• L’erosione di Schengen, sempre più area di libertà per pochi a danno di molti

    I Paesi che hanno aderito all’area di libera circolazione strumentalizzano il concetto di minaccia per la sicurezza interna per poter ripristinare i controlli alle frontiere e impedire così l’ingresso ai migranti indesiderati. Una forzatura, praticata anche dall’Italia, che scatena riammissioni informali e violazioni dei diritti. L’analisi dell’Asgi

    Lo spazio Schengen sta venendo progressivamente eroso e ridotto dagli Stati membri dell’Unione europea che, con il pretesto della sicurezza interna o di “minacce” esterne, ne sospendono l’applicazione. Ed è così che da spazio di libera circolazione, Schengen si starebbe trasformando sempre più in un labirinto creato per isolare e respingere le persone in transito e i cittadini stranieri.

    Per l’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi) la sospensione della libera circolazione, che dovrebbe essere una pratica emergenziale da attivarsi solo nel caso di minacce gravi per la sicurezza di un Paese, rischia infatti di diventare una prassi ricorrente nella gestione dei flussi migratori.

    A fine ottobre di quest’anno il governo italiano ha riattivato i controlli al confine con la Slovenia, giustificando l’iniziativa con l’aumento del rischio interno a seguito della guerra in atto a Gaza e da possibili infiltrazioni terroristiche. La decisione è stata anche proposta come reazione alla pressione migratoria a cui è soggetto il Paese. Lo stesso giorno in cui l’Italia ha annunciato la sospensione della libera circolazione -misura prorogata- la stessa scelta è stata presa anche da Slovenia, Austria, Repubblica Ceca, Slovacchia, Polonia e Germania. Una prassi che rischia di agevolare le violazioni dei diritti delle persone in transito. “Questa pratica, così come l’uso degli accordi bilaterali di riammissione, ha di fatto consentito alle autorità di frontiera dei vari Stati membri di impedire l’ingresso nel territorio e di applicare respingimenti ai danni di persone migranti e richiedenti asilo, in violazione di numerose norme nazionali e sovranazionali”, scrive l’Asgi.

    Il “Codice frontiere Schengen” prevede che i confini interni possano essere attraversati in un qualsiasi punto senza controlli sulle persone, in modo indipendente dalla loro nazionalità. Secondo i dati del Consiglio dell’Unione europea, circa 3,5 milioni di persone attraverserebbero questi confini ogni giorno mentre in 1,7 milioni lavorerebbero in un Paese diverso da quello di residenza, attraversando così una frontiera interna. In caso di minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna in uno Stato membro, però, quest’ultimo è autorizzato a ripristinare i controlli “in tutte o in alcune parti delle sue frontiere interne per un periodo limitato non superiore a 30 giorni o per la durata prevedibile della minaccia grave”. Tuttavia, lo stesso Codice afferma che “la migrazione e l’attraversamento delle frontiere esterne di un gran numero di cittadini di Paesi terzi non dovrebbero in sé essere considerate una minaccia per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza”.

    Inoltre, anche nel caso in cui vengano introdotte restrizioni alla libera circolazione, queste vanno applicate in accordo con il diritto delle persone in transito. “La reintroduzione temporanea dei controlli non può giustificare alcuna deroga al rispetto dei diritti fondamentali delle persone straniere che fanno ingresso nel territorio degli Stati membri e, nel caso specifico dell’Italia, attraverso il confine italo-sloveno -ribadisce l’Asgi-. In particolare, il controllo non può esentare le autorità di frontiera dalla verifica delle situazioni individuali delle persone straniere che intendano accedere nel territorio dello Stato e che intendano presentare domanda di asilo”. In particolare, la sicurezza dei confini non può impedire l’accesso alle procedure di protezione internazionale per chi ne fa richieste e di riceve informazioni sulla possibilità di farlo. Infine, i controlli non possono portare a una violazione del diritto di non respingimento, che impedisce l’espulsione di una persona verso Paese dove potrebbe subire trattamenti inumani o degradanti o dove possa essere soggetta a respingimenti “a catena” verso Stati che si macchiano di queste pratiche.

    Le operazioni di pattugliamento lungo il confine tra Italia e Slovenia presentano criticità proprio in tal senso. Secondo le notizie riportate dai media e le recenti dichiarazioni del ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi, l’Italia avrebbe applicato ulteriori misure che hanno l’evidente effetto di impedire alla persona straniera l’accesso al territorio nazionale e ai diritti che ne conseguono. Già a settembre del 2023 il ministro aveva dichiarato, in risposta a un’interrogazione parlamentare, la ripresa dell’attività congiunta tra le forze di polizia di Italia e Slovenia a partire dal 2022. Sottolineando come grazie all’accordo fosse stato possibile impedire, per tutto il 2023, l’ingresso sul territorio nazionale di circa 1.900 “migranti irregolari”. “Preoccupa, inoltre, l’opacità operativa che caratterizza questi interventi di polizia: le modalità, infatti, con le quali vengono condotti sono poco chiare e difficilmente osservabili ma celano evidenti profili di criticità e potenziali lesioni di diritti”.

    Le azioni di polizia, infatti, avrebbero avuto luogo già in territorio italiano oltre il confine: una simile procedura appare in linea con quanto previsto dalle procedure di riammissione bilaterale, ma in contrasto con il Codice frontiere Schengen, che presuppone che i controlli possano essere svolti solo presso i valichi di frontiera comunicati alle istituzioni competenti. Una prassi simile è stata riscontrata lungo il confine italo-francese, dove l’Asgi ha identificato la coesistenza di pratiche legate alla sospensione della libera circolazione con procedure di riammissione informale.

    “La libera circolazione nello spazio europeo è una delle conquiste più importanti dei nostri tempi -è la conclusione dell’Asgi-. Il suo progressivo smantellamento dovrebbe essere dettato da una effettiva emergenza e contingenza, entrambe condizioni che sembrano non rinvenibili nelle motivazioni addotte dall’Italia e dagli altri Stati membri alla Commissione europea. La libertà di circolazione, pilastro fondamentale dell’area Schengen, rivela forse a tutt’oggi la sua vera natura: un’area di libertà per pochi a danno di molti”.

    https://altreconomia.it/lerosione-di-schengen-sempre-piu-area-di-liberta-per-pochi-a-danno-di-m

    #Schengen #contrôles_frontaliers #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Europe #frontières_intérieures #espace_Schengen #sécurité #libre_circulation #Italie #Slovénie #terrorisme #Gaza #Slovénie #Autriche #République_Tchèque #Slovaquie #Pologne #Allemagne #accords_bilatéraux #code_frontières #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #droit_d'asile #refoulements_en_chaîne #patrouilles_mixtes #réadmissions_informelles #France #frontière_sud-alpine

    –-

    ajouté au fil de discussion sur la réintroduction des contrôles systématiques à la frontière entre Italie et Slovénie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1021994

  • Cet automne c’est une suite d’annonces du rétablissement des #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières dans les pays de l’#Union_européenne (#UE / #EU)... tentative de #métaliste

    La liste complète des demandes de réintroduction des contrôles systématiques à la commission européenne :
    https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area/temporary-reintroduction-border-control_en

    #Schengen #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #2023 #automne_2023

  • Slovenci objavili gdje je na granici najgore stanje. “Koristimo konjicu, helikoptere”

    SLOVENIJA uvodi pojačane kontrole granice s Hrvatskom. Slovenska policija, odmah nakon graničnih prijelaza, postavlja punktove na kojima može zaustavljati vozila.

    Portal 24ur navodi da se radi o sljedećim mjestima: kod željezničkog nadvožnjaka u mjestu Rigonce u blizini prijelaza Harmica, na punktu Trnovec kod Metlike, Obrežje kod Kalina, ali i na granici prema Italiji - u mjestima Rakitovec, Podgorje i Sočerga na području PU Koper. Iza graničnog prijelaza Obrežje, najvećeg cestovnog prijelaza Hrvatske i Slovenije, policija je organizirala motrenje.

    Kako pišu slovenski mediji, nakon ulaska Hrvatske u Schengen početkom godine, broj migranata koji zapadnobalkanskom rutom ilegalno dolaze u Sloveniju, pa tako i preko Bosne i Hercegovine, znatno je porastao. Slovenska policija je od početka godine do kraja kolovoza obradila 36.137 ilegalnih prelazaka državne granice između Slovenije i Hrvatske. U istom razdoblju prošle godine obrađen je 13.601 neovlašteni ulazak.

    Policija primjećuje da je i prije ulaska Hrvatske u šengenski prostor došlo do preusmjeravanja migracijskih tokova s ​​područja Bele krajine na područje Posavja. Jedan od razloga je i to što sve više migranata u Hrvatskoj iskazuje namjeru traženja azila, pa ih se dovozi u azilantske centre na zagrebačkom području, koje je geografski vrlo blizu Posavja, rekao je Bojan Tomc, načelnik Odjela za državnu granicu i strance, pojasnili su prije nekoliko dana iz Policijske uprave (PU) Novo mesto.

    I dok slovenska vlada Roberta Goloba inzistira na koalicijskoj obvezi oko uklanjanja ograde na granici, iz pograničnih općina kažu da šengenski sustav u Hrvatskoj očito ne funkcionira. Od mještana se čuju pozivi da se pojača policijski nadzor i da se prestane s uklanjanjem ograde na granici.
    Slovenci objavili gdje je najgore stanje

    Kako pišu slovenski mediji, trenutno je najgore na području zapadno od Samobora (Bregana-Obrežje) i posebno Zaprešića. S hrvatske strane granice zapadno od Zaprešića nalazi se Šenkovec, a sa slovenske mjesto Rigonce za koje Slovenci kažu da je najpogođenije migracijama.

    Cijelo to područje od Obrežja do Rigonce spada u slovensku regiju Posavje, gdje su najviše pogođena naselja Rigonce, Dobova (nalazi se u nastavku na Rigonce) i Obrežje. Prema riječima ravnatelja PU Novo mesto Igora Juršiča, policija je u Rigoncama, gdje je najkritičnije - trenutno bilježe od 120 do 200 migranata dnevno - pojačala kontrolu i ophodnjama i tehničkim sredstvima. Između ostalog, migrante nastoje presresti što bliže granici kako ne bi ulazili u naselja i izazivali nelagodu kod mještana. Svakodnevno koriste konjicu, vodiče službenih pasa i helikopter. Surađuju s hrvatskom policijom s kojom imaju redovite sastanke, a u mješovitim patrolama zajednički nadziru područje s obje strane granice.

    Ove godine na području PU Novo mesto obrađeno je 32.500 stranaca koji su ilegalno prešli državnu granicu. U istom razdoblju prošle godine takvih je prelazaka bilo oko 5000. Samo u Rigoncama ove je godine granicu ilegalno prešlo 25 tisuća stranaca. Također je uhićeno 177 stranaca, krijumčara, koji su počinili kazneno djelo nedopuštenog prelaska državne granice. Lani je u istom razdoblju uhićen 31.
    “Mještani su vrlo tolerantni”

    Kako javlja STA, zamjenik glavnog ravnatelja policije Robert Ferenc objasnio je na hitnoj sjednici Odbora za unutarnje poslove, državnu upravu i lokalnu samoupravu da se nakon ulaska Hrvatske u šengenski prostor migracije više odvijaju kroz tzv. zelenu granicu nego raznim cestovnim i željezničkim pravcima.

    Zbog toga je policija pojačala prisutnost i počela provoditi mješovite ophodnje sa svim policijama država s kojima Slovenija graniči. Glavni ravnatelj policije Senad Jušić pozvao je hrvatskog kolegu da pojača mješovite ophodnje na području Policijske postaje Brežice.

    Načelnik Općine Brežice Ivan Molan rekao je da je ministar unutarnjih poslova Boštjan Poklukar tijekom posjeta Rigoncama obećao da će ovaj dio ograde biti posljednji koji će biti uklonjen.

    Mještane Rigonca, koji osjećaju izrazito pojačan pritisak ilegalnih prelazaka granice, opisao je kao vrlo tolerantne prema izbjeglicama te, prema njegovim riječima, zbog toga nije bilo sukoba između te dvije skupine. Prema riječima Anje Bah Žibert (SDS), u rujnu je granicu prešlo 6200 migranata u naselju s oko 180 stanovnika.

    https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/slovenci-objavili-na-kojem-granicnom-prijelazu-s-hrvatskom-ulazi-najvise-migranata/2498944.aspx

    Google translation:
    Slovenians announced where the worst situation is on the border. “We use cavalry, helicopters”

    SLOVENIA introduces increased border controls with Croatia. Immediately after the border crossings, the Slovenian police set up checkpoints where they can stop vehicles.

    The 24ur portal states that the following places are involved: near the railway overpass in the town of Rigonce near the Harmica crossing, at the Trnovec point near Metlika, Obrežje near Kalin, but also on the border with Italy - in the towns of Rakitovec, Podgorje and Sočerga in the area of ​​PU Koper. Behind the Obrežje border crossing, the largest road crossing between Croatia and Slovenia, the police organized surveillance.

    According to the Slovenian media, after Croatia’s entry into Schengen at the beginning of the year, the number of migrants who illegally come to Slovenia via the Western Balkans route, including via Bosnia and Herzegovina, has increased significantly. From the beginning of the year to the end of August, the Slovenian police processed 36,137 illegal border crossings between Slovenia and Croatia. In the same period last year, 13,601 unauthorized entries were processed.

    The police note that even before Croatia’s entry into the Schengen area, there was a redirection of migration flows from the area of ​​Bela Krajina to the area of ​​Posavija. One of the reasons is that more and more migrants in Croatia express their intention to seek asylum, so they are brought to asylum centers in the Zagreb area, which is geographically very close to Posavije, said Bojan Tomc, head of the Department for State Borders and Foreigners, explained a few days ago from the Police Administration (PU) Novo mesto.

    And while the Slovenian government of Robert Golob insists on a coalition commitment to remove the fence on the border, the border municipalities say that the Schengen system in Croatia is clearly not working. There are calls from the locals to increase police surveillance and to stop removing the border fence.
    Slovenians announced where the worst situation is

    According to the Slovenian media, it is currently worst in the area west of Samobor (Bregan-Obrežje) and especially Zaprešić. On the Croatian side of the border, west of Zaprešić, is Šenkovec, and on the Slovenian side is Rigonce, which Slovenians say is the most affected by migration.

    The entire area from Obrežje to Rigonce belongs to the Slovenian region of Posavje, where the settlements of Rigonce, Dobova (it is located below Rigonce) and Obrežje are the most affected. According to the director of PU Novo mesto Igor Juršič, the police in Rigonci, where it is most critical - currently recording 120 to 200 migrants per day - has strengthened control with patrols and technical means. Among other things, they try to intercept migrants as close to the border as possible so that they do not enter settlements and cause discomfort among the locals. They use cavalry, service dog handlers and a helicopter on a daily basis. They cooperate with the Croatian police, with whom they have regular meetings, and jointly monitor the area on both sides of the border in mixed patrols.

    This year, 32,500 foreigners who illegally crossed the state border were processed in the territory of the Novo mesto PU. In the same period last year, there were about 5,000 such crossings. Only in Rigonci this year, 25,000 foreigners crossed the border illegally. Also, 177 foreigners, smugglers, who committed the crime of illegally crossing the state border were arrested. Last year, 31 were arrested in the same period.
    “The locals are very tolerant”

    As reported by STA, Deputy Director General of Police Robert Ferenc explained at the emergency meeting of the Committee for Internal Affairs, State Administration and Local Self-Government that after Croatia’s entry into the Schengen area, migration is taking place more through the so-called the green border but by various road and rail routes.

    Because of this, the police increased their presence and began conducting joint patrols with all the police of the countries with which Slovenia borders. Chief Police Director Senad Jušić called on his Croatian colleague to step up mixed patrols in the area of ​​the Brežice Police Station.

    The head of the municipality of Brežice, Ivan Molan, said that the Minister of the Interior, Boštjan Poklukar, promised during his visit to Rigonci that this part of the fence would be the last to be removed.

    He described the locals of Rigonc, who feel the extremely increased pressure of illegal border crossings, as very tolerant towards refugees and, according to him, because of this, there were no conflicts between the two groups. According to Anja Bah Žibert (SDS), in September, 6,200 migrants crossed the border in a settlement with about 180 inhabitants.

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Slovénie #Croatie #militarisation_des_frontières #Rigonice #Harmica
    #Trnovec #Metlika #Obrežje #Kalin #Rakitovec #Podgorje #Sočerga
    #Italie #Schengen #Posavja #Zaprešić #Šenkovec

    via @erim

  • EU judges slam France’s migrant pushbacks

    Ruling examines decision to shut French border to non-EU nationals.

    The EU’s top court ruled against France’s policy of turning away migrants at its borders.

    The European Court of Justice announced on Thursday (https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-09/cp230145en.pdf) that those actions breached the EU’s rules on migrant returns.

    The ruling comes as France closed its border to Italy amid a recent surge in migrant arrivals to the Italian island of Lampedusa.

    France’s center-right Home Affairs Minister Gerard Darmanin had on Monday vowed that “France will not take in a single migrant from Lampedusa” after meeting his Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi in Rome (https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/09/18/darmanin-la-francia-non-accogliera-migranti-da-lampedusa_2f53eae6-e8f7-4b82-9d7).

    But EU rules compel member countries to initiate a formal procedure when expelling an irregular migrant, and give that person sufficient time to leave the country.

    So-called pushbacks of migrants, or forcing a migrant directly back across a border, may only be carried out as a last resort, the judges in Luxembourg ruled.

    They also noted that non-EU citizens who lack permission to stay may not be turned away at internal EU borders.

    Commenting on the ruling, the European Commission’s Home Affairs spokesperson Anitta Hipper told a daily media briefing that “reintroducing [internal EU] border controls must remain an exceptional measure.” (https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-246319)

    She added that the EU executive is in consultations with countries that have sealed their borders.

