice frontiere #Schengen ma che, ai fini dell’allontanamento dell’interessato, devono comunque essere rispettate le norme e le procedure comuni previste dalla direttiva “rimpatri” (https://openmigration.org/glossary-term/direttiva-rimpatri), il che può condurre a privare di una larga parte della sua utilità l’adozione di un siffatto provvedimento di respingimento».

      «La sentenza della CGUE impone la giurisprudenza a tutti gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, ma in particolare è rivolta alla Francia, che dal 2015 ha reintrodotto i controlli alle frontiere interne.»

      Negli ultimi otto anni, tutti i treni che passano per #Menton sono stati controllati, gli agenti di polizia hanno controllato i passaggi di frontiera e pattugliato i valichi alpini. Dal 1° giugno è ulteriormente stata dispiegata un militarizzazione delle frontiere con personale aggiuntivo, il supporto dell’esercito, droni con termocamere.

      La Francia è stata accusata di respingere le persone migranti che cercano di entrare nel Paese, anche quelli che chiedono asilo e perfino i minorenni. Diversi rapporti di organizzazioni e collettivi hanno messo in luce queste pratiche violente e illegali, soprattutto nella zona di Ventimiglia. Secondo le testimonianze raccolte, si tratta di respingimenti “sistematici”.

      «In poche parole, questa decisione dice che la Francia sta perseguendo una politica illegale di chiusura delle frontiere», riassume Flor Tercero, dell’Association pour le Droit des Etrangers (ADDE) intervistato da Infomigrants. Questa decisione «è chiaramente una vittoria» e «significa che il governo non può ignorare il diritto dell’Unione europea».


      #frontières_intérieures #directive_retour #illégalité

    • European Court of Justice rules systematic pushbacks are illegal

      European countries do not have the right to refuse entry to irregular migrants even if they have border controls in place, the ECJ has ruled. Activists say the decision means that France has been violating EU law by pushing back migrants coming from Italy.

      When a member state decides to reintroduce checks at its internal borders, can it systematically refuse entry to all irregular foreign nationals? No, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ruled earlier this month. It must comply with the “Return Directive,” a law which says that a non-European national can “be granted a certain period of time to voluntarily leave the territory.”

      “A decision to refuse entry may be decided but, when seeking the removal of the person concerned, the common standards and procedures provided for by the Return Directive must still be respected,” the Luxembourg court stated.

      It also said that “excluding from the scope of this directive foreign nationals who are staying irregularly in the territory” can only be done “exceptionally.”

      The ruling on September 21 is at odds with the policy pursued by France, which re-established controls at its internal EU borders in 2015. For the past eight years, all trains passing through the French coastal city of Menton have been checked, and police have monitored border posts and patrolled the Alps.

      Activist groups say France has been taking advantage of the temporary border controls in order to turn back migrants who try to enter the territory — even those who come to ask for asylum. In an August report, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) teams in Ventimiglia documented practices of pushbacks at the border between Italy and France. “Systematic” pushbacks target unaccompanied minors, even sometimes separating families, according to the report.
      ’An illegal policy’

      “In a nutshell, this decision means that France is pursuing an illegal policy of closing borders,” Flor Tercero, of the Association for Foreigners’ Rights (ADDE), told InfoMigrants. ADDE is one of the associations involved in bringing the lawsuit to court.

      “Pushing back means, in a way, refusing these people the possibility of coming to France to apply for asylum or to cross France to go elsewhere in the EU. France for eight years has decided to carry out border checks. And as it re-established checks, it considered itself entitled to be able to push back migrants coming from Italy, in particular,” he added.

      “After eight years of illegal practices by the French government controlling and detaining migrants at internal borders, the CJEU confirms (...) that [these practices] are contrary to the law,” a joint press release of twenty organizations added.


      For Flor Tercero, this decision is a clear victory. “This means that the government cannot forego European law,” he said.
      France ’will not welcome migrants’ from Lampedusa

      The court decision came at a time when attention was focused on the French-Italian border. Following the recent arrival of a very large number of people on the Italian island of Lampedusa, the French interior minister, Gérald Darmanin, announced that 200 additional police officers would be sent to the border between the two countries, in the expectation that the migrants would eventually make their way from Italy to France.

      France “will not welcome migrants” from the Italian island, the minister stated.

      Meanwhile the departmental director of the border police, Emmanuelle Joubert, announced that more than 3,000 migrants had been arrested in Menton within a fortnight. This brings to 32,000 the number of arrests since the start of the year along the Franco-Italian border. Of those, 24,000 were rejected and handed over to the Italian authorities

      Joubert said she had been informed about the judgment by the CJEU. “The State is carrying out an analysis, we will have instructions later,” she said, adding that migrants who had recently arrived in Lampedusa should not arrive at the French border for “several weeks.”


  • Conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area

    On 28 March 2023, the European Commission (DG HOME), Frontex and Europol will jointly hold a conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area.

    The conference will provide a platform for dialogue between policy decision-makers, senior technology project managers, and strategic industry leaders, essential actors who contribute to making the Schengen area more secure and resilient. The conference will include discussions on the current situation and needs in Member States, selected innovative technology solutions that could strengthen Schengen as well as selected technology use cases relevant for police cooperation within Schengen.

    The conference target participants are ‘chief technology officers’ and lead managers from each Member State’s law enforcement and border guard authorities responsible for border management, security of border regions and internal security related activities, senior policy-makers and EU agencies. With regards to the presentation of innovative technological solutions, a dedicated call for industry participation will be published soon.


    Le rapport est téléchargeable ici:
    Report from the conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area

    In March 2023, the European Commission (DG HOME), Frontex and Europol jointly hosted a conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area. The event brought together policy makers, senior technology project managers, and strategic industry leaders, essential actors who contribute to making the Schengen area more secure and resilient. The conference included discussions on the current situation and needs in Member States, selected innovative technology solutions that could strengthen Schengen as well as selected technology use cases relevant for police cooperation within Schengen.

    Lien pour télécharger le pdf:

    #technologie #frontières #Frontex #Europol #conférence #Schengen #UE #EU #commission_européenne #droits #droits_fondamentaux #biométrie #complexe_militaro-industriel #frontières_intérieures #contrôles_frontaliers #interopérabilité #acceptabilité #libre-circulation #Advanced_Passenger_Information (#API) #One-stop-shop_solutions #données #EU_Innovation_Hub_for_Internal_Security #Personal_Identification_system (#PerIS) #migrations #asile #réfugiés #vidéosurveillance #ePolicist_system #IDEMIA #Grant_Detection #OptoPrecision #Airbus_Defense_and_Space #Airbus #border_management #PNR #eu-LISA #European_Innovation_Hub_for_Internal_Security

  • Europa dreaming
    –-> What happens when the European dream meets the dream of migrants?

    Europe, the broken dream

    It is the spring of 2016 and the Brenner is likely to go back to being a frontier, “an officially defined and recognised border line, equipped, in various cases, with appropriate defensive systems” (Treccani). Compared to the past, however, border barriers are no longer used to delimit our spaces in relation to our “neighbours”, nor to reduce and/or control trade between two neighbouring countries, but with the explicit goal of decreasing the inflow of people coming into the country, from other continents, from places located thousands of kilometres away. The decision to re-introduce border controls between Italy and Austria has been defined by many newspapers as “the end of the Schengen dream”, but this work shows a different reality.

    Because the Schengen Agreement, which was intended to create an area of free movement within the European Union, has been essentially based – and from the very beginning – on a “policing” agreement. Because “the fall of internal borders was complemented by the strengthening of the borders external to the Schengen area” (Internazionale). The point is that the “strengthening of external borders” was not the corollary outcome, but the very essence of this Agreement. It is no coincidence that work on the first European “wall”, the Ceuta and Melilla border fences (funded by the European Union) began in the fall of 1995.

    #Schengen #rêve #migrations #frontières #asile #réfugiés #Langer #Alexander_Langer #accord_de_Schengen

    • L’accordo di Schengen sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione Europea; La riforma della legge Martelli sull’immigrazione

      L’accordo di Schengen sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione Europea; La riforma della legge Martelli sull’immigrazione.

      «L’accordo di Schengen sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione Europea; La riforma della legge Martelli sull’immigrazione» realizzata da Mohamed Ba con Alexander Langer (parlamentare europeo, Federazione dei Verdi).

      L’intervista è stata registrata martedì 27 giugno 1995 alle ore 00:00.

      Quelques extraits:

      «Il sogno mi sembra sia la libera circolazione, l’accordo di Schengen è tutt’ora un accordo tra polizie e di efficienza poliziesca che non mi sembra il migliore modello europeo. (...) Io sarei più contento se la libera circolazione venisse realizzata attraverso accordi politici che non attraverso accordi tra le polizie, come di fatto l’accordo di Schengen è fino ad oggi. Io non auspico tanto che l’Italia assomigli di più ai paesi di Schengen, che quindi imponga controlli più rigidi alle sue frontiere esterne per poi liberalizzare le frontiere esterne [erreur? Frontiere interne plutôt?], ma auspicherei un’Europa con le frontiere esterne anche molto più permeabili. In questo senso oggi, per me, è anche quasi un vanto che l’Italia abbia le frontiere più permeabili e sia giudicata da altri paesi europei come non abbastanza affidabile dal punto di vista Schengen. Perché quando avremo alzato un bel muro allora saremo maturi per Schengen»

      (à partir de la min. 1’13)

      «L’Italia, come si può dire anche della Grecia sono dei paesi oggi ancora molto aperti sul Mediterraneo. Per entrare nell’accordo di Schengen bisognerebbe chiudersi di più verso il Mediterraneo e a quel punto avere libera circolazione con Lussemburgo, Olanda, Germania e così via. Io credo che un’Europa con un grado così alto di chiusura ermetica intorno a sé, può magari garantire la libera circolazione dei suoi cittadini ma non è una grande promessa verso i suoi vicini.»

      (à partir de la min. 2’17)

      "Io trovo che l’accordo di Schengen non sia un tipico accordo non di integrazione democratica dell’Europa ma di integrazione della parte più forte, più robusta e più isolata rispetto ai deboli. Oggi la partita italiana è se si vuole entrare a far parte di questa specie di nucleo duro, mentre per me il nucleo europeo deve distinguersi per la democrazia non per il grado alto del suo isolamento verso l’esterno.

      (à partir de la min. 2’52)

      «Sull’immigrazione bisogna trovare una politica che sostanzialmente arrivi a due cose importanti. Da un lato a un’immigrazione regolata e quindi anche integrabile. Dell’altro a una politica che chiamerei della doppia cittadinanza, che permetta agli immigrati di vivere nel paese in cui lavorano e nello stesso tempo di non perdere né la prospettiva di un possibile ritorno se lo vorranno né il legame con il proprio paese. Mi pare che l’Italia su tutti e due i punti oggi sia fortemente carente. Per cui noi oggi sostanzialmente ci affidiamo alla furbizia, cioè al singolo poliziotto, alla singola guardia di frontiera: chi si riesce a respingere si è contenti che si respinga, chi rientra tra le maglie poi si vedrà come sistemarlo o se rimandarlo indietro.»

      (à partir de la min. 3’55)

      #interview #1995 #legge_Martelli #migrations #radio_radicale #réfugiés #libre-circulation #démocratie #histoire #citoyenneté #double_citoyenneté

  • Qu’est-ce que l’entrée de la #Croatie dans #Schengen peut changer à la route migratoire des Balkans ?

    La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace Schengen. L’intégration de ce pays des Balkans dans la zone de libre circulation pourrait changer la donne à la frontière croate, où les #refoulements de migrants sont fréquents, observe la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. Par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine pourrait se durcir.

    La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace de libre circulation européen Schengen alors que la route migratoire des Balkans connaît une forte hausse de fréquentation depuis l’été. Zagreb a enregistré 30 000 migrants irréguliers dans le pays au cours des dix premiers mois de 2022, soit une augmentation de 150% par rapport à la même période de l’année précédente.

