• France : Macron annonce un doublement des #forces_de_sécurité aux frontières

    Le président français Emmanuel Macron a annoncé jeudi un doublement des forces contrôlant les frontières de la France, de 2.400 à 4.800, pour lutter contre la menace terroriste, les trafics et l’immigration illégale.

    Le président français Emmanuel Macron a annoncé jeudi un doublement des forces contrôlant les frontières de la France, de 2.400 à 4.800, pour lutter contre la menace terroriste, les trafics et l’immigration illégale.

    Ce doublement a été décidé « en raison de l’intensification de la #menace » après les récents #attentats, dont celui de Nice (Sud-Est), a expliqué le chef de l’État à la frontière franco-espagnole, au #col_du_Perthus, où « quatre unités mobiles » sont « en cours de déploiement ».

    Accompagné du ministre de l’Intérieur Gérald Darmanin et du secrétaire d’Etat chargé des Affaires européennes Clément Beaune, Emmanuel Macron s’est également dit « favorable » à une refondation « en profondeur » des règles régissant l’#espace_Schengen de #libre_circulation en Europe, et à « un plus grand contrôle » des frontières.

    « Je porterai en ce sens des premières propositions au Conseil » européen de décembre, pour « repenser l’organisation » de #Schengen et « intensifier notre protection commune aux frontières avec une véritable #police_de_sécurité_aux_frontières_extérieures », a-t-il ajouté. Avec la « volonté d’aboutir sous la présidence française », au premier semestre 2022.

    Cette refondation doit rendre l’espace Schengen « plus cohérent », pour qu’il « protège mieux ses frontières communes », qu’il « articule mieux » les impératifs de responsabilité de protection de frontières et de « #solidarité » et que « la charge ne soit pas qu’aux pays de première entrée ».

    « La France est un des principaux pays d’arrivée d’#immigration_secondaire », lorsque les migrants #déboutés d’un pays tentent leur chance dans un autre en Europe, et « je souhaite profondément aussi qu’on change les règles du jeu », a-t-il dit.

    Il a également plaidé pour « intensifier » la lutte contre l’#immigration_clandestine et les réseaux de #trafiquants « qui, de plus en plus souvent, sont liés aux réseaux terroristes ».

    « Nous prendrons les lois qui sont nécessaires, si elles correspondent à des besoins identifiés », a-t-il ajouté, mais la situation « ne justifie pas de changer la Constitution », a-t-il assuré, face à des pressions de responsables politiques de droite et d’extrême droite.

    Arrivé à la mi-journée au col du Perthus, Emmanuel Macron s’est entretenu avec les policiers de la #police_aux_frontières (#PAF) qui contrôlent les véhicules entrant en France par l’autoroute ou la nationale qui le traversent. L’un d’eux lui a notamment fait la démonstration d’un drone surveillant les voies de passage et les sentiers frontaliers.

    Puis il a visité le Centre franco-espagnol de coopération policière et douanière, où sont affectées 24 personnes des deux pays à plein temps. « Nous partageons un espace de travail et de convivialité (...) La coopération marche très bien », lui a assuré un responsable espagnol.

    « Depuis 2017, la coordination entre les services de renseignement a été renforcée et confiée à la DGSI (sécurité intérieure, ndlr). Les moyens financiers, humains et technologiques ont été considérablement augmentés », a déclaré Emmanuel Macron dans un tweet posté durant sa visite.

    Quelque 35.000 véhicules passent tous les jours sur l’autoroute et la route qui franchissent le col, entre les villes du Perthus en France et de La Jonquera en Espagne.

    L’#Espagne est l’une des principales portes d’entrée des immigrés clandestins en France, qui arrivent par la côte en provenance d’Afrique du nord. Plus de 4.000 migrants ont été refusés ces trois derniers mois dans le département des #Pyrénées-Orientales, selon un responsable de la PAF. Une partie d’entre eux étaient des Algériens tentant d’entrer en France.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/051120/france-macron-annonce-un-doublement-des-forces-de-securite-aux-frontieres

    #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières #France #terrorisme #migrations #immigration_illégale #militarisation_des_frontières

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Frontières : quel est l’impact du Covid-19 sur l’espace Schengen ? - actudaily
    #Covid-19#Europe#Schengen#frontiere#migrant#migration

    https://actudaily.com/index.php/2020/05/21/frontieres-quel-est-limpact-du-covid-19-sur-lespace-schengen

    La crise du Covid-19 a poussé les 26 Etats membres de l’espace Schengen à restreindre la circulation des personnes aux frontières extérieures de la zone, mais aussi en son sein. Ces mesures ont des implications politiques, économiques et juridiques, et menacent l’avenir de cet espace de libre circulation, qui n’avait jamais été aussi contrarié depuis son entrée en vigueur en 1995.

  • EU must go ’back to the future’ of open borders after COVID-19, commissioner says - Reuters
    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#Europe#Schengen

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-borders-idUSKBN22J2DM
    https://s1.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20200507&t=2&i=1517822106&w=1200&r=LYNXMPEG461D2

    BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The European Union must go “back to the future” of open borders once the coronavirus pandemic is brought under control, a senior EU official said on Thursday, after a spate of frontier closures by member states fraying the bloc’s cohesion.

  • Schengen, migration, asylum and security in times of COVID-19 | News | European Parliament
    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#Schengen#Europe#frontiere

    https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200505IPR78408/schengen-migration-asylum-and-security-in-times-of-covid-19

    MEPs will quiz Commissioner Johansson on the future of the border-free Schengen zone, common migration and asylum policy and security in the context of the pandemic.

  • La frontière franco-suisse au temps du coronavirus...

    Photos prises le dimanche 19.04.2020 par #Juliet_Fall

    Sunday morning bike ride with my family chasing newly/temporarily-closed borders around the Canton of Geneva during Covid19 pandemic. France & Switz are both in the Schengen area: these are usually open to people. Fascinating ad hoc use of different material. (#Bardonnex, #Soral)

    We chased closed borders on bicycles for three hours, starting early. Luckily, in Switzerland, we are allowed to exercise outside in family groups as long as we maintain distance to others. On the other side, in France, people are more tightly policed & controlled (Soral)

    Some borders that usually shut at night are now completely closed. The one in #Sézegnin used tape covered in private companies’ names ("La Mobiliaire"), making them seem even more improvised, as though people threw them together using whatever was at hand.

    Did a border professional grab a piece of pink chalk to mark out the line before they laid the concrete blocks? So many personal stories hidden in these geopolitical traces. Geography & history in the making: experiences & sights to remember (the best type of ’homeschooling’)...

    https://twitter.com/JulietJFall/status/1251838051434799104
    #Schengen (fin de-) #fin_de_Schengen #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #covid-19 #coronavirus #France #Suisse #Juliet_Fall @simplicissimus #Genève #Haute-Savoie
    #rematérialisation #matérialisation

    ping @isskein @reka

  • #Asile et #migrations dans l’Union européenne - Migrations - Toute l’#Europe
    https://www.touteleurope.eu/actualite/asile-et-migrations-dans-l-union-europeenne.html

    Combien y a-t-il de #migrants dans le monde et en Europe ? Qui sont les #réfugiés ? Quelle est la politique de l’#Union_européenne et qu’est-ce que l’espace #Schengen ? L’essentiel sur l’asile et les migrations.

  • #COVID-19 Restrictions

    In response to COVID-19, national governments have introduced a series of restrictions to slow the spread of the virus. Below is a map showing various constraints implemented by countries across Europe.


    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/covid-19-restrictions-4IdY3J
    #mobilité #fermeture_des_frontières #Europe #migrations #frontières #coronavirus #cartographie #visualisation #état_d'urgence #liberté_de_circulation #liberté_de_mouvement #Schengen (fin de -)
    ping @karine4 @reka @thomas_lacroix @isskein

    • How COVID-19 is changing border control

      The pandemic is teaching border agencies in Europe important lessons about operational preparedness in times of crisis. This has implications for the future in terms of training, staffing, cross-border information sharing and the use of technologies.

      COVID-19 has triggered an unprecedented chain reaction of border closures around the world in an effort to stop the virus, including in the Schengen area. This has raised the question of whether border controls are effective in containing such outbreaks; how well prepared were border agencies for the emergency; and where next for border management in a post-pandemic world.

      Operational realities and preparedness

      After the creation of the Schengen area 25 years ago, many of Europe’s border guards were re-assigned to the EU’s external borders or given other responsibilities inside their own Member States. Hence, when the pandemic hit, governments were suddenly under pressure to re-apply border infrastructure that has not existed in any real operational sense for decades. Some states reacted by limiting the number of entry/exit points; others mobilised border reserve units or asked the army or civil protection for support.

      Furthermore, border guards did not initially have the right information or training in public health issues. It took almost two weeks for the role of border agencies to be clarified as an auxiliary/support to public health services. In practice, border officials were directing vehicles and passengers to the specialists responsible for medical checks on the spot, while strict internal checks as prescribed by the Schengen Border Code and relevant national legislation were relaxed.

      At first, the new internal travel restrictions resulted in major congestion, but after a period of adjustment by travellers, border traffic actually declined sharply due to the growing awareness of the new reality. Consequently, some staff were redeployed internally to assist law enforcement with enforcing behavioural restrictions such as social distancing.

      The operational realities facing border agencies in the first stages of the outbreak highlighted the need to step up capacities and technical assistance on health-related issues, including crisis management and contingency planning.

      Lessons from the pandemic

      The need for improvement in three other headline areas is also clear: First, base-level cooperation between border guards, customs services and sanitary agencies must improve. Although the Guidelines for Integrated Border Management (IBM) in EC External Cooperation define health agencies as key players in IBM, the part on sanitary inspections in border management has to date received less attention than aspects related to security and trade. Hitherto, in the northern hemisphere at least, this was more a nice thing to have for most national administrations rather than a necessity. COVID-19 is changing that, making clear the need for better involvement of health inspections in border management.

      Second, countries need to cooperate better on early warning and risk assessment. This should start with agreed mechanisms to trigger the adoption of safeguards against the spread between countries, regions and continents. The fact that infected persons may be asymptomatic adds to the seriousness and scale of the pandemic and highlights the need to share information across borders, including threat perception and risk analysis. In addition, staff at borders must have a minimum level of awareness about sanitary risks related to persons, but also to goods.

      Third, the existing trend towards modernisation needs to accelerate. The current mobility restrictions have changed communication and working methods. This will affect how services provide training, capacity building and technical assistance to staff and key partners through a combination of traditional face-to-face approaches with remote actions (e.g. e-learning, webinars). Modernisation also needs to happen downstream so that operational staff have better access to virtual platforms (including via smart devices) to improve the flow of real-time information and raise overall preparedness at the borders.

      Border technology after the coronavirus pandemic

      Travel to some countries in Africa has since long been preconditioned on the submission of an international vaccination certification prior passport control; a number of countries have required to present international certificate on vaccination against yellow fever, for instance. At the major airports, measuring body temperature by thermovision or contactless thermometers is a regular part of the entry processes, too. In the future, a medical certification and medical card containing information about the current health status and health history will probably be required when traveling to countries in other regions of the world, too. This may even be required as early as at the planning or booking stages.

      The current crisis might even fuel developments in the area of travel documents, with a move from the traditional paper passport to a smartphone-based one possibly being the next step. Such a digital passport (or ‘AppPassport’) would allow integrating sensitive and - for privacy and personal data protection reasons - highly secured medical records, including the vaccination history for example, in addition to the current biometric data already contained in passports or identity cards. Given the high numbers of smartphone users and the broad mobile coverage, this would be feasible.

      The use of artificial intelligence in border management could furthermore help avoid physical contacts in situations when physical distancing is required for the prevention of infections. Increased use of contactless equipment (fingerprint scanners, facial recognition cameras, etc.) and robotic voice commands would enhance the health security of both border guards and travellers.

      Finally, technology could help solve some of the conflicting objectives of border security agencies, which must reconcile secure but speedy border checks and ensure cost-effectiveness but also the convenience for travellers. Automated border controls, so-called e-gates, have improved border checks at several border crossing points worldwide, especially at air borders. Airport passengers have widely accepted the intuitive and user-friendly automatic controls. E-gates can read biometric data; there is no reason why they should not also be able to read medical data in a secured manner. There will be a need to add additional parameters, for example by equipping e-gates with body temperature measuring devices and expand their installation to arrival halls at land and maritime border crossing points. Such e-gates would provide an early warning system to take the necessary precautions in a timely manner. Installing automatic sanitiser dispensers at e-gates or in arrival hall areas is another feasible option and a strong preventive tool.