    This ruling comes as the European Parliament’s home affairs committee on Wednesday backed legislation that allows EU countries to enact border controls only when faced with emergencies such as health or terrorism threats, and only for a limited time period.

    https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-judges-slam-france-migrant-pushback

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #Italie #France #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #fermeture_des_frontières #Alpes #justice #C-143/22 #Cour_de_justice_de_l'Union_européenne (#CJUE) #frontières_intérieures

    • JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Border control, asylum and immigration – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 – Article 32 – Temporary reintroduction of border control by a Member State at its internal borders – Article 14 – Refusal of entry – Equation of internal borders with external borders – Directive 2008/115/EC – Scope – Article 2(2)(a))

      In Case C‑143/22,

      REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France), made by decision of 24 February 2022, received at the Court on 1 March 2022, in the proceedings

      Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE),

      Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE),

      Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT),

      Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade),

      Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI),

      Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI),

      Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH),

      Le paria,

      Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF),

      SOS – Hépatites Fédération

      v

      Ministre de l’Intérieur,

      intervening party :

      Défenseur des droits,

      THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

      composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, L.S. Rossi, J.-C. Bonichot, S. Rodin and O. Spineanu-Matei, Judges,

      Advocate General : A. Rantos,

      Registrar : M. Krausenböck, Administrator,

      having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 19 January 2023,

      after considering the observations submitted on behalf of :

      – Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF) and SOS – Hépatites Fédération, by P. Spinosi, lawyer,

      – the Défenseur des droits, by C. Hédon, Défenseure des droits, M. Cauvin and A. Guitton, acting as advisers, and by I. Zribi, lawyer,

      – the French Government, by A.-L. Desjonquères and J. Illouz, acting as Agents,

      – the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, E. Borawska-Kędzierska and A. Siwek-Ślusarek, acting as Agents,

      – the European Commission, by A. Azéma, A. Katsimerou, T. Lilamand and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents,

      after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 30 March 2023,

      gives the following

      Judgment

      1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1, ‘the Schengen Borders Code’), and of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

      2 The request has been made in proceedings between Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le Paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF), SOS – Hépatites Fédération, and Ministre de l’Intérieur (Minister of the Interior, France) regarding the legality of the ordonnance no 2020-1733 du 16 décembre 2020 portant partie législative du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Order No 2020-1733 of 16 December 2020, laying down the legislative part of the Code on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum) (JORF of 30 December 2020, Text No 41).

      Legal context

      European Union law

      The Schengen Borders Code

      3 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code :

      ‘For the purposes of this Regulation the following definitions apply :

      1. “internal borders” means :

      (a) the common land borders, including river and lake borders, of the Member States ;

      (b) the airports of the Member States for internal flights ;

      (c) sea, river and lake ports of the Member States for regular internal ferry connections ;

      2. “external borders” means : the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders ;

      …’

      4 Title II of that code, which concerns ‘External Borders’, includes Articles 5 to 21.

      5 Article 14 of the code, entitled ‘Refusal of entry’, states :

      ‘1. A third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of long-stay visas.

      2. Entry may only be refused by a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal. The decision shall be taken by an authority empowered by national law. It shall take effect immediately.

      The substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal shall be given by means of a standard form, as set out in Annex V, Part B, filled in by the authority empowered by national law to refuse entry. The completed standard form shall be handed to the third-country national concerned, who shall acknowledge receipt of the decision to refuse entry by means of that form.

      Data on third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused shall be registered in the EES in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ 2017 L 327, p. 20)].

      3. Persons refused entry shall have the right to appeal. Appeals shall be conducted in accordance with national law. A written indication of contact points able to provide information on representatives competent to act on behalf of the third-country national in accordance with national law shall also be given to the third-country national.

      Lodging such an appeal shall not have suspensive effect on a decision to refuse entry.

      Without prejudice to any compensation granted in accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to the correction of the data entered in the EES or of the cancelled entry stamp, or both, and any other cancellations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry.

      4. The border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned.

      5. Member States shall collect statistics on the number of persons refused entry, the grounds for refusal, the nationality of the persons who were refused entry and the type of border (land, air or sea) at which they were refused entry and submit them yearly to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 23)].

      6. Detailed rules governing refusal of entry are given in Part A of Annex V.’

      6 Title III of the Schengen Borders Code, which concerns ‘Internal Borders’, includes Articles 22 to 35.

      7 Article 25 of that code, entitled ‘General framework for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where, in the area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State, that Member State may exceptionally reintroduce border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders for a limited period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days. The scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat.’

      8 Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, entitled ‘Provisions to be applied where border control is reintroduced at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of Title II shall apply mutatis mutandis.’

      9 Annex V, Part A, of the Schengen Borders Code provides :

      ‘1. When refusing entry, the competent border guard shall :

      (a) fill in the standard form for refusing entry, as shown in Part B. The third-country national concerned shall sign the form and shall be given a copy of the signed form. Where the third-country national refuses to sign, the border guard shall indicate this refusal in the form under the section “comments” ;

      (b) for third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused, register in the EES the data on refusal of entry in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 ;

      (c) annul or revoke the visas, as appropriate, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 34 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1)] ;

      (d) for third-country nationals whose refusals of entry are not to be registered into the EES, affix an entry stamp on the passport, cancelled by a cross in indelible black ink, and write opposite it on the right-hand side, also in indelible ink, the letter(s) corresponding to the reason(s) for refusing entry, the list of which is given on the standard form for refusing entry as shown in Part B of this Annex. In addition, for these categories of persons, the border guard shall record every refusal of entry in a register or on a list stating the identity and nationality of the third-country national concerned, the references of the document authorising the third-country national to cross the border and the reason for, and date of, refusal of entry.

      The practical arrangements for stamping are set out in Annex IV.

      2. If a third-country national who has been refused entry is brought to the border by a carrier, the authority responsible locally shall :

      (a) order the carrier to take charge of the third-country national and transport him or her without delay to the third country from which he or she was brought, to the third country which issued the document authorising him or her to cross the border, or to any other third country where he or she is guaranteed admittance, or to find means of onward transportation in accordance with Article 26 of the Schengen Convention and Council Directive 2001/51/EC [of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 45)] ;

      (b) pending onward transportation, take appropriate measures, in compliance with national law and having regard to local circumstances, to prevent third-country nationals who have been refused entry from entering illegally.

      …’

      10 Pursuant to Article 44 of that code, entitled ‘Repeal’ :

      ‘Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1)] is repealed.

      References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex X.’

      11 In accordance with that correlation table, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code corresponds to Article 13 of Regulation No 562/2006.

      Directive 2008/115

      12 Article 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115 states :

      ‘1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State.

      2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who :

      (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of [Regulation No 562/2006], or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State ;

      (b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.’

      13 Article 3 of that directive provides :

      ‘For the purpose of this Directive the following definitions shall apply :

      2. “illegal stay” means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of [Regulation No 562/2006] or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State ;

      3. “return” means the process of a third-country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced – to :

      – his or her country of origin, or

      – a country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or

      – another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted ;

      …’

      14 Article 4(4) of the directive provides :

      ‘With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the scope of this Directive in accordance with Article 2(2)(a), Member States shall :

      (a) ensure that their treatment and level of protection are no less favourable than as set out in Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 9(2)(a) (postponement of removal), Article 14(1)(b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into account needs of vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention conditions) and

      (b) respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      15 Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 provides :

      ‘When implementing this Directive, Member States shall take due account of :

      (a) the best interests of the child ;

      (b) family life ;

      (c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned,

      and respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      16 Article 6 of that directive provides :

      ‘1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.

      2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to the territory of that other Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance by the third-country national concerned with this requirement, or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security, paragraph 1 shall apply.

      3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1.

      …’

      17 The first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application.’

      18 Article 15(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when :

      (a) there is a risk of absconding or

      (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process.

      Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.’

      French law

      19 Article L. 213-3-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum), in the version resulting from the loi no 2018-778, du 10 septembre 2018, pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie (Law No 2018-778 of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration) (JORF of 11 September 2018, Text No 1) (‘the former Ceseda’), stated :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders provided for in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code], the decisions referred to in Article L. 213-2 may be taken in respect of foreign nationals who have arrived directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention signed on 19 June 1990, who have entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and were checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres behind it. The procedures for these checks are defined by decree in the Conseil d’État [(Council of State, France)].’

      20 Order No 2020-1733 recast the legislative part of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. Article L. 332-2 of that code, as amended (‘the amended Ceseda’) provides :

      ‘The decision refusing entry, which shall be in writing and substantiated, shall be taken by an officer belonging to a category prescribed by regulations.

      The notification of the decision refusing entry shall state that the foreign national has the right to inform, or cause to be informed, the person he or she has indicated that he or she intended to visit, his or her consulate or the adviser of his or her choice. It shall state that the foreign national has the right to refuse to be repatriated before one clear day has passed, under the conditions laid down in Article L. 333-2.

      The decision and the notification of rights which accompanies it shall be provided to him in a language he or she understands.

      Particular attention shall be paid to vulnerable persons, especially minors whether accompanied by an adult or not.’

      21 Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda provides :

      ‘The procedure laid down in Article L. 332-2 is applicable to the decision to refuse entry taken against the foreign national pursuant to Article 6 of the [Schengen Borders Code]. It shall also apply to checks carried out at an internal border in the event of the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code].’

      The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

      22 The associations referred to in paragraph 2 of the present judgment are challenging the validity of Order No 2020-1733 before the Conseil d’État (Council of State), in an action for annulment of that order, on the grounds, inter alia, that Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda resulting from it infringes Directive 2008/115 in that it allows decisions to refuse entry at internal borders where checks have been reintroduced.

      23 The referring court observes that the Court held, in its judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others (C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220), that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, does not apply to the situation of an illegally staying third-country national who was apprehended in the immediate vicinity of an internal border of a Member State, even where that Member State has reintroduced border control at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or to internal security in that Member State.

      24 The Conseil d’État (Council of State) points out that, in its Decision No 428175 of 27 November 2020, it held that the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda, which provided that in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, a foreign national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 and which entered into force on 26 March 1995 (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19, ‘the Schengen Convention’), could be refused entry under the terms of Article L. 213-2 of the former Ceseda if he or entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and was checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres inside that border, were contrary to Directive 2008/115.

      25 Admittedly, according to the Conseil d’État (Council of State), Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda does not repeat the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda. However, Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda again provides only for the adoption of a refusal of entry while carrying out border checks at internal borders in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the Schengen Borders Code.

      26 That court therefore considers it necessary to determine whether, in such a case, a third-country national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention who presents themselves at an authorised stationary or mobile border crossing point, without being in possession of documents justifying an authorisation to enter or right to stay in France, may be refused entry on the basis of Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, without Directive 2008/115 being applicable.

      27 In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of [the Schengen Borders Code], can foreign nationals arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention … be refused entry, when entry checks are carried out at that border, on the basis of Article 14 of that [code], without [Directive 2008/115] being applicable ?’

      Consideration of the question referred

      28 By its question referred for a preliminary ruling, the national court asks, in essence, whether the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out, a decision refusing entry, within the meaning of Article 14 of that code, without being subject to compliance with that directive.

      29 Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code allows, exceptionally and under certain conditions, a Member State to reintroduce temporarily border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in that Member State. Under Article 32 of the code, where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of the Title II of the code relating to external borders shall apply mutatis mutandis.

      30 That is the case with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, which provides that a third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States.

      31 However, it is important to remember that a third-country national who, after entering the territory of a Member State illegally is present on that territory without fulfilling the conditions for entry, stay or residence is, therefore, staying illegally, within the meaning of Directive 2008/115. Under Article 2(1) of that directive, and without prejudice to Article 2(2) of the directive, that third-country national falls within the scope of the directive, without his or her presence in the territory of the Member State concerned being subject to a condition as to minimum duration or intention to remain in that territory. He or she must therefore, in principle, be subject to the common standards and procedures laid down by the directive for the purpose of his or her removal, as long as his or her stay has not, as the case may be, been regularised (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

      32 This also applies where the third-country national has been apprehended at a border crossing point, provided that the border crossing point is on the territory of that Member State. In that respect, it should be noted that a person may have entered the territory of a Member State even before crossing a border crossing point (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 February 2020, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Signing-on of seamen in the port of Rotterdam), C‑341/18, EU:C:2020:76, paragraph 45).

      33 It should also be specified, by way of example, that when checks are carried out on board a train between the time when the train leaves the last station located on the territory of a Member State sharing an internal border with a Member State that has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, and the moment when that train enters the first station situated on the territory of the latter Member State, the check on board that same train must, unless otherwise agreed between those two Member States, be regarded as a check carried out at a border crossing point situated on the territory of the Member State which has reintroduced such checks. A third-country national who has been checked on board this train will necessarily remain on the territory of the latter Member State following the check, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/115.

      34 However, it should also be noted that Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States to exclude, exceptionally and under certain conditions, third-country nationals who are staying illegally on their territory from the scope of that directive.

      35 Thus, on the one hand, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States not to apply that directive, subject to the provisions of Article 4(4) thereof, in two specific situations, namely that of third-country nationals who are the subject to a refusal of entry at an external border of a Member State, in accordance with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, or that of third-country nationals who are apprehended or intercepted in connection with the irregular crossing of such an external border and who have not subsequently obtained authorisation or a right to reside in that Member State.

      36 However, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that those two situations relate exclusively to the crossing of an external border of a Member State, as defined in Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code, and do not therefore concern the crossing of a border common to Member States forming part of the Schengen area, even where checks have been reintroduced at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or the internal security of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 45 and 67).

      37 It follows, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 35 of his Opinion, that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 does not authorise a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders to derogate from the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive in order to remove a third-country national who has been intercepted, without a valid residence permit, at one of the border crossing points situated in the territory of that Member State where such checks are carried out.

      38 On the other hand, although Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2008/115 authorises Member States not to apply that directive to third-country nationals who are subject to a criminal penalty providing for or resulting in their return, in accordance with national law, or who are subject to extradition proceedings, it must be noted that such a case is not the one referred to by the provision at issue in the main proceedings.

      39 It follows from the foregoing, first, that a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders may apply, mutatis mutandis, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code and paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex V to that code in respect of a third-country national who is intercepted, without a legal residence permit, at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out.

      40 On the other hand, where the border crossing point is located on the territory of the Member State concerned, the latter must ensure that the consequences of such application, mutatis mutandis, of the provisions referred to in the previous point do not result in disregard of the common standards and procedures laid down in Directive 2008/115. The fact that this obligation on the Member State concerned is likely to render ineffective to a large extent any decision to refuse entry to a third-country national arriving at one of its internal borders is not such as to alter that finding.

      41 With regard to the relevant provisions of that directive, it should be recalled, in particular, that it follows from Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 that any third-country national staying illegally on the territory of a Member State must, without prejudice to the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of that article and in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 5 of that directive, be the subject of a return decision, which must identify, among the third countries referred to in Article 3(3) of that directive, the country to which he or she must return (judgment of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 53).

      42 In addition, a third-country national who is the subject of such a return decision must still, in principle, be given, under Article 7 of Directive 2008/115, a certain period of time in which to leave the territory of the Member State concerned voluntarily. Forced removal is to take place only as a last resort, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, and subject to Article 9 thereof, which requires Member States to postpone removal in the cases it sets out (judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection), C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 252).

      43 Furthermore, it follows from Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 that the detention of an illegally staying third-country national may only be imposed in certain specific cases. However, as the Advocate General pointed out, in essence, in point 46 of his Opinion, that article does not preclude a national from being detained, pending his or her removal, where he or she represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or domestic security, provided that such detention complies with the conditions set out in Articles 15 to 18 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, C‑18/19, EU:C:2020:511, paragraphs 41 to 48).

      44 Furthermore, Directive 2008/115 does not rule out the possibility for Member States to impose a prison sentence for offences other than those relating solely to illegal entry, including in situations where the return procedure established by that directive has not yet been completed. Consequently, that directive also does not preclude the arrest or placing in police custody of an illegally staying third-country national where such measures are adopted on the ground that that national is suspected of having committed an offence other than simply entering the national territory illegally, and in particular an offence likely to threaten public policy or the internal security of the Member State concerned (judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraph 66).

      45 It follows that, contrary to what the French Government maintains, the application, in a case such as that referred to in the reference for a preliminary ruling, of the common standards and procedures laid down by Directive 2008/115 is not such as to make it impossible to maintain public order and safeguard internal security within the meaning of Article 72 TFEU.

      46 In light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that code, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      Costs

      47 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

      On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules :

      Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals,

      must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that regulation, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down in that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0143

    • Contrôle des frontières : le gouvernement contraint de sortir de l’illégalité

      Communiqué commun signé par la LDH

      Après 8 ans de pratiques illégales du gouvernement français en matière de contrôle et d’enfermement des personnes en migration aux frontières intérieures, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) confirme, dans un arrêt du 21 septembre, qu’elles sont contraires au droit.

      La CJUE rappelle à la France qu’elle doit se conformer au droit de l’Union européenne, et il appartient au gouvernement français de prendre des mesures immédiates sans attendre que le Conseil d’État en tire toutes les conséquences.

      Associations signataires : Avocats pour la Défense des Droits des Etrangers (ADDE), Alliance-DEDF, Amnesty International France, Anafé (association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les personnes étrangères), Bizi migrant.es, Emmaüs Roya, Federation Etorkinekin Diakité, Gisti, La Cimade, LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme), Médecins du Monde, Roya citoyenne, Syndicat des avocats de France (Saf), Syndicat de la magistrature (SM), Tous Migrants, Tous Migrants 73, Utopia 56 (antenne Toulouse)

      Paris, le 21 septembre 2023

      https://www.ldh-france.org/controle-des-frontieres-le-gouvernement-contraint-de-sortir-de-lillegali

    • Corte di giustizia UE: vietato il respingimento sistematico alle frontiere interne

      La sentenza della Corte nella causa #C-143/22 promossa da diverse associazioni francesi

      Il 21 settembre 2023 una sentenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea (CGUE) ha dichiarato che, anche se un Paese UE ha introdotto controlli alle sue frontiere, non ha il diritto di effettuare respingimenti sistematici. Deve rispettare la direttiva europea «rimpatri» che prevede che a un cittadino extraeuropeo possa “essere concesso un certo periodo di tempo per lasciare volontariamente il territorio“.

      Tutto era partito dal ricorso di varie associazioni francesi 1 che hanno contestato dinanzi al Consiglio di Stato francese la legittimità di un’ordinanza che ha modificato il codice sull’ingresso e sul soggiorno degli stranieri e sul diritto d’asilo (Ceseda).

      Esse hanno sostenuto che, consentendo alle autorità francesi di rifiutare l’ingresso di cittadini di paesi terzi alle frontiere con altri Stati membri (ossia le «frontiere interne»), alle quali sia stato temporaneamente ripristinato un controllo di frontiera in forza del codice frontiere Schengen in ragione di una minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna della Francia, il Ceseda contravverrebbe alla direttiva «rimpatri». Secondo tale direttiva, qualsiasi cittadino di un paese terzo il cui soggiorno è irregolare deve, di norma, essere oggetto di una decisione di rimpatrio. Tuttavia, l’interessato deve, in linea di principio, beneficiare di un certo termine per lasciare volontariamente il territorio. L’allontanamento forzato avviene solo in ultima istanza.