    Pour Camille Le Coz, analyste au Migration policy institute, l’entrée de la Croatie dans Schengen permet d’"acter quelque chose qui était déjà en place sur le terrain". « La Croatie a été récompensée pour ses bons et loyaux services en faisant en sorte de limiter les arrivées de migrants [dans l’UE] », affirme-t-elle.

    Depuis son intégration dans l’Union européenne en 2013, la Croatie est chargée de protéger les frontières extérieures de l’UE, dont la majeure partie est partagée avec la Bosnie. Si les chiffres n’ont rien à voir aujourd’hui avec ceux de 2015, des milliers d’exilés tentent encore chaque année ce passage par la route des Balkans, via la Serbie ou la Bosnie.

    Depuis 2018, le nord de la Bosnie, à la frontière croate, s’est transformé en cul-de-sac pour ces migrants. Voulant montrer à Bruxelles sa capacité à protéger les frontières de l’Union, la Croatie a en effet déployé de nombreux garde-frontières sur la zone. Les refoulements se sont multipliés et, dans la plupart des cas, ils se sont accompagnés de graves violences, tortures et vols, régulièrement dénoncés. Depuis des années, les rapports d’ONG se multiplient sur les exactions commises contre les exilés à la frontière bosno-croate.
    Vers davantage de respect des droits humains ?

    Mais cela pourrait changer à la faveur de cette nouvelle situation, explique la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. « Le respect des droits de l’Homme fait partie des obligations liées à l’entrée dans Schengen. Il est donc possible que l’entrée de la Croatie mette plus de pression sur les policiers et les garde-frontières croates », pointe-t-elle. Les cas de non-respect des droits humains pourraient ainsi être davantage contrôlés.

    Cette entrée pourrait aussi s’accompagner d’aides pour améliorer le système d’asile dans le pays et d’une coopération sur les retours volontaires de migrants. À condition que les garde-frontières ne refoulent pas systématiquement les exilés qui entrent dans le pays pour demander une protection internationale.

    A contrario, et par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine, qui a récemment obtenu le statut de candidat à l’entrée dans l’Union européenne, pourrait se durcir.
    « Éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks »

    Le 28 novembre, le commissaire européen Olivér Várhelyi a annoncé le financement d’un protocole d’accord entre l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le ministère bosnien de la Sécurité à hauteur de 500 000 euros. Cette somme doit servir à augmenter le nombre de « retours volontaires et forcés » des migrants vers leur pays d’origine. Le commissaire a également indiqué que le camp de Lipa, situé dans le nord de la Bosnie serait amené à devenir un centre de détention. « Les faux demandeurs d’asile doivent être détenus jusqu’à leur retour dans leur pays », a-t-il déclaré.

    Barbara Becares, chargée des relations avec la presse de l’ONG No Name Kitchen, qui vient en aide aux exilés en Bosnie et en Serbie, voit dans ce projet la volonté de Bruxelles d’"éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks […] en gardant les personnes en Bosnie".

    Sur le terrain, les polices bosniennes et serbes œuvrent déjà à retenir les personnes le plus loin possible des frontières de l’UE, selon elle. « Les expulsions sont très courantes, autant en Bosnie qu’en Serbie, observe-t-elle. La police va chercher très tôt le matin les personnes qui dorment à l’extérieur des camps et les emmène dans des endroits éloignés des frontières ». En Bosnie, elles sont généralement emmenées dans le camp de Lipa, alors qu’en Serbie, elles sont conduites dans le sud du pays.

    Pour freiner les arrivées via la route des Balkans, Bruxelles compte aussi sur l’aide de la Serbie. Le pays est, lui aussi, candidat à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne et son intégration dépendra sans doute largement, comme pour la Bosnie, de sa capacité à montrer à Bruxelles qu’il contrôle ses frontières.

    En octobre, Belgrade a déjà, à la demande de Bruxelles, mis fin à l’exemption de visas pour les ressortissants tunisiens et burundais. L’obligation de détenir un visa pour entrer dans le pays a été étendue, le 1er janvier, aux ressortissants d’Inde et de Guinée-Bissau.

    #espace_Schengen #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #refoulements_en_chaîne #récompense #frontières_extérieures #soutien_financier #accord #protocole_d'accord #OIM #IOM #retours_volontaires #retours_forcés #Lipa #rétention #détention_administrative #expulsions #push-backs #visas #Serbie

  • « Les #réfugiés sont les #cobayes des futures mesures de #surveillance »

    Les dangers de l’émigration vers l’Europe vont croissant, déplore Mark Akkerman, qui étudie la #militarisation_des_frontières du continent depuis 2016. Un mouvement largement poussé par le #lobby de l’#industrie_de_l’armement et de la sécurité.

    Mark Akkerman étudie depuis 2016 la militarisation des frontières européennes. Chercheur pour l’ONG anti-militariste #Stop_Wapenhandel, il a publié, avec le soutien de The Transnational Institute, plusieurs rapports de référence sur l’industrie des « #Safe_Borders ». Il revient pour Mediapart sur des années de politiques européennes de surveillance aux frontières.

    Mediapart : En 2016, vous publiez un premier rapport, « Borders Wars », qui cartographie la surveillance aux frontières en Europe. Dans quel contexte naît ce travail ?

    Mark Akkerman : Il faut se rappeler que l’Europe a une longue histoire avec la traque des migrants et la sécurisation des frontières, qui remonte, comme l’a montré la journaliste d’investigation néerlandaise Linda Polman, à la Seconde Guerre mondiale et au refus de soutenir et abriter des réfugiés juifs d’Allemagne. Dès la création de l’espace Schengen, au début des années 1990, l’ouverture des frontières à l’intérieur de cet espace était étroitement liée au renforcement du contrôle et de la sécurité aux frontières extérieures. Depuis lors, il s’agit d’un processus continu marqué par plusieurs phases d’accélération.

    Notre premier rapport (https://www.tni.org/en/publication/border-wars) est né durant l’une de ces phases. J’ai commencé ce travail en 2015, au moment où émerge le terme « crise migratoire », que je qualifierais plutôt de tragédie de l’exil. De nombreuses personnes, principalement motivées par la guerre en Syrie, tentent alors de trouver un avenir sûr en Europe. En réponse, l’Union et ses États membres concentrent leurs efforts sur la sécurisation des frontières et le renvoi des personnes exilées en dehors du territoire européen.

    Cela passe pour une part importante par la militarisation des frontières, par le renforcement des pouvoirs de Frontex et de ses financements. Les réfugiés sont dépeints comme une menace pour la sécurité de l’Europe, les migrations comme un « problème de sécurité ». C’est un récit largement poussé par le lobby de l’industrie militaire et de la sécurité, qui a été le principal bénéficiaire de ces politiques, des budgets croissants et des contrats conclus dans ce contexte.

    Cinq ans après votre premier rapport, quel regard portez-vous sur la politique européenne de sécurisation des frontières ? La pandémie a-t-elle influencé cette politique ?

    Depuis 2016, l’Europe est restée sur la même voie. Renforcer, militariser et externaliser la sécurité aux frontières sont les seules réponses aux migrations. Davantage de murs et de clôtures ont été érigés, de nouveaux équipements de surveillance, de détection et de contrôle ont été installés, de nouveaux accords avec des pays tiers ont été conclus, de nouvelles bases de données destinées à traquer les personnes exilées ont été créées. En ce sens, les politiques visibles en 2016 ont été poursuivies, intensifiées et élargies.

    La pandémie de Covid-19 a certainement joué un rôle dans ce processus. De nombreux pays ont introduit de nouvelles mesures de sécurité et de contrôle aux frontières pour contenir le virus. Cela a également servi d’excuse pour cibler à nouveau les réfugiés, les présentant encore une fois comme des menaces, responsables de la propagation du virus.

    Comme toujours, une partie de ces mesures temporaires vont se pérenniser et on constate déjà, par exemple, l’évolution des contrôles aux frontières vers l’utilisation de technologies biométriques sans contact.

    En 2020, l’UE a choisi Idemia et Sopra Steria, deux entreprises françaises, pour construire un fichier de contrôle biométrique destiné à réguler les entrées et sorties de l’espace Schengen. Quel regard portez-vous sur ces bases de données ?

    Il existe de nombreuses bases de données biométriques utilisées pour la sécurité aux frontières. L’Union européenne met depuis plusieurs années l’accent sur leur développement. Plus récemment, elle insiste sur leur nécessaire connexion, leur prétendue interopérabilité. L’objectif est de créer un système global de détection, de surveillance et de suivi des mouvements de réfugiés à l’échelle européenne pour faciliter leur détention et leur expulsion.

    Cela contribue à créer une nouvelle forme d’« apartheid ». Ces fichiers sont destinés certes à accélérer les processus de contrôles aux frontières pour les citoyens nationaux et autres voyageurs acceptables mais, surtout, à arrêter ou expulser les migrantes et migrants indésirables grâce à l’utilisation de systèmes informatiques et biométriques toujours plus sophistiqués.

    Quelles sont les conséquences concrètes de ces politiques de surveillance ?

    Il devient chaque jour plus difficile et dangereux de migrer vers l’Europe. Parce qu’elles sont confrontées à la violence et aux refoulements aux frontières, ces personnes sont obligées de chercher d’autres routes migratoires, souvent plus dangereuses, ce qui crée un vrai marché pour les passeurs. La situation n’est pas meilleure pour les personnes réfugiées qui arrivent à entrer sur le territoire européen. Elles finissent régulièrement en détention, sont expulsées ou sont contraintes de vivre dans des conditions désastreuses en Europe ou dans des pays limitrophes.

    Cette politique n’impacte pas que les personnes réfugiées. Elle présente un risque pour les libertés publiques de l’ensemble des Européens. Outre leur usage dans le cadre d’une politique migratoire raciste, les technologies de surveillance sont aussi « testées » sur des personnes migrantes qui peuvent difficilement faire valoir leurs droits, puis introduites plus tard auprès d’un public plus large. Les réfugiés sont les cobayes des futures mesures de contrôle et de surveillance des pays européens.

    Vous pointez aussi que les industriels qui fournissent en armement les belligérants de conflits extra-européens, souvent à l’origine de mouvements migratoires, sont ceux qui bénéficient du business des frontières.

    C’est ce que fait Thales en France, Leonardo en Italie ou Airbus. Ces entreprises européennes de sécurité et d’armement exportent des armes et des technologies de surveillance partout dans le monde, notamment dans des pays en guerre ou avec des régimes autoritaires. À titre d’exemple, les exportations européennes au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord des dix dernières années représentent 92 milliards d’euros et concernent des pays aussi controversés que l’Arabie saoudite, l’Égypte ou la Turquie.

    Si elles fuient leur pays, les populations civiles exposées à la guerre dans ces régions du monde se retrouveront très certainement confrontées à des technologies produites par les mêmes industriels lors de leur passage aux frontières. C’est une manière profondément cynique de profiter, deux fois, de la misère d’une même population.

    Quelles entreprises bénéficient le plus de la politique européenne de surveillance aux frontières ? Par quels mécanismes ? Je pense notamment aux programmes de recherches comme Horizon 2020 et Horizon Europe.

    J’identifie deux types d’entreprises qui bénéficient de la militarisation des frontières de l’Europe. D’abord les grandes entreprises européennes d’armement et de sécurité, comme Airbus, Leonardo et Thales, qui disposent toutes d’une importante gamme de technologies militaires et de surveillance. Pour elles, le marché des frontières est un marché parmi d’autres. Ensuite, des entreprises spécialisées, qui travaillent sur des niches, bénéficient aussi directement de cette politique européenne. C’est le cas de l’entreprise espagnole European Security Fencing, qui fabrique des fils barbelés. Elles s’enrichissent en remportant des contrats, à l’échelle européenne, mais aussi nationale, voire locale.

    Une autre source de financement est le programme cadre européen pour la recherche et l’innovation. Il finance des projets sur 7 ans et comprend un volet sécurité aux frontières. Des programmes existent aussi au niveau du Fonds européen de défense.

    Un de vos travaux de recherche, « Expanding the Fortress », s’intéresse aux partenariats entre l’Europe et des pays tiers. Quels sont les pays concernés ? Comment se manifestent ces partenariats ?

