• I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro

    Nel 2023 le autorità italiane hanno classificato come operazioni di polizia e non Sar oltre mille sbarchi, per un totale di quasi 40mila persone, un quarto degli arrivi via mare. Dati inediti del Viminale descrivono la “strategia” contro le Ong e l’intento di creare l’emergenza a Lampedusa concentrando lì oltre i due terzi degli approdi.

    Nell’anno della strage di Cutro (26 febbraio 2023) le autorità italiane hanno classificato come operazioni di polizia oltre 1.000 sbarchi, per un totale di quasi 40mila persone, poco più di un quarto di tutti gli arrivi via mare. Questo nonostante gli effetti funesti che la confusione tra “law enforcement” e ricerca e soccorso ha prodotto proprio in occasione del naufragio di fine febbraio dell’anno scorso a pochi metri dalle coste calabresi, quando morirono più di 90 persone, e sulla quale sta indagando la Procura di Crotone.

    Quello degli eventi strumentalmente classificati come di natura poliziesca in luogo del soccorso, anche dopo i fatti di Cutro, è solo uno dei dati attraverso i quali si può leggere come è andata lo scorso anno nel Mediterraneo. È possibile farlo dopo aver ottenuto dati inediti dal ministero dell’Interno, che rispetto al passato ha fortemente ridotto qualità e quantità degli elementi pubblicati nel cruscotto statistico giornaliero e nella sua rielaborazione di fine anno.

    Prima però partiamo dai dati noti. Nel 2023 sono sbarcate sulle coste italiane 157.651 persone (il Viminale talvolta ne riporta 157.652, ma la sostanza è identica). Il dato è il più alto dal 2017 ma inferiore al 2016, quando furono 181.436. Le prime cinque nazionalità dichiarate al momento dello sbarco, che rappresentano quasi il 50% degli arrivi, sono di cittadini della Guinea, Tunisia, Costa d’Avorio, Bangladesh, Egitto. I minori soli sono stati 17.319.

    E qui veniamo ai dati che ci ha trasmesso il Viminale a seguito di un’istanza di accesso civico generalizzato. La stragrande maggioranza delle persone sbarcate è partita nel 2023 dalla Tunisia: oltre 97mila persone sulle 157mila totali. Segue a distanza la Libia, con 52mila partenze, quasi doppiata, e poi più dietro la Turchia (7.150), Algeria, Libano e finanche Cipro.

    Come mostrano le elaborazioni grafiche dei dati governativi, ci sono stati mesi in cui dalla Tunisia sono sbarcate anche oltre 20mila persone. Una tendenza che ha conosciuto una brusca interruzione a partire dal mese di ottobre 2023, quando gli sbarchi in quota Tunisia, al netto delle condizioni meteo marine, sono crollati a poco meno di 1.900, attestandosi poco sotto i 5mila nei due mesi successivi.

    Tradotto: l’ultimo trimestre dello scorso anno ha visto una forte diminuzione degli sbarchi provenienti dalla Tunisia, Paese con il quale Unione europea e Italia hanno stretto il “solito” accordo che prevede soldi e forniture in cambio di “contrasto ai flussi”, ovvero contrasto ai diritti umani. È lo schema libico, con le differenze del caso. Il ministro Matteo Piantedosi il 31 dicembre 2023, intervistato da La Stampa, ha rivendicato la bontà della strategia parlando di “121.883 persone” (dando l’idea di un conteggio analitico e quotidiano) “bloccate” grazie alla “collaborazione con le autorità tunisine e libiche”.

    Un altro dato utilissimo per capire come “funziona” la macchina mediatica della presunta “emergenza immigrazione” è quello dei porti di sbarco. Il primo e incontrastato porto sul quale lo scorso anno è stata scaricata la stragrande maggioranza degli sbarchi è Lampedusa, con quasi 110mila arrivi (di cui “solo” 7.400 autonomi) contro i 5.500 di Augusta, Roccella Jonica, i 4.800 di Pantelleria e i 3.800 di Catania. In passato non è sempre stato così. Ma Lampedusa è troppo importante per due ragioni: dare in pasto all’opinione pubblica l’idea di una situazione esplosiva e ingestibile, bloccando i trasferimenti verso la terraferma (vedasi l’estate 2023), e contemporaneamente convogliare quanti più richiedenti asilo potenziali possibile nella macchina del trattenimento dell’hotspot.

    Benché in Italia si sia convinti che a soccorrere le persone in mare siano solo le acerrime nemiche Ong, i dati, ancora una volta, confermano il loro ruolo ridotto a marginale dopo anni di campagne diffamatorie, criminalizzazione penale e vera e propria persecuzione amministrativa. Nel 2023, infatti, gli assetti delle Organizzazioni non governative hanno salvato e sbarcato in Italia neanche 9mila persone. Poco più del 5% del totale. Anche nei mesi più intensi degli arrivi la quota delle Ong è stata limitata.

    Come noto, le poche navi umanitarie intervenute sono state deliberatamente indirizzate verso porti lontani. Il primo per numero di persone sbarcate è stato Brindisi (quasi 1.400 sbarcati su 9mila), ovvero 285 miglia in più rispetto al Sud-Ovest della Sicilia. Segue Lampedusa con 980, vero, ma poi ci sono Carrara (535 miglia di distanza in più dalla Sicilia), Trapani, Salerno, Bari, Civitavecchia, Ortona.

    Non è facile dire quanti giorni di navigazione in più questa “strategia” brutale abbia esattamente determinato. Un esperto operatore di ricerca e soccorso in mare aiuta a fare due conti a spanne: “Le navi normalmente viaggiano a meno di dieci nodi, calcolando una velocità di sette nodi andare a Brindisi implica circa 41 ore in più rispetto ai porti più vicini del Sud della Sicilia, come ad esempio Pozzallo. E per arrivare a Pozzallo dalla cosiddetta ‘SAR 1’, a Ovest di Tripoli, partendo da una distanza dalla costa libica di circa 35 miglia, tra Zuara e Zawiya, ci vogliono circa 24 ore”.

    Una recente analisi di Sos Humanity -ripresa dal Guardian a metà febbraio- ha stimato che questo modus operandi delle autorità italiane possa aver complessivamente fatto perdere alle navi delle Ong 374 giorni di operatività. Nell’anno in cui sono morte annegate ufficialmente almeno 2.500 persone e intercettate dalle milizie libiche e riportate indietro, sempre ufficialmente, quasi 17.200 (con l’ancora una volta dimostrata complicità dell’Agenzia europea Frontex). Ma sono tempi così oscuri che ostacolare le “ambulanze” è divenuto un vanto.

    https://altreconomia.it/i-dati-che-raccontano-la-guerra-ai-soccorsi-nellanno-nero-della-strage-

    #statistiques #débarquement #Italie #migrations #réfugiés #chiffres #sauvetage #ONG #SAR #search-and-rescue #Méditerranée #Lampedusa #law_enforcement #2023 #Tunisie #Libye #externalisation #accord #urgence #hotspot

  • FROM LIBYA TO TUNISIA : HOW THE EU IS EXTENDING THE PUSH-BACK REGIME BY PROXY IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

    On August 21, 2023, the rescue ship Aurora from Sea Watch was detained by the Italian authorities after refusing to disembark survivors in Tunisia as ordered by the Rome MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center), a country which by no means can be considered a place of safety.

    This episode is just one example of the efforts of European states to avoid arrivals on their shores at all costs, and to evade their responsibility for reception and #Search_and_Rescue (#SAR). Already in 2018, the European Commission, with its disembarkation platform project, attempted to force sea rescue NGOs to disembark survivors in North Africa. While this project was ultimately unsuccessful as it stood, European states have endeavored to increase the number of measures aimed at reducing crossings in the central Mediterranean.

    One of the strategies employed was to set up a “push-back by proxy regime”, outsourcing interceptions at sea to the Libyan Coast guards, enabling the sending back of people on the move to a territory in which their lives are at risk, undertaken by Libyan border forces under the control of the EU authorities, in contravention of principle of non-refoulement, one of the cornerstones of international refugee law. Since 2016, the EU and its member states have equipped, financed, and trained the Libyan coastguard and supported the creation of a MRCC in Tripoli and the declaration of a Libyan SRR (search and rescue region).

    This analysis details how the European Union and its member states are attempting to replicate in Tunisia the regime of refoulement by proxy set up in Libya just a few years earlier. Four elements are considered: strengthening the capacities of the Tunisian coastguard (equipment and training), setting up a coastal surveillance system, creating a functional MRCC and declaring a Tunisian SRR.
    A. Building capacity of the Garde Nationale Maritime
    Providing equipment

    For several decades now, Tunisia has been receiving equipment to strengthen its coast guard capabilities. After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Italy-Tunisia cooperation deepened. Under the informal agreement of April 5, 2011, 12 boats were delivered to the Tunisian authorities. In 2017, in a joint statement by the IItalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Tunisian counterpart, the two parties committed to “closer cooperation in the fight against irregular migration and border management,” with a particular focus on the maritime border. In this context, the Italian Minister declared Italy’s support for the modernization and maintenance of the patrol vessels supplied to Tunisia (worth around 12 million euros) and the supply of new equipment for maritime border control. On March 13, 2019, Italy also supplied Tunisia with vehicles for maritime border surveillance, sending 50 4-wheelers designed to monitor the coasts.

    Recently, Germany also started to support the coast guard more actively in Tunisia, providing it with equipment for a boat workshop designed to repair coast guard vessels in 2019. As revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question, in the last two years, the Federal Police also donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors. On the French side, after a visit in Tunis in June 2023, the Interior Minister Gérard Darmanin announced 25 million euros in aid enabling Tunisia to buy border policing equipment and train border guards. In August 2023, the Italian authorities also promised hastening the provision of patrol boats and other vehicles aimed at preventing sea departures.

    Apart from EU member states, Tunisia has also received equipment from the USA. Between 2012 and 2019, the Tunisian Navy was equipped with 26 US-made patrol boats. In 2019, the Tunisian national guard was also reinforced with 3 American helicopters. Primarily designed to fight against terrorism, the US equipment is also used to monitor the Tunisian coast and to track “smugglers.”

    Above all, the supply of equipment to the Tunisian coastguard is gaining more and more support by the European Union. Following the EU-Tunisia memorandum signed on July 16, 2023, for which €150 million was pledged towards the “fight against illegal migration”, in September 2023, Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million “to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment.”

    In a letter to the European Council, leaked by Statewatch in October 2023, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to the Tunisian coast guards: “Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operation and others will be repaired by the end of the year.”
    Trainings the authorities

    In addition to supplying equipment, the European countries are also organizing training courses to enhance the skills of the Tunisian coastguard. In 2019, Italy’s Interior Ministry released €11 million to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the crossing of people on the move from Tunisia, and to provide training to local security forces involved in maritime border control.

    Under the framework of Phase III of the EU-supported IBM project (Integrated Border Management), Germany is also organizing training for the Tunisian coast guards. As revealed in the answer to a parliamentary question mentioned before, the German Ministry of Interior admitted that 3.395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and border police had been trained, including within Germany. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police, and the coast guard. These training sessions were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats.”

    In a document presenting the “EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia” for the year 2021, the European Commission announced the creation of a “coast guard training academy.” In Tunisia, the project consists of implementing a training plan, rehabilitating the physical training environment of the Garde Nationale Maritime, and enhancing the cooperation between Tunisian authorities and all stakeholders, including EU agencies and neighboring countries. Implemented by the German Federal Police and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the project started in January 2023 and is supposed to run until June 2026, to the sum of 13,5 million EUR.

    Although the European Commission underlines the objective that “the Training Academy Staff is fully aware and acting on the basis of human rights standards” the increase in dangerous maneuvers and attacks perpetrated by the Tunisian coast guard since the increase in European support leaves little doubt that respect for human rights is far from top priority.

    On November 17, 2023, the ICMPD announced on its Linkedin account the inauguration of the Nefta inter-agency border management training center, as a benefit to the three agencies responsible for border management in Tunisia (Directorate General Directorate of Borders and Foreigners of the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Border Guard of the National Guard and the General Directorate of Customs).
    B. Setting up a coastal surveillance system

    In addition to supplying equipment, European countries also organize training courses to enhance the skills of European coastguards in the pursuit of an “early detection” strategy, which involves spotting boats as soon as they leave the Tunisian coast in order to outsource their interception to the Tunisian coastguard. As early as 2019, Italy expressed its willingness to install radar equipment in Tunisia and to establish “a shared information system that will promptly alert the Tunisian gendarmerie and Italian coast guard when migrant boats are at sea, in order to block them while they still are in Tunisian waters.” This ambition seems to have been achieved through the implementation of the system ISMaris in Tunisia.
    An Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance (ISMaris)

    The system ISMaris, or “Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance”, was first mentioned in the “Support Programme to Integrated Border Management in Tunisia” (IBM Tunisia, launched in 2015. Funded by the EU and Switzerland and implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the first phase of the program (2015-2018) supported the equipment of the Garde Nationale Maritime with this system, defined as “a maritime surveillance system that centralizes information coming from naval assets at sea and from coastal radars […] [aiming] to connect the sensors (radar, VHF, GPS position, surveillance cameras) on board of selected Tunisian Coast Guard vessels, control posts, and command centers within the Gulf of Tunis zone in order for them to better communicate between each other.”

    The implementation of this data centralization system was then taken over by the “Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region” (BMP-Maghreb), launched in 2018 and funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Tunisia component, funded with €24,5 million is implemented by ICMPD together with the Italian Ministry of Interior and designed to “strengthen the capacity of competent Tunisian authorities in the areas of maritime surveillance and migration management, including tackling migrant smuggling, search and rescue at sea, as well as in the coast guard sphere of competence.” With the BMP programme, the Tunisian Garde Maritime Nationale was equipped with navigational radars, thermal cameras, AIS and other IT equipment related to maritime surveillance.
    Data exchange with the EU

    The action document of the BMP program clearly states that one of the purposes of ISMaris is the reinforcement of “operational cooperation in the maritime domain between Tunisia and Italy (and other EU Member States, and possibly through EUROSUR and FRONTEX).” Established in 2013, the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex, to prevent the so-called irregular migration at external borders. Thanks to this system, Frontex already monitors the coast regions off Tunisia using aerial service and satellites.

    What remains dubious is the connection between IS-Maris and the EU surveillance-database. In 2020, the European Commission claimed that ISMariS was still in development and not connected to any non-Tunisian entity such as Frontex, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) or the Italian border control authorities. But it is likely that in the meantime information exchange between the different entities was systematized.

    In the absence of an official agreement, the cooperation between Frontex and Tunisia is unclear. As already mentioned in Echoes#3, “so far, it has not been possible to verify if Frontex has direct contact with the Tunisian Coast Guard as it is the case with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even if most of the interceptions happen close to Tunisian shores, some are carried out by the Tunisian Navy outside of territorial waters. […] Since May 2021 Frontex has been flying a drone, in addition to its different assets, monitoring the corridor between Tunisia and Lampedusa on a daily basis. While it is clear that Frontex is sharing data with the Italian authorities and that Italian authorities are sharing info on boats which are on the way from Tunisia to Italy with the Tunisian side, the communication and data exchanges between Frontex and Tunisian authorities remain uncertain.”

    While in 2021, Frontex reported that “no direct border related activities have been carried out in Tunisia due to Tunisian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate with Frontex”, formalizing the cooperation between Tunisia and Frontex seems to remain one of the EU’s priorities. In September 2023, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Poland, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, briefings were held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and where all threads from surveillance from ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together.

    However, as emphasized by Mathias Monroy, an independent researcher working on border externalization and the expansion of surveillance systems, “Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex.”

    This does not prevent the EU from continuing its efforts. In September 2023, in the wake of the thousands of arrivals on the island of Lampedusa, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed, in a 10-point action plan, the need to have a “working arrangement between Tunisia and Frontex” and to “step up border surveillance at sea and aerial surveillance including through Frontex.” In a letter written by the European Commission in reply to the LIBE letter about the Tunisia deal sent on the Greens Party initiative in July 2023, the EU also openly admits that IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far and that more surveillance equipment is to come.

    To be noted as well is that the EU4BorderSecurity program, which includes support to “inter-regional information sharing, utilizing tools provided by Frontex” has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
    C. Supporting the creation of a Tunisian MRCC and the declaration of a Search and rescue region (SRR)
    Building a MRCC in Tunisia, a top priority for the EU

    In 2021, the European Commission stated the creation of a functioning MRCC in Tunisia as a priority: “Currently there is no MRCC in Tunisia but the coordination of SAR events is conducted by Tunisian Navy Maritime Operations Centre. The official establishment of a MRCC is a necessary next step, together with the completion of the radar installations along the coast, and will contribute to implementing a Search and rescue region in Tunisia. The establishment of an MRCC would bring Tunisia’s institutional set-up in line with the requirements set in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979 (as required by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation IMO).”

    The objective of creating a functioning Tunisian MRCC is also mentioned in a European Commission document presenting the “strategy for the regional, multi-country cooperation on migration with partner countries in North Africa” for the period 2021-2027. The related project is detailed in the “Action Document for EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia (2021),” whose overall objective is to “contribute to the improvement of respective state services through the institutional development of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres” in the North Africa region. The EU also promotes a “regional approach to a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center,” that “would improve the coordination in the Central Mediterranean in conducting SAR operations and support the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks in Libya and Tunisia.”

    The Tunisia component of the programs announces the objective to “support the establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, [… ] operational 24/7 in a physical structure with functional equipment and trained staff,” establishing “cooperation of the Tunisian authorities with all national stakeholders, EU agencies and neighbouring countries on SAR.”

    This project seems to be gradually taking shape. On the website of Civipol, the French Ministry of the Interior’s service and consultancy company, a new project entitled “Support for Search and Rescue Operations at Sea in Tunisia” is mentioned in a job advertisement. It states that this project, funded by the European Union, implemented together with the GIZ and starting in September 2023, aims to “support the Tunisian authorities in strengthening their operational capacities (fleet and other)” and “provide support to the Tunisian authorities in strengthening the Marine Nationale and the MRCC via functional equipment and staff training.”

    In October 2023, the German development agency GIZ also published a job offer for a project manager in Tunisia, to implement the EU-funded project “Support to border management institution (MRCC)” in Tunisia (the job offer was deleted from the website in the meantime but screenshots can be shared on demand). The objective of the project is described as such: “improvement of the Tunisia’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity through reinforced border management institutions to conduct SAR operations at sea and the fight against migrant smuggling and human being trafficking by supporting increased collaboration between Tunisian actors via a Maritime RescueCoordination Centre (MRCC).”

    According to Mathias Monroy, other steps have been taken in this direction: “[the Tunisian MRCC] has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.”

    The establishment of a functional MRCC represents a major challenge for the EU, with the aim to allow Tunisia to engage actively in coordination of interceptions. Another step in the recognition of the Tunisian part as a valid SAR actor by the IMO is the declaration of a search and rescue region (SRR).
    The unclear status of the current Tunisian area of responsibility

    Adopted in 1979 in Hamburg, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR – Search & Rescue Convention) aimed to establish an international search and rescue plan to encourage cooperation and coordination between neighboring states in order to ensure better assistance to persons in distress at sea. The main idea of the convention is to divide seas and oceans into search and rescue zones in which states are responsible for providing adequate SAR services, by establishing rescue coordination centers and setting operating procedures to be followed in case of SAR operations.

    Whereas Tunisia acceded to the treaty in 1998, this was not followed by the delimitation of the Tunisian SAR zone of responsibilities nor by regional agreements with neighboring states. It is only in 2013 that Tunisia declared the limits of its SRR, following the approval of the Maghreb Convention in the Field of Search and Rescue in 2013 and by virtue of Decree No. 2009-3333 of November 2, 2009, setting out the intervention plans and means to assist aircraft in distress. In application of this norm, Tunisian authorities are required to intervene immediately, following the first signal of help or emergency, in the limits of the Tunisia sovereign borders (12 nautical miles). This means that under national legislation, Tunisian authorities are obliged to intervene only in territorial waters. Outside this domain, the limits of SAR interventions are not clearly defined.

    A point to underline is that the Tunisian territorial waters overlap with the Maltese SRR. The Tunisian Exclusive Economic Zone – which does not entail any specific duty connected to SAR – also overlaps with the Maltese SRR and this circumstance led in the past to attempts by the Maltese authorities to drop their SAR responsibilities claiming that distress cases were happening in this vast area. Another complex topic regards the presence, in international waters which is part of the Maltese SRR, of Tunisian oil platforms. Also, in these cases the coordination of SAR operations have been contested and were often subject to a “ping-pong” responsibility from the involved state authorities.
    Towards the declaration of a huge Tunisian SRR?

    In a research document published by the IMO Institute (International Maritime Organization), Akram Boubakri (Lieutenant Commander, Head, Maritime Affairs, Tunisian Coast Guard according to IMO Institute website) wrote that at the beginning of 2020, Tunisia officially submitted the coordinates of the Tunisian SRR to the IMO. According to this document, these new coordinates, still pending the notification of consideration by the IMO, would cover a large area, creating two overlapping areas with neighboring SAR zones – the first one with Libya, the second one with Malta* (see map below):

    *This delimitation has to be confirmed (tbc). Nothing proves that the coordinates mentioned in the article were actually submitted to the IMO

    As several media outlets have reported, the declaration of an official Tunisian SRR is a project supported by the European Union, which was notably put back on the table on the occasion of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia.

    During the summer 2023, the Civil MRCC legal team initiated a freedom of information access request to the Tunisian authorities to clarify the current status of the Tunisian SRR. The Tunisian Ministry of Transport/the Office of the Merchant Navy and Ports replied that”[n]o legal text has yet been published defining the geographical marine limits of the search and rescue zone stipulated in the 1979 International Convention for Search and Rescue […]. We would like to inform you that the National Committee for the Law of the Sea, chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, has submitted a draft on this subject, which has been sent in 2019 to the International Maritime Organisation through the Ministry of Transport.” A recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior was sent but no reply was received yet.

    Replying in December 2023 to a freedom of information access request initiated by the Civil MRCC, the IMO stated that “Tunisia has not communicated their established search and rescue region to the IMO Secretariat.” However, on November 3, 2023, the Tunisian Ministerial Council adopted a “draft law on the regulation of search and rescue at sea in Tunisia’s area of responsibility.” A text which, according to FTDES, provides for the creation of a Tunisian SAR zone, although it has not yet been published. While the text still has to be ratified by the parliament, it is quite clear that the Tunisian authorities are currently making concrete steps to align on the IMO standards and, by doing so, on the EU agenda.
    Conclusion: A EU strategy to escape from its SAR responsibilities

    While some analysts have seen the drop in arrivals in Italy from Tunisia in recent months as a sign of the “success” of the European Union’s strategy to close its borders (in November, a drop of over 80% compared to the summer months), in reality, the evolution of these policies proves that reinforcing a border only shifts migratory routes. From autumn onwards, the Libyan route has seen an increase in traffic, with many departing from the east of the country. These analyses fail to consider the agency of people on the move, and the constant reinvention of strategies for transgressing borders.

    While condemning the generalization of a regime of refoulement by proxy in the central Mediterranean and the continued brutalization of the border regime, the Civil MRCC aims to give visibility to the autonomy of migration and non-stop solidarity struggles for freedom of movement!

    https://civilmrcc.eu/from-libya-to-tunisia-how-the-eu-is-extending-the-push-back-regime-by-prox

    #push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #Tunisie #Libye #EU #UE #Union_européenne #gardes-côtes_libyens #push-back_by_proxy_regime #financement #training #formation #gardes-côtes #MRCC #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #Libyan_SRR #technologie #matériel #Integrated_Border_Management #surveillance #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMaris) #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_Region #Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUROSUR #Frontex #ISMariS #Search_and_rescue_region (#SRR)

    ping @_kg_

  • Chile searches for those missing from Pinochet dictatorship with the help of artificial intelligence

    At the end of August, Chilean president Gabriel Boric launched the Search Plan for more than 1,000 Chileans. Today, old judicial documents, many typewritten, have been digitized to apply cutting edge technology and cross-reference data.

    On Monday 15 January, at the inauguration of the “Congress of the Future” in Santiago, President Gabriel Boric stated that artificial intelligence, the theme of the 13th version of the conference, “will play an important role in the search for our #missing detainees.” He was referring to the #Search_Plan to find over 1,000 individuals who were victims of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), which his Administration presented on August 30, 2023, on the eve of the September 11 commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the coup d’état that ousted Salvador Allende, the socialist president.

    The plan, spearheaded by Justice Minister Luis Cordero, is an initiative that is intended to become a permanent State policy. According to Justice data, after the dictatorship in Chile there were 1,469 victims of forced disappearance and of these, 1,092 are missing detainees, while 377, who were executed, are missing as well. So far only 307 have been identified.

    To embark on this new search, which has already been initiated by the courts, Cordero tells EL PAÍS that he is working with two main sources. On the one hand, the judicial investigations, which comprise millions of pages. And on the other, the administrative records of the cases that are scattered around state agencies. These include the Human Rights Program, created in 1997, which falls under the Ministry of Justice, as well as previous investigations in military Prosecutor’s Offices (which used to close the cases) and the files that provided the basis for the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report, driven by the former president, Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), and in which an account of the victims was given for the first time.

    Typewritten documents

    Unsholster, a company specialized in data analysis, data science and software development, whose general manager is the civil engineer Antonio Díaz-Araujo, is behind the technological analysis of the information. The Human Rights Program has already digitalized the information, while the Judicial Branch is 80% digitalized. The firm was awarded the project in a bidding process in the context of the Search Plan — it is in charge of the implementation of artificial intelligence.

    Something of relevance in this investigation is that the judicial files, separated according to each case, were processed in the old Chilean justice system (changed in 2005), which implies that the judges’ inquiries are on paper — most of them have the pages sewn into a notebook by hand, written on typewriters, and there are even several handwritten parts. These are the ones containing statements, black and white photographs, photocopies of photos, forensic reports and old police reports.

    However, in addition, the judicial inquiries that have been undertaken since 2000 will provide a more up-to-date and crucial basis of information in the analysis. Since then, hundreds of cases that had been shelved during the dictatorship have been reopened by judges with exclusive dedication to cases of human rights violations with sentences.

    Cordero points out that “there is a lot of information in the hands of the State and there is no human capacity to process it, because it needs to be interconnected. For example, there are testimonies that appear in some files and not in others. And, in addition, depending on the judges, there were lines of investigation, so there may have been precedents that were useful for some and not for others.” For this reason, the justice minister says artificial intelligence can play a key role, as he believes that in these cases, the cross-referencing of information will be crucial.

    “All that information is in judicial and administrative files, and what digitization accomplishes first is to integrate them in one place. And then to work with artificial intelligence, which allows us to reduce the investigation gaps using algorithms, which are being tested, and which can read, for example, dates, names, places, for instance, in those files,” the minister adds.
    4.7 million pages and counting

    Unsholster is currently in the pre-project stage, before it starts programming, Díaz-Araujo explains to EL PAÍS. “But we have already touched on most of the file types that we will need to deal with,” he says. The documents that have been coming in, scanned sheet by sheet, are in folders, in PDF format, and therefore do not correspond to a logic that allows data to be searched because they are recorded as images. For this reason, the first step has been to start applying OCR (Optical Character Recognition) technology so that they can be transformed into data.

    They already have information — which does not yet include the thousands of files of the Judicial Branch — totaling 46,768 PDF files, which amounts to more than 4.7 million pages. “If a person were to read every one of those pages, out loud and without understanding or relating facts, they would probably spend eight hours a day reading for 27 years,” explains the civil engineer.

    Once those files are moved to pages, Díaz-Araujo says, “a big classification tree is created, which allows you to classify pages that have images, manuscripts, typewritten pages, or Word-style files. And then you start to apply, on each one of them, the best OCR” for each type of page, because the key, he adds, lies in “what material is brought to each one.”

    Another stage, he explains, is to create different types of dictionaries and entities “that can be learned with use.” For example, nicknames of people, places, streets (many have changed names since the dictatorship), ways of writing and dates.

    This implies, he says, creating a topology of entities in the reading, using technology, of each of the texts “that is capable of rapidly correlating different pages, people, places and dates in a highly flexible way.” He gives an example: “Many of the offenders may have nicknames, and several of them may be written in different ways, but that doesn’t mean that they won’t be linked. What you do is create technology that is capable of suggesting other correlations to the analyst as they occur over time.”

    Therefore, he elaborates, “there is artificial intelligence in the classification of documents; there is high intelligence in transforming documents from an image to searchable data and then, there is a lot of it, in the creation of entities that enable the connection of some documents with others. And, finally, the most necessary thing in a platform is that it should be about the possibility of competing algorithms, with artificial intelligence or without, on this data. But it should not be bound to a technology, because the biggest issue is being open to new technologies of the future. If you keep it closed, it becomes a stumbling block.”

    He continues: “Another key point of this platform is that the original data, and the transformed data, are retained. But you can continue to create other data on top of that. There is no time machine that kind of freezes the ability to produce more algorithms and more information with new platforms in the future.”
    Contreras and Krassnoff

    Five months after technology was first applied to the nearly 47,000 documents of Unsholster’s Human Rights Program, it is already possible, thanks to the implementation of the initial OCR on the identification documents, to find thousands of mentions of at least four military officers who were part of Pinochet’s secret police, the feared DINA (National Intelligence Directorate).

    Manuel Contreras, its director general, sentenced at the time of his death in 2015 to 526 years in prison for hundreds of crimes, appears 2,800 times; Pedro Espinoza and Miguel Krassnoff, both serving sentences in Punta Peuco prison, 2,079 and 2,954 mentions, respectively. And Marcelo Moren Brito, who was the torturer of Ángela Jeria, the mother of former socialist president, Michelle Bachelet, 2,284 times.

    For now they are only mentions. But from now on, names, facts, dates and places can be linked and related, says Díaz-Araujo.

    https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-01-18/chile-searches-for-those-missing-from-pinochet-dictatorship-with-the

    #Chili #intelligence_artificielle #identification #fosses_communes #dictature #AI #IA

  • Fewer boat crossings, visit to Frontex : EU and Tunisia implement migration pact

    Despite an alleged repayment of funds for migration defence, Tunisia is cooperating with the EU. Fewer refugees are also arriving across the Mediterranean – a decrease by a factor of seven.

    In June, the EU Commission signed an agreement on joint migration control with Tunisia. According to the agreement, the government in Tunis will receive €105 million to monitor its borders and “combat people smuggling”. Another €150 million should flow from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) in the coming years for the purposes of border management and countering the “smuggling” of migrants.

    Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million in September. The money was to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment. Around €25 million of this tranche was earmarked for “voluntary return” programmes, which are implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Organisation for Migration.

    However, a few weeks after the transfer from Brussels, the government in Tunis allegedly repaid almost the entire sum. Tunisia “does not accept anything resembling favours or alms”, President Kais Saied is quoted as saying. Earlier, the government had also cancelled a working visit by the Commission to implement the agreement.

    Successes at the working level

    Despite the supposed U-turn, cooperation on migration prevention between the EU and Tunisia has got off the ground and is even showing initial successes at the working level. Under the agreement, the EU has supplied spare parts for the Tunisian coast guard, for example, which will keep “six ships operational”. This is what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote last week to MEPs who had asked about the implementation of the deal. Another six coast guard vessels are to be repaired by the end of the year.

    In an undated letter to the EU member states, von der Leyen specifies the equipment aid. According to the letter, IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far. An “additional capacity building” is to take place within the framework of existing “border management programmes” implemented by Italy and the Netherlands, among others. One of these is the EU4BorderSecurity programme, which among other things provides skills in sea rescue and has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.

    The Tunisian Garde Nationale Maritime, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre benefit from these measures. This MRCC has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.

    Departures from Tunisia decrease by a factor of seven

    Since the signing of the migration agreement, the departures of boats with refugees from Tunisia have decreased by a factor of 7, according to information from Migazin in October. The reason for this is probably the increased frequency of patrols by the Tunisian coast guard. In August, 1,351 people were reportedly apprehended at sea. More and more often, the boats are also destroyed after being intercepted by Tunisian officials. The prices that refugees have to pay to smugglers are presumably also responsible for fewer crossings; these are said to have risen significantly in Tunisia.

    State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.

    Now the EU wants to put pressure on Tunisia to introduce visa requirements for individual West African states. This is to affect, among others, Côte d’Ivoire, where most of the people arriving in the EU via Tunisia come from and almost all of whom arrive in Italy. Guinea and Tunisia come second and third among these nationalities.

    Reception from the Frontex Director

    In September, three months after the signing of the migration agreement, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The visit from Tunis was personally received by Frontex Director Hans Leijtens. EU officials then gave presentations on the capabilities and capacities of the border agency, including the training department or the deportation centre set up in 2021, which relies on good cooperation with destination states of deportation flights.

    Briefings were also held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and the “Situation Centre”, where all threads from surveillance with ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together. The armed “permanent reserve” that Frontex has been building up since 2021 was also presented to the Tunisian ministries. These will also be deployed in third countries, but so far only in Europe in the Western Balkans.

    However, Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex. Finally, the Tunisian coast guard also turned down an offer to participate in an exercise of European coast guards in Greece.

    Model for migration defence with Egypt

    Aiding and abetting “smuggling” is an offence that the police are responsible for prosecuting in EU states. If these offences affect two or more EU states, Europol can coordinate the investigations. This, too, is now to get underway with Tunisia: In April, EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson had already visited Tunis and agreed on an “operational partnership to combat people smuggling” (ASOP), for which additional funds will be made available. Italy, Spain and Austria are responsible for implementing this police cooperation.

    Finally, Tunisia is also one of the countries being discussed in Brussels in the “Mechanism of Operational Coordination for the External Dimension of Migration” (MOCADEM). This working group was newly created by the EU states last year and serves to politically bundle measures towards third countries of particular interest. In one of the most recent meetings, the migration agreement was also a topic. Following Tunisia’s example, the EU could also conclude such a deal with Egypt. The EU heads of government are now to take a decision on this.

    https://digit.site36.net/2023/11/01/fewer-boat-crossings-visit-to-frontex-eu-and-tunisia-implement-migrati

    #Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Tunisie #coopération #Frontex #aide_financière #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #militarisation_des_frontières #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM #UNHCR #EU4BorderSecurity_programme #Seahorse_Mediterranean #officiers_de_liaison #arrivées #départs #chiffres #statistiques #prix #Frontex #operational_partnership_to_combat_people_smuggling (#ASOP) #Mechanism_of_Operational_Coordination_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM)

    –—
    ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

  • The Man in #Seat_Sixty-One . . .

    Who is the Man in #Seat_61?

    I’m Mark Smith, and I live in an English village in deepest Buckinghamshire, with Dutch wife Nicolette, our son & daughter, cats Phoenix & Rosie & Pip the crazy cockapoo.

    Many years ago I ran away from Oxford to join the circus - or as we called it in those days, British Rail. Starting out in rural Kent on what was then BR’s Southern Region, I was the Station Manager for London’s Charing Cross, London Bridge & Cannon Street stations in the early to mid 1990s. After a spell as the Customer Relations Manager for two large UK train companies, I worked for the Office of the Rail Regulator and later the Strategic Rail Authority, ending up at the Department for Transport in charge of the team regulating fares & ticketing on the British rail network. Since 2007 I have run seat 61 full-time, as (a) updating it has become a full-time job and (b) it’s more fun than real work.

    I’ve travelled the world on trains & ships and I’ve been on the other side of the counter too - in university vacations I worked for Transalpino in London, a European rail ticketing agency issuing tickets and advising travel agents on train travel across Europe. Now I can share that knowledge online. See awards & press room.

    Why ’Seat 61’?

    Zaharoff, the notorious arms dealer, would always book compartment 7 on the Orient Express to or from Istanbul. On Eurostar, I would always request seat 61 (in first class cars 7, 8, 11 or 12 in a classic Eurostar or in cars 3 or 14 in the new e320) as it lines up with the window, one of a cosy pair of seats facing each other across a table complete with table lamp, like an old Pullman car. It became a tradition, and I’ve left London in seat 61 en route to destinations such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta, Albania, Tunisia (via Lille & Marseille), Marrakech (via Paris, Madrid & Algeciras), Istanbul (via Vienna, Budapest & Transylvania), Ukraine & the Crimea, Aleppo, Damascus, Petra & Aqaba, and even Moscow, Vladivostok, Tokyo & Nagasaki via the Trans-Siberian Railway.
    What does the site aim to do?

    Many people want to cut their carbon footprint or are simply fed up with the stress of flying - and a significant number of people are afraid of flying or medically restricted from doing so. However, information on alternatives to flying is often difficult to find through a travel industry obsessed with flights.

    So this site aims to inspire people to do something more rewarding with their travel opportunities than schlepping to an airport, getting on a soulless airliner and missing all the world has to offer. It then sets out to enable people to take train or ferry by giving the confidence and know-how to book their trip themselves, or call the right people to book it for them at affordable prices.

    https://www.seat61.com

    #train #transport_ferroviaire #tout_sur_le_train #Mark_Smith

  • La lutte féministe et le piège du punitivisme
    https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/La-lutte-feministe-et-le-piege-du-punitivisme

    De #MeToo au mouvement Ni Una Menos en Argentine ou en Italie, en passant par le plus récent #SeAcabó des footballeuses espagnoles, l’accent a été mis sur la violence de genre et sur la manière d’y faire face, en dénonçant les féminicides et les multiples agressions et abus sexuels qui se produisent sur les lieux de travail et dans d’autres sphères sociales. Le mouvement des femmes a contesté la naturalisation de ces agressions et abus, ce qui a constitué un grand pas en avant. Cependant, lorsqu’il a fallu articuler des stratégies de lutte, des objectifs et des programmes politiques, de profondes divergences sont apparues au sein du féminisme. Si dans les premières années de cette nouvelle vague féministe, les courants du féminisme radical, défendant des conceptions séparatistes et parfois essentialistes, étaient assez hégémoniques, récemment des voix se sont faites entendre à gauche pour remettre en cause ce que l’on peut appeler une dérive punitiviste du féminisme. Dans cet article, nous proposons un aperçu de certaines de ces critiques, pour ensuite approfondir le point de vue et le programme d’un féminisme socialiste à ce sujet.

    #féminisme #punitivisme #anticarcéral #abolitionnisme #justice

  • loupe-php/loupe: A #fulltext #search engine with #tokenization, #stemming, #typo_tolerance, #filters and #geo support based on only #PHP and #SQLite.
    https://github.com/loupe-php/loupe

    An SQLite based, PHP-only fulltext search engine.

    Loupe…
    –…only requires PHP and SQLite, you don’t need anything else - no containers, no nothing
    –…is typo-tolerant (based on the State Set Index Algorithm and Levenshtein)
    –…supports phrase search using " quotation marks
    –…supports filtering (and ordering) on any attribute with any SQL-inspired filter statement
    –…supports filtering (and ordering) on Geo distance
    –…orders relevance based on a typical TF-IDF Cosine similarity algorithm
    …auto-detects languages
    –…supports stemming
    –…is very easy to use
    –…is all-in-all just the easiest way to replace your good old SQL LIKE %...% queries with a way better search experience but without all the hassle of an additional service to manage. SQLite is everywhere and all it needs is your filesystem.

  • #Search-and-rescue in the Central Mediterranean Route does not induce migration : Predictive modeling to answer causal queries in migration research

    State- and private-led search-and-rescue are hypothesized to foster irregular migration (and thereby migrant fatalities) by altering the decision calculus associated with the journey. We here investigate this ‘pull factor’ claim by focusing on the Central Mediterranean route, the most frequented and deadly irregular migration route towards Europe during the past decade. Based on three intervention periods—(1) state-led Mare Nostrum, (2) private-led search-and-rescue, and (3) coordinated pushbacks by the Libyan Coast Guard—which correspond to substantial changes in laws, policies, and practices of search-and-rescue in the Mediterranean, we are able to test the ‘pull factor’ claim by employing an innovative machine learning method in combination with causal inference. We employ a Bayesian structural time-series model to estimate the effects of these three intervention periods on the migration flow as measured by crossing attempts (i.e., time-series aggregate counts of arrivals, pushbacks, and deaths), adjusting for various known drivers of irregular migration. We combine multiple sources of traditional and non-traditional data to build a synthetic, predicted counterfactual flow. Results show that our predictive modeling approach accurately captures the behavior of the target time-series during the various pre-intervention periods of interest. A comparison of the observed and predicted counterfactual time-series in the post-intervention periods suggest that pushback policies did affect the migration flow, but that the search-and-rescue periods did not yield a discernible difference between the observed and the predicted counterfactual number of crossing attempts. Hence we do not find support for search-and-rescue as a driver of irregular migration. In general, this modeling approach lends itself to forecasting migration flows with the goal of answering causal queries in migration research.

    https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-38119-4

    #appel_d'air #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #sauvetage #pull-factor #facteur_pull #chiffres #statistiques #rhétorique #afflux #invasion #sauvetage_en_mer #démonstration #déconstruction #fact-checking

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste qui réunit des fils de discussion pour démanteler la rhétorique de l’#appel_d'air en lien avec les #sauvetages en #Méditerranée :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1012135

    • Sur les #données et le #code qui ont servi à l’étude :

      We document the various data sources used in Table S1 in Supplementary Materials. Though most data sources
      are publicly available—with the exception of the Sabre data on air traffic, we are unable to upload our data set
      to a repository due to data-usage requirements and proprietary restrictions. The data that support the findings
      of this study are available from various sources documented in Table S1 in Supplementary Materials but restrictions
      apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for the current study, and so are not
      publicly available. Data are however available from the authors upon reasonable request and with permission of
      the various third party owners of the data. The code to construct the data set and perform the various statistical
      analyses is available at https://github.com/xlejx-rodsxn/sar_migration

      https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-38119-4.pdf

    • Migranti, il pull factor non esiste. La prova del nove in uno studio scientifico

      Attraverso l’uso di tecniche statistiche avanzatissime e del machine learning quattro ricercatori hanno incrociato migliaia di dati relativi al decennio 2011-2020 dimostrando che le attività di ricerca e soccorso, istituzionali o delle Ong, non fanno aumentare le partenze dai paesi nordafricani. Come sostenuto per anni dalle destre e non solo.

      Le attività di ricerca e soccorso nel Mediterraneo centrale non costituiscono un fattore di attrazione per i migranti, cioè non li spingono a partire. Lo dimostra uno studio pubblicato sulla rivista Scientific Reports, dello stesso gruppo editoriale di Nature sebbene non si tratti della più nota e importante collega. Per la prima volta allo scopo di verificare l’esistenza di questo presunto pull factor sono state utilizzate tecniche statistiche particolarmente avanzate e sistemi di machine learning capaci di far interagire molte banche dati.

      I ricercatori Alejandra Rodríguez Sánchez, Julian Wucherpfennig, Ramona Rischke e Stefano Maria Iacus hanno raccolto informazioni sul decennio 2011-2020 provenienti da diversi ambiti – tassi di cambio, prezzi internazionali delle merci, livelli di disoccupazione, conflitti, condizioni climatiche – e le hanno usate per identificare i fattori che meglio prevedono le variazioni numeriche delle partenze da Tunisia e Libia. La loro attenzione si è concentrata su tre fasi che riflettono cambiamenti sostanziali di natura politica, legale e operativa del fenomeno analizzato: la vasta operazione di salvataggio messa in campo dall’Italia tra il 18 ottobre 2013 e il 31 ottobre dell’anno seguente, cioè Mare Nostrum; l’arrivo delle navi umanitarie delle Ong, a partire dal 26 agosto 2014; l’istituzione della zona Sar (search and rescue) libica e la collaborazione tra Tripoli e Unione Europea, dal 2017, in funzione anti-migranti.

      «Abbiamo comparato il fenomeno delle partenze prima e dopo l’inizio delle attività di ricerca e soccorso, il nostro modello predittivo dice che sarebbe andata allo stesso modo anche se le seconde non fossero intervenute», spiega Rodríguez Sánchez. Il modello è di tipo contro-fattuale: mostra cosa sarebbe successo modificando un certo fattore. In questo caso le operazioni Sar, che dunque non fanno aumentare le traversate.

      La forza del metodo statistico usato è di permettere di investigare non soltanto il terreno della correlazione tra due fenomeni, ma anche quello della presunta causalità di uno rispetto all’altro. La conclusione è che le navi di soccorso non sono il motivo delle traversate, o anche solo del loro aumento, ma esattamente l’opposto: costituiscono una risposta a esse. Sono altri i fattori che spingono le persone a migrare e rischiare la vita nel Mediterraneo, sono estremamente variegati e complessi, riguardano la povertà, la disoccupazione, le persecuzioni politiche, gli effetti del cambiamento climatico.

      Lo studio ha poi rilevato un altro elemento: la cooperazione Libia-Ue ha effettivamente ridotto le traversate, che dal 2017 sono state meno di quelle che si sarebbero dovute verificare secondo il modello predittivo. I ricercatori però avvertono che questo ha avuto un altissimo costo umano e che, in ogni caso, le politiche di esternalizzazione «non incidono sui fattori strutturali che influenzano un certo flusso e potrebbero forzare i potenziali migranti a seguire rotte ancora più pericolose». Se anche producono dei risultati in termini di deterrenza, insomma, ciò avviene esclusivamente a stretto giro, spostando il problema solo un po’ più in là.

      «Questa importante ricerca mostra a livello strutturale che le politiche di salvataggio, anche le più grandi e organizzate, non sembrano far aumentare le traversate. Noi stiamo indagando l’effetto puntuale: cioè se la presenza di singole navi Ong davanti alle coste libiche incida sulle persone che partono», commenta Matteo Villa, ricercatore dell’Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (Ispi). Villa nel 2019 ha pubblicato il primo studio scientifico che smentiva la tesi delle navi Ong come fattore di attrazione. Tra qualche mese uscirà un aggiornamento con una base dati molto più ampia. «Conferma quanto avevamo osservato quattro anni fa – anticipa Villa al manifesto – L’unica correlazione che abbiamo trovato riguarda i mesi più freddi: tra dicembre, gennaio e febbraio ci sono più partenze se le Ong sono in missione. Ma parliamo di numeri irrilevanti: lo scorso anno 300 persone sulle 50mila arrivate dalla Libia».

      La tesi del pull factor è nata nel 2014 quando l’allora direttore di Frontex, l’agenzia europea per il controllo delle frontiere esterne, Gil Arias-Fernández iniziò a sostenere pubblicamente che le navi di Mare Nostrum stavano facendo aumentare i flussi dal Nord Africa. In una Risk Analysis della stessa agenzia relativa al 2016 l’accusa è stata spostata sulle Ong, intervenute nel frattempo a colmare il vuoto lasciato dalla chiusura dell’operazione italiana. Da allora questa teoria è stata un cavallo di battaglia delle destre ed è tornata in voga dopo l’insediamento del governo Meloni. Lo scorso autunno il ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi e quello degli Esteri Antonio Tajani, tra gli altri, hanno più volte citato un misterioso rapporto di Frontex che avrebbe ribadito lo stesso assunto per il 2021.

      Di quel rapporto non si è mai saputo nulla, ma ora abbiamo uno studio scientifico che smentisce il pull factor per l’ennesima volta. Intanto questa retorica ha influenzato le scelte dell’attuale esecutivo e anni di politiche migratorie basate sulla criminalizzazione delle Ong e sul disimpegno istituzionale dalla ricerca e dal soccorso davanti alle coste libiche. C’è da sperare che nuove ricercje facciano luce su quante vittime hanno causato simili norme e prassi, slegate da qualsiasi rapporto con la realtà e basate soltanto sulla propaganda.

      https://ilmanifesto.it/il-pull-factor-non-esiste-la-prova-del-nove-in-uno-studio-scientifico

      #propagande

    • Sea rescue operations do not promote migration, study finds

      Rescue operations do not incentivise migrants try to cross the Mediterranean, a recent study has found. Instead conflicts, economic hardship, natural and climate disasters, and the weather are reportedly key drivers of migration.

      Irregular migrant departures from the coasts of North Africa to Europe are not encouraged by search and rescue missions in the Central Mediterranean, a recent study has found. Instead, factors such as conflicts, economic hardship, natural disasters, and weather conditions drive migration.
      Rescue operations are not a ’pull factor’

      The study was published in Scientific Reports by an international research group led by Alejanda Rodríguez Sánchez from the University of Potsdam (Germany). The scientists looked at the number of attempts to cross the Central Mediterranean between 2011 and 2020.

      Through various simulations, the researchers tried to identify factors that can best predict changes in the number of sea crossings. The factors that they looked at included the number of search and rescue missions — both by state authorities and NGOs, as well as the currency exchange rates, the cost of international raw materials, unemployment rates, conflicts, violence, the rates of flight travel between Africa, the Middle East and Europe and meteorological conditions.
      Libya: Pushbacks reduced migration, increased human rights violations

      The study also looked at the increased activities of the Libyan coast guard since 2017, intercepting migrant boats and returning migrants to Libya. Researchers found that this had caused a reduction in the number of departure attempts and might have discouraged migration.

      The authors pointed out that, however, this has coincided with the reports of a worsening of human rights for migrants in Libya — particularly in the detention centers where migrants are being held after being stopped at sea.

      The researchers looked at migration on an “aggregate-level” and did not look at “micro-motives of migrants and smugglers”, they pointed out in the study. They recommended that future studies should do an in-depth analysis of the impact of search and rescue missions at sea on the decisions of individual migrants and human traffickers.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/50875/sea-rescue-operations-do-not-promote-migration-study-finds

  • Dans la Manche, l’État sous-traite le sauvetage d’exilés à une société privée

    Le ministère des armées a signé un marché avec l’entreprise #SeaOwl, qui fournit, depuis le printemps, deux #bateaux pour des missions de sauvetage au large de #Dunkerque et de #Calais. Une première. D’après nos informations, des questions émergent autour de la formation des équipages et des performances des navires.

    AccostéAccosté à un quai du port de Dunkerque, l’#Esvagt_Charlie se remarque de loin. Sa coque rouge de 40 mètres de long sur laquelle sont inscrits les mots « RESCUE ZONE » ne laisse aucun doute : il s’agit de l’un des deux nouveaux moyens de sauvetage déployés par la France dans la Manche. Sur le pont, quatre marins s’activent, avant de se murer dans le silence à la moindre question. La capitaine renvoie vers la préfecture maritime. Tous ont l’ordre de ne pas parler à la presse.

    Les deux marchés conclus en mars et en avril 2023 entre le ministère des armées et l’entreprise SeaOwl, qui fournit ces bateaux et leur équipage, sanctionnent en effet de pénalités financières toute communication sans « accord préalable de l’autorité maritime ». Ce #marché_public est une première : jamais l’État français n’avait lancé d’appel d’offres en direction du privé pour une mission entièrement dédiée au sauvetage d’exilé·es.

    Depuis 2019 et l’augmentation du nombre de passages par la mer, la préfecture maritime de la Manche et de la mer du Nord coordonne en effet les opérations de sauvetage avec les moyens de la marine nationale, des douanes, de la Société nationale de sauvetage en mer (SNSM), de la gendarmerie maritime ou des Abeilles, ces remorqueurs destinés aux bateaux de marchandises ou ferries. Parmi tous ces acteurs, seule la SNSM, une association d’utilité publique, est exclusivement dédiée au sauvetage et composée de sauveteurs bénévoles.

    En optant pour une société privée, l’État montre son incapacité à mobiliser ses propres moyens. « Dans le #Pas-de-Calais, tout le système a été conçu pour le sauvetage des biens et des gros bateaux. Jamais personne n’a vu venir la question de la mort massive en mer », analyse Vincent Guigueno, historien spécialiste des enjeux maritimes et conférencier à Sciences Po Paris.

    Deux bateaux ont ainsi été affrétés par SeaOwl : l’Esvagt Charlie, depuis début avril à Dunkerque ; et l’#Apollo_Moon, depuis début mai à Calais. #Coût du marché, d’après nos informations : 4 millions d’euros par an pour chaque bateau, renouvelable au bout de quatre années.

    Rachetée en 2021 par l’homme d’affaires #Walter_Butler, SeaOwl est spécialisée dans les technologies de défense maritime (drones flottants armés, surveillance, navire d’entraînement pour la marine) et propose des services de sécurité pour des plateformes offshore en Asie, en Afrique ou au Moyen-Orient.

    Ce recours au privé a été annoncé en décembre 2022 par la première ministre Élisabeth Borne, après qu’un naufrage a fait 27 morts et quatre disparus à la fin 2021, et dans la foulée de révélations du Monde sur l’attitude, ce jour-là, de certains militaires du centre régional opérationnel de surveillance et de sauvetage (Cross) de Gris-Nez – sept militaires ont depuis été mis en examen pour « non-assistance à personne en danger ».

    Mais si les spécialistes du monde maritime interrogés saluent le renforcement du dispositif de sauvetage, les interrogations se multiplient quant à l’efficacité opérationnelle des deux navires de SeaOwl, à l’heure où la capacité des embarcations d’exilé·es augmente jusqu’à 40 voire 60 personnes. « Il fallait vite mettre quelque chose en place. Sauf que quand on fait les choses dans l’urgence, dans le domaine du sauvetage, on fait n’importe quoi, n’importe comment », expose Jean-Paul Hellequin, marin à la retraite, porte-parole du syndicat des marins CGT du Grand Ouest et président de l’association de défense des marins Mor Glaz.

    Ainsi, à l’arrivée de l’Esvagt Charlie, à la mi-avril, « il y avait zéro personne formée à bord », témoigne sous couvert d’anonymat l’un des membres d’équipage. « Il n’y en a pas un qui ait de l’expérience dans ce que ce bateau est censé faire : sauver beaucoup de gens à la fois. » À bord, ils sont six marins recrutés par SeaOwl, à alterner tous les quinze jours avec une autre équipe.

    En plus de ces marins, les navires embarquent en permanence « des agents de sécurité, ni marins ni secouristes ». Embauchés eux aussi par SeaOwl, il s’agit d’« une équipe dite de protection, composée de trois personnes », confirme le secrétariat général de la mer, organe interministériel dirigé par l’ancien préfet de police de Paris, Didier Lallement, sous l’autorité de la première ministre. Mission : « Aider à prendre en charge et gérer les naufragés ».

    Pas de formation en sauvetage de masse prévue dans l’appel d’offres

    Mais avec quelle #formation ? « Leur métier est la sécurité, ils ne sont pas là pour prendre soin... Ils sont là pour fouiller les naufragés, fustige le marin déjà cité. Cela relève d’un fantasme entourant ces gens qui traversent, comme s’ils pouvaient représenter un danger. » « Le cas échéant, [cette équipe] est en mesure de protéger l’équipage », soutient le secrétariat général de la mer.

    Le cahier des clauses, consulté par Mediapart, reste vague quant aux exigences de formation de l’équipage. « Il n’existe pas de formation institutionnelle en matière de sauvetage de masse définie par l’organisation maritime internationale. Cela ne pouvait donc pas être intégré dans les prérequis de l’appel d’offres », justifie l’équipe de Didier Lallement. En renvoyant la balle au titulaire du marché : « Il [lui] appartient de prendre les dispositions requises pour que ses navires soient en mesure de réaliser la mission ordonnée dans de bonnes conditions. »

    Pourtant, des formations sont organisées depuis janvier 2022 auprès de plusieurs administrations intervenant dans la Manche, comme la marine, les douanes, les affaires maritimes... Elles sont délivrées par Arnaud Banos, formateur pour la SNSM, l’une des rares personnes à pouvoir former au sauvetage de masse en France. Directeur de recherche au CNRS et sauveteur auprès d’ONG en Méditerranée, Arnaud Banos affirme avoir été contacté « début juin » par la préfecture maritime afin de former les équipages de SeaOwl. Mais aucune date n’a pour l’instant été fixée.

    L’Esvagt Charlie est déjà intervenu sur quatre opérations de sauvetage (38 personnes le 18 mai, 17 dans la nuit du 27 au 28 mai, 45 le 12 juin, et 54 dans la nuit du 20 au 21 juin), et les semaines continuent donc de défiler sans équipage formé. « Le jour où un naufrage avec quelque chose de grave se passe, ça va être le gros merdier », craint un marin.

    « Les opérations de sauvetage impliquant des dizaines de naufragés sont très complexes à mener et mettent en danger aussi bien les naufragés que les équipages », complète Arnaud Banos.

    Un vieux navire censé jouer les ambulances

    Par ailleurs, pour plusieurs experts interrogés, les caractéristiques techniques des bateaux ne sont pas à la hauteur des enjeux. L’Esvagt Charlie, un bateau vieux de presque 50 ans, ne dépasse pas les 10 nœuds (18 km/h) ; pas plus que son homologue l’Apollo Moon, ex-navire de pêche. À titre de comparaison, certains canots de la Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) anglaise ou de la SNSM atteignent les 25 nœuds (46 km/h), soit plus du double.

    « On ne transforme pas en quelque temps des chalutiers ou de vieux navires en des ambulances de la mer », raille Jean-Paul Hellequin. « La rapidité d’intervention est primordiale », complète un acteur expérimenté du sauvetage dans la Manche, souhaitant pour sa part rester anonyme. « S’il y a une urgence vitale, dans une nuit très chargée, ils ne pourront pas agir dans la seconde », abonde Flore, responsable communication de l’association d’aide aux exilé·es Utopia 56. « En période hivernale, quand les personnes sont gelées, avec les risques d’hypothermie, il y a aussi un vrai enjeu à rentrer vite au port », s’inquiète-t-elle.

    L’accord-cadre exige certes un tirant d’eau maximum (partie immergée du bateau) de 4,5 mètres, afin de pouvoir opérer dans les zones de petits fonds du détroit. Ceux des deux navires atteignent 4,20 mètres... Encore trop, selon le spécialiste du sauvetage interrogé sous anonymat : « En mer du Nord, il y a des bancs de sable partout, durs comme la pierre. À 4,20 mètres ça ne passe pas : s’ils les touchent, ils s’échouent et ne peuvent pas intervenir sur les embarcations. »

    Enfin, le franc-bord (hauteur entre la ligne de flottaison sur l’eau et le pont principal) de l’Apollo Moon est très haut. « Même avec un franc-bord d’à peine un mètre, c’est déjà un défi de sortir les gens de l’eau », insiste cet acteur du sauvetage. L’Esvagt Charlie et l’Apollo Moon fonctionnent avec des zodiacs mis à l’eau par une grue. L’accord-cadre prévoit que les bateaux disposent d’une zone de sauvetage « abaissée » pour faciliter la remontée des naufragé·es depuis ces zodiacs. L’Esvagt Charlie en a une, mais pas l’Apollo Moon.

    Son pont, situé à plusieurs mètres au-dessus de l’eau, rend donc impossible la remontée sans utiliser à nouveau les grues. Avec ce système, « on ne prend que quelques naufragés à chaque fois, pas 50. Cela peut durer longtemps : le problème de l’hypothermie arrive très vite, on risque de perdre du monde », avertit l’expert interrogé. « Je pense que les armateurs français auraient pu fournir des navires plus modernes et plus adéquats », conclut pour sa part Jean-Paul Hellequin.

    « Obligation de moyens, pas de résultats »

    D’autres experts sont plus nuancés. « La question, c’est les compétences de l’équipage. Les compétences s’articulent à l’outil technique que vous avez », recentre Vincent Guigueno. Les traversées dans la Manche sont « une situation neuve. La période d’adaptation est courte. L’État fait ce qu’il peut », relève aussi le marin interrogé sous anonymat.

    En janvier dernier, lors de la présentation du bilan annuel de la préfecture maritime de la Manche et de la mer du Nord, le préfet Marc Véran a déclaré que « l’État a une obligation de moyens, pas de résultats ». Et de comparer les risques encourus par les exilé·es à ceux liés aux avalanches pour les skieurs en hors-piste : « Les sauveteurs vont tout faire pour vous sauver, mais ils n’y arriveront peut-être pas. Nous, c’est pareil. » Ces deux nouveaux bateaux permettent donc à l’État de répondre à son obligation de moyens…

    Alors que l’État va dépenser 550 millions d’euros reçus du Royaume-Uni (via un accord signé en novembre 2022) dans la sécurisation du littoral et l’interception des départs, aucun investissement n’est pour le moment prévu pour renforcer ses effectifs de sauvetage en mer. En revanche, 500 agents de police supplémentaires doivent être déployés, et un centre de rétention administrative (CRA) construit.

    « Les différentes administrations se demandent sur qui va retomber la responsabilité dans le cas d’un nouveau naufrage », conclut l’historien Vincent Guigueno. « L’idée, c’est de mettre en place le storytelling, et de pouvoir dire : “On a mis des moyens supplémentaires”, si un nouveau drame se produit. »

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/270623/dans-la-manche-l-etat-sous-traite-le-sauvetage-d-exiles-une-societe-privee
    #sous-traitance #France #sauvetage #migrations #asile #privatisation #réfugiés #frontières #Manche #complexe_militaro-industriel

  • #Sénégal : pilleurs des mers

    Le Sénégal se trouve au coeur de l’une des zones de pêche les plus riches du monde. Pourtant, depuis quelques années, les poissons se font plus rares... Victimes de surexploitation par les bateaux usines venus de l’étranger, les pêcheurs artisanaux sont les témoins d’un désastre écologique. La tension monte entre les locaux et les chalutiers étrangers autour de l’or bleu en voie de disparition. 

    Ces derniers n’hésitent plus à empiéter illégalement dans les zones dédiées aux pêcheurs artisanaux causant des collisions et parfois la mort des pêcheurs.

    Il y a urgence à agir car la raréfaction du poisson se fait sentir au-delà des frontières du Sénégal. Certains Etats africains, tel le Libéria, acceptent désormais de coopérer avec des organisations de défense de l’environnement comme #Sea_Shepherd.

    Embarquant leurs officiers armés à bord du Sam Simon, un puissant navire de l’ONG, ils interceptent les pêcheurs industriels illégaux qui sont immédiatement arraisonnés et arrêtés. La côte ouest-africaine est devenue le théâtre d’une redoutable guerre pour la défense de ses #ressources_hialeutiques et la protection de ses pêcheurs.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/086543-000-A/senegal-pilleurs-des-mers

    #pêche #surpêche #industrie_de_la_pêche #extractivisme #désert_liquide #aire_marine_protégée (#AMP) #travail #femmes #Greenpeace #résistance #Mauritanie #Liberia #opération_Sola_Stella #pêche_intensive

  • Une ONG allemande dépose une plainte contre des dirigeants européens pour #crimes_contre_l'humanité envers des migrants

    Le Centre européen pour les droits constitutionnels et humains a annoncé, mercredi, avoir déposé une plainte pour crimes contre l’humanité contre des dirigeants européens devant la Cour pénale internationale. L’ONG les accuse d’avoir collaboré avec la Libye pour l’interception de migrants en mer malgré les risques de sévices que les exilés encourent dans le pays.

    Le #Centre_européen_pour_les_droits constitutionnels_et_humains (#ECCHR) a déposé une plainte pour crimes contre l’humanité devant la #Cour_pénale_internationale (#CPI) visant plusieurs responsables européens, a annoncé, mercredi 30 novembre, cette ONG allemande, soutenue par l’ONG, Sea-Watch.

    Parmi les personnes visées par la plainte figurent l’ancien ministre de l’Intérieur italien #Matteo_Salvini, les ancien et actuel Premiers ministres maltais #Robert_Abela et #Joseph_Muscat, ou encore l’ancienne cheffe de la diplomatie européenne, #Federica_Mogherini.

    L’ECCHR estime que la politique européenne de soutien aux #garde-côtes_libyens chargés d’intercepter les exilés en #Méditerranée puis de les ramener en #Libye a rendu ces personnalités indirectement responsables des #violences et #exactions subies par les migrants dans le pays. Les exilés, qui sont interceptés en mer par les garde-côtes libyens, sont systématiquement envoyés dans des centres de détention, où ils subissent des violences physiques et sexuelles, des privations de nourriture et de la #torture.

    « Bien qu’ils aient eu connaissance de ces crimes, des fonctionnaires des agences de l’UE ainsi que de l’Italie et de Malte ont renforcé leur collaboration avec la Libye pour empêcher les réfugiés et les migrants de fuir la Libye par la mer », souligne l’ECCHR dans son communiqué, publié mercredi 30 novembre. « Ce soutien et cette #collaboration tendent à démontrer le rôle décisif que jouent les #hauts_fonctionnaires de l’UE dans la privation de liberté des migrants et des réfugiés fuyant la Libye », ajoute l’ONG.

    Enquête sur les faits de #collaboration

    L’ECCHR et #Sea-Watch appellent la CPI à enquêter sur ces faits de collaboration entre acteurs européens et libyens et à traduire en justice les responsables. Les deux ONG réclament également la fin du financement des programmes d’externalisation des frontières européennes qui s’appuient, entre autres, sur le soutien et la formation des garde-côtes libyens. Elles demandent enfin la création d’un programme civil de recherche et sauvetage européen qui serait financé par les États membres de l’Union européenne (UE).

    Environ 100 000 migrants ont été interceptés au large des côtes libyennes et renvoyés dans le pays depuis 2017, date de la signature d’un accord entre la Libye et l’Italie pour lutter contre l’immigration illégale. Outre l’Italie, l’UE a versé depuis 2015 plus de 500 millions d’euros au gouvernement de Tripoli pour l’aider à freiner les départs de migrants vers l’Europe.

    Malgré les preuves de plus en plus nombreuses des cas de maltraitance envers des migrants en Libye, l’UE n’a pas cessé son aide financière au pays. Pire, l’Union a elle-même reconnu dans un rapport confidentiel remis en début d’année que les autorités libyennes ont eu recours à un « usage excessif de la force » envers les migrants et que certaines interceptions en Méditerranée ont été menées à l’encontre de la règlementation internationale.

    En 2021, Amnesty international a accusé l’UE de « complicité » dans les atrocités commises sur le sol libyen à l’encontre des exilés. L’ONG, comme le fait l’ONU, exhorte régulièrement les États membres à « suspendre leur coopération sur les migrations et les contrôles des frontières avec la Libye ». En vain.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/45141/une-ong-allemande-depose-une-plainte-contre-des-dirigeants-europeens-p

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #justice #plainte #responsabilité #complicité #décès #mourir_en_mer #morts_en_mer

    –—

    juin 2019 :
    ICC submission calls for prosecution of EU over migrant deaths
    https://seenthis.net/messages/785050

  • Bayonetta 3 Voice Actor’s Pay Dispute Overshadows Nintendo Game - Bloomberg
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-18/bayonetta-3-voice-actor-s-pay-dispute-overshadows-nintendo-game

    A pay dispute between the creator of a critically acclaimed video game series and its star voice actor reignited a long-simmering debate over wages in the industry. As is often the case in these sorts of disagreements, the details surrounding negotiations and casting for the upcoming game, Bayonetta 3, are more complicated than what has been portrayed publicly.

    #jeu_vidéo #jeux_vidéo #jeu_vidéo_bayonetta_3 #doublage #hellena_taylor #boycott #rémunération #ressources_humaines #screen_actors_guild-american_federation_of_television_and_radio_artists #sag-aftra #platinum_games #nintendo #hideki_kamiya #bryan_dechart #jeu_vidéo_cyberpunk_2077 #jeu_vidéo_red_dead_redemption_ii #sean_chiplock #jeu_vidéo_legend_of_zelda_breath_of_the_wild #conosole_nintendo_switch #jeu_vidéo_bayonetta_2 #jennifer_hale

  • Seine-et-Marne. Une vingtaine d’élèves de Vert-Saint-Denis obligés de redoubler faute de place dans les lycées La République de Seine et Marne

    Une vingtaine d’élèves de 3e du collège Jean-Vilar de Vert-Saint-Denis ont été obligés de redoubler, faute d’avoir trouvé une place dans un lycée professionnel.

    En fin de troisième, la dernière année du collège, les élèves sont toujours soumis au même moment-clé, celui de l’orientation. Formation, lycées professionnels, filière générale, chaque élève formule des vœux pour intégrer le lycée qui lui permettra de poursuivre ses études. Sauf que cette année, tout ne s’est pas passé comme prévu pour une vingtaine d’élèves du collège Jean-Vilar de Vert-Saint-Denis, qui avaient choisi une orientation en seconde professionnelle, dont les lycées ne sont pas sectorisés. 

    « Comme le collège nous l’a bien expliqué, nous avons formulé des vœux au mois de juin pour notre fille, Lou, qui était en troisième, explique Aurélie Michel. On n’a eu que des refus. On a vite vu qu’on n’était pas les seuls dans ce cas, et le collège nous a demandé de revenir le 24 août, et d’être là physiquement, au collège, pour formuler de nouveaux vœux. Ce que nous avons fait. Nous avons remis trois nouveaux vœux, qui se sont encore soldés par des réponses négatives le 25 août. On a recommencé début septembre, avec quatre vœux cette fois, en choisissant des lycées pourtant loin de chez nous, comme Uruguay-France à Avon, Combs-la-Ville ou encore Dammarie-lès-Lys. Là encore, que des réponses négatives ! Le collège s’est alors engagé à nous rappeler le 14 septembre pour trouver une solution. Nous n’avons pas eu de nouvelles avant le 16, tout ça pour nous dire qu’il nous proposait finalement de faire redoubler notre fille. C’était hors de question d’accepter ça pour moi ! »
    . . . . . . .
    La suite : https://actu.fr/ile-de-france/vert-saint-denis_77495/seine-et-marne-une-vingtaine-deleves-de-vert-saint-denis-obliges-de-redoubler-f

    #france #école #éducation #inégalités #enfants #onisep #eduscol #parcoursup

    • La halle du marché d’Abbeville baptisée au nom de Jean-Pierre Pernaut Rédaction Le Journal d’Abbeville

      La plaque a été dévoilée par les enfants de l’ancien journaliste picard.
      La halle Jean-Pierre Pernaut a été inaugurée ce samedi 24 septembre à Abbeville (Somme) en présence de ses enfants Julia et Olivier Pernaut pour ce moment symbolique. Une halle accueillant le marché qui était si cher au cœur de l’ancien présentateur du JT de TF1.

      De nombreuses personnalités étaient également présentes, Célestine Dias de Olivera, Miss somme 2022 élue à Abbeville ainsi que Saïda Hadji présidente du Comité Miss Somme mais également l’ancien journaliste et maire d’Eaucourt-sur-Somme Henri Sannier qui était proche de l’ancien présentateur du JT de 13 h.
      . . . . . .
      La suite : https://actu.fr/hauts-de-france/abbeville_80001/la-halle-du-marche-d-abbeville-baptisee-au-nom-de-jean-pierre-pernaut_54090209.

      #revue_de_presse #tf1 #jean-pierre_pernaut #pernaut

    • TRI SELECTIF – Didier Lallement à la mer : « halte à la pollution maritime » Malheurs Actuels

      La nomination de l’ancien préfet de police de Paris a suscité un torrent d’indignations de la part des différentes parties prenantes qui tentent de survivre dans l’océan ou de le défendre.

      Même si le gouvernement a commenté la nouvelle, en expliquant que l’arrivée de Didier Lallement à la mer servait simplement à « s’assurer de l’alimentation des canons à eaux qui participent au maintien de l’ordre », cette communication n’a pas calmé la vague d’indignations.


      Comme d’habitude, c’est la Fédération des Tortues de Mer qui a donné le là, à travers un communiqué particulièrement alarmant, dénonçant notamment « une aggravation manifeste de la pollution des océans, qui ne sont pas voués à accueillir tous les déchets de l’humanité ». Dans ce communiqué, les tortues de mer ont exigé la démission immédiate du secrétaire général.

      Même son de cloche du côté de Sea Shepherd, qui a assuré ne pas faiblir dans sa lutte contre la pollution des océans, en restant particulièrement en alerte face aux violences que subissent les populations maritimes. Greenpeace a également abondé dans ce sens, en condamnant « la gestion du tri des déchets du gouvernement français ».

      La suite : https://malheursactuels.com/didier-lallement-pollution-maritime

      #dauphins #didier lallement #greenpeace #mer #océan #requins #sea shepherd #tortues

  • I finanziamenti europei al Marocco per bloccare le persone, a tutti i costi

    In questi anni l’Unione europea ha garantito alle polizie marocchine mezzi, “formazione” e strumenti di identificazione. Forniture milionarie, poco trasparenti, di cui hanno beneficiato quelle stesse guardie di frontiera che il 24 giugno hanno causato la morte di oltre 20 persone. Anche qui Frontex ha un ruolo decisivo

    “Un partner di riferimento per l’Unione europea, un modello che altri potranno seguire per la sua capacità di collaborare con le nostra agenzie”. Così la Commissione europea descriveva nell’ottobre 2021 l’attività delle autorità marocchine nel campo della “gestione” del fenomeno migratorio. Un’immagine che stride con quella dei corpi stesi a terra, immersi in pozze di sangue, di chi la mattina presto del 24 giugno è stato brutalmente respinto mentre tentava di far ingresso nell’enclave spagnola di Melilla. Almeno 23 i morti, molti di più secondo le Ong indipendenti, in prevalenza persone originarie di Sudan e Sud-Sudan, centinaia i feriti e decine gli arresti tra le circa 2mila persone che hanno tentato di scalare la triplice barriera metallica che separa il territorio marocchino dalla città spagnola. Ma la violenza perpetrata ai danni dei rifugiati sia dalle forze di polizia marocchina sia dalla Guardia civile spagnola va contestualizzata in un quadro più ampio. I soldi dell’Ue hanno finanziato quella violenza.

    Del bilancio pluriennale 2014-2020 circa 370 milioni di euro sono stati assegnati al governo di Rabat per la gestione del fenomeno migratorio, di cui 238 derivanti direttamente dal Fondo fiduciario dell’Ue per l’Africa (Eutf): l’80% è stato destinato a programmi di sostegno, supporto e gestione dei confini con solo le “briciole” per la protezione delle persone in transito (circa l’11%) e per l’integrazione socio-economica di chi “sceglie” di restare in Marocco (7,5%). Cifre stanziate con il consueto ritornello della “lotta contro l’immigrazione illegale” che, come su tanti altri confini esterni dell’Ue giustifica il blocco del flusso delle persone in transito e l’impossibilità di vedersi riconosciuto il diritto d’asilo. Una strategia che, nel caso del Marocco, getta le prime basi nel 2001 quando la rotta del Mediterraneo centrale comincia a vedere i primi flussi. L’Italia è precursore con un finanziamento di 10 miliardi di lire, tra 1999 e il 2000, per finanziare secondo quanto ricostruito dal progetto Sciabaca&Oruka di Asgi l’acquisto di mezzi, strumenti ed equipaggiamento che favoriscono le forze di polizia marocchina nell’attività di contrasto all’immigrazione “clandestina”.

    Come ricostruito da Statewatch, gruppo di ricerca indipendente, a livello europeo invece dal 2001 al 2010 vengono stanziati circa 74,6 milioni di euro per sei progetti riguardanti la sicurezza delle frontiere. Tra questi sei progetti almeno due meritano attenzione. Il “Seahorse network” (costo totale di circa 2,5 milioni di euro, con un contributo Ue pari a più di 1,9 milioni) che ha fornito fondi per la creazione di una “rete regionale sicura per lo scambio di informazioni sull’immigrazione irregolare”. Statewatch, grazie ai documenti forniti dalla Direzione generale per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo internazionale della Commissione (Dg Devco) ha ricostruito che la rete ha sede a Gran Canaria ed è collegata a quella della Guardia civil spagnola e l’Agenzia Frontex. E poi un progetto da più di 67 milioni di euro fornito tra il 2007 e il 2010 direttamente al ministero dell’Interno marocchino: non si conoscono i contenuti del progetto, in quanto l’accesso ai documenti è stato negato per “tutela dell’interesse pubblico che è prevalente alla necessità di divulgazione” e soprattutto non esistono documenti di valutazione. “Il fatto che l’Ue non abbia intrapreso una valutazione è sorprendente dati i rigorosi standard di audit e valutazione che dovrebbero essere applicata ai finanziamenti”.

    All’aumento dei flussi corrisponde una crescita dei finanziamenti. Non a caso tra il 2013-2018, sempre da quanto ricostruito da Statewatch, i finanziamenti si sono concentrati sull’integrazione delle persone già presenti sul territorio complice un cambio di rotta delle autorità marocchine che hanno promosso due campagne di regolarizzazione per le persone prive di documenti (nel 2013 e nel 2016) e un tentativo di garantire sostegno a rifugiati e richiedenti asilo. I circa 61,5 milioni di euro stanziati dall’Ue hanno di fatto “compensato il mancato coinvolgimento delle autorità marocchine nella formulazione e nell’attuazione di una vera politica di integrazione”. Ma l’intervento umanitario europeo è solo una breve parentesi. Tra il 2017 e il 2018 gli attraversamenti “irregolari” nel Mediterraneo occidentale aumentano del 40% e le autorità marocchine dichiarano di aver fermato circa 76mila persone. Cifre da prendere con le pinze ma che giustificano, secondo i legislatori europei, la ripresa dei fondi destinati a Rabat. Questo nonostante, a livello assoluto, gli attraversamenti irregolari diminuirono del 25% rispetto al 2017 e raggiunsero il numero più basso dei cinque anni precedenti (150mila in totale). Ma poco conta, come visto anche su altre frontiere, non è una questione di numeri.

    Il 20 agosto 2018 attraverso il “Programma di gestione delle frontiere per la regione del Maghreb (BMP – Maghreb) vengono destinati 30 milioni di euro per “proteggere, monitorare e gestire le frontiere” del Marocco in un più ampio progetto multinazionale, dal budget totale di 55 milioni di euro, in cui figura tra i partner esecutivi anche il ministero dell’Interno italiano per alcune azioni in Tunisia. Si va dal potenziamento delle infrastrutture informatiche per “raccolta, archiviazione e identificazione della biometria digitale” e l’acquisizione di mezzi aerei e navali per il controllo pre-frontaliero. Il 13 dicembre 2018 vengono poi destinati 44 milioni di euro per il progetto “Soutien à la gestion intégrée des frontières et de la migration au Maroc” che mira a “rafforzare le capacità delle istituzioni marocchine a protezione, sorveglianza e controllo delle frontiere”: per un periodo di 36 mesi e gestito dalle autorità spagnole per “migliorare le capacità delle autorità marocchine di intercettare i valichi di frontiera irregolari e svolgere attività di ricerca e soccorso in mare”. A questo si aggiunge un programma per il contrasto al “contrabbando e al traffico di esseri umani” con un finanziamento pari a 70 milioni di euro. Nel dicembre 2019 nonostante gli attraversamenti registrati da Frontex sono la metà rispetto all’anno precedente (appena 23.969), l’Ue finanzia più di 101 milioni di euro nuovamente per “rafforzare le capacità delle istituzioni marocchine, in particolare per il ministero dell’Interno a contrastare il traffico di migranti e la tratta degli esseri umani incluso un sostegno per la gestione delle frontiere del Paese”.

    Nonostante queste ingenti cifre la trasparenza è negata. Per nessuno dei progetti di gestione delle frontiere le istituzioni europee hanno fornito accesso ai documenti tirando in ballo nuovamente la “tutela dell’interesse pubblico in materia di relazioni internazionali”. Nel novembre 2019 i ricercatori di Statewatch commentavano “profeticamente” questo sostegno: “È probabile che le conseguenze di questo approccio siano terribili dato che la cooperazione del Marocco in materia di sicurezza e sorveglianza delle frontiere comporta un costo molto elevato in termini di violazioni dei diritti umani commesse dalle forze di sicurezza marocchine contro migranti, rifugiati e persone richiedenti asilo”.

    Eccoli i frutti della politica di esternalizzazione europea in Marocco. “Video e fotografie mostrano corpi sparsi per terra in pozze di sangue, forze di sicurezza marocchine che prendono a calci e picchiano le persone; la Guardia civil spagnola che lancia gas lacrimogeni contro uomini aggrapparti alle recinzioni” spiega Judith Sunderland, vicedirettrice per l’Europa e l’Asia di Human rights watch che spingono l’Ong a chiedere una ferma condanna da parte dei funzionari di Spagna, Marocco e Unione europea e “garantire indagini efficaci e imparziali per portare giustizia a coloro che hanno perso la vita”. Il numero delle persone morte non è ancora chiaro. Secondo Caminando Fronteras, organizzazione spagnola, sarebbero 37 e decine di feriti. Ma le autorità marocchine stanno già facendo pulizia dei crimini commessi: l’Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (Amdh), che si occupa di tutelare i diritti umani nel Paese, ha pubblicato su Twitter due fotografie di quelle che si stima fossero tra le 16 e le 21 tombe scavate nel cimitero di Sidi Salem, alla periferia di Nador, la città marocchina oltre confine da Melilla. Hrw ne ha potuto confermare la veridicità identificando almeno 10 tombe individuali scavate.

    Di fronte all’orrore e alla tragedia, la strada è già tracciata. Il documento di “messa a terra” delle attività in Marocco previste dal Patto per le migrazioni e l’asilo, presentato nel settembre 2020 di fronte alla Commissione europea, prevede il sostegno finanziario per il periodo 2021-2027 per implementare, nuovamente, il controllo dei confini e soprattutto “sostenere i rimpatri volontari dei cittadini stranieri dal Marocco ai loro Paesi d’origine” oltre che l’efficientamento delle procedure per il rimpatrio dei cittadini marocchini che non hanno titolo per stare sul territorio europeo. Infine nel documento si chiarisce l’importanza del “dialogo strategico” che le autorità marocchine hanno mantenuto con Frontex che apre la possibilità della firma di un accordo operativo con l’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere esterne europee. Non cambia la strategia, nonostante tra gennaio e maggio 2022 siano stati appena 3.965 attraversamenti irregolari registrati nel Mediterraneo occidentale. L’invasione non c’è: i morti distesi nelle pozze di sangue a Melilla svelano nuovamente il volto di un’Europa che respinge e delega il lavoro sporco alle polizie di Paesi autocratici.

    https://altreconomia.it/i-finanziamenti-europei-al-marocco-per-bloccare-le-persone-a-tutti-i-co

    #Maroc #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #complexe_militaro-industriel #Frontex #Fonds_fiduciaire #Italie #Seahorse_network #Seahorse #programme_de_gestion_des_frontières_de_la_région_du_Maghreb #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_region (#BMP-Maghreb) #Tunisie #biométrie #technologie #identification #Soutien_à_la_gestion_intégrée_des_frontières_et_de_la_migration_au_Maroc

  • L’ONG allemande #Sea-Watch porte #plainte contre #Frontex

    L’agence européenne des #frontières de l’Union européenne est à nouveau dans la tourmente. Mi-avril, l’ONG Sea-Watch a porté plainte contre Frontex pour #non_divulgations_d'informations concernant une interception en Méditerranée, le 31 juillet 2021, d’un canot de migrants par les garde-côtes libyens. Le navire humanitaire Sea Watch 3, pourtant à proximité immédiate de l’embarcation en détresse, n’avait pas été informé par Frontex de la présence du canot.

    L’ONG allemande Sea-Watch a porté plainte mi-avril contre l’agence européenne des frontière de l’Union européenne (UE), Frontex, devant le tribunal de l’Union européenne (CGE) à Luxembourg. L’agence de l’UE est poursuivie pour avoir refusé de divulguer des documents détaillant la nature de ses relations qui les lie aux garde-côtes libyens.

    En clair, le préjudice remonte au 30 juillet 2021. Ce jour-là, le navire Sea Watch 3 (de l’ONG allemande éponyme) assiste à l’interception d’un canot en détresse, dans les eaux maltaises, par les garde-côtes libyens. Vingt personnes étaient à bord. Selon les déclarations de l’ONG, aucune autorité maritime n’avait informé Sea-Watch de la présence de ce canot, alors que le navire humanitaire en était le plus proche. L’ONG s’étonne aussi que les autorités maltaises ne soient pas intervenues.

    Juste avant l’intervention des Libyens, un #drone de Frontex survolait la zone. L’agence européenne aurait donc dû, selon le protocole maritime internationale, envoyé un message à tous les navires de la zone pour porter secours à l’embarcation.

    « Le Sea Watch 3 était le navire le plus proche doté d’une capacité de sauvetage mais n’a été informé par aucune autorité. Les autorités maltaises ont refusé de remplir leur devoir de coordonner les efforts de sauvetage et de veiller à ce que les personnes en détresse en mer soient emmenées en lieu sûr », écrit Sea-Watch dans un communiqué.

    L’ONG accuse Frontex d’ignorer délibérément les navires de sauvetage européens pour faire appel de préférence aux garde-côtes libyens.

    « Frontex fonctionne comme un service secret qui dissimule en permanence des informations »

    À la suite de cette interception et du retour des 20 exilés en Libye, Sea-Watch aidée par la plateforme de défense de la liberté d’information FragDenStaat ont demandé des explications à Frontex sur leur déroulé des opérations ce jour-là. En vain. Les avocats des deux plaignants disent pourtant avoir identifié 73 documents liés à ce sauvetage mais Frontex refuse de les rendre publics.

    « Après une demande [de Sea-Watch, ndlr] en vertu du règlement sur la #liberté_d'information concernant les opérations de Frontex le 30 juillet 2021, l’agence des frontières a refusé à plusieurs reprises de divulguer les informations demandées » peut-on encore lire sur le communiqué de l’ONG. « Parmi eux se trouvaient 36 documents sur l’échange de communications entre Frontex et les autorités libyennes, italiennes et maltaises ce seul jour précis. »

    « Frontex fonctionne comme un service secret qui dissimule en permanence des informations », a également écrit l’ONG sur Twitter.

    Ce n’est pas la première fois que Frontex se retrouve dans la tourmente, notamment pour des faits se déroulant en mer Égée. Au mois d’octobre 2021, un cabinet néerlandais d’avocats spécialisés dans la défense des droits de l’Homme a annoncé avoir intenté une action contre l’agence européenne pour le renvoi illégal d’une famille syrienne, demandeuse d’asile, depuis la Grèce vers la Turquie.

    Au mois de mai 2021, deux demandeurs d’asile, un mineur congolais et une Burundaise, ont porté plainte contre l’agence. Après avoir atteint l’île de Lesbos, toux deux affirment avoir été refoulés illégalement vers la Turquie.

    Depuis l’automne dernier, l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes est également pointée du doigt dans des incidents de refoulements de bateaux de demandeurs d’asile de Grèce vers la Turquie.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/40143/long-allemande-seawatch-porte-plainte-contre-frontex

    #sauvetage #migrations #réfugiés

  • Despite its beautiful Ori games, Moon Studios is called an ’oppressive’ place to work | VentureBeat
    https://venturebeat.com/2022/03/18/despite-its-beautiful-ori-games-moon-studio-is-called-an-oppressive-pla

    Gaming fans know Moon Studios for its amazing Ori games with beautiful art and emotional stories. But a number of current and former employees consider the Ori studio an oppressive place to work. That is according to GamesBeat’s interviews with Moon developers.

    Franciska Csongrady sur Twitter :
    https://twitter.com/TigrMoth/status/1505276733771112449

    I worked at Moon Studios for two years. I was the only woman on the story team. I struggle to find the words to express what a soul-destroying experience it was to work with the heads of the studio, Thomas and Gennadiy.

    The whole studio is built on the lie that Quality justifies everything. Verbal abuse. Crunch. Public humiliation. But it just wears you down, and burns you out. Burnt out people do not produce quality.

    Anything good that you had made before they had killed your creative spark was used to lure new, unwitting devs in, to fill the places of the friends you watched leave, one by one.

    Please, don’t be fooled. Don’t perpetuate the problem by working for places like Moon. We have to stop the defeatist mentality that this is just what the industry is like. There are better places out there. You deserve better.

    #jeu_vidéo #jeux_vidéo #moon_studios #jeu_vidéo_ori #culture_toxique #ressources_humaines #encadrement #turnover #jeu_vidéo_blind_forest #jeu_vidéo_ori_and_the_will_of_the_wisps #thomas_mahler #gennadiy_korol #oppression #activision_blizzard #riot_games #ubisoft #ea #electronic_arts #microsoft #succès #violence_verbale #micromanagement #crunch #glassdoor #cd_projekt_red #jeu_vidéo_cyberpunk_2077 #sean_murray #hello_games #jeu_vidéo_no_man_s_sky #salaires #rémunération #primes #royalties #crédits #santé_mentale #santé_psychique #stress_post_traumatique #viol

  • Status agreement with Senegal : #Frontex might operate in Africa for the first time

    The border agency in Warsaw could deploy drones, vessels and personnel. It would be the first mission in a country that does not directly border the EU. Mauretania might be next.

    As a „priority third state“ in West Africa, Senegal has long been a partner for migration-related security cooperation with the EU. The government in Dakar is one of the addressees of the „#North_Africa_Operational_Partnership“; it also receives technical equipment and advice for border police upgrading from EU development aid funds. Now Brussels is pushing for a Frontex mission in Senegal. To this end, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen travelled personally to the capital Dakar last week. She was accompanied by the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, who said that a contract with Senegal might be finalised until summer. For the matter, Johansson met with Senegal’s armed-forces minister and foreign minister.

    For operations outside the EU, Frontex needs a so-called status agreement with the country concerned. It regulates, for example, the use of coercive police measures, the deployment of weapons or immunity from criminal and civil prosecution. The Commission will be entrusted with the negotiations for such an agreement with Senegal after the Council has given the mandate. The basis would be a „model status agreement“ drafted by the Commission on the basis of Frontex missions in the Western Balkans. Frontex launched its first mission in a third country in 2019 in Albania, followed by Montenegro in 2020 and Serbia in 2021.

    New EU Steering Group on migration issues

    The deployment to Senegal would be the first time the Border Agency would be stationed outside Europe with operational competences. Johansson also offered „#surveillance equipment such as #drones and vessels“. This would take the already established cooperation to a new level.

    Frontex is already active in the country, but without uniformed and armed police personnel. Of the only four liaison officers Frontex has seconded to third countries, one is based at the premises of the EU delegation in #Dakar. His tasks include communicating with the authorities responsible for border management and assisting with deportations from EU member states. Since 2019, Senegal has been a member of Frontex’s so-called AFIC network. In this „Risk Analysis Cell“, the agency joins forces with African police forces and secret services for exchanges on imminent migration movements. For this purpose, Frontex has negotiated a working agreement with the Senegalese police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    The new talks with Senegal are coordinated in the recently created „Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration“ (MOCADEM). It is an initiative of EU member states to better manage their politics in countries of particular interest. These include Niger or Iraq, whose government recently organised return flights for its own nationals from Minsk after Belarus‘ „instrumentalisation of refugees“ at the EU’s insistence. If the countries continue to help with EU migration control, they will receive concessions for visa issuance or for labour migration.

    Senegal also demands something in return for allowing a Frontex mission. The government wants financial support for the weakened economy after the COVID pandemic. Possibilities for legal migration to the EU were also on the agenda at the meetings with the Commission. Negotiations are also likely to take place on a deportation agreement; the Senegalese authorities are to „take back“ not only their own nationals but also those of other countries if they can prove that they have travelled through the country to the EU and have received an exit order there.

    Deployment in territorial waters

    Senegal is surrounded by more than 2,600 kilometres of external border; like the neighbouring countries of Mali, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the government has joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Similar to the Schengen area, the agreement also regulates the free movement of people and goods in a total of 15 countries. Only at the border with Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2001, are border security measures being stepped up.

    It is therefore possible that a Frontex operation in Senegal will not focus on securing the land borders as in the Western Balkans, but on monitoring the maritime border. After the „Canary Islands crisis“ in 2006 with an increase in the number of refugee crossings, Frontex coordinated the Joint Operation „Hera“ off the islands in the Atlantic; it was the first border surveillance mission after Frontex was founded. Departures towards the Canary Islands are mostly from the coast north of Senegal’s capital Dakar, and many of the people in the boats come from neighbouring countries.

    The host country of „Hera“ has always been Spain, which itself has bilateral migration control agreements with Senegal. Authorities there participate in the communication network „Seahorse Atlantic“, with which the Spanish gendarmerie wants to improve surveillance in the Atlantic. Within the framework of „Seahorse“, the Guardia Civil is also allowed to conduct joint patrols in the territorial waters of Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde. The units in „Hera“ were also the only Frontex mission allowed to navigate the countries‘ twelve-mile zone with their vessels. Within the framework of „Hera“, however, it was not possible for Frontex ships to dock on the coasts of Senegal or to disembark intercepted refugees there.

    Spain wants to lead Frontex mission

    Two years ago, the government in Madrid terminated the joint maritime mission in the Atlantic. According to the daily newspaper „El Pais“, relations between Spain and Frontex were at a low point after the border agency demanded more control over the resources deployed in „Hera“. Spain was also said to be unhappy with Frontex’s role in the Canary Islands. The agency had seconded two dozen officers to the Canary Islands to fingerprint and check identity documents after a sharp increase in crossings from Senegal and Mauritania in 2020. According to the International Organization for Migration, at least 1,200 people died or went missing when the crossing in 2021. The news agency AFP quotes the Spanish NGO Caminando Fronteras which puts this number at over 4,400 people. Also the Commissioner Johansson said that 1,200 were likely underestimated.

    The new situation on the Canary Islands is said to have prompted Frontex and the government in Madrid to advocate the envisaged launch of the joint operation in Senegal. With a status agreement, Frontex would be able to hand over refugees taken on board to Senegalese authorities or bring them back to the country itself by ship. The Guardia Civil wants to take over the leadership of such an operation, writes El Pais with reference to Spanish government circles. The government in Dakar is also said to have already informed the EU of its readiness for such an effort.

    The idea for an operational Frontex deployment in Senegal is at least three years old. Every year, Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri assesses in a report on the implementation of the EU’s External Maritime Borders Regulation whether refugees rescued in its missions could disembark in the respective eligible third countries. In the annual report for 2018, Leggeri attested to the government in Senegal’s compliance with basic fundamental and human rights. While Frontex did not even consider disembarking refugees in Libya, Tunisia or Morocco, the director believes this would be possible with Senegal – as well as Turkey.

    Currently, the EU and its agencies have no concrete plans to conclude status agreements with other African countries, but Mauritania is also under discussion. Frontex is furthermore planning working (not status) arrangements with other governments in North and East Africa. Libya is of particular interest; after such a contract, Frontex could also complete Libya’s long-planned connection to the surveillance network EUROSUR. With a working agreement, the border agency would be able to regularly pass on information from its aerial reconnaissance in the Mediterranean to the Libyan coast guard, even outside of measures to counter distress situations at sea.

    https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t

    #Sénégal #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Afrique #Mauritanie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #renvois #expulsions #AFIC #Risk_Analysis_Cell #services_secrets #police #coopération #accord #MOCADEM #Operational_Coordination_Mechanism_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration #accords_de_réadmission #accord_de_réadmission #frontières_maritimes #Atlantique #Seahorse_Atlantic #Hera

    –-
    ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    et plus précisément ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765327

    ping @isskein @reka @karine4

    • L’Union européenne veut déployer Frontex au large des côtes sénégalaises

      À l’occasion de la visite au Sénégal de cinq commissaires européennes, l’UE propose au gouvernement le déploiement de Frontex, l’agence européenne de garde-côtes et de gardes-frontières. La Commission européenne envisagerait un déploiement d’ici à l’été en cas d’accord avec les autorités sénégalaises.

      C’est pour l’instant une proposition faite par Ylva Johansson. La commissaire chargée des Affaires intérieures a évoqué la question avec les ministres des Affaires étrangères, des forces armées et de l’Intérieur ce vendredi à Dakar.

      Pour l’Union européenne, l’intérêt immédiat est de contrôler le trafic d’êtres humains avec les embarcations qui partent des côtes sénégalaises vers l’archipel espagnol des Canaries. Mais le principe serait aussi de surveiller les mouvements migratoires vers l’Europe via la Mauritanie ou bien la route plus longue via l’Algérie et la Libye.

      L’idée est une collaboration opérationnelle des garde-côtes et gardes-frontières de l’agence Frontex avec la gendarmerie nationale sénégalaise et sous sa direction. L’UE envisage le déploiement de navires, de personnel et de matériel. La commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures a évoqué par exemple des drones.

      L’agence Frontex de surveillance des frontières extérieures de l’Union est en train de monter en puissance : son effectif devrait s’élever à 10 000 gardes-côtes et gardes-frontières dans quatre ans, soit dix fois plus qu’en 2018. Elle n’a jamais été déployée hors d’Europe et cette proposition faite au Sénégal illustre à l’avance la priorité que va mettre l’Europe sur les questions migratoires lors du sommet avec l’Union africaine dans une semaine.

      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220211-l-union-europ%C3%A9enne-veut-d%C3%A9ployer-frontex-au-large-des-c%C3%B4

    • EU seeks to deploy border agency to Senegal

      European Commissioner Ylva Johansson on Friday offered to deploy the EU’s border agency to Senegal to help combat migrant smuggling, following a surge in perilous crossings to Spain’s Canary Islands.

      At a news conference in the Senegalese capital Dakar, Johansson said the arrangement would mark the first time that the EU border agency Frontex would operate outside Europe.

      Should the Senegalese government agree, the commissioner added, the EU could send surveillance equipment such as drones and vessels, as well as Frontex personnel.

      Deployed alongside local forces, the agents would “work together to fight the smugglers,” she said.

      “This is my offer and I hope that Senegal’s government is interested in this unique opportunity,” said Johansson, the EU’s home affairs commissioner.

      The announcement comes amid a sharp jump in attempts to reach the Canary Islands — a gateway to the EU — as authorities have clamped down on crossings to Europe from Libya.

      The Spanish archipelago lies just over 100 kilometres (60 miles) from the coast of Africa at its closest point.

      But the conditions in the open Atlantic are often dangerous, and would-be migrants often brave the trip in rickety wooden canoes known as pirogues.

      About 1,200 people died or went missing attempting the crossing in 2021, according to the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM).

      Spanish NGO Caminando Fronteras last month put the figure at over 4,400 people.

      Johansson also said on Friday that the 1,200-person figure was likely an underestimate.

      She added that she had discussed her Frontex proposal with Senegal’s armed-forces minister and foreign minister, and was due to continue talks with the interior minister on Friday.

      An agreement that would see Frontex agents deployed in Senegal could be finalised by the summer, she said.

      EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, who was also at the news conference, said a Frontex mission in Senegal could also help tackle illegal fishing.

      Several top European Commission officials, including President Ursula von der Leyen, arrived in Senegal this week to prepare for a summit between the EU and the African Union on February 17-18.

      https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220211-eu-seeks-to-deploy-border-agency-to-senegal

    • EU: Tracking the Pact: Plan for Frontex to deploy “vessels, surveillance equipment, and carry out operational tasks” in Senegal and Mauritania

      The EU’s border agency is also due to open a “risk analysis cell” in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in autumn this year, according to documents obtained by Statewatch and published here. The two “action files” put heavy emphasis on the “prevention of irregular departures” towards the Canary Islands and increased cooperation on border management and anti-smuggling activities. Earlier this month, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations on status agreements that would allow Frontex to operate in both countries.

      Senegal: Fiche Action - Sénégal - Renforcement de la coopération avec l’agence Frontex (WK 7990/2022 INIT, LIMITE, 7 June 2022, pdf)

      Action 1: Jointly pursue contacts with the Senegalese authorities - and in particular the Ministry of the Interior, as well as other relevant authorities - at political and diplomatic level to achieve progress on the commitments made during the visit of President von der Leyen and Commissioners on 9-11 February 2022, in particular with regard to the fight against irregular immigration, and Frontex cooperation, as part of a comprehensive EU-Senegal partnership on migration and mobility. Take stock of Senegal’s political context (i.a. Casamance) and suggestions in order to agree on next steps and a calendar.

      Action 2: Taking up the elements of the previous negotiations with the relevant Senegalese authorities, and in the framework of the new working arrangement model, propose a working arrangement with Frontex in the short term, depending on the will and the interest of the Senegalese authorities to conclude such an arrangement.

      Action 3: Depending on the response from the Senegalese authorities, initiate steps towards the negotiation and, in the medium term, the conclusion of a status agreement allowing direct operational support from Frontex to Senegal, particularly in terms of prevention of crime and irregular migration, including in the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.

      Action 4 Give substance to the messages expressed by the Senegalese authorities in the framework of policy exchanges and work on joint programming (Joint Strategy Paper - JSP). Identify support and cooperation measures of major interest to the Senegalese authorities (e.g. explore with Senegal the interest in concluding a Talent Partnership with voluntary Member States, if progress is made in other aspects of migration cooperation; propose an anti-smuggling operational partnership and explore possibilities to strengthen cooperation and exchange of information with Europol). Make use of the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic route to frame cooperation projects on migration issues. Promote cooperation with Frontex on border management also in the broader framework of cooperation and exchanges with the Senegalese authorities.

      –-

      Mauretania: Fiche Action - Mauritanie - Renforcement de la coopération avec l’agence Frontex (WK 7989/2022 INIT, LIMITE, 7 June 2022, pdf):

      Action 1: On the basis of the exchanges initiated and the cooperation undertaken with the Mauritanian authorities, identify the main priorities of the migration relationship. Determine the support and cooperation measures of major interest (e.g. support for the implementation of the National Migration Management Strategy, continuation of maritime strategy actions, protection of refugees and asylum seekers, support for reintegration, fight against smuggling networks, deployment of an additional surveillance and intervention unit of the “GAR-SI” type, creation of jobs for young people, involvement of the diaspora in the development of the country, etc.). Use the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic route to coordinate cooperation projects on migration issues, including on root causes.

      Action 2: Propose to the Mauritanian authorities the holding of an informal migration dialogue between the EU and Mauritania, focusing notably on the fight against migrant smuggling and border management, in order to best determine their needs in this area and identify the possibilities for Frontex support.

      Action 3: On the basis of the exchanges that took place between Frontex and the Mauritanian authorities in the first semester of 2022, finalise the exchanges on a working arrangement with Frontex, depending on their interest to conclude it.

      Action 4: Depending on the interest shown by the Mauritanian authorities, initiate diplomatic steps to propose the negotiation and conclusion of a status agreement allowing direct operational support from Frontex at Mauritania’s borders, in particular in the area of prevention of irregular departures, but also in the fight against migrant smuggling and other areas of interest to Mauritania, in the framework of the Frontex mandate.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2022/july/eu-tracking-the-pact-plan-for-frontex-to-deploy-vessels-surveillance-equ
      #Mauritanie #surveillance

  • Epilogue sur le mouvement anti-mondialisation - Marseille Infos Autonomes
    https://mars-infos.org/epilogue-sur-le-mouvement-anti-6096

    Traduction d’un texte du collectif CrimeThinc qui analyse 22 ans après le blocage de l’OMC à Seattle ce que le mouvement qui a débuté à ce moment là peut nous apprendre aujourd’hui.

    Il y a 22 ans aujourd’hui, des anarchistes et d’autres manifestants ont réussi à bloquer et à fermer le sommet de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce à Seattle. C’était le début spectaculaire de ce que les journalistes ont appelé le « mouvement antimondialisation » - en fait, un mouvement mondial contre le capitalisme néolibéral. Au cours des dernières années, nous avons célébré les vingt ans de plusieurs des moments forts de ce mouvement. Aujourd’hui, nous réfléchissons à ses origines et à ce qu’il peut enseigner aux mouvements contemporains.

    • À Seattle, le 30 novembre 1999, les manifestants ont dû faire face à quelque 400 policiers ; en 2017, les manifestants ont dû affronter plus de 28 000 agents de sécurité lors de l’investiture de Donald Trump à Washington, DC, ou 31 000 lors des manifestations du G20 à Hambourg.

    • Il est important de souligner que pratiquement toutes ces expériences étaient fondamentalement joyeuses, positives et créatives. Reclaim the Streets organisait des fêtes de rue - oui, ils détruisaient les rues avec des marteaux-piqueurs, mais la police ne pouvait ni les voir ni les entendre car les marteaux-piqueurs étaient dissimulés sous les jupes des échassiers et noyés dans la musique techno. Chaque manifestation met en scène des marionnettes géantes et se termine par un concert punk ou une rave party. Les actions d’art performance prolifèrent, de même que les farces comme celles organisées par les Yes Men, qui créent de faux sites web pour les organisations commerciales mondiales et envoient ensuite des porte-parole se faisant passer pour leurs représentants, infligeant des burlesques farces à quiconque prend les faux sites web pour les pages officielles de ces institutions.

      Cette approche joyeuse et créative de la résistance est quelque chose que nous avons perdu, même si les confrontations se sont intensifiées dans le monde entier au cours des 20 dernières années.

    • La police était extrêmement inférieure en nombre lors des manifestations de l’OMC à Seattle. Sinon, les tactiques passives employées par les manifestants majoritairement « non violents » n’auraient pas suffi à les submerger. Au fur et à mesure que la police s’est intensifiée et militarisée au cours des années suivantes, les militants ont dû recourir à des tactiques plus conflictuelles, ainsi qu’à une spontanéité et une décentralisation croissantes, afin de déjouer la police.

    • L’une des principales fonctions de la police est de nous entraîner dans des querelles privées avec les autorités, nous enfermant dans le genre de bataille étroite qu’ils peuvent gagner, afin de nous distraire du reste du terrain social, y compris de tous ceux qui pourraient encore nous rejoindre mais qui restent sur la touche pour le moment.

    • En fin de compte, ce n’est ni l’escalade du maintien de l’ordre, ni notre réduction des effectifs qui ont sonné le glas du mouvement. Le mouvement altermondialiste s’est plutôt retrouvé dans une impasse après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, lorsque les gouvernements auxquels nous nous opposions ont pu substituer un récit sur le terrorisme, la guerre et la violence ethnique à nos propositions de changement social. Ce changement de discours a été fatal non seulement parce qu’il a distrait ou intimidé ceux qui auraient pu rejoindre le mouvement, mais aussi parce qu’il a permis aux groupes autoritaires qui avaient été mis sur la touche par le mouvement de reprendre l’initiative et d’occuper l’espace de la protestation.

      Le mouvement anti-guerre, qui a suivi immédiatement le mouvement dit anti-mondialisation de la même manière que la réaction suit la révolution, fournit un contrepoint utile concernant ses forces. Dès le début de l’organisation, les organisateurs de partis marxistes traditionnels se sont assurés de tenir les rênes - et le brouillard du discours « anti-guerre » s’est avéré plus propice à leurs ambitions que l’opposition la plus confuse aux institutions financières mondiales. Immédiatement après les attaques du 11 septembre, les membres du Workers World Party ont organisé la coalition ANSWER comme groupe de façade pour leurs ambitions ; six mois plus tard, en mars 2002, les membres du Revolutionary Communist Party ont créé la coalition Not in Our Name. Ces deux dinosaures ont dominé l’organisation des manifestations pendant les années qui ont suivi.

      En conséquence, un nombre beaucoup plus important de personnes ont afflué dans les rues - le 15 février 2003 a connu l’une des plus grandes affluences de tous les temps - sans que les mobilisations énergiques qui ont eu lieu contre la mondialisation capitaliste n’aient eu le moindre impact.

    • Des politiciens comme Donald Trump ont réussi non pas en promettant aux gens un meilleur niveau de vie, mais en promettant à leurs électeurs que la violence inhérente à la société capitaliste sera principalement dirigée contre les autres.

      En réponse, nous pourrions prendre du recul par rapport aux confrontations immédiates - qui vont certainement persister et s’intensifier, que cela nous plaise ou non - pour nous demander ce dont les gens ont désespérément besoin aujourd’hui et réfléchir à la manière dont nous pourrions nous organiser à la base pour fournir ces choses comme point de départ de luttes qui peuvent finalement remplacer le pouvoir de l’État par une nouvelle base pour nos relations. Il ne s’agit pas seulement de nourriture et d’abris - que les groupes d’entraide se sont admirablement mobilisés pour fournir et défendre pendant la pandémie - ni d’assurer notre survie face à des catastrophes écologiques de plus en plus répandues. Il s’agit aussi de créer des liens significatifs entre les personnes, de canaliser la créativité hors des espaces virtuels où elle sert les plateformes des entreprises, d’inventer de nouvelles formes de joie et de convivialité. Tels devraient être nos points de départ à l’approche de la prochaine phase de notre lutte contre le capitalisme et la destruction industrielle de la biosphère.

  • Si formano a Gaeta le forze d’élite della famigerata Guardia Costiera libica

    Non bastava addestrare in Italia gli equipaggi delle motovedette libiche che sparano sui migranti nel Mediterraneo o li catturano in mare (oltre 15.000 nei primi sette mesi del 2021) per poi deportarli e torturarli nei famigerati centri di detenzione / lager in Libia. Dalla scorsa estate è nella #Scuola_Nautica della #Guardia_di_Finanza di #Gaeta che si “formano” pure le componenti subacquee di nuova costituzione della #Guardia_Costiera e della #General_Administration_for_Coastal_Security (#GACS).

    La presenza a Gaeta delle unità d’élite della #Libyan_Coast_Guard_and_Port_Security (#LCGPS) dipendente dal Ministero della Difesa e della GACS del Ministero dell’Interno è documentata dall’Ufficio Amministrazione - Sezione Acquisti della Guardia di Finanza. Il 18 giugno 2021 l’ente ha autorizzato la spesa per un servizio di interpretariato in lingua araba a favore dei sommozzatori libici “partecipanti al corso di addestramento che inizierà il 21 giugno 2021 presso la Scuola Nautica nell’ambito della Missione bilaterale della Guardia di Finanza in Libia”. Nell’atto amministrativo non vengono fornite informazioni né sul numero degli allievi-sub libici né la durata del corso, il primo di questa tipologia effettuato in Italia.

    Dal 29 agosto al 29 settembre del 2019 ne era stato promosso e finanziato uno simile a #Spalato, in Croazia da #EUNAVFOR_MED (la forza navale europea per le operazioni anti-migranti nel Mediterraneo, meglio nota come #Missione_Irini). Le attività vennero svolte in collaborazione con la Marina militare croate e riguardarono dodici sommozzatori della Guardia costiera e della Marina libica.

    A fine ottobre 2020 un’altra attività addestrativa del personale subacqueo venne condotta in Libia da personale della Marina militare della Turchia, provocando molte gelosie in Italia e finanche le ire dell’(ex) ammiraglio #Giuseppe_De_Giorgi, già comandante della Nato Response Force e Capo di Stato Maggiore della Marina Militare dal 2013 al 2016.

    “In un tweet, la Marina turca riferisce che le operazioni rientrano a pieno nel novero di attività di supporto, consultazione e addestramento militare e di sicurezza incluse nell’accordo raggiunto nel novembre del 2019 tra il GNA tripolino e Ankara: non può sfuggire come questo avvenimento sia un ulteriore affondo turco a nostre spese e l’ennesimo spregio all’Italia”, scrisse l’ammiraglio #De_Giorgi su Difesaonline. “Nelle foto allegate al tweet, infatti, sono presenti le navi che proprio l’Italia nel 2018 aveva donato alla Libia in seguito all’accordo siglato con il primo #Memorandum che avrebbe previsto da parte nostra la presa in carico della collaborazione con la Guardia Costiera libica, non solo per tenere a bada il fenomeno migratorio in generale, ma soprattutto per dare un freno al vergognoso traffico di esseri umani. In particolare, si può vedere la motovedetta #Ubari_660, gemella della #Fezzan_658, entrambe della classe #Corrubia”.

    “Oltre al danno, anche la beffa di veder usare le nostre navi per un addestramento che condurrà un altro Stato, la Turchia”, concluse l’ex Capo di Stato della Marina. “Mentre Erdogan riporta la Tripolitania nella sfera d’influenza ottomana si conferma l’assenteismo italiano conseguenza di una leadership spaesata, impotente, priva di autorevolezza, inadeguata”.

    Le durissime parole dell’ammiraglio De Giorgi hanno colpito in pieno il bersaglio; così dal cappello dell’esecutivo Draghi è uscito bello e pronto per i sommozzatori libici un corso d’addestramento estivo a Gaeta, viaggio, vitto e alloggio, tutto pagato.

    Il personale dell’ultrachiacchierata Guardia costiera della Libia ha iniziato ad addestrarsi presso la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza nella primavera del 2017. Trentanove militari e tre tutor giunsero in aereo nella base dell’aeronautica di Pratica di Mare (Roma) il 1° aprile e vennero poi addestrati a Gaeta per un mese. “A selezionarli sono stati i vertici della Marina libica tra i 93 militari che hanno superato il primo modulo formativo di 14 settimane, svolto nell’ambito della missione europea Eunavformed, a bordo della nave olandese Rotterdam e della nostra nave San Giorgio”, riportò la redazione di Latina del quotidiano Il Messaggero.

    Nella scuola laziale i libici furono formati prevalentemente alla conduzione delle quattro motovedette della classe “#Bigliani”, già di appartenenza della Guardia di Finanza, donate alla Libia tra il 2009 e il 2010 e successivamente riparate in Italia dopo i danneggiamenti ricevuti nel corso dei bombardamenti NATO del 2011. Le quattro unità, rinominate #Ras_al_Jadar, #Zuwarah, #Sabratha e #Zawia sono quelle poi impiegate per i pattugliamenti delle coste della #Tripolitania e la spietata caccia ai natanti dei migranti in fuga dai conflitti e dalle carestie di Africa e Medio Oriente.

    Per la cronaca, alla cerimonia di chiusura del primo corso di formazione degli equipaggi libici intervenne a Gaeta l’allora ministro dell’Interno #Marco_Minniti. Ai giornalisti, #Minniti annunciò che entro la fine del mese di giugno 2017 il governo italiano avrebbe consegnato alla Libia una decina di motovedette. “Quando il programma di fornitura delle imbarcazioni sarà terminato la Marina libica sarà tra le strutture più importanti dell’Africa settentrionale”, dichiarò con enfasi Marco Minniti. “Lì si dovranno incrementare le azioni congiunte e coordinate per il controllo contro il terrorismo e i trafficanti di esseri umani: missioni cruciali per tutta la comunità internazionale”.

    Un secondo corso di formazione per 19 ufficiali della Guardia costiera libica venne svolto nel giugno 2017 ancora un volta presso la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza di Gaeta. Nel corso del 2018, con fondi del Ministero dell’Interno vennero svolti invece due corsi della durata ognuno di tre settimane per 28 militari libici, costo giornaliero stimato 606 euro per allievo.

    Nell’ambito del #Sea_Horse_Mediterranean_Project, il progetto UE di “cooperazione e scambio di informazioni nell’area mediterranea tra gli Stati membri dell’Unione di Spagna, Italia, Francia, Malta, Grecia, Cipro e Portogallo e i paesi nordafricani nel quadro di #EUROSUR”, (valore complessivo di 7,1 milioni di euro), la Guardia di Finanza ha concluso uno specifico accordo con la Guardia Civil spagnola, capofila del programma, per erogare sempre nel 2018 un corso di conduzione di unità navali per 63 libici tra guardiacoste del Ministero della Difesa e personale degli Organi per la sicurezza del Ministero dell’Interno.

    Istituzionalmente la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza di Gaeta provvede alla formazione tecnico-operativa degli allievi finanzieri destinati al contingente mare, nonché all’aggiornamento ed alla specializzazione di ufficiali impiegati nel servizio navale. In passato ha svolto attività di formazione a favore del personale militare e della polizia della Repubblica d’Albania e della Guardia Civil spagnola.

    L’Istituto ha partecipato anche a due missioni internazionali: la prima sul fiume Danubio, nell’ambito dell’embargo introdotto nel maggio 1992 dal Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU contro l’allora esistente Repubblica Federale di Jugoslavia; poi, a fine anni ’90, a Valona (Albania) per fornire assistenza e consulenza ai locali organi polizia nella “lotta ai traffici illeciti”.

    Adesso per la Scuola di Gaeta è scattata l’ora dell’addestramento dei reparti d’élite delle forze navali di Tripoli, sommozzatori in testa.

    http://antoniomazzeoblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/si-formano-gaeta-le-forze-delite-della.html

    –-> Articolo pubblicato in Africa ExPress il 30 novembre 2021, https://www.africa-express.info/2021/11/30/addestrata-in-italia-la-guardia-costiera-libica-accusata-di-crimini

    #Gaeta #formation #gardes-côtes_libyens #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Italie #Libye #frontières #Méditerranée #plongeurs

    –---

    Ajouté à la métaiste sur les formations des gardes-côtes lybiens sur le territoire européen :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/938454

    ping @isskein

  • Les psychopathes préfèrent rouler en voitures allemandes, selon une étude ETX Daily Up
    https://www.midilibre.fr/2021/11/22/les-psychopathes-preferent-rouler-en-voitures-allemandes-selon-une-etude-9

    Une étonnante étude britannique révèle que les personnes ayant des caractéristiques proches de celles d’un psychopathe aiment rouler en BMW ou en Audi, alors que ceux davantage sains d’esprit préfèrent les Kia ou les Skoda.


    Une étonnante étude britannique révèle que les personnes ayant des caractéristiques proches de celles d’un psychopathe aiment rouler en BMW ou en Audi, alors que ceux davantage sains d’esprit préfèrent les #Kia ou les #Skoda .

    La prochaine fois que vous croiserez une BMW marron ou une Audi verte, méfiez-vous de son conducteur. Une étude publiée par le comparateur de prix Scrap Car Comparison montre en effet que les possesseurs de voitures allemandes sont les plus susceptibles de présenter des signes de troubles du comportement.

    Cette étude a été réalisée auprès de conducteurs britanniques ayant accepté de passer un petit test de psychologie. Un score (noté sur 36) leur a chacun été attribué, puis une moyenne a été réalisée à partir de la marque de leur voiture. Il en ressort que ce sont les propriétaires de BMW qui présentent en moyenne les signes les plus avant-coureurs de psychopathie, juste devant ceux possédant une Audi. Suivent les propriétaires de Fiat et de Mazda. A noter que ceux qui roulent dans une voiture français ne seraient a priori pas trop inquiétants ! En queue de peloton, les conducteurs de #Seat, de #Kia ou de #Skoda ont l’air bien sages.

    Top 10 des marques dont les conducteurs présentent des signes de psychopathie (/36)
    1. #BMW (12,1)

    2. #Audi (11,7)
    
3. #Fiat (7,0)
    
4. #Mazda (6,4)
    
5. #Honda (6,3)
    
6. #Ford (6,1)

    7. #Mercedes-Benz (5,9)

    8. #Citroën (5,8)
    
9. #Volkswagen (5,4)

    10. #Hyundai (5,3)

    

L’étude va même encore plus loin puisqu’elle établit également un classement en fonction de la couleur de la carrosserie. Ainsi, les conducteurs d’une voiture couleur or (12,7) ou marron (12,2) seraient les plus inquiétants. D’autre part, ceux qui conduisent un #véhicule_électrique obtiennent en moyenne un score bien plus important (16) que ceux qui ont choisi de rouler en #hybride (9,8), au #Diesel (7) ou à l’ #essence (5,2).

    L’étude précise tout de même « qu’aucun de nos conducteurs interrogés n’ait obtenu un score suffisamment élevé pour suggérer qu’ils possèdent des traits clairs généralement exposés par un psychopathe ».

    Cette étude a été réalisée en novembre 2021 par 3Gem auprès de 2000 conducteurs britanniques.

    #Voiture #Angleterre #psychopathe #psychopathie

    • Financer une étude scientifique sur un fait que tous les automobilistes connaissent.
      Il y en a qui s’ennuient et qui ont du pognon à gaspiller.

      Ils auraient pu étudier le type de voiture.
      Les conductrices.eurs de coupés mercedes battent tous les records, dans mon coin.

  • Global LiDAR land elevation data reveal greatest sea-level rise vulnerability in the tropics | Nature Communications
    https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-021-23810-9

    Coastal flood risk assessments require accurate land elevation data. Those to date existed only for limited parts of the world, which has resulted in high uncertainty in projections of land area at risk of sea-level rise (SLR). Here we have applied the first global elevation model derived from satellite LiDAR data. We find that of the worldwide land area less than 2 m above mean sea level, that is most vulnerable to SLR, 649,000 km2 or 62% is in the tropics. Even assuming a low-end relative SLR of 1 m by 2100 and a stable lowland population number and distribution, the 2020 population of 267 million on such land would increase to at least 410 million of which 72% in the tropics and 59% in tropical Asia alone. We conclude that the burden of current coastal flood risk and future SLR falls disproportionally on tropical regions, especially in Asia.

    #climat #mer #élévation_du_niveau_marin #sea_level_rise

  • Parcours de formation en Éducation aux Médias et à l’Information (EMI)
    http://www.apdep-bretagne.org/2021/02/11/parcours-de-formation-en-education-aux-medias-et-a-linformation-emi

    Ce parcours et cette progression ont été élaborés à partir des matrices des académies de Caen et de Toulouse en Éducation aux médias et à l’information, des compétences des domaines PIX et de l’expérience issue des différentes séquences pédagogiques faites avec les élèves.

    #EMI #séance #progression