      Il Consiglio di Stato ha quindi interrogato la CGUE sulla questione dichiarando che «in una situazione del genere, un provvedimento di respingimento può essere adottato sulla base del codice frontiere #Schengen ma che, ai fini dell’allontanamento dell’interessato, devono comunque essere rispettate le norme e le procedure comuni previste dalla direttiva “rimpatri” (https://openmigration.org/glossary-term/direttiva-rimpatri), il che può condurre a privare di una larga parte della sua utilità l’adozione di un siffatto provvedimento di respingimento».

      «La sentenza della CGUE impone la giurisprudenza a tutti gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, ma in particolare è rivolta alla Francia, che dal 2015 ha reintrodotto i controlli alle frontiere interne.»

      Negli ultimi otto anni, tutti i treni che passano per #Menton sono stati controllati, gli agenti di polizia hanno controllato i passaggi di frontiera e pattugliato i valichi alpini. Dal 1° giugno è ulteriormente stata dispiegata un militarizzazione delle frontiere con personale aggiuntivo, il supporto dell’esercito, droni con termocamere.

      La Francia è stata accusata di respingere le persone migranti che cercano di entrare nel Paese, anche quelli che chiedono asilo e perfino i minorenni. Diversi rapporti di organizzazioni e collettivi hanno messo in luce queste pratiche violente e illegali, soprattutto nella zona di Ventimiglia. Secondo le testimonianze raccolte, si tratta di respingimenti “sistematici”.

      «In poche parole, questa decisione dice che la Francia sta perseguendo una politica illegale di chiusura delle frontiere», riassume Flor Tercero, dell’Association pour le Droit des Etrangers (ADDE) intervistato da Infomigrants. Questa decisione «è chiaramente una vittoria» e «significa che il governo non può ignorare il diritto dell’Unione europea».

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/09/corte-di-giustizia-ue-vietato-il-respingimento-sistematico-alle-frontier

      #frontières_intérieures #directive_retour #illégalité

    • European Court of Justice rules systematic pushbacks are illegal

      European countries do not have the right to refuse entry to irregular migrants even if they have border controls in place, the ECJ has ruled. Activists say the decision means that France has been violating EU law by pushing back migrants coming from Italy.

      When a member state decides to reintroduce checks at its internal borders, can it systematically refuse entry to all irregular foreign nationals? No, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ruled earlier this month. It must comply with the “Return Directive,” a law which says that a non-European national can “be granted a certain period of time to voluntarily leave the territory.”

      “A decision to refuse entry may be decided but, when seeking the removal of the person concerned, the common standards and procedures provided for by the Return Directive must still be respected,” the Luxembourg court stated.

      It also said that “excluding from the scope of this directive foreign nationals who are staying irregularly in the territory” can only be done “exceptionally.”

      The ruling on September 21 is at odds with the policy pursued by France, which re-established controls at its internal EU borders in 2015. For the past eight years, all trains passing through the French coastal city of Menton have been checked, and police have monitored border posts and patrolled the Alps.

      Activist groups say France has been taking advantage of the temporary border controls in order to turn back migrants who try to enter the territory — even those who come to ask for asylum. In an August report, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) teams in Ventimiglia documented practices of pushbacks at the border between Italy and France. “Systematic” pushbacks target unaccompanied minors, even sometimes separating families, according to the report.
      ’An illegal policy’

      “In a nutshell, this decision means that France is pursuing an illegal policy of closing borders,” Flor Tercero, of the Association for Foreigners’ Rights (ADDE), told InfoMigrants. ADDE is one of the associations involved in bringing the lawsuit to court.

      “Pushing back means, in a way, refusing these people the possibility of coming to France to apply for asylum or to cross France to go elsewhere in the EU. France for eight years has decided to carry out border checks. And as it re-established checks, it considered itself entitled to be able to push back migrants coming from Italy, in particular,” he added.

      “After eight years of illegal practices by the French government controlling and detaining migrants at internal borders, the CJEU confirms (...) that [these practices] are contrary to the law,” a joint press release of twenty organizations added.

      https://twitter.com/anafeasso/status/1704893792266969108

      For Flor Tercero, this decision is a clear victory. “This means that the government cannot forego European law,” he said.
      France ’will not welcome migrants’ from Lampedusa

      The court decision came at a time when attention was focused on the French-Italian border. Following the recent arrival of a very large number of people on the Italian island of Lampedusa, the French interior minister, Gérald Darmanin, announced that 200 additional police officers would be sent to the border between the two countries, in the expectation that the migrants would eventually make their way from Italy to France.

      France “will not welcome migrants” from the Italian island, the minister stated.

      Meanwhile the departmental director of the border police, Emmanuelle Joubert, announced that more than 3,000 migrants had been arrested in Menton within a fortnight. This brings to 32,000 the number of arrests since the start of the year along the Franco-Italian border. Of those, 24,000 were rejected and handed over to the Italian authorities

      Joubert said she had been informed about the judgment by the CJEU. “The State is carrying out an analysis, we will have instructions later,” she said, adding that migrants who had recently arrived in Lampedusa should not arrive at the French border for “several weeks.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/52117/european-court-of-justice-rules-systematic-pushbacks-are-illegal

  • Conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area

    On 28 March 2023, the European Commission (DG HOME), Frontex and Europol will jointly hold a conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area.


    The conference will provide a platform for dialogue between policy decision-makers, senior technology project managers, and strategic industry leaders, essential actors who contribute to making the Schengen area more secure and resilient. The conference will include discussions on the current situation and needs in Member States, selected innovative technology solutions that could strengthen Schengen as well as selected technology use cases relevant for police cooperation within Schengen.

    The conference target participants are ‘chief technology officers’ and lead managers from each Member State’s law enforcement and border guard authorities responsible for border management, security of border regions and internal security related activities, senior policy-makers and EU agencies. With regards to the presentation of innovative technological solutions, a dedicated call for industry participation will be published soon.

    https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/events/conference-innovative-technologies-for-strengthening-schengen-area

    Le rapport est téléchargeable ici:
    Report from the conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area

    In March 2023, the European Commission (DG HOME), Frontex and Europol jointly hosted a conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area. The event brought together policy makers, senior technology project managers, and strategic industry leaders, essential actors who contribute to making the Schengen area more secure and resilient. The conference included discussions on the current situation and needs in Member States, selected innovative technology solutions that could strengthen Schengen as well as selected technology use cases relevant for police cooperation within Schengen.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/innovation/announcements/report-from-the-conference-on-innovative-technologies-for-strengtheni
    Lien pour télécharger le pdf:
    https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/EUresearchprojects/2023/Conference_on_innovative_technologies_for_Schengen_-_Report.pdf

    #technologie #frontières #Frontex #Europol #conférence #Schengen #UE #EU #commission_européenne #droits #droits_fondamentaux #biométrie #complexe_militaro-industriel #frontières_intérieures #contrôles_frontaliers #interopérabilité #acceptabilité #libre-circulation #Advanced_Passenger_Information (#API) #One-stop-shop_solutions #données #EU_Innovation_Hub_for_Internal_Security #Personal_Identification_system (#PerIS) #migrations #asile #réfugiés #vidéosurveillance #ePolicist_system #IDEMIA #Grant_Detection #OptoPrecision #Airbus_Defense_and_Space #Airbus #border_management #PNR #eu-LISA #European_Innovation_Hub_for_Internal_Security

  • Europa dreaming
    –-> What happens when the European dream meets the dream of migrants?

    Europe, the broken dream

    It is the spring of 2016 and the Brenner is likely to go back to being a frontier, “an officially defined and recognised border line, equipped, in various cases, with appropriate defensive systems” (Treccani). Compared to the past, however, border barriers are no longer used to delimit our spaces in relation to our “neighbours”, nor to reduce and/or control trade between two neighbouring countries, but with the explicit goal of decreasing the inflow of people coming into the country, from other continents, from places located thousands of kilometres away. The decision to re-introduce border controls between Italy and Austria has been defined by many newspapers as “the end of the Schengen dream”, but this work shows a different reality.

    Because the Schengen Agreement, which was intended to create an area of free movement within the European Union, has been essentially based – and from the very beginning – on a “policing” agreement. Because “the fall of internal borders was complemented by the strengthening of the borders external to the Schengen area” (Internazionale). The point is that the “strengthening of external borders” was not the corollary outcome, but the very essence of this Agreement. It is no coincidence that work on the first European “wall”, the Ceuta and Melilla border fences (funded by the European Union) began in the fall of 1995.

    https://europadreaming.eu/en
    #Schengen #rêve #migrations #frontières #asile #réfugiés #Langer #Alexander_Langer #accord_de_Schengen

    • L’accordo di Schengen sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione Europea; La riforma della legge Martelli sull’immigrazione

      L’accordo di Schengen sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione Europea; La riforma della legge Martelli sull’immigrazione.

      «L’accordo di Schengen sulla libera circolazione dei cittadini dell’Unione Europea; La riforma della legge Martelli sull’immigrazione» realizzata da Mohamed Ba con Alexander Langer (parlamentare europeo, Federazione dei Verdi).

      L’intervista è stata registrata martedì 27 giugno 1995 alle ore 00:00.
      https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/73575/laccordo-di-schengen-sulla-libera-circolazione-dei-cittadini-dellunion

      Quelques extraits:

      «Il sogno mi sembra sia la libera circolazione, l’accordo di Schengen è tutt’ora un accordo tra polizie e di efficienza poliziesca che non mi sembra il migliore modello europeo. (...) Io sarei più contento se la libera circolazione venisse realizzata attraverso accordi politici che non attraverso accordi tra le polizie, come di fatto l’accordo di Schengen è fino ad oggi. Io non auspico tanto che l’Italia assomigli di più ai paesi di Schengen, che quindi imponga controlli più rigidi alle sue frontiere esterne per poi liberalizzare le frontiere esterne [erreur? Frontiere interne plutôt?], ma auspicherei un’Europa con le frontiere esterne anche molto più permeabili. In questo senso oggi, per me, è anche quasi un vanto che l’Italia abbia le frontiere più permeabili e sia giudicata da altri paesi europei come non abbastanza affidabile dal punto di vista Schengen. Perché quando avremo alzato un bel muro allora saremo maturi per Schengen»

      (à partir de la min. 1’13)

      «L’Italia, come si può dire anche della Grecia sono dei paesi oggi ancora molto aperti sul Mediterraneo. Per entrare nell’accordo di Schengen bisognerebbe chiudersi di più verso il Mediterraneo e a quel punto avere libera circolazione con Lussemburgo, Olanda, Germania e così via. Io credo che un’Europa con un grado così alto di chiusura ermetica intorno a sé, può magari garantire la libera circolazione dei suoi cittadini ma non è una grande promessa verso i suoi vicini.»

      (à partir de la min. 2’17)

      "Io trovo che l’accordo di Schengen non sia un tipico accordo non di integrazione democratica dell’Europa ma di integrazione della parte più forte, più robusta e più isolata rispetto ai deboli. Oggi la partita italiana è se si vuole entrare a far parte di questa specie di nucleo duro, mentre per me il nucleo europeo deve distinguersi per la democrazia non per il grado alto del suo isolamento verso l’esterno.

      (à partir de la min. 2’52)

      «Sull’immigrazione bisogna trovare una politica che sostanzialmente arrivi a due cose importanti. Da un lato a un’immigrazione regolata e quindi anche integrabile. Dell’altro a una politica che chiamerei della doppia cittadinanza, che permetta agli immigrati di vivere nel paese in cui lavorano e nello stesso tempo di non perdere né la prospettiva di un possibile ritorno se lo vorranno né il legame con il proprio paese. Mi pare che l’Italia su tutti e due i punti oggi sia fortemente carente. Per cui noi oggi sostanzialmente ci affidiamo alla furbizia, cioè al singolo poliziotto, alla singola guardia di frontiera: chi si riesce a respingere si è contenti che si respinga, chi rientra tra le maglie poi si vedrà come sistemarlo o se rimandarlo indietro.»

      (à partir de la min. 3’55)

      #interview #1995 #legge_Martelli #migrations #radio_radicale #réfugiés #libre-circulation #démocratie #histoire #citoyenneté #double_citoyenneté

  • Qu’est-ce que l’entrée de la #Croatie dans #Schengen peut changer à la route migratoire des Balkans ?

    La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace Schengen. L’intégration de ce pays des Balkans dans la zone de libre circulation pourrait changer la donne à la frontière croate, où les #refoulements de migrants sont fréquents, observe la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. Par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine pourrait se durcir.

    La Croatie a fait son entrée, le 1er janvier 2023, dans l’espace de libre circulation européen Schengen alors que la route migratoire des Balkans connaît une forte hausse de fréquentation depuis l’été. Zagreb a enregistré 30 000 migrants irréguliers dans le pays au cours des dix premiers mois de 2022, soit une augmentation de 150% par rapport à la même période de l’année précédente.

    Pour Camille Le Coz, analyste au Migration policy institute, l’entrée de la Croatie dans Schengen permet d’"acter quelque chose qui était déjà en place sur le terrain". « La Croatie a été récompensée pour ses bons et loyaux services en faisant en sorte de limiter les arrivées de migrants [dans l’UE] », affirme-t-elle.

    Depuis son intégration dans l’Union européenne en 2013, la Croatie est chargée de protéger les frontières extérieures de l’UE, dont la majeure partie est partagée avec la Bosnie. Si les chiffres n’ont rien à voir aujourd’hui avec ceux de 2015, des milliers d’exilés tentent encore chaque année ce passage par la route des Balkans, via la Serbie ou la Bosnie.

    Depuis 2018, le nord de la Bosnie, à la frontière croate, s’est transformé en cul-de-sac pour ces migrants. Voulant montrer à Bruxelles sa capacité à protéger les frontières de l’Union, la Croatie a en effet déployé de nombreux garde-frontières sur la zone. Les refoulements se sont multipliés et, dans la plupart des cas, ils se sont accompagnés de graves violences, tortures et vols, régulièrement dénoncés. Depuis des années, les rapports d’ONG se multiplient sur les exactions commises contre les exilés à la frontière bosno-croate.
    Vers davantage de respect des droits humains ?

    Mais cela pourrait changer à la faveur de cette nouvelle situation, explique la chercheuse Camille Le Coz. « Le respect des droits de l’Homme fait partie des obligations liées à l’entrée dans Schengen. Il est donc possible que l’entrée de la Croatie mette plus de pression sur les policiers et les garde-frontières croates », pointe-t-elle. Les cas de non-respect des droits humains pourraient ainsi être davantage contrôlés.

    Cette entrée pourrait aussi s’accompagner d’aides pour améliorer le système d’asile dans le pays et d’une coopération sur les retours volontaires de migrants. À condition que les garde-frontières ne refoulent pas systématiquement les exilés qui entrent dans le pays pour demander une protection internationale.

    A contrario, et par un effet de dominos, la situation en Bosnie voisine, qui a récemment obtenu le statut de candidat à l’entrée dans l’Union européenne, pourrait se durcir.
    « Éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks »

    Le 28 novembre, le commissaire européen Olivér Várhelyi a annoncé le financement d’un protocole d’accord entre l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le ministère bosnien de la Sécurité à hauteur de 500 000 euros. Cette somme doit servir à augmenter le nombre de « retours volontaires et forcés » des migrants vers leur pays d’origine. Le commissaire a également indiqué que le camp de Lipa, situé dans le nord de la Bosnie serait amené à devenir un centre de détention. « Les faux demandeurs d’asile doivent être détenus jusqu’à leur retour dans leur pays », a-t-il déclaré.

    Barbara Becares, chargée des relations avec la presse de l’ONG No Name Kitchen, qui vient en aide aux exilés en Bosnie et en Serbie, voit dans ce projet la volonté de Bruxelles d’"éviter à la Croatie d’avoir à pratiquer des pushbacks […] en gardant les personnes en Bosnie".

    Sur le terrain, les polices bosniennes et serbes œuvrent déjà à retenir les personnes le plus loin possible des frontières de l’UE, selon elle. « Les expulsions sont très courantes, autant en Bosnie qu’en Serbie, observe-t-elle. La police va chercher très tôt le matin les personnes qui dorment à l’extérieur des camps et les emmène dans des endroits éloignés des frontières ». En Bosnie, elles sont généralement emmenées dans le camp de Lipa, alors qu’en Serbie, elles sont conduites dans le sud du pays.

    Pour freiner les arrivées via la route des Balkans, Bruxelles compte aussi sur l’aide de la Serbie. Le pays est, lui aussi, candidat à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne et son intégration dépendra sans doute largement, comme pour la Bosnie, de sa capacité à montrer à Bruxelles qu’il contrôle ses frontières.

    En octobre, Belgrade a déjà, à la demande de Bruxelles, mis fin à l’exemption de visas pour les ressortissants tunisiens et burundais. L’obligation de détenir un visa pour entrer dans le pays a été étendue, le 1er janvier, aux ressortissants d’Inde et de Guinée-Bissau.

    #espace_Schengen #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #refoulements_en_chaîne #récompense #frontières_extérieures #soutien_financier #accord #protocole_d'accord #OIM #IOM #retours_volontaires #retours_forcés #Lipa #rétention #détention_administrative #expulsions #push-backs #visas #Serbie

  • « Les #réfugiés sont les #cobayes des futures mesures de #surveillance »

    Les dangers de l’émigration vers l’Europe vont croissant, déplore Mark Akkerman, qui étudie la #militarisation_des_frontières du continent depuis 2016. Un mouvement largement poussé par le #lobby de l’#industrie_de_l’armement et de la sécurité.

    Mark Akkerman étudie depuis 2016 la militarisation des frontières européennes. Chercheur pour l’ONG anti-militariste #Stop_Wapenhandel, il a publié, avec le soutien de The Transnational Institute, plusieurs rapports de référence sur l’industrie des « #Safe_Borders ». Il revient pour Mediapart sur des années de politiques européennes de surveillance aux frontières.

    Mediapart : En 2016, vous publiez un premier rapport, « Borders Wars », qui cartographie la surveillance aux frontières en Europe. Dans quel contexte naît ce travail ?

    Mark Akkerman : Il faut se rappeler que l’Europe a une longue histoire avec la traque des migrants et la sécurisation des frontières, qui remonte, comme l’a montré la journaliste d’investigation néerlandaise Linda Polman, à la Seconde Guerre mondiale et au refus de soutenir et abriter des réfugiés juifs d’Allemagne. Dès la création de l’espace Schengen, au début des années 1990, l’ouverture des frontières à l’intérieur de cet espace était étroitement liée au renforcement du contrôle et de la sécurité aux frontières extérieures. Depuis lors, il s’agit d’un processus continu marqué par plusieurs phases d’accélération.