    L’UE et ses États membres tentent d’établir une coopération en matière de migrations avec de nombreux pays du monde. L’accent est mis sur les pays identifiés comme des « pays de transit » pour celles et ceux qui aspirent à rejoindre l’Union européenne. L’Europe entretient de nombreux accords avec la Libye, qu’elle équipe notamment en matériel militaire. Il s’agit d’un pays où la torture et la mise à mort des réfugiés ont été largement documentées.

    Des accords existent aussi avec l’Égypte, la Tunisie, le Maroc, la Jordanie, le Liban ou encore l’Ukraine. L’Union a financé la construction de centres de détention dans ces pays, dans lesquels on a constaté, à plusieurs reprises, d’importantes violations en matière de droits humains.

    Ces pays extra-européens sont-ils des zones d’expérimentations pour les entreprises européennes de surveillance ?

    Ce sont plutôt les frontières européennes, comme celle d’Evros, entre la Grèce et la Turquie, qui servent de zone d’expérimentation. Le transfert d’équipements, de technologies et de connaissances pour la sécurité et le contrôle des frontières représente en revanche une partie importante de ces coopérations. Cela veut dire que les États européens dispensent des formations, partagent des renseignements ou fournissent de nouveaux équipements aux forces de sécurité de régimes autoritaires.

    Ces régimes peuvent ainsi renforcer et étendre leurs capacités de répression et de violation des droits humains avec le soutien de l’UE. Les conséquences sont dévastatrices pour la population de ces pays, ce qui sert de moteur pour de nouvelles vagues de migration…


    cité dans l’interview, ce rapport :
    déjà signalé ici : https://seenthis.net/messages/934948#message934949

    #asile #migrations #complexe_militaro-industriel #surveillance_des_frontières #Frontex #problème #Covid-19 #coronavirus #biométrie #technologie #Idemia #Sopra_Steria #contrôle_biométrique #base_de_données #interopérabilité #détection #apartheid #informatique #violence #refoulement #libertés_publiques #test #normalisation #généralisation #Thales #Leonardo #Airbus #armes #armements #industrie_de_l'armement #cynisme #Horizon_Europe #Horizon_2020 #marché #business #European_Security_Fencing #barbelés #fils_barbelés #recherche #programmes_de_recherche #Fonds_européen_de_défense #accords #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #Égypte #Libye #Tunisie #Maroc #Jordanie #Liban #Ukraine #rétention #détention_administrative #expérimentation #équipements #connaissance #transfert #coopérations #formations #renseignements #répression

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

    • Le système électronique d’#Entrée-Sortie en zone #Schengen : la biométrie au service des #frontières_intelligentes

      Avec la pression migratoire et la vague d’attentats subis par l’Europe ces derniers mois, la gestion des frontières devient une priorité pour la Commission.

      Certes, le système d’information sur les #visas (#VIS, #Visa_Information_System) est déployé depuis 2015 dans les consulats des États Membres et sa consultation rendue obligatoire lors de l’accès dans l’#espace_Schengen.

      Mais, depuis février 2013, est apparu le concept de « #frontières_intelligentes », (#Smart_Borders), qui recouvre un panel ambitieux de mesures législatives élaborées en concertation avec le Parlement Européen.

      Le système entrée/sortie, en particulier, va permettre, avec un système informatique unifié, d’enregistrer les données relatives aux #entrées et aux #sorties des ressortissants de pays tiers en court séjour franchissant les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne.

      Adopté puis signé le 30 Novembre 2017 par le Conseil Européen, il sera mis en application en 2022. Il s’ajoutera au « PNR européen » qui, depuis le 25 mai 2018, recense les informations sur les passagers aériens.

      Partant du principe que la majorité des visiteurs sont « de bonne foi », #EES bouleverse les fondements mêmes du #Code_Schengen avec le double objectif de :

      - rendre les frontières intelligentes, c’est-à-dire automatiser le contrôle des visiteurs fiables tout en renforçant la lutte contre les migrations irrégulières
      - créer un #registre_central des mouvements transfrontaliers.

      La modernisation de la gestion des frontières extérieures est en marche. En améliorant la qualité et l’efficacité des contrôles de l’espace Schengen, EES, avec une base de données commune, doit contribuer à renforcer la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme ainsi que les formes graves de criminalité.

      L’#identification de façon systématique des personnes qui dépassent la durée de séjour autorisée dans l’espace Schengen en est un des enjeux majeurs.

      Nous verrons pourquoi la reconnaissance faciale en particulier, est la grande gagnante du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Dans ce dossier web, nous traiterons des 6 sujets suivants :

      - ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection
      - La remise en cause du code « frontières Schengen » de 2006
      - EES : un accès très réglementé
      - La biométrie faciale : fer de lance de l’EES
      - EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité
      - Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Examinons maintenant ces divers points plus en détail.

      ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection

      Les activités criminelles telles que la traite d’êtres humains, les filières d’immigration clandestine ou les trafics d’objets sont aujourd’hui la conséquence de franchissements illicites de frontières, largement facilités par l’absence d’enregistrement lors des entrées/ sorties.

      Le scénario de fraude est – hélas – bien rôdé : Contrôle « standard » lors de l’accès à l’espace Schengen, puis destruction des documents d’identité dans la perspective d’activités malveillantes, sachant l’impossibilité d’être authentifié.

      Même si EES vise le visiteur « de bonne foi », le système va constituer à terme un puissant dispositif pour la prévention et la détection d’activités terroristes ou autres infractions pénales graves. En effet les informations stockées dans le nouveau registre pour 5 ans– y compris concernant les personnes refoulées aux frontières – couvrent principalement les noms, numéros de passeport, empreintes digitales et photos. Elles seront accessibles aux autorités frontalières et de délivrance des visas, ainsi qu’à Europol.

      Le système sera à la disposition d’enquêtes en particulier, vu la possibilité de consulter les mouvements transfrontières et historiques de déplacements. Tout cela dans le plus strict respect de la dignité humaine et de l’intégrité des personnes.

      Le dispositif est très clair sur ce point : aucune discrimination fondée sur le sexe, la couleur, les origines ethniques ou sociales, les caractéristiques génétiques, la langue, la religion ou les convictions, les opinions politiques ou toute autre opinion.

      Sont également exclus du champ d’investigation l’appartenance à une minorité nationale, la fortune, la naissance, un handicap, l’âge ou l’orientation sexuelle des visiteurs.​

      La remise en cause du Code frontières Schengen

      Vu la croissance attendue des visiteurs de pays tiers (887 millions en 2025), l’enjeu est maintenant de fluidifier et simplifier les contrôles.

      Une initiative particulièrement ambitieuse dans la mesure où elle remet en cause le fameux Code Schengen qui impose des vérifications approfondies, conduites manuellement par les autorités des Etats Membres aux entrées et sorties, sans possibilité d’automatisation.

      Par ailleurs, le Code Schengen ne prévoit aucun enregistrement des mouvements transfrontaliers. La procédure actuelle exigeant seulement que les passeports soient tamponnés avec mention des dates d’entrée et sortie.

      Seule possibilité pour les gardes-frontières : Calculer un éventuel dépassement de la durée de séjour qui elle-même est une information falsifiable et non consignée dans une base de données.

      Autre contrainte, les visiteurs réguliers comme les frontaliers doivent remplacer leurs passeports tous les 2-3 mois, vue la multitude de tampons ! Un procédé bien archaïque si l’on considère le potentiel des technologies de l’information.

      La proposition de 2013 comprenait donc trois piliers :

      - ​La création d’un système automatisé d’entrée/sortie (Entry/ Exit System ou EES)
      - Un programme d’enregistrement de voyageurs fiables, (RTP, Registered Traveller Program) pour simplifier le passage des visiteurs réguliers, titulaires d’un contrôle de sûreté préalable
      – La modification du Code Schengen

      Abandon de l’initiative RTP

      Trop complexe à mettre en œuvre au niveau des 28 Etats Membres, l’initiative RTP (Registered Travelers Program) a été finalement abandonnée au profit d’un ambitieux programme Entry/ Exit (EES) destiné aux visiteurs de courte durée (moins de 90 jours sur 180 jours).

      Précision importante, sont maintenant concernés les voyageurs non soumis à l’obligation de visa, sachant que les détenteurs de visas sont déjà répertoriés par le VIS.

      La note est beaucoup moins salée que prévue par la Commission en 2013. Au lieu du milliard estimé, mais qui incluait un RTP, la proposition révisée d’un EES unique ne coutera « que » 480 millions d’EUR.

      Cette initiative ambitieuse fait suite à une étude technique menée en 2014, puis une phase de prototypage conduite sous l’égide de l’agence EU-LISA en 2015 avec pour résultat le retrait du projet RTP et un focus particulier sur le programme EES.

      Une architecture centralisée gérée par EU-LISA

      L’acteur clé du dispositif EES, c’est EU-LISA, l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle dont le siège est à Tallinn, le site opérationnel à Strasbourg et le site de secours à Sankt Johann im Pongau (Autriche). L’Agence sera en charge des 4 aspects suivants :

      - Développement du système central
      - Mise en œuvre d’une interface uniforme nationale (IUN) dans chaque État Membre
      - Communication sécurisée entre les systèmes centraux EES et VIS
      - Infrastructure de communication entre système central et interfaces uniformes nationales.

      Chaque État Membre sera responsable de l’organisation, la gestion, le fonctionnement et de la maintenance de son infrastructure frontalière vis-à-vis d’EES.

      Une gestion optimisée des frontières

      Grâce au nouveau dispositif, tous les ressortissants des pays tiers seront traités de manière égale, qu’ils soient ou non exemptés de visas.

      Le VIS répertorie déjà les visiteurs soumis à visas. Et l’ambition d’EES c’est de constituer une base pour les autres.

      Les États Membres seront donc en mesure d’identifier tout migrant ou visiteur en situation irrégulière ayant franchi illégalement les frontières et faciliter, le cas échéant, son expulsion.

      Dès l’authentification à une borne en libre–service, le visiteur se verra afficher les informations suivantes, sous supervision d’un garde-frontière :

      - ​Date, heure et point de passage, en remplacement des tampons manuels
      - Notification éventuelle d’un refus d’accès.
      - Durée maximale de séjour autorisé.
      - Dépassement éventuelle de la durée de séjour autorisée
      En ce qui concerne les autorités des Etats Membres, c’est une véritable révolution par rapport à l’extrême indigence du système actuel. On anticipe déjà la possibilité de constituer des statistiques puissantes et mieux gérer l’octroi, ou la suppression de visas, en fonction de mouvements transfrontières, notamment grâce à des informations telles que :

      - ​​​Dépassements des durées de séjour par pays
      - Historique des mouvements frontaliers par pays

      EES : un accès très réglementé

      L’accès à EES est très réglementé. Chaque État Membre doit notifier à EU-LISA les autorités répressives habilitées à consulter les données aux fins de prévention ou détection d’infractions terroristes et autres infractions pénales graves, ou des enquêtes en la matière.

      Europol, qui joue un rôle clé dans la prévention de la criminalité, fera partie des autorités répressives autorisées à accéder au système dans le cadre de sa mission.

      Par contre, les données EES ne pourront pas être communiquées à des pays tiers, une organisation internationale ou une quelconque partie privée établie ou non dans l’Union, ni mises à leur disposition. Bien entendu, dans le cas d’enquêtes visant l’identification d’un ressortissant de pays tiers, la prévention ou la détection d’infractions terroristes, des exceptions pourront être envisagées.​

      Proportionnalité et respect de la vie privée

      Dans un contexte législatif qui considère le respect de la vie privée comme une priorité, le volume de données à caractère personnel enregistré dans EES sera considérablement réduit, soit 26 éléments au lieu des 36 prévus en 2013.

      Il s’agit d’un dispositif négocié auprès du Contrôleur Européen pour la Protection des Données (CEPD) et les autorités nationales en charge d’appliquer la nouvelle réglementation.

      Très schématiquement, les données collectées se limiteront à des informations minimales telles que : nom, prénom, références du document de voyage et visa, biométrie du visage et de 4 empreintes digitales.