      The process of reverting to regular mobility across international borders will take time as states will gradually assess the extent to which the coronavirus is contained. In the long-term, border controls as we knew them are going to change. If we manage to learn the right lessons from the crisis, this does not mean things have to change for the worse.


      https://www.icmpd.org/news-centre/news-detail/expert-voice-how-covid-19-is-changing-border-control
      #contrôles_frontaliers #dessin

      Avec ce commentaire de Marie Martin, via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 21.04.2020 :

      j’attire votre attention sur un article d’ICMPD paru la semaine dernière (publication de Borut Eržen, Monika Weber et Sandra Sacchetti).

      On croirait lire du Frontex dans le texte sur « la gestion des risques » (la criminalisation des personnes migrantes en moins cependant), et donc un discours très consensuel sur l’importance des contrôles aux frontières.

      Comme souvent, le bureau d’étude parvient à se positionner en tant qu’expert sans avoir à aborder les sujets « qui fâchent », notamment toute la question des droits fondamentaux. On se situe davantage sur la protection des intérêts des Etats, comment « gérer au mieux leurs frontières », ce qui fait d’ICMPD le chouchou de la Commission européenne et un interlocuteur privilégié pour voir ses recommandations reprises par les institutions régionales et nationales (ICMPD conseille aussi les autorités afghanes ou turques sur la question par exemple, et est allocataire de pas mal de fonds issus du Fonds Fiduciaire).

  • Why ’stronger borders’ don’t work

    Thousands of people die annually trying to cross borders. It’s often argued stronger borders and more checks would deter people from making dangerous crossings. But how accurate is this? Maya Goodfellow explores what the current border regime means for people seeking asylum

    https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2020/jan/21/why-stronger-borders-dont-work
    #fermeture_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #walls_don't_work #dissuasion #frontières #problème #solution #vidéo #externalisation #vulnérabilité #danger #péril #militarisation_des_frontières #ressources_pédagogiques #pull_factor #facteur_pull #stéréotypes #préjugés #pull-factor #audition #voies_légales #réinstallation

    Cette carte


    #cartographie #visualisation #frontières_intérieures #Schengen (fin de -)
    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Transcender
    (Update)

    Natalie

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Transcender-Update

    Paris, le 7 novembre 2019
    Amis,

    Ce sous-titre (premier pas vers l’auto-évaluation de votre adaptabilité langagière) signale que les développements à venir sont en prolongement de ce qui avait pourtant été annoncé, au « Plancher des vaches IV|II », comme enfin achevé.

    Le sujet étant, comme on le sait, en renouvellement permanent, il se trouve que la lecture, ce jour, de la synthèse du rapport « Le business de l’édification des murs », par Mark Akkerman (synthèse dont je vous recommande vivement la lecture), m’a incitée à me balader dans les sites de quelques-unes des organisations et entreprises mentionnées dans ledit rapport.

    Mark Akkerman : « Un grand nombre des entreprises répertoriées dans les présentes, notamment les grandes sociétés d’armement, font partie de l’EOS (Organisation européenne pour la sécurité), le plus important groupe de pression sur la sécurité des frontières. »

    Ça vous rappelle quelque chose ? (...)

    #langage #symbole #capitalisme #biométrie #La_Vache_qui_rit #libre-service #Schengen #Europe #interaction_digitale #X-Reality #migrants #asile #Paris

  • Denmark starts border checks at crossings to Sweden

    Danish police on Tuesday began performing border checks at the country’s crossings with Sweden, moves that followed a series of shootings and explosions around Copenhagen that Danish authorities say were carried out by people crossing the waterway between the Scandinavian neighbors.

    The checks were conducted on trains and vehicles crossing the Oresund Bridge over the narrow waterway that separates Copenhagen, Denmark’s largest city, and Malmo, Sweden’s third-largest city. Checks were also carried out at ferry ports.

    Police spokesman Jens Jespersen told The Associated Press that officers at the Oresund Bridge vehicle checkpoint had “a particular focus on cross-border crime involving explosives, weapons and drugs.” He also said authorities were stopping cars to have “a peak at who is inside.”

    “It gives us a pretty good picture of who is coming over,” he said.

    For years, Danes and Swedes have been able to cross without needing a passport. Now a passport is needed for Swedes entering Denmark — at least for the next six months.

    That requirement and the checkpoints come after violence that includes 13 explosions in Copenhagen since February, as well as a shooting in June that killed two Swedish citizens.

    The spiraling violence is believed to be gang related, stemming from disputes over drugs, money, protection and retaliation. An estimated 200 people in Malmo belong to about a dozen gangs.

    On Saturday, a shooting in Malmo killed a 15-year-old boy and critically wounded another. Police said the teenagers who were shot were well-known to authorities in Malmo and officials vowed to crack down even further on organized crime. No one has been arrested.

    Lilian Gustavsson, a 67-year-old Swedish woman who was about to embark on the train to Malmo from Copenhagen’s international airport, said she understood why the Danes were carrying out the checks.

    “I believe this will mean a little travel delay for everyone,” she said. “I fear we might get stuck, but better that than having criminals crossing.”

    As part of Monday’s checks, all vehicles coming from Sweden on the Orseund Bridge were led to a rest area on the Danish side. They then went through a large white tent where officers checked the driver, passengers and the car. Police scanned vehicle license plates, Jespersen said, “so if a (vehicle) is known in the system, we can pull it aside.”

    During the roughly four-hour check Monday, no one was pulled aside, he said. He declined to give details as to when police would carry out further checks but said “a good guess would be two or three times a week.”

    https://apnews.com/45659f17ec2e44eb8160ec4efeb10c21
    #fermeture_des_frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Schengen (fin de -) #frontières #Danemark #Suède #migrations #asile #réfugiés

    ping @reka

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

  • The creation of preconditions for Croatia’s entry into #Schengen is visible in the both on the field and diplomacy - while the Croatian border police continues to prevent the entry of refugees into the country and does not restrain from using violent methods, Minister #Božinović received praises from Bavarian Minister of Interior, Sports and Integration, #Joachim_Herrman, on the work of Croatian #police and protection of Croatian Borders (http://hr.n1info.com/Vijesti/a401099/Bavarski-ministar-unutarnjih-poslova-pohvalio-hrvatsku-granicnu-policiju.). The border area of the European Union seems to have become a mirror in which politics sees only itself and those who “pat it on the back”, while they refuse to face with the reality.

    #route_des_balkans #Allemagne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Croatie #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #militarisation_des_frontières #buffer_zone #Balkans

    Une manière de contrôler la #frontière_sud-alpine

    Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa dobrodosli, le 15.05.2019

    ping @isskein

  • Mobilisation générale des tireurs

    La Suisse doit adapter sa législation sur les armes aux prescriptions de l’#UE si elle ne veut pas mettre en péril les accords de Schengen. Le projet essuie les tirs nourris des amateurs d’#armes. Il sera soumis au vote du peuple le 19 mai.

    Quand il est question d’armes, le débat devient rapidement houleux en Suisse, et le premier tireur du pays, Guillaume Tell, n’est jamais très loin… Il reprend du service en ce moment, par exemple sur le site web de #Pro_Tell, la société pour un droit libéral sur les armes, où il dresse sa main droite en signe d’arrêt, flanqué de ce slogan : « La Suisse libre, non au diktat de l’UE qui nous désarme ! » Guillaume Tell ne se bat pas seul. René Schneider est lui aussi prêt à dégainer. Excellent connaisseur du tir, il est président d’honneur de la société Militärschützen Unterseen, membre d’honneur de l’Oberländischer Schützenverband de Berne et membre d’honneur de l’Association sportive bernoise de tir. Voici ce qu’il a dit à la « Revue Suisse » : « Nous sommes un peuple démocratique et décidons nous-mêmes ce que nous voulons et ce que nous ne voulons pas. Nous ne devons en aucun cas tolérer que le tir sportif, cette grande tradition suisse, soit anéanti par la directive de l’UE sur les armes. » Celle-ci est sous le feu des attaques des tireurs suisses.

    L’origine des débats remonte aux attentats terroristes de 2015 à Paris, au cours desquels 130 personnes ont été abattues avec des armes semi-automatiques. Peu après, l’UE a durci sa législation sur les armes. La Suisse faisant partie de l’espace Schengen, et donc du réseau européen de sécurité policière, elle doit intégrer les nouvelles dispositions à sa législation nationale sur les armes. C’est précisément ce contre quoi s’élèvent les sociétés de tireurs, soutenues par l’UDC. Elles ont lancé un référendum.

    Les #armes_semi-automatiques en point de mire

    Seront interdites les armes semi-automatiques ayant des chargeurs de grande capacité. Il s’agit des fusils, revolvers et pistolets avec lesquels on peut tirer plusieurs coups d’affilée : s’il reste nécessaire de déclencher chaque tir, l’arme ne doit pas être rechargée. Problème : les fusils d’assaut 90 et 57, très répandus parmi les tireurs suisses, font justement partie de ces armes semi-automatiques. La Suisse a cependant négocié des #dérogations avec l’UE : l’#arme_d’ordonnance pourra toujours être conservée à la maison et utilisée après la fin du #service_militaire. L’UE a ainsi véritablement fait une fleur à la Suisse, cette dérogation ne s’appliquant qu’à la Confédération. On parle d’ailleurs même parfois, pour cette raison-là, de « Lex Helvetica ».

    Les personnes possédant déjà une telle arme pourront elles aussi la conserver. Elles doivent simplement, si elles ne l’ont pas encore effectué, la faire inscrire dans les trois ans au registre cantonal des armes. De leur côté, les tireurs sportifs pourront toujours acquérir ce type d’armes. Ils devront cependant être membres d’une société de tir ou prouver qu’ils pratiquent régulièrement le tir sportif. Par « régulièrement », les autorités entendent cinq séances de tir en cinq ans.

    Alors, qu’est-ce qui gêne concrètement les tireurs dans ces nouvelles règles ? Réponse de René Schneider : « Nous ne serions plus les propriétaires d’une arme, mais seulement les détenteurs d’armes interdites soumis à des obligations particulières et tolérés par l’État ! Nos pratiquerions notre sport avec des ‹armes interdites›. L’acquisition d’une arme ne serait possible qu’avec une autorisation exceptionnelle. Or, cette autorisation est bien plus stricte que le permis d’acquisition d’armes exigé aujourd’hui, et entraînerait une diminution massive du nombre de tireuses et de tireurs. » René Schneider trouve en outre « absolument illogique » qu’une arme fournie par l’armée ne soit pas considérée comme interdite, alors qu’une arme achetée en privé le soit, « bien qu’il s’agisse de la même arme. Cela engendrerait un système à deux vitesses parmi les tireurs. »

    Cette nouvelle réglementation ne serait-elle pas susceptible de gonfler les rangs des membres des sociétés de tir, puisqu’elle requiert notamment que les tireurs sportifs s’affilient à une telle association ? « Absolument pas », tranche René Schneider, catégorique. « Dans notre association, nous n’acceptons que les nouveaux membres introduits par un membre déjà inscrit. Ainsi, nous nous assurons de n’enrôler que des personnes dont la réputation est intègre. Nous n’accueillons pas n’importe quel quidam qui frappe à notre porte. Les obligations et responsabilités se reporteraient, j’en suis certain, sur les sociétés de tir. Celles-ci pourraient tout à coup avoir à fournir des preuves de tir pour leurs membres. »
    La sortie de Schengen coûterait des milliards

    Dans les sociétés de tir, la méfiance est donc grande. Même si le Parlement s’est donné la peine de réduire autant que possible la charge administrative. Josef Dittli, conseiller d’État libéral uranais, a résumé la situation ainsi : « Nous voulons prendre en compte les particularités suisses et la tradition dans le domaine du tir sans mettre en péril les accords de Schengen. » Toutes les requêtes de la gauche visant à durcir encore la législation sur les armes ont été rejetées, tout comme celle de l’UDC, qui s’opposait à l’application des règles européennes.

    Nicolo Paganini, conseiller national PDC, invite à ne pas sacrifier ces accords « pour en faire un exemple en matière de souveraineté sur un objet inapproprié ». L’Office fédéral de la police (fedpol) rappelle lui aussi les problèmes que cela engendrerait : sans Schengen, « notre police serait aveugle et sourde ». Il souligne qu’il est important que la Suisse continue de faire partie du réseau européen de sécurité. Mettre sur pied un système de sécurité policière national correspondant aux standards actuels de Schengen coûterait entre 400 et 500 millions de francs. De surcroît, la perte du visa Schengen aurait de graves conséquences pour le tourisme suisse et les régions frontalières. D’après la Confédération, la sortie de Schengen équivaudrait à une perte de revenus de l’ordre d’onze milliards de francs par an pour l’économie suisse.