    Notre premier rapport (https://www.tni.org/en/publication/border-wars) est né durant l’une de ces phases. J’ai commencé ce travail en 2015, au moment où émerge le terme « crise migratoire », que je qualifierais plutôt de tragédie de l’exil. De nombreuses personnes, principalement motivées par la guerre en Syrie, tentent alors de trouver un avenir sûr en Europe. En réponse, l’Union et ses États membres concentrent leurs efforts sur la sécurisation des frontières et le renvoi des personnes exilées en dehors du territoire européen.

    Cela passe pour une part importante par la militarisation des frontières, par le renforcement des pouvoirs de Frontex et de ses financements. Les réfugiés sont dépeints comme une menace pour la sécurité de l’Europe, les migrations comme un « problème de sécurité ». C’est un récit largement poussé par le lobby de l’industrie militaire et de la sécurité, qui a été le principal bénéficiaire de ces politiques, des budgets croissants et des contrats conclus dans ce contexte.

    Cinq ans après votre premier rapport, quel regard portez-vous sur la politique européenne de sécurisation des frontières ? La pandémie a-t-elle influencé cette politique ?

    Depuis 2016, l’Europe est restée sur la même voie. Renforcer, militariser et externaliser la sécurité aux frontières sont les seules réponses aux migrations. Davantage de murs et de clôtures ont été érigés, de nouveaux équipements de surveillance, de détection et de contrôle ont été installés, de nouveaux accords avec des pays tiers ont été conclus, de nouvelles bases de données destinées à traquer les personnes exilées ont été créées. En ce sens, les politiques visibles en 2016 ont été poursuivies, intensifiées et élargies.

    La pandémie de Covid-19 a certainement joué un rôle dans ce processus. De nombreux pays ont introduit de nouvelles mesures de sécurité et de contrôle aux frontières pour contenir le virus. Cela a également servi d’excuse pour cibler à nouveau les réfugiés, les présentant encore une fois comme des menaces, responsables de la propagation du virus.

    Comme toujours, une partie de ces mesures temporaires vont se pérenniser et on constate déjà, par exemple, l’évolution des contrôles aux frontières vers l’utilisation de technologies biométriques sans contact.

    En 2020, l’UE a choisi Idemia et Sopra Steria, deux entreprises françaises, pour construire un fichier de contrôle biométrique destiné à réguler les entrées et sorties de l’espace Schengen. Quel regard portez-vous sur ces bases de données ?

    Il existe de nombreuses bases de données biométriques utilisées pour la sécurité aux frontières. L’Union européenne met depuis plusieurs années l’accent sur leur développement. Plus récemment, elle insiste sur leur nécessaire connexion, leur prétendue interopérabilité. L’objectif est de créer un système global de détection, de surveillance et de suivi des mouvements de réfugiés à l’échelle européenne pour faciliter leur détention et leur expulsion.

    Cela contribue à créer une nouvelle forme d’« apartheid ». Ces fichiers sont destinés certes à accélérer les processus de contrôles aux frontières pour les citoyens nationaux et autres voyageurs acceptables mais, surtout, à arrêter ou expulser les migrantes et migrants indésirables grâce à l’utilisation de systèmes informatiques et biométriques toujours plus sophistiqués.

    Quelles sont les conséquences concrètes de ces politiques de surveillance ?

    Il devient chaque jour plus difficile et dangereux de migrer vers l’Europe. Parce qu’elles sont confrontées à la violence et aux refoulements aux frontières, ces personnes sont obligées de chercher d’autres routes migratoires, souvent plus dangereuses, ce qui crée un vrai marché pour les passeurs. La situation n’est pas meilleure pour les personnes réfugiées qui arrivent à entrer sur le territoire européen. Elles finissent régulièrement en détention, sont expulsées ou sont contraintes de vivre dans des conditions désastreuses en Europe ou dans des pays limitrophes.

    Cette politique n’impacte pas que les personnes réfugiées. Elle présente un risque pour les libertés publiques de l’ensemble des Européens. Outre leur usage dans le cadre d’une politique migratoire raciste, les technologies de surveillance sont aussi « testées » sur des personnes migrantes qui peuvent difficilement faire valoir leurs droits, puis introduites plus tard auprès d’un public plus large. Les réfugiés sont les cobayes des futures mesures de contrôle et de surveillance des pays européens.

    Vous pointez aussi que les industriels qui fournissent en armement les belligérants de conflits extra-européens, souvent à l’origine de mouvements migratoires, sont ceux qui bénéficient du business des frontières.

    C’est ce que fait Thales en France, Leonardo en Italie ou Airbus. Ces entreprises européennes de sécurité et d’armement exportent des armes et des technologies de surveillance partout dans le monde, notamment dans des pays en guerre ou avec des régimes autoritaires. À titre d’exemple, les exportations européennes au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord des dix dernières années représentent 92 milliards d’euros et concernent des pays aussi controversés que l’Arabie saoudite, l’Égypte ou la Turquie.

    Si elles fuient leur pays, les populations civiles exposées à la guerre dans ces régions du monde se retrouveront très certainement confrontées à des technologies produites par les mêmes industriels lors de leur passage aux frontières. C’est une manière profondément cynique de profiter, deux fois, de la misère d’une même population.

    Quelles entreprises bénéficient le plus de la politique européenne de surveillance aux frontières ? Par quels mécanismes ? Je pense notamment aux programmes de recherches comme Horizon 2020 et Horizon Europe.

    J’identifie deux types d’entreprises qui bénéficient de la militarisation des frontières de l’Europe. D’abord les grandes entreprises européennes d’armement et de sécurité, comme Airbus, Leonardo et Thales, qui disposent toutes d’une importante gamme de technologies militaires et de surveillance. Pour elles, le marché des frontières est un marché parmi d’autres. Ensuite, des entreprises spécialisées, qui travaillent sur des niches, bénéficient aussi directement de cette politique européenne. C’est le cas de l’entreprise espagnole European Security Fencing, qui fabrique des fils barbelés. Elles s’enrichissent en remportant des contrats, à l’échelle européenne, mais aussi nationale, voire locale.

    Une autre source de financement est le programme cadre européen pour la recherche et l’innovation. Il finance des projets sur 7 ans et comprend un volet sécurité aux frontières. Des programmes existent aussi au niveau du Fonds européen de défense.

    Un de vos travaux de recherche, « Expanding the Fortress », s’intéresse aux partenariats entre l’Europe et des pays tiers. Quels sont les pays concernés ? Comment se manifestent ces partenariats ?

    L’UE et ses États membres tentent d’établir une coopération en matière de migrations avec de nombreux pays du monde. L’accent est mis sur les pays identifiés comme des « pays de transit » pour celles et ceux qui aspirent à rejoindre l’Union européenne. L’Europe entretient de nombreux accords avec la Libye, qu’elle équipe notamment en matériel militaire. Il s’agit d’un pays où la torture et la mise à mort des réfugiés ont été largement documentées.

    Des accords existent aussi avec l’Égypte, la Tunisie, le Maroc, la Jordanie, le Liban ou encore l’Ukraine. L’Union a financé la construction de centres de détention dans ces pays, dans lesquels on a constaté, à plusieurs reprises, d’importantes violations en matière de droits humains.

    Ces pays extra-européens sont-ils des zones d’expérimentations pour les entreprises européennes de surveillance ?

    Ce sont plutôt les frontières européennes, comme celle d’Evros, entre la Grèce et la Turquie, qui servent de zone d’expérimentation. Le transfert d’équipements, de technologies et de connaissances pour la sécurité et le contrôle des frontières représente en revanche une partie importante de ces coopérations. Cela veut dire que les États européens dispensent des formations, partagent des renseignements ou fournissent de nouveaux équipements aux forces de sécurité de régimes autoritaires.

    Ces régimes peuvent ainsi renforcer et étendre leurs capacités de répression et de violation des droits humains avec le soutien de l’UE. Les conséquences sont dévastatrices pour la population de ces pays, ce qui sert de moteur pour de nouvelles vagues de migration…

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/040822/les-refugies-sont-les-cobayes-des-futures-mesures-de-surveillance

    cité dans l’interview, ce rapport :
    #Global_Climate_Wall
    https://www.tni.org/en/publication/global-climate-wall
    déjà signalé ici : https://seenthis.net/messages/934948#message934949

    #asile #migrations #complexe_militaro-industriel #surveillance_des_frontières #Frontex #problème #Covid-19 #coronavirus #biométrie #technologie #Idemia #Sopra_Steria #contrôle_biométrique #base_de_données #interopérabilité #détection #apartheid #informatique #violence #refoulement #libertés_publiques #test #normalisation #généralisation #Thales #Leonardo #Airbus #armes #armements #industrie_de_l'armement #cynisme #Horizon_Europe #Horizon_2020 #marché #business #European_Security_Fencing #barbelés #fils_barbelés #recherche #programmes_de_recherche #Fonds_européen_de_défense #accords #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #Égypte #Libye #Tunisie #Maroc #Jordanie #Liban #Ukraine #rétention #détention_administrative #expérimentation #équipements #connaissance #transfert #coopérations #formations #renseignements #répression

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

    • Le système électronique d’#Entrée-Sortie en zone #Schengen : la biométrie au service des #frontières_intelligentes

      Avec la pression migratoire et la vague d’attentats subis par l’Europe ces derniers mois, la gestion des frontières devient une priorité pour la Commission.

      Certes, le système d’information sur les #visas (#VIS, #Visa_Information_System) est déployé depuis 2015 dans les consulats des États Membres et sa consultation rendue obligatoire lors de l’accès dans l’#espace_Schengen.

      Mais, depuis février 2013, est apparu le concept de « #frontières_intelligentes », (#Smart_Borders), qui recouvre un panel ambitieux de mesures législatives élaborées en concertation avec le Parlement Européen.

      Le système entrée/sortie, en particulier, va permettre, avec un système informatique unifié, d’enregistrer les données relatives aux #entrées et aux #sorties des ressortissants de pays tiers en court séjour franchissant les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne.

      Adopté puis signé le 30 Novembre 2017 par le Conseil Européen, il sera mis en application en 2022. Il s’ajoutera au « PNR européen » qui, depuis le 25 mai 2018, recense les informations sur les passagers aériens.

      Partant du principe que la majorité des visiteurs sont « de bonne foi », #EES bouleverse les fondements mêmes du #Code_Schengen avec le double objectif de :

      - rendre les frontières intelligentes, c’est-à-dire automatiser le contrôle des visiteurs fiables tout en renforçant la lutte contre les migrations irrégulières
      - créer un #registre_central des mouvements transfrontaliers.

      La modernisation de la gestion des frontières extérieures est en marche. En améliorant la qualité et l’efficacité des contrôles de l’espace Schengen, EES, avec une base de données commune, doit contribuer à renforcer la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme ainsi que les formes graves de criminalité.

      L’#identification de façon systématique des personnes qui dépassent la durée de séjour autorisée dans l’espace Schengen en est un des enjeux majeurs.

      Nous verrons pourquoi la reconnaissance faciale en particulier, est la grande gagnante du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Dans ce dossier web, nous traiterons des 6 sujets suivants :

      - ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection
      - La remise en cause du code « frontières Schengen » de 2006
      - EES : un accès très réglementé
      - La biométrie faciale : fer de lance de l’EES
      - EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité
      - Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Examinons maintenant ces divers points plus en détail.

      ESS : un puissant dispositif de prévention et détection

      Les activités criminelles telles que la traite d’êtres humains, les filières d’immigration clandestine ou les trafics d’objets sont aujourd’hui la conséquence de franchissements illicites de frontières, largement facilités par l’absence d’enregistrement lors des entrées/ sorties.

      Le scénario de fraude est – hélas – bien rôdé : Contrôle « standard » lors de l’accès à l’espace Schengen, puis destruction des documents d’identité dans la perspective d’activités malveillantes, sachant l’impossibilité d’être authentifié.

      Même si EES vise le visiteur « de bonne foi », le système va constituer à terme un puissant dispositif pour la prévention et la détection d’activités terroristes ou autres infractions pénales graves. En effet les informations stockées dans le nouveau registre pour 5 ans– y compris concernant les personnes refoulées aux frontières – couvrent principalement les noms, numéros de passeport, empreintes digitales et photos. Elles seront accessibles aux autorités frontalières et de délivrance des visas, ainsi qu’à Europol.

      Le système sera à la disposition d’enquêtes en particulier, vu la possibilité de consulter les mouvements transfrontières et historiques de déplacements. Tout cela dans le plus strict respect de la dignité humaine et de l’intégrité des personnes.

      Le dispositif est très clair sur ce point : aucune discrimination fondée sur le sexe, la couleur, les origines ethniques ou sociales, les caractéristiques génétiques, la langue, la religion ou les convictions, les opinions politiques ou toute autre opinion.

      Sont également exclus du champ d’investigation l’appartenance à une minorité nationale, la fortune, la naissance, un handicap, l’âge ou l’orientation sexuelle des visiteurs.​

      La remise en cause du Code frontières Schengen

      Vu la croissance attendue des visiteurs de pays tiers (887 millions en 2025), l’enjeu est maintenant de fluidifier et simplifier les contrôles.

      Une initiative particulièrement ambitieuse dans la mesure où elle remet en cause le fameux Code Schengen qui impose des vérifications approfondies, conduites manuellement par les autorités des Etats Membres aux entrées et sorties, sans possibilité d’automatisation.

      Par ailleurs, le Code Schengen ne prévoit aucun enregistrement des mouvements transfrontaliers. La procédure actuelle exigeant seulement que les passeports soient tamponnés avec mention des dates d’entrée et sortie.

      Seule possibilité pour les gardes-frontières : Calculer un éventuel dépassement de la durée de séjour qui elle-même est une information falsifiable et non consignée dans une base de données.

      Autre contrainte, les visiteurs réguliers comme les frontaliers doivent remplacer leurs passeports tous les 2-3 mois, vue la multitude de tampons ! Un procédé bien archaïque si l’on considère le potentiel des technologies de l’information.

      La proposition de 2013 comprenait donc trois piliers :

      - ​La création d’un système automatisé d’entrée/sortie (Entry/ Exit System ou EES)
      - Un programme d’enregistrement de voyageurs fiables, (RTP, Registered Traveller Program) pour simplifier le passage des visiteurs réguliers, titulaires d’un contrôle de sûreté préalable
      – La modification du Code Schengen

      Abandon de l’initiative RTP

      Trop complexe à mettre en œuvre au niveau des 28 Etats Membres, l’initiative RTP (Registered Travelers Program) a été finalement abandonnée au profit d’un ambitieux programme Entry/ Exit (EES) destiné aux visiteurs de courte durée (moins de 90 jours sur 180 jours).

      Précision importante, sont maintenant concernés les voyageurs non soumis à l’obligation de visa, sachant que les détenteurs de visas sont déjà répertoriés par le VIS.

      La note est beaucoup moins salée que prévue par la Commission en 2013. Au lieu du milliard estimé, mais qui incluait un RTP, la proposition révisée d’un EES unique ne coutera « que » 480 millions d’EUR.

      Cette initiative ambitieuse fait suite à une étude technique menée en 2014, puis une phase de prototypage conduite sous l’égide de l’agence EU-LISA en 2015 avec pour résultat le retrait du projet RTP et un focus particulier sur le programme EES.

      Une architecture centralisée gérée par EU-LISA

      L’acteur clé du dispositif EES, c’est EU-LISA, l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle dont le siège est à Tallinn, le site opérationnel à Strasbourg et le site de secours à Sankt Johann im Pongau (Autriche). L’Agence sera en charge des 4 aspects suivants :

      - Développement du système central
      - Mise en œuvre d’une interface uniforme nationale (IUN) dans chaque État Membre
      - Communication sécurisée entre les systèmes centraux EES et VIS
      - Infrastructure de communication entre système central et interfaces uniformes nationales.

      Chaque État Membre sera responsable de l’organisation, la gestion, le fonctionnement et de la maintenance de son infrastructure frontalière vis-à-vis d’EES.

      Une gestion optimisée des frontières

      Grâce au nouveau dispositif, tous les ressortissants des pays tiers seront traités de manière égale, qu’ils soient ou non exemptés de visas.

      Le VIS répertorie déjà les visiteurs soumis à visas. Et l’ambition d’EES c’est de constituer une base pour les autres.

      Les États Membres seront donc en mesure d’identifier tout migrant ou visiteur en situation irrégulière ayant franchi illégalement les frontières et faciliter, le cas échéant, son expulsion.

      Dès l’authentification à une borne en libre–service, le visiteur se verra afficher les informations suivantes, sous supervision d’un garde-frontière :

      - ​Date, heure et point de passage, en remplacement des tampons manuels
      - Notification éventuelle d’un refus d’accès.
      - Durée maximale de séjour autorisé.
      - Dépassement éventuelle de la durée de séjour autorisée
      En ce qui concerne les autorités des Etats Membres, c’est une véritable révolution par rapport à l’extrême indigence du système actuel. On anticipe déjà la possibilité de constituer des statistiques puissantes et mieux gérer l’octroi, ou la suppression de visas, en fonction de mouvements transfrontières, notamment grâce à des informations telles que :

      - ​​​Dépassements des durées de séjour par pays
      - Historique des mouvements frontaliers par pays

      EES : un accès très réglementé

      L’accès à EES est très réglementé. Chaque État Membre doit notifier à EU-LISA les autorités répressives habilitées à consulter les données aux fins de prévention ou détection d’infractions terroristes et autres infractions pénales graves, ou des enquêtes en la matière.

      Europol, qui joue un rôle clé dans la prévention de la criminalité, fera partie des autorités répressives autorisées à accéder au système dans le cadre de sa mission.

      Par contre, les données EES ne pourront pas être communiquées à des pays tiers, une organisation internationale ou une quelconque partie privée établie ou non dans l’Union, ni mises à leur disposition. Bien entendu, dans le cas d’enquêtes visant l’identification d’un ressortissant de pays tiers, la prévention ou la détection d’infractions terroristes, des exceptions pourront être envisagées.​

      Proportionnalité et respect de la vie privée

      Dans un contexte législatif qui considère le respect de la vie privée comme une priorité, le volume de données à caractère personnel enregistré dans EES sera considérablement réduit, soit 26 éléments au lieu des 36 prévus en 2013.