      A chaque visite, seront relevés la date, l’heure et le lieu de contrôle frontière. Ces données seront conservées pendant cinq années, et non plus 181 jours comme proposé en 2013.

      Un procédé qui permettra aux gardes-frontières et postes consulaires d’analyser l’historique des déplacements, lors de l’octroi de nouveaux visas.
      ESS : privacy by design

      La proposition de la Commission a été rédigée selon le principe de « respect de la vie privée dès la conception », mieux connue sous le label « Privacy By Design ».

      Sous l’angle du droit, elle est bien proportionnée à la protection des données à caractère personnel en ce que la collecte, le stockage et la durée de conservation des données permettent strictement au système de fonctionner et d’atteindre ses objectifs.

      EES sera un système centralisé avec coopération des Etats Membres ; d’où une architecture et des règles de fonctionnement communes.​

      Vu cette contrainte d’uniformisation des modalités régissant vérifications aux frontières et accès au système, seul le règlement en tant que véhicule juridique pouvait convenir, sans possibilité d’adaptation aux législations nationales.

      Un accès internet sécurisé à un service web hébergé par EU-LISA permettra aux visiteurs des pays tiers de vérifier à tout moment leur durée de séjour autorisée.

      Cette fonctionnalité sera également accessible aux transporteurs, comme les compagnies aériennes, pour vérifier si leurs voyageurs sont bien autorisés à pénétrer dans le territoire de l’UE.

      La biométrie faciale, fer de lance du programme EES

      Véritable remise en question du Code Schengen, EES permettra de relever la biométrie de tous les visiteurs des pays tiers, alors que ceux soumis à visa sont déjà enregistrés dans le VIS.

      Pour les identifiants biométriques, l’ancien système envisageait 10 empreintes digitales. Le nouveau combine quatre empreintes et la reconnaissance faciale.

      La technologie, qui a bénéficié de progrès considérables ces dernières années, s’inscrit en support des traditionnelles empreintes digitales.

      Bien que la Commission ne retienne pas le principe d’enregistrement de visiteurs fiables (RTP), c’est tout comme.

      En effet, quatre empreintes seront encore relevées lors du premier contrôle pour vérifier que le demandeur n’est pas déjà répertorié dans EES ou VIS.

      En l’absence d’un signal, l’autorité frontalière créera un dossier en s’assurant que la photographie du passeport ayant une zone de lecture automatique (« Machine Readable Travel Document ») correspond bien à l’image faciale prise en direct du nouveau visiteur.

      Mais pour les passages suivants, c’est le visage qui l’emporte.

      Souriez, vous êtes en Europe ! Les fastidieux (et falsifiables) tampons sur les passeports seront remplacés par un accès à EES.

      La biométrie est donc le grand gagnant du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Certains terminaux maritimes ou postes frontières terrestres particulièrement fréquentés deviendront les premiers clients de ces fameuses eGates réservées aujourd’hui aux seuls voyageurs aériens.

      Frontex, en tant qu’agence aidant les pays de l’UE et les pays associés à Schengen à gérer leurs frontières extérieures, va aider à harmoniser les contrôles aux frontières à travers l’UE.

      EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité

      Le dispositif EES est complexe et ambitieux dans la mesure où il fluidifie les passages tout en relevant le niveau des contrôles. On anticipe dès aujourd’hui des procédures d’accueil en Europe bien meilleures grâce aux eGates et bornes self-service.

      Sous l’angle de nos politiques migratoires et de la prévention des malveillances, on pourra immédiatement repérer les personnes ne rempliss​​ant pas les conditions d’entrée et accéder aux historiques des déplacements.

      Mais rappelons également qu’EES constituera un puissant outil de lutte contre la fraude à l’identité, notamment au sein de l’espace Schengen, tout visiteur ayant été enregistré lors de son arrivée à la frontière.

      Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Thales est particulièrement attentif à cette initiative EES qui repose massivement sur la biométrie et le contrôle des documents de voyage.

      En effet, l’identification et l’authentification des personnes sont deux expertises majeures de Thales depuis plus de 20 ans. La société contribue d’ailleurs à plus de 200 programmes gouvernementaux dans 80 pays sur ces sujets.

      La société peut répondre aux objectifs du programme EES en particulier pour :

      - Exploiter les dernières technologies pour l’authentification des documents de voyage, l’identification des voyageurs à l’aide de captures et vérifications biométriques, et l’évaluation des risques avec accès aux listes de contrôle, dans tous les points de contrôle aux frontières.
      - Réduire les coûts par l’automatisation et l’optimisation des processus tout en misant sur de nouvelles technologies pour renforcer la sécurité et offrir davantage de confort aux passagers
      - Valoriser des tâches de gardes-frontières qui superviseront ces dispositifs tout en portant leur attention sur des cas pouvant porter à suspicion.
      - Diminuer les temps d’attente après enregistrement dans la base EES. Un facteur non négligeable pour des frontaliers ou visiteurs réguliers qui consacreront plus de temps à des activités productives !

      Des bornes d’enregistrement libre-service comme des frontières automatiques ou semi-automatiques peuvent être déployées dans les prochaines années avec l’objectif de fluidifier les contrôles et rendre plus accueillant l’accès à l’espace Schengen.

      Ces bornes automatiques et biométriques ont d’ailleurs été installées dans les aéroports parisiens d’Orly et de Charles de Gaulle (Nouveau PARAFE : https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/europe/france/dis/gouvernement/controle-aux-frontieres).

      La reconnaissance faciale a été mise en place en 2018.

      Les nouveaux sas PARAFE à Roissy – Septembre 2017

      Thales dispose aussi d’une expertise reconnue dans la gestion intégrée des frontières et contribue en particulier à deux grand systèmes de gestion des flux migratoires.

      - Les systèmes d’identification biométrique de Thales sont en particulier au cœur du système américain de gestion des données IDENT (anciennement US-VISIT). Cette base de données biographiques et biométriques contient des informations sur plus de 200 millions de personnes qui sont entrées, ont tenté d’entrer et ont quitté les États-Unis d’Amérique.

      - Thales est le fournisseur depuis l’origine du système biométrique Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy System) qui est le plus important système AFIS multi-juridictionnel au monde, avec ses 32 pays affiliés. Le système Eurodac est une base de données comportant les empreintes digitales des demandeurs d’asile pour chacun des états membres ainsi que des personnes appréhendées à l’occasion d’un franchissement irrégulier d’une frontière.

      Pour déjouer les tentatives de fraude documentaire, Thales a mis au point des équipements sophistiqués permettant de vérifier leur authenticité par comparaison avec les modèles en circulation. Leur validité est aussi vérifiée par connexion à des bases de documents volés ou perdus (SLTD de Interpol). Ou a des watch lists nationales.

      Pour le contrôle des frontières, au-delà de ses SAS et de ses kiosks biométriques, Thales propose toute une gamme de lecteurs de passeports d’équipements et de logiciels d’authentification biométriques, grâce à son portefeuille Cogent, l’un des pionniers du secteur.

      Pour en savoir plus, n’hésitez pas à nous contacter.​

      #smart_borders #Thales #overstayers #reconnaissance_faciale #prévention #détection #fraude_à_l'identité #Registered_Traveller_Program (#RTP) #EU-LISA #interface_uniforme_nationale (#IUN) #Contrôleur_Européen_pour_la_Protection_des_Données (#CEPD) #Privacy_By_Design #respect_de_la_vie_privée #empreintes_digitales #biométrie #Frontex #bornes #aéroport #PARAFE #IDENT #US-VISIT #Eurodac #Gemalto

  • EU: Tracking the Pact: Access to criminal records for “screening” of migrants

    Under the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the “screening” of migrants who have entered the EU irregularly or who have applied for asylum will become mandatory. The aim is to establish their identity and to investigate whether they should be considered a “security risk”. To facilitate the screening process, access to the EU’s system of “interoperable” databases is being broadened, with the Council recently approving its negotiating position on new rules granting access to a centralised register of individuals convicted of criminal offences in EU member states.

    Interoperability for screening

    The Commission’s proposal for a criminal records screening Regulation (pdf), one of countless amendments to the “interoperability” framework since it was approved in 2019, was published in March last year with a typically impenetrable, jargon-laden title.

    It was part of a series of new rules that aim to introduce new checks for asylum applicants and individuals making irregular border crossings, that are “at least of a similar level as the checks performed in respect of third country nationals that apply beforehand for an authorisation to enter the Union for a short stay, whether they are under a visa obligation or not.”

    Thus, the “screening” process requires checks against a multitude of databases: the Entry/Exit System (EES), the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), Europol’s databases, two Interpol databases, and – the subject of the Council’s recently-approved negotiating position – the European Criminal Records Information System for Third-Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN).

    The ECRIS-TCN contains information on non-EU nationals who have been convicted in one or more EU member states (fingerprints, facial images and certain biographic data), in order to make it easier for national authorities to find information on convictions handed down elsewhere in the EU.

    The Council’s position

    The Council’s position (pdf) was approved by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) on 29 June, and makes extensive changes to the Commission’s proposal. However, many of these are deletions that appear to have been made because the text in question has already been added to the original ECRIS-TCN Regulation through one of the two other sets of amendments that have been made, in 2019 and 2021.

    The proposal used the term “threat to internal security or public policy”, which the Council has replaced with “security risk”. This somewhat vaguer term matches the wording approved by the Council in its position on the Screening Regulation, previously published by Statewatch, where the proposal initially referred to individuals that may “constitute a threat to public policy, internal security or international relations for any of the Member States.”

    Currently only visa authorities and those responsible for examining travel authorisation applications are granted access to the ECRIS-TCN for border control and immigration purposes (listed in Article 5(7) of the ECRIS-TCN Regulation and as explained in the Statewatch report Automated Suspicion).

    The criminal records screening Regulation grants new authorities access to the ECRIS-TCN, but does not list those authorities explicitly. Instead, it refers to the Screening Regulation itself, which is set to give member states discretion to determine “the screening authorities” as they see fit, although the Council’s preferred version of that text includes the provision that:

    “Member States shall also ensure that only the screening authorities responsible for the identification or verification of identity and the security check have access to the databases foreseen in Article 10 and Article 11 of this Regulation.”

    The Council’s position on the Screening Regulation, like the original proposal, does not include a requirement that the authorities responsible for the screening process be publicly listed anywhere.

    Whoever those authorities may be, they will be granted access to use the European Search Portal (part of the interoperability framework) to conduct searches in the ECRIS-TCN (and other databases), although will only be granted access to ECRIS-TCN records that have a “flag” attached.

    Those “flags” will be added to records to show whether an individual has been convicted of a terrorist offence in the last 25 years, or (in the last 15 years) one or more of the criminal offences listed in a separate piece of legislation.

    In the case of a “hit” against information stored in the ECRIS-TCN, the new rules will require screening authorities to contact the member state that handed down the conviction and to seek an opinion on the implications of that conviction for an individuals’ potential status as a security risk.

    The Commission wanted that opinion to be provided within two days, but the Council has increased this to three; if no opinion is provided within that time, then “this shall mean there are no security grounds to be taken into account.” The Council’s position also makes it explicit that the convicting authorities are obliged to consult the criminal record before providing their opinion.

    The European Parliament is yet to reach a position on the proposal. The EP rapporteur, Socialists & Democrats MEP Birgit Sippel, told Statewatch:

    “The European Parliament continues to work on all proposals related to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, including both the Screening and Screening ECRIS-TCN proposals. As rapporteur, I have presented my draft report on both files at the end of 2021. Negotiations continue at political and technical level. Due to the deep links to the other proposals, we aim for a harmonised EP position and there is currently no concrete date foreseen for a debate or vote in the LIBE Committee.”

    However, the Parliament has committed itself to completing work on all the migration and asylum laws currently on the table by February 2024.

    Interoperability marches on

    Many are likely to see the screening process as part of the ongoing “criminalisation” of migration – indeed, the intention with the criminal records screening proposal is to explicitly link aspects of the criminal justice system with the EU’s immigration and asylum systems, in order to increase the possibilities of excluding individuals deemed to pose a security risk – however that may be determined by the authorities.

