Death on the Central Mediterranean : 2013-2020
Since 2013, more than 17,000 asylum seekers and migrants are known to have disappeared or died.
Death on the Central Mediterranean : 2013-2020
Since 2013, more than 17,000 asylum seekers and migrants are known to have disappeared or died.
Deadly Crossings and the militarisation of Britain’s borders
Military-style solutions won’t solve humanitarian problems, argues our new report that details the nearly 300 border-related deaths in and around the English Channel since 1999. Deadly Crossings and the Militarisation of Britain’s Borders reveals the human tragedies caused by inhumane border enforcement at a time when the UK Home Office is seeking to make Channel crossings ‘unviable’.
Pour télécharger le rapport:
#Manche #UK #Angleterre #mer #France #mourir_en_mer #décès #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #rapport #chiffres #statistiques #IRR #Gisti #Le_Gisti #chronologie #morts #décès #timeline #time-line #frise_chronologique
À Calais, la frontière tue. Contre l’oubli et l’impunité, nommer et compter les victimes
Jeudi 19 novembre, près de Calais, un homme est mort.
« Coquelles : un migrant décède à l’hôpital après avoir été percuté sur l’autoroute A16 » a titré La Voix du Nord dans un article classé dans les « Faits divers » . « L’accident s’est produit peu après 16h30 au niveau de l’échangeur 42 sur l’autoroute A16 » a précisé France 3 Hauts-de-France .
Fatalité. Un « migrant » qui « décède après avoir été percuté sur l’autoroute A16 », c’est forcément un « accident » à ranger dans les « faits divers ».
Pourtant, à Calais et dans la région, des « migrants qui décèdent », il y en a eu des dizaines, des centaines même. Des hommes, des femmes, des enfants et même parfois des nourrissons. Avec un nom, une identité, une histoire. Depuis 1999, ce sont au moins 297 personnes en exil qui sont mortes dans cette zone transfrontalière.
Mortes en tentant de franchir la frontière qui sépare le Royaume-Uni de la France : écrasées par la cargaison d’un camion ou broyées par l’essieu, électrocutées par les caténaires de l’Eurotunnel, percutées par un véhicule sur l’autoroute A16 ou noyées en essayant de franchir le Channel en bateau, en kayak ou tout simplement à la nage avec des bouteilles en plastique comme seules bouées de fortune. Mortes également du fait des conditions de vie inhumaines que leur réservent les gouvernements français successifs depuis plus de 25 ans.
« Les CRS font de nos vies un enfer » écrivaient des exilé·es érythréen·nes dans une lettre adressée au préfet du Pas-de-Calais le 16 novembre dernier . « Les CRS sont venus et ont gazé nos affaires et nous ont frappés comme si on était des animaux. Le lendemain matin ils nous attendaient et nous ont encore frappés. Même quand nous marchons ils ouvrent leur voiture et ils nous gazent, juste pour s’amuser » détaillent ils et elles un peu plus loin dans le courrier.
Violences policières, harcèlement continu, humiliations, contrôles d’identité répétés, destructions de tentes, privation de duvets ou confiscation d’effets personnels, gazage de bidons de stockage d’eau sont le quotidien des personnes exilées présentes dans le Calaisis. Et cette réalité n’est pas nouvelle. Depuis des années, les exilé·es et leurs soutiens locaux dénoncent ce régime de violences généralisées. Des organisations internationales, telles que Human Rights Watch , font de même. Le Défenseur des Droits, à plusieurs reprises (notamment en 2012 , 2015  et 2018 ), a dénoncé les politiques qui font de cet espace transfrontalier un « enfer » pour les exilé·es fuyant la guerre en Afghanistan ou en Syrie, la dictature en Érythrée ou les violences d’états autoritaires au Soudan ou en Éthiopie.
Mais rien ne change. La réponse des gouvernements, quelle que soit leur étiquette politique, qui se succèdent reste inchangé et le message officiel adressé aux exilé·es errant dans le Calaisis est toujours le même : « Disparaissez ! ». Et si les coups de matraques et les gazages ne suffisent pas, les personnes migrantes comprendront d’elles mêmes qu’à Calais et dans la région, on risque sa peau.