      Il s’agit d’un dispositif négocié auprès du Contrôleur Européen pour la Protection des Données (CEPD) et les autorités nationales en charge d’appliquer la nouvelle réglementation.

      Très schématiquement, les données collectées se limiteront à des informations minimales telles que : nom, prénom, références du document de voyage et visa, biométrie du visage et de 4 empreintes digitales.

      A chaque visite, seront relevés la date, l’heure et le lieu de contrôle frontière. Ces données seront conservées pendant cinq années, et non plus 181 jours comme proposé en 2013.

      Un procédé qui permettra aux gardes-frontières et postes consulaires d’analyser l’historique des déplacements, lors de l’octroi de nouveaux visas.
      ESS : privacy by design

      La proposition de la Commission a été rédigée selon le principe de « respect de la vie privée dès la conception », mieux connue sous le label « Privacy By Design ».

      Sous l’angle du droit, elle est bien proportionnée à la protection des données à caractère personnel en ce que la collecte, le stockage et la durée de conservation des données permettent strictement au système de fonctionner et d’atteindre ses objectifs.

      EES sera un système centralisé avec coopération des Etats Membres ; d’où une architecture et des règles de fonctionnement communes.​

      Vu cette contrainte d’uniformisation des modalités régissant vérifications aux frontières et accès au système, seul le règlement en tant que véhicule juridique pouvait convenir, sans possibilité d’adaptation aux législations nationales.

      Un accès internet sécurisé à un service web hébergé par EU-LISA permettra aux visiteurs des pays tiers de vérifier à tout moment leur durée de séjour autorisée.

      Cette fonctionnalité sera également accessible aux transporteurs, comme les compagnies aériennes, pour vérifier si leurs voyageurs sont bien autorisés à pénétrer dans le territoire de l’UE.

      La biométrie faciale, fer de lance du programme EES

      Véritable remise en question du Code Schengen, EES permettra de relever la biométrie de tous les visiteurs des pays tiers, alors que ceux soumis à visa sont déjà enregistrés dans le VIS.

      Pour les identifiants biométriques, l’ancien système envisageait 10 empreintes digitales. Le nouveau combine quatre empreintes et la reconnaissance faciale.

      La technologie, qui a bénéficié de progrès considérables ces dernières années, s’inscrit en support des traditionnelles empreintes digitales.

      Bien que la Commission ne retienne pas le principe d’enregistrement de visiteurs fiables (RTP), c’est tout comme.

      En effet, quatre empreintes seront encore relevées lors du premier contrôle pour vérifier que le demandeur n’est pas déjà répertorié dans EES ou VIS.

      En l’absence d’un signal, l’autorité frontalière créera un dossier en s’assurant que la photographie du passeport ayant une zone de lecture automatique (« Machine Readable Travel Document ») correspond bien à l’image faciale prise en direct du nouveau visiteur.

      Mais pour les passages suivants, c’est le visage qui l’emporte.

      Souriez, vous êtes en Europe ! Les fastidieux (et falsifiables) tampons sur les passeports seront remplacés par un accès à EES.

      La biométrie est donc le grand gagnant du programme EES. Et plus seulement dans les aéroports comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui.

      Certains terminaux maritimes ou postes frontières terrestres particulièrement fréquentés deviendront les premiers clients de ces fameuses eGates réservées aujourd’hui aux seuls voyageurs aériens.

      Frontex, en tant qu’agence aidant les pays de l’UE et les pays associés à Schengen à gérer leurs frontières extérieures, va aider à harmoniser les contrôles aux frontières à travers l’UE.

      EES et la lutte contre la fraude à l’identité

      Le dispositif EES est complexe et ambitieux dans la mesure où il fluidifie les passages tout en relevant le niveau des contrôles. On anticipe dès aujourd’hui des procédures d’accueil en Europe bien meilleures grâce aux eGates et bornes self-service.

      Sous l’angle de nos politiques migratoires et de la prévention des malveillances, on pourra immédiatement repérer les personnes ne rempliss​​ant pas les conditions d’entrée et accéder aux historiques des déplacements.

      Mais rappelons également qu’EES constituera un puissant outil de lutte contre la fraude à l’identité, notamment au sein de l’espace Schengen, tout visiteur ayant été enregistré lors de son arrivée à la frontière.

      Thales et l’identité : plus de 20 ans d’expertise

      Thales est particulièrement attentif à cette initiative EES qui repose massivement sur la biométrie et le contrôle des documents de voyage.

      En effet, l’identification et l’authentification des personnes sont deux expertises majeures de Thales depuis plus de 20 ans. La société contribue d’ailleurs à plus de 200 programmes gouvernementaux dans 80 pays sur ces sujets.

      La société peut répondre aux objectifs du programme EES en particulier pour :

      - Exploiter les dernières technologies pour l’authentification des documents de voyage, l’identification des voyageurs à l’aide de captures et vérifications biométriques, et l’évaluation des risques avec accès aux listes de contrôle, dans tous les points de contrôle aux frontières.
      - Réduire les coûts par l’automatisation et l’optimisation des processus tout en misant sur de nouvelles technologies pour renforcer la sécurité et offrir davantage de confort aux passagers
      - Valoriser des tâches de gardes-frontières qui superviseront ces dispositifs tout en portant leur attention sur des cas pouvant porter à suspicion.
      - Diminuer les temps d’attente après enregistrement dans la base EES. Un facteur non négligeable pour des frontaliers ou visiteurs réguliers qui consacreront plus de temps à des activités productives !

      Des bornes d’enregistrement libre-service comme des frontières automatiques ou semi-automatiques peuvent être déployées dans les prochaines années avec l’objectif de fluidifier les contrôles et rendre plus accueillant l’accès à l’espace Schengen.

      Ces bornes automatiques et biométriques ont d’ailleurs été installées dans les aéroports parisiens d’Orly et de Charles de Gaulle (Nouveau PARAFE : https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/europe/france/dis/gouvernement/controle-aux-frontieres).

      La reconnaissance faciale a été mise en place en 2018.

      Les nouveaux sas PARAFE à Roissy – Septembre 2017

      Thales dispose aussi d’une expertise reconnue dans la gestion intégrée des frontières et contribue en particulier à deux grand systèmes de gestion des flux migratoires.

      - Les systèmes d’identification biométrique de Thales sont en particulier au cœur du système américain de gestion des données IDENT (anciennement US-VISIT). Cette base de données biographiques et biométriques contient des informations sur plus de 200 millions de personnes qui sont entrées, ont tenté d’entrer et ont quitté les États-Unis d’Amérique.

      - Thales est le fournisseur depuis l’origine du système biométrique Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy System) qui est le plus important système AFIS multi-juridictionnel au monde, avec ses 32 pays affiliés. Le système Eurodac est une base de données comportant les empreintes digitales des demandeurs d’asile pour chacun des états membres ainsi que des personnes appréhendées à l’occasion d’un franchissement irrégulier d’une frontière.

      Pour déjouer les tentatives de fraude documentaire, Thales a mis au point des équipements sophistiqués permettant de vérifier leur authenticité par comparaison avec les modèles en circulation. Leur validité est aussi vérifiée par connexion à des bases de documents volés ou perdus (SLTD de Interpol). Ou a des watch lists nationales.

      Pour le contrôle des frontières, au-delà de ses SAS et de ses kiosks biométriques, Thales propose toute une gamme de lecteurs de passeports d’équipements et de logiciels d’authentification biométriques, grâce à son portefeuille Cogent, l’un des pionniers du secteur.

      Pour en savoir plus, n’hésitez pas à nous contacter.​

      https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/europe/france/dis/gouvernement/biometrie/systeme-entree-sortie
      #smart_borders #Thales #overstayers #reconnaissance_faciale #prévention #détection #fraude_à_l'identité #Registered_Traveller_Program (#RTP) #EU-LISA #interface_uniforme_nationale (#IUN) #Contrôleur_Européen_pour_la_Protection_des_Données (#CEPD) #Privacy_By_Design #respect_de_la_vie_privée #empreintes_digitales #biométrie #Frontex #bornes #aéroport #PARAFE #IDENT #US-VISIT #Eurodac #Gemalto

  • EU: Tracking the Pact: Access to criminal records for “screening” of migrants

    Under the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the “screening” of migrants who have entered the EU irregularly or who have applied for asylum will become mandatory. The aim is to establish their identity and to investigate whether they should be considered a “security risk”. To facilitate the screening process, access to the EU’s system of “interoperable” databases is being broadened, with the Council recently approving its negotiating position on new rules granting access to a centralised register of individuals convicted of criminal offences in EU member states.

    Interoperability for screening

    The Commission’s proposal for a criminal records screening Regulation (pdf), one of countless amendments to the “interoperability” framework since it was approved in 2019, was published in March last year with a typically impenetrable, jargon-laden title.

    It was part of a series of new rules that aim to introduce new checks for asylum applicants and individuals making irregular border crossings, that are “at least of a similar level as the checks performed in respect of third country nationals that apply beforehand for an authorisation to enter the Union for a short stay, whether they are under a visa obligation or not.”

    Thus, the “screening” process requires checks against a multitude of databases: the Entry/Exit System (EES), the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), Europol’s databases, two Interpol databases, and – the subject of the Council’s recently-approved negotiating position – the European Criminal Records Information System for Third-Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN).

    The ECRIS-TCN contains information on non-EU nationals who have been convicted in one or more EU member states (fingerprints, facial images and certain biographic data), in order to make it easier for national authorities to find information on convictions handed down elsewhere in the EU.

    The Council’s position

    The Council’s position (pdf) was approved by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) on 29 June, and makes extensive changes to the Commission’s proposal. However, many of these are deletions that appear to have been made because the text in question has already been added to the original ECRIS-TCN Regulation through one of the two other sets of amendments that have been made, in 2019 and 2021.

    The proposal used the term “threat to internal security or public policy”, which the Council has replaced with “security risk”. This somewhat vaguer term matches the wording approved by the Council in its position on the Screening Regulation, previously published by Statewatch, where the proposal initially referred to individuals that may “constitute a threat to public policy, internal security or international relations for any of the Member States.”

    Currently only visa authorities and those responsible for examining travel authorisation applications are granted access to the ECRIS-TCN for border control and immigration purposes (listed in Article 5(7) of the ECRIS-TCN Regulation and as explained in the Statewatch report Automated Suspicion).

    The criminal records screening Regulation grants new authorities access to the ECRIS-TCN, but does not list those authorities explicitly. Instead, it refers to the Screening Regulation itself, which is set to give member states discretion to determine “the screening authorities” as they see fit, although the Council’s preferred version of that text includes the provision that:

    “Member States shall also ensure that only the screening authorities responsible for the identification or verification of identity and the security check have access to the databases foreseen in Article 10 and Article 11 of this Regulation.”

    The Council’s position on the Screening Regulation, like the original proposal, does not include a requirement that the authorities responsible for the screening process be publicly listed anywhere.

    Whoever those authorities may be, they will be granted access to use the European Search Portal (part of the interoperability framework) to conduct searches in the ECRIS-TCN (and other databases), although will only be granted access to ECRIS-TCN records that have a “flag” attached.

    Those “flags” will be added to records to show whether an individual has been convicted of a terrorist offence in the last 25 years, or (in the last 15 years) one or more of the criminal offences listed in a separate piece of legislation.

    In the case of a “hit” against information stored in the ECRIS-TCN, the new rules will require screening authorities to contact the member state that handed down the conviction and to seek an opinion on the implications of that conviction for an individuals’ potential status as a security risk.

    The Commission wanted that opinion to be provided within two days, but the Council has increased this to three; if no opinion is provided within that time, then “this shall mean there are no security grounds to be taken into account.” The Council’s position also makes it explicit that the convicting authorities are obliged to consult the criminal record before providing their opinion.

    The European Parliament is yet to reach a position on the proposal. The EP rapporteur, Socialists & Democrats MEP Birgit Sippel, told Statewatch:

    “The European Parliament continues to work on all proposals related to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, including both the Screening and Screening ECRIS-TCN proposals. As rapporteur, I have presented my draft report on both files at the end of 2021. Negotiations continue at political and technical level. Due to the deep links to the other proposals, we aim for a harmonised EP position and there is currently no concrete date foreseen for a debate or vote in the LIBE Committee.”

    However, the Parliament has committed itself to completing work on all the migration and asylum laws currently on the table by February 2024.

    Interoperability marches on

    Many are likely to see the screening process as part of the ongoing “criminalisation” of migration – indeed, the intention with the criminal records screening proposal is to explicitly link aspects of the criminal justice system with the EU’s immigration and asylum systems, in order to increase the possibilities of excluding individuals deemed to pose a security risk – however that may be determined by the authorities.

    The application of these checks to irregular border-crossers and asylum applicants is also a logical consequence of the way the EU’s interoperable databases are being deployed against other categories of individuals: as noted above, it is deemed imperative that everyone entering the EU faces “a similar level” of checks. With the interoperability architecture largely seen as a starting point for future developments, and with EU agencies Europol and Frontex pushing for AI-based profiling of all travellers, future proposals to further expand the types of checks and the individuals to whom they should be applied are almost guaranteed.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2022/july/eu-tracking-the-pact-access-to-criminal-records-for-screening-of-migrant

    #screening #identification #migrations #asile #réfugiés #pacte #interopérabilité #Entry_Exit_System (#EES) #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS) #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS) #technologie #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #base_de_données #European_Criminal_Records_Information_System_for_Third-Country_Nationals (#ECRIS-TCN)

  • La #France crée une « #impulsion_politique » sur la gestion des frontières de l’Union

    Un #Conseil_des_ministres dédié à l’#espace_Schengen sera créé.

    « Nous devons avoir une #vision_politique de l’espace de #libre_circulation Schengen » et l’adapter « à la situation géopolitique actuelle », a plaidé jeudi Gérald Darmanin, ministre français de l’Intérieur, lors de son arrivée à une réunion informelle avec ses homologues européens à Lille. Ceux-ci ont endossé l’idée, proposée par la France, de créer une structure politique dédiée au pilotage de cet espace de 26 pays sans frontières intérieures, « joyau de la couronne » européenne, selon les mots du vice-président de la Commission Margaritis Schinas, mais malmené par les réactions politiques, parfois désordonnées, des États face à la migration, aux attaques terroristes ou à la pandémie de Covid-19.

    Cet accord constitue une première réussite pour la présidence française du Conseil de l’UE (PFUE), qui a commencé le 1er janvier 2022 et qui a fait du contrôle des #frontières_extérieures de l’Union une priorité. Même si le grand défi sera surtout d’obtenir des avancées sur la réforme de l’espace Schengen et la politique d’asile européenne.

    Le premier « Conseil des ministres de l’Intérieur de l’espace Schengen » aura lieu le 3 mars prochain. L’objectif est d’en faire un « rendez-vous politique » qui se tiendrait quatre fois par an ou plus, en cas de crise aux frontières de l’Union européenne. Y seront conviés tous les États de l’UE, même ceux qui ne font pas partie de l’espace Schengen (Croatie, Irlande, Roumanie, Bulgarie et Chypre). Ainsi que la Suisse, la Norvège, le Liechtenstein et l’Islande, membres de l’espace Schengen mais pas de l’Union.

    Pour alimenter les discussions, la France propose d’établir un « #baromètre_Schengen » avec des #indicateurs sur la #pression_migratoire aux frontières extérieures de l’UE, les #mouvements_secondaires des demandeurs d’asile en son sein et la #situation_sanitaire - autant d’éléments qui ont déjà poussé certains pays à rétablir des contrôles à leurs frontières et donc à mettre en suspens la libre circulation des personnes.

    « Ce Conseil, ce n’est pas une révolution institutionnelle et ce n’est pas le but. La plus-value sera d’anticiper les crises et de donner des réponses politiques aux défis qui se situent à nos portes », explique une source française. Fin novembre, la Biélorussie a fait venir sur son territoire des migrants, avant de les pousser vers les pays baltes et la Pologne, afin d’exercer une pression sur l’Union européenne. De manière générale, l’espace « Schengen a été créé dans les années 1990, au moment où il n’y avait pas la déstabilisation qu’on observe en Libye, en Syrie, en Afghanistan ou encore les grands mouvements migratoires que nous connaissons », a souligné M. Darmanin.

    Accord pour essayer la méthode française

    Mais, pour répondre à ces défis, l’enjeu fondamental sera surtout de faire progresser les négociations sur les réformes de l’espace Schengen proposées par la Commission l’année dernière, ainsi que celles sur le Pacte sur l’asile et la migration.

    Sur ce dernier point, le ministre s’est réjoui de l’#accord « unanime » des États membres pour s’essayer à la méthode française afin de tenter de dépasser leurs divisions quant à la gestion de la migration. Paris a invité les Vingt-sept à construire la #politique_d'asile commune étape par étape, en commençant par le renforcement du #contrôle (identité, sécurité, santé…) et du #filtrage des migrants aux frontières de l’UE. Puisque cela représente une charge considérable pour les États membres qui s’y trouvent, les Français mettront sur la table le 3 mars des « formes concrètes » de #solidarité_européenne. Dont notamment une liste d’États « volontaires » - une douzaine selon nos informations - prêts à relocaliser des migrants sur leur sol.

    Ces idées françaises n’ont rien de révolutionnaire par rapport à ce qui a déjà été imaginé, par la Commission ou par d’autres États membres, pour déminer le dossier migratoire. Mais la paralysie européenne face à ce sujet clivant et éminemment politique est telle que relancer les discussions entre les Vingt-sept est déjà une victoire en soi. « J’attendais beaucoup de la présidence française et aujourd’hui vous avez répondu à mes attentes », a carrément déclaré jeudi Ylva Johansson, commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures, lors d’une conférence de presse aux côtés de Gérald Darmanin.

    Le risque est cependant que ce dialogue finisse encore dans une impasse. « Il y a toujours l’envie d’aboutir à un compromis », (se) rassurait une source française jeudi, tout en reconnaissant que « chacun des États membres garde ses lignes rouges et ses demandes »

    https://www.lalibre.be/international/europe/2022/02/03/la-france-cree-une-impulsion-politique-sur-la-gestion-des-frontieres-de-luni

    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Schengen #relocalisation #Union_européenne #UE #EU

  • Schengen : de nouvelles règles pour rendre l’espace sans contrôles aux #frontières_intérieures plus résilient

    La Commission propose aujourd’hui des règles actualisées pour renforcer la gouvernance de l’espace Schengen. Les modifications ciblées renforceront la coordination au niveau de l’UE et offriront aux États membres des outils améliorés pour faire face aux difficultés qui surviennent dans la gestion tant des frontières extérieures communes de l’UE que des frontières intérieures au sein de l’espace Schengen. L’actualisation des règles vise à faire en sorte que la réintroduction des #contrôles_aux_frontières_intérieures demeure une mesure de dernier recours. Les nouvelles règles créent également des outils communs pour gérer plus efficacement les frontières extérieures en cas de crise de santé publique, grâce aux enseignements tirés de la pandémie de COVID-19. L’#instrumentalisation des migrants est également prise en compte dans cette mise à jour des règles de Schengen, ainsi que dans une proposition parallèle portant sur les mesures que les États membres pourront prendre dans les domaines de l’asile et du retour dans une telle situation.