    The application of these checks to irregular border-crossers and asylum applicants is also a logical consequence of the way the EU’s interoperable databases are being deployed against other categories of individuals: as noted above, it is deemed imperative that everyone entering the EU faces “a similar level” of checks. With the interoperability architecture largely seen as a starting point for future developments, and with EU agencies Europol and Frontex pushing for AI-based profiling of all travellers, future proposals to further expand the types of checks and the individuals to whom they should be applied are almost guaranteed.


    #screening #identification #migrations #asile #réfugiés #pacte #interopérabilité #Entry_Exit_System (#EES) #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS) #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS) #technologie #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #base_de_données #European_Criminal_Records_Information_System_for_Third-Country_Nationals (#ECRIS-TCN)

  • La #France crée une « #impulsion_politique » sur la gestion des frontières de l’Union

    Un #Conseil_des_ministres dédié à l’#espace_Schengen sera créé.

    « Nous devons avoir une #vision_politique de l’espace de #libre_circulation Schengen » et l’adapter « à la situation géopolitique actuelle », a plaidé jeudi Gérald Darmanin, ministre français de l’Intérieur, lors de son arrivée à une réunion informelle avec ses homologues européens à Lille. Ceux-ci ont endossé l’idée, proposée par la France, de créer une structure politique dédiée au pilotage de cet espace de 26 pays sans frontières intérieures, « joyau de la couronne » européenne, selon les mots du vice-président de la Commission Margaritis Schinas, mais malmené par les réactions politiques, parfois désordonnées, des États face à la migration, aux attaques terroristes ou à la pandémie de Covid-19.

    Cet accord constitue une première réussite pour la présidence française du Conseil de l’UE (PFUE), qui a commencé le 1er janvier 2022 et qui a fait du contrôle des #frontières_extérieures de l’Union une priorité. Même si le grand défi sera surtout d’obtenir des avancées sur la réforme de l’espace Schengen et la politique d’asile européenne.

    Le premier « Conseil des ministres de l’Intérieur de l’espace Schengen » aura lieu le 3 mars prochain. L’objectif est d’en faire un « rendez-vous politique » qui se tiendrait quatre fois par an ou plus, en cas de crise aux frontières de l’Union européenne. Y seront conviés tous les États de l’UE, même ceux qui ne font pas partie de l’espace Schengen (Croatie, Irlande, Roumanie, Bulgarie et Chypre). Ainsi que la Suisse, la Norvège, le Liechtenstein et l’Islande, membres de l’espace Schengen mais pas de l’Union.

    Pour alimenter les discussions, la France propose d’établir un « #baromètre_Schengen » avec des #indicateurs sur la #pression_migratoire aux frontières extérieures de l’UE, les #mouvements_secondaires des demandeurs d’asile en son sein et la #situation_sanitaire - autant d’éléments qui ont déjà poussé certains pays à rétablir des contrôles à leurs frontières et donc à mettre en suspens la libre circulation des personnes.

    « Ce Conseil, ce n’est pas une révolution institutionnelle et ce n’est pas le but. La plus-value sera d’anticiper les crises et de donner des réponses politiques aux défis qui se situent à nos portes », explique une source française. Fin novembre, la Biélorussie a fait venir sur son territoire des migrants, avant de les pousser vers les pays baltes et la Pologne, afin d’exercer une pression sur l’Union européenne. De manière générale, l’espace « Schengen a été créé dans les années 1990, au moment où il n’y avait pas la déstabilisation qu’on observe en Libye, en Syrie, en Afghanistan ou encore les grands mouvements migratoires que nous connaissons », a souligné M. Darmanin.

    Accord pour essayer la méthode française

    Mais, pour répondre à ces défis, l’enjeu fondamental sera surtout de faire progresser les négociations sur les réformes de l’espace Schengen proposées par la Commission l’année dernière, ainsi que celles sur le Pacte sur l’asile et la migration.

    Sur ce dernier point, le ministre s’est réjoui de l’#accord « unanime » des États membres pour s’essayer à la méthode française afin de tenter de dépasser leurs divisions quant à la gestion de la migration. Paris a invité les Vingt-sept à construire la #politique_d'asile commune étape par étape, en commençant par le renforcement du #contrôle (identité, sécurité, santé…) et du #filtrage des migrants aux frontières de l’UE. Puisque cela représente une charge considérable pour les États membres qui s’y trouvent, les Français mettront sur la table le 3 mars des « formes concrètes » de #solidarité_européenne. Dont notamment une liste d’États « volontaires » - une douzaine selon nos informations - prêts à relocaliser des migrants sur leur sol.

    Ces idées françaises n’ont rien de révolutionnaire par rapport à ce qui a déjà été imaginé, par la Commission ou par d’autres États membres, pour déminer le dossier migratoire. Mais la paralysie européenne face à ce sujet clivant et éminemment politique est telle que relancer les discussions entre les Vingt-sept est déjà une victoire en soi. « J’attendais beaucoup de la présidence française et aujourd’hui vous avez répondu à mes attentes », a carrément déclaré jeudi Ylva Johansson, commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures, lors d’une conférence de presse aux côtés de Gérald Darmanin.

    Le risque est cependant que ce dialogue finisse encore dans une impasse. « Il y a toujours l’envie d’aboutir à un compromis », (se) rassurait une source française jeudi, tout en reconnaissant que « chacun des États membres garde ses lignes rouges et ses demandes »


    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Schengen #relocalisation #Union_européenne #UE #EU

  • Schengen : de nouvelles règles pour rendre l’espace sans contrôles aux #frontières_intérieures plus résilient

    La Commission propose aujourd’hui des règles actualisées pour renforcer la gouvernance de l’espace Schengen. Les modifications ciblées renforceront la coordination au niveau de l’UE et offriront aux États membres des outils améliorés pour faire face aux difficultés qui surviennent dans la gestion tant des frontières extérieures communes de l’UE que des frontières intérieures au sein de l’espace Schengen. L’actualisation des règles vise à faire en sorte que la réintroduction des #contrôles_aux_frontières_intérieures demeure une mesure de dernier recours. Les nouvelles règles créent également des outils communs pour gérer plus efficacement les frontières extérieures en cas de crise de santé publique, grâce aux enseignements tirés de la pandémie de COVID-19. L’#instrumentalisation des migrants est également prise en compte dans cette mise à jour des règles de Schengen, ainsi que dans une proposition parallèle portant sur les mesures que les États membres pourront prendre dans les domaines de l’asile et du retour dans une telle situation.

    Margaritis Schinas, vice-président chargé de la promotion de notre mode de vie européen, s’est exprimé en ces termes : « La crise des réfugiés de 2015, la vague d’attentats terroristes sur le sol européen et la pandémie de COVID-19 ont mis l’espace Schengen à rude épreuve. Il est de notre responsabilité de renforcer la gouvernance de Schengen et de faire en sorte que les États membres soient équipés pour offrir une réaction rapide, coordonnée et européenne en cas de crise, y compris lorsque des migrants sont instrumentalisés. Grâce aux propositions présentées aujourd’hui, nous fortifierons ce “joyau” si emblématique de notre mode de vie européen. »

    Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, a quant à elle déclaré : « La pandémie a montré très clairement que l’espace Schengen est essentiel pour nos économies et nos sociétés. Grâce aux propositions présentées aujourd’hui, nous ferons en sorte que les contrôles aux frontières ne soient rétablis qu’en dernier recours, sur la base d’une évaluation commune et uniquement pour la durée nécessaire. Nous dotons les États membres des outils leur permettant de relever les défis auxquels ils sont confrontés. Et nous veillons également à gérer ensemble les frontières extérieures de l’UE, y compris dans les situations où les migrants sont instrumentalisés à des fins politiques. »

    Réaction coordonnée aux menaces communes

    La proposition de modification du code frontières Schengen vise à tirer les leçons de la pandémie de COVID-19 et à garantir la mise en place de mécanismes de coordination solides pour faire face aux menaces sanitaires. Les règles actualisées permettront au Conseil d’adopter rapidement des règles contraignantes fixant des restrictions temporaires des déplacements aux frontières extérieures en cas de menace pour la santé publique. Des dérogations seront prévues, y compris pour les voyageurs essentiels ainsi que pour les citoyens et résidents de l’Union. L’application uniforme des restrictions en matière de déplacements sera ainsi garantie, en s’appuyant sur l’expérience acquise ces dernières années.

    Les règles comprennent également un nouveau mécanisme de sauvegarde de Schengen destiné à générer une réaction commune aux frontières intérieures en cas de menaces touchant la majorité des États membres, par exemple des menaces sanitaires ou d’autres menaces pour la sécurité intérieure et l’ordre public. Grâce à ce mécanisme, qui complète le mécanisme applicable en cas de manquements aux frontières extérieures, les vérifications aux frontières intérieures dans la majorité des États membres pourraient être autorisées par une décision du Conseil en cas de menace commune. Une telle décision devrait également définir des mesures atténuant les effets négatifs des contrôles.

    De nouvelles règles visant à promouvoir des alternatives effectives aux vérifications aux frontières intérieures

    La proposition vise à promouvoir le recours à d’autres mesures que les contrôles aux frontières intérieures et à faire en sorte que, lorsqu’ils sont nécessaires, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures restent une mesure de dernier recours. Ces mesures sont les suivantes :

    - Une procédure plus structurée pour toute réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, comportant davantage de garanties : Actuellement, tout État membre qui décide de réintroduire des contrôles doit évaluer le caractère adéquat de cette réintroduction et son incidence probable sur la libre circulation des personnes. En application des nouvelles règles, il devra en outre évaluer l’impact sur les régions frontalières. Par ailleurs, tout État membre envisageant de prolonger les contrôles en réaction à des menaces prévisibles devrait d’abord évaluer si d’autres mesures, telles que des contrôles de police ciblés et une coopération policière renforcée, pourraient être plus adéquates. Une évaluation des risques devrait être fournie pour ce qui concerne les prolongations de plus de 6 mois. Lorsque des contrôles intérieurs auront été rétablis depuis 18 mois, la Commission devra émettre un avis sur leur caractère proportionné et sur leur nécessité. Dans tous les cas, les contrôles temporaires aux frontières ne devraient pas excéder une durée totale de 2 ans, sauf dans des circonstances très particulières. Il sera ainsi fait en sorte que les contrôles aux frontières intérieures restent une mesure de dernier recours et ne durent que le temps strictement nécessaire.
    – Promouvoir le recours à d’autres mesures : Conformément au nouveau code de coopération policière de l’UE, proposé par la Commission le 8 décembre 2021, les nouvelles règles de Schengen encouragent le recours à des alternatives effectives aux contrôles aux frontières intérieures, sous la forme de contrôles de police renforcés et plus opérationnels dans les régions frontalières, en précisant qu’elles ne sont pas équivalentes aux contrôles aux frontières.
    - Limiter les répercussions des contrôles aux frontières intérieures sur les régions frontalières : Eu égard aux enseignements tirés de la pandémie, qui a grippé les chaînes d’approvisionnement, les États membres rétablissant des contrôles devraient prendre des mesures pour limiter les répercussions négatives sur les régions frontalières et le marché intérieur. Il pourra s’agir notamment de faciliter le franchissement d’une frontière pour les travailleurs frontaliers et d’établir des voies réservées pour garantir un transit fluide des marchandises essentielles.
    - Lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés au sein de l’espace Schengen : Afin de lutter contre le phénomène de faible ampleur mais constant des déplacements non autorisés, les nouvelles règles créeront une nouvelle procédure pour contrer ce phénomène au moyen d’opérations de police conjointes et permettre aux États membres de réviser ou de conclure de nouveaux accords bilatéraux de réadmission entre eux. Ces mesures complètent celles proposées dans le cadre du nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile, en particulier le cadre de solidarité contraignant, et doivent être envisagées en liaison avec elles.

    Aider les États membres à gérer les situations d’instrumentalisation des flux migratoires

    Les règles de Schengen révisées reconnaissent l’importance du rôle que jouent les États membres aux frontières extérieures pour le compte de tous les États membres et de l’Union dans son ensemble. Elles prévoient de nouvelles mesures que les États membres pourront prendre pour gérer efficacement les frontières extérieures de l’UE en cas d’instrumentalisation de migrants à des fins politiques. Ces mesures consistent notamment à limiter le nombre de points de passage frontaliers et à intensifier la surveillance des frontières.