    N’est-ce pas un prix trop cher à payer pour épargner quelques éventuelles tracasseries administratives aux tireurs ? René Schneider demeure quelque peu évasif à ce sujet. Le Conseil fédéral doit d’après lui renégocier la directive sur les armes de l’UE avec celle-ci : « Je suis convaincu qu’une solution peut être trouvée qui soit acceptable pour les deux parties et ne mette pas en péril les accords. »
    La Suisse : un véritable arsenal

    Le tir est une tradition ancestrale en Suisse, et les amateurs d’armes y sont nombreux : en 2013, date de la dernière estimation de la Confédération, les Suisses possédaient près de deux millions d’armes à feu. Des recherches de la « NZZ am Sonntag » montrent que les cantons ont depuis délivré entre 150 000 et 250 000 permis d’acquisition d’armes. Étant donné qu’il est possible d’acheter jusqu’à trois armes par permis, il est raisonnable de penser que 2,5 à 3 millions d’armes à feu se trouvent actuellement dans les foyers suisses.

    https://www.revue.ch/fr/editions/2019/02/detail/news/detail/News/mobilisation-generale-des-tireurs
    #loi #Suisse #Schengen #Euro-compatibilité #votation

    • #PROTELL

      La Commission de la politique de sécurité du Conseil des Etats est restée sourde à l’appel de PROTELL et des organisations alliées. Suivant la voie funeste tracée par le Conseil national, elle propose elle aussi d’apporter à notre loi sur les armes les durcissements exigés par l’UE. Il ne s’est trouvé qu’un unique Sénateur contre 11 et une abstention pour oser dire non et défendre jusqu’au bout les droits et les libertés des centaines de milliers de détenteurs d’armes de ce pays.

      Le Conseil des Etats débattra de cet objet en septembre. Les divergences avec le National seront éliminées au cours de cette même session. Le vote final est prévu pour le 28 septembre. PROTELL mobilisera évidemment tous ses relais pour convaincre les parlementaires fédéraux de rejeter ce texte inique dont les effets se résument ainsi : moins de droits pour pas plus de sécurité (c’est quand même cher payé !).

      PROTELL réaffirme que ses obligations découlant de l’accord de Schengen, la Suisse les a déjà honorées en 2008 et en 2015. Nous disposons ainsi, aujourd’hui, d’une loi adaptée à nos traditions et à notre culture qui, avec d’autres facteurs, fait de notre pays l’un des plus sûrs au monde. Ce que demande PROTELL, c’est qu’au lieu de punir injustement les honnêtes citoyens sans aucun effet ni sur le terrorisme ni en termes de sécurité publique, on s’en tienne au droit en vigueur, tout simplement parce qu’il a fait ses preuves.

      PROTELL invite toutes les organisations qui, avec elle, défendent les droits et les libertés des détenteurs d’armes (tireurs, chasseurs, collectionneurs, citoyens-soldats), à s’unir dans ce but et à ne pas hésiter, si le Parlement fédéral persiste à ignorer leur appel, à lancer un référendum. S’il le faut, nous nous donnerons rendez-vous devant le peuple qui, dans notre pays, a une chance unique : c’est lui qui peut avoir le dernier mot !

      PROTELL appelle en outre tous ses membres et sympathisants à contacter les parlementaires fédéraux qu’ils connaissent pour les sensibiliser à la valeur de nos traditions ancestrales et leur répéter clairement le mot d’ordre décidé par son assemblée générale : pour PROTELL, le droit sur les armes n’est pas négociable !

      https://www.protell.ch/fr
      #référendum

  • Quand l’#Union_europeénne se met au #fact-checking... et que du coup, elle véhicule elle-même des #préjugés...
    Et les mythes sont pensés à la fois pour les personnes qui portent un discours anti-migrants ("L’UE ne protège pas ses frontières"), comme pour ceux qui portent des discours pro-migrants ("L’UE veut créer une #forteresse_Europe")...
    Le résultat ne peut être que mauvais, surtout vu les pratiques de l’UE...

    Je copie-colle ici les mythes et les réponses de l’UE à ce mythe...


    #crise_migratoire


    #frontières #protection_des_frontières


    #Libye #IOM #OIM #évacuation #détention #détention_arbitraire #centres #retours_volontaires #retour_volontaire #droits_humains


    #push-back #refoulement #Libye


    #aide_financière #Espagne #Grèce #Italie #Frontex #gardes-frontière #EASO


    #Forteresse_européenne


    #global_compact


    #frontières_intérieures #Schengen #Espace_Schengen


    #ONG #sauvetage #mer #Méditerranée


    #maladies #contamination


    #criminels #criminalité


    #économie #coût #bénéfice


    #externalisation #externalisation_des_frontières


    #Fonds_fiduciaire #dictature #dictatures #régimes_autoritaires

    https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20190306_managing-migration-factsheet-debunking-myths-about-migration_en.p
    #préjugés #mythes #migrations #asile #réfugiés
    #hypocrisie #on_n'est_pas_sorti_de_l'auberge
    ping @reka @isskein

  • Un projet de #fichage géant des citoyens non membres de l’#UE prend forme en #Europe

    Un accord provisoire a été signé le 5 février entre la présidence du Conseil européen et le Parlement européen pour renforcer les contrôles aux frontières de l’Union. Il va consolider la mise en commun de fichiers de données personnelles. Les défenseurs des libertés individuelles s’alarment.

    Des appareils portables équipés de lecteurs d’#empreintes_digitales et d’#images_faciales, pour permettre aux policiers de traquer des terroristes : ce n’est plus de la science-fiction, mais un projet européen en train de devenir réalité. Le 5 février 2019, un accord préliminaire sur l’#interopérabilité des #systèmes_d'information au niveau du continent a ainsi été signé.

    Il doit permettre l’unification de six #registres avec des données d’#identification_alphanumériques et biométriques (empreintes digitales et images faciales) de citoyens non membres de l’UE. En dépit des nombreuses réserves émises par les Cnil européennes.

    Giovanni Buttarelli, contrôleur européen de la protection des données, a qualifié cette proposition de « point de non-retour » dans le système de base de données européen. En substance, les registres des demandeurs d’asile (#Eurodac), des demandeurs de visa pour l’Union européenne (#Visa) et des demandeurs (système d’information #Schengen) seront joints à trois nouvelles bases de données mises en place ces derniers mois, toutes concernant des citoyens non membres de l’UE.

    Pourront ainsi accéder à la nouvelle base de données les forces de police des États membres, mais aussi les responsables d’#Interpol, d’#Europol et, dans de nombreux cas, même les #gardes-frontières de l’agence européenne #Frontex. Ils pourront rechercher des personnes par nom, mais également par empreinte digitale ou faciale, et croiser les informations de plusieurs bases de données sur une personne.

    « L’interopérabilité peut consister en un seul registre avec des données isolées les unes des autres ou dans une base de données centralisée. Cette dernière hypothèse peut comporter des risques graves de perte d’informations sensibles, explique Buttarelli. Le choix entre les deux options est un détail fondamental qui sera clarifié au moment de la mise en œuvre. »

    Le Parlement européen et le Conseil doivent encore approuver officiellement l’accord, avant qu’il ne devienne législation.

    Les #risques de la méga base de données

    « J’ai voté contre l’interopérabilité parce que c’est une usine à gaz qui n’est pas conforme aux principes de proportionnalité, de nécessité et de finalité que l’on met en avant dès lors qu’il peut être question d’atteintes aux droits fondamentaux et aux libertés publiques, assure Marie-Christine Vergiat, députée européenne, membre de la commission des libertés civiles. On mélange tout : les autorités de contrôle aux #frontières et les autorités répressives par exemple, alors que ce ne sont pas les mêmes finalités. »

    La proposition de règlement, élaborée par un groupe d’experts de haut niveau d’institutions européennes et d’États membres, dont les noms n’ont pas été révélés, avait été présentée par la Commission en décembre 2017, dans le but de prévenir les attaques terroristes et de promouvoir le contrôle aux frontières.

    Les institutions de l’UE sont pourtant divisées quant à son impact sur la sécurité des citoyens : d’un côté, Krum Garkov, directeur de #Eu-Lisa – l’agence européenne chargée de la gestion de l’immense registre de données –, estime qu’elle va aider à prévenir les attaques et les terroristes en identifiant des criminels sous de fausses identités. De l’autre côté, Giovanni Buttarelli met en garde contre une base de données centralisée, qui risque davantage d’être visée par des cyberattaques. « Nous ne devons pas penser aux simples pirates, a-t-il déclaré. Il y a des puissances étrangères très intéressées par la vulnérabilité de ces systèmes. »

    L’utilité pour l’antiterrorisme : les doutes des experts

    L’idée de l’interopérabilité des systèmes d’information est née après le 11-Septembre. Elle s’est développée en Europe dans le contexte de la crise migratoire et des attentats de 2015, et a été élaborée dans le cadre d’une relation de collaboration étroite entre les institutions européennes chargées du contrôle des frontières et l’industrie qui développe les technologies pour le mettre en œuvre.

    « L’objectif de lutte contre le terrorisme a disparu : on parle maintenant de “#fraude_à_l'identité”, et l’on mélange de plus en plus lutte contre la #criminalité et lutte contre l’immigration dite irrégulière, ajoute Vergiat. J’ai participé à la commission spéciale du Parlement européen sur la #lutte_contre_le_terrorisme ; je sais donc que le lien entre #terrorisme et #immigration dite irrégulière est infinitésimal. On compte les cas de ressortissants de pays tiers arrêtés pour faits de terrorisme sur les doigts d’une main. »

    Dans la future base de données, « un référentiel d’identité unique collectera les données personnelles des systèmes d’information des différents pays, tandis qu’un détecteur d’identités multiples reliera les différentes identités d’un même individu », a déclaré le directeur d’Eu-Lisa, lors de la conférence annuelle de l’#Association_européenne_de_biométrie (#European_Association_for_Biometrics#EAB) qui réunit des représentants des fabricants des technologies de #reconnaissance_numérique nécessaires à la mise en œuvre du système.

    « Lors de l’attaque de Berlin, perpétrée par le terroriste Anis Amri, nous avons constaté que cet individu avait 14 identités dans l’Union européenne, a-t-il expliqué. Il est possible que, s’il y avait eu une base de données interopérable, il aurait été arrêté auparavant. »

    Cependant, Reinhard Kreissl, directeur du Vienna Centre for Societal Security (Vicesse) et expert en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, souligne que, dans les attentats terroristes perpétrés en Europe ces dix dernières années, « les auteurs étaient souvent des citoyens européens, et ne figuraient donc pas dans des bases de données qui devaient être unifiées. Et tous étaient déjà dans les radars des forces de police ».

    « Tout agent des services de renseignement sérieux admettra qu’il dispose d’une liste de 1 000 à 1 500 individus dangereux, mais qu’il ne peut pas les suivre tous, ajoute Kreissl. Un trop-plein de données n’aide pas la police. »

    « L’interopérabilité coûte des milliards de dollars et l’intégration de différents systèmes n’est pas aussi facile qu’il y paraît », déclare Sandro Gaycken, directeur du Digital Society Institute à l’Esmt de Berlin. « Il est préférable d’investir dans l’intelligence des gens, dit l’expert en cyberintelligence, afin d’assurer plus de #sécurité de manière moins intrusive pour la vie privée. »

    Le #budget frontière de l’UE augmente de 197 %

    La course aux marchés publics pour la mise en place de la nouvelle base de données est sur le point de commencer : dans le chapitre consacré aux dépenses « Migration et contrôle des frontières » du budget proposé par la Commission pour la période 2021-2027, le fonds de gestion des frontières a connu une augmentation de 197 %, tandis que la part consacrée aux politiques de migration et d’asile n’a augmenté, en comparaison, que de 36 %.

    En 2020, le système #Entry_Exit (#Ees, ou #SEE, l’une des trois nouvelles bases de données centralisées avec interopérabilité) entrera en vigueur. Il oblige chaque État membre à collecter les empreintes digitales et les images de visages de tous les citoyens non européens entrant et sortant de l’Union, et d’alerter lorsque les permis de résidence expirent.

    Cela signifie que chaque frontière, aéroportuaire, portuaire ou terrestre, doit être équipée de lecteurs d’empreintes digitales et d’images faciales. La Commission a estimé que ce SEE coûterait 480 millions d’euros pour les quatre premières années. Malgré l’énorme investissement de l’Union, de nombreuses dépenses resteront à la charge des États membres.