    Margaritis Schinas, vice-président chargé de la promotion de notre mode de vie européen, s’est exprimé en ces termes : « La crise des réfugiés de 2015, la vague d’attentats terroristes sur le sol européen et la pandémie de COVID-19 ont mis l’espace Schengen à rude épreuve. Il est de notre responsabilité de renforcer la gouvernance de Schengen et de faire en sorte que les États membres soient équipés pour offrir une réaction rapide, coordonnée et européenne en cas de crise, y compris lorsque des migrants sont instrumentalisés. Grâce aux propositions présentées aujourd’hui, nous fortifierons ce “joyau” si emblématique de notre mode de vie européen. »

    Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, a quant à elle déclaré : « La pandémie a montré très clairement que l’espace Schengen est essentiel pour nos économies et nos sociétés. Grâce aux propositions présentées aujourd’hui, nous ferons en sorte que les contrôles aux frontières ne soient rétablis qu’en dernier recours, sur la base d’une évaluation commune et uniquement pour la durée nécessaire. Nous dotons les États membres des outils leur permettant de relever les défis auxquels ils sont confrontés. Et nous veillons également à gérer ensemble les frontières extérieures de l’UE, y compris dans les situations où les migrants sont instrumentalisés à des fins politiques. »

    Réaction coordonnée aux menaces communes

    La proposition de modification du code frontières Schengen vise à tirer les leçons de la pandémie de COVID-19 et à garantir la mise en place de mécanismes de coordination solides pour faire face aux menaces sanitaires. Les règles actualisées permettront au Conseil d’adopter rapidement des règles contraignantes fixant des restrictions temporaires des déplacements aux frontières extérieures en cas de menace pour la santé publique. Des dérogations seront prévues, y compris pour les voyageurs essentiels ainsi que pour les citoyens et résidents de l’Union. L’application uniforme des restrictions en matière de déplacements sera ainsi garantie, en s’appuyant sur l’expérience acquise ces dernières années.

    Les règles comprennent également un nouveau mécanisme de sauvegarde de Schengen destiné à générer une réaction commune aux frontières intérieures en cas de menaces touchant la majorité des États membres, par exemple des menaces sanitaires ou d’autres menaces pour la sécurité intérieure et l’ordre public. Grâce à ce mécanisme, qui complète le mécanisme applicable en cas de manquements aux frontières extérieures, les vérifications aux frontières intérieures dans la majorité des États membres pourraient être autorisées par une décision du Conseil en cas de menace commune. Une telle décision devrait également définir des mesures atténuant les effets négatifs des contrôles.

    De nouvelles règles visant à promouvoir des alternatives effectives aux vérifications aux frontières intérieures

    La proposition vise à promouvoir le recours à d’autres mesures que les contrôles aux frontières intérieures et à faire en sorte que, lorsqu’ils sont nécessaires, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures restent une mesure de dernier recours. Ces mesures sont les suivantes :

    - Une procédure plus structurée pour toute réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, comportant davantage de garanties : Actuellement, tout État membre qui décide de réintroduire des contrôles doit évaluer le caractère adéquat de cette réintroduction et son incidence probable sur la libre circulation des personnes. En application des nouvelles règles, il devra en outre évaluer l’impact sur les régions frontalières. Par ailleurs, tout État membre envisageant de prolonger les contrôles en réaction à des menaces prévisibles devrait d’abord évaluer si d’autres mesures, telles que des contrôles de police ciblés et une coopération policière renforcée, pourraient être plus adéquates. Une évaluation des risques devrait être fournie pour ce qui concerne les prolongations de plus de 6 mois. Lorsque des contrôles intérieurs auront été rétablis depuis 18 mois, la Commission devra émettre un avis sur leur caractère proportionné et sur leur nécessité. Dans tous les cas, les contrôles temporaires aux frontières ne devraient pas excéder une durée totale de 2 ans, sauf dans des circonstances très particulières. Il sera ainsi fait en sorte que les contrôles aux frontières intérieures restent une mesure de dernier recours et ne durent que le temps strictement nécessaire.
    – Promouvoir le recours à d’autres mesures : Conformément au nouveau code de coopération policière de l’UE, proposé par la Commission le 8 décembre 2021, les nouvelles règles de Schengen encouragent le recours à des alternatives effectives aux contrôles aux frontières intérieures, sous la forme de contrôles de police renforcés et plus opérationnels dans les régions frontalières, en précisant qu’elles ne sont pas équivalentes aux contrôles aux frontières.
    - Limiter les répercussions des contrôles aux frontières intérieures sur les régions frontalières : Eu égard aux enseignements tirés de la pandémie, qui a grippé les chaînes d’approvisionnement, les États membres rétablissant des contrôles devraient prendre des mesures pour limiter les répercussions négatives sur les régions frontalières et le marché intérieur. Il pourra s’agir notamment de faciliter le franchissement d’une frontière pour les travailleurs frontaliers et d’établir des voies réservées pour garantir un transit fluide des marchandises essentielles.
    - Lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés au sein de l’espace Schengen : Afin de lutter contre le phénomène de faible ampleur mais constant des déplacements non autorisés, les nouvelles règles créeront une nouvelle procédure pour contrer ce phénomène au moyen d’opérations de police conjointes et permettre aux États membres de réviser ou de conclure de nouveaux accords bilatéraux de réadmission entre eux. Ces mesures complètent celles proposées dans le cadre du nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile, en particulier le cadre de solidarité contraignant, et doivent être envisagées en liaison avec elles.

    Aider les États membres à gérer les situations d’instrumentalisation des flux migratoires

    Les règles de Schengen révisées reconnaissent l’importance du rôle que jouent les États membres aux frontières extérieures pour le compte de tous les États membres et de l’Union dans son ensemble. Elles prévoient de nouvelles mesures que les États membres pourront prendre pour gérer efficacement les frontières extérieures de l’UE en cas d’instrumentalisation de migrants à des fins politiques. Ces mesures consistent notamment à limiter le nombre de points de passage frontaliers et à intensifier la surveillance des frontières.

    La Commission propose en outre des mesures supplémentaires dans le cadre des règles de l’UE en matière d’asile et de retour afin de préciser les modalités de réaction des États membres en pareilles situations, dans le strict respect des droits fondamentaux. Ces mesures comprennent notamment la possibilité de prolonger le délai d’enregistrement des demandes d’asile jusqu’à 4 semaines et d’examiner toutes les demandes d’asile à la frontière, sauf en ce qui concerne les cas médicaux. Il convient de continuer à garantir un accès effectif à la procédure d’asile, et les États membres devraient permettre l’accès des organisations humanitaires qui fournissent une aide. Les États membres auront également la possibilité de mettre en place une procédure d’urgence pour la gestion des retours. Enfin, sur demande, les agences de l’UE (Agence de l’UE pour l’asile, Frontex, Europol) devraient apporter en priorité un soutien opérationnel à l’État membre concerné.

    Prochaines étapes

    Il appartient à présent au Parlement européen et au Conseil d’examiner et d’adopter les deux propositions.

    Contexte

    L’espace Schengen compte plus de 420 millions de personnes dans 26 pays. La suppression des contrôles aux frontières intérieures entre les États Schengen fait partie intégrante du mode de vie européen : près de 1,7 million de personnes résident dans un État Schengen et travaillent dans un autre. Les personnes ont bâti leur vie autour des libertés offertes par l’espace Schengen, et 3,5 millions d’entre elles se déplacent chaque jour entre des États Schengen.

    Afin de renforcer la résilience de l’espace Schengen face aux menaces graves et d’adapter les règles de Schengen aux défis en constante évolution, la Commission a annoncé, dans son nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile présenté en septembre 2020, ainsi que dans la stratégie de juin 2021 pour un espace Schengen pleinement opérationnel et résilient, qu’elle proposerait une révision du code frontières Schengen. Dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union de 2021, la présidente von der Leyen a également annoncé de nouvelles mesures pour contrer l’instrumentalisation des migrants à des fins politiques et pour assurer l’unité dans la gestion des frontières extérieures de l’UE.

    Les propositions présentées ce jour viennent s’ajouter aux travaux en cours visant à améliorer le fonctionnement global et la gouvernance de Schengen dans le cadre de la stratégie pour un espace Schengen plus fort et plus résilient. Afin de favoriser le dialogue politique visant à relever les défis communs, la Commission organise régulièrement des forums Schengen réunissant des membres du Parlement européen et les ministres de l’intérieur. À l’appui de ces discussions, la Commission présentera chaque année un rapport sur l’état de Schengen résumant la situation en ce qui concerne l’absence de contrôles aux frontières intérieures, les résultats des évaluations de Schengen et l’état d’avancement de la mise en œuvre des recommandations. Cela contribuera également à aider les États membres à relever tous les défis auxquels ils pourraient être confrontés. La proposition de révision du mécanisme d’évaluation et de contrôle de Schengen, actuellement en cours d’examen au Parlement européen et au Conseil, contribuera à renforcer la confiance commune dans la mise en œuvre des règles de Schengen. Le 8 décembre, la Commission a également proposé un code de coopération policière de l’UE destiné à renforcer la coopération des services répressifs entre les États membres, qui constitue un moyen efficace de faire face aux menaces pesant sur la sécurité dans l’espace Schengen et contribuera à la préservation d’un espace sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

    La proposition de révision du code frontières Schengen qui est présentée ce jour fait suite à des consultations étroites auprès des membres du Parlement européen et des ministres de l’intérieur réunis au sein du forum Schengen.

    Pour en savoir plus

    Documents législatifs :

    – Proposition de règlement modifiant le régime de franchissement des frontières par les personnes : https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulation-rules-governing-movement-persons-across-borders-com-20

    – Proposition de règlement visant à faire face aux situations d’instrumentalisation dans le domaine de la migration et de l’asile : https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulation-situations-instrumentalisation-field-migration-and-asy

    – Questions-réponses : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_6822

    – Fiche d’information : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_21_6838

    https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_21_6821

    #Schengen #Espace_Schengen #frontières #frontières_internes #résilience #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #réfugiés #asile #crise #pandémie #covid-19 #coronavirus #crise_sanitaire #code_Schengen #code_frontières_Schengen #menace_sanitaire #frontières_extérieures #mobilité #restrictions #déplacements #ordre_public #sécurité #sécurité_intérieure #menace_commune #vérifications #coopération_policière #contrôles_temporaires #temporaire #dernier_recours #régions_frontalières #marchandises #voies_réservées #déplacements_non_autorisés #opérations_de_police_conjointes #pacte #surveillance #surveillance_frontalière #points_de_passage #Frontex #Europol #soutien_opérationnel

    –—

    Ajouté dans la métaliste sur les #patrouilles_mixtes ce paragraphe :

    « Lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés au sein de l’espace Schengen : Afin de lutter contre le phénomène de faible ampleur mais constant des déplacements non autorisés, les nouvelles règles créeront une nouvelle procédure pour contrer ce phénomène au moyen d’opérations de police conjointes et permettre aux États membres de réviser ou de conclure de nouveaux accords bilatéraux de réadmission entre eux. Ces mesures complètent celles proposées dans le cadre du nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile, en particulier le cadre de solidarité contraignant, et doivent être envisagées en liaison avec elles. »

    https://seenthis.net/messages/910352

    • La Commission européenne propose de réformer les règles de Schengen pour préserver la #libre_circulation

      Elle veut favoriser la coordination entre États membres et adapter le code Schengen aux nouveaux défis que sont les crise sanitaires et l’instrumentalisation de la migration par des pays tiers.

      Ces dernières années, les attaques terroristes, les mouvements migratoires et la pandémie de Covid-19 ont ébranlé le principe de libre circulation en vigueur au sein de l’espace Schengen. Pour faire face à ces événements et phénomènes, les pays Schengen (vingt-deux pays de l’Union européenne et la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège et l’Islande) ont réintroduit plus souvent qu’à leur tour des contrôles aux frontières internes de la zone, en ordre dispersé, souvent, et, dans le cas de l’Allemagne, de l’Autriche, de la France, du Danemark, de la Norvège et de la Suède, de manière « provisoirement permanente ».
      Consciente des risques qui pèsent sur le principe de libre circulation, grâce à laquelle 3,5 millions de personnes passent quotidiennement d’un État membre à l’autre, sans contrôle, la Commission européenne a proposé mardi de revoir les règles du Code Schengen pour les adapter aux nouveaux défis. « Nous devons faire en sorte que la fermeture des frontières intérieures soit un ultime recours », a déclaré le vice-président de la Commission en charge de la Promotion du mode de vie européen, Margaritis Schinas.
      Plus de coordination entre États membres

      Pour éviter le chaos connu au début de la pandémie, la Commission propose de revoir la procédure en vertu de laquelle un État membre peut réintroduire des contrôles aux frontières internes de Schengen. Pour les événements « imprévisibles », les contrôles aux frontières pourraient être instaurés pour une période de trente jours, extensibles jusqu’à trois mois (contre dix jours et deux mois actuellement) ; pour les événements prévisibles, elle propose des périodes renouvelables de six mois jusqu’à un maximum de deux ans… ou plus si les circonstances l’exigent. Les États membres devraient évaluer l’impact de ces mesures sur les régions frontalières et tenter de le minimiser - pour les travailleurs frontaliers, au nombre de 1,7 million dans l’Union, et le transit de marchandises essentielle, par exemple - et et envisager des mesures alternatives, comme des contrôles de police ciblés ou une coopération policière transfrontalières.
      Au bout de dix-huit mois, la Commission émettrait un avis sur la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ces mesures.
      De nouvelles règles pour empêcher les migrations secondaires

      L’exécutif européen propose aussi d’établir un cadre légal, actuellement inexistant, pour lutter contre les « migrations secondaires ». L’objectif est de faire en sorte qu’une personne en situation irrégulière dans l’UE qui traverse une frontière interne puisse être renvoyée dans l’État d’où elle vient. Une mesure de nature à satisfaire les pays du Nord, dont la Belgique, qui se plaignent de voir arriver ou transiter sur leur territoire des migrants n’ayant pas déposé de demandes d’asile dans leur pays de « première entrée », souvent situé au sud de l’Europe. La procédure réclame des opérations de police conjointes et des accords de réadmission entre États membres. « Notre réponse la plus systémique serait un accord sur le paquet migratoire », proposé par la Commission en septembre 2020, a cependant insisté le vice-président Schengen. Mais les États membres ne sont pas en mesure de trouver de compromis, en raison de positions trop divergentes.
      L’Europe doit se préparer à de nouvelles instrumentalisations de la migration

      La Commission veut aussi apporter une réponse à l’instrumentalisation de la migration telle que celle pratiquée par la Biélorussie, qui a fait venir des migrants sur son sol pour les envoyer vers la Pologne et les États baltes afin de faire pression sur les Vingt-sept. La Commission veut définir la façon dont les États membres peuvent renforcer la surveillance de leur frontière, limiter les points d’accès à leur territoire, faire appel à la solidarité européenne, tout en respectant les droits fondamentaux des migrants.
      Actuellement, « la Commission peut seulement faire des recommandations qui, si elles sont adoptées par le Conseil, ne sont pas toujours suivies d’effet », constate la commissaire aux Affaires intérieures Ylva Johansson.
      Pour faire face à l’afflux migratoire venu de Biélorussie, la Pologne avait notamment pratiqué le refoulement, contraire aux règles européennes en matière d’asile, sans que l’on donne l’impression de s’en émouvoir à Bruxelles et dans les autres capitales de l’Union. Pour éviter que cela se reproduise, la Commission propose des mesures garantissant la possibilité de demander l’asile, notamment en étendant à quatre semaines la période pour qu’une demande soit enregistrée et traitée. Les demandes pourront être examinée à la frontière, ce qui implique que l’État membre concerné devrait donner l’accès aux zones frontalières aux organisations humanitaires.

      La présidence française du Conseil, qui a fait de la réforme de Schengen une de ses priorités, va essayer de faire progresser le paquet législatif dans les six mois qui viennent. « Ces mesures constituent une ensemble nécessaire et robuste, qui devrait permettre de préserver Schengen intact », a assuré le vice-président Schinas. Non sans souligner que la solution systémique et permanente pour assurer un traitement harmonisé de l’asile et de la migration réside dans le pacte migratoire déposé en 2020 par la Commission et sur lequel les États membres sont actuellement incapables de trouver un compromis, en raison de leurs profondes divergences sur ces questions.

      https://www.lalibre.be/international/europe/2021/12/14/face-aux-risques-qui-pesent-sur-la-libre-circulation-la-commission-europeenn
      #réforme

  • EU : One step closer to the establishment of the ’#permission-to-travel' scheme

    The Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement on rules governing how the forthcoming #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation System (#ETIAS) will ’talk’ to other migration and policing databases, with the purpose of conducting automated searches on would-be travellers to the EU.

    The ETIAS will mirror systems such as the #ESTA scheme in the USA, and will require that citizens of countries who do not need a #visa to travel to the EU instead apply for a “travel authorisation”.

    As with visas, travel companies will be required to check an individual’s travel authorisation before they board a plane, coach or train, effectively creating a new ’permission-to-travel’ scheme.

    The ETIAS also includes a controversial #profiling and ’watchlist’ system, an aspect not mentioned in the Council’s press release (full-text below).

    The rules on which the Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement - and which will thus almost certainly be the final text of the legislation - concern how and when the ETIAS can ’talk’ to other EU databases such as #Eurodac (asylum applications), the #Visa_Information_System, or the #Schengen_Information_System.

    Applicants will also be checked against #Europol and #Interpol databases.

    As the press release notes, the ETIAS will also serve as one of the key components of the “interoperability” scheme, which will interconnect numerous EU databases and lead to the creation of a new, biometric ’#Common_Identity_Repository' on up to 300 million non-EU nationals.