    La Commission propose en outre des mesures supplémentaires dans le cadre des règles de l’UE en matière d’asile et de retour afin de préciser les modalités de réaction des États membres en pareilles situations, dans le strict respect des droits fondamentaux. Ces mesures comprennent notamment la possibilité de prolonger le délai d’enregistrement des demandes d’asile jusqu’à 4 semaines et d’examiner toutes les demandes d’asile à la frontière, sauf en ce qui concerne les cas médicaux. Il convient de continuer à garantir un accès effectif à la procédure d’asile, et les États membres devraient permettre l’accès des organisations humanitaires qui fournissent une aide. Les États membres auront également la possibilité de mettre en place une procédure d’urgence pour la gestion des retours. Enfin, sur demande, les agences de l’UE (Agence de l’UE pour l’asile, Frontex, Europol) devraient apporter en priorité un soutien opérationnel à l’État membre concerné.

    Prochaines étapes

    Il appartient à présent au Parlement européen et au Conseil d’examiner et d’adopter les deux propositions.


    L’espace Schengen compte plus de 420 millions de personnes dans 26 pays. La suppression des contrôles aux frontières intérieures entre les États Schengen fait partie intégrante du mode de vie européen : près de 1,7 million de personnes résident dans un État Schengen et travaillent dans un autre. Les personnes ont bâti leur vie autour des libertés offertes par l’espace Schengen, et 3,5 millions d’entre elles se déplacent chaque jour entre des États Schengen.

    Afin de renforcer la résilience de l’espace Schengen face aux menaces graves et d’adapter les règles de Schengen aux défis en constante évolution, la Commission a annoncé, dans son nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile présenté en septembre 2020, ainsi que dans la stratégie de juin 2021 pour un espace Schengen pleinement opérationnel et résilient, qu’elle proposerait une révision du code frontières Schengen. Dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union de 2021, la présidente von der Leyen a également annoncé de nouvelles mesures pour contrer l’instrumentalisation des migrants à des fins politiques et pour assurer l’unité dans la gestion des frontières extérieures de l’UE.

    Les propositions présentées ce jour viennent s’ajouter aux travaux en cours visant à améliorer le fonctionnement global et la gouvernance de Schengen dans le cadre de la stratégie pour un espace Schengen plus fort et plus résilient. Afin de favoriser le dialogue politique visant à relever les défis communs, la Commission organise régulièrement des forums Schengen réunissant des membres du Parlement européen et les ministres de l’intérieur. À l’appui de ces discussions, la Commission présentera chaque année un rapport sur l’état de Schengen résumant la situation en ce qui concerne l’absence de contrôles aux frontières intérieures, les résultats des évaluations de Schengen et l’état d’avancement de la mise en œuvre des recommandations. Cela contribuera également à aider les États membres à relever tous les défis auxquels ils pourraient être confrontés. La proposition de révision du mécanisme d’évaluation et de contrôle de Schengen, actuellement en cours d’examen au Parlement européen et au Conseil, contribuera à renforcer la confiance commune dans la mise en œuvre des règles de Schengen. Le 8 décembre, la Commission a également proposé un code de coopération policière de l’UE destiné à renforcer la coopération des services répressifs entre les États membres, qui constitue un moyen efficace de faire face aux menaces pesant sur la sécurité dans l’espace Schengen et contribuera à la préservation d’un espace sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

    La proposition de révision du code frontières Schengen qui est présentée ce jour fait suite à des consultations étroites auprès des membres du Parlement européen et des ministres de l’intérieur réunis au sein du forum Schengen.

    Pour en savoir plus

    Documents législatifs :

    – Proposition de règlement modifiant le régime de franchissement des frontières par les personnes : https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulation-rules-governing-movement-persons-across-borders-com-20

    – Proposition de règlement visant à faire face aux situations d’instrumentalisation dans le domaine de la migration et de l’asile : https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulation-situations-instrumentalisation-field-migration-and-asy

    – Questions-réponses : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_6822

    – Fiche d’information : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_21_6838


    #Schengen #Espace_Schengen #frontières #frontières_internes #résilience #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #réfugiés #asile #crise #pandémie #covid-19 #coronavirus #crise_sanitaire #code_Schengen #code_frontières_Schengen #menace_sanitaire #frontières_extérieures #mobilité #restrictions #déplacements #ordre_public #sécurité #sécurité_intérieure #menace_commune #vérifications #coopération_policière #contrôles_temporaires #temporaire #dernier_recours #régions_frontalières #marchandises #voies_réservées #déplacements_non_autorisés #opérations_de_police_conjointes #pacte #surveillance #surveillance_frontalière #points_de_passage #Frontex #Europol #soutien_opérationnel


    Ajouté dans la métaliste sur les #patrouilles_mixtes ce paragraphe :

    « Lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés au sein de l’espace Schengen : Afin de lutter contre le phénomène de faible ampleur mais constant des déplacements non autorisés, les nouvelles règles créeront une nouvelle procédure pour contrer ce phénomène au moyen d’opérations de police conjointes et permettre aux États membres de réviser ou de conclure de nouveaux accords bilatéraux de réadmission entre eux. Ces mesures complètent celles proposées dans le cadre du nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile, en particulier le cadre de solidarité contraignant, et doivent être envisagées en liaison avec elles. »


    • La Commission européenne propose de réformer les règles de Schengen pour préserver la #libre_circulation

      Elle veut favoriser la coordination entre États membres et adapter le code Schengen aux nouveaux défis que sont les crise sanitaires et l’instrumentalisation de la migration par des pays tiers.

      Ces dernières années, les attaques terroristes, les mouvements migratoires et la pandémie de Covid-19 ont ébranlé le principe de libre circulation en vigueur au sein de l’espace Schengen. Pour faire face à ces événements et phénomènes, les pays Schengen (vingt-deux pays de l’Union européenne et la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège et l’Islande) ont réintroduit plus souvent qu’à leur tour des contrôles aux frontières internes de la zone, en ordre dispersé, souvent, et, dans le cas de l’Allemagne, de l’Autriche, de la France, du Danemark, de la Norvège et de la Suède, de manière « provisoirement permanente ».
      Consciente des risques qui pèsent sur le principe de libre circulation, grâce à laquelle 3,5 millions de personnes passent quotidiennement d’un État membre à l’autre, sans contrôle, la Commission européenne a proposé mardi de revoir les règles du Code Schengen pour les adapter aux nouveaux défis. « Nous devons faire en sorte que la fermeture des frontières intérieures soit un ultime recours », a déclaré le vice-président de la Commission en charge de la Promotion du mode de vie européen, Margaritis Schinas.
      Plus de coordination entre États membres

      Pour éviter le chaos connu au début de la pandémie, la Commission propose de revoir la procédure en vertu de laquelle un État membre peut réintroduire des contrôles aux frontières internes de Schengen. Pour les événements « imprévisibles », les contrôles aux frontières pourraient être instaurés pour une période de trente jours, extensibles jusqu’à trois mois (contre dix jours et deux mois actuellement) ; pour les événements prévisibles, elle propose des périodes renouvelables de six mois jusqu’à un maximum de deux ans… ou plus si les circonstances l’exigent. Les États membres devraient évaluer l’impact de ces mesures sur les régions frontalières et tenter de le minimiser - pour les travailleurs frontaliers, au nombre de 1,7 million dans l’Union, et le transit de marchandises essentielle, par exemple - et et envisager des mesures alternatives, comme des contrôles de police ciblés ou une coopération policière transfrontalières.
      Au bout de dix-huit mois, la Commission émettrait un avis sur la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ces mesures.
      De nouvelles règles pour empêcher les migrations secondaires

      L’exécutif européen propose aussi d’établir un cadre légal, actuellement inexistant, pour lutter contre les « migrations secondaires ». L’objectif est de faire en sorte qu’une personne en situation irrégulière dans l’UE qui traverse une frontière interne puisse être renvoyée dans l’État d’où elle vient. Une mesure de nature à satisfaire les pays du Nord, dont la Belgique, qui se plaignent de voir arriver ou transiter sur leur territoire des migrants n’ayant pas déposé de demandes d’asile dans leur pays de « première entrée », souvent situé au sud de l’Europe. La procédure réclame des opérations de police conjointes et des accords de réadmission entre États membres. « Notre réponse la plus systémique serait un accord sur le paquet migratoire », proposé par la Commission en septembre 2020, a cependant insisté le vice-président Schengen. Mais les États membres ne sont pas en mesure de trouver de compromis, en raison de positions trop divergentes.
      L’Europe doit se préparer à de nouvelles instrumentalisations de la migration

      La Commission veut aussi apporter une réponse à l’instrumentalisation de la migration telle que celle pratiquée par la Biélorussie, qui a fait venir des migrants sur son sol pour les envoyer vers la Pologne et les États baltes afin de faire pression sur les Vingt-sept. La Commission veut définir la façon dont les États membres peuvent renforcer la surveillance de leur frontière, limiter les points d’accès à leur territoire, faire appel à la solidarité européenne, tout en respectant les droits fondamentaux des migrants.
      Actuellement, « la Commission peut seulement faire des recommandations qui, si elles sont adoptées par le Conseil, ne sont pas toujours suivies d’effet », constate la commissaire aux Affaires intérieures Ylva Johansson.
      Pour faire face à l’afflux migratoire venu de Biélorussie, la Pologne avait notamment pratiqué le refoulement, contraire aux règles européennes en matière d’asile, sans que l’on donne l’impression de s’en émouvoir à Bruxelles et dans les autres capitales de l’Union. Pour éviter que cela se reproduise, la Commission propose des mesures garantissant la possibilité de demander l’asile, notamment en étendant à quatre semaines la période pour qu’une demande soit enregistrée et traitée. Les demandes pourront être examinée à la frontière, ce qui implique que l’État membre concerné devrait donner l’accès aux zones frontalières aux organisations humanitaires.

      La présidence française du Conseil, qui a fait de la réforme de Schengen une de ses priorités, va essayer de faire progresser le paquet législatif dans les six mois qui viennent. « Ces mesures constituent une ensemble nécessaire et robuste, qui devrait permettre de préserver Schengen intact », a assuré le vice-président Schinas. Non sans souligner que la solution systémique et permanente pour assurer un traitement harmonisé de l’asile et de la migration réside dans le pacte migratoire déposé en 2020 par la Commission et sur lequel les États membres sont actuellement incapables de trouver un compromis, en raison de leurs profondes divergences sur ces questions.


  • EU : One step closer to the establishment of the ’#permission-to-travel' scheme

    The Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement on rules governing how the forthcoming #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation System (#ETIAS) will ’talk’ to other migration and policing databases, with the purpose of conducting automated searches on would-be travellers to the EU.

    The ETIAS will mirror systems such as the #ESTA scheme in the USA, and will require that citizens of countries who do not need a #visa to travel to the EU instead apply for a “travel authorisation”.

    As with visas, travel companies will be required to check an individual’s travel authorisation before they board a plane, coach or train, effectively creating a new ’permission-to-travel’ scheme.

    The ETIAS also includes a controversial #profiling and ’watchlist’ system, an aspect not mentioned in the Council’s press release (full-text below).

    The rules on which the Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement - and which will thus almost certainly be the final text of the legislation - concern how and when the ETIAS can ’talk’ to other EU databases such as #Eurodac (asylum applications), the #Visa_Information_System, or the #Schengen_Information_System.

    Applicants will also be checked against #Europol and #Interpol databases.

    As the press release notes, the ETIAS will also serve as one of the key components of the “interoperability” scheme, which will interconnect numerous EU databases and lead to the creation of a new, biometric ’#Common_Identity_Repository' on up to 300 million non-EU nationals.