    Ce sera ensuite au tour d’#Etias (#Système_européen_d’information_de_voyage_et_d’autorisation), le nouveau registre qui établit un examen préventif des demandes d’entrée, même pour les citoyens de pays étrangers qui n’ont pas besoin de visa pour entrer dans l’UE. Cette dernière a estimé son coût à 212,1 millions d’euros, mais le règlement, en plus de prévoir des coûts supplémentaires pour les États, mentionne des « ressources supplémentaires » à garantir aux agences de l’UE responsables de son fonctionnement, en particulier pour les gardes-côtes et les gardes-frontières de Frontex.

    C’est probablement la raison pour laquelle le #budget proposé pour Frontex a plus que triplé pour les sept prochaines années, pour atteindre 12 milliards d’euros. Le tout dans une ambiance de conflits d’intérêts entre l’agence européenne et l’industrie de la biométrie.

    Un membre de l’unité recherche et innovation de Frontex siège ainsi au conseil d’administration de l’#Association_européenne_de_biométrie (#EAB), qui regroupe les principales organisations de recherche et industrielles du secteur de l’identification numérique, et fait aussi du lobbying. La conférence annuelle de l’association a été parrainée par le géant biométrique français #Idemia et la #Security_Identity_Alliance.

    L’agente de recherche de Frontex et membre du conseil d’EAB Rasa Karbauskaite a ainsi suggéré à l’auditoire de représentants de l’industrie de participer à la conférence organisée par Frontex avec les États membres : « L’occasion de montrer les dernières technologies développées. » Un représentant de l’industrie a également demandé à Karbauskaite d’utiliser son rôle institutionnel pour faire pression sur l’Icao, l’agence des Nations unies chargée de la législation des passeports, afin de rendre les technologies de sécurité des données biométriques obligatoires pour le monde entier.

    La justification est toujours de « protéger les citoyens européens du terrorisme international », mais il n’existe toujours aucune donnée ou étude sur la manière dont les nouveaux registres de données biométriques et leur interconnexion peuvent contribuer à cet objectif.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/250219/un-projet-de-fichage-geant-de-citoyens-prend-forme-en-europe
    #surveillance_de_masse #surveillance #étrangers #EU #anti-terrorisme #big-data #biométrie #complexe_militaro-industriel #business

    • Règlement (UE) 2019/817 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 20 mai 2019 portant établissement d’un cadre pour l’interopérabilité des systèmes d’information de l’UE dans le domaine des frontières et des visas

      Point 9 du préambule du règlement UE 2019/817

      "Dans le but d’améliorer l’efficacité et l’efficience des vérifications aux frontières extérieures, de contribuer à prévenir et combattre l’immigration illégale et de favoriser un niveau élevé de sécurité au sein de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice de l’Union, y compris la préservation de la sécurité publique et de l’ordre public et la sauvegarde de la sécurité sur les territoires des États membres, d’améliorer la mise en œuvre de la politique commune des visas, d’aider dans l’examen des demandes de protection internationale, de contribuer à la prévention et à la détection des infractions terroristes et d’autres infractions pénales graves et aux enquêtes en la matière, de faciliter l’identification de personnes inconnues qui ne sont pas en mesure de s’identifier elles-mêmes ou des restes humains non identifiés en cas de catastrophe naturelle, d’accident ou d’attaque terroriste, afin de préserver la confiance des citoyens à l’égard du régime d’asile et de migration de l’Union, des mesures de sécurité de l’Union et de la capacité de l’Union à gérer les frontières extérieures, il convient d’établir l’interopérabilité des systèmes d’information de l’UE, à savoir le système d’entrée/de sortie (EES), le système d’information sur les visas (VIS), le système européen d’information et d’autorisation concernant les voyages (ETIAS), Eurodac, le système d’information Schengen (SIS) et le système européen d’information sur les casiers judiciaires pour les ressortissants de pays tiers (ECRIS-TCN), afin que lesdits systèmes d’information de l’UE et leurs données se complètent mutuellement, tout en respectant les droits fondamentaux des personnes, en particulier le droit à la protection des données à caractère personnel. À cet effet, il convient de créer un portail de recherche européen (ESP), un service partagé d’établissement de correspondances biométriques (#BMS partagé), un répertoire commun de données d’identité (#CIR) et un détecteur d’identités multiples (#MID) en tant qu’éléments d’interopérabilité.

      http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/bases-de-donnees-interoperabilite-reglement-ue-2019817-frontier

  • 21.11.2018 – UE - Tunisie - Conseil d’association - Priorités stratégiques

    Décision n° 1/2018 du Conseil d’association UE-Tunisie du 9 novembre 2018 adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE-Tunisie pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    Consolider le partenariat privilégié UE-Tunisie : priorités stratégiques pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    2.3. Rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration

    Le rapprochement entre les sociétés tunisiennes et européennes constitue un pilier essentiel du partenariat privilégié, à travers le renforcement des échanges entre peuples, sociétés et cultures. Cette dimension mobilité revêt une importance particulière dans la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la Jeunesse. La mise en œuvre effective de l’association de la Tunisie à Horizon 2020 et sa participation à Europe Créative et Erasmus+ seront les pierres angulaires de ces efforts.

    La gestion concertée de la migration est une priorité politique, tant pour la Tunisie que pour l’Union européenne. Les deux parties s’engagent à intensifier le dialogue et la coopération, notamment par la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la mobilité, le renforcement de la lutte contre les causes profondes de la migration irrégulière, ainsi qu’une disponibilité européenne pour soutenir la mise en place d’un système d’asile tunisien. Cette coopération, qui reflétera aussi la dimension régionale de ces problématiques, inclura :

    -- la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale tunisienne en matière de migration, couvrant également l’asile et la protection internationale, y inclus la mise en œuvre d’un cadre législatif approprié,

    -- la conclusion des négociations d’accords de réadmission et de facilitation des visas,

    -- la bonne gouvernance de la migration légale, par une meilleure coordination avec les États membres de l’Union européenne dans le respect de leurs compétences, y compris à travers la mise en place de schémas pilotes de mobilité et une meilleure intégration des migrants dans les pays hôtes,

    --

    le soutien à la mobilisation des Tunisiens de l’étranger pour les investissements dans les secteurs innovants en Tunisie,

    -- le soutien à la prévention de la migration irrégulière, en particulier par une meilleure prise en compte des questions migratoires dans les stratégies de développement ; ceci passe également par une gestion des frontières renforcée et par des campagnes de sensibilisation sur les risques de la migration irrégulière,

    -- le soutien aux activités de prévention, et de lutte contre le trafic des migrants et la traite des êtres humains, y compris à travers la détection et la poursuite des réseaux criminels, et

    -- la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour.

    –-> https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.293.01.0039.01.FRA&toc=OJ:L:2018:293:TOC

    http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/ue-tunisie-conseil-d-association-priorites-strategiques.html
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #EU #UE #Europe

    Commentaire de Claudia Charles sur la mailing-list Migreurop :

    En complément du message envoyé par Alizée, voici un article sur la décision n° 1/2018 du conseil d’association (en vertu de l’#accord_d'association UE - Tunisie) "adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE - Tunisie pour la période 2018 - 2020

    Le point sur « rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration » se résume (rien de nouveau) à l’adoption, par la Tunisie, d’une réglementation en matière de migration et d’asile, des mesurettes concernant la mobilité (ce qui était déjà dit à multiples occasions et enceintes (processus de Rabat, Sommet de Malte, FFU, partenariat pour la mobilité), et les #accords_de_réadmission / facilitation de #visa.

    L’#OIM aura sa part du gâteau : « la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et #réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la #réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour. »

    #IOM #retours #renvois #expulsions

    ping @_kg_

    • L’émigration irrégulière : Conception de l’opération et parade

      L’émigration vers l’Europe n’est pas un phénomène nouveau en Tunisie car elle date depuis 1970. Par contre, l’émigration irrégulière (la #Harga) entre les côtes tunisiennes et italiennes a commencé en 1990 lorsque l’#Italie a ratifié les accords #Schengen imposant ainsi des #visas d’entrée pour les ressortissants tunisiens.

      Une étude élaborée par le Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux (FTDES) montre qu’avant la révolution de 2011, 30% des Tunisiens de moins de 35 ans exprimaient le désir de migrer vers l’Europe. En raison de la #crise_économique qui ne cesse de frapper le pays durant la période de transition démocratique, ce chiffre a grimpé à 54% en 2017.

      La recrudescence de l’#émigration clandestine à partir de 2015 s’est traduite par des chiffres très alarmants. En effet, 119.369 migrants sont arrivés en Italie en 2017 alors que le nombre de victimes en 2016 est de 5000 selon un rapport publié par les Nations Unies.

      Face à cette situation préoccupante, l’Europe cherche à coordonner avec les #pays_de_transit en vue de trouver une solution à ce quelle considère une menace asymétrique qui pèse sur la sécurité de l’Occident.

      Aujourd’hui, les causes de l’émigration irrégulière sont connues et toute solution au problème doit passer par une combinaison de mesures politiques, économiques, sociales et sécuritaires.
      Sachant que les mesures politiques et socio-économiques ont fait l’objet de plusieurs études, le présent article est consacré à l’explication du volet opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. Une explication sans laquelle toute mesure sécuritaire reste incomplète et non concluante.

      Ainsi, après une présentation succincte de l’importance géographique de la Tunisie qui fait du pays un tremplin pour l’Europe, je prendrai en détails la conception de l’opération d’émigration clandestine avant de proposer les actions à entreprendre pour interdire ou contrer cette opération.

      1. Importance géographique de la Tunisie

      Selon une carte tracée par l’Union Européenne, les flux de l’émigration clandestine à destination de l’Europe suivent trois routes en mer méditerranéenne : La route occidentale qui passe par Gibraltar, la route centrale qui passe par la Tunisie et la Libye (carte nr1) et la route orientale qui passe par la Turquie et la mer Egée.

      Sur cette route centrale, la Tunisie occupe une place privilégiée. En effet, située sur le canal de Sicile qui constitue un pont entre l’Afrique et l’Europe et marquée par des conditions météorologiques clémentes sur la quasi-totalité de l’année, elle offre plusieurs possibilités pour rallier l’Italie (carte nr2) :

      Au nord, on trouve deux routes : La Galite-La Sardaigne (130 km) et Bizerte-Mazzara (175km).
      le nord-est présente trois options : Kélébia-Pantelleria (70km), Al Hawaria-Mazzara (160km) et Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km).
      au sud, trois autres itinéraires vers Lampedusa : à partir de Chebba (135km), de Kerkennah (140km) et de Zarzis (250km).

      En outre, la Tunisie est devenue le seul pays de transit après la fermeture des routes partant de la Libye. En effet, le flux d’émigrés à partir de ce pays a significativement tari suite à la signature d’un mémorandum d’entente le 2 février 2017 entre Rome et Tripoli (appuyé par les dirigeants européens dans la déclaration de Malte). Aux termes de cet accord, l’Italie doit coopérer avec les forces armées et les garde-frontières libyennes afin de juguler l’afflux de migrants illégaux. Un dispositif a été alors mis en place et 20.000 émigrants ont été interceptés en 2017 et reconduits en Libye, dans des centres de détention. Ainsi, le flux venant essentiellement des pays du Sahel africain a basculé sur le territoire tunisien.
      2. Déroulement d’une opération d’émigration clandestine

      De prime abord, il est à signaler que Les voyages clandestins sont organisés par des réseaux criminels. Le trafic est devenu transnational et apporte beaucoup d’argent. Une étude publiée par le journal d’actualités américain « The Christian Science Monitor » souligne « l’apparition de groupes mafieux d’envergure internationale italiens, albanais, libyens et autres » qui se livrent à ce trafic et gagnent 400 milliards de dollars à travers leurs actions qui englobent toute la région. Selon la même étude, Le candidat à l’émigration clandestine à partir de la Tunisie doit dépenser entre 3000 et 8000 dinars.
      L’organisation d’une opération d’émigration irrégulière passe par trois phases :
      2.1. La phase de recrutement

      Il s’agit de se servir d’agents et intermédiaires pour chercher et d’identifier les postulants à l’émigration sur le territoire national. Les quartiers pauvres et les zones grises du pays sont visés en priorité. Le contact se fait soit directement de bouche à l’oreille dans les cafés et les lieux publics soit par internet et notamment à travers les réseaux sociaux. Ceux qui viennent des pays étrangers sont recrutés et regroupés dans les pays limitrophes avant de les transférer par des passeurs en Tunisie.
      2.2. La phase de préparation logistique

      Tout d’abord, il faut trouver des caches (locaux) où regrouper les postulants au voyage et stocker des vivres pour subvenir à leur besoin durant la période d’attente. Ensuite, on prévoit le moyen de transport. Il est généralement un moyen vétuste acheté à moindre coût pour effectuer un aller sans retour (canot pneumatique, embarcation ou un vieux chalutier). Ce moyen est dépourvu de tout équipement de sécurité, de navigation et de communication. Enfin, le chef de réseau doit coordonner avec ses agents locaux et ses pairs à l’étranger pour fixer les moyens et les procédures nécessaires pour passer et/ou diriger les émigrés sur le lieu du regroupement. Cette phase englobe aussi une collecte de renseignement sur les dispositifs de sécurité déployés sur le théâtre de l’opération.
      2.3. Phase de préparation du transit

      C’est la phase la plus importante car elle fait appel à une bonne expérience pour choisir l’itinéraire, la période propice au voyage et le passeur (patron) qui sera chargé de la traversée.