    You can find out more about the ETIAS, related changes to the Visa Information System, and the interoperability plans in the Statewatch report Automated Suspicion: https://www.statewatch.org/automated-suspicion-the-eu-s-new-travel-surveillance-initiatives

    –------

    The text below is a press release published by the Council of the EU on 18 March 2020: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/18/european-travel-information-and-authorisation-system-etias-council-

    European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS): Council Presidency and European Parliament provisionally agree on rules for accessing relevant databases

    The Council presidency and European Parliament representatives today reached a provisional agreement on the rules connecting the ETIAS central system to the relevant EU databases. The agreed texts will next be submitted to the relevant bodies of the Council and the Parliament for political endorsement and, following this, for their formal adoption.

    The adoption of these rules will be the final legislative step required for the setting up of ETIAS, which is expected to be operational by 2022.

    The introduction of ETIAS aims to improve internal security, prevent illegal immigration, protect public health and reduce delays at the borders by identifying persons who may pose a risk in one of these areas before they arrive at the external borders. ETIAS is also a building bloc of the interoperability between JHA databases, an important political objective of the EU in this area, which is foreseen to be operational by the end of 2023.

    The provisionally agreed rules will allow the ETIAS central system to perform checks against the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), the Entry/Exit System (EES), Eurodac and the database on criminal records of third country nationals (ECRIS-TCN), as well as on Europol and Interpol data.

    They allow for the connection of the ETIAS central system to these databases and set out the data to be accessed for ETIAS purposes, as well as the conditions and access rights for the ETIAS central unit and the ETIAS national units. Access to the relevant data in these systems will allow authorities to assess the security or immigration risk of applicants and decide whether to issue or refuse a travel authorisation.
    Background

    ETIAS is the new EU travel information and authorisation system. It will apply to visa-exempt third country nationals, who will need to obtain a travel authorisation before their trip, via an online application.

    The information submitted in each application will be automatically processed against EU and relevant Interpol databases to determine whether there are grounds to refuse a travel authorisation. If no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, the travel authorisation will be issued automatically and quickly. This is expected to be the case for most applications. If there is a hit or an element requiring analysis, the application will be handled manually by the competent authorities.

    A travel authorisation will be valid for three years or until the end of validity of the travel document registered during application, whichever comes first. For each application, the applicant will be required to pay a travel authorisation fee of 7 euros.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/march/eu-one-step-closer-to-the-establishment-of-the-permission-to-travel-sche

    #interopérabilité #base_de_données #database #données_personnelles #migrations #mobilité #autorisations #visas #compagnies_de_voyage #VIS #SIS #EU #UE #union_européenne #biométrie

    ping @etraces @isskein @karine4

    • L’UE précise son futur système de contrôle des voyageurs exemptés de visas

      Les modalités du futur système de #contrôle_préalable, auquel devront se soumettre d’ici fin 2022 les ressortissants de pays tiers pouvant se rendre dans l’Union #sans_visa, a fait l’objet d’un #accord annoncé vendredi par l’exécutif européen.

      Ce dispositif, baptisé ETIAS et inspiré du système utilisé par les Etats-Unis, concernera les ressortissants de plus de 60 pays qui sont exemptés de visas pour leurs courts séjours dans l’Union, comme les ressortissants des Etats-Unis, du Brésil, ou encore de l’Albanie et des Emirats arabes unis.

      Ce système dit « d’information et d’autorisation », qui vise à repérer avant leur entrée dans l’#espace_Schengen des personnes jugées à #risques, doit permettre un contrôle de sécurité avant leur départ via une demande d’autorisation sur internet.

      Dans le cadre de l’ETIAS, les demandes en ligne coûteront 7 euros et chaque autorisation sera valable trois ans pour des entrées multiples, a indiqué un porte-parole de la Commission.

      Selon les prévisions, « probablement plus de 95% » des demandes « donneront lieu à une #autorisation_automatique », a-t-il ajouté.

      Le Parlement européen avait adopté dès juillet 2018 une législation établissant le système ETIAS, mais dans les négociations pour finaliser ses modalités opérationnelles, les eurodéputés réclamaient des garde-fous, en le rendant interopérable avec les autres systèmes d’information de l’UE.

      Eurodéputés et représentants des Etats, de concert avec la Commission, ont approuvé jeudi des modifications qui permettront la consultation de différentes #bases_de_données, dont celles d’#Europol et d’#Interpol, pour identifier les « menaces sécuritaires potentielles, dangers de migration illégale ou risques épidémiologiques élevés ».

      Il contribuera ainsi à « la mise en oeuvre du nouveau Pacte (européen) sur la migration et l’asile », a estimé le porte-parole.

      « Nous devons savoir qui franchit nos #frontières_extérieures. (ETIAS) fournira des #informations_préalables sur les voyageurs avant qu’ils n’atteignent les frontières de l’UE afin d’identifier les risques en matière de #sécurité ou de #santé », a souligné Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, citée dans un communiqué.

      Hors restrictions dues à la pandémie, « au moins 30 millions de voyageurs se rendent chaque année dans l’UE sans visa, et on ne sait pas grand chose à leur sujet. L’ETIAS comblera cette lacune, car il exigera un "#background_check" », selon l’eurodéputé Jeroen Lenaers (PPE, droite pro-UE), rapporteur du texte.

      L’accord doit recevoir un ultime feu vert du Parlement et des Vingt-Sept pour permettre au système d’entrer en vigueur.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/190321/l-ue-precise-son-futur-systeme-de-controle-des-voyageurs-exemptes-de-visas
      #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes

    • Eurodac, la “sorveglianza di massa” per fermare le persone ai confini Ue

      Oggi il database conserva le impronte digitali di richiedenti asilo e stranieri “irregolari”. La proposta di riforma della Commissione Ue vuole inserire più dati biometrici, compresi quelli dei minori. Mettendo a rischio privacy e diritti

      Da più di vent’anni i richiedenti asilo che presentano domanda di protezione in un Paese europeo, così come i cittadini stranieri che attraversano “irregolarmente” i confini dell’Unione, sono registrati con le impronte digitali all’interno del sistema “Eurodac”. L’acronimo sta per “European asylum dactyloscopy database” e al 31 dicembre 2019 contava oltre 5,69 milioni di set di impronte cui se ne sono aggiunti oltre 644mila nel corso del 2020. Le finalità di Eurodac sono strettamente legate al Regolamento Dublino: il database, infatti, era stato istituito nel 2000 per individuare il Paese europeo di primo ingresso dei richiedenti asilo, che avrebbe dovuto valutare la domanda di protezione, ed evitare che la stessa persona presentasse domanda di protezione in più Paesi europei (il cosiddetto asylum shopping). 

      Nei prossimi anni, però, Eurodac potrebbe diventare uno strumento completamente diverso. Il 23 settembre 2020 la “nuova” Commissione europea guidata da Ursula von der Leyen, infatti, ha presentato una proposta di riforma che ricalca un testo presentato nel 2016 e si inserisce all’interno del Patto sull’immigrazione e l’asilo, ampliando gli obiettivi del database: “Eurodac, che era stato creato per stabilire quale sia il Paese europeo competente a esaminare la domanda di asilo, vede affiancarsi alla sua funzione originaria il controllo delle migrazioni irregolari e dei flussi secondari all’interno dell’Unione -commenta Valeria Ferraris, ricercatrice presso il dipartimento di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Torino (unito.it)-. Viene messa in atto un’estensione del controllo sui richiedenti asilo visti sempre più come migranti irregolari e non come persone bisognose di protezione”.

      “Oggi Eurodac registra solo le impronte digitali. La proposta di riforma prevede di aggiungere i dati biometrici del volto, che possono essere utilizzati per il riconoscimento facciale tramite apposite tecnologie -spiega ad Altreconomia Chloé Berthélémy, policy advisor dell’European digital rights-. Inoltre si prevede di raccogliere anche le generalità dei migranti, informazioni relative a data e luogo di nascita-nazionalità. Sia per gli adulti sia per i minori a partire dai sei anni di età, mentre oggi vengono registrati solo gli adolescenti dai 14 anni in su”. Per Bruxelles l’esigenza di aggiungere nuovi dati biometrici al database è motivata dalle difficoltà di alcuni Stati membri nel raccogliere le impronte digitali a causa del rifiuto da parte dei richiedenti asilo o perché questi si procurano tagli, lesioni o scottature per non essere identificati. La stima dei costi per l’espansione di Eurodac è di 29,8 milioni di euro, necessari per “l’aggiornamento tecnico, l’aumento dell’archiviazione e della capacità del sistema centrale” si legge nella proposta di legge. 

      Le preoccupazioni per possibili violazioni dei diritti di migranti hanno spinto Edri, il principale network europeo di Ong impegnate nella tutela dei diritti e delle libertà digitali, e altre trenta associazioni (tra cui Amnesty International, Statewatch, Terre des Hommes) a scrivere lo scorso settembre una lettera aperta alla Commissione Libe del Parlamento europeo per chiedere di ritardare il processo legislativo di modifica di Eurodac e “concedere il tempo necessario a un’analisi significativa delle implicazioni sui diritti fondamentali della proposta di riforma”. 

      “Lungi dall’essere meramente tecnico, il dossier Eurodac è di natura altamente politica e strategica”, scrivono le associazioni firmatarie nella lettera. Che avvertono: se le modifiche proposte verranno adottate potrebbe venire compromesso “il dovere dell’Unione europea di rispettare il diritto e gli standard internazionali in materia di asilo e migrazione”. Eurodac rischia così di trasformarsi in “un potente strumento per la sorveglianza di massa” dei cittadini stranieri. Inoltre “le modifiche proposte sulla banca dati, che implicano il trattamento di più categorie di dati per una serie più ampia di finalità, sono in palese contraddizione con il principio di limitazione delle finalità, un principio chiave Ue sulla protezione dei dati”.

      “Si rischia di estendere il controllo sui richiedenti asilo visti sempre più come migranti ‘irregolari’ e non come persone bisognose di protezione” – Valeria Ferraris

      Le critiche delle associazioni firmatarie si concentrano soprattutto sul possibile uso del riconoscimento facciale per l’identificazione biometrica che viene definito “sproporzionato e invasivo della privacy” si legge nella lettera. “Le leggi fondamentali sulla protezione dei dati personali in Europa stabiliscono che l’interferenza con il diritto alla privacy deve essere proporzionata e rispondere a un interesse generale -spiega Chloé Berthélémy-. Nel caso di Eurodac, l’utilizzo delle impronte digitali è sufficiente a garantire l’identificazione della persona garantendo così il principio di limitazione dello scopo, che è centrale per la protezione dei dati in Europa”. 

      “Noi siamo contrari all’uso di tecnologie di riconoscimento facciale e siamo particolarmente radicali su questo -aggiungono Davide Del Monte e Laura Carrer dell’Hermes Center, una delle associazioni firmatarie della lettera-. Una tecnologia può anche avere un utilizzo corretto, ad esempio per combattere il terrorismo, ma la potenza di questi strumenti è tale che, a nostro avviso, i rischi e i pericoli sono molto superiori ai potenziali benefici che possono portare. Inoltre è molto difficile fare un passo indietro una volta che le infrastrutture necessarie a implementare queste tecnologie vengono ‘posate’ e messe in funzione: non si torna mai indietro e il loro utilizzo viene sempre ampliato. Per noi sono equiparabili ad armi e per questo la loro circolazione deve essere limitata”. Anche in virtù di queste posizioni, Hermes Center è promotore in Italia della campagna “Reclaim your face” con cui si chiede alle istituzioni di vietare il riconoscimento facciale negli spazi pubblici.

      “La potenza di questi strumenti è tale che, a nostro avviso, i rischi e i pericoli sono molto superiori ai potenziali benefici che possono portare” – Laura Carrer

      Ma non è finita. Se la riforma verrà adottata, all’interno del database europeo finiranno non solo i richiedenti asilo e le persone intercettate mentre attraversano “irregolarmente” le frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea ma anche tutti gli stranieri privi di titolo di soggiorno che venissero fermati all’interno di un Paese europeo e verrebbe anche creata una categoria ad hoc per i migranti soccorsi in mare durante un’operazione di search and rescue. Verranno inoltre raccolti i dati relativi ai bambini a partire dai sei anni di età: ufficialmente, questa (radicale) modifica al funzionamento del database europeo è stata introdotta con l’obiettivo di tutelare i minori stranieri. 

      Ma le associazioni evidenziano come raccogliere e conservare i dati biometrici dei bambini per scopi non legati alla loro protezione rappresenti “una violazione gravemente invasiva e ingiustificata del diritto alla privacy, che lede i principi di proporzionalità e necessità”. Dati e informazioni che verranno conservati più a lungo di quanto non accade oggi: per i “migranti irregolari” si passa dai 18 mesi attuali a cinque anni.

      A complicare ulteriormente la situazione c’è anche l’entrata in vigore nel 2018 del nuovo “Regolamento interoperatività”, che permette di mettere in connessione Eurodac con altri database come il Sistema informativo Schengen (Sis) e il sistema informativo Visti (Vis), il Sistema europeo di informazione e autorizzazione ai viaggi (Etias) e il Sistema di ingressi/uscite (Ees). 

      “In precedenza, questi erano tutti sistemi autonomi, ora si sta andando verso un merging, garantendo una connessione che contraddice la base giuridica iniziale per cui ciascuno di questi sistemi aveva un suo obiettivo -spiega Ferraris-. Nel corso degli anni gli obiettivi attribuiti a ciascun sistema si sono moltiplicati, violando i principi in materia di protezione dei dati personali e diventando progressivamente sempre più focalizzati sul controllo della migrazione”. Inoltre le modifiche normative hanno esteso l’accesso a questi database sempre più integrati tra loro a un numero sempre maggiore di autorità.

      “Quello che chiediamo al Parlamento europeo è di fare un passo indietro e di ripensare l’intero quadro normativo -conclude Berthélémy-. La nostra principale raccomandazione è quella di realizzare e pubblicare una valutazione di impatto sull’estensione dell’applicazione di Eurodac per delineare le conseguenze sui diritti fondamentali o su quelli dei minori causati dalle significative modifiche proposte. Si sta estendendo in maniera enorme l’ambito di applicazione di un database, e questo avrà conseguenze per decine di migliaia di persone”.

      https://altreconomia.it/eurodac-la-sorveglianza-di-massa-per-fermare-le-persone-ai-confini-ue

  • Rapporti di monitoraggio

    Sin dal 2016 il progetto ha pubblicato report di approfondimento giuridico sulle situazioni di violazione riscontrate presso le diverse frontiere oggetto delle attività di monitoraggio. Ciascun report affronta questioni ed aspetti contingenti e particolarmente interessanti al fine di sviluppare azioni di contenzioso strategico.

    Elenco dei rapporti pubblicati in ordine cronologico:

    “Le riammissioni di cittadini stranieri a Ventimiglia (giugno 2015): profili di illegittimità“

    Il report è stato redatto nel giugno del 2015 è costituisce una prima analisi delle principali criticità riscontrabili alla frontiera italo-francese verosimilmente sulla base dell’Accordo bilaterale fra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Governo della Repubblica francese sulla cooperazione transfrontaliera in materia di polizia e dogana (Accordo di Chambery)
    #Vintimille #Ventimiglia #frontière_sud-alpine #Alpes #Menton #accord_bilatéral #Accord_de_Chambéry #réadmissions

    Ajouté à la #métaliste de liens autour d’#accords_de_réadmission entre pays européens...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091
    Et plus précisément ici:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091#message887941

    –---

    “Le riammissioni di cittadini stranieri alla frontiera di Chiasso: profili di illegittimità”

    Il report è stato redatto nell’estate del 2016 per evidenziare la situazione critica che si era venuta a creare in seguito al massiccio afflusso di cittadini stranieri in Italia attraverso la rotta balcanica scatenata dalla crisi siriana. La frontiera italo-svizzera è stata particolarmente interessata da numerosi tentativi di attraversamento del confine nei pressi di Como e il presente documento fornisce una analisi giuridica delle criticità riscontrate.

    Ajouté à la #métaliste de liens autour d’#accords_de_réadmission entre pays européens...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091
    Et plus précisément ici:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091#message887940

    –-----

    “Lungo la rotta del Brennero”

    Il report, redatto con la collaborazione della associazione Antenne Migranti e il contributo della fondazione Alex Langer nel 2017, analizza le dinamiche della frontiera altoatesina e sviluppa una parte di approfondimento sulle violazioni relative al diritto all’accoglienza per richiedenti asilo e minori, alle violazioni all’accesso alla procedura di asilo e ad una analisi delle modalità di attuazione delle riammissioni alla frontiera.

    #Brenner #Autriche

    –---

    “Attività di monitoraggio ai confini interni italiani – Periodo giugno 2018 – giugno 2019”

    Report analitico che riporta i dati raccolti e le prassi di interesse alle frontiere italo-francesi, italo-svizzere, italo-austriache e italo slovene. Contiene inoltre un approfondimento sui trasferimenti di cittadini di paesi terzi dalle zone di frontiera indicate all’#hotspot di #Taranto e centri di accoglienza del sud Italia.

    #Italie_du_Sud

    –------

    “Report interno sopralluogo Bosnia 27-31 ottobre 2019”

    Report descrittivo a seguito del sopralluogo effettuato da soci coinvolti nel progetto Medea dal 27 al 31 ottobre sulla condizione delle persone in transito in Bosnia. Il rapporto si concentra sulla descrizione delle strutture di accoglienza presenti nel paese, sull’accesso alla procedura di protezione internazionale e sulle strategie di intervento future.

    #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine

    –---

    “Report attività frontiere interne terrestri, porti adriatici e Bosnia”

    Rapporto di analisi dettagliata sulle progettualità sviluppate nel corso del periodo luglio 2019 – luglio 2020 sulle diverse frontiere coinvolte (in particolare la frontiera italo-francese, italo-slovena, la frontiera adriatica e le frontiere coinvolte nella rotta balcanica). Le novità progettuali più interessanti riguardano proprio l’espansione delle progettualità rivolte ai paesi della rotta balcanica e alla Grecia coinvolta nelle riammissioni dall’Italia. Nel periodo ad oggetto del rapporto il lavoro ha avuto un focus principale legato ad iniziative di monitoraggio, costituzione della rete ed azioni di advocacy.

    #Slovénie #mer_Adriatique #Adriatique

    https://medea.asgi.it/rapporti

    #rapport #monitoring #medea #ASGI
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières
    #frontières_internes #frontières_intérieures #Balkans #route_des_balkans

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • France : Macron annonce un doublement des #forces_de_sécurité aux frontières

    Le président français Emmanuel Macron a annoncé jeudi un doublement des forces contrôlant les frontières de la France, de 2.400 à 4.800, pour lutter contre la menace terroriste, les trafics et l’immigration illégale.