    You can find out more about the ETIAS, related changes to the Visa Information System, and the interoperability plans in the Statewatch report Automated Suspicion: https://www.statewatch.org/automated-suspicion-the-eu-s-new-travel-surveillance-initiatives


    The text below is a press release published by the Council of the EU on 18 March 2020: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/18/european-travel-information-and-authorisation-system-etias-council-

    European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS): Council Presidency and European Parliament provisionally agree on rules for accessing relevant databases

    The Council presidency and European Parliament representatives today reached a provisional agreement on the rules connecting the ETIAS central system to the relevant EU databases. The agreed texts will next be submitted to the relevant bodies of the Council and the Parliament for political endorsement and, following this, for their formal adoption.

    The adoption of these rules will be the final legislative step required for the setting up of ETIAS, which is expected to be operational by 2022.

    The introduction of ETIAS aims to improve internal security, prevent illegal immigration, protect public health and reduce delays at the borders by identifying persons who may pose a risk in one of these areas before they arrive at the external borders. ETIAS is also a building bloc of the interoperability between JHA databases, an important political objective of the EU in this area, which is foreseen to be operational by the end of 2023.

    The provisionally agreed rules will allow the ETIAS central system to perform checks against the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), the Entry/Exit System (EES), Eurodac and the database on criminal records of third country nationals (ECRIS-TCN), as well as on Europol and Interpol data.

    They allow for the connection of the ETIAS central system to these databases and set out the data to be accessed for ETIAS purposes, as well as the conditions and access rights for the ETIAS central unit and the ETIAS national units. Access to the relevant data in these systems will allow authorities to assess the security or immigration risk of applicants and decide whether to issue or refuse a travel authorisation.

    ETIAS is the new EU travel information and authorisation system. It will apply to visa-exempt third country nationals, who will need to obtain a travel authorisation before their trip, via an online application.

    The information submitted in each application will be automatically processed against EU and relevant Interpol databases to determine whether there are grounds to refuse a travel authorisation. If no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, the travel authorisation will be issued automatically and quickly. This is expected to be the case for most applications. If there is a hit or an element requiring analysis, the application will be handled manually by the competent authorities.

    A travel authorisation will be valid for three years or until the end of validity of the travel document registered during application, whichever comes first. For each application, the applicant will be required to pay a travel authorisation fee of 7 euros.


    #interopérabilité #base_de_données #database #données_personnelles #migrations #mobilité #autorisations #visas #compagnies_de_voyage #VIS #SIS #EU #UE #union_européenne #biométrie

    ping @etraces @isskein @karine4

    • L’UE précise son futur système de contrôle des voyageurs exemptés de visas

      Les modalités du futur système de #contrôle_préalable, auquel devront se soumettre d’ici fin 2022 les ressortissants de pays tiers pouvant se rendre dans l’Union #sans_visa, a fait l’objet d’un #accord annoncé vendredi par l’exécutif européen.

      Ce dispositif, baptisé ETIAS et inspiré du système utilisé par les Etats-Unis, concernera les ressortissants de plus de 60 pays qui sont exemptés de visas pour leurs courts séjours dans l’Union, comme les ressortissants des Etats-Unis, du Brésil, ou encore de l’Albanie et des Emirats arabes unis.

      Ce système dit « d’information et d’autorisation », qui vise à repérer avant leur entrée dans l’#espace_Schengen des personnes jugées à #risques, doit permettre un contrôle de sécurité avant leur départ via une demande d’autorisation sur internet.

      Dans le cadre de l’ETIAS, les demandes en ligne coûteront 7 euros et chaque autorisation sera valable trois ans pour des entrées multiples, a indiqué un porte-parole de la Commission.

      Selon les prévisions, « probablement plus de 95% » des demandes « donneront lieu à une #autorisation_automatique », a-t-il ajouté.

      Le Parlement européen avait adopté dès juillet 2018 une législation établissant le système ETIAS, mais dans les négociations pour finaliser ses modalités opérationnelles, les eurodéputés réclamaient des garde-fous, en le rendant interopérable avec les autres systèmes d’information de l’UE.

      Eurodéputés et représentants des Etats, de concert avec la Commission, ont approuvé jeudi des modifications qui permettront la consultation de différentes #bases_de_données, dont celles d’#Europol et d’#Interpol, pour identifier les « menaces sécuritaires potentielles, dangers de migration illégale ou risques épidémiologiques élevés ».

      Il contribuera ainsi à « la mise en oeuvre du nouveau Pacte (européen) sur la migration et l’asile », a estimé le porte-parole.

      « Nous devons savoir qui franchit nos #frontières_extérieures. (ETIAS) fournira des #informations_préalables sur les voyageurs avant qu’ils n’atteignent les frontières de l’UE afin d’identifier les risques en matière de #sécurité ou de #santé », a souligné Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, citée dans un communiqué.

      Hors restrictions dues à la pandémie, « au moins 30 millions de voyageurs se rendent chaque année dans l’UE sans visa, et on ne sait pas grand chose à leur sujet. L’ETIAS comblera cette lacune, car il exigera un "#background_check" », selon l’eurodéputé Jeroen Lenaers (PPE, droite pro-UE), rapporteur du texte.

      L’accord doit recevoir un ultime feu vert du Parlement et des Vingt-Sept pour permettre au système d’entrer en vigueur.

      #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes

    • Eurodac, la “sorveglianza di massa” per fermare le persone ai confini Ue

      Oggi il database conserva le impronte digitali di richiedenti asilo e stranieri “irregolari”. La proposta di riforma della Commissione Ue vuole inserire più dati biometrici, compresi quelli dei minori. Mettendo a rischio privacy e diritti

      Da più di vent’anni i richiedenti asilo che presentano domanda di protezione in un Paese europeo, così come i cittadini stranieri che attraversano “irregolarmente” i confini dell’Unione, sono registrati con le impronte digitali all’interno del sistema “Eurodac”. L’acronimo sta per “European asylum dactyloscopy database” e al 31 dicembre 2019 contava oltre 5,69 milioni di set di impronte cui se ne sono aggiunti oltre 644mila nel corso del 2020. Le finalità di Eurodac sono strettamente legate al Regolamento Dublino: il database, infatti, era stato istituito nel 2000 per individuare il Paese europeo di primo ingresso dei richiedenti asilo, che avrebbe dovuto valutare la domanda di protezione, ed evitare che la stessa persona presentasse domanda di protezione in più Paesi europei (il cosiddetto asylum shopping). 

      Nei prossimi anni, però, Eurodac potrebbe diventare uno strumento completamente diverso. Il 23 settembre 2020 la “nuova” Commissione europea guidata da Ursula von der Leyen, infatti, ha presentato una proposta di riforma che ricalca un testo presentato nel 2016 e si inserisce all’interno del Patto sull’immigrazione e l’asilo, ampliando gli obiettivi del database: “Eurodac, che era stato creato per stabilire quale sia il Paese europeo competente a esaminare la domanda di asilo, vede affiancarsi alla sua funzione originaria il controllo delle migrazioni irregolari e dei flussi secondari all’interno dell’Unione -commenta Valeria Ferraris, ricercatrice presso il dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Torino (unito.it)-. Viene messa in atto un’estensione del controllo sui richiedenti asilo visti sempre più come migranti irregolari e non come persone bisognose di protezione”.

      “Oggi Eurodac registra solo le impronte digitali. La proposta di riforma prevede di aggiungere i dati biometrici del volto, che possono essere utilizzati per il riconoscimento facciale tramite apposite tecnologie -spiega ad Altreconomia Chloé Berthélémy, policy advisor dell’European digital rights-. Inoltre si prevede di raccogliere anche le generalità dei migranti, informazioni relative a data e luogo di nascita-nazionalità. Sia per gli adulti sia per i minori a partire dai sei anni di età, mentre oggi vengono registrati solo gli adolescenti dai 14 anni in su”. Per Bruxelles l’esigenza di aggiungere nuovi dati biometrici al database è motivata dalle difficoltà di alcuni Stati membri nel raccogliere le impronte digitali a causa del rifiuto da parte dei richiedenti asilo o perché questi si procurano tagli, lesioni o scottature per non essere identificati. La stima dei costi per l’espansione di Eurodac è di 29,8 milioni di euro, necessari per “l’aggiornamento tecnico, l’aumento dell’archiviazione e della capacità del sistema centrale” si legge nella proposta di legge. 

      Le preoccupazioni per possibili violazioni dei diritti di migranti hanno spinto Edri, il principale network europeo di Ong impegnate nella tutela dei diritti e delle libertà digitali, e altre trenta associazioni (tra cui Amnesty International, Statewatch, Terre des Hommes) a scrivere lo scorso settembre una lettera aperta alla Commissione Libe del Parlamento europeo per chiedere di ritardare il processo legislativo di modifica di Eurodac e “concedere il tempo necessario a un’analisi significativa delle implicazioni sui diritti fondamentali della proposta di riforma”. 

      “Lungi dall’essere meramente tecnico, il dossier Eurodac è di natura altamente politica e strategica”, scrivono le associazioni firmatarie nella lettera. Che avvertono: se le modifiche proposte verranno adottate potrebbe venire compromesso “il dovere dell’Unione europea di rispettare il diritto e gli standard internazionali in materia di asilo e migrazione”. Eurodac rischia così di trasformarsi in “un potente strumento per la sorveglianza di massa” dei cittadini stranieri. Inoltre “le modifiche proposte sulla banca dati, che implicano il trattamento di più categorie di dati per una serie più ampia di finalità, sono in palese contraddizione con il principio di limitazione delle finalità, un principio chiave Ue sulla protezione dei dati”.

      “Si rischia di estendere il controllo sui richiedenti asilo visti sempre più come migranti ‘irregolari’ e non come persone bisognose di protezione” – Valeria Ferraris

      Le critiche delle associazioni firmatarie si concentrano soprattutto sul possibile uso del riconoscimento facciale per l’identificazione biometrica che viene definito “sproporzionato e invasivo della privacy” si legge nella lettera. “Le leggi fondamentali sulla protezione dei dati personali in Europa stabiliscono che l’interferenza con il diritto alla privacy deve essere proporzionata e rispondere a un interesse generale -spiega Chloé Berthélémy-. Nel caso di Eurodac, l’utilizzo delle impronte digitali è sufficiente a garantire l’identificazione della persona garantendo così il principio di limitazione dello scopo, che è centrale per la protezione dei dati in Europa”. 

      “Noi siamo contrari all’uso di tecnologie di riconoscimento facciale e siamo particolarmente radicali su questo -aggiungono Davide Del Monte e Laura Carrer dell’Hermes Center, una delle associazioni firmatarie della lettera-. Una tecnologia può anche avere un utilizzo corretto, ad esempio per combattere il terrorismo, ma la potenza di questi strumenti è tale che, a nostro avviso, i rischi e i pericoli sono molto superiori ai potenziali benefici che possono portare. Inoltre è molto difficile fare un passo indietro una volta che le infrastrutture necessarie a implementare queste tecnologie vengono ‘posate’ e messe in funzione: non si torna mai indietro e il loro utilizzo viene sempre ampliato. Per noi sono equiparabili ad armi e per questo la loro circolazione deve essere limitata”. Anche in virtù di queste posizioni, Hermes Center è promotore in Italia della campagna “Reclaim your face” con cui si chiede alle istituzioni di vietare il riconoscimento facciale negli spazi pubblici.

      “La potenza di questi strumenti è tale che, a nostro avviso, i rischi e i pericoli sono molto superiori ai potenziali benefici che possono portare” – Laura Carrer

      Ma non è finita. Se la riforma verrà adottata, all’interno del database europeo finiranno non solo i richiedenti asilo e le persone intercettate mentre attraversano “irregolarmente” le frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea ma anche tutti gli stranieri privi di titolo di soggiorno che venissero fermati all’interno di un Paese europeo e verrebbe anche creata una categoria ad hoc per i migranti soccorsi in mare durante un’operazione di search and rescue. Verranno inoltre raccolti i dati relativi ai bambini a partire dai sei anni di età: ufficialmente, questa (radicale) modifica al funzionamento del database europeo è stata introdotta con l’obiettivo di tutelare i minori stranieri. 