      2.3.1. Choix de l’itinéraire : Le choix de la route doit prendre en compte la caractéristique physique du milieu marin, la sûreté du transit et le temps mis pour la traversée :

      La route La Galite-La Sardaigne est relativement longue (130km). Elle traverse une zone connue par la faible densité du trafic maritime et le mauvais temps. Elle est donc favorable à la détection radar (difficulté de dissimulation) et défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      Les deux routes à destination de Mazzara à partir de Bizerte (175km) et de Hawaria (160km) sont similaires. Elles sont longues et traversent une zone de séparation de trafic par laquelle passe plusieurs centaines de navires par jour. La zone est caractérisée par des courants giratoires relativement forts. Elle est donc favorable à la dissimulation mais défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      La route Kélébia-Pantellaria est la plus courte (70km). Cependant, elle est risquée en raison des patrouilles, de la couverture radar et du dispositif de sécurité mis en place par les autorités italiennes.
      La route Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km) est longue et traverse une zone peu fréquentée sur une grande partie de l’année. Elle est donc très défavorable à l’emploi des embarcations pneumatiques qui sont handicapées par le manque d’autonomie et le mode de propulsion.
      Les deux routes à destination de Lampedusa à parir de Chebba (135km) et de Kerkenah (140km) sont très similaires. Elles ont la même distance et traversent la zone de pêche réservée délimitée par l’isobathe de 50m (la zone verte sur la carte nr3). C’est une zone de haut fond qui s’étend jusqu’aux approches de Lampedusa. Cette zone est très hospitalière pour les petits navires. Elle est fréquentée par plusieurs milliers de chalutiers et embarcations. L’environnement est donc très favorable à la navigation et la dissimulation.

      La route Zarzis-Lampedusa est la plus longue (250km). L’emploi de petites embarcations sur cette route est très risqué à moins qu’elles soient utilisées comme relais pour rallier une plate-forme plus grande stationnée au large (navire ou chalutier).

      2.3.2. Le critère de compétence : Les iles Kerkennah se distinguent par le nombre de compétences (des anciens pêcheurs) qui coopèrent avec les réseaux criminels. Ces pêcheurs reconvertis en passeurs sont chargés de la traversée. Cette reconversion s’explique par une pollution maritime qui a mis ces gens de mer au chômage. En effet, les déchets chimiques provenant des industriels dont notamment Thyna Petroleum Services (TPS) et Petrofac ont dégradé l’environnement marin détruisant ainsi la faune marine (poissons, poulpes et éponges). victime de cette pollution et de la pêche illicite, la mer n’est plus généreuse comme au bon vieux temps. D’après The Christian Science Monitor, “les pêcheurs gagnaient jusqu’à 40$ - 100$ par jour (entre 100 et 250 dinars tunisiens). Maintenant, ils ont du mal à gagner 4 à 7$ (entre 10 et 17 dinars) par jour”. Ils ce sont alors livrés aux contrebondiers et leurs embarcations sont vendues aux réseaux criminels à un coût qui fait trois fois le prix réel.

      C’est cette qualité de pêcheur qui explique l’enrôlement des Kerkéniens dans les réseaux de trafic de migrants. Les statistiques du ministère de l’intérieur montrent que la majorité des patrons d’embarcations arrêtés lors des opérations avortées sont originaires de l’archipel.

      2.3.3. Le choix de la période et lieu d’embarquement :

      C’est le critère le plus important pour décider de l’exécution de l’opération. Tout s’explique par la force et la direction du vent. Une étude élaborée par l’Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques ( ITES) montre des chiffres très significatifs tirés à partir des opérations avortées en 2017 :

      le gouvernorat de Sfax est classé premier sur la liste avec 62 opérations suivi par Nabeul (34 opérations), Bizerte (24 opérations) et Zarzis (11 opérations). En outre, les statistiques montrent que 60% de ces opérations sont effectuées pendant les mois de septembre et d’octobre, 14% pendant juin et juillet. Le reste (26%) est réparti sur toute l’année. Ceci s’explique par la force et la direction (moyenne sur toute l’année) du vent dans ces régions (voir tableau).
      En effet, dans la région de Sfax, le vent atteint sa force la plus faible durant septembre et octobre (inférieur à 10 km/h). Il souffle du secteur Est engendrant de petites vagues qui ne gênent pas le mouvement des embarcations qui naviguent bout au vent (face au vent). Les accidents qui surviennent durant cette période sont causés essentiellement par un manque de stabilité en raison d’un excès de chargement. Ces caractéristiques du vent qui s’ajoutent aux caractéristiques physiques de l’environnement et aux compétences des pêcheurs font de Kerkénah le port préféré pour l’embarquement.
      Le fait que Nabeul et Bizerte occupent respectivement la deuxième et la troisième place s’explique par le vent du secteur Ouest qui souffle sur ces régions et qui pousse les embarcations (vent arrière) sur les côtes de Pantellaria et Mazzara. Les itinéraires partant de la Galite vers la Sardaigne et de Béni Khiar vers Lampeduza, qui sont déjà discriminés par le facteur physique, sont écartés en raison du vent très défavorable (vent de travers).
      La place occupée par Zarzis (4ème place) s’explique uniquement par sa proximité des frontières libyennes et par le vent modéré qui domine la région.

      3. Comment lutter contre le fléau ?

      Tout d’abord, il faut signaler que nos voisins européens déploient leur force (Opération Sofia) sur nos frontières et cherchent à s’ingérer dans nos affaires intérieures sous prétexte de lutter contre l’immigration clandestine. Plusieurs déclarations de responsables européens rentrent dans ce sens :

      Le 15 février 2011, le ministre de l’intérieur italien Roberto Maroni propose de déployer des policiers italiens en Tunisie. Le 9 avril de la même année, il parle de « débarquement » de 22.000 Tunisiens sur les côtes italiennes.
      Le 26 mai 2011, le député maire de Nice, Christian Estrosi, déclare “On constate aussi qu’une partie d’entre eux (les imigrés) – et cela est plus grave – appartiennent aux 10 000 délinquants condamnés et évadés des prisons.”
      Le 3 juin 2018, le nouveau ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini déclare « Il y a de plus en plus de migrants clandestins qui arrivent de Tunisie ici. Ce ne sont pas des réfugiés de guerre mais bien souvent des délinquants et ex-détenus. »
      Dans son projet de rapport 2018/2044(INI), la commission spéciale sur le terrorisme demande au parlement européen « que le mandat de l’opération #EUNAVFOR_MED Sophia soit étendu et que sa portée territoriale soit élargie afin de mieux répondre à l’évolution des schémas migratoires tels que les débarquements fantômes en provenance de la Tunisie, et que la lutte contre le terrorisme soit spécifiquement couverte par son mandat ». Elle propose aussi de « saisir Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU en vue d’adopter une résolution permettant à Sophia d’accéder aux eaux territoriales des États côtiers afin d’effectuer des contrôles sur les navires suspects ».
      Ensuite, il faut appliquer les textes juridiques propres à la matière :
      le Protocole contre le trafic illicite de migrants par terre, air et mer, additionnel à la Convention des Nations unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée en 2000.
      notre réglementation intérieure en matière de lutte contre l’émigration clandestine et notamment la loi du 3 février 2004 relative à la traite des personnes et au trafic des migrants.
      Les accords bilatéraux (avec la France et l’Italie) concernant les migrants.

      Sur le plan opérationnel, la lutte doit se baser sur deux volets ; le renseignement et l’intervention. Le renseignement est la seule solution pour compenser le manque de moyens matériels dont souffrent nos unités.

      Aujourd’hui, l’intervention est handicapée par le manque d’unités navales et la diversité des intervenants en mer qui appartiennent aux différents ministères (marine nationale, garde maritime nationale et douane). Pour assurer notre souveraineté sur les espaces maritimes qui nous reviennent de droit et remplir nos missions en mer (dont la lutte contre l’émigration clandestine), il faut agir en deux directions :

      Adopter le concept de la sauvegarde maritime pour assurer la synergie des efforts entre tous les intervenants en mer,
      Déployer nos unités en fonction des impératifs du moment. A titre d’exemple, basculer des unités sur le port de Sfax, durant les mois de septembre et d’octobre pour couper la route à l’émigration clandestine entre Kerkennah et Lampedusa.

      Ainsi, ce sont quelques idées proposées aux décideurs pour les éclairer sur le coté opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. La guerre contre ce fléau ne peut être gagnée qu’avec la combinaison de mesures d’ordre économique et social.

      http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/25601-l-immigration-irreguliere-conception-de-l-operation-et-parade
      #émigration_irrégulière #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Tunisie #statistiques #chiffres #histoire #opération_sophia #externalisation
      ping @_kg_

  • #Trieste, valico con la Slovenia. Le «riammissioni» dei migranti. Dopo settimane di marcia nei boschi rimandati indietro anche se arrivati su territorio italiano.

    La Questura di Trieste: sono riammissioni previste dalle norme Ue. Ma è giallo sui respingimenti a catena.

    «Nessun respingimento irregolare alla frontiera con la Slovenia», giura il questore di Trieste. «Tutto viene fatto secondo le regole». È comprensibile infatti lo smarrimento del povero disgraziato che dopo settimane di marcia nei boschi di Slovenia e Croazia, si butta tra le braccia di un poliziotto italiano pensando di avercela fatta. Ma non è così perché c’è l’impersonale, algido, fors’anche crudele accordo di #Schengen che stabilisce la sua sorte.

    Ebbene, Schengen dice che se un irregolare è individuato in una «fascia frontaliera» e nella presunta «immediatezza» dell’ingresso, può essere riaccompagnato oltre frontiera e affidato alla polizia dell’altra parte. È una procedura che si chiama «riammissione» e sostituisce il vecchio «respingimento» di quando esistevano le frontiere. Abolite appunto grazie a Schengen.

    È quanto accade quotidianamente al confine con la Slovenia, come anche con l’Austria e la Francia. A regolare queste «riammissioni» ci sono alcune circolari della Ue che fissano lo spazio e il tempo: per fascia frontaliera s’intende un corridoio di 150 metri da una parte e dell’altra della linea di confine, per fascia temporale s’intende un massimo di 2 ore.

    C’è poi un accordo bilaterale italo-sloveno firmato a Roma il 3 settembre 1996, entrato in vigore dal 1° settembre 1997, più estensivo quanto a territorio e orari. Secondo quest’accordo, può essere «riammesso» (e succede ormai massicciamente da quando si sono intensificati gli arrivi dalla rotta balcanica e ci sono molte più pattuglie a controllare il confine, comprese la guardie forestali mobilitate dal governatore Massimiliano Fedriga) chi non ha richiesto l’asilo politico.

    Il database nazionale
    In ogni caso, dato che la polizia slovena non è felice di riprendersi i clandestini, l’intera procedura viene documentata (e secondo la questura ciò avviene alla presenza di interpreti, ma chissà se questo avviene davvero a ogni ora del giorno e della notte) per essere poi condivisa con i colleghi d’oltre frontiera. Agli stranieri vengono prese le impronte digitali, che si confrontano con il database nazionale e quello cosiddetto Eurodac per verificare se la persona non sia stata già fotosegnalata in Slovenia, Croazia o Grecia. Nel secondo caso, la procedura è più lunga e complessa. E se mai nessun poliziotto di altri Paesi li ha identificati, paradossalmente la procedura è più spiccia. I minori stranieri non vengono riammessi, ma affidati ad apposite strutture di accoglienza italiane, e così le persone particolarmente malate.

