• Venezia mostra che l’Italia è nel mezzo di una crisi climatica

    L’acqua alta che ha sommerso Venezia nella notte tra il 12 e il 13 novembre – la seconda più alta di sempre, dopo la cosiddetta acqua granda del 1966 – è un sintomo emblematico di quanto la crisi climatica stia incidendo sulla fisionomia dell’Italia. Il sindaco della città, Luigi Brugnaro, lo ha sottolineato così: “Questi sono evidentemente gli effetti dei cambiamenti climatici”.

    Provocata da un vortice di venti che ha assunto una velocità fuori dal comune e ha sospinto grandi masse d’acqua verso la laguna, la marea ha raggiunto i 187 centimetri e ha sommerso l’85 per cento della città. Dopo aver segnalato per la serata un livello di 145 centimetri, il centro maree ha rivisto la stima in diretta, trovandosi di fronte a una situazione del tutto inedita. “I nostri modelli non hanno segnalato l’ondata di marea semplicemente perché si è trattato di un evento mai visto da quando facciamo previsioni modellistiche”, dicono dalla sala operativa dell’ente incaricato di prevedere l’innalzamento delle acque e allertare la cittadinanza.

    Ma Venezia è uno specchio di quello che sta succedendo in tutto il paese: non passa giorno senza che un territorio si trovi colpito da un evento meteorologico “mai visto prima”, sia esso un vento di velocità inconsueta, una grandinata fortissima o una pioggia che fa esondare fiumi e torrenti. Nella stessa giornata in cui Venezia finiva sotto l’acqua, il centro di Matera veniva sommerso da un fiume di fango provocato da un temporale di intensità inaudita, e una tromba d’aria si abbatteva sulle coste di Porto Cesareo, in Puglia, facendo letteralmente volare le barche ormeggiate al molo.

    Dati preoccupanti
    Questo è quello che sta accadendo oggi: un ripetersi di eventi estremi che stanno flagellando il paese, distruggendo territori, fiaccando comunità intere. È passato poco più di un anno da quando la tempesta Vaia ha cancellato una parte rilevante dei boschi nel nordest dell’Italia. Venti con una velocità superiore ai 200 chilometri orari hanno divelto in poche ore milioni di alberi: “Quanto è successo qui l’anno scorso è qualcosa di assolutamente inedito”, ricorda Severino Andrea De Bernardin, sindaco di Rocca Pietore, tra i comuni più colpiti dalla tempesta in Veneto. “Qui sono esondati trenta torrenti e si sono schiantati 600mila alberi – 500 per ognuno dei nostri 1.200 abitanti”.

    Il piccolo comune del bellunese è circondato da montagne dove ancora si vedono i segni del disastro: i boschi che ne coprivano i fianchi sono diventati un manto di tronchi abbattuti. Il che aumenta il pericolo di valanghe in caso di nevicate forti. “Ormai passo le giornate a guardare ossessivamente il meteo”, dice il sindaco preoccupato.

    L’acqua alta a Venezia o la tempesta Vaia fanno notizia per l’entità dei danni, per il numero di persone colpite e per l’alto valore simbolico. Ma non sono altro che la punta di un iceberg con cui tutti noi siamo chiamati a fare i conti. Basta prendere i dati dell’European severe weather database per vedere come in Italia l’evento straordinario sia ormai diventato ordinario. Secondo questo database, che registra tutti gli eventi estremi – tornado, piogge torrenziali, grandinate eccezionali, tempeste di neve, valanghe –, dall’inizio del 2019 si sono verificati 1.543 eventi di questo tipo in Italia. Circa cinque al giorno.

    Un dato preoccupante, che assume una valenza ancora più inquietante se lo si confronta con quello di paesi come la Spagna, che nello stesso periodo ne ha avuti 248, o il Regno Unito, che ne ha avuti 190. Se guardiamo alla serie storica di questi tre paesi, osserviamo una progressione ancora più preoccupante: in Italia nel 2009 si sono verificati 213 eventi estremi, in Spagna 219, nel Regno Unito 47. Nel 1999, in Italia se ne sono registrati 17, in Spagna 24, nel Regno Unito 27. Questo vuol dire che nel nostro paese il fenomeno cresce velocemente.

    “Per la sua particolare posizione geografica, in mezzo al mar Mediterraneo, l’Italia è da considerarsi uno hot spot climatico, un luogo cioè dove il cambiamento climatico è più rapido”, dice Gianmaria Sannino, responsabile del laboratorio di modellistica climatica e impatti dell’Agenzia nazionale per le nuove tecnologie, l’energia e lo sviluppo economico sostenibile (Enea), che studia la situazione nel Mediterraneo e ha previsto che da qui al 2100 ci sarà un aumento del livello del mare di almeno un metro. “Il livello del Mediterraneo si alza più rapidamente rispetto all’oceano, e soprattutto si scalda. Il che libera più energia nel sistema atmosfera-mare e rende più probabile i fenomeni estremi”.

    Che fare di fronte a questa serie di disastri? Forse per prima cosa sarebbe il caso di cambiare prospettiva, riconoscendo che siamo nel bel mezzo di una crisi climatica e che dobbiamo dotarci di strumenti di adattamento il più efficaci possibili per affrontare quella che presumibilmente non sarà un’emergenza inaspettata, ma una nuova normalità.

    https://www.internazionale.it/opinione/stefano-liberti/2019/11/14/venezia-acqua-alta-sommersa
    #Venise #acqua_alta #climat #changement_climatique #inondation #Italie

  • Le nombre de frontaliers bat des records depuis le début de l’année

    Le marché du travail suisse s’ouvre toujours davantage vers les pays voisins. Le nombre de frontaliers dépasse les 325’000 personnes cette année, un record. La hausse est particulièrement marquée au Tessin et à Genève.


    https://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/travailler-en-suisse_le-nombre-de-frontaliers-bat-des-records-depuis-le-d%C3%A9but-de-l-ann%C3%A9e/45364082

    #frontaliers #Suisse #statistiques #chiffres #travail

  • Entre 3,9 et 4,8 millions de sans-papiers vivent en Europe

    Leur nombre a augmenté en 2015, avec la hausse de la demande d’asile, mais s’est stabilisé dès 2019. La moitié d’entre eux se trouvent en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni.

    Entre 3,9 et 4,8 millions d’étrangers vivent en situation irrégulière en Europe et la moitié d’entre eux résident en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni. Dans une étude parue mercredi 13 novembre, le centre de recherche américain Pew Research Center évalue le nombre de personnes qui se trouvaient sans papiers sur le continent en 2017. C’est la première étude du genre depuis dix ans, qui permet notamment d’évaluer l’impact de ce qui a été communément appelé la « crise migratoire ».

    Selon les travaux du Pew Research Center, les sans-papiers représenteraient moins de 1 % de la population européenne (évaluée à 500 millions de personnes). A titre de comparaison, la part des sans-papiers est de 3 % aux Etat-Unis, avec plus de 10 millions de personnes.

    Le Pew Research Center note toutefois une « augmentation récente » du nombre de sans-papiers
    en Europe, due essentiellement à la hausse des demandeurs d’asile depuis 2015, qui pèsent pour
    environ un quart de l’ensemble des personnes en situation irrégulière. Les auteurs de l’étude ont
    en effet choisi d’inclure dans leur estimation les personnes sollicitant un statut de réfugié et qui
    n’ont pas encore obtenu de réponse du fait de leur avenir incertain (38 % des demandeurs ont
    obtenu une protection en 2018). Il est toutefois important de souligner que les auteurs ont
    constaté une stabilisation du nombre de migrants sans titre de séjour à partir de 2016.

    L’Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, la France et l’Italie, principales destinations
    Environ un million de sans-papiers vivent en Allemagne et autant au Royaume-Uni. Si les volumes
    sont comparables, le nombre de sans-papiers outre-Rhin a presque doublé entre 2014 et 2016,
    alors qu’il est resté plutôt stable outre-Manche, les îles britanniques n’ayant pas été l’une des
    principales destinations des demandeurs d’asile arrivés à partir de 2015. De la même manière, si
    l’Allemagne compte environ quatre fois plus de migrants réguliers qu’irréguliers – ce qui
    correspond à la moyenne européenne –, le Royaume-Uni a autant d’étrangers sans titres que
    d’étrangers pourvus d’un titre de séjour.

    La France et l’Italie arrivent en troisième et quatrième positions avec, respectivement, autour
    de 350 000 et 600 000 sans-papiers. « Comparé aux grands pays de destination des migrants
    en Europe, la France a un nombre relativement plus faible de sans-papiers, soulignent les auteurs.
    Une des raisons possibles est que certains sans-papiers peuvent être régularisés après plusieurs
    années s’ils remplissent certains critères ». Autour de 30 000 personnes bénéficient d’une
    admission exceptionnelle au séjour chaque année, pour des motifs liés principalement à leur
    situation familiale ou professionnelle. Cette particularité montre l’impact des politiques
    gouvernementales sur le volume de sans-papiers.

    Le plus souvent des hommes de moins de 35 ans
    Sur l’ensemble du continent, 56 % des sans-papiers sont présents depuis moins de cinq ans, mais
    plus d’un quart sont présents depuis plus de dix ans. Ils sont, pour les deux tiers d’entre eux, âgés
    de moins de 35 ans et sont des hommes dans plus d’un cas sur deux.
    En Europe, les origines des migrants sans papiers sont plus diverses qu’aux Etats-Unis, où
    l’écrasante majorité d’entre eux viennent du sous-continent américain et en particulier du
    Mexique. En Europe, environ un tiers des sans-papiers sont originaires d’Asie Pacifique – c’est
    particulièrement le cas au Royaume-Uni où ils comptent pour plus de la moitié des sans-papiers ;
    23 % viennent d’Europe et 21 % du Moyen-Orient et d’Afrique du Nord, tandis que 17 % sont
    originaires d’Afrique subsaharienne.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/11/13/entre-3-9-et-4-8-millions-de-sans-papiers-vivent-en-europe_6019025_3210.html
    #statistiques #estimations #chiffres #sans-papiers #Pew_Research_Center #Europe

    • Europe’s Unauthorized Immigrant Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off

      New estimates find half live in Germany and the United Kingdom.


      Europe has experienced a high level of immigration in recent years, driving debate about how countries should deal with immigrants when it comes to social services, security issues, deportation policies and integration efforts. Among these recently arrived immigrants are many who live in Europe without authorization. Coupled with unauthorized immigrants who were already in Europe, their numbers reach into the millions, though together they make up a small share of Europe’s total population.

      A new Pew Research Center analysis based on European data sources estimates that at least 3.9 million unauthorized immigrants – and possibly as many as 4.8 million – lived in Europe in 2017. The total is up from 2014, when 3.0 million to 3.7 million unauthorized migrants lived in Europe, but is little changed from a recent peak of 4.1 million to 5.3 million in 2016.1

      Overall, unauthorized immigrants accounted for less than 1% of Europe’s total population of more than 500 million people living in the 28 European Union member states, including the United Kingdom, and four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). And among the roughly 24 million noncitizens of EU-EFTA countries living in Europe, fewer than one-fifth were unauthorized immigrants in 2017.

      The recent rise in Europe’s long-standing unauthorized immigrant population from nations outside of EU-EFTA countries is largely due to a surge of asylum seekers who mostly arrived in 2015, when more than 1.3 million people applied for asylum in EU-EFTA countries. Many from that wave have been approved to remain in Europe. Many others, however, have had their applications rejected. Some have appealed those denials. Still others whose applications were rejected or withdrawn continue to live in Europe.

      Meanwhile, many asylum seekers in Europe are still awaiting a decision on their pending application, a group that is part of our estimates, and accounted for nearly a quarter (20% to 24%) of Europe’s unauthorized immigrant population in 2017. Although asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary legal standing, their future in Europe is uncertain. Most entered their country of residence without permission, and the majority of applicants are now seeing their applications rejected. Consequently, many have been or could be subject to deportation orders in the future.

      Since asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary lawful status, the Center also produced estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population without this group. These estimates are lower – 2.9 million to 3.8 million in 2017 – yet still show an apparent increase from 2014 before the asylum seeker surge, when the unauthorized immigrant population without asylum seekers waiting for a decision was an estimated 2.4 million to 3.2 million. (For estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population in Europe and by country without waiting asylum seekers, see Appendix C.)

      Unauthorized immigrants made up roughly one-fifth (16% to 20%) of Europe’s total non-EU-EFTA population in 2017, according to estimates, with 4% being unauthorized immigrants with a pending asylum claim that year. This means authorized non-EU-EFTA citizens living in Europe outnumbered unauthorized immigrants by about four to one.
      Who’s counted as an unauthorized immigrant?

      Unauthorized immigrants in this report are people living without a residency permit in their country of residence who are not citizens of any European Union or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country. Most unauthorized immigrants entered an EU-EFTA country without authorization, overstayed a visa, failed to leave after being ordered to do so or have had their deportation temporarily stayed. The unauthorized population also includes those born in EU-EFTA countries to unauthorized immigrant parents, since most European countries do not have birthright citizenship. Finally, the European unauthorized immigrant population estimate includes asylum seekers with a pending decision. This last group makes up nearly a quarter (20% to 24%) of Europe’s estimated total unauthorized immigrant population.

      Many different immigrant groups can be counted as unauthorized immigrants, as there is no universal definition and the inclusion of some groups over others is a point of debate. A broad definition could include anyone who entered the country without authorization and has yet to procure permanent residency. This definition could include those with subsidiary protection status, a group that does not qualify for refugee status but receives humanitarian protection that can be renewed for one or two years at a time. Those with this status can sometimes sponsor family members and after several years apply for permanent residency.

      By contrast, a narrower definition for unauthorized immigrants would not include those with legal protection from deportation, even if such protection is temporary. From this perspective, unauthorized immigrant populations would not include asylum seekers waiting on a decision, those whose deportation has been deferred or stayed, or children of unauthorized immigrants.

      Pew Research Center has selected an approach that considers a combination of authorized entry, legal certainty and likely permanency. In the U.S., the Center considers those with deportation relief (for example, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals or Temporary Protected Status) as well as asylum seekers waiting on their cases as unauthorized immigrants. Although these groups are authorized to work, many entered without permission and their legal future in the U.S. is uncertain, as evidenced by recent policy changes implemented by the U.S. government and subsequent court cases.

      In the same way in EU-EFTA countries, deportees with a stayed or deferred deportation who have a legal right of residence and may even be allowed to work are included as unauthorized immigrants. Children born in Europe to unauthorized immigrant parents are considered part of the unauthorized immigrant population. Similarly, asylum seekers with a pending decision, of whom many entered without permission and whose acceptance rates continue to fall, are also included as unauthorized immigrants. Since the definition of an unauthorized immigrant is a point of debate, the Center has published estimates without asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their application (see Appendix C). Waiting asylum seekers, at nearly 1 million people in Europe in 2017, are likely the largest of unauthorized immigrant groups with an uncertain legal status.