    Le président français Emmanuel Macron a annoncé jeudi un doublement des forces contrôlant les frontières de la France, de 2.400 à 4.800, pour lutter contre la menace terroriste, les trafics et l’immigration illégale.

    Ce doublement a été décidé « en raison de l’intensification de la #menace » après les récents #attentats, dont celui de Nice (Sud-Est), a expliqué le chef de l’État à la frontière franco-espagnole, au #col_du_Perthus, où « quatre unités mobiles » sont « en cours de déploiement ».

    Accompagné du ministre de l’Intérieur Gérald Darmanin et du secrétaire d’Etat chargé des Affaires européennes Clément Beaune, Emmanuel Macron s’est également dit « favorable » à une refondation « en profondeur » des règles régissant l’#espace_Schengen de #libre_circulation en Europe, et à « un plus grand contrôle » des frontières.

    « Je porterai en ce sens des premières propositions au Conseil » européen de décembre, pour « repenser l’organisation » de #Schengen et « intensifier notre protection commune aux frontières avec une véritable #police_de_sécurité_aux_frontières_extérieures », a-t-il ajouté. Avec la « volonté d’aboutir sous la présidence française », au premier semestre 2022.

    Cette refondation doit rendre l’espace Schengen « plus cohérent », pour qu’il « protège mieux ses frontières communes », qu’il « articule mieux » les impératifs de responsabilité de protection de frontières et de « #solidarité » et que « la charge ne soit pas qu’aux pays de première entrée ».

    « La France est un des principaux pays d’arrivée d’#immigration_secondaire », lorsque les migrants #déboutés d’un pays tentent leur chance dans un autre en Europe, et « je souhaite profondément aussi qu’on change les règles du jeu », a-t-il dit.

    Il a également plaidé pour « intensifier » la lutte contre l’#immigration_clandestine et les réseaux de #trafiquants « qui, de plus en plus souvent, sont liés aux réseaux terroristes ».

    « Nous prendrons les lois qui sont nécessaires, si elles correspondent à des besoins identifiés », a-t-il ajouté, mais la situation « ne justifie pas de changer la Constitution », a-t-il assuré, face à des pressions de responsables politiques de droite et d’extrême droite.

    Arrivé à la mi-journée au col du Perthus, Emmanuel Macron s’est entretenu avec les policiers de la #police_aux_frontières (#PAF) qui contrôlent les véhicules entrant en France par l’autoroute ou la nationale qui le traversent. L’un d’eux lui a notamment fait la démonstration d’un drone surveillant les voies de passage et les sentiers frontaliers.

    Puis il a visité le Centre franco-espagnol de coopération policière et douanière, où sont affectées 24 personnes des deux pays à plein temps. « Nous partageons un espace de travail et de convivialité (...) La coopération marche très bien », lui a assuré un responsable espagnol.

    « Depuis 2017, la coordination entre les services de renseignement a été renforcée et confiée à la DGSI (sécurité intérieure, ndlr). Les moyens financiers, humains et technologiques ont été considérablement augmentés », a déclaré Emmanuel Macron dans un tweet posté durant sa visite.

    Quelque 35.000 véhicules passent tous les jours sur l’autoroute et la route qui franchissent le col, entre les villes du Perthus en France et de La Jonquera en Espagne.

    L’#Espagne est l’une des principales portes d’entrée des immigrés clandestins en France, qui arrivent par la côte en provenance d’Afrique du nord. Plus de 4.000 migrants ont été refusés ces trois derniers mois dans le département des #Pyrénées-Orientales, selon un responsable de la PAF. Une partie d’entre eux étaient des Algériens tentant d’entrer en France.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/051120/france-macron-annonce-un-doublement-des-forces-de-securite-aux-frontieres

    #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières #France #terrorisme #migrations #immigration_illégale #militarisation_des_frontières

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Frontières : quel est l’impact du Covid-19 sur l’espace Schengen ? - actudaily
    #Covid-19#Europe#Schengen#frontiere#migrant#migration

    https://actudaily.com/index.php/2020/05/21/frontieres-quel-est-limpact-du-covid-19-sur-lespace-schengen
    https://i1.wp.com/actudaily.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/1590052993_frontiere-suisse-italie.jpg?fit=780%2C517&ssl=1

    La crise du Covid-19 a poussé les 26 Etats membres de l’espace Schengen à restreindre la circulation des personnes aux frontières extérieures de la zone, mais aussi en son sein. Ces mesures ont des implications politiques, économiques et juridiques, et menacent l’avenir de cet espace de libre circulation, qui n’avait jamais été aussi contrarié depuis son entrée en vigueur en 1995.

  • EU must go ’back to the future’ of open borders after COVID-19, commissioner says - Reuters
    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#Europe#Schengen

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-borders-idUSKBN22J2DM
    https://s1.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20200507&t=2&i=1517822106&w=1200&r=LYNXMPEG461D2

    BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The European Union must go “back to the future” of open borders once the coronavirus pandemic is brought under control, a senior EU official said on Thursday, after a spate of frontier closures by member states fraying the bloc’s cohesion.

  • Schengen, migration, asylum and security in times of COVID-19 | News | European Parliament
    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#Schengen#Europe#frontiere

    https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200505IPR78408/schengen-migration-asylum-and-security-in-times-of-covid-19

    MEPs will quiz Commissioner Johansson on the future of the border-free Schengen zone, common migration and asylum policy and security in the context of the pandemic.

  • La frontière franco-suisse au temps du coronavirus...

    Photos prises le dimanche 19.04.2020 par #Juliet_Fall

    Sunday morning bike ride with my family chasing newly/temporarily-closed borders around the Canton of Geneva during Covid19 pandemic. France & Switz are both in the Schengen area: these are usually open to people. Fascinating ad hoc use of different material. (#Bardonnex, #Soral)

    We chased closed borders on bicycles for three hours, starting early. Luckily, in Switzerland, we are allowed to exercise outside in family groups as long as we maintain distance to others. On the other side, in France, people are more tightly policed & controlled (Soral)

    Some borders that usually shut at night are now completely closed. The one in #Sézegnin used tape covered in private companies’ names ("La Mobiliaire"), making them seem even more improvised, as though people threw them together using whatever was at hand.

    Did a border professional grab a piece of pink chalk to mark out the line before they laid the concrete blocks? So many personal stories hidden in these geopolitical traces. Geography & history in the making: experiences & sights to remember (the best type of ’homeschooling’)...

    https://twitter.com/JulietJFall/status/1251838051434799104
    #Schengen (fin de-) #fin_de_Schengen #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #covid-19 #coronavirus #France #Suisse #Juliet_Fall @simplicissimus #Genève #Haute-Savoie
    #rematérialisation #matérialisation

    ping @isskein @reka

  • #Asile et #migrations dans l’Union européenne - Migrations - Toute l’#Europe
    https://www.touteleurope.eu/actualite/asile-et-migrations-dans-l-union-europeenne.html

    Combien y a-t-il de #migrants dans le monde et en Europe ? Qui sont les #réfugiés ? Quelle est la politique de l’#Union_européenne et qu’est-ce que l’espace #Schengen ? L’essentiel sur l’asile et les migrations.

  • #COVID-19 Restrictions

    In response to COVID-19, national governments have introduced a series of restrictions to slow the spread of the virus. Below is a map showing various constraints implemented by countries across Europe.


    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/covid-19-restrictions-4IdY3J
    #mobilité #fermeture_des_frontières #Europe #migrations #frontières #coronavirus #cartographie #visualisation #état_d'urgence #liberté_de_circulation #liberté_de_mouvement #Schengen (fin de -)
    ping @karine4 @reka @thomas_lacroix @isskein

    • How COVID-19 is changing border control

      The pandemic is teaching border agencies in Europe important lessons about operational preparedness in times of crisis. This has implications for the future in terms of training, staffing, cross-border information sharing and the use of technologies.

      COVID-19 has triggered an unprecedented chain reaction of border closures around the world in an effort to stop the virus, including in the Schengen area. This has raised the question of whether border controls are effective in containing such outbreaks; how well prepared were border agencies for the emergency; and where next for border management in a post-pandemic world.

      Operational realities and preparedness

      After the creation of the Schengen area 25 years ago, many of Europe’s border guards were re-assigned to the EU’s external borders or given other responsibilities inside their own Member States. Hence, when the pandemic hit, governments were suddenly under pressure to re-apply border infrastructure that has not existed in any real operational sense for decades. Some states reacted by limiting the number of entry/exit points; others mobilised border reserve units or asked the army or civil protection for support.

      Furthermore, border guards did not initially have the right information or training in public health issues. It took almost two weeks for the role of border agencies to be clarified as an auxiliary/support to public health services. In practice, border officials were directing vehicles and passengers to the specialists responsible for medical checks on the spot, while strict internal checks as prescribed by the Schengen Border Code and relevant national legislation were relaxed.

      At first, the new internal travel restrictions resulted in major congestion, but after a period of adjustment by travellers, border traffic actually declined sharply due to the growing awareness of the new reality. Consequently, some staff were redeployed internally to assist law enforcement with enforcing behavioural restrictions such as social distancing.

      The operational realities facing border agencies in the first stages of the outbreak highlighted the need to step up capacities and technical assistance on health-related issues, including crisis management and contingency planning.

      Lessons from the pandemic

      The need for improvement in three other headline areas is also clear: First, base-level cooperation between border guards, customs services and sanitary agencies must improve. Although the Guidelines for Integrated Border Management (IBM) in EC External Cooperation define health agencies as key players in IBM, the part on sanitary inspections in border management has to date received less attention than aspects related to security and trade. Hitherto, in the northern hemisphere at least, this was more a nice thing to have for most national administrations rather than a necessity. COVID-19 is changing that, making clear the need for better involvement of health inspections in border management.

      Second, countries need to cooperate better on early warning and risk assessment. This should start with agreed mechanisms to trigger the adoption of safeguards against the spread between countries, regions and continents. The fact that infected persons may be asymptomatic adds to the seriousness and scale of the pandemic and highlights the need to share information across borders, including threat perception and risk analysis. In addition, staff at borders must have a minimum level of awareness about sanitary risks related to persons, but also to goods.

      Third, the existing trend towards modernisation needs to accelerate. The current mobility restrictions have changed communication and working methods. This will affect how services provide training, capacity building and technical assistance to staff and key partners through a combination of traditional face-to-face approaches with remote actions (e.g. e-learning, webinars). Modernisation also needs to happen downstream so that operational staff have better access to virtual platforms (including via smart devices) to improve the flow of real-time information and raise overall preparedness at the borders.

      Border technology after the coronavirus pandemic

      Travel to some countries in Africa has since long been preconditioned on the submission of an international vaccination certification prior passport control; a number of countries have required to present international certificate on vaccination against yellow fever, for instance. At the major airports, measuring body temperature by thermovision or contactless thermometers is a regular part of the entry processes, too. In the future, a medical certification and medical card containing information about the current health status and health history will probably be required when traveling to countries in other regions of the world, too. This may even be required as early as at the planning or booking stages.

      The current crisis might even fuel developments in the area of travel documents, with a move from the traditional paper passport to a smartphone-based one possibly being the next step. Such a digital passport (or ‘AppPassport’) would allow integrating sensitive and - for privacy and personal data protection reasons - highly secured medical records, including the vaccination history for example, in addition to the current biometric data already contained in passports or identity cards. Given the high numbers of smartphone users and the broad mobile coverage, this would be feasible.

      The use of artificial intelligence in border management could furthermore help avoid physical contacts in situations when physical distancing is required for the prevention of infections. Increased use of contactless equipment (fingerprint scanners, facial recognition cameras, etc.) and robotic voice commands would enhance the health security of both border guards and travellers.

      Finally, technology could help solve some of the conflicting objectives of border security agencies, which must reconcile secure but speedy border checks and ensure cost-effectiveness but also the convenience for travellers. Automated border controls, so-called e-gates, have improved border checks at several border crossing points worldwide, especially at air borders. Airport passengers have widely accepted the intuitive and user-friendly automatic controls. E-gates can read biometric data; there is no reason why they should not also be able to read medical data in a secured manner. There will be a need to add additional parameters, for example by equipping e-gates with body temperature measuring devices and expand their installation to arrival halls at land and maritime border crossing points. Such e-gates would provide an early warning system to take the necessary precautions in a timely manner. Installing automatic sanitiser dispensers at e-gates or in arrival hall areas is another feasible option and a strong preventive tool.

      The process of reverting to regular mobility across international borders will take time as states will gradually assess the extent to which the coronavirus is contained. In the long-term, border controls as we knew them are going to change. If we manage to learn the right lessons from the crisis, this does not mean things have to change for the worse.


      https://www.icmpd.org/news-centre/news-detail/expert-voice-how-covid-19-is-changing-border-control
      #contrôles_frontaliers #dessin

      Avec ce commentaire de Marie Martin, via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 21.04.2020 :

      j’attire votre attention sur un article d’ICMPD paru la semaine dernière (publication de Borut Eržen, Monika Weber et Sandra Sacchetti).

      On croirait lire du Frontex dans le texte sur « la gestion des risques » (la criminalisation des personnes migrantes en moins cependant), et donc un discours très consensuel sur l’importance des contrôles aux frontières.

      Comme souvent, le bureau d’étude parvient à se positionner en tant qu’expert sans avoir à aborder les sujets « qui fâchent », notamment toute la question des droits fondamentaux. On se situe davantage sur la protection des intérêts des Etats, comment « gérer au mieux leurs frontières », ce qui fait d’ICMPD le chouchou de la Commission européenne et un interlocuteur privilégié pour voir ses recommandations reprises par les institutions régionales et nationales (ICMPD conseille aussi les autorités afghanes ou turques sur la question par exemple, et est allocataire de pas mal de fonds issus du Fonds Fiduciaire).

  • Why ’stronger borders’ don’t work

    Thousands of people die annually trying to cross borders. It’s often argued stronger borders and more checks would deter people from making dangerous crossings. But how accurate is this? Maya Goodfellow explores what the current border regime means for people seeking asylum

    https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2020/jan/21/why-stronger-borders-dont-work
    #fermeture_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #walls_don't_work #dissuasion #frontières #problème #solution #vidéo #externalisation #vulnérabilité #danger #péril #militarisation_des_frontières #ressources_pédagogiques #pull_factor #facteur_pull #stéréotypes #préjugés #pull-factor #audition #voies_légales #réinstallation

    Cette carte


    #cartographie #visualisation #frontières_intérieures #Schengen (fin de -)
    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Transcender
    (Update)

    Natalie

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Transcender-Update

    Paris, le 7 novembre 2019
    Amis,

    Ce sous-titre (premier pas vers l’auto-évaluation de votre adaptabilité langagière) signale que les développements à venir sont en prolongement de ce qui avait pourtant été annoncé, au « Plancher des vaches IV|II », comme enfin achevé.

    Le sujet étant, comme on le sait, en renouvellement permanent, il se trouve que la lecture, ce jour, de la synthèse du rapport « Le business de l’édification des murs », par Mark Akkerman (synthèse dont je vous recommande vivement la lecture), m’a incitée à me balader dans les sites de quelques-unes des organisations et entreprises mentionnées dans ledit rapport.

    Mark Akkerman : « Un grand nombre des entreprises répertoriées dans les présentes, notamment les grandes sociétés d’armement, font partie de l’EOS (Organisation européenne pour la sécurité), le plus important groupe de pression sur la sécurité des frontières. »

    Ça vous rappelle quelque chose ? (...)

    #langage #symbole #capitalisme #biométrie #La_Vache_qui_rit #libre-service #Schengen #Europe #interaction_digitale #X-Reality #migrants #asile #Paris

  • Denmark starts border checks at crossings to Sweden

    Danish police on Tuesday began performing border checks at the country’s crossings with Sweden, moves that followed a series of shootings and explosions around Copenhagen that Danish authorities say were carried out by people crossing the waterway between the Scandinavian neighbors.

    The checks were conducted on trains and vehicles crossing the Oresund Bridge over the narrow waterway that separates Copenhagen, Denmark’s largest city, and Malmo, Sweden’s third-largest city. Checks were also carried out at ferry ports.

    Police spokesman Jens Jespersen told The Associated Press that officers at the Oresund Bridge vehicle checkpoint had “a particular focus on cross-border crime involving explosives, weapons and drugs.” He also said authorities were stopping cars to have “a peak at who is inside.”

    “It gives us a pretty good picture of who is coming over,” he said.

    For years, Danes and Swedes have been able to cross without needing a passport. Now a passport is needed for Swedes entering Denmark — at least for the next six months.

    That requirement and the checkpoints come after violence that includes 13 explosions in Copenhagen since February, as well as a shooting in June that killed two Swedish citizens.

    The spiraling violence is believed to be gang related, stemming from disputes over drugs, money, protection and retaliation. An estimated 200 people in Malmo belong to about a dozen gangs.

    On Saturday, a shooting in Malmo killed a 15-year-old boy and critically wounded another. Police said the teenagers who were shot were well-known to authorities in Malmo and officials vowed to crack down even further on organized crime. No one has been arrested.

    Lilian Gustavsson, a 67-year-old Swedish woman who was about to embark on the train to Malmo from Copenhagen’s international airport, said she understood why the Danes were carrying out the checks.

    “I believe this will mean a little travel delay for everyone,” she said. “I fear we might get stuck, but better that than having criminals crossing.”

    As part of Monday’s checks, all vehicles coming from Sweden on the Orseund Bridge were led to a rest area on the Danish side. They then went through a large white tent where officers checked the driver, passengers and the car. Police scanned vehicle license plates, Jespersen said, “so if a (vehicle) is known in the system, we can pull it aside.”

    During the roughly four-hour check Monday, no one was pulled aside, he said. He declined to give details as to when police would carry out further checks but said “a good guess would be two or three times a week.”

    https://apnews.com/45659f17ec2e44eb8160ec4efeb10c21
    #fermeture_des_frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Schengen (fin de -) #frontières #Danemark #Suède #migrations #asile #réfugiés

    ping @reka

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox #High-Altitude_Pseudo-Satellites (#HAPS)

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

    • Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

      We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

      From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

      Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

      The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

      The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

      In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

      “In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

      Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

      “They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

      “For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

      Air Surveillance

      Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

      Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

      Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

      German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

      “The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

      “The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

      Sensors and cameras

      EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

      Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

      Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

      Surveillance centres

      In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

      https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

      At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

      Artificial intelligence

      The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

      The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu