#sof

#violente_paix #violences_structurelles #invisibilisation_violence

voir aussi la note de Migreurop sur l’OIM :
L’OIM, une organisation au service des frontières… fermées.
►https://seenthis.net/messages/779989

Contrôle des frontières et des âmes : le #soft_power de l’OIM en Afrique

Comment l’organisation internationale pour les migrations tente à travers toute l’Afrique d’éviter les départs en s’appuyant sur les artistes et les chanteurs. Un décryptage à retrouver dans la Revue du Crieur, dont le numéro 15 sort ce jeudi en librairies.

Le terminal des vols domestiques de l’aéroport Gbessia de Conakry est le lieu idéal où débarquer discrètement d’un avion en Guinée. Situé à l’écart, il n’a plus de fonction commerciale depuis que la compagnie Air Guinée qui assurait les rares vols intérieurs a fait faillite en 1992. Et quand ce ne sont pas des VIP qui pénètrent dans son hall, ce sont les migrants « rapatriés volontaires » de Libye, à l’abri des regards, pour un retour au pays perçu comme honteux parce qu’il signe l’échec de leur projet migratoire. Ils sont cent onze ce soir-là à descendre de l’avion affrété par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations ( OIM ), en provenance de l’aéroport de Mitiga à Tripoli. En file indienne sur le tarmac, ils masquent leurs visages face à la caméra de la télévision d’État guinéenne, toujours présente depuis que l’OIM rapatrie des migrants guinéens de Libye, près de douze mille en trois ans.

Les officiers « de protection » de l’OIM les attendent dans le hall du terminal, secondés par les bénévoles de l’Organisation guinéenne de lutte contre la migration irrégulière, créée de toutes pièces par l’Union européenne et l’OIM afin d’organiser des campagnes « de sensibilisation » à moindres frais qui visent à décourager les candidats à l’émigration. Leurs membres sont tous d’anciens migrants revenus au pays après avoir échoué dans leur aventure en Libye, en Algérie ou au Maroc. Ils sillonnent le pays, les plateaux de télévision ou les studios de radio dans le but d’alerter contre les dangers du voyage et les horreurs vécues en Libye.

Elhadj Mohamed Diallo, le président de l’organisation, harangue les « rapatriés volontaires » dès leur arrivée dans le hall : « Votre retour n’est pas un échec ! La Guinée a besoin de vous ! Tous ensemble nous allons travailler ! Regardez-moi, je suis l’un de vous, j’ai vécu ce que vous avez vécu ! Et maintenant que vous êtes rentrés, vous allez nous aider parce qu’il faut raconter votre histoire à nos jeunes pour les empêcher de partir et qu’ils vivent la même chose que nous. »

Tous se sont assis, hagards, dans l’attente des instructions des officiers « de protection » de l’OIM. Ils sont épuisés par des semaines voire des mois d’un voyage éprouvant qui s’est terminé dans les prisons de Libye où la plupart d’entre eux ont fait l’expérience de la torture, la malnutrition, le travail forcé et la peur de mourir noyé en mer Méditerranée lors de leurs tentatives parfois multiples de passage en Europe. Certains écoutent, voire répondent au discours du président de l’association. La plupart ont la tête ailleurs.

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Lorsque nous interrogeons l’un d’entre eux, il s’offusque du qualificatif de « volontaire » utilisé dans le programme d’aide au retour volontaire et à la réintégration ( AVRR ) de l’OIM : « Mais je n’étais pas volontaire ! Je ne voulais pas rentrer ! Ce sont les Libyens du DCIM [ Directorate for Combating Illegal Immigration ] qui m’ont forcé à signer le papier ! Je n’avais pas d’autre choix que de monter dans l’avion. Dès que j’aurai rassemblé un peu d’argent, je repartirai pour encore tenter ma chance. J’essayerai par le Maroc cette fois. »

C’est toute l’ambiguïté de ce programme : le guide du Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés ( HCR ) qui encadre les retours dits volontaires précise que « si les droits des réfugiés ne sont pas reconnus, s’ils sont soumis à des pressions, des restrictions et confinés dans des camps, il se peut qu’ils veuillent rentrer chez eux, mais ce ne peut être considéré comme un acte de libre choix ». Ce qui est clairement le cas en Libye où les réfugiés sont approchés par les autorités consulaires de leur pays d’origine alors qu’ils se trouvent en détention dans des conditions sanitaires déplorables.

Lorsqu’ils déclinent l’offre qui leur est faite, on les invite à réfléchir pour la fois où elles reviendront. À raison le plus souvent d’un repas par jour qui consiste en une assiette de macaronis, d’eau saumâtre pour se désaltérer et d’un accès aux soins dépendant de l’action limitée des organisations internationales, sujets aux brimades de leurs geôliers, les migrants finissent souvent par accepter un retour « volontaire » dans leur pays d’origine.

L’OIM leur remet l’équivalent de cinquante euros en francs guinéens, parfois un téléphone avec ce qu’il faut de crédit pour appeler leur famille, et leur promet monts et merveilles quant à leur avenir au pays. C’est le volet réintégration du programme AVRR. Il entend « aider à la réintégration à court et/ou moyen terme, y compris création d’entreprise, formation professionnelle, études, assistance médicale et autre forme d’aide adaptée aux besoins particuliers des migrants de retour ».

Plus que l’appât d’un modeste gain, ce sont l’épuisement et le désespoir qui ont poussé Maurice Koïba à se faire rapatrier de Libye. Intercepté par les gardes-côtes libyens alors qu’il tentait de gagner l’Europe dans un canot pneumatique bondé, Maurice a été vendu par ces mêmes gardes-côtes à un certain Mohammed basé à Sabratha, quatre-vingts kilomètres à l’ouest de la capitale Tripoli. Pendant un mois et demi, il est battu tous les matins avec ses parents au téléphone de façon à ce qu’ils entendent ses cris provoqués par les sévices qu’on lui inflige, afin de les convaincre de payer la rançon qui le libérera. Son père au chômage et sa mère ménagère parviendront à réunir la somme de mille euros pour le faire libérer, l’équivalent de près de dix mois du salaire minimum en Guinée. Une fois sorti de cette prison clandestine, Maurice tente de nouveau sa chance sur un bateau de fortune avant d’être une fois encore intercepté par les gardes-côtes libyens. Cette fois-ci, il est confié aux agents du DCIM qui l’incarcèrent dans un camp dont la rénovation a été financée par l’OIM via des fonds européens.

Là, les conditions ne sont pas meilleures que dans sa prison clandestine de Sabratha : il ne mange qu’un maigre repas par jour, l’eau est toujours saumâtre et les rares soins prodigués le sont par des équipes de Médecins sans frontières qui ont un accès limité aux malades. C’est dans ces conditions que les autorités consulaires de son pays et les agents de l’OIM lui rendent visite ainsi qu’à ses compatriotes afin de les convaincre de « bénéficier » du programme de « retour volontaire » : « Lorsque les agents de l’OIM venaient dans le camp avec leurs gilets siglés, ils n’osaient jamais s’élever contre les violences et les tortures que les geôliers libyens nous faisaient subir », se souvient Maurice, et cela nonobstant le programme de formation aux droits de l’homme toujours financé par l’Union européenne et conduit par l’OIM auprès des gardiens des centres de détention pour migrants illégaux.

« Nous avons éprouvé des sentiments mêlés et contradictoires, ajoute-t-il, lorsque les représentants consulaires de nos pays respectifs sont venus nous recenser et nous proposer de rentrer, à la fois heureux de pouvoir être extraits de cet enfer et infiniment tristes de devoir renoncer, si près du but, à nos rêves d’avenir meilleur. Sans compter la honte que nous allions devoir affronter une fois rentrés dans nos familles et dans les quartiers de nos villes. »

Ce n’est que le jour de leur départ que Maurice et ses compatriotes d’infortune sortent du camp pour être remis à l’OIM. L’organisation prend soin de les rendre « présentables » en vue de leur retour au pays : « Pour la première fois depuis des semaines, j’ai pu me doucher, manger à ma faim et boire de l’eau potable. L’OIM nous a remis un kit d’hygiène et des vêtements propres avant de nous emmener à l’aéroport Mitiga de Tripoli », confie Maurice.

Arrivé à Conakry, il prend la route de Nzérékoré, à l’autre bout du pays, où vit sa famille. Une fièvre typhoïde contractée en Libye se déclare le jour de son arrivée. Malgré ses multiples appels à l’aide et contrairement aux clauses du programme AVRR, l’OIM ne donne pas suite à sa demande de prise en charge de son hospitalisation, alors que la Guinée n’est pas dotée d’un système de sécurité sociale. Le voici doublement endetté : aux mille euros de sa rançon s’ajoutent maintenant les frais de l’hôpital et du traitement qu’il doit suivre s’il ne veut pas mourir.

Comme la majorité des candidats guinéens à l’exil, Maurice est pourvu d’un diplôme universitaire et avait tenté d’émigrer dans le but de poursuivre ses études au Maroc, en Algérie ou en Europe. Il pensait que son retour en Guinée via le programme d’aide au retour volontaire aurait pu lui ouvrir la voie vers de nouvelles opportunités professionnelles ou de formation. Il voulait étudier l’anglais. En vain. Il retourne enseigner le français dans une école secondaire privée, contre un salaire de misère, avant de comprendre que l’OIM n’aide les retournés volontaires que s’ils donnent de leur temps afin de promouvoir le message selon lequel il est mal de voyager.

Après avoir enfilé le tee-shirt siglé du slogan « Non à l’immigration clandestine, oui à une migration digne et légale » et participé ( ou avoir été « invité » à participer ) à des campagnes de sensibilisation, on lui a financé ses études d’anglais et même d’informatique. S’il n’est que bénévole, les per diem reçus lors de ses déplacements afin de porter la bonne parole de la sédentarité heureuse, ainsi que l’appartenance à un réseau, lui assurent une sécurité enviable dans un pays dont tous les indices de développement baissent inexorablement depuis plus d’une décennie.
Le soft power de l’OIM

Les maux de la Guinée, l’humoriste Sow Pedro les égrène dans la salle de spectacle du Centre culturel franco-guinéen ( CCFG ). Il fait se lever la salle et lui intime d’entonner un « N’y va pas ! » sonore à chaque fléau évoqué : « – Je veux aller en Europe !… – N’y va pas ! – Loyer cher je vais chez les Blancs… – N’y va pas ! – Là-bas au moins on nous met dans des camps… – N’y va pas ! – Politiciens vous mentent tous les jours – N’y va pas ! – C’est pour ça que j’irai là-bas ! » Ainsi conclut-il sur le refrain d’un des plus grands succès de Jean-Jacques Goldman, Là-bas, qu’il enchaîne, moqueur, face au tout Conakry qui s’est déplacé pour l’applaudir avant de se retrouver au bar du Centre culturel, lors de l’entracte, et d’y échanger sur ce fléau que constitue l’immigration illégale entre personnes pouvant, du moins la plupart d’entre elles, circuler librement autour de la planète.

Le spectacle de Sow Pedro est sponsorisé par l’OIM. Afin de mener à bien l’écriture du show, l’humoriste a bénéficié de l’expertise du bureau guinéen de l’organisation internationale : « L’équipe de l’OIM m’a fourni une documentation et nous avons beaucoup échangé ensemble pour que mon spectacle colle au plus près de la réalité vécue par mes compatriotes sur les routes de l’exil. J’étais ignorant sur ce sujet et à mille lieues d’imaginer l’ampleur des horreurs que les migrants peuvent subir sur leur chemin. »

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« Ne t’en va pas », c’est encore le refrain de Fallé, le titre phare de Degg J Force 3, le groupe de rap le plus populaire de Guinée, qui clôt la soirée au Centre culturel franco-guinéen. « Ne pars pas. La mer te tuera, c’est la mort qui t’attend », exhorte la chanson. La qualité des images du clip jure avec la production habituelle d’un groupe de cette envergure en Afrique. Et pour cause, l’Union européenne l’a financé à hauteur de quinze mille dollars et a chargé l’OIM de la mise en œuvre de sa production.

Moussa Mbaye, l’un des deux chanteurs du groupe explique la genèse de cette chanson : « Lorsqu’en 1999 Yaguine Koïta et Fodé Tounkara avaient été retrouvés morts dans le train d’atterrissage d’un avion de la [ compagnie aérienne belge ] Sabena, ça nous avait particulièrement marqués que deux jeunes puissent mourir parce qu’ils voulaient partir en Europe. C’est ce qui nous a poussés à écrire cette chanson qui n’était jamais sortie dans aucun de nos albums, elle n’avait jusqu’alors circulé que dans les “ ghettos ”. Ce n’est finalement que beaucoup plus tard, à force d’apprendre chaque semaine la mort d’un jeune de notre quartier en Libye, dans le Sahara ou au Maroc, qu’on s’est décidés à la réécrire. Comme on n’y connaissait rien sur les questions migratoires, on est allés voir l’OIM pour qu’ils nous fournissent des informations à ce sujet. »

Moussa et les membres de son groupe sont reçus par Fatou Diallo N’Diaye, la cheffe de mission de l’OIM en Guinée, qui choisira de travailler avec eux « parce qu’ils sont connus et que nous savions que leur chanson serait écoutée par notre public cible ». Fatou Diallo N’Diaye porte la chanson Fallé dans son cœur pour avoir largement contribué à son écriture : « L’écriture du morceau Fallé a été un travail d’équipe, un véritable brainstorming. Il y a certaines paroles que j’ai écrites moi-même tandis que d’autres l’ont été par Lucas Chandellier, notre chargé de communication. Aujourd’hui, ce morceau appartient à l’Union européenne et à l’OIM. »

Depuis le succès commercial de Fallé, Fatou Diallo N’Diaye confesse voir de plus en plus d’artistes venir frapper à sa porte pour écrire et composer des chansons sur le thème de la migration irrégulière. Les chanteurs et musiciens ne sont pas les seuls cooptés par l’institution : auteurs de bandes dessinées, humoristes, metteurs en scène de théâtre, griots, conteurs traditionnels, organisateurs de festivals, imams, radios locales, etc., sont également sollicités.

La représentante d’un organisme de développement qui a souhaité garder l’anonymat nous a confié que l’OIM avait cependant refusé de contribuer au financement d’un film qu’elle produisait parce que l’on y voyait des migrants guinéens arrivés en Europe et que de telles images « pouvaient susciter un espoir chez les candidats au départ ». L’OIM organise aussi des formations de journalistes sur les « techniques de couverture des questions migratoires ». Depuis 2018, près de cinq cents d’entre eux, originaires d’Afrique de l’Ouest et d’Afrique centrale, ont été formés selon la vision de l’OIM sur cette question.

Fondée en 1951 par les États-Unis pour faire contrepoids au HCR que les diplomates américains soupçonnaient d’être sous influence communiste, l’OIM a d’abord eu la fonction logistique d’organiser le transit vers l’Amérique de dizaines de milliers de personnes déplacées par la Seconde Guerre mondiale en Europe. Selon les mots du site de l’organisation : « Simple agence logistique au départ, elle a constamment élargi son champ d’action pour devenir l’organisme international chef de file œuvrant aux côtés des gouvernements et de la société civile afin de favoriser la compréhension de la problématique migratoire, d’encourager le développement économique et social par le biais de la migration et de veiller au respect de la dignité humaine et au bien-être des migrants. »

Ce que l’OIM met moins en valeur, en revanche, ce sont les campagnes de sensibilisation et de propagande qu’elle a mises en place au début des années 1990 dans les pays d’Europe centrale et d’Europe de l’Est afin de mettre en garde les jeunes femmes contre les réseaux de traite et de prostitution. Selon le sociologue Antoine Pécoud, Youssou N’Dour, archétype du chanteur mondialisé, serait le premier artiste africain à avoir mis sa voix et sa renommée au service de la lutte contre la migration illégale en Afrique.

Ce n’est pas l’OIM, cette fois, qui en fut à l’origine, mais le gouvernement espagnol et l’Union européenne qui, en 2007, et alors que de nombreux Sénégalais tentaient de rallier l’archipel des Canaries en pirogue, décidaient de produire et diffuser un clip afin de les dissuader de prendre la mer. Cette vidéo met en scène une mère de famille prénommée Fatou, sans nouvelles de son fils parti depuis huit mois, et se termine par un message de Youssou N’Dour : « Vous savez déjà comment [ l’histoire de Fatou ] se termine, ce sont des milliers de familles détruites. Je suis Youssou N’Dour, s’il vous plaît, ne risquez pas votre vie en vain. Vous êtes le futur de l’Afrique. »

Depuis lors, la liste des artistes cooptés par diverses institutions internationales et européennes ne cesse de s’allonger : Coumba Gawlo, Fatou Guewel et Adiouza au Sénégal, Bétika en Côte d’Ivoire, Ousmane Bangara et Degg J Force 3 en Guinée, Jalimadi Kanuteh en Gambie, Miss Espoir au Bénin, Will B Black au Burkina Faso, Ousmane Cissé au Mali, Zara Moussa au Niger, ou encore Ewlad Leblad en Mauritanie pour ne citer qu’eux. Lors de la campagne Aware migrants lancée en 2017 par l’OIM, l’artiste malienne Rokia Traoré a composé la chanson Be aware. Dans une interview à l’émission 28 Minutes diffusée sur Arte, elle expliquait que son but à travers cette chanson n’était pas de vouloir empêcher les jeunes Africains de partir mais « qu’il était inhumain de ne pas les informer sur les dangers de la route ». Ce qu’elle ne dit pas, c’est que sa chanson et son clip avaient été sponsorisés par le ministère italien de l’Intérieur.
Dissuader les Africains ou rassurer les Européens ?

Sur un continent comme l’Afrique où les frontières sont historiquement poreuses et où 80 % des migrations sont internes au continent, l’Union européenne, via l’OIM notamment, s’emploie à restreindre la liberté de circulation en modernisant les postes frontières et en formant les gardes-frontières, introduisant la technologie biométrique ou faisant pression sur les gouvernements et les parlementaires africains afin de rendre toujours plus restrictive leur législation en matière de migration, comme au Niger en 2015 avec le vote d’une loi sur la criminalisation des « passeurs ».

C’est toute la contradiction de ces campagnes de propagande sur les dangers de la route dont les auteurs sont les principaux responsables, explique le sociologue Antoine Pécoud : « S’il est louable de renseigner les candidats à l’exil sur les dangers de la route, il y a une contradiction fondamentale dans la nature même de ce danger dont on prétend avertir les migrants. Parce que ce danger est corrélé au contrôle de l’immigration. Plus on contrôle l’immigration, plus il est difficile pour les migrants de circuler légalement, plus ils vont tenter de migrer par des chemins détournés, plus ils vont prendre de risques et plus il y aura de morts. »

Affiliée à l’ONU depuis 2016, l’OIM demeure, à l’instar des autres agences gravitant dans la galaxie de l’organisation internationale, directement et principalement financée par les pays les plus riches de l’hémisphère occidental qui lui délèguent une gestion des migrations conforme à leurs intérêts : ceux de l’Australie en Asie et en Océanie, des États-Unis en Amérique centrale et de l’Europe en Afrique pour ne citer que ces exemples. Son budget en 2018 était de 1,8 milliard d’euros. Il provient principalement de fonds liés à des projets spécifiques qui rendent l’OIM très accommodante auprès de ses donateurs et la restreint dans le développement d’une politique qui leur serait défavorable. C’est un outil parfait de contrôle à distance de la mise en œuvre de la politique d’externalisation des frontières chère à l’Union européenne. D’autant qu’au contraire du HCR, elle n’a pas à s’embarrasser des conventions internationales et notamment de celle de 1951 relative à la protection des réfugiés.

D’après Nauja Kleist, chercheuse au Danish Institute for International Studies, c’est précisément « le manque de crédibilité des diffuseurs de ces messages qui les rend peu efficaces auprès des populations ciblées » d’autant que « les jeunes Africains qui décident de migrer sont suffisamment informés des dangers de la route – via les réseaux sociaux notamment – et que pour un certain nombre d’entre eux, mourir socialement au pays ou physiquement en Méditerranée revient au même ». Selon elle, « ces campagnes sont surtout un moyen parmi d’autres de l’Union européenne d’adresser un message à son opinion publique afin de lui montrer qu’elle ne reste pas inactive dans la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière ».

Selon Antoine Pécoud, « le développement de ces campagnes de propagande est d’une certaine manière le symbole de l’échec de la répression des flux migratoires. Malgré sa brutalité et les milliards investis dans les murs et les technologies de surveillance des frontières, il se trouve que de jeunes Africains continuent d’essayer de venir ».

Promouvoir un message sédentariste et une « désirable immobilité », selon les mots d’Antoine Pécoud, c’est aussi encourager une forme de patriotisme dans le but d’inciter les jeunes à contribuer au développement de leur pays et de l’Afrique. Une fable qui ne résiste pas aux recherches en cours sur la mobilité internationale : c’est à partir d’un certain niveau de développement qu’un pays voit ses citoyens émigrer de façon significative vers des pays plus riches. Qu’importe, avec l’argent du contribuable européen, l’OIM finance aussi des artistes porteurs de ce message.

Dans le clip de sa chanson No Place Like Home promu par l’OIM ( « On n’est nulle part aussi bien que chez soi » ), Kofi Kinaata, la star ghanéenne du fante rap, confronte le destin d’un migrant qui a échoué dans son aventure incertaine à celui d’un proche resté au pays, lequel, à force de labeur, a pu accéder aux standards de la classe moyenne européenne incarnés dans le clip par la fondation d’une famille et l’acquisition d’une voiture neuve.

De son côté, le groupe guinéen Degg J Force 3 a composé #Guinealove qui met en scène une Guinée largement fantasmée aux rues vierges de détritus, aux infrastructures modernes, sans bidonvilles et où se succèdent des paysages majestueux et une nature vierge alors que ce pays occupe la cent quatre-vingt-deuxième place sur les cent quatre-vingt-sept que compte le classement de l’Indice de développement humain. Le groupe l’a notamment interprétée lors du lancement en grande pompe du programme Integra, le volet réintégration du programme de retours volontaires et de réintégration de l’OIM juste après le discours du Premier ministre guinéen :

Ma Guinée ma mère ma fierté ma cité

Ma Guinée ma belle mon soleil ma beauté

Ma Guinée ma terre mon chez-moi

Mon havre de paix

Ouvrez les frontières de Tiken Jah Fakoly, sorti en 2007, est peut-être l’un des derniers tubes africains à avoir promu aussi frontalement la liberté de circulation. Douze ans plus tard, le message adressé par la star africaine du reggae est tout autre. Son dernier album, Le monde est chaud, fait la part belle aux messages prônés par l’Union européenne en Afrique : « Dans Ouvrez les frontières, je dénonçais cette injustice dont étaient et sont toujours victimes les Africains de ne pas pouvoir circuler librement. Aujourd’hui, je dis qu’effectivement cette injustice demeure, mais si on veut que nos enfants grandissent dans une autre Afrique, alors notre place n’est pas ailleurs. Donc aujourd’hui, je dis aux jeunes de rester au pays, je dis que l’Afrique a besoin de tous ses enfants. D’autant que notre race est rabaissée quand nos frères sont mis en esclavage en Libye, quand ils ont payé si cher pour se retrouver sous les ponts à Paris. Au lieu de donner leurs forces à l’Europe, pourquoi nos jeunes ne restent-ils pas ici ? » Tiken Jah Fakoly affirme n’avoir pas reçu de fonds européens pour la production de son dernier album.

Ses compatriotes du Magic System, eux, ne s’en cachent pas et ont compris via leur fondation éponyme que le développement de l’emploi local et la lutte contre la migration irrégulière étaient des thèmes capteurs de fonds européens. Partenaire privilégiée de l’Union européenne en Côte d’Ivoire à travers une multitude de projets de développement, la fondation Magic System a signé en février dernier avec l’OIM un partenariat qui engage les deux structures « à travailler main dans la main pour promouvoir des migrations sûres et informées, et des alternatives durables à la migration irrégulière ».

La migration sûre, c’est le parent pauvre du Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence européen pour l’Afrique, créé le 11 novembre 2015 lors du sommet européen de La Valette sur la migration, et à partir duquel sont financées les campagnes dites de sensibilisation et de propagande en prévention de la migration irrégulière. L’un des points sur lequel les pays européens se sont pourtant entendus et qui consiste à « favoriser la migration et la mobilité légales » ne s’est, pour l’heure, toujours pas concrétisé sur le terrain et ne reçoit ni publicité ni propagande dans les pays de départ. Maurice Koïba, le rapatrié de Libye, désormais tout à ses études d’anglais et d’informatique et toujours en campagne « pour une migration digne et légale », a renoncé depuis belle lurette à demander un visa à l’ambassade de France : son prix est prohibitif pour un jeune de sa condition sociale et n’est pas remboursé en cas de refus, ce qui attend l’immense majorité des demandes.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/200220/controle-des-frontieres-et-des-ames-le-soft-power-de-l-oim-en-afrique?ongl

Au sujet du « nouveau » tag qui sévit sur Tik-Tok et Twitter en echo depuis maintenant plusieurs jours, la bonne nouvelle c’est que les vidéo de « prévention » et d’information cartonnent. Celle-ci se classe dans les premières désormais :

#silouhettechallenge SUPER URGENT regardez cette vidéo tout ceux qui ont fait ce #challenge #tiktok

▻https://twitter.com/e_lonorele/status/1355188291637751809
(désolée je ne sais pas comment intégrer la vidéo)

J’ai testé et... franchement... simple et très bien pour les visioconférences (on se voit bien et entend bien, on peut partager l’écran et converser dans une boîte « conversation »).

Possible de l’essayer ici :
▻https://galene.org:8443/group/public

EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

#technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

State-of-play report

At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

The new standing corps

Recruitment

A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

Training

The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

Use of force

The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

“On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

Privileges and immunities

The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

“Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

Law enforcement

To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

Fundamental rights and data protection

The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

Returns

The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

“The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

EUROSUR

The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

Summary

Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Jane Kilpatrick

Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

“the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
“The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
“if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

Endnotes

[1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

[2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[3] Section 1.1, state of play report

[4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

[5] Section 7.1, state of play report

[6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, ▻https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

[7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

[9] Chapter III, state of play report

[10] Section 2.5, state of play report

[11] Protocol (No 7), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

[12] Chapter III, state of play report

[13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

[14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, ▻https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

[15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

[16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

[18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[19] Section 8, state of play report

[20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

[21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, ▻https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

[22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

[23] Section 9, state of play report

[24] ERRIN, ▻https://returnnetwork.eu

[25] Section 3.2, state of play report

[26] Chapter III, state of play report

[27] Section 3.2, state of play report

[28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[29] State of play report, p. 19

[30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, ►http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

[31] Section 4, state of play report

[32] Section 7.2, state of play report
Next article >

Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

#EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

What is the standing corps?

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
Long-term staff seconded from member states;
Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

The size of the standing corps

The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

–-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

What are the profiles?

The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

border checks and surveillance;
interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
verifying travel documents;
escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
operating data systems and platforms; and
offering cultural mediation

*Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

Recruitment for the profiles

Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

“Never touch yourself with gloves”

Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

Fit for service?

The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

Jane Kilpatrick

Endnotes

[1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

[5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

[8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

[9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

[11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

[12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

[13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

[14] Ibid.