Aucune de ces vies volées n’est un accident. C’est pourquoi il importe de compter et nommer les exilé·es mort·es à la frontière franco-britannique, et de refuser de réduire ces décès à des événements isolés et anonymes, pour les ranger ensuite dans la case des « faits divers ». Au contraire, recenser les étranger·es décédé·es dans cette zone frontalière montre que ces morts sont le résultat des politiques menées par des sous-préfets, des préfets et des ministres successifs, qui ont délibérément décidé de faire de cette frontière un « enfer ».
En 2016, le Gisti publiait un numéro de sa revue Plein Droit intitulé « Homicides aux frontières » dans lequel paraissait l’article « Voir Calais et mourir ». L’auteur, un ancien salarié de la Plateforme des Soutiens aux Migrant·e·s (PSM) basée à Calais, y décrivait ce travail d’enquête sur les mort·es à la frontière franco-britannique (qui permettait de dresser une liste des victimes et une cartographie) et montrait comment « l’addition d’accords européens et de traités bilatéraux, destinés à empêcher les indésirables d’accéder au territoire britannique a fait de cette région un mur meurtrier ».
Des liens récents entre militant·es français·es et activistes britanniques ont permis de travailler à la publication de cette enquête sur les personnes exilées mortes à la frontière franco-britannique pour un public anglophone. Fruit d’une collaboration entre l’Institute of Race Relations (IRR), le Tribunal Permanent des Peuples (TPP) de Londres et le Gisti, le rapport « Deadly Crossings and the Militarisation of Britain’s Borders » a pour but de donner à voir, une fois encore, les conséquences des politiques migratoires menées par les gouvernements français et britanniques dans cet espace frontalier et d’outiller activistes et associations anglophones dans leur contestation sans relâche du régime meurtrier des frontières.
Army sends drones to France to catch migrants crossing Channel
The armed forces have supplied France with a range of military-grade kit amid fears that plans to overhaul British asylum laws will trigger a sharp rise in Channel crossings this summer.
Drones, thermal imaging gear, advanced binoculars and radar technology used by the army are being deployed to detect small boats entering the sea at the French coast.
A fleet of motorbikes was also supplied as part of a £28 million deal struck with Paris in November to bolster efforts on the French side of the Channel.
The #Rohingya. A humanitarian emergency decades in the making
The violent 2017 ouster of more than 700,000 Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh captured the international spotlight, but the humanitarian crisis had been building for decades.
In August 2017, Myanmar’s military launched a crackdown that pushed out hundreds of thousands of members of the minority Rohingya community from their homes in northern Rakhine State. Today, roughly 900,000 Rohingya live across the border in southern Bangladesh, in cramped refugee camps where basic needs often overwhelm stretched resources.
The crisis has shifted from a short-term response to a protracted emergency. Conditions in the camps have worsened as humanitarian services are scaled back during the coronavirus pandemic. Government restrictions on refugees and aid groups have grown, along with grievances among local communities on the margins of a massive aid operation.
The 2017 exodus was the culmination of decades of restrictive policies in Myanmar, which have stripped Rohingya of their rights over generations, denied them an identity, and driven them from their homes.
Here’s an overview of the current crisis and a timeline of what led to it. A selection of our recent and archival reporting on the Rohingya crisis is available below.
Who are the Rohingya?
The Rohingya are a mostly Muslim minority in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Rohingya say they are native to the area, but in Myanmar they are largely viewed as illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh.
Myanmar’s government does not consider the Rohingya one of the country’s 135 officially recognised ethnic groups. Over decades, government policies have stripped Rohingya of citizenship and enforced an apartheid-like system where they are isolated and marginalised.
How did the current crisis unfold?
In October 2016, a group of Rohingya fighters calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, or ARSA, staged attacks on border posts in northern Rakhine State, killing nine border officers and four soldiers. Myanmar’s military launched a crackdown, and 87,000 Rohingya civilians fled to Bangladesh over the next year.
A month earlier, Myanmar’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, had set up an advisory commission chaired by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan to recommend a path forward in Rakhine and ease tensions between the Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities.
On 24 August 2017, the commission issued its final report, which included recommendations to improve development in the region and tackle questions of citizenship for the Rohingya. Within hours, ARSA fighters again attacked border security posts.
Myanmar’s military swept through the townships of northern Rakhine, razing villages and driving away civilians. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in the ensuing weeks. They brought with them stories of burnt villages, rape, and killings at the hands of Myanmar’s military and groups of ethnic Rakhine neighbours. The refugee settlements of southern Bangladesh now have a population of roughly 900,000 people, including previous generations of refugees.
What has the international community said?
Multiple UN officials, rights investigators, and aid groups working in the refugee camps say there is evidence of brutal levels of violence against the Rohingya and the scorched-earth clearance of their villages in northern Rakhine State.
A UN-mandated fact-finding mission on Myanmar says abuses and rights violations in Rakhine “undoubtedly amount to the gravest crimes under international law”; the rights probe is calling for Myanmar’s top generals to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
The UN’s top rights official has called the military purge a “textbook case of ethnic cleansing”. Médecins Sans Frontières estimates at least 6,700 Rohingya were killed in the days after military operations began in August 2017.
Rights groups say there’s evidence that Myanmar security forces were preparing to strike weeks and months before the August 2017 attacks. The evidence included disarming Rohingya civilians, arming non-Rohingya, and increasing troop levels in the area.
What has Myanmar said?
Myanmar has denied almost all allegations of violence against the Rohingya. It says the August 2017 military crackdown was a direct response to the attacks by ARSA militants.
Myanmar’s security forces admitted to the September 2017 killings of 10 Rohingya men in Inn Din village – a massacre exposed by a media investigation. Two Reuters journalists were arrested while researching the story. In September 2018, the reporters were convicted of breaking a state secrets law and sentenced to seven years in prison. They were released in May 2019, after more than a year behind bars.
Myanmar continues to block international investigators from probing rights violations on its soil. This includes barring entry to the UN-mandated fact-finding mission and the UN’s special rapporteurs for the country.
What is the situation in Bangladesh’s refugee camps?
The swollen refugee camps of southern Bangladesh now have the population of a large city but little of the basic infrastructure.
The dimensions of the response have changed as the months and years pass: medical operations focused on saving lives in 2017 must now also think of everyday illnesses and healthcare needs; a generation of young Rohingya have spent another year without formal schooling or ways to earn a living; women (and men) reported sexual violence at the hands of Myanmar’s military, but today the violence happens within the cramped confines of the camps.
The coronavirus has magnified the problems and aid shortfalls in 2020. The government limited all but essential services and restricted aid access to the camps. Humanitarian groups say visits to health centres have dropped by half – driven in part by fear and misunderstandings. Gender-based violence has risen, and already-minimal services for women and girls are now even more rare.
The majority of Rohingya refugees live in camps with population densities of less than 15 square metres per person – far below the minimum international guidelines for refugee camps (30 to 45 square metres per person). The risk of disease outbreaks is high in such crowded conditions, aid groups say.
Rohingya refugees live in fragile shelters in the middle of floodplains and on landslide-prone hillsides. Aid groups say seasonal monsoon floods threaten large parts of the camps, which are also poorly prepared for powerful cyclones that typically peak along coastal Bangladesh in May and October.
The funding request for the Rohingya response – totalling more than $1 billion in 2020 – represents one of the largest humanitarian appeals for a crisis this year. Previous appeals have been underfunded, which aid groups said had a direct impact on the quality of services available.
What’s happening in Rakhine State?
The UN estimates that 470,000 non-displaced Rohingya still live in Rakhine State. Aid groups say they continue to have extremely limited access to northern Rakhine State – the flashpoint of 2017’s military purge. There are “alarming” rates of malnutrition among children in northern Rakhine, according to UN agencies.
Rohingya still living in northern Rakhine face heavy restrictions on working, going to school, and accessing healthcare. The UN says remaining Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities continue to live in fear of each other.