    Diverso ancora è il caso di chi è sbarcato in uno hotspot in Grecia. Oppure di chi ha presentato domanda di asilo politico in un Paese della Ue e poi si presenta alla nostra frontiera: una selva di situazioni giuridiche diverse che agli occhi del migrante, proveniente da Paesi immensamente lontani, rappresenta un’incomprensibile roulette russa.

    E che magari interpreta come il capriccio del poliziotto che ha davanti. Tocca comunque agli sloveni accettarli. Perciò gli italiani devono documentare con scontrini, biglietti di treno, qualsiasi prova, l’immediatezza dell’ingresso in Italia. Quindi, se arriva il via libera, rigorosamente entro le ore 16 perché dopo gli sloveni non ci stanno, gli stranieri vengono consegnati «esclusivamente con mezzi con i colori d’istituto della Polizia di Stato» presso la stazione di polizia Krvavi Potoc (Pesek).

    Le accuse contro Zagabria
    Quel che accade da quel momento, lo sanno solo gli sloveni ma è immaginabile che abbiano accordi diretti con la polizia croata. E nessuno dubita che sia un circuito infernale per il disgraziato che vi finisce dentro. Pochissimi sono i diritti riconosciuti ai migranti, specie da parte croata.

    L’ultimo Rapporto di Amnesty International ci ricorda che «la Croazia ha continuato a rimandare in Serbia rifugiati e migranti entrati nel Paese irregolarmente, senza garantire loro l’accesso a un’effettiva procedura per la determinazione del diritto d’asilo. Durante i respingimenti, talvolta anche dall’interno del territorio croato, la polizia è ricorsa regolarmente a coercizione, intimidazione, confisca o distruzione di oggetti personali di valore e uso sproporzionato della forza».

    https://www.diritti-umani.org/2018/11/trieste-valico-con-la-slovenia-le.html
    #Italie #Slovénie #réadmissions #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #push-back #renvois #expulsions #refoulement #frontière_sud-alpine #Croatie #accord_bilatéral #accords_bilatéraux

    • “Caricati a forza nei furgoni”. Così la polizia italiana riporta i migranti nei Balcani

      Il racconto di due pakistani: «A Trieste ci hanno illuso sulla richiesta d’asilo ma ci hanno rimandati in Slovenia». Poi una nuova odissea fino alla Bosnia. «Le autorità croate ci hanno picchiato e lasciato nei boschi al confine»

      https://www.lastampa.it/2018/11/02/italia/caricati-a-forza-nei-furgoni-cos-la-polizia-italiana-riporta-i-migranti-nei-balcani-K775KFcYpdofE4r0eNJTFI/premium.html

    • Il caso dei migranti riportati in Slovenia. La polizia: “Agiamo seguendo le regole”

      La Questura di Trieste: sono riammissioni previste dalle norme Ue. Ma è giallo sui respingimenti a catena.

      «Nessun respingimento irregolare alla frontiera con la Slovenia», giura il questore di Trieste. «Tutto viene fatto secondo le regole». È comprensibile infatti lo smarrimento del povero disgraziato che dopo settimane di marcia nei boschi di Slovenia e Croazia, si butta tra le braccia di un poliziotto italiano pensando di avercela fatta. Ma non è così perché c’è l’impersonale, algido, fors’anche crudele accordo di Schengen che stabilisce la sua sorte.

      Ebbene, Schengen dice che se un irregolare è individuato in una «fascia frontaliera» e nella presunta «immediatezza» dell’ingresso, può essere riaccompagnato oltre frontiera e affidato alla polizia dell’altra parte. È una procedura che si chiama «riammissione» e sostituisce il vecchio «respingimento» di quando esistevano le frontiere. Abolite appunto grazie a Schengen.

      È quanto accade quotidianamente al confine con la Slovenia, come anche con l’Austria e la Francia. A regolare queste «riammissioni» ci sono alcune circolari della Ue che fissano lo spazio e il tempo: per fascia frontaliera s’intende un corridoio di 150 metri da una parte e dell’altra della linea di confine, per fascia temporale s’intende un massimo di 2 ore. C’è poi un accordo bilaterale italo-sloveno firmato a Roma il 3 settembre 1996, entrato in vigore dal 1° settembre 1997, più estensivo quanto a territorio e orari. Secondo quest’accordo, può essere «riammesso» (e succede ormai massicciamente da quando si sono intensificati gli arrivi dalla rotta balcanica e ci sono molte più pattuglie a controllare il confine, comprese la guardie forestali mobilitate dal governatore Massimiliano Fedriga) chi non ha richiesto l’asilo politico.

      Il database nazionale

      In ogni caso, dato che la polizia slovena non è felice di riprendersi i clandestini, l’intera procedura viene documentata (e secondo la questura ciò avviene alla presenza di interpreti, ma chissà se questo avviene davvero a ogni ora del giorno e della notte) per essere poi condivisa con i colleghi d’oltre frontiera. Agli stranieri vengono prese le impronte digitali, che si confrontano con il database nazionale e quello cosiddetto Eurodac per verificare se la persona non sia stata già fotosegnalata in Slovenia, Croazia o Grecia. Nel secondo caso, la procedura è più lunga e complessa. E se mai nessun poliziotto di altri Paesi li ha identificati, paradossalmente la procedura è più spiccia. I minori stranieri non vengono riammessi, ma affidati ad apposite strutture di accoglienza italiane, e così le persone particolarmente malate.

      Diverso ancora è il caso di chi è sbarcato in uno hotspot in Grecia. Oppure di chi ha presentato domanda di asilo politico in un Paese della Ue e poi si presenta alla nostra frontiera: una selva di situazioni giuridiche diverse che agli occhi del migrante, proveniente da Paesi immensamente lontani, rappresenta un’incomprensibile roulette russa. E che magari interpreta come il capriccio del poliziotto che ha davanti. Tocca comunque agli sloveni accettarli. Perciò gli italiani devono documentare con scontrini, biglietti di treno, qualsiasi prova, l’immediatezza dell’ingresso in Italia. Quindi, se arriva il via libera, rigorosamente entro le ore 16 perché dopo gli sloveni non ci stanno, gli stranieri vengono consegnati «esclusivamente con mezzi con i colori d’istituto della Polizia di Stato» presso la stazione di polizia Krvavi Potoc (Pesek).
      Le accuse contro Zagabria

      Quel che accade da quel momento, lo sanno solo gli sloveni ma è immaginabile che abbiano accordi diretti con la polizia croata. E nessuno dubita che sia un circuito infernale per il disgraziato che vi finisce dentro. Pochissimi sono i diritti riconosciuti ai migranti, specie da parte croata. L’ultimo Rapporto di Amnesty International ci ricorda che «la Croazia ha continuato a rimandare in Serbia rifugiati e migranti entrati nel Paese irregolarmente, senza garantire loro l’accesso a un’effettiva procedura per la determinazione del diritto d’asilo. Durante i respingimenti, talvolta anche dall’interno del territorio croato, la polizia è ricorsa regolarmente a coercizione, intimidazione, confisca o distruzione di oggetti personali di valore e uso sproporzionato della forza».

      https://www.lastampa.it/2018/11/03/italia/il-caso-dei-migranti-riportati-in-slovenia-la-polizia-agiamo-seguendo-le-regole-KLb7LoSe5l5uv8XggFl7FN/pagina.html

  • Barrières controversées aux #postes-frontières secondaires tessinois

    Des barrières sont en voie d’installation à plusieurs postes-frontières secondaires entre le Tessin et l’Italie. Fruits d’un compromis entre le canton et la Confédération, elles ne font pas l’unanimité.

    La pose de barrières à six de ces passages qui ne sont plus surveillés en permanence intervient après une période d’essai de six mois de #fermeture_nocturne, entre 23 heures et 5 heures du matin, qui avait été mise en place pour lutter contre les #braquages.

    Pour le Conseil fédéral, l’expérience menée en 2017 n’avait pas permis de conclure à une baisse de la criminalité. Il a cependant accepté que, selon les circonstances, ces petites frontières puissent être temporairement bouclées.

    Mais au sud des Alpes, certains ont le sentiment que Berne ménage davantage les susceptibilités italiennes que les intérêts du Tessin. C’est le cas de la conseillère nationale de la Lega et vice-syndique de Chiasso Roberta Pantani, qui avait demandé une fermeture nocturne durable.
    « Berne a peur des mesures de rétorsion de l’Italie »

    « Les problèmes majeurs ont surtout été posés par l’Italie qui disait que la fermeture était contraire à l’accord de Schengen », souligne-t-elle. « Mais pour nous, il s’agissait seulement de rétablir une certaine habitude de fermeture la nuit. C’est la première chose. Et la seconde, c’est que peut-être que le Conseil fédéral ne connaît pas très bien la situation du Tessin, où il a peur des mesures de rétorsion de l’Italie. »

    Mais de simples barrières, comme à l’entrée des parkings, suffiront-elles à repousser des malfaiteurs ? Pour Ornello Rusconi, patron d’une station d’essence à deux pas de la douane de San Pietro où sera installée une barrière, c’est toujours bon à prendre. Il a subi une quinzaine de braquages ces dernières années et l’entrée de son magasin est désormais verrouillée, sécurisée par des barreaux et une caméra de surveillance. Il est impossible d’entrer sans contrôle facial préalable.
    « Une mesure supplémentaire bienvenue »

    Pour lui, la décision constitue une bonne nouvelle : « En cas de besoin, le passage est bloqué et les autos ne peuvent plus passer », relève-t-il. « Si quelqu’un veut sortir, il doit s’arrêter ou trouver une alternative. Ou casser la barrière, mais l’infraction est grave. Si la route est barrée, il faut trouver une autre voie. C’est une mesure supplémentaire bienvenue », dit le commerçant.

    D’autres habitants de la région se montrent plutôt sceptiques. « Celui qui a envie d’entrer pour commettre un méfait ne va pas s’arrêter devant une barrière », juge un père de famille dont l’entourage a déjà subi des cambriolages à répétition. « Dans les faits divers, on lit que ce sont même des bandes professionnelles qui viennent ; ce n’est certainement pas une barrière qui va les arrêter. La frontière est vraiment ouverte ; il n’y a pas qu’un seul passage, la zone de frontière est partout. »
    L’objectif est de fermer rapidement ces frontières

    Reste à savoir quand la décision d’abaisser ces barrières - qui sont en cours d’installation - sera prise. Interpellée, la direction des gardes-frontière à Berne a répondu par un « no comment » à la RTS.

    Le département tessinois du Territoire, chargé de leur pose, fait savoir de son côté qu’un groupe de travail réunissant police et gardes-frontière planche actuellement sur les critères qui permettront « de boucler rapidement » ces frontières secondaires.

    https://www.rts.ch/info/regions/autres-cantons/9944416-barrieres-controversees-aux-postes-frontieres-secondaires-tessinois.html
    #frontières #rematérialisation_des_frontières #Schengen (fin de -) #criminalité #barrières_frontalières #Tessin #Suisse #Italie #fermeture_des_frontières #frontière_sud-alpine

    signalé par @bce_106_6, que je remercie

  • Barrières controversées aux postes-frontières secondaires tessinois Nicole della Pietra/oang - 27 Octobre 2018 - RTS
    https://www.rts.ch/info/regions/autres-cantons/9944416-barrieres-controversees-aux-postes-frontieres-secondaires-tessinois.html

    Des barrières sont en voie d’installation à plusieurs postes-frontières secondaires entre le Tessin et l’Italie. Fruits d’un compromis entre le canton et la Confédération, elles ne font pas l’unanimité.
    La pose de barrières à six de ces passages qui ne sont plus surveillés en permanence intervient après une période d’essai de six mois de fermeture nocturne, entre 23 heures et 5 heures du matin, qui avait été mise en place pour lutter contre les braquages.

    Pour le Conseil fédéral, l’expérience menée en 2017 n’avait pas permis de conclure à une baisse de la criminalité. Il a cependant accepté que, selon les circonstances, ces petites frontières puissent être temporairement bouclées.

    Mais au sud des Alpes, certains ont le sentiment que Berne ménage davantage les susceptibilités italiennes que les intérêts du Tessin. C’est le cas de la conseillère nationale de la Lega et vice-syndique de Chiasso Roberta Pantani, qui avait demandé une fermeture nocturne durable.