      Ma le associazioni evidenziano come raccogliere e conservare i dati biometrici dei bambini per scopi non legati alla loro protezione rappresenti “una violazione gravemente invasiva e ingiustificata del diritto alla privacy, che lede i principi di proporzionalità e necessità”. Dati e informazioni che verranno conservati più a lungo di quanto non accade oggi: per i “migranti irregolari” si passa dai 18 mesi attuali a cinque anni.

      A complicare ulteriormente la situazione c’è anche l’entrata in vigore nel 2018 del nuovo “Regolamento interoperatività”, che permette di mettere in connessione Eurodac con altri database come il Sistema informativo Schengen (Sis) e il sistema informativo Visti (Vis), il Sistema europeo di informazione e autorizzazione ai viaggi (Etias) e il Sistema di ingressi/uscite (Ees). 

      “In precedenza, questi erano tutti sistemi autonomi, ora si sta andando verso un merging, garantendo una connessione che contraddice la base giuridica iniziale per cui ciascuno di questi sistemi aveva un suo obiettivo -spiega Ferraris-. Nel corso degli anni gli obiettivi attribuiti a ciascun sistema si sono moltiplicati, violando i principi in materia di protezione dei dati personali e diventando progressivamente sempre più focalizzati sul controllo della migrazione”. Inoltre le modifiche normative hanno esteso l’accesso a questi database sempre più integrati tra loro a un numero sempre maggiore di autorità.

      “Quello che chiediamo al Parlamento europeo è di fare un passo indietro e di ripensare l’intero quadro normativo -conclude Berthélémy-. La nostra principale raccomandazione è quella di realizzare e pubblicare una valutazione di impatto sull’estensione dell’applicazione di Eurodac per delineare le conseguenze sui diritti fondamentali o su quelli dei minori causati dalle significative modifiche proposte. Si sta estendendo in maniera enorme l’ambito di applicazione di un database, e questo avrà conseguenze per decine di migliaia di persone”.


  • Rapporti di monitoraggio

    Sin dal 2016 il progetto ha pubblicato report di approfondimento giuridico sulle situazioni di violazione riscontrate presso le diverse frontiere oggetto delle attività di monitoraggio. Ciascun report affronta questioni ed aspetti contingenti e particolarmente interessanti al fine di sviluppare azioni di contenzioso strategico.

    Elenco dei rapporti pubblicati in ordine cronologico:

    “Le riammissioni di cittadini stranieri a Ventimiglia (giugno 2015): profili di illegittimità“

    Il report è stato redatto nel giugno del 2015 è costituisce una prima analisi delle principali criticità riscontrabili alla frontiera italo-francese verosimilmente sulla base dell’Accordo bilaterale fra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Governo della Repubblica francese sulla cooperazione transfrontaliera in materia di polizia e dogana (Accordo di Chambery)
    #Vintimille #Ventimiglia #frontière_sud-alpine #Alpes #Menton #accord_bilatéral #Accord_de_Chambéry #réadmissions

    Ajouté à la #métaliste de liens autour d’#accords_de_réadmission entre pays européens...
    Et plus précisément ici:


    “Le riammissioni di cittadini stranieri alla frontiera di Chiasso: profili di illegittimità”

    Il report è stato redatto nell’estate del 2016 per evidenziare la situazione critica che si era venuta a creare in seguito al massiccio afflusso di cittadini stranieri in Italia attraverso la rotta balcanica scatenata dalla crisi siriana. La frontiera italo-svizzera è stata particolarmente interessata da numerosi tentativi di attraversamento del confine nei pressi di Como e il presente documento fornisce una analisi giuridica delle criticità riscontrate.

    Ajouté à la #métaliste de liens autour d’#accords_de_réadmission entre pays européens...
    Et plus précisément ici:


    “Lungo la rotta del Brennero”

    Il report, redatto con la collaborazione della associazione Antenne Migranti e il contributo della fondazione Alex Langer nel 2017, analizza le dinamiche della frontiera altoatesina e sviluppa una parte di approfondimento sulle violazioni relative al diritto all’accoglienza per richiedenti asilo e minori, alle violazioni all’accesso alla procedura di asilo e ad una analisi delle modalità di attuazione delle riammissioni alla frontiera.

    #Brenner #Autriche


    “Attività di monitoraggio ai confini interni italiani – Periodo giugno 2018 – giugno 2019”

    Report analitico che riporta i dati raccolti e le prassi di interesse alle frontiere italo-francesi, italo-svizzere, italo-austriache e italo slovene. Contiene inoltre un approfondimento sui trasferimenti di cittadini di paesi terzi dalle zone di frontiera indicate all’#hotspot di #Taranto e centri di accoglienza del sud Italia.



    “Report interno sopralluogo Bosnia 27-31 ottobre 2019”

    Report descrittivo a seguito del sopralluogo effettuato da soci coinvolti nel progetto Medea dal 27 al 31 ottobre sulla condizione delle persone in transito in Bosnia. Il rapporto si concentra sulla descrizione delle strutture di accoglienza presenti nel paese, sull’accesso alla procedura di protezione internazionale e sulle strategie di intervento future.

    #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine


    “Report attività frontiere interne terrestri, porti adriatici e Bosnia”

    Rapporto di analisi dettagliata sulle progettualità sviluppate nel corso del periodo luglio 2019 – luglio 2020 sulle diverse frontiere coinvolte (in particolare la frontiera italo-francese, italo-slovena, la frontiera adriatica e le frontiere coinvolte nella rotta balcanica). Le novità progettuali più interessanti riguardano proprio l’espansione delle progettualità rivolte ai paesi della rotta balcanica e alla Grecia coinvolta nelle riammissioni dall’Italia. Nel periodo ad oggetto del rapporto il lavoro ha avuto un focus principale legato ad iniziative di monitoraggio, costituzione della rete ed azioni di advocacy.

    #Slovénie #mer_Adriatique #Adriatique


    #rapport #monitoring #medea #ASGI
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières
    #frontières_internes #frontières_intérieures #Balkans #route_des_balkans

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • France : Macron annonce un doublement des #forces_de_sécurité aux frontières

    Le président français Emmanuel Macron a annoncé jeudi un doublement des forces contrôlant les frontières de la France, de 2.400 à 4.800, pour lutter contre la menace terroriste, les trafics et l’immigration illégale.

    Le président français Emmanuel Macron a annoncé jeudi un doublement des forces contrôlant les frontières de la France, de 2.400 à 4.800, pour lutter contre la menace terroriste, les trafics et l’immigration illégale.

    Ce doublement a été décidé « en raison de l’intensification de la #menace » après les récents #attentats, dont celui de Nice (Sud-Est), a expliqué le chef de l’État à la frontière franco-espagnole, au #col_du_Perthus, où « quatre unités mobiles » sont « en cours de déploiement ».

    Accompagné du ministre de l’Intérieur Gérald Darmanin et du secrétaire d’Etat chargé des Affaires européennes Clément Beaune, Emmanuel Macron s’est également dit « favorable » à une refondation « en profondeur » des règles régissant l’#espace_Schengen de #libre_circulation en Europe, et à « un plus grand contrôle » des frontières.

    « Je porterai en ce sens des premières propositions au Conseil » européen de décembre, pour « repenser l’organisation » de #Schengen et « intensifier notre protection commune aux frontières avec une véritable #police_de_sécurité_aux_frontières_extérieures », a-t-il ajouté. Avec la « volonté d’aboutir sous la présidence française », au premier semestre 2022.

    Cette refondation doit rendre l’espace Schengen « plus cohérent », pour qu’il « protège mieux ses frontières communes », qu’il « articule mieux » les impératifs de responsabilité de protection de frontières et de « #solidarité » et que « la charge ne soit pas qu’aux pays de première entrée ».

    « La France est un des principaux pays d’arrivée d’#immigration_secondaire », lorsque les migrants #déboutés d’un pays tentent leur chance dans un autre en Europe, et « je souhaite profondément aussi qu’on change les règles du jeu », a-t-il dit.

    Il a également plaidé pour « intensifier » la lutte contre l’#immigration_clandestine et les réseaux de #trafiquants « qui, de plus en plus souvent, sont liés aux réseaux terroristes ».

    « Nous prendrons les lois qui sont nécessaires, si elles correspondent à des besoins identifiés », a-t-il ajouté, mais la situation « ne justifie pas de changer la Constitution », a-t-il assuré, face à des pressions de responsables politiques de droite et d’extrême droite.

    Arrivé à la mi-journée au col du Perthus, Emmanuel Macron s’est entretenu avec les policiers de la #police_aux_frontières (#PAF) qui contrôlent les véhicules entrant en France par l’autoroute ou la nationale qui le traversent. L’un d’eux lui a notamment fait la démonstration d’un drone surveillant les voies de passage et les sentiers frontaliers.

    Puis il a visité le Centre franco-espagnol de coopération policière et douanière, où sont affectées 24 personnes des deux pays à plein temps. « Nous partageons un espace de travail et de convivialité (...) La coopération marche très bien », lui a assuré un responsable espagnol.

    « Depuis 2017, la coordination entre les services de renseignement a été renforcée et confiée à la DGSI (sécurité intérieure, ndlr). Les moyens financiers, humains et technologiques ont été considérablement augmentés », a déclaré Emmanuel Macron dans un tweet posté durant sa visite.

    Quelque 35.000 véhicules passent tous les jours sur l’autoroute et la route qui franchissent le col, entre les villes du Perthus en France et de La Jonquera en Espagne.

    L’#Espagne est l’une des principales portes d’entrée des immigrés clandestins en France, qui arrivent par la côte en provenance d’Afrique du nord. Plus de 4.000 migrants ont été refusés ces trois derniers mois dans le département des #Pyrénées-Orientales, selon un responsable de la PAF. Une partie d’entre eux étaient des Algériens tentant d’entrer en France.


    #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières #France #terrorisme #migrations #immigration_illégale #militarisation_des_frontières

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.


      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps


      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]


      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.


      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]


      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.


      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”


      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe


      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick


      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.


      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html



    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones


      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf


      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Frontières : quel est l’impact du Covid-19 sur l’espace Schengen ? - actudaily


    La crise du Covid-19 a poussé les 26 Etats membres de l’espace Schengen à restreindre la circulation des personnes aux frontières extérieures de la zone, mais aussi en son sein. Ces mesures ont des implications politiques, économiques et juridiques, et menacent l’avenir de cet espace de libre circulation, qui n’avait jamais été aussi contrarié depuis son entrée en vigueur en 1995.

  • EU must go ’back to the future’ of open borders after COVID-19, commissioner says - Reuters


    BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The European Union must go “back to the future” of open borders once the coronavirus pandemic is brought under control, a senior EU official said on Thursday, after a spate of frontier closures by member states fraying the bloc’s cohesion.

  • Schengen, migration, asylum and security in times of COVID-19 | News | European Parliament


    MEPs will quiz Commissioner Johansson on the future of the border-free Schengen zone, common migration and asylum policy and security in the context of the pandemic.

  • La frontière franco-suisse au temps du coronavirus...

    Photos prises le dimanche 19.04.2020 par #Juliet_Fall

    Sunday morning bike ride with my family chasing newly/temporarily-closed borders around the Canton of Geneva during Covid19 pandemic. France & Switz are both in the Schengen area: these are usually open to people. Fascinating ad hoc use of different material. (#Bardonnex, #Soral)

    We chased closed borders on bicycles for three hours, starting early. Luckily, in Switzerland, we are allowed to exercise outside in family groups as long as we maintain distance to others. On the other side, in France, people are more tightly policed & controlled (Soral)

    Some borders that usually shut at night are now completely closed. The one in #Sézegnin used tape covered in private companies’ names ("La Mobiliaire"), making them seem even more improvised, as though people threw them together using whatever was at hand.

    Did a border professional grab a piece of pink chalk to mark out the line before they laid the concrete blocks? So many personal stories hidden in these geopolitical traces. Geography & history in the making: experiences & sights to remember (the best type of ’homeschooling’)...

    #Schengen (fin de-) #fin_de_Schengen #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #covid-19 #coronavirus #France #Suisse #Juliet_Fall @simplicissimus #Genève #Haute-Savoie
    #rematérialisation #matérialisation

    ping @isskein @reka