Additionally, some 125,000 Rohingya live in barricaded camps in central Rakhine State. The government created these camps following clashes between Rohingya and Rakhine communities in 2012. Rohingya there face severe restrictions and depend on aid groups for basic services.
A separate conflict between the military and the Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine armed group, has brought new displacement and civilian casualties. Clashes displaced tens of thousands of people in Rakhine and neighbouring Chin State by early 2020, and humanitarian access has again been severely restricted. In February 2020, Myanmar’s government re-imposed mobile internet blackouts in several townships in Rakhine and Chin states, later extending high-speed restrictions until the end of October. Rights groups say the blackout could risk lives and make it even harder for humanitarian aid to reach people trapped by conflict. Amnesty International has warned of a looming food insecurity crisis in Rakhine.
Rights groups have called on the UN Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court to investigate allegations of committing atrocity crimes. The UN body has not done so.
There are at least three parallel attempts, in three separate courts, to pursue accountability. ICC judges have authorised prosecutor Fatou Bensouda to begin an investigation into one aspect: the alleged deportation of the Rohingya, which is a crime against humanity under international law.
Separately, the West African nation of The Gambia filed a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice asking the UN’s highest court to hold Myanmar accountable for “state-sponsored genocide”. In an emergency injunction granted in January 2020, the court ordered Myanmar to “take all measures within its power” to protect the Rohingya.
And in a third legal challenge, a Rohingya rights group launched a case calling on courts in Argentina to prosecute military and civilian officials – including Aung San Suu Kyi – under the concept of universal jurisdiction, which pushes for domestic courts to investigate international crimes.
Bangladesh and Myanmar have pledged to begin the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, but three separate deadlines have come and gone with no movement. In June 2018, two UN agencies signed a controversial agreement with Myanmar – billed as a first step to participating in any eventual returns plan. The UN, rights groups, and refugees themselves say Rakhine State is not yet safe for Rohingya to return.
With no resolution in sight in Myanmar and bleak prospects in Bangladesh, a growing number of Rohingya women and children are using once-dormant smuggling routes to travel to countries like Malaysia.
A regional crisis erupted in 2020 as multiple countries shut their borders to Rohingya boats, citing the coronavirus, leaving hundreds of people stranded at sea for weeks. Dozens are believed to have died.
Bangladesh has raised the possibility of transferring 100,000 Rohingya refugees to an uninhabited, flood-prone island – a plan that rights groups say would effectively create an “island detention centre”. Most Rohingya refuse to go, but Bangladeshi authorities detained more than 300 people on the island in 2020 after they were rescued at sea.
The government has imposed growing restrictions on the Rohingya as the crisis continues. In recent months, authorities have enforced orders barring most Rohingya from leaving the camp areas, banned the sale of SIM cards and cut mobile internet, and tightened restrictions on NGOs. Local community tensions have also risen. Aid groups report a rise in anti-Rohingya hate speech and racism, as well as “rapidly deteriorating security dynamics”.
Local NGOs and civil society groups are pushing for a greater role in leading the response, warning that international donor funding will dwindle over the long term.
And rights groups say Rohingya refugees themselves have had little opportunity to participate in decisions that affect their futures – both in Bangladesh’s camps and when it comes to the possibility of returning to Myanmar.
#asile #migrations #réfugiés #Birmanie #Myanmar #chronologie #histoire #génocide #Bangladesh #réfugiés_rohingya #Rakhine #camps_de_réfugiés #timeline #time-line #Arakan_Rohingya_Salvation_Army (#ARSA) #nettoyage_ethnique #justice #Cour_internationale_de_Justice (#CIJ)
What happens to migrants forcibly returned to Libya?
‘These are people going missing by the hundreds.’
The killing last week of three young men after they were intercepted at sea by the EU-funded Libyan Coast Guard has thrown the spotlight on the fate of tens of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers returned to Libya to face detention, abuse and torture by traffickers, or worse.
The three Sudanese nationals aged between 15 and 18 were shot dead on 28 July, reportedly by members of a militia linked to the Coast Guard as they tried to avoid being detained. They are among more than 6,200 men, women, and children intercepted on the central Mediterranean and returned to Libya this year. Since 2017, that figure is around 40,000.