    « Berne a peur des mesures de rétorsion de l’Italie »
    « Les problèmes majeurs ont surtout été posés par l’Italie qui disait que la fermeture était contraire à l’accord de Schengen », souligne-t-elle. « Mais pour nous, il s’agissait seulement de rétablir une certaine habitude de fermeture la nuit. C’est la première chose. Et la seconde, c’est que peut-être que le Conseil fédéral ne connaît pas très bien la situation du Tessin, où il a peur des mesures de rétorsion de l’Italie. »

    Mais de simples barrières, comme à l’entrée des parkings, suffiront-elles à repousser des malfaiteurs ? Pour Ornello Rusconi, patron d’une station d’essence à deux pas de la douane de San Pietro où sera installée une barrière, c’est toujours bon à prendre. Il a subi une quinzaine de braquages ces dernières années et l’entrée de son magasin est désormais verrouillée, sécurisée par des barreaux et une caméra de surveillance. Il est impossible d’entrer sans contrôle facial préalable.

    « Une mesure supplémentaire bienvenue »
    Pour lui, la décision constitue une bonne nouvelle : « En cas de besoin, le passage est bloqué et les autos ne peuvent plus passer », relève-t-il. « Si quelqu’un veut sortir, il doit s’arrêter ou trouver une alternative. Ou casser la barrière, mais l’infraction est grave. Si la route est barrée, il faut trouver une autre voie. C’est une mesure supplémentaire bienvenue », dit le commerçant.

    D’autres habitants de la région se montrent plutôt sceptiques. « Celui qui a envie d’entrer pour commettre un méfait ne va pas s’arrêter devant une barrière », juge un père de famille dont l’entourage a déjà subi des cambriolages à répétition. « Dans les faits divers, on lit que ce sont même des bandes professionnelles qui viennent ; ce n’est certainement pas une barrière qui va les arrêter. La frontière est vraiment ouverte ; il n’y a pas qu’un seul passage, la zone de frontière est partout. »

    L’objectif est de fermer rapidement ces frontières
    Reste à savoir quand la décision d’abaisser ces barrières - qui sont en cours d’installation - sera prise. Interpellée, la direction des gardes-frontière à Berne a répondu par un « no comment » à la RTS.

    Le département tessinois du Territoire, chargé de leur pose, fait savoir de son côté qu’un groupe de travail réunissant police et gardes-frontière planche actuellement sur les critères qui permettront « de boucler rapidement » ces frontières secondaires.

    #schengen #frontières #ue #union_européenne #libre_circulation #

  • « Vilnius, Paris, Londres », destins sans frontières

    Dans ce #roman fort et onirique, l’Ukrainien #Andreï_Kourkov entremêle quatre histoires aux portes de #Schengen.
    C’est une maison dans la neige et dans la nuit. On l’imagine en bois, dans un recoin de notre univers connu. Europe du Nord, de l’Est, peu nous importe finalement. C’est bien par un lieu que l’on entre dans un livre, et le lecteur français ne se saisira pas de Vilnius, Paris, Londres comme compatriote de l’auteur, l’Ukrainien Andreï Kourkov ; il partira en voyage vers une destination inconnue, donc imaginaire. Il s’agit cependant du premier roman de Kourkov qui ne se passe pas dans son pays et qui s’éloigne de ses tourments politiques… et l’on peut imaginer que le rôle de cette chaumière est bel et bien de dépayser celui qui ouvre ces pages, quel qu’il soit.

    Trompe-l’œil

    Pour nous, en tout cas, l’incipit a quelque chose du conte enneigé. Et dans le même temps, cette ouverture résonne avec les préoccupations de notre anthropocène : en lisant « La Terre n’est pas aveugle, même la #nuit, elle garde les yeux ouverts », on imagine s’engager dans une prose écologique. La beauté de la page est unique, car on bascule ensuite dans une autre dimension. La majuscule est mise de côté, on revient sur terre, dans un ici et maintenant chaleureux malgré l’obscurité : des personnages sont réunis pour partager un peu de chaleur, mais le lieu est indéfini. L’espace-temps met encore une page à se préciser : toujours aucune indication de localisation, mais la temporalité se resserre, l’action se produit au milieu de la nuit, « minuit moins huit », et dans un lieu qui met du temps à être nommé. On n’en prend conscience qu’au détour d’une question : « Et puis, est-il bien permis de boire à la frontière ? »

    Le roman Vilnius, Paris, Londres, comme son titre ne l’indique pas, est un livre sur la #frontière. L’intrigue se noue le jour de l’intégration de la #Lituanie dans l’#espace_Schengen, le 21 décembre 2007. Quelques détails plus faciles à saisir pour un Européen du Nord lui permettent de comprendre cela avant la page 15, ce qui a peu d’impact sur la force narrative du texte. On bascule alors d’un espace onirique à une forme de réalisme qui s’avère très vite un trompe-l’œil. L’auteur va tisser le fil de quatre aventures, traversées de cette ligne imaginaire dont l’ouverture ne semble en aucune manière éroder la puissance politique. Les trois noms de lieux qui forment le titre de l’ouvrage sont trompeurs, ils ne font qu’en trianguler un autre difficile à nommer (« près d’Anyksciai »). Sans doute trop petit pour exister sur la carte, il n’en constitue pas moins le port d’attache de tous les personnages du roman. C’est dans le lien entre ces lieux que va se déployer ce qui fait les frontières contemporaines, résolument mobiles.
    « 
    Trou noir »

    Il n’est pas anodin que cette expérience se construise depuis un petit pays européen où l’histoire a prouvé que la problématique du voisinage était loin d’être anodine et où la distance à l’autre s’avérait compliquée à déterminer : dans son roman intitulé l a Ligne des glaces, l’écrivain français Emmanuel Ruben écrit en écho, situant l’action dans un pays balte indéterminé : « Tu cherches la frontière extérieure, alors tu crois la trouver au bout de tes forces. Mais il n’y a pas de frontière extérieure. Crois-moi, la vraie frontière est à l’intérieur. Elle est infiniment plus proche que tu ne l’imagines, la vraie frontière ! »

    C’est à cette exploration d’un espace-temps frontalier qui dépasse de très loin le moment d’ouverture du poste de contrôle officiel que vont s’employer les personnages principaux de Vilnius, Paris, Londres. Le texte est construit sur l’intrication de leurs trajectoires dans une succession haletante de chapitres qui mettent en résonance intime les expériences des uns et des autres. Il n’y a rien de nécessaire entre le relatif succès économique rencontré par ceux qui sont partis à Londres, la vie de bohème de ceux qui ont préféré Paris, l’itinérance choisie par celui qui part vers l’Allemagne, et pourtant tout semble lié. L’intensité des événements traversés par ceux qui sont restés montre en miroir combien la mobilité de la frontière se fabrique aussi dans l’ancrage, comment ce sont parfois les lieux qui agissent sur les liens.

    « C’est un trou noir, cette Grande Europe […] On n’en revient pas, on ne répond plus… » déclare l’un des personnages de l’univers mis en place par Andreï Kourkov aux portes de Schengen. Derrière les anecdotes des vies rassemblées et la truculence de formules dont le texte est émaillé, il y a là certainement de quoi mettre le lecteur en éveil sur la portée géopolitique du texte dont l’auteur, malgré les apparences, ne se départ pas.

    https://next.liberation.fr/livres/2018/10/03/vilnius-paris-londres-destins-sans-frontieres_1682953
    #frontières #livre

    ping @reka

    • #Vilnius, #Paris, #Londres

      C’est la fin des #gardes-frontière et des contrôles de passeports, un immense espoir pour un pays minuscule : le 21 décembre 2007, à minuit, la Lituanie intègre enfin l’espace Schengen. Comme beaucoup de leurs compatriotes, trois couples se lancent dans la grande aventure européenne. Ingrida et Klaudijus tenteront leur chance à Londres. Barbora et Andrius à Paris. Et si Renata et Vitas restent dans leur petite ferme à Anykšciai, eux aussi espèrent voir souffler jusqu’à l’Est le vent du changement. Mais l’Europe peut-elle tenir ses promesses de liberté et d’union ? Estampillés étrangers, bousculés par des habitudes et des langues nouvelles, ces jeunes Lituaniens verront l’eldorado s’éloigner de jour en jour. Kukutis, un vieux sage qui traverse l’Europe à pied, le sait bien, lui : « Peu importe la ville où l’on veut atterrir, c’est le voyage lui-même qui est la vie. »

      Dans ce roman tour à tour drôle, tendre et mélancolique, Kourkov donne un visage à tous les désenchantés du rêve européen.


      http://www.lianalevi.fr/f/index.php?sp=liv&livre_id=632
      #contrôles_frontaliers

  • This European Border Is Still Open. But for How Long?

    The border between Austria and Slovenia runs through Armin Tement’s backyard. Literally.

    Not that you would know it. Neat rows of vines march up and down the valley like military columns with no regard for a frontier laid down by man, why here, no one can quite remember. The Slovene wine workers speak German. The Austrians speak Slovenian, or at least try.

    As for the wine, well, says Mr. Tement, 32, “it tastes exactly the same on both sides.”

    When Mr. Tement’s family started making wine back in the 19th century, there was no border here. The region of Styria, straddling what is now southeastern Austria and northeastern Slovenia, was part of the Hapsburg Empire.

    When the empire was broken up after World War I, Upper Styria became Austrian and Lower Styria became part of Yugoslavia — until the 1990s, when that country, too, was broken up and Slovenia gained its independence.

    The border, a hundred years old this year, was briefly eliminated by advancing Nazi armies, then heavily policed during the Cold War, before vanishing in all but name when Slovenia joined the European Union’s passport-free travel zone in 2007.

    “It was a great moment,” recalled Janez Valdhuber, 53, a winemaker on the Slovenian side. To celebrate, he grabbed his young children, climbed the steep vineyard opposite his house to the top where the border runs, and unfurled a European flag.

    The interrogations at the border stopped, and Mr. Valdhuber’s car trunk was no longer searched when entering Austria.

    But some worry Europe’s open borders might slowly be closing again, one checkpoint at a time.

    This month, Germany announced that at its Bavarian border, it would turn back asylum seekers registered in other European Union countries, a move reintroducing a hard border of sorts with Austria.

    Austria, now run by a conservative government in coalition with the far right, threatened to do the same on its southern border with Italy, Europe’s busiest north-south trade route. And as if to demonstrate its resolve, Austria briefly resurrected checkpoints at the Brenner Pass this month.

    The border at Spielfeld, an Austrian town with barely 1,000 inhabitants, became a stop on the migrant route in 2015, and for a few traumatic weeks that year, tens of thousands of refugees came through.

    Since then, Austrian soldiers have returned.

    They ride in military jeeps along the “Wine Route,” a winding country road that zigzags back and forth across the border. They have built a fence along a small border stretch near Spielfeld and set up makeshift checkpoints in the hills — only sporadically manned, but there — on otherwise deserted lanes.

    No one here reports having seen any refugees in more than two years, and so far the border checks are relatively rare.

    But this month, the Austrian military and police staged a high-profile military exercise, simulating another mass arrival of migrants.

    A platform was set up for the photographers. Two Black Hawk helicopters circled overhead. Two hundred students from the police academy were enlisted as “refugees.” Later, the defense ministry released a video.

    “It feels a bit like we’re backsliding into the old days,” said Marko Oraze, a member of Austria’s Slovene-speaking minority who runs the Council of Carinthian Slovenes.

    Mr. Oraze lives in Austria but gets his car fixed in Slovenia. Many of his friends commute across the border every day.

    “More and more of them are stopped at the border on their way to work,” he said.

    Some in Spielfeld applaud the tougher stance taken by Austria.

    “It’s about time,” said Walpurga Sternad, who runs a restaurant with her husband near the highway connecting Austria and Slovenia. “They should just close all the borders in Europe, go back to what we used to have,” she said, as a group of friends nodded in approval.

    Ms. Sternad remembers the day in October 2015, when some 6,000 migrants poured over the border in Spielfeld, filling the motorway and spilling into her own front yard. “It was scary,” she said. “So many people. They kept coming.”


    https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/world/europe/austria-slovenia-border-migrants-spielfeld-schengen.html#click=https://t.co/YWlazq9xGU
    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Autriche #Slovénie #fermeture_des_frontières #Schengen (fin de -) #militarisation_des_frontières #armée #frontière_sud-alpine

    • Anti-immigration mood drives fear of racist profiling on EU borders

      Europe’s passport-free area under pressure as calls grow for tougher migrant controls.

      Police spot checks have become a part of Fahad’s annual summer holiday when driving through the snow-topped mountains of southern Bavaria.

      “This usually happens,” said the Kuwaiti father of three, when his silver people-carrier with his wife and children was stopped by German border officers in the idyllic Alpine town of #Kiefersfelden.

      Fahad and his family had to wait for more than half an hour at the border post, until they were given a pass to drive from Austria into Germany. During the FT’s three-hour stay at the checkpoint, non-white drivers made up about 70 per cent of cars selected for further checks. Fahad was one of a few drivers with beards, while others included women wearing headscarves and motorists who at first sight did not look like white Europeans. All were waved through once their IDs were checked, vehicle boots searched and luggage examined.

      Racial profiling at Europe’s internal borders is forbidden under EU law. But with a fresh wave of anti-immigrant governments calling for tougher controls on migrant movements, there are concerns that non-white people will come under increasing suspicion when travelling in the continent.

      Europe’s passport-free Schengen zone — an area made up of 26 European states that abolished passport control at their mutual borders — has buckled under twin pressures: Europe’s biggest influx of refugees since the second world war, and a growing number of anti-immigrant governments pushing to crack down on irregular migration flows. “There is such a fear that Schengen won’t survive that countries are being given the discretion to do whatever they can to keep it alive,” said Elizabeth Collett, director of the Migration Policy Institute Europe think-tank.

      Although the number of migrants entering the EU has dropped dramatically since the height of the migration crisis in 2015, emergency powers still allow border controls across 20,000km inside the Schengen zone. Kiefersfelden, a popular skiing destination, has become one of Schengen’s pinch points: it is home to one of three emergency police controls along Germany’s 820km border with Austria.

      Every car travelling on the A12 autobahn through Kiefersfelden must pass a police border stop where officers select vehicles for extra spot checks. The cars that are picked are sent to a tented zone, where drivers and passengers must show valid ID documents.

      Border police said they are told to look for signs of undocumented migrants and people smugglers crossing into Germany from Austria. So far this year, an average of 900 illegal migrants per month have been detained on the Austro-German border, down from 1,120 per month in 2017.

      As racial profiling is outlawed, it is the responsibility of European governments to ensure their police forces carry out checks at random. Rainer Schafer, spokesman for the federal police overseeing the Kiefersfelden controls, said race and ethnicity “can be among the indicators” officers look for when deciding to pull over a vehicle for extra checks.

      “But there are no rules that we just pick out the people who look like they are coming from Africa,” he said. Other factors include registration plates (Italian or eastern European plates draw officers’ attention), blacked-out windows, and the number of passengers, he said.

      Police checks in Bavaria are expected to intensify after the region’s conservative local government last month requested tougher migration controls.

      Horst Seehofer, Germany’s interior minister, has also called on the government to break two decades of EU-wide co-operation on migration and unilaterally send people away at Germany’s internal borders. Observers fear that other Schengen countries, like Austria, could in turn erect their own emergency border controls — and that the EU’s principle of free movement of people is at risk of becoming a privilege enjoyed only by white Europeans.

      A report from La Cimade, a French non-governmental organisation, found French border police “systematically check the identity documents of people who do not have the right skin colour” on inbound trains from Italy.

      Inga Schwarz, a researcher at the University of Freiburg, said Europe’s internal border crossings are becoming “increasingly racialised spaces, constructed not only by border guards profiling according to race, but also by European citizens who witness these racialised control practices”.

      In Kiefersfelden, the majority of the non-white drivers selected for checks were tourists in people-carriers and expensive cars — mostly from the Gulf — and were waved through in less than 15 minutes. Uruj, a 27-year-old teacher from Kuwait, her husband and young daughter waited for nearly an hour in their white Mercedes.

      Although they had valid visa documents, police took away their passports and only permitted the family to continue to their holiday destination in Austria once they had obtained a car seat for their three-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Wafah. Uruj, who was wearing a pink headscarf, said, “I don’t think they liked the look of us.”


      https://www.ft.com/content/fac891a6-93f9-11e8-b67b-b8205561c3fe?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754
      #contrôles_frontaliers #profiling #Allemagne #Autriche #contrôle_au_faciès

    • Réfugiés : la #Slovénie veut toujours plus de #barbelés sur sa frontière avec la #Croatie

      Les autorités slovènes se veulent rassurantes : la sécurité des frontières est assurée et personne n’a d’information sur l’éventuelle réouverture massive de la « #route_des_Balkans ». Pourtant le nouveau gouvernement ne semble pas avoir l’intention d’infléchir la politique migratoire de son prédécesseur et songerait même à étendre les barbelés qui coupent la Slovénie de son voisin croate.

      Par Charles Nonne

      La question des réfugiés semble ces dernières semaines avoir déserté le débat public en Slovénie. Le contrat de coalition signé le 28 août 2018, lapidaire, dédramatise : « Nous élaborerons une stratégie migratoire exhaustive, basée sur la coopération intergouvernementale. Nous protègerons les frontières de l’espace Schengen avec davantage d’efficacité et nous démonterons les obstacles techniques [barrières et panneaux] dès que les circonstances le permettront. »

      Pourtant, les passages de la frontière se poursuivent, notamment dans la région de la Bela Krajina, au sud-est du pays, où la rivière Kolpa sépare Slovénie et Croatie. Selon la police de Novo Mesto, entre le 1er janvier et le 31 septembre 2018, plus de 2400 ressortissants étrangers auraient illégalement franchi la Kolpa, soit douze fois plus qu’en 2017.

      Fin septembre, en marge d’un déplacement dans le centre régional de Črnomelj, le nouveau ministre de l’Intérieur, Boris Poklukar, avait affirmé vouloir maintenir les barrières en l’état, tout en garantissant que la police était préparée à une augmentation des passages frontaliers. Pour la maire de Črnomelj, Mojca Čemas Stjepanovič, « pour le moment, la sécurité est garantie et nous n’avons aucune raison de nous inquiéter. » Dans les communes les plus exposées, le gouvernement a promis l’érection de nouveaux « obstacles techniques » : sur les 670 kilomètres de frontière slovéno-croate, plus de 160 sont parcourus par des barbelés et 56 par de véritables barrières.

      En Slovénie, c’est notamment les tensions à la frontière entre la Bosnie-Herzégovine et la Croatie qui préoccupent. Si le gouvernement se prépare à plusieurs scénarios, il affirme n’avoir « aucune information laissant penser à une augmentation prochaine des flux », indique le ministre Boris Poklukar. Au nord, l’Autriche a d’ores et déjà annoncé qu’elle ne diminuerait pas la surveillance de sa frontière lors des six prochains mois.

      Au-delà du strict contrôle frontalier, d’autres questions divisent : des inquiétudes pèsent notamment sur la possible installation de centres d’accueil, comme à Debeli Rtič, sur la côte slovène, et à Brežice, à 40 kilomètres de Zagreb. La directrice du bureau gouvernemental pour la prise en charge de l’intégration des migrants, Mojca Špec Potočar, a tenu à indiquer qu’« il n’y [aurait] aucune installation permanente de réfugiés. »

      La question secoue également les rangs de la coalition : l’ancienne ministre de l’Intérieur, Vesna Györkös Žnidar, « faucon » régulièrement critiqué par les défenseurs des droits de l’homme, vient de claquer la porte de son parti, le Parti du centre moderne (SMC) de l’ancien Premier ministre Miro Cerar, en raison de désaccords profonds sur les questions migratoires.

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Slovenie-le-gouvernement-poursuit-lentement-le-renforcement-de-sa
      #fermeture_des_frontières #murs #barrières_frontalières

  • Migranti, l’Austria: «Dovremo proteggere il confine con l’Italia»

    Scatta quella chiusura delle frontiere nel cuore dell’Europa che potrebbe tagliare fuori l’Italia dal resto del continente e provocare un effetto domino capace di far vacillare Schengen e la stessa Unione. Dopo l’accordo tra la Cdu di Angela Merkel e la bavarese Csu del ministro degli Interni Horst Seehofer, è l’Austria (in accordo con Berlino) ad annunciare che «proteggerà i confini meridionali». Decisione presa dal Cancelliere Sebastian Kurz e dal suo vice, il leader dell’ultradestra dell’Fpoe Christian Strache. Di fatto i migranti registrati in Italia e lasciati fuggire a Nord non saranno più accettati dalla Germania. L’Austria sposa la politica di Merkel e annuncia che nemmeno lei li farà passare, scaricando la pressione (politica, i numeri reali sono irrisori) sul Brennero. E con Salvini lesto a rilanciare: «L’Austria chiude i confini? Sono pronto da domani a ripristinare i controlli al Brennero perché l’Italia ha solo da guadagnarci, sono più i migranti che tornano da noi di quelli che vanno da loro».

    Ecco la temuta crisi di Schengen, annunciata da settimane e puntualmente in arrivo. «Un capolavoro di Salvini», incalza il Pd con Filippo Sensi. In effetti l’Italia dalla nascita del governo giallo-verde ha provocato i partner con una strategia di insulti firmata Salvini-Di Maio e con il ricatto sulle navi cariche di migranti (Aquarius e Lifeline), si è detta pronta a stringere alleanze con xenofobi ed estrema destra (tra cui gli stessi austriaci e Seehofer) dagli interessi contrari con quelli della penisola e la scorsa settimana non ha portato a casa nulla al Consiglio europeo di Bruxelles, preparato in modo estemporaneo, senza tessere alleanze reali e con richieste (per quanto legittime) gettate sul tavolo solo a fini di consenso interno.
    Alla vigilia di quel summit Conte aveva annunciato che in caso di successo a Bruxelles avrebbe accettato una soluzione sui migranti secondari, ovvero i richiedenti asilo registrati da noi e lasciati scappare in Germania. Ma pur rivendicando un successo al vertice Ue (non suffragato dai fatti), si è rifiutato di negoziare quel trattato bilaterale capace di salvare Merkel dalle bordate di Seehofer. E in giro per l’Europa diversi osservatori si chiedono se il fine ultimo di Salvini e Di Maio non sia quello di far cadere la Cancelliera, se non di provocare una crisi europea capace di ridimensionare l’Unione nel nome di un’ideologia sovranista che coincide con quella di Vladimir Putin e di chi dall’esterno (lo stesso Trump) vorrebbe dare un colpo alla Ue per poi dettare legge ai singoli stati nazionali.

    Ad ogni modo, Merkel ha salvato il governo accordandosi su Seehofer sui respingimenti, innescando l’annunciato effetto domino su Schengen, evitabile solo con un accordo a tre tra Roma, Vienna e Berlino (non a caso Seehofer spiegava che «parleremo anche con l’Italia»). In mattinata lo stesso Kurz, da due giorni presidente di turno dell’Unione, di fronte alla plenaria dell’Europarlamento a Strasburgo ha ribadito che Schengen sarà salva solo se si bloccheranno gli sbarchi: «Un’Europa senza confini interni funzionerà solo se saranno protetti i confini esterni». Dall’alleato di Salvini non una parola sulla solidarietà, sulla riforma di Dublino che porterebbe alla ripartizione tra partner dei richiedenti asilo. Quanto alla chiusura dei confini esterni, proprio oggi l’Unione africana ha condannato l’idea europea di istituire campi per migranti ("piattaforme") nel Sahel.

    Il dibattito a Strasburgo è stato duro. Il presidente dell’Europarlamento, Antonio Tajani, ha ricordato a Kurz la necessità di approvare la riforma di Dublino (tra l’altro il testo approvato a gennaio da Strasburgo garantirebbe l’Italia e permetterebbe ai Visegrad di restare fuori dalla ripartizione per un decennio). Ma è il clima politico che dovrebbe far riflettere. Il capogruppo dei liberali, Guy Verhofstadt, ha ricordato che i numeri dimostrano che «non c’è nessun crisi migratoria, c’è una crisi politica sulle spalle dei migranti creata da Salvini e dai suoi amici, come Orban, che però sono solo d’accordo solo nel dire che non vogliono i migranti a casa loro». Il presidente dei deputati socialisti e democratici, Udo Bullmann, ha ammonito: «Dovete smilitarizzare le frontiere, state distruggendo Schengen». Il leader dei Verdi, Philippe Lamberts, ha concluso: «Non ho mai avuto paura dell’estrema destra, ma siamo tutti in pericolo quando le sue idee contaminano i partiti che erano al cuore dell’Europa e della democrazia». Riferimento ai popolari di Kurz. In effetti i toni dei sostenitori di Kurz sono preoccupanti, riportano il pensiero al passato: le voci del populismo e della destra estrema stanno montando all’interno dei governi di mezza Europa e dopo le europee del 2019 anche a Strasburgo - cuore della democrazia europea - potrebbero non essere più una trascurabile minoranza.

    http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2018/07/03/news/migranti_austria_frontiere-200704252/?ref=search
    #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Autriche #Allemagne #Italie #frontières_sud-alpine #Schengen (fin de-)