[15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

[16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

[19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, ▻https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
#gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

Frontex seeks company for drone flights

The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

Aircraft from arms companies

Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

New interested parties for drone flights

At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

Information to non-EU countries

The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

Matthias Monroy

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

Endnotes

[1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, ►https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

[2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

[3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, ▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

[4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, ▻https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

[5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, ▻http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

[6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

[7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, ▻http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

[8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

[9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, ▻https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

[10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, ▻https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

[11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, ▻https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

[12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, ▻https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

[13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, ▻https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

[14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, ▻https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

[15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, ▻http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

[16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

[17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

[18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

[19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, ▻https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

[20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

[21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

[22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

#drones

Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

From external to internal surveillance

Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

Legal provisions

A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

“EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

“…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

“The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

“The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

Sources of data

The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

national border surveillance systems;
stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
local, regional and other coordination centres;
other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
border checks;
Frontex;
other member states’ national coordination centres;
third countries’ authorities;
ship reporting systems;
other relevant European and international organisations; and
other sources.[10]

For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

national coordination centres;
national situational pictures;
immigration liaison officers;
Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
third countries’ authorities.[11]

The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

“The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

Operational activities at the internal borders

Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

“When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

“there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

Chris Jones

Endnotes

[1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

[3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, ▻http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

[4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

[5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

[6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, ▻https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

[7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

[8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

[9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

[10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

[11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

[12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

[13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

[14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: ▻https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

[16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, ▻https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

[17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, ▻https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

[18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

[19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

#mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

voir aussi cette enquête de #ZDF : The #Frontex_files :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900554

Les effets des politiques d’austérité sur les dépenses et services publics de santé en Europe

Cet article analyse l’évolution des politiques et des dépenses de santé depuis la grande récession (2008-2009) dans les pays européens. Dans un premier temps, l’article analyse les modalités des réformes et des mesures prises dans le secteur de la santé, en particulier depuis le tournant de l’austérité débuté en 2010, qu’il s’agisse de mesures visant à diminuer directement le volume et le prix des soins au moyen d’une limitation des emplois et des rémunérations dans le secteur de la santé ou à travers des réformes plus « structurelles ». La compression des dépenses publiques de santé a été d’autant plus forte que les mesures ont porté sur le facteur travail. Dans un second temps, l’article documente et analyse l’évolution des dépenses de santé. Si la croissance des dépenses (totales et publiques) de santé a été très peu altérée durant la récession de 2008-2009, une rupture est intervenue dans tous les pays après 2009 (l’Allemagne faisant exception). Certains pays « périphériques » ont connu une baisse des dépenses de santé sans équivalent dans l’histoire contemporaine. L’article conclut sur les limites des politiques d’austérité appliquées au champ de la santé, non pas tant au regard de leurs effets sur le soin ou la situation sanitaire, mais au regard même de leur objectif de réduction des déficits publics. Les travaux montrent que les restrictions opérées dans les dépenses publiques de santé, mais aussi celles en matière d’éducation et de protection sociale, ont des effets récessifs désastreux et s’avèrent inefficaces, ou moins efficaces que des réductions d’autres dépenses publiques.

▻https://www.cairn.info/revue-de-l-ires-2017-1-page-17.htm

#chanson #soft_power
cc @sinehebdo

#HCI : Human-Computer Interaction
Max Van Kleek : ▻https://hip.cat/emax/about more or less un #cybernéticien. ( My research activities fall within Human Centred Computing and focuses on Privacy, Autonomy, and Augmented Human Cognition (AHC) through intelligent systems and smarter interfaces. This requires work at the intersection of AI, HCI, systems, cybersecurity, psychology, sociology, and the health sciences.) #intermedialite #software_studies

ping @deka - citations de Camille ! C’est grace à toi aussi, merci pour tout soutien pendant les recherches !

source : ►https://inkyfada.com/fr/2020/03/20/financements-ue-tunisie-migration

Camille c’est @deka ?

Non, malheureusement j’ai pas encore réussi à convaincre Camille de joindre SeenThis...mais j’essaie toujours ;-) @deka c’est un prêtre très intéressé au sujet, AI Interview No 1 dans le mémoire M2, ensemble avec Camille on a beaucoup discuté