Over the last three months, The New Humanitarian has spoken to migrants and Libyan officials, as well as to UN agencies and other aid groups and actors involved, to piece together what is happening to the returnees after they are brought back to shore.
It has long been difficult to track the whereabouts of migrants and asylum seekers after they are returned to Libya, and for years there have been reports of people going missing or disappearing into unofficial detention centres after disembarking.
But the UN’s migration agency, IOM, told TNH there has been an uptick in people vanishing off its radar since around December, and it suspects that at least some returnees are being taken to so-called “data-collection and investigation facilities” under the direct control of the Ministry of Interior for the Government of National Accord.
The GNA, the internationally recognised authority in Libya, is based in the capital, Tripoli, and has been fighting eastern forces commanded by general Khalifa Haftar for 16 months in a series of battles that has developed into a regional proxy war.
Unlike official detention centres run by the GNA’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) – also under the Ministry of the Interior – and its affiliated militias, neither IOM nor the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, has access to these data-collection facilities, which are intended for the investigation of smugglers and not for detaining migrants.
“We have been told that migrants are no longer in these [data-collection] facilities and we wonder if they have been transferred,” Safa Msehli, spokesperson for IOM in Libya, told TNH.
“These are people going missing by the hundreds. We have also been told – and are hearing reports from community leaders – that people are going missing,” she said. “We feel the worst has happened, and that these locations [data-collection facilities] are being used to smuggle or traffic people.”
According to IOM, more than half of the over 6,200 people returned to Libya this year – which includes at least 264 women and 202 children – remain unaccounted for after being loaded onto buses and driven away from the disembarkation points on the coast.
Msehli said some people had been released after they are returned, but that their number was “200 maximum”, and that if others had simply escaped she would have expected them to show up at community centres run by IOM and its local partners – which most haven’t.
Masoud Abdal Samad, a commander in the Libyan Coast Guard, denied all accusations of trafficking to TNH, even though the UN has sanctioned individuals in the Coast Guard for their involvement in people smuggling and trafficking. He also said he didn’t know where asylum seekers and migrants end up after they are returned to shore. “It’s not my responsibility. It’s DCIM that determines where the migrants go,” he said.
Neither the head of the DCIM, Al Mabrouk Abdel-Hafez, nor the media officer for the interior ministry, Mohammad Abu Abdallah, responded to requests for comment from TNH. But the Libyan government recently told the Wall Street Journal that all asylum seekers and migrants returned by the Coast Guard are taken to official detention centres.
‘I can’t tell you where we take them’
TNH spoke to four migrants – three of whom were returned by the Libyan Coast Guard and placed in detention, one of them twice. All described a system whereby returned migrants and asylum seekers are being routinely extorted and passed between different militias.
Contacted via WhatsApp, Yasser, who only gave his first name for fear of retribution for exposing the abuse he suffered, recounted his ordeal in a series of conversations between May and June.
The final stage of his journey to start a new life in Europe began on a warm September morning in 2019 when he squeezed onto a rubber dinghy along with 120 other people in al-Garabulli, a coastal town near Tripoli. The year before, the 33-year-old Sudanese asylum seeker had escaped from conflict in his village in the Nuba Mountains to search for safety and opportunity.
By nightfall, those on board the small boat spotted a reconnaissance aircraft, likely dispatched as part of an EU or Italian aerial surveillance mission. It appears the aircraft alerted the Libyan Coast Guard, which soon arrived to drag them onto their boat and back to war-torn Libya.
Later that day, as the boat approached the port, Yasser overheard a uniformed member of the Coast Guard speaking on the phone. The man said he had around 100 migrants and was willing to sell each one for 500 Libyan dinars ($83).
“Militias buy and sell us to make a profit in this country,” Yasser told TNH months later, after he escaped. “In their eyes, refugees are just an investment.”
When Yasser stepped off the Coast Guard boat in Tripoli’s port, he saw dozens of people he presumed were aid workers tending to the injured. He tried to tell them that he and the others were going to be sold to a militia, but the scene was frantic and he said they didn’t listen.