      The Center’s new estimates come at a time when publics across Europe express mixed opinions on the place of immigrants in their societies. A 2018 multi-nation survey from the Center found that majorities in several European countries support the deportation of immigrants living in their countries illegally. On the other hand, when asked about refugees fleeing war and violence, the 2018 survey also found that majorities across Europe support taking them in, a group that has often entered Europe without permission and claims asylum.

      This is the first time Pew Research Center has estimated the size of Europe’s unauthorized migrant population. The methodology used for these new estimates builds on the Center’s more than 15 years of experience in estimating the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States. The unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. is more than double the size (10.3 million to 10.7 million in 2017) of that in Europe (3.9 million to 4.8 million); has been decreasing in number since 2007; and makes up a larger share of the total population (roughly 3% in the U.S. compared with less than 1% in Europe). (See our related blog post for more details on how unauthorized immigrant populations and their characteristics differ between Europe and the U.S.)

      The Center’s estimates are also the first comprehensive estimate for Europe in a decade. Europe’s unauthorized migrant population was last estimated for 2008 by an EU-funded team of European researchers called the Clandestino project. At that time, the number living in the EU was estimated to be 1.9 million to 3.8 million, not including asylum seekers with pending decisions. By comparison, our estimate for 2017 for EU countries only, excluding asylum seekers with a pending application, is 2.8 million to 3.7 million – the upper end of Clandestino’s 2008 estimate.2
      The Center’s estimates compared with others

      Pew Research Center’s unauthorized immigrant estimates in Europe are in line with other reputable data, including estimates from previous studies, statistics on the number of unauthorized immigrants regularized by governments and analysis of recent migration flows.

      In Germany, for example, a separate 2014 estimate using a different method than the one used by the Center and that did not include waiting asylum seekers, estimated the number of unauthorized immigrants to have been 180,000 to 520,000. For the same year, the Center estimated the number of unauthorized immigrants in Germany to be between 300,000 and 400,000 without waiting asylum seekers, within the 2014 study’s range. Moving forward, our 2017 estimate for Germany of 600,000 to 700,000 unauthorized immigrants, excluding asylum seekers waiting for a resolution in their case, is in line with expected trends. For more, see our Germany estimate methodology.

      Meanwhile, in the UK, a London School of Economics study placed the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the country between 417,000 and 863,000 in 2007. Ten years later, after hundreds of thousands of additional migrants from non-EU-EFTA countries entered and stayed in the UK, our 2017 estimate of 800,000 to 1.2 million unauthorized immigrants with waiting asylum seekers would be consistent with recent migration trends. For more methodological background, see our UK estimate methodology.

      In Italy, hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers have landed on the country’s shores during the past decade. Many have had their asylum cases rejected, and some have remained in Italy without authorization. Adjusting for regularizations of unauthorized immigrants to authorized status during the past decade, deaths, out-migration and additional arrivals, our estimate of 500,000 to 700,000 for 2017, including asylum seekers with a pending asylum case, is similar to the estimate published by the Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità Foundation. For more information, see our Italy estimate methodology.

      In France, our estimate shows between 300,000 and 400,000 unauthorized immigrants lived in the country in 2017, including some 38,000 asylum seekers waiting for a decision on their case. This estimate is similar to that cited by government leaders as well as several French demographers. Also, some 300,000 people in 2017 were enrolled in a government medical plan accessed by unauthorized immigrants. For more, see our methodology for our France estimate.

      https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/11/13/europes-unauthorized-immigrant-population-peaks-in-2016-then-levels-off

      Pour télécharger le #rapport :
      https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/11/2019.11.13_EU-Unauthorized_FINAL.pdf

    • Commentaire de Serge Slama sur twitter :

      Le journal @lemondefr @JuliaPascualita pourrait prendre des précautions méthodologiques à l’égard de cette étude @pewresearch avec une appréhension très américaine de l’irrégularité qui inclut les demandeurs d’asile entrés illégalement.

      https://twitter.com/combatsdh/status/1194660424177922050

      En France on n’a pas de moyens de comptabiliser le nombre exact de sans-papiers. On connaît les bénéficiaires de l’aide médicale d’Etat (315 835 en 2017), le nombre de déboutés du droit d’asile (80 000 à 90 000 par an), le nombre d’OQTF non exécutées (environ 60 000 par an).
      Enfin on sait qu’environ 30 000 jeunes nés en France de parents étrangers deviennent français à leur majorité (mais on ignore le statut de leurs parents).

      https://twitter.com/combatsdh/status/1194895286491062273

      –-----

      Et ce commentaire de Nando Sigona, toujours sur twitter :

      I need to have a closer look at the report, but the estimate for the UK seems too high. The UK has only marginally being affected by the 2013-2015 #refugeecrisis, and does more forced/voluntary removals than other EU states...
      Previous estimates, including LSE, Home Office, Clandestino project and our own on #undocumentedchildren, identified pre-accession EU nationals as one of the larger group of undocumented migrants in the UK. A group that was ’regularised’ through the EU enlargement.
      refused but not removed asylum seekers also contributes to the estimate, but total asylum refusals minus returns may be in the thousands but nothing like what the estimate would require.
      The report is also counting people with short term legal status like subsidiary protection which is again questionable. The report recognises that this approach may be controversial and in Appendix C provides an estimate without asylum seekers.
      and yet they went for the splash number for the press release and from initial media reports it is clear that some of the nuances are lost.
      and by the way, it would seem that there is no variation in the UK between the estimates with and without asylum seekers...

      https://twitter.com/nandosigona/status/1194665603388321798

    • @Pewresearch a publié une étude sur la population immigrée « non-autorisée » en #Europe, dont les résultats ont été largement médiatisés depuis hier https://pewrsr.ch/2OalGIV un certain nombre d’éléments ont retenu l’attention de @DesinfoxMig :
      L’étude adopte un parti pris méthodologique basé sur le contexte américain pour définir le groupe étudié, à savoir la population immigrée « non-autorisée » en E. Cela inclut entre autre les #demandeursasile et les enfants nés en E. de parents en situation irrégulière.
      @Pewresearch
      reconnait que l’acception très large de la notion #immigré « non-autorisé » qui considère une combinaison de facteurs (entrée autorisée, séjour régulier et la probabilité de séjour permanent) fait débat.
      Dans le contexte FR il y a débat car la traduction du terme « unauthorized » en #sanspapier, #clandestin ou en situation irrégulière renvoi à un contexte juridique et administratif différent du contexte US.
      Par ex, en France l’immigré ayant introduit une #demandeasile se voit délivrer par la #préfecture une autorisation provisoire de séjour, il ne peut pas être expulsé, et n’est donc pas considéré comme « sans-papiers » aux yeux du droit français.
      Si on peut ne pas être d’accord avec certains choix méthodologiques – et on apprécierait certaines précautions et nuances de la part des médias qui diffusent cette étude - elle propose une approche comparative d’un phénomène par sa nature même très difficile à quantifier.
      Pour la France, on peut retenir que la part des « non-autorisés » dans #immigration est particulièrement basse (10%), comparé à Allemagne ou aux Etats-Unis (environ 20%) et au Royaume-Uni (45%). Ils représentent au total moins de 1% de la population totale.

      https://twitter.com/DesinfoxMig/status/1195073984099946496

    • Pew Research Centre Estimates on the Irregular Migrant Population the UK and the rest of Europe

      The Pew Research Centre has produced new estimates of the number of irregular (‘illegal’ or ‘unauthorised’) migrants in the EU, including the UK. Here we explain briefly what they find and how they reach their conclusions.

      What are the key findings for the UK?

      The report estimates that in 2017 there were between 800,000 and 1.2m people living in the UK without a valid residence permit. The authors also estimate that, in 2017:

      Around one third of irregular migrants had been living in the UK for 10 years or more;
      They included similar shares of men and women, and around 14% were children;
      There was no evidence of any increase in the number of irregular migrants living in the UK since 2014;
      Half came from the ‘Asia Pacific’ region, but there no breakdown by individual countries within that region;
      The UK had one of the largest irregular migrant populations in Europe, alongside Germany.

      How are the figures calculated and are they accurate?

      The study uses the ‘residual method’. It compares the estimated the number of non-EU citizens living in the UK to an estimate of the number holding a valid residence permit in the same year.

      The results come with a high degree of uncertainty, because both of these figures are just estimates—as the Pew report recognises.

      In 2017, ONS estimated that there were around 2.4m non-EU citizens living in the UK (this is lower than the 5.7m non-EU born migrants living in the UK that year, because most people born in non-EU countries now hold UK citizenship). The precise figure is uncertain for various reasons, including because it is drawn from a statistical survey to which not everyone agrees to respond.

      Separately, the Home Office is required to report to Eurostat an estimate of the number of the non-EU citizens holding a valid residence permit each year – ranging from temporary work permit holders to long-term residents with Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). In 2017, this estimate was roughly 1.5m. The UK government does not actually know the precise number of legally resident non-EU citizens, so the estimate requires various assumptions, for example about how many people with ILR have left the country or died.

      Pew’s ‘lower-bound’ estimate of 800,000 compares the estimated non-EU citizen population with the number of valid residence permits of at least 3 months duration. The ‘upper bound’ estimate of 1.2m instead looks only at those with permits lasting at least a year, and also adjusts the figure upwards to account for the possibility that ONS has underestimated the number of non-EU citizens living here.

      The comparison between the UK and other EU countries is particularly uncertain because the estimates of the number of legal residents are produced in very different ways and are not thought to be comparable.

      In summary, without more accurate data on both the number non-EU citizens in the UK and the number holding valid residence authorisation, it is difficult to know how accurate the figures are likely to be.

      Earlier this year, ONS and the Home Office produced a joint statement suggesting they did not plan to produce a new estimate using this method, because of limitations in the data and methodologies.

      What are the remaining evidence gaps?

      Even if we cannot be certain about the number, it is reasonable to assume based on this and previous estimates that the UK has a substantial irregular migrant population. There are still many things that are not known about the unauthorised population, notably:

      It is not known how many entered illegally vs. came legally but later overstayed or were not able to renew their residence authorisation.
      The figures do not tell us what the impacts of policy have been on the decisions irregular migrants make, and/or whether the figure would have been higher or lower if different policies had been in place.

      Migration Observatory comment

      Madeleine Sumption, Director of the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, said: “This report relies on a standard methodology to estimate the irregular migrant population, and gives us the most up-to-date estimate that is available. The big challenge when using this method in the UK in particular is that the data required for the calculation are not very good. In particular, the UK government simply doesn’t have an accurate record of exactly how many people are living in the UK legally. Without more precise data, there will continue to be a high degree of uncertainty around the number of people living here without authorisation.”

      https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/pew-research-centre-estimates-on-the-irregular-migrant-po

    • The Trouble with Pew’s estimates of the “unauthorized” migrant population in Europe

      The Pew Research Center, where I once held a leadership position, published a report on November 13, 2019 entitled, “Europe’s Unauthorized Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off.” The document is at best misleading, the product of an inappropriate statistical exercise. Given the reality of immigration politics in Europe, it is a made-to-order talking point for right-wing nationalists, echoing their attacks on asylum policies and on the migrants themselves. .

      This is Pew’s first effort to estimate the “unauthorized” population in Europe by applying a terminology I authored in 2002 for use in the United States. The current report has led me to conclude that the terminology and aspects of the statistical method that underlie its application are anachronisms that fail to take into account fundamental changes in the nature of migration flow to both Europe and the United States. As such, and no doubt unintentionally, the very knowledgeable people at Pew, including several I value highly as friends and colleagues, have fallen into a perceptual trap with significant political consequences.

      Pew’s critical error is to count as “unauthorized” people who have presented themselves to immigration authorities as required on arrival, have been identified, screened and registered in the lawful exercise of their right to seek asylum and have been granted permission to reside in their country of destination after an initial processing of that asylum claim. Nearly a quarter of the total “unauthorized” population in Europe, and closer to half in Germany, are asylum seekers, according to Pew’s account of its methodology. The estimate claims to be a statistical snapshot of this population on December 31, 2017, but as of that date these individuals, with few exceptions, had been granted documents attesting to their right to reside in these countries legally without fear of deportation and in many cases to work and receive social benefits.

      Pew counts these individuals as “unauthorized” because they had not yet been granted permission to remain as residents on a permanent basis. Germany and other European countries have several different degrees of asylum, including categories that grant protection for a period of years pending developments in their countries of origin and other matters. Moreover, in Europe as in the US, final disposition of asylum cases can take years due to backlogs and appeals, but those with pending cases are fully authorized to remain in the meantime. And, there is another category of persons whose claims have been denied, a small number in the 2017 Pew European estimates but more by now, who are not subject to deportation either by virtue of explicit administrative decisions or the prioritization of enforcement resources, a situation that occurs in the United States as well.

      In an exercise of highly subjective — and, to my mind, ill-informed — speculation, Pew concludes the individuals it observed in 2017 will never be granted permanent status in the future and that they will be subject to removal some day and so they should be counted as “unauthorized” in the present. This prognostication is as highly freighted politically as it is unjustified on any empirical basis. But, it is even more biased and inflammatory as a historical narrative.

      Almost the entire increase in the “unauthorized” population in Europe that peaked as of 2016, according to Pew, is the result of the extraordinary surge of Syrians, more than a million, who came across the Aegean from Turkey from the summer of 2015 to the spring of 2016 to seek refuge. By retroactively categorizing about half of those migrants as “unauthorized,” Pew is offering its statistical support to narratives that characterize that event as illegitimate, an abuse of Europe’s humanitarian values, a criminal effort to exploit social services and rich labor markets, a cynical abuse of the asylum system, a willing dilution of European identity by globalists, a pollution of Europe’s racial purity, etc.

      The methodology is explained in the fine print, and Pew even offers estimates minus the asylum seekers in an appendix. But, that does nothing to change the report’s deliberately attention-grabbing conclusion, its analytical perspective and the way it will be used for political purposes.

      Pew’s US estimates of the “unauthorized” are vulnerable to the same manipulation. They too include asylum seekers and produce the same statistical support for a demagogic portrayal of current migration.

      In the US, more than a million asylum seekers are sitting in an immigration court backlog awaiting adjudication of their claims, a number that has doubled since President Trump took office. These people have identified themselves to immigration officials, registered an asylum claim and have passed a “credible fear” interview with a finding that their claim is worthy of full consideration. By counting them as “unauthorized,” Pew fully embraces the Trump administration’s portrayal of the underlying migration phenomena as illegitimate even criminal. In the US asylum seekers account for a much smaller share of the Pew estimates than in Europe, about 10%, but that does not lessen the weight of the statistical fallacy. They are “unauthorized” only in the eyes of the beholders, in this case Pew and Trump. The result is a highly biased data point.

      In my view the problem with the Pew estimates is that they fail to account for new developments in migration flows to the United States and Europe.

      It was my great fortune to have been asked by the Pew Charitable Trusts in 2001 to create the Pew Hispanic Center and to then be part of the management committee that merged that center and several other stand-alone projects into the Pew Research Center in 2004. When the Pew Hispanic Center began publishing estimates of the “unauthorized migrant” population in 2002, the target was made up overwhelmingly of Mexican labor migrants who had either entered the country illegally or who had overstayed a legal entry and who would be subject to removal if apprehended. I am proud to say those estimates served an important and constructive role in repeated policy initiatives to legalize this population from 2004 to 2014. (I left Pew in 2007 to take a position on the faculty of the University of Southern California.)

      Both the migration phenomena and the focus of policy debate have shifted in the past few years, but Pew’s methodology has not.

      The number of cases in the immigration court backlog did not exceed 200,000 until 2009 and only crossed the 400,000 mark in 2014, according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University, a source of pure data, just the numbers, on immigration. As such, asylum seekers were a small fraction of the total population which we were measuring in the 00’s which stood at about 11 million people, plus or minus, throughout that period.

      But, in the past decade, as Pew has ably chronicled, migration flows to the United States have changed. Mexican labor migration outside legal channels has been negligible for a decade and meanwhile the number of Central American asylum seekers has increased dramatically in the past five years. In Europe, the 2015–16 events and subsequent arrivals of asylum seekers represent an even more singular event compared to the very small ongoing irregular labor migrations.

      The Pew Research Center remains committed to its version of strict political neutrality, portraying itself as a “fact-tank” that produces data with no spin, no advocacy and only as much analysis as is necessary to make sense of the numbers. (The exercise is fraught and one of the reasons I left, but that is another story.) Taking the institution at its word about its intention, the distortions created by the current report on the “unauthorized” population in Europe should be occasion for a reconsideration of the methodology and terminology.

      First there is a technical issue.

      Both in the United States and in Europe, the population of migrants who are not citizens or legal permanent residents now comprises several categories of individuals with different kinds of status in national immigration systems. Some are indeed “unauthorized” in that they have no legal basis to reside in those countries and would be subject to removal with little recourse if apprehended and put in proceedings. But, there is also this large, and in the United States rapidly growing, population of persons who have presented asylum claims and have been awarded permission to remain in the country until those claims are fully adjudicated. So it is technically a mistake to apply “unauthorized” as a blanket term, and it retrospect it was a technical mistake when I first did it nearly 20 years ago.

      But, now there is a much graver issue about how the data is communicated.

      The nature of the migration phenomena that produce asylum seekers as well as the laws governing migration and the processes to administer it are all the subject of vociferous, brutally-polarized, high-stakes political debates in the United States and across Europe. Pew is taking sides in that debate when it counts asylum seekers as “unauthorized migrants.”

      https://medium.com/@suro_26975/the-trouble-with-pews-estimates-of-the-unauthorized-migrant-population-in-eu

  • World inequality database

    The World Inequality Database (WID.world) aims to provide open and convenient access to the most extensive available database on the historical evolution of the world distribution of income and wealth, both within countries and between countries.

    HISTORY OF WID.world

    During the past fifteen years, the renewed interest for the long-run evolution of income and wealth inequality gave rise to a flourishing literature. In particular, a succession of studies has constructed top income share series for a large number of countries (see Thomas Piketty 2001, 2003, T. Piketty and Emmanuel Saez 2003, and the two multi-country volumes on top incomes edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and T. Piketty 2007, 2010; see also A. B. Atkinson et al. 2011 and Facundo Alvaredo et al. 2013 for surveys of this literature). These projects generated a large volume of data, intended as a research resource for further analysis, as well as a source to inform the public debate on income inequality. To a large extent, this literature follows the pioneering work of Simon Kuznets 1953, and A. B. Atkinson and Alan Harrison 1978, and extends it to many more countries and years.

    THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE (2011)

    The World Inequality Database was initially created as the The World Top Incomes Database (WTID) in January 2011 with the aim of providing convenient and free access to all the existing series. Thanks to the contribution of over a hundred researchers, the WTID expanded to include series on income inequality for more than thirty countries, spanning over most of the 20th and early 21st centuries, with over forty additional countries now under study.

    The key novelty has been to combine fiscal, survey and national accounts data in a systematic manner. This allowed us to compute longer and more reliable top income shares series than previous inequality databases (which generally rely on self-reported survey data, with large under-reporting problems at the top, and limited time span). These series had a large impact on the global inequality debate. In particular, by making it possible to compare over long periods of time and across countries the income shares captured by top income groups (e.g. the top 1%), they contributed to reveal new facts and refocus the discussion on rising inequality.

    In principle, all the top income share series respond to the same general methods: following the pioneering work of S. Kuznets (1953), they use income tax data, national accounts, and Pareto interpolation techniques to estimate the share of total income going to top income groups (typically the top decile and the top percentile). However, despite researchers’ best efforts, the units of observation, the income concepts, and also the Pareto interpolation techniques were never made fully homogeneous over time and across countries. Moreover, for the most part attention has been restricted to the top decile, rather than the entire distribution of income and wealth. These elements pointed to the need for a methodological re-examination and clarification.

    FROM THE WTID TO THE WID (2015)

    In December 2015, the WTID was subsumed into the WID, The World Wealth and Income Database. In addition to the WTID top income shares series, this first version of WID included an extended version of the historical database on the long-run evolution of aggregate wealth-income ratios and the changing structure of national wealth and national income first developed by T. Piketty and G. Zucman 2013, 2014 (see also T. Piketty, 2014, for an attempt to propose an interpretative historical synthesis on the basis of this new material and of the top income shares series). We changed the name of the database from WTID to WID in order to express the extension in scope and ambition of the database, as well as the new emphasis on both wealth and income.

    At the same time, over the last years the distribution of personal wealth has been receiving increasing attention after having been neglected for decades. The work on top income shares was recently extended to study the long run evolution of top wealth shares (see E. Saez and G. Zucman 2016, F. Alvaredo, A. Atkinson and S. Morelli 2017, and B. Garbinti, J. Goupille and T. Piketty 2016).

    FROM INCOME INEQUALITY TO WEALTH INEQUALITY

    One reason is the growing recognition that, in seeking explanations for rising income inequality, we need to look not only at wages and earned income but also at income from capital. Income from interest, from dividends, and from rents represents a minority of total personal income, but it is nonetheless significant, especially at the top of the distribution. The ratio of total personal wealth to total personal income has been rising. One consequence is that the role of inherited wealth – which declined for much of the twentieth century – has, in a number of countries, begun to acquire greater significance. In addition, there is extensive evidence – e.g. from billionaire rankings – suggesting that top global wealth holders have grown much faster than average and have therefore benefited from a substantial increase in their share.

    In order to produce reliable estimates of wealth inequality, it is becoming increasingly critical to combine different sources in a consistent manner, including income tax data (using the capitalization method) and inheritance tax data (using the mortality multiplier method), following the pioneering work of A. B. Atkinson and A. Harrison (1978). One also needs to introduce new sources such as global billionaire rankings, and to address novel issues such as cross-border assets and offshore wealth (G. Zucman, 2013, 2014). More generally, it is becoming more and more critical to measure the inequality of income and wealth from a global perspective, and not simply at the country level.

    THE WORLD INEQUALITY DATABASE (WID.WORLD) : A NEW WEBSITE, A NEW AMBITION (2017)

    In January 2017, with the objective of reaching yet a wider audience of researchers and general public, we released the first version of the more user-friendly website, WID.world, hosting the World Inequality Database.

    These changes come along with a new ambition. Thanks to the continuous cooperation of the WID.world Fellows, we pursue our efforts to expand the database into three major directions.

    First, we keep expanding the time coverage and the geographical coverage of the database, in particular to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. We also keep updating the database with new observations, as official bodies release the necessary information each year. Additionally, we will progressively include inequality series at the sub-national level whenever possible (series of top income shares for each state in the United States are already available, as well as for urban and rural China).

    Next, we plan to provide more series on wealth-income ratios and the distribution of wealth, and not only on income. Third, we aim to offer series on the entire distribution of income and wealth, from the bottom to the top, and not only for top shares.

    The overall long-run objective is to be able to produce Distributional National Accounts (DINA), that is, to provide annual estimates of the distribution of income and wealth using concepts of income and wealth that are consistent with the macroeconomic national accounts. This also includes the production of synthetic income and wealth micro-files, which will also be made available online.

    A LONG-TERM, CUMULATIVE, COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROCESS

    We should stress at the onset that our methods and series are and will always be imperfect, and subject to revision. We attempt to combine the different data sources available (in particular fiscal data, survey data and national accounts) in a more systematic way than what was done to date, but more progress is yet to come. We provide a detailed and explicit description of our methodology and sources, so that other users can contribute to their improvement. Our series and methods should be viewed from the perspective of a long-term, cumulative, collaborative research process.

    In this spirit, we also provide a new set of research tools for scholars, journalists, or any interested user in the production of their own inequality datasets. Our programs allow for the estimation of income and wealth distributions based on raw tabulated data, such as those provided by statisical agencies and tax administrations. They can also be used to combine distributions from different countries and produce representative synthetic files. The programs are based on generalized, non-parametric Pareto interpolation techniques. They can be run directly from our website with no prior technical knowledge. Users can also download and install our open-access R-language codes on their computers.


    https://wid.world
    #inégalités #données #base_de_données #statistiques #chiffres #monde #cartographie #visualisation
    signalé par @mobileborders

    #rapport 2018 :
    https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf
    ping @simplicissimus @reka @fil

    • Just 10 per cent of workers receive nearly half of global pay

      An ILO assessment gives the first global estimates of the distribution of labour income, and shows that pay inequality remains pervasive in the world of work. The findings are drawn from a new database which includes national, regional and global data.

      Ten per cent of workers receive 48.9 per cent of total global pay, while the lowest-paid 50 per cent of workers receive just 6.4 per cent, a new ILO dataset reveals.

      What’s more, the lowest 20 per cent of income earners – around 650 million workers – earn less than 1 per cent of global labour income, a figure that has hardly changed in 13 years.

      The new dataset shows that overall global labour income inequality has fallen since 2004. However, this is not due to reductions in inequality within countries – at the national level, pay inequality is actually increasing. Rather, it is because of increasing prosperity in large emerging economies, namely China and India. Overall, the findings say, income inequality remains pervasive in the world of work.

      The Key Findings show that, globally, the share of national income going to workers is falling, from 53.7 per cent in 2004 to 51.4 per cent in 2017.

      Looking at the average pay distribution across countries, it finds that the share going to the middle class (the middle 60 per cent of workers) declined between 2004 and 2017, from 44.8 per cent to 43 per cent. At the same time, the share earned by the top 20 per cent of earners increased, from 51.3 per cent to 53.5 per cent. Countries where these top earners saw their share of national pay rise by at least one percentage point include Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States.

      “The data show that in relative terms, increases in the top labour incomes are associated with losses for everyone else, with both middle class and lower-income workers seeing their share of income decline,” said Steven Kapsos, Head of the ILO’s Data Production and Analysis Unit. “However, when the labour income shares of the middle or lower income workers increase, the gains tend to be widespread, favouring everyone except the top earners.”

      Poorer countries tend to have much higher levels of pay inequality, something that exacerbates the hardships of vulnerable populations. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the bottom 50 per cent of workers earn only 3.3 per cent of labour income, compared to the European Union, where the same group receives 22.9 per cent of the total income paid to workers.

      Roger Gomis, Economist in the ILO Department of Statistics, said: “The majority of the global workforce endures strikingly low pay and for many having a job does not mean having enough to live on. The average pay of the bottom half of the world’s workers is just 198 dollars per month and the poorest 10 per cent would need to work more than three centuries to earn the same as the richest 10 per cent do in one year.”

      https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_712234/lang--en/index.htm

    • In un anno i ricchi guadagnano quanto i più poveri in tre secoli

      La maggior parte della forza lavoro globale sopporta salari bassi e le occupazioni dove è impiegata non bastano per sopravvivere. Il 10 per cento dei lavoratori più poveri dovrebbe lavorare per più di tre secoli per guadagnare lo stesso reddito del 10 per cento che guadagna di più. Lo sostiene la ricerca dell’Organizzazione internazionale del lavoro (Ilo) intitolata «The global labour income share and distribution» che analizza la più grande raccolta mondiale di dati armonizzati per l’indagine sulla forza lavoro in 189 paesi.

      TRA IL 2004 E IL 2017 il reddito della cosiddetta «classe media» è diminuita, mentre è aumentato il salario della parte meglio retribuita dei lavoratori collocati nella parte alta della gerarchia sociale e produttiva. L’immagine scelta per rappresentare l’evoluzione della distribuzione del reddito da lavoro è un «bastone da hockey»: i redditi della classe media e medio-bassa – con queste nozioni di solito si allude a coloro che per vivere devono lavorare, indipendentemente dalle classi e dai ceti di riferimento – si assottigliano mentre si allargano i guadagni di chi è collocato in corrispondenza del termine del bastone chiamato «spatola» o «paletta». Questo significa che la quota destinata alla classe media (il 60 per cento medio dei lavoratori) è diminuita tra il 2004 e il 2017, passando dal 44,8 per cento al 43 per cento. Allo stesso tempo, la quota guadagnata dal 20 per cento dei lavoratori più pagati è aumentata, passando dal 51,3 per cento al 53,5 per cento. Su scala mondiale la disuguaglianza globale del reddito da lavoro è diminuita dal 2004. Ciò non è dovuto a una maggiore giustizia sociale. A livello nazionale, infatti, le disuguaglianze salariali sono aumentate. Questo calo è dovuto all’aumento della prosperità nelle grandi economie emergenti: Cina e India. Nel complesso, invece, la disuguaglianza di reddito rimane pervasiva nel mondo del lavoro. La ricerca conferma che l’Italia è uno dei paesi dove gli alti salari sono aumentati di almeno un punto percentuale insieme a Germania, Indonesia, Pakistan, Regno Unito e Stati Uniti, mentre tutti gli altri continuano a diminuire. I paesi più poveri tendono invece ad avere livelli molto più elevati di disuguaglianza retributiva, elemento che aggrava le difficoltà delle popolazioni vulnerabili. Nell’Africa subsahariana, ad esempio, il 50 per cento dei lavoratori guadagna solo il 3,3 per cento del reddito da lavoro, rispetto all’Unione Europea, dove lo stesso gruppo riceve il 22,9 per cento del reddito totale pagato ai lavoratori. «La maggior parte della forza lavoro globale sopporta salari sorprendentemente bassi e per molti avere un lavoro non significa avere abbastanza per vivere – sostiene Roger Gomis, economista del dipartimento di statistica dell’Ilo – La retribuzione media della metà inferiore dei lavoratori del mondo è di appena 198 dollari al mese e il 10 per cento più povero dovrebbe lavorare più di tre secoli per guadagnare la stessa cosa che il 10 per cento più ricco fa in un anno».

      «I DATI MOSTRANO che, in termini relativi, gli aumenti dei redditi da lavoro più alti sono accompagnati da perdite per tutti gli altri – ha detto Steven Kapsos, capo dell’unità di produzione e analisi dei dati dell’Ilo- Tuttavia, quando aumenta la quota di reddito da lavoro dei lavoratori a reddito medio o basso, i guadagni tendono ad essere ampiamente distribuiti, a vantaggio di tutti i lavoratori, eccetto per gli alti salari». Questo significa che un aumento generalizzato della parte bassa o mediana della forza lavoro comporterebbe una maggiore redistribuzione della ricchezza prodotta. Ciò non avviene perché la piramide è rovesciata: il progressivo calo del reddito da lavoro comporta un aumento per chi già guadagna di più. È una vecchia legge del capitalismo, sempre più attuale: avrà di più chi ha già di più. Chi ha di meno oggi, ne avrà ancora meno domani.

      https://ilmanifesto.it/ilo

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport:


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

  • Ocular injuries caused by less-lethal weapons in France - The Lancet

    https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)31807-0/abstract

    Qui aurait dit qu’un jour Macron et Castaner fasse la une the The Lancet comme éborgneurs professionnels (et accessoirement arracheurs de mains).

    Since the introduction of so-called less-lethal weapons in France in the late 1990s, there has been no legal requirement to collect data on injuries induced by kinetic impact projectiles, and no epidemiological surveys have been planned. To estimate the number of patients with ocular injuries caused by the use of these defensive tools, a retrospective survey was sent to all ophthalmology department chairs in French university hospitals, which are where the most severe cases are managed. Demographic data, date of trauma, initial ophthalmological examination and any specialised investigations, initial and immediate surgical management of the injury, follow-up, and visual prognosis were documented and transmitted anonymously.

  • Continuous Influx of Eritrean Refugees Challenges Ethiopia

    Refugee and host communities in Ethiopia came together on June 20 to commemorate World Refugee Day through various cultural activities, organized within refugee camps as well as urban settings. But the reality behind the festivities is that hundreds of Eritrean refugees continue to cross the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia every day.

    Despite the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea, signed in July 2018, the internal situation and oppression of Eritrean people, mainly through the indefinite military service, remains intact. The continued inflow of young Eritreans fleeing oppression is putting strain on Ethiopia’s refugee camps.

    A senior official from the Ethiopian refugee agency has reported that Eritrean refugees continue to arrive in Ethiopia in large numbers, 250 to 300 persons a day. The increasing number of people residing in refugee camps is posing an enormous challenge for the Ethiopian Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affair (ARRA) as well as development and relief organizations working with refugees. “We have challenges of shelter, Core Relief Items (CRI), water and energy alternatives,” states the senior official. Earlier reports indicate that many young Eritreans currently flee due to the increase of raids, Giffas, to force them into the indefinite national service.

    It is not just Eritreans who are fleeing the country. According to the informed sources, around 5000 Somali refugees living in Eritrea are trying to reach Ethiopia in search of safety. Out of this group, more than 400 individuals have already arrived at Zalambessa, a border town between Ethiopia and Eritrea, where they are supported by Gulomokeda Wereda, a local administrative district of Tigray region.

    Ethiopia has introduced an open door approach and is currently hosting more than 915,000 refugees inside the country. Even though the Federal Government of Ethiopia has shifted its national legislation to give broader rights to refugees, including work permits, the strain on Ethiopian reception facilities is growing.

    Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has hosted a summit in Brussels in which migration and its management was high on the agenda. The external migration policies of the EU have been challenged this week by a group of organizations through a joint initiative.

    In the letter, addressed to the president of the European Council, organizations denounced migration policies and platforms such as the Khartoum Process through which the EU and several member states cooperate with regimes accused of systematic and severe human rights violations.

    Civil society actors have been mobilizing in the form of legal action, campaigns and protests in order to challenge the adverse effect on human rights, democracy and rule of law that the EU’s external policies are creating. The Foundation Human Rights for Eritreans has initiated a court case against the EU’s €20 million project supporting the Eritrean regime to build roads through a forced labour. Amnesty International and seven other NGOs have taken legal steps against France over the allegedly unlawful donation of boats to the Libyan coast guard. Also, a young Ethiopian asylum seeker has sued the UK’s Department for International Development for funding detention centres in Libya where refugees are exposed to human rights violations, torture and abuse.

    Furthermore, NGOs have legally challenged the blocking of rescue operations on the Mediterranean Sea; meanwhile, a German rescue boat captain Pia Klemp faces prosecution in Italy for her rescue work. A group of lawyers has submitted a document to the International Criminal Court, which calls for EU prosecution over migrant and refugee deaths as a result of EU policy.

    Meanwhile in the Greater Horn of Africa, citizens are raising their voice. Sudanese citizens have been demonstrating, first against the oppressive regime and now against the Transitional Military Council, and are calling for a democratic civilian government. A group of prominent African activists has written an open letter urging Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afwerki, to launch political reforms and to protect human rights of Eritrean people.

    This initiative was predictably dismissed by the regime. Nevertheless, diaspora and even activists within Eritrea are pushing for change through the #Enough and #Yiakil campaign demanding end of indefinite national service, slavery and human rights violations.

    If change is to happen, oppressive leaders and militia should be held accountable for their actions through empowerment of the people. As the letter to the president of the European Council highlights, the EU should support the people, rather than unaccountable external actors, by directing its policies and instruments towards this objective. [IDN-InDepthNews – 22 June 2019]

    https://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/the-world/africa/2770-continuous-influx-of-eritrean-refugees-challenges-ethiopia

    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Ethiopie #Erythrée #réfugiés_érythréens #passages #traversées

    Une news qui date de juin 2019, mais que je mets ici pour archivage, et notamment pour ces #statistiques #chiffres :

    A senior official from the Ethiopian refugee agency has reported that Eritrean refugees continue to arrive in Ethiopia in large numbers, 250 to 300 persons a day.

    J’ai trouvé ce chiffre aussi ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/808866

  • Les #paradis_fiscaux : visite guidée. Entretien avec #Gabriel_Zucman

    Quelles sommes sont cachées dans les paradis fiscaux ? Par qui ? Et comment ? À l’aide d’une méthodologie originale et de données jusqu’alors sous-exploitées, Gabriel Zucman apporte une lumière nouvelle et crue sur ces problèmes, en espérant que cela puisse aider à améliorer la lutte contre les paradis fiscaux.

    https://laviedesidees.fr/Les-paradis-fiscaux-visite-guidee.html
    #données #chiffres #statistiques #paradis_fiscal #Suisse

    –-> Un article de 2011, mais toujours utile d’avoir sous la main

  • Briefing: Behind the new refugee surge to the Greek islands

    “They told us, the young boys, to take a gun and go fight. Because of that I escaped from there [and] came here,” Mohammed, a 16-year-old from Ghazni province in Afghanistan, said while sitting in the entrance of a small, summer camping tent on the Greek island of Lesvos in early October.

    Nearby, across a narrow streambed, the din of voices rose from behind the barbed wire-topped fences surrounding Moria, Europe’s largest refugee camp.

    With the capacity to house around 3,000 people, the camp has long since spilled out of its walls, spreading into the olive groves on the surrounding hills, and is continuing to grow each day, with dangers of sickness and accidents set to increase in the winter months ahead.

    The population of the camp exploded this summer, from about 4,500 people in May to almost 14,000 by the end of October, reflecting a spike in the number of people crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey in recent months. So far this year, nearly 44,000 people have landed on the Greek islands, compared to around 32,500 in all of 2018.

    The increase is being led by Afghans, accounting for nearly 40 percent of arrivals, and Syrians, around 25 percent, and appears to be driven by worsening conflict and instability in their respective countries and increasingly hostile Turkish policies towards refugees.
    Isn’t it normal to see a surge this time of year?

    Arrivals to Greece usually peak in the summertime, when weather conditions are better for making the passage from the Turkish coast.

    But the increase this year has been “unprecedented”, according to Astrid Castelein, head of the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) office on Lesvos.

    Since the EU and Turkey signed an agreement in March 2016 aimed at stopping the flow of asylum seekers and migrants across the Aegean, arrivals to the Greek Islands during the summer have ranged from around 2,000 to just under 5,000 people per month.

    In July this year, arrivals rose to more than 5,000 and continued to climb to nearly 8,000 in August, before peaking at over 10,000 in September.

    These numbers are a far cry from the height of the European migration crisis in 2015, when over 850,000 people crossed the Aegean in 12 months and more than 5,000 often landed on the islands in a single day.

    Still, this year’s uptick has caused European leaders to warn about the potential that arrivals from Turkey could once again reach 2015 levels.
    What is Turkey threatening to do?

    Turkey hosts the largest refugee population in the world, at around four million people, including around 3.6 million Syrians.

    In recent months, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly threatened to “open the gates” of migration, using the spectre of increased refugee arrivals to try to pressure the EU to support controversial plans for “a safe zone” in northern Syria. He wielded it again to try to get EU leaders to dampen their criticism of the military offensive Turkey launched at the beginning of October, which had the stated aim of carving out the zone, as well as fending off a Kurdish-led militia it considers terrorists.

    But despite the rhetoric, apprehensions of asylum seekers and migrants trying to leave Turkey have increased along with arrivals to the Greek islands.

    Between the beginning of July and the end of September, the Turkish Coast Guard apprehended around 25,500 people attempting to cross the Aegean Sea, compared to around 8,600 in the previous three months.

    “This stark increase is in line with the increase in [the] number of people crossing the Eastern Mediterranean,” Simon Verduijn, a Middle East migration specialist with the Mixed Migration Centre, said via email. “The Turkish Coast Guard seems to monitor the Aegean seas very carefully.”

    “The situation has not changed,” Ali Hekmat, founder of the Afghan Refugees Association in Turkey, said, referring to the difficulty of crossing the sea without being apprehended, “but the number of boats increased.”
    Why are there so many Afghans?

    The spike in people trying to reach the Greek islands also coincides with an increase in the number of asylum seekers and migrants crossing into Turkey.

    “We’ve noticed a general… increase in movement across the country lately,” said Lanna Walsh, a spokesperson for the UN’s migration agency, IOM, in Turkey.

    So far this year, Turkish authorities have apprehended more than 330,000 people who irregularly entered the country, compared to just under 270,000 all of last year. Similar to the Greek islands, Afghans are crossing into Turkey in greater numbers than any other nationality, accounting for 44 percent of people who have been apprehended, following a spike in Afghan arrivals that started last year.

    “It’s not surprising that people see that they no longer have a future in Turkey.”

    2018 was the deadliest year for civilians in Afghanistan out of the past decade, and the violence has continued this year, crescendoing in recent months as peace talks between the United States and the Taliban gained momentum and then collapsed and the country held presidential elections. Afghanistan is now the world’s least peaceful country, trading places with Syria, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace, an Australia-based think tank that publishes an annual Global Peace Index.

    At the same time, options for Afghans seeking refuge outside the country have narrowed. Conditions for around three million Afghans living in Iran – many without legal status – have deteriorated, with US sanctions squeezing the economy and the Iranian government deporting people back to Afghanistan.

    Turkey has also carried out mass deportations of Afghans for the past two years, changes to the Turkish asylum system have made it extremely difficult for Afghans to access protection and services in the country, and legal routes out of the country – even for the most vulnerable – have dried up following deep cuts to the US refugee resettlement programme, according to independent migration consultant Izza Leghtas.

    “It’s not surprising that people see that they no longer have a future in Turkey,” Leghtas said.
    What do the refugees themselves say?

    The stories of Afghans who have made it to Lesvos reflect these difficult circumstances. Mohammed, the 16-year-old who fled Afghanistan because he didn’t want to fight, said that the Taliban had attacked the area near his home in Ghazni province. He decided to flee when local men who were fighting the Taliban told him and other young men to take up arms. “We just want to get [an] education… We want to live. We don’t want to fight,” he said.

    Mohammed went to Iran using his Afghan passport and then crossed the border into Turkey with the help of a smuggler, walking for about 14 hours before he reached a safe location inside the country. After about a month, he boarded an inflatable dinghy with other refugees and crossed from the Turkish coast to Lesvos. “There’s no way to live in Turkey,” he said when asked why he didn’t want to stay in the country. “If they found out that I am Afghan… the police arrest Afghan people who are refugees.”

    Ahmad, a 23-year-old Afghan asylum seeker also camping out in the olive groves at Moria, left Afghanistan three years ago because of tensions between ethnic groups in the country and because of Taliban violence. He spent two years in Iran, working illegally – “the government didn’t give us permission to work,” he said – before crossing into Turkey last year. He eventually found a job in Turkey and was able to save up enough money to come to Greece after struggling to register as an asylum seeker in Turkey.

    Ali, a 17-year-old Afghan asylum seeker, was born in Iran. Ali’s father was the only member of the family with a job and wasn’t earning enough money to cover the family’s expenses. Ali also wasn’t able to register for school in Iran, so he decided to come to Europe to continue his education. “I wanted to go to Afghanistan, but I heard that Afghanistan isn’t safe for students or anyone,” Ali said.
    Is pressure growing on Syrian refugees?

    UNHCR also noticed an increase in the proportion of Syrians arriving to the Greek islands in August and September compared to previous months, according to Castelein.

    Since July, human rights organisations have documented cases of Turkish authorities forcibly returning Syrians from Istanbul to Idlib, a rebel-held province in northwestern Syria, which has been the target of an intense bombing campaign by the Syrian government and its Russian allies since April. The Turkish government has denied that it is forcibly returning people to northwest Syria, which would be a violation of customary international law.

    “I left for safety – not to take a vacation – for safety, for a safe country that has work, that has hope, that life.”

    Tighter controls on residency permits, more police checks, and increased public hostility towards Syrians amidst an economic downturn in Turkey have also added to a climate of fear. “People that don’t have a kimlik (a Turkish identity card) aren’t leaving their houses. They’re afraid they’ll be sent back to Syria,” said Mustafa, a 22-year-old Syrian asylum seeker on Lesvos who asked that his name be changed.

    Until recently, Mustafa was living in the countryside of Damascus, Syria’s capital, in an area controlled by the Syrian government. His family was displaced early on in Syria’s more than eight and a half year civil war, but he decided to leave the country only now, after being called up for mandatory military service. “I didn’t know what to do. They want you to go fight in Idlib,” he said.

    Mustafa spent a month in Istanbul before crossing to Lesvos at the end of September. “I saw that the situation was terrible in Turkey, so I decided to come here,” he added. “I left for safety – not to take a vacation – for safety, for a safe country that has work, that has hope, that life.”
    How shaky is the EU-Turkey deal?

    The military campaign Turkey launched in the Kurdish-administered part of northeast Syria at the beginning of October displaced some 180,000 people, and around 106,000 have yet to return. Another 12,000 Syrians have crossed the border into Iraq.

    A ceasefire is now in place but the future of the region remains unclear, so it’s too early to tell what impact, if any, it will have on migration across the Aegean, according to Gerry Simpson, associate director of Human Rights Watch’s crisis and conflict division.

    But Turkey’s tightening residency restrictions, deportations, and talk of mass expulsions could, Simpson said, be a “game-changer” for the EU-Turkey deal, which is credited with reducing the number of people crossing the Aegean since March 2016.

    The agreement is based on the idea that Turkey is a safe third country for asylum seekers and migrants to be sent back to, a claim human rights groups have always taken issue with.

    In the more than three years since the deal was signed, fewer than 3,000 people have been returned from Greece to Turkey. But Greece’s new government, which came to power in July, has said it will speed up returns, sending 10,000 people back to Turkey by the end of 2020.

    “This idea that [Turkey] is a safe third country of asylum was never acceptable to begin with. Obviously, now we’ve seen [that] even more concretely with very well documented returns, not only of Syrians, but also of Afghans,” Leghtas, the migration consultant, said.

    “Whether that changes the two sides’ approach to the [EU-Turkey deal] is another matter because in practical terms… the only real effect of the [deal] has been to trap people on the islands,” Simpson added.

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/10/30/refugee-surge-Greek-islands
    #îles #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Grèce #Mer_Egée #réfugiés_afghans

    • Refugees trapped on Kos: An unspeakable crisis in reception conditions

      Hundreds of refugees are forced to live in boxes made out of cardboard and reed or makeshift sheds inside and outside of the Kos hotspot, in the utmost precarious and unsuitable conditions, without access to adequate medical and legal assistance. Since last April, the Kos hotspot, located on a hill at the village of Pyli, 15km outside of the city, is overcrowded, while the number of transfers of vulnerable refugees from the island to the mainland is significantly lower[1] compared to other islands, therefore creating an unbearable sense of entrapment for the refugees. RSA staff visited the island recently, spoke with refugees[2] living at the hotspot and visited the surrounding area. The images and testimonies cited in this document point out an unspeakable crisis in reception conditions.

      A former military camp in the village of Pyli serves as the Kos hotspot, despite intense protests residents; it started operating in March 2016 following the implementation of the toxic EU – Turkey Deal. According to official data, a place designed for a maximum occupancy of 816 people and 116 containers is now accommodating 3.734 people. Given the lack of any other accommodation structure on the island, the above number includes those living in makeshift sheds inside the hotspot as well as in crumbling abandoned buildings and tents outside of it. This severe overcrowding has led the authorities to use the Pre-removal Centre as an area for the stay for asylum-seekers– who are under restriction of their freedom of movement – including vulnerable individuals, women and families.

      According to UNHCR, the majority of asylum-seekers come from Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine and Iraq, while children make up for 27% of the entire population. This data points out that, despite the dominant opposite and unfounded rhetoric, most of the newcomers are refugees, coming from countries with high asylum recognition rates.

      “We are living like mice”

      Two large abandoned buildings stand outside the hotspot; they are accessible only through debris, trash and a “stream” of sewage. RSA met with refugees who live there and who described their wretched living conditions. “Here, we are living like mice. We are looking for cardboard boxes and reeds to make ourselves a place to sleep. At night, there is no electricity. You look for an empty space between others, you lay down and try to sleep”, says an English-speaking man from Cameroon, who has been living in one of these abandoned buildings for two months. It is an open space full of holes in the walls and a weathered roof of rusty iron[3].

      Cardboard rooms

      African refugees, men and women have found shelter in this utterly dangerous setting. They have made a slum with big cardboard rooms, one next to the other, where the entrance is not visible. As the refugees sleeping in this area mention, there is cement and plaster falling off of the roof all the time. A vulnerable female refugee from Africa described to us her justified fear that her living conditions expose her to further danger.

      “The police told us to go find somewhere to sleep, there is no room at the hotspot. I am scared in here among so many men, because there is no electricity and it gets dark at night. But, what can I do? There was no room for me inside”.

      A blanket for each person

      The situation for Afghan families living in rooms of the other abandoned building, a few meters away, is similar. “When we take our children to the doctor, he writes prescriptions and tells us to buy them by ourselves. No one has helped us. When we arrived, they gave only one blanket to each one of us. Us women, we don’t even have the basics for personal hygiene”, says a young Afghan who has been living here for a month with her daughter and her husband. “They give us 1.5lt of water every day and pasta or potatoes almost daily”, says a young Afghan.

      In that space we met with refugees who complain about snakes getting indoors, where people sleep. Many try to shut the holes in the abandoned buildings to deter serpents from entering and to protect themselves from the cold. “We shut the holes but it is impossible to protect ourselves, this building is falling apart, it is really dangerous”, says a man from Afghanistan.

      There are no toilets outside of the hotspot; a cement trough is used as a shower for men, women and children, along with a hose from the fields nearby. There, they collect water in buckets and take it to their sheds. Alongside the road leading to the hotspot, refugees are carrying on their shoulders mattresses they have found in the trash, to put them in their tents and sheds.

      According to UNHCR, following a request by the Reception and Identification Authority, 200 tents were donated to the hotspot. This said, the Authorities have yet to find an appropriate space to set them up.

      Unbearable conditions inside the hotspot

      At the moment, there is not really a “safe zone” for unaccompanied minors, despite the fact that there is a space that was designed for this purpose, as families seem to be living in UNHCR tents in that space. The area is not completely protected and according to reports adults, who use the hygiene facilities, can enter there.

      Due to the overcrowding, lodgings have been set up in almost every available space, whereas, according to testimonies, there are serious problems with electricity, water supply, sewage disposal and cleanliness. The refugees mention that there is only one public toilet for those not living in a container, lack of clothing, shoes and hygiene products. Some told us that they left the hotspot because of the conditions there, in search of a living space outside of it. Such is the case of a Syrian refugee with his son, who are sleeping in a small construction near the hotspot entrance. “I found two mattresses in the trash. It was so filthy inside and the smell was so unbearable that I couldn’t stand it. I was suffering of skin problems, both me and the child”, he says. Tens of other refugees are sleeping in parks and streets downtown and depend upon solidarity groups in order to attend to their basic needs.

      Several refugees told us that they are in search of ways to work, even for free, in order to be of use. “I want to do something, I can’t just sit around doing nothing, it is driving me crazy. Would you happen to know where I could be of help? They say they don’t need me at the hotspot, is there anything I could do for the town of Kos? Clean, help somehow?”, a young Palestinian asks.

      Inadequate access to medical care

      Refugees living in the hotspot point out the inadequate or non-existent medical care. “We queue up and, if we manage to get to a doctor, they tell us to drink water, a lot of water, and sometimes they give paracetamol. There is no doctor at night, not even for emergencies. If someone is sick, the police won’t even call an ambulance. Take a taxi, they tell us. The other day, my friend was sick with a high fever, we called a taxi, but because the taxi wouldn’t come to the hotspot entrance, we carried him down the road for the taxi to pick us up”, says a young refugee.

      According to reports, at this moment there is only one doctor at the hotspot and only one Arab-speaking interpreter among the National Public Health Organization (NPHO) staff; during the summer, because of the limited NHPO staff, there were serious delays in medical tests and vulnerability screenings. Also, Kos hospital is understaffed, with whatever the consequences might be for the locals and the refugees in need of medical care[4].

      Not having a Social Security Number makes things even worse for those in need of medication, as they have to pay the entire price to buy it. The amount of 90 EURO that they receive as asylum-seekers from the cash program (cash card), especially when they have a health issue, is not enough. Such is the testimony of a woman from Africa, living in one of the abandoned buildings outside the hotspot. “It is dangerous here, we are suffering. It is difficult in these conditions, with our health, if you go to the hospital, they won’t give you medication. They will write you a prescription and you will have to buy it with your own money”, she tells us.

      Problems with free access to medical care for the thousands of newcomers increased sharply since July 2019 because the Foreigner Health Card system did not work and the Minister of Labor revoked[5] the circular on granting a Social Security Number to asylum-seekers, since the matter has yet to be regulated.

      Under these circumstances, survivors of a shipwreck (caused by the Coast Guard ramming a refugee boat near Kos resulting in the death of a 3-year old boy and a man) were transferred last week. According to the press, the 19-year old mother of the child, a few hours after the shipwreck and while still in shock, grave mourning and exhaustion, was transferred to the Reception and Identification Centre in order to be registered.

      Repression and police brutality

      According to the testimonies of at least four refugees, their protests are mostly dealt with repression, while there are reports on use of police violence in these situations. “Every time there is an issue, we go to the police and tell them do something, you have to protect us. They tell us to go away and if we insist, they start yelling and, if we don’t leave, they beat us”, says a minor Afghan who is living in the hotspot with his family. “If we complain, no one listens to you. It is a waste of time and you risk getting in trouble”, a 41-year old man from Africa, who has been living for the past six months inside the hotspot in a shed made of cardboard boxes, explains to us. ”A month ago, when we had the first rain, people were complaining, but it did nothing other than the riot police coming over”, they are telling us.

      Huge delays in the asylum process

      Many of those we met have yet to receive the threefold document and still have no access to the cash program. Newcomers have only received their “Restriction of Freedom Decision”, valid for 25 days; several have told us that the information on the asylum process is incomplete and they are having difficulty understanding it. At the end of the 25 days, they usually receive a document titled “Service Note of Release” where there is mention of the geographical restriction on the island of Kos. Lately, a notification for the intention to claim asylum is required.

      According to reports, at the moment there is a large number of people whose asylum process has not advanced (backlog). “Some of us have been here for 4-6 months and we haven’t even had a pre-interview[6] or an interview yet”, says a woman from Cameroon who is living in the hotspot.

      Arrivals have particularly increased in the past months, while refugees arriving in smaller islands, such as Kalymnos, Symi, are transferred to the Kos and Leros hotspots. According to UNHCR, a recent transfer of refugees from Kos to the mainland took place on 6 October and concerned 16 individuals. [7]. Due to the fact that in Kos the geographic restriction was not usually lifted in the past months, hundreds of people are trapped in these extremely precarious conditions. This appears to be happening because of the delays in the asylum process and the lack of medical staff, resulting to vulnerable individuals not being identified, combined with the lack of available space in the mainland structures and the prioritization of other islands that have hotspots.

      In Kos, there is free legal aid by four lawyers in total (a Registry lawyer, Metadrasi, Greek Refugee Council, Arsis), while there is great lack of interpreters both in the hotspot and the local hospital.

      Lack of access to education

      With regard to the refugees children’s education, evening classes in the Refugee Reception and Education Centres (RREC) have yet to start. According to UNHCR data, more than 438 children of school and pre-school age – aged 5 to 17-years old – are living in the hotspot[8] .

      In total, 108 children attend the Centre of non-typical education (KEDU) of Arsis Organization near the hotspot, funded by UNHCR. Any educational activity inside the hotspot, take place as part of an unemployment program by the Manpower Employment Organization. According to reports, the kindergarten providing formal education that operated in the previous two years inside the hotspot under the Ministry of Education is now closed as safety reasons were invoked.

      Detention: bad conditions and detention of vulnerable individuals

      The Pre-removal Centre next to the hotspot, with a capacity of 474 people, is currently detaining 325 people. According to UNHCR observations, the main nationalities are Iraq, Cameroon, Egypt, Syria and Pakistan.

      According to reports, newcomers in nearby islands that are transferred to Kos are also detained there until they submit their asylum claim. Also, people who have violated the geographic restriction are also held there. Among the detainees, there are people who have not been subjected to reception procedures process due to shortcomings of the Reception and Identification Authority[9]. Characteristically, following his visit to Kos in August 2019, Philippe Leclerc, the UNHCR Representative in Greece, reported: “I also visited the pre-removal centre on Kos, which since May 2019 has broadly been used as a place for direct placement in detention, instead of reception, of asylum-seekers, including women and those with specific needs, some of whom without prior and sufficient medical or psychosocial screening, due to lack of enough personnel”.

      In the context of the pilot project implemented in Lesvos, even extremely vulnerable individuals are being detained, despite the fact that there is no doctor in the Pre-removal Centre. An African refugee with a serious condition told us “I was in the Pre-removal Centre for three and a half months. I almost collapsed. I showed them a document from my country’s hospital, where my condition is mentioned, I asked them for a doctor, but they brought a nurse. Now I sleep in a room made of cardboard and reed outside of the hotspot”.

      According to complaints by at least two people who have been detained at the Pre-removal Centre, the police broke the camera of their mobile phones, that resulted in the phones not functioning and them losing their contacts and the only means of communication with their families. “Inside the Pre-removal Centre we didn’t have access to a doctor nor to medication. There was a nurse, but we were receiving no help. Also, we didn’t have access to a lawyer. When we complained, they transferred us to another wing, but all the wings were in an equally bad condition. Many times those who complained were being taken to the police station”, says a 30-year old man from Gambia.

      https://rsaegean.org/en/refugees-trapped-on-kos

    • 800 migrants arrive in Greece within 48 hours, living conditions described as ’horrible’

      Migrant arrivals to Greece continue unabated: Nearly 800 migrants crossed from Turkey to Greece in just 48 hours this week, marking the highest pace of arrivals in 40 months. The Council of Europe during a visit to migrant camps on the Greek islands warned of an explosive situation and described living conditions there as ’horrible.’

      On Wednesday, the Greek coastguard registered the arrival of 790 migrants in just 48 hours. As state media reported, the migrants arrived by land and by sea on boats at Alexandropouli on the mainland and the islands of Samos and Farmakonisi.

      The country has not seen this many arrivals of migrants via sea since the EU-Turkey deal came into effect in March 2016. The number of migrants arriving in Greece in the first ten months of this year has already overshot last year’s figure of around 50,500.

      According to the latest UNHCR figures, 55,348 migrants have arrived, 43,683 of them by sea, between the start of 2019 and Sunday.

      Dramatic situation

      The surge has led to dramatic overcrowding in camps on the Greek Aegean islands, where the migrant population has more than doubled over the past six months, according to the German press agency dpa. Even before, the camps were packed at more than twice their capacity. Outbreaks of violence and fires at the EU-funded island camps have further escalated the situation.

      During a visit to Greek island camps on Wednesday, Dunja Mijatovic, the Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe, said she had witnessed people queuing for food or to use a bathroom for more than three hours at refugee camps for asylum seekers on the Greek islands of Lesbos, Samos and Corinth.

      “The people I have met are living in horrible conditions and in an unbearable limbo,” she said at a news briefing on Thursday; adding the migrants were struggling to cope with overcrowding, lack of shelter, poor hygiene conditions and substandard access to medical care.

      “I saw children with skin diseases not treated. I heard about no medications or drugs at all available to these people. No access to health, no proper access to health and many other things that are really quite shocking for Europe in the 21st century,” Mijatovic continued.

      Relocation

      To ease the overcrowding, the Greek government has already started relocating people to the mainland. Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced that 20,000 migrants would be moved by the end of the year. With the current resurgence of arrivals, however, decongestion is not in sight. Mijatovic urged the authorities to transfer asylum seekers from islands to the mainland as soon as possible. “It is an explosive situation”, she said. “This no longer has anything to do with the reception of asylum-seekers,” she said. “This has become a struggle for survival,” she concluded at the end of her visit.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/20526/800-migrants-arrive-in-greece-within-48-hours-living-conditions-descri

    • Sur l’île de #Samos, une poudrière pour des milliers d’exilés confinés à l’entrée de l’UE

      Avec 6 000 migrants pour 650 places, le camp grec de Samos est une poudrière ravagée par un incendie à la mi-octobre. Alors que la Grèce redevient la première porte d’entrée dans l’UE, autorités comme réfugiés alertent sur la catastrophe en cours. Reportage sur cette île, symptôme de la crise européenne de l’accueil.

      La ligne d’horizon se fond dans le ciel d’encre de Samos. L’île grecque des confins de l’Europe est isolée dans la nuit d’automne. Sur le flanc de la montagne qui surplombe la ville côtière de Vathy, des lumières blanches et orange illuminent un amas de blocs blancs d’où s’élèvent des voix. Elles résonnent loin dans les hauteurs de cyprès et d’oliviers, où s’égarent des centaines de tentes. Ces voix sont celles d’Afghans et de Syriens en majorité, d’Irakiens, de Camerounais, de Congolais, de Ghanéens… Pour moitié d’entre eux, ce sont des femmes et des enfants. Un monde au-dehors qui peine à s’endormir malgré l’heure tardive.

      À deux kilomètres des côtes turques, l’île de Samos (Grèce) est rejointe en Zodiac par les exilés. © Dessin Elisa Perrigueur

      Ils sont 6 000 à se serrer dans les conteneurs prévus pour 648 personnes, et la « jungle » alentour, dit-on ici. Ce camp est devenu une ville dans la ville. On y compte autant de migrants que d’habitants. « Samos est un petit paradis avec ce point cauchemardesque au milieu », résume Mohammed, Afghan qui foule ces pentes depuis un an. Les exilés sont arrivés illégalement au fil des mois en Zodiac, depuis la Turquie, à deux kilomètres. Surpeuplé, Vathy continue de se remplir de nouveaux venus débarqués avec des rêves d’Europe, peu à peu gagnés par la désillusion.

      À l’origine lieu de transit, le camp fut transformé en 2016 en « hotspot », l’un des cinq centres d’identification des îles Égéennes gérés par l’État grec et l’UE. Les migrants, invisibles sur le reste de l’île de Samos, sont désormais tous bloqués là le temps de leur demande d’asile, faute de places d’hébergement sur le continent grec, où le dispositif est débordé par 73 000 requêtes. Ils attendent leur premier entretien, parfois calé en 2022, coincés sur ce bout de terre de 35 000 habitants.

      Naveed Majedi, Afghan de 27 ans rencontré à Vathy. © Elisa Perrigueur
      Naveed Majedi, un Afghan de 27 ans, physique menu et yeux verts, évoque la sensation d’être enlisé dans un « piège » depuis sept mois qu’il s’est enregistré ici. « On est bloqués au milieu de l’eau. Je ne peux pas repartir en Afghanistan, avec les retours volontaires [proposés par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations de l’ONU – ndlr], c’est trop dangereux pour ma vie », déplore l’ancien traducteur pour la Force internationale d’assistance à la sécurité à Kaboul.

      Le camp implose, les « habitations » se négocient au noir. Naveed a payé sa tente 150 euros à un autre migrant en partance. Il peste contre « ces tranchées de déchets, ces toilettes peu nombreuses et immondes. La nourriture mauvaise et insuffisante ». Le jeune homme prend des photos en rafale, les partage avec ses proches pour montrer sa condition « inhumaine », dit-il. De même que l’organisation Médecins sans frontières (MSF) alerte : « On compte aujourd’hui le plus grand nombre de personnes dans le camp depuis 2016. La situation se détériore très vite. Le lieu est dangereux pour la santé physique et mentale. »

      Il n’existe qu’une échappatoire : un transfert pour Athènes en ferry avec un relogement à la clef, conditionné à l’obtention d’une « carte ouverte » (en fonction des disponibilités, de la nationalité, etc.). Depuis l’arrivée en juillet d’un premier ministre de droite, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, celles-ci sont octroyées en petit nombre.

      Se rêvant dans le prochain bateau, Naveed scrute avec obsession les rumeurs de transferts sur Facebook. « Il y a des nationalités prioritaires, comme les Syriens », croit-il. Les tensions entre communautés marquent le camp, qui s’est naturellement divisé par pays d’origine. « Il y a constamment des rixes, surtout entre des Afghans et des Syriens, admet Naveed. Les Africains souvent ne s’en mêlent pas. Nous, les Afghans, sommes mal perçus à cause de certains qui sont agressifs, on nous met dans le même sac. » Querelles politiques à propos du conflit syrien, embrouilles dans les files d’attente de repas, promiscuité trop intense… Nul ne sait précisément ce qui entraîne les flambées de colère. La dernière, sanglante, a traumatisé Samos.

      Le camp était une poudrière, alertaient ces derniers mois les acteurs de l’île dans l’indifférence. Le 14 octobre, Vathy a explosé. Dans la soirée, deux jeunes exilés ont été poignardés dans le centre-ville, vengeance d’une précédente rixe entre Syriens et Afghans au motif inconnu. En représailles, un incendie volontaire a ravagé 700 « habitations » du camp. L’état d’urgence a été déclaré. Les écoles ont fermé. Des centaines de migrants ont déserté le camp.

      L’Afghan Abdul Fatah, 43 ans, sa femme de 34 ans et leurs sept enfants ont quitté « par peur » leur conteneur pour dormir sur la promenade du front de mer. Les manifestations de migrants se sont multipliées devant les bureaux de l’asile. Des policiers sont arrivés en renfort et de nouvelles évacuations de migrants vers Athènes ont été programmées.

      Dans l’attente de ces transferts qui ne viennent pas, les migrants s’échappent quand ils le peuvent du camp infernal. Le jour, ils errent entre les maisons pâles du petit centre-ville, déambulent sur la baie, patientent dans les squares publics.

      « Nous ne sommes pas acceptés par tous. Un jour, j’ai voulu commander à dîner dans une taverne. La femme m’a répondu que je pouvais seulement prendre à emporter », relate Naveed, assis sur une place où trône le noble Lion de Samos. Un homme du camp à l’air triste sirote à côté une canette de bière. Une famille de réfugiés sort d’un supermarché les bras chargés : ils viennent de dépenser les 90 euros mensuels donnés par le Haut-Commissariat pour les réfugiés (HCR) dans l’échoppe où se mêlent les langues grecque, dari, arabe et français.

      D’autres migrants entament une longue marche vers les hauteurs de l’île. Ils se rendent à l’autre point de convergence des réfugiés : l’hôpital de Samos. Situé entre les villas silencieuses, l’établissement est pris d’assaut. Chaque jour entre 100 et 150 demandeurs s’y pressent espérant rencontrer un docteur, de ceux qui peuvent rédiger un rapport aidant à l’octroi d’un statut de « vulnérabilité » permettant d’obtenir plus facilement une « carte ouverte ».

      Samuel et Alice, un couple de Ghanéens ont mis des semaines à obtenir un rendez-vous avec le gynécologue de l’hôpital. © Elisa Perrigueur

      La « vulnérabilité » est théoriquement octroyée aux femmes enceintes, aux personnes atteintes de maladies graves, de problèmes psychiques. Le panel est flou, il y a des failles. Tous le savent, rappelle le Dr Fabio Giardina, le responsable des médecins. Certains exilés désespérés tentent de simuler des pathologies pour partir. « Un jour, on a transféré plusieurs personnes pour des cas de tuberculose ; les jours suivants, d’autres sont venues ici, nombreuses, en prétextant des symptômes, relate le médecin stoïque. On a également eu beaucoup de cas de simulations d’épilepsie. C’est très fatigant pour les médecins, stressés, qui perdent du temps et de l’argent pour traiter au détriment des vrais malades. Avec la nouvelle loi en préparation, plus sévère, ce système pourrait changer. »

      En neuf mois, l’établissement de 123 lits a comptabilisé quelque 12 000 consultations ambulatoires. Les pathologies graves constatées : quelques cas de tuberculose et de VIH. L’unique psychiatre a démissionné il y a quelques mois. Depuis un an et demi, deux postes de pédiatres sont vacants. « Le camp est une bombe à retardement, lâche le Dr Fabio Giardina. Si la population continue d’augmenter, on franchira la ligne rouge. »

      Dans le couloir où résonnent les plaintes, Samuel Kwabena Opoku, Ghanéen de 42 ans, est venu pour sa femme Alice enceinte de huit mois. Ils ont mis longtemps à obtenir ce rendez-vous, qui doit être pris avec le médecin du camp. « Nous, les Noirs, passons toujours au dernier plan, accuse-t-il. Une policière m’a lancé un jour : vous, les Africains [souvent venus de l’ouest du continent – ndlr], vous êtes des migrants économiques, vous n’avez rien à faire là. » Ils sont les plus nombreux parmi les déboutés.
      Le maire : « L’Europe doit nous aider »

      Samuel, lui, raconte être « menacé de mort au Ghana. Je devais reprendre la place de mon père, chef de tribu important. Pour cela, je devais sacrifier le premier de mes fils, eu avec mon autre femme. J’ai refusé ce crime rituel ». Son avocate française a déposé pour le couple une requête d’urgence, acceptée, devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Arrivés à Samos en août, Samuel et Alice ont vu le gynécologue, débordé, en octobre pour la première fois. L’hôpital a enregistré 213 naissances sur l’île en 2019, dont 88 parmi la population migrante.

      Des ONG internationales suisses, françaises, allemandes sillonnent l’institution, aident aux traductions, mais ne sont qu’une quinzaine sur l’île. « Nous sommes déconnectées des autorités locales qui communiquent peu et sommes sans arrêt contrôlées, déplore Domitille Nicolet, de l’association Avocats sans frontières. Une situation que nous voulons dénoncer mais peu de médias s’intéressent à ce qui se passe ici. »

      Une partie de la « jungle » du camp de Vathy, non accessible aux journalistes ni aux ONG. © Elisa Perrigueur

      Chryssa Solomonidou, habitante de l’île depuis 1986 qui donne des cours de grec aux exilés, est en lien avec ces groupes humanitaires souvent arrivés ces dernières années. « Les migrants et ONG ont rajeuni la ville, les 15-35 ans étaient partis à cause de la crise », relate-t-elle. Se tenant droite dans son chemisier colorée au comptoir d’un bar cossu, elle remarque des policiers anti-émeute attablés devant leurs cafés frappés. Eux aussi sont les nouveaux visages de cette ville « où tout le monde se connaissait », souligne Chryssa Solomonidou. En grand nombre, ils remplissent tous les hôtels aux façades en travaux après une saison estivale.

      « J’ai le cœur toujours serré devant cette situation de misère où ces gens vivent dehors et nous dans nos maisons. C’est devenu ici le premier sujet de conversation », angoisse Chryssa. Cette maman a assisté, désemparée, à la rapide montée des ressentiments, de l’apparition de deux univers étrangers qui se croisent sans se parler. « Il y a des rumeurs sur les agressions, les maladies, etc. Une commerçante vendait des tee-shirts en promotion pour 20 euros. À trois hommes noirs qui sont arrivés, elle a menti : “Désolée, on ferme.” Elle ne voulait pas qu’ils les essayent par peur des microbes », se souvient Chryssa.

      Il y a aussi eu cette professeure, ajoute-t-elle, « poursuivie en justice par des parents d’élèves » parce qu’elle voulait faire venir des migrants dans sa classe, ce que ces derniers refusaient. L’enseignante s’est retrouvée au tribunal pour avoir appelé les enfants à ignorer « la xénophobie » de leurs aînés. « Ce n’est pas aux migrants qu’il faut en vouloir, mais aux autorités, à l’Europe, qui nous a oubliés », déplore Chryssa.

      « L’UE doit nous aider, nous devons rouvrir les frontières [européennes – ndlr] comme en 2015 et répartir les réfugiés », prône Giorgos Stantzos, le nouveau maire de Vathy (sans étiquette). Mais le gouvernement de Mitsotakis prépare une nouvelle loi sur l’immigration et a annoncé des mesures plus sévères que son prédécesseur de gauche Syriza, comme le renvoi de 10 000 migrants en Turquie.

      Des centaines de migrants ont embarqué sur un ferry le 21 octobre, direction Athènes. © Elisa Perrigueur

      Les termes de l’accord controversé signé en mars 2016 entre Ankara et l’UE ne s’appliquent pas dans les faits. Alors que les arrivées en Grèce se poursuivent, la Turquie affirme que seuls 3 des 6 milliards d’euros dus par l’Europe en échange de la limitation des départs illégaux de ses côtes auraient été versés. Le président turc Erdogan a de nouveau menacé au cours d’un discours le 24 octobre « d’envoyer 3,6 millions de migrants en Europe » si celle-ci essayait « de présenter [son] opération [offensive contre les Kurdes en Syrie – ndlr] comme une invasion ».

      À Samos, où les avions militaires turcs fendent régulièrement le ciel, ce chantage résonne plus qu’ailleurs. « Le moment est très critique. Le problème, ce n’est pas l’arrivée des familles qui sont réfugiées et n’ont pas le choix, mais les hommes seuls. Il n’y a pas de problèmes avec les habitants mais entre eux », estime la municipalité. Celle-ci « n’intervient pas dans le camp, nous ne logeons pas les réfugiés même après les incendies, ce n’est pas notre job ».

      L’édile Giorgos Stantzos multiplie les déclarations sur Samos, trop éclipsée médiatiquement, selon les locaux, par la médiatisation, légitime, de l’île de Lesbos et de son camp bondé, avec 13 000 migrants. Au cours d’un rassemblement appelé le 21 octobre, Giorgos Stantzos a pris la parole avec les popes sur le parvis de la mairie de Samos. « Nous sommes trop d’êtres humains ici […], notre santé publique est en danger », a-t-il martelé sous les applaudissements de quelques milliers d’habitants.

      La municipalité attend toujours la « solution d’urgence » proposée par l’État grec et l’UE. Bientôt, un nouveau camp devrait naître, loin des villes et des regards. Un mastodonte de 300 conteneurs, d’une capacité de 1 000 à 1 500 places, cernés de grillages de l’OTAN, avec « toutes les facilités à l’intérieur : médecins, supermarchés, électricité, etc. », décrypte une source gouvernementale. Les conteneurs doivent être livrés mi-novembre et le camp devrait être effectif à la fin de l’année. « Et le gouvernement nous a assuré qu’il organiserait des transferts de migrants vers le continent toutes les semaines d’ici la fin novembre pour désengorger Samos », précise le maire Giorgos Stantzos.

      Sur les quais du port, le soir du 21 octobre, près de 700 Afghans, Syriens, Camerounais, Irakiens… ont souri dans le noir à l’arrivée du ferry de l’État aux lumières aveuglantes. Après s’y être engouffrés sans regret, ils ont fait escale au port du Pirée et voulu rejoindre des hébergements réquisitionnés aux quatre coins du continent. Quelque 380 passagers de ce convoi ont été conduits en bus dans le nord de la Grèce. Eux qui espéraient tant de cette nouvelle étape ont dû faire demi-tour sous les huées de villageois grecs : « Fermez les frontières », « Chassez les clandestins ».

      Boîte noire :

      L’actuel camp de conteneurs de Vathy, entouré de barbelés, n’est accessible qu’avec l’autorisation du gouvernement, et il est donc uniquement possible de se rendre dans la « jungle » de tentes alentour.

      Dès le 10 octobre, nous avons formulé des demandes d’interviews avec le secrétaire de la politique migratoire, Giorgos Koumoutsakos (ou un représentant de son cabinet), la responsable du « hotspot » de Samos et/ou un représentant de l’EASO, bureau européen de l’asile. Le 15 octobre, nous avons reçu une réponse négative, après les « graves incidents » de la veille. Nous avons réitéré cette demande les 20 et 23 octobre, au cours de notre reportage à Samos. Avec un nouveau refus des autorités grecques à la clef, qui évoquent une « situation trop tendue » sur les îles.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/311019/sur-l-ile-de-samos-une-poudriere-pour-des-milliers-d-exiles-confines-l-ent

  • Arbeit ohne Ende, Drohungen, soziale Isolation und das alles für einen Hungerlohn – moderne Sklaven gibt es auch in der Schweiz

    Opfer von Menschenhandel werden in der Schweiz nicht nur als Prostituierte ausgebeutet. Sie arbeiten auch als Gipser, Küchenhilfen oder Pflegende. Doch ihr Leid wird kaum entdeckt.

    Er hauste in der Vorratskammer, kochte und putzte bis zu 14 Stunden am Tag – ein Jahr lang. Dann wurde die Berner Fremdenpolizei per Zufall auf den jungen Chinesen aufmerksam. Er war in die Schweiz gekommen, um an einer Hotelfachschule zu studieren. Dort fing er aber nie an. Stattdessen musste er in einem asiatischen Restaurant arbeiten. Er war völlig isoliert und bekam einen Hungerlohn.

    Moderne Sklaverei nimmt viele Formen an. Bekannt sind vor allem Fälle, bei denen Frauen unter Drohungen in die Schweiz gebracht und zur Prostitution gezwungen werden. Die wenigsten wissen, dass Menschenhandel auch auf dem Bau, in Haushalten oder in Restaurants existiert. «Was, das passiert hier bei uns? Das kann doch nicht sein!» Sätze wie diese bekommt Alexander Ott, der Chef der Berner Fremdenpolizei oft zu hören. Das habe auch damit zu tun, dass falsche Vorstellungen kursierten, wie ein Opfer von Menschenhandel aussehe, sagt er. «Die meisten Leute erwarten eine ausgemergelte Frau mit lauter blauen Flecken.» In Wirklichkeit sieht man den Opfern oft nicht an, was sie durchmachen müssen.
    Kaum Opferberatungen für Männer

    Der Bundesrat bezeichnet den Menschenhandel zwecks Arbeitsausbeutung als «wenig bekanntes und vermutlich unterschätztes Phänomen». Wie viele Opfer es in der Schweiz gibt, ist nicht bekannt. Das Gleiche gilt auch für die Opfer sexueller Ausbeutung, obwohl sie häufiger entdeckt werden. Die kantonalen Opferberatungsstellen und die Fachstelle für Frauenhandel und Frauenmigration (FIZ) haben letztes Jahr zusammen rund 360 Personen im Zusammenhang mit Menschenhandel beraten. Die Dunkelziffer dürfte deutlich höher sein.

    Opfer von Menschenhandel suchen selten selbst Hilfe. Ohne gezielte Kontrollen durch Polizei und andere Behörden kommen die Fälle daher kaum ans Licht. Während die Polizei im Milieu seit Jahren gezielt nach Opfern sexueller Ausbeutung sucht, hat sie die Arbeitsausbeutung noch zu wenig auf dem Radar. «Wir haben erst vor kurzem angefangen, Schwarzarbeiter auch als potenzielle Opfer von Menschenhandel zu sehen», erklärt Ott.

    Bisher waren die meisten Opfer, die entdeckt wurden, Frauen. Doch nun zeigt sich, dass auch viele Männer ausgebeutet werden. Während es für Frauen die Opferfachstelle FIZ gibt, fehlen Beratungsangebote und Unterbringungsmöglichkeiten für Männer. «Das ist ein Riesenproblem», sagt Ott. Beratungsstellen sind zentral, weil die Opfer ihre Situation zu Beginn oft schlecht einordnen können. Sie brauchen Bedenkzeit, bis sie sich entscheiden, vor Gericht auszusagen. Viele vertrauen den Behörden nicht, manche schämen sich für ihre Situation. Ohne ihre Aussage kommt es jedoch oft zu keinem Urteil gegen die Täter, denn Sachbeweise reichen meist nicht. «Ohne Opferschutz kein Prozess gegen die Täter», fasst Ott zusammen.
    Schläge, kein Lohn und 24 Stunden Bereitschaft

    Die FIZ nimmt vereinzelt auch Männer auf. Doch eigentlich ist ihr Angebot spezifisch auf Frauen ausgerichtet. Die meisten sind Opfer von Menschenhandel zwecks sexueller Ausbeutung. Mittlerweile kommen laut Eva Andonie von der FIZ aber auch immer mehr Fälle von Arbeitsausbeutung ans Licht. Meist handle es sich um Frauen, die in Privathaushalten ausgebeutet werden: «Sie müssen rund um die Uhr verfügbar sein, um sich um Kinder oder ältere Leute zu kümmern oder zu putzen.»

    Das hat auch Elena* erlebt. Die 20-Jährige lebte mit ihrer Tochter in armen Verhältnissen in einem Land in Osteuropa. Ihre Mutter stellte den Kontakt zu einer Familie in der Schweiz her, wo Elena im Haushalt arbeiten und sich um die Kinder kümmern sollte. Ihr wurden nicht nur Kost und Logis, sondern auch viel Geld versprochen. Als sie in der Schweiz ankam, nahm ihr die Familie den Pass ab und zwang sie, fast rund um die Uhr zu arbeiten. Lohn erhielt sie keinen, sie wurde regelmässig geschlagen. Als einem Nachbarn auffiel, dass Elena Spuren von Misshandlungen aufwies, brachte er sie zur Polizei. Diese ermittelte anfangs nur wegen Körperverletzung, verwies Elena aber an die FIZ. In den Gesprächen mit der Fachstelle erzählte die junge Frau, was sie durchmachen musste. Es kam zu einer Gerichtsverhandlung, und das Täterpaar wurde wegen Menschenhandels verurteilt.
    Nicht überall wird Opfern gleich gut geholfen

    Anfang Oktober hat eine Expertengruppe des Europarats die Schweiz in einem Bericht kritisiert. Sie hatte untersucht, wie Menschenhandel hierzulande geahndet wird und welche Möglichkeiten den Opfern geboten werden. Die Experten stellen zwar fest, dass es in den letzten Jahren Fortschritte gab. Trotzdem bemängeln sie, die Schweiz tue noch immer nicht genug, um Opfer zu identifizieren, insbesondere bei der Arbeitsausbeutung. Und es gebe grosse kantonale Unterschiede: Nicht überall werde gleich viel getan, um Betroffenen zu helfen.

    Der Bund setzt derzeit den zweiten Aktionsplan gegen Menschenhandel um. Die Zusammenarbeit verschiedener Stellen wurde intensiviert, medizinisches Personal und Arbeitsinspektoren wurden geschult. Ott und seine Kollegen bei der Fremdenpolizei ziehen mittlerweile immer andere Stellen mit ein, wenn sie einen Betrieb kontrollieren – beispielsweise Arbeitsinspektoren oder die Kantonspolizei. «Jede Behörde achtet auf andere Faktoren. Die müssen wir kombinieren, damit wir Opfer von Menschenhandel identifizieren können.»

    Es kann sein, dass Papiere und Lohn eines Betroffenen auf den ersten Blick stimmen, er aber alles Geld an seinen Arbeitgeber abtreten muss. Das sei nicht leicht zu entdecken. Die Zusammenarbeit sei auch deshalb wichtig, weil das föderale System der Schweiz von den Tätern leicht ausgenutzt werden könne: «Sie gehen einfach in einen anderen Kanton oder wechseln die Branche – so verschwinden sie leicht vom Radar.»
    Opfer aus Osteuropa, Asien oder Südamerika

    2016 hat die Universität Neuenburg in einer ersten Studie untersucht, in welchen Branchen Arbeitsausbeutung häufig vorkommt und woher die Opfer stammen. Dabei stellten die Forscher klare Muster fest: Im Baugewerbe sind fast nur Männer aus Osteuropa oder dem Balkan betroffen. Ähnlich ist es in der Landwirtschaft. In der Gastronomie sind es Frauen und Männer, viele stammen aus Asien. Frauen, die im Haushalt ausgebeutet werden, stammen derweil oft aus Südamerika oder Afrika.

    Gerade im Pflegebereich müsse in Zukunft stärker kontrolliert werden, findet Polizeichef Ott. Das sei jedoch schwierig, weil illegal in Haushalten Arbeitende schwer zu entdecken seien. Wichtig sei es auch, sich nicht nur auf die bekannten Problembranchen zu fokussieren. So gebe es beispielsweise zunehmend Hinweise auf Ausbeutung bei Paketzustellern.

    Hinter Menschenhandel müssen keine internationalen Verbrechernetzwerke stehen. Es gibt auch Einzelpersonen, die Menschen mit Inseraten in die Schweiz locken, um sie auszubeuten. Oft kommen die Täter aus demselben Land wie ihre Opfer. Ott weiss aber auch von einem Fall, in dem ein Schweizer Bauer seinen Saisonarbeitern nur einen Hungerlohn bezahlte. Sie schliefen im Auto neben dem Feld. Die Polizei wurde auf sie aufmerksam, doch ein Prozess kam nicht zustande.
    Manche willigen zuerst ein, für einen Hungerlohn zu schuften

    Viele Opfer haben einen ungesicherten Aufenthaltsstatus und sind in einer prekären finanziellen Situation. Dadurch werden sie vom Ausbeuter abhängig. Andonie und Ott sagen beide, es gebe einen grossen Graubereich. Nicht immer ist klar, ob die Täter oder Täterinnen ihre Opfer gezwungen haben. «Manche Opfer willigen zu Beginn auch ein, für einen schlechten Lohn zu arbeiten, weil sie keine Alternative sehen.» Erst später werde dann psychischer Druck auf sie ausgeübt, womit die Ausbeutung offensichtlich werde. Ott ergänzt, oft hätten die Betroffenen in ihrer Heimat kaum Perspektiven. Da nähmen sie jede noch so schlechte Arbeit an. Gleichzeitig sähen sich gerade Männer oft selbst nicht als Opfer. «Das macht es für die Täter einfacher und für uns umso schwieriger».

    In der Schweiz gibt es nur wenige Verurteilungen wegen Menschenhandels. Oft ist die Beweislage schwierig – gerade, wenn keine sexuelle Ausbeutung vorliegt. Laut einer Studie des Kompetenzzentrums für Menschenrechte, die im Mai erschienen ist, kam es in der Schweiz bisher nur in sechs Fällen zu einer Verurteilung wegen Menschenhandels zwecks Arbeitsausbeutung. Die Autoren kamen zum Schluss, dass die mangelnde juristische Definition des Begriffs «Arbeitsausbeutung» problematisch ist. Dies führe dazu, dass ähnliche Fälle unterschiedlich beurteilt würden.
    Fehlt ein Straftatbestand?

    Runa Meier ist Staatsanwältin in Zürich und spezialisiert auf Menschenhandel. Sie sagt: «Weil es in diesem Bereich bis heute so wenige Urteile gibt, fehlt es an der Rechtsprechung, an der sich die Strafverfolgungsbehörden orientieren könnten.» Derzeit sind bei der Staatsanwaltschaft Zürich mehrere Fälle hängig, in denen einem Verdacht auf Arbeitsausbeutung nachgegangen wird.

    Für ein Urteil wegen Menschenhandels muss man beweisen können, dass der Täter einen Menschen angeworben hat, um dessen Arbeitskraft auszubeuten. «Das ist extrem schwierig», erklärt Meier. Bei der sexuellen Ausbeutung gibt es zusätzlich den Straftatbestand der Förderung der Prostitution. «So kann ein Täter trotzdem bestraft werden, wenn für Menschenhandel die Beweise fehlen», sagt Meier. Bei der Arbeitsausbeutung fehlt eine vergleichbare gesetzliche Regelung. Es kann höchstens auf Wucher plädiert werden. Darum wird derzeit diskutiert, ob ein neuer Tatbestand geschaffen werden soll. Doch selbst damit wären nicht alle Probleme gelöst: «Am Ende sind wir auf die Aussagen des Opfers angewiesen, um eine Verurteilung zu erreichen.» Diese zu bekommen, bleibt die zentrale Herausforderung.

    https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/menschenhandel-moderne-sklaven-sind-zum-schuften-in-der-schweiz-ld.1516008?mktci

    #esclavage #esclavage_moderne #travail #exploitation #Suisse #impuntié #justice #chiffres #statistiques #migrations #femmes #hommes #traite_d'êtres_humains

    ping @reka

  • Italy presents plan to accelerate expulsion of migrants

    Italy presented a scheme on Friday to accelerate the expulsion of migrants who have no right to stay in the country, cutting the time it takes to decide on whether an asylum seeker must return home.

    Immigration flows helped fuel the rise of Italy’s far-right League party, whose leader Matteo Salvini imposed a crackdown on arrivals while he was interior minister until August.

    Salvini closed Italy’s ports to migrant rescue ships, threatening the charities operating them with fines of up to 1 million euros ($1.10 million) if they tried to dock.

    After the League unexpectedly quit the government in a failed bid to trigger an early election, its former ally the 5-Star Movement formed a coalition with the center-left Democratic Party, ushering in a less aggressive approach to immigration.

    The new government has already agreed with four other EU states a scheme to distribute people saved in the Mediterranean, and it hopes its plan to send back those already in Italy will defuse accusations by Salvini that it is soft on immigration.

    “I do not believe that redistributing migrants to other European countries is the final solution”, 5-Star leader and Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio told a news conference.

    Under the new decree, the time to examine asylum requests of migrants who come from a list of 13 “safe” European and African countries, including Tunisia and Albania, will be reduced from two years to four months.

    If the request is rejected, the expulsion procedure will be immediately triggered.

    “More than one third of those who arrived in Italy in 2019 comes from these countries,” Di Maio said.

    Fewer than 8,000 migrants came to Italy by sea in 2019, down 62% from 2018 and down 92% compared to 2017, official data show. However, expulsions fell far short of Salvini’s electoral promises.

    The League leader said he would repatriate 100,000 migrants in his first year in power, followed by another 400,000 during the rest of his five-year term in office, but Interior Minister Luciana Lamorgese told parliament this month that only 5,244 people had been repatriated this year up to Sept 22.

    Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte welcomed the new plan as “a great step forward” and said he was confident it would produce more rapid repatriations.

    “Italy has always been inefficient in this,” Conte said.

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy-expulsion/italy-presents-plan-to-accelerate-expulsion-of-migrants-idUSKBN1WJ1YH
    #Italie #expulsions #migrations #réfugiés #machine_à_expulser #sans-papiers #déboutés #renvois

    • Analyse de Matteo Villa sur twitter

      Oggi l’Italia ha varato una lista di 13 paesi considerati sicuri.

      Non significa che sarà più semplice rimpatriare, ma che aumenteranno ulteriormente gli stranieri irregolari presenti in Italia.

      Seguitemi, ve lo spiego.

      Cos’è successo.

      Con un decreto interministeriale è stata varata una lista di 13 paesi (NON “porti”, come è stato detto) considerati sicuri.

      L’azione è consentita dal #DecretoSicurezza (oggi legge), varato dal precedente Governo a ottobre dell’anno scorso.

      Quali sono i 13 paesi che sono stati designati come “sicuri”?

      Tutti quelli dei Balcani occidentali, l’Ucraina, e alcuni paesi dell’Africa settentrionale e subsahariana.

      Li trovate in arancione su questa mappa (il giallo ve lo spiego tra poco).

      Tra i paesi dell’Unione europea, altri 12 hanno una loro lista di “paesi sicuri”.
      Li trovate in blu scuro in questa carta.

      Oggi, il tredicesimo diventa l’Italia.

      Insomma, siamo in buona compagnia.

      Tornando alla carta del mondo, in arancione ho indicato i 13 paesi extra-europei designati come sicuri dall’Italia.

      In giallo, invece, trovate tutti i paesi designati come sicuri da almeno un altro paese UE, ma non da noi.

      Poteva andare molto peggio (Turchia, Nigeria, Etiopia).

      Cosa succede se designi un paese come sicuro?

      Chi chiede asilo in Italia possedendo la nazionalità di uno dei «paesi sicuri» avrà davanti a sé molti più ostacoli.

      Di fatto, aumenterà ulteriormente il tasso di diniego delle protezioni.

      La conseguenza? Aumentano gli irregolari.

      L’aumento degli irregolari sarà probabilmente piccolo rispetto all’effetto dell’abolizione della protezione umanitaria nel 2018.

      Ma andrà a complicare una situazione già molto precaria, anziché regolarizzare parte di chi oggi è qui e qui resterà.

      https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/i-nuovi-irregolari-italia-21812

      Sì, ma i rimpatri?

      Sul fronte dei rimpatri, designare un paese come sicuro non cambia nulla.

      Se un paese terzo già collaborava con noi (per es.,
      🇹🇳
      Tunisia), continuerà a farlo.

      Se un paese terzo non collaborava (per es.,
      🇬🇭
      Ghana), continuerà a non farlo.

      Del resto, se c’entrassero in qualche modo i rimpatri sorgerebbe spontanea una domanda: perché includere nella lista dei «sicuri» paesi che, in media, hanno già un tasso di rimpatrio superiore rispetto a quelli esclusi dalla lista?

      La realtà è una: convincere i paesi dell’Africa subsahariana a collaborare sui rimpatri è difficile.

      L’Italia ha tassi in linea con quelli di altri grandi paesi, come Francia e Germania, che hanno «leve» (legami post-coloniali, commercio, aiuti) ben maggiori delle nostre.

      CONCLUSIONE.

      La lista di «paesi sicuri»:

      ☑️
      è consentita da un decreto adottato dal precedente governo;
      ☑️
      aumenterà il numero degli stranieri irregolari presenti in Italia;
      ☑️
      non avrà alcun effetto sui rimpatri.

      https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1180135437358243840?s=19
      #cartographie #visualisation #pays_sûrs #clandestinisation #illégalisation #statistiques #chiffres #Matteo_Villa

  • Quelques documents sur la question de la #pauvreté à #Grenoble (contributions supplémentaires bienvenues...)

    Grenoble-Alpes Métropole : des signes de précarité urbaine dans les plus grandes communes
    https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1285701

    Pauvreté et revenus dans les quartiers prioritaires de la ville de la Métro
    https://www.ades-grenoble.org/wordpress/2017/09/08/pauvrete-et-revenus-dans-les-quartiers-prioritaires-de-la-ville-de-la

    Comparateur de territoire. Commune de Grenoble (38185)
    https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1405599?geo=COM-38185

    Cahier thématique #économie et #emploi du Réseau des observatoires de l’agglomération grenobloise :
    http://www.alpesolidaires.org/files/cahierthematique-economieweb.pdf

    #inégalités #précarité #statistiques #chiffres #cartographie #visualisation

  • Gli arrivi di #migranti in Friuli Venezia Giulia sono stati 5526 nel 2019, poco meno degli sbarchi al sud (circa 7000). Dato reso noto nell’audizione dei prefetti al Consiglio Regionale. Numeri dell’accoglienza in calo grazie ai trasferimenti nel resto d’Italia.
    Ogni settimana arrivano tra i 150 e i 300 migranti attraverso il confine orientale. Le pattuglie miste per ora sono un flop: solo 40 i rintracci in Slovenia dal primo luglio. Provengono perlopiù da Pachistan e Afganistan. A 6 su 10 la commissione nega ogni tipo di protezione.
    I tempi sono un problema: un anno per attendere la decisione della commissione, due per aspettare la decisione del tribunale sul ricorso in caso di diniego. Altro limite: lente le procedure di trasferimento all’estero dei dublinanti (sono 700).

    #Friuli_Venezia_Giulia #statistiques #asile #migrations #réfugiés #chiffres #route_des_balcans #Italie #2019 #frontières #frontière_sud-alpine

    Des chiffres importants, malgré la #militarisation_des_frontières et la constitution de #patrouilles_mixtes (italienne et slovène) de gardes-frontière :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/791706

    ping @isskein

  • Fewer asylum seekers paid welfare benefits in Germany

    The number of asylum seekers receiving benefits decreased considerably in 2018. According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, the number went down by 12%.

    A total of 411,000 asylum seekers were making use of asylum benefits by the end of 2018 — 58,000 fewer people than was the case at the end of 2017. In 2015, at the height of the so-called refugee crisis, those receiving asylum benefit had reached nearly a million.

    In addition to fewer recipients, the overall expenses incurred by the government in relation to asylum seekers’ benefit also declined. Germany spent less than 4.87 billion euros on asylum seekers in 2018, which marks a fall of 17% in total. Furthermore, the state also benefited from recouping over 200 million euros in refunded benefits which had previously been distributed.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/19538/fewer-asylum-seekers-paid-welfare-benefits-in-germany
    #welfare_state #Allemagne #réfugiés #asile #migrations #statistiques #chiffres #Etat_providence #coût #bénéfice #économie

    ping @_kg_

  • ’Updata-ing’ the narrative about African migration

    Migration has become a staple of the news in many countries, filled with images of desperate Africans fleeing an impoverished continent, poised to descend on the West. These reports are not necessarily false, and they can be valuable in highlighting the human stories of migration but they are not a good basis for helpful action.

    Politicians push myths and half-truths to score points but policymakers interested in addressing the complex issues around migration need data that can help them understand who, where, and why and therefore what an appropriate and targeted response might look like. Surely migration is not the same in Malawi and Morocco?

    In addition to official figures, one source of useful data is ordinary Africans – the source, after all, of all African migration. In its Round 7 public-attitude surveys (2016/2018), the research network Afrobarometer asked more than 45,000 Africans in 34 countries how they see and think about migration.

    Engaging with the data and scratching beneath the surface of existing narratives are essential if we are to move beyond ’stronger borders’ and other simplistic, one-size-fits-all ’solutions’. While statistical data help to reposition the discussion on migration and to cool down debates about ’mass migration’, perception data contribute to understanding intentions and motivations. Together they form a strong basis for informing areas for policy action.

    This co-authored research paper showcases the main findings of Afrobarometer research and the latest facts and figures of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation report “Africa’s youth: jobs or migration?”

    http://afrobarometer.org/fr/publications/updata-ing-narrative-about-african-migration

    #Rapport en pdf:
    http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publications%20conjointes/partenaires/afrobarometer-moibrahim-updata-ing-the-narrative-about-african-migrat

    #émigration #chiffes #statistiques #migrations #réfugiés #Afrique #émigration #cartographie #visualisation

  • Moins de 5% des besoins mondiaux pour la réinstallation de réfugiés satisfaits en #2018 (#HCR)

    De nouvelles statistiques publiées par l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), indiquent que malgré un niveau sans précédent de déplacements forcés à travers le monde, seulement 4,7% des besoins mondiaux en matière de réinstallation de réfugiés ont été satisfaits en 2018.

    Selon les statistiques publiées ce mois-ci sur les départs facilités par le HCR vers des pays de réinstallation et parmi 1,2 million de réfugiés qui en avaient besoin en 2018, seuls 55.692 d’entre eux ont été effectivement réinstallés.

    La majorité des départs facilités par le HCR vers des pays de réinstallation se sont effectués depuis les principaux pays d’accueil de réfugiés, dont le Liban (9.800), la Turquie (9.000), la Jordanie (5.100) et l’Ouganda (4.000).

    Sur un total de 81.310 personnes dont la candidature avait été recommandée, la majorité des réfugiés qui avaient besoin d’être réinstallés étaient originaires de Syrie (28.200), de République démocratique du Congo (21.800), d’Érythrée (4.300) et d’Afghanistan (4.000).

    L’année dernière, 68% des dossiers de candidature pour la réinstallation concernaient des survivants de violences et de torture, des personnes ayant besoin de protection juridique et physique ainsi que des femmes et des jeunes filles dont la vie était menacée. Plus de la moitié (52%) des demandes de réinstallation présentées en 2018 concernaient des enfants.
    Peu de réinstallation des réfugiés

    La réinstallation des réfugiés - en provenance d’un pays d’asile et à destination d’un pays tiers qui a accepté de les accueillir et de leur accorder l’installation permanente - n’est accessible qu’à une part limitée de la population réfugiée à travers le monde. En règle générale, moins d’un pour cent sont réinstallés parmi les 19,9 millions de réfugiés relevant de la compétence du HCR à travers le monde.

    Selon le HCR, la réinstallation demeure un mécanisme vital qui permet d’assurer la protection aux personnes les plus exposées. Grâce à ce dispositif concret en matière de protection, les gouvernements et les communautés à travers le monde peuvent partager la responsabilité dans les efforts de réponse aux crises de déplacement forcé. La réinstallation et d’autres voies complémentaires d’admission constituent un objectif clé du Pacte mondial sur les réfugiés qui vise à réduire l’impact, sur les pays hôtes, de situations de réfugiés majeures.

    Selon les estimations pour 2019, 1,4 million de réfugiés actuellement hébergés dans 65 pays d’accueil à travers le monde auront besoin d’être réinstallés.

    Parmi eux se trouvent des réfugiés syriens actuellement hébergés dans des pays du Moyen-Orient et en Turquie (43%) ainsi que des réfugiés se trouvant dans des pays d’asile et de transit situés le long de l’itinéraire de la Méditerranée centrale (22%), où les mouvements vers l’Europe génèrent un lourd bilan en termes de pertes en vies humaines.

    Le Pacte mondial sur les réfugiés appelle les États à offrir davantage de places de réinstallation, via le lancement de nouveaux programmes ou l’extension de ceux qui existent déjà.

    Le HCR travaille actuellement avec les États et ses partenaires à l’élaboration d’une stratégie triennale concernant la réinstallation et les voies complémentaires d’admission - afin d’accroître le nombre de places de réinstallation, d’encourager davantage de pays à participer aux efforts mondiaux en matière de réinstallation et d’améliorer l’accès des réfugiés aux voies complémentaires d’admission.

    https://news.un.org/fr/story/2019/02/1036661
    #réinstallation #statistiques #chiffres #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • Channel migrants: Two boats found after 86 attempted crossing

    Two boats carrying 21 migrants have been intercepted off the Kent coast after a record 86 made the crossing in one day.

    One man was airlifted to hospital from a dinghy which was carrying 13 people, including three children.

    A second vessel carrying eight men was intercepted and taken to Dover.

    Eighty-six people were detained by Border Force on Tuesday. It is thought to be the highest number of migrants to make the crossing in one day.

    https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-kent-49662172
    #frontières #Angleterre #UK #France #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Manche

    #statistiques #chiffres


    https://twitter.com/ElisaPerrigueur/status/1171873291470016515/photo/1
    #routes_migratoires #parcours_migratoires

  • La #fin des #bunkers à #Genève ??

    Genève inaugure un centre pour réfugiés de 370 places.

    « 370 places, 2 immeubles de 4 étages flambant neuf, 100% bois de la région, inaugurés ce matin par l’#Hospice_général. Le lieu se veut novateur, la structure est modulable pour s’adapter au profil des résidents et espère surtout rompre avec le passé tumultueux de l’hébergement de migrants à Genève : incendie au foyer surchargé des Tattes en 2014, structures d’accueil souterraines vétustes voire insalubres. Avec cette #inauguration l’Hospice général espère une nouvelle ère »

    https://www.rts.ch/play/tv/19h30/video/geneve-inaugure-un-centre-pour-refugies-de-370-places-?id=10700021
    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #hébergement #logement #Suisse

    Ce qui est intéressant, c’est le mots de Christophe Girod, directeur de l’Hospice générale, quand il commente les chiffres de l’arrivée de demandeurs d’asile en Suisse... #chiffres qui connaissent une baisse considérable...


    10% en moins par rapport à la même période l’année passée... et encore moins par rapport à 2015 :

    Voici ce que dit Girod :
    « La population que nous avons à charge n’a pas véritablement baisser. Elle n’augmente plus, mais elle reste constante. L’inauguration d’un tel centre permet d’offrir un hébergement de meilleure qualité et de fermer nos vieux centres vétustes »

    Voici ce que Sophie Malka et moi-même écrivions en février 2015 :

    Le manque de logement ne serait pas à attribuer prioritairement à une (relative) hausse des demandes d’asile, mais à des décisions structurelles (mauvaises prévisions sur le nombre de nouvelles demandes d’asile) et à des situations conjoncturelles (fluctuation du taux d’acceptation des demandes et des décisions NEM). Mais alors pourquoi ne pas simplement le dire ? Au lieu d’agiter le spectre de l’invasion, il serait peut-être temps de dire haut et fort que la plupart des personnes arrivées en Suisse et demandant une protection l’obtiennent lorsqu’on examine leurs motifs d’asile. En leur accordant le droit de rester, la Suisse a le devoir de leur assurer un accueil digne pour leur permettre de se reconstruire et de s’intégrer. Un accueil digne qui passe également par un logement décent, et certainement pas par l’ouverture de places dans des abris PC, qui causent “d’importantes dégradations de [la] personnalité [des personnes y logées] et même de leur santé, d’isolement social extrême et de graves atteintes à leur autonomie notamment économique”

    Girod parle aussi de la meilleure possibilité de s’intégrer si on a un hébergement digne... et là aussi, on l’avait dit en février 2015...

    #statistiques