“Militias buy and sell us to make a profit in this country. In their eyes, refugees are just an investment.”
Yasser couldn’t recall which organisation the aid workers were from. Whoever was there, they watched Libyan authorities herd Yasser and the other migrants onto a handful of buses and drive them away.
IOM, or UNHCR, or one of their local partners are usually present at disembarkation points when migrants are returned to shore. The two UN agencies, which receive significant EU funding for their operations in Libya and have been criticised for participating in the system of interception and detention, say they tend to the injured and register asylum seekers. They also said they count the number of people returned from sea and jot down their nationalities and gender.
But both agencies told TNH they are unable to track where people go next because Libyan authorities do not keep an official database of asylum seekers and migrants intercepted at sea or held in detention centres.
News footage – and testimonies from migrants and aid workers – shows white buses with DCIM logos frequently pick up those disembarking. TNH also identified a private bus company that DCIM contracts for transportation. The company, called Essahim, imported 130 vehicles from China before beginning operations in September 2019.
On its Facebook page, Essahim only advertises its shuttle bus services to Misrata airport, in northwest Libya. But a high-level employee, who asked TNH not to disclose his name for fear of reprisal from Libyan authorities, confirmed that the company picks up asylum seekers and migrants from disembarkation points on the shore.
He said all of Essahim’s buses are equipped with a GPS tracking system to ensure drivers don’t deviate from their route. He also emphasised that the company takes people to “legitimate centres”, but he refused to disclose the locations.
“You have to ask the government,” he told TNH. “I can’t tell you where we take them. It’s one of the conditions in the contract.”https://assets.irinnews.org/s3fs-public/styles/responsive_large/public/libya-migrants-2.jpg?.OcSiTF_1UWS_V2OtBTV5StzPRq3HoXb&itok=9Wmvx-2L#.jpg
Off the radar
Since Libya’s 2011 revolution, state security forces – such as the Coast Guard and interior ministry units – have mostly consisted of a collection of militias vying for legitimacy and access to sources of revenue.
Migrant detention centres have been particularly lucrative to control, and even the official ones can be run by whichever local militia or armed group holds sway at a particular time. Those detained are not granted rights or legal processes, and there have been numerous reports of horrific abuse, and deaths from treatable diseases like tuberculosis.
Facts regarding the number of different detention centres and who controls them are sketchy, especially as they often close and re-open or come under new management, and as territory can change hands between the GNA and forces aligned with Haftar. Both sides have a variety of militias fighting alongside them, and there are splits within the alliances.
But IOM’s Msehli told TNH that as of 1 August that there are 11 official detention centres run by DCIM, and that she was aware of returned migrants also being taken to what she believes are four different data-collection and investigation facilities – three in Tripoli and one in Zuwara, a coastal city about 100 kilometres west of the capital. The government has not disclosed how many data-collection centres there are or where they are located.
Beyond the official facilities, there are also numerous makeshift compounds used by smugglers and militias – especially in the south and in the former Muammar Gaddafi stronghold of Bani Walid – for which there is no data, according to a report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI).
Yasser told TNH he had no idea if he was in an official DCIM-run detention centre or an unofficial site after he was pulled off the bus that took him to a makeshift prison from the port of Tripoli. Unless UN agencies show up, it is hard for detainees to tell the difference. Conditions are dismal and abuses occur in both locations: In unofficial facilities the extortion of detainees is systematic, while in official centres it tends to be carried out by individual staff members, according to the GI report.
Between Yasser’s description and information from an aid group that gained access to the facility – but declined to be identified for fear of jeopardising its work – TNH believes Yasser was taken to an informal centre in Tripoli called Shaaria Zawiya, outside the reach of UN agencies. Msehli said IOM believes it is a data-collection and investigation facility.
During the time Yasser was there, the facility was under the control of a militia commander with a brutal reputation, according to a high-level source from the aid group. The commander was eventually replaced in late 2019, but not before trying to extort hundreds of people, including Yasser.
Several nights after he arrived at the centre, everyone being held there was ordered to pay a 3,000 Libyan dinar ransom – about $500 on the Libyan black market. The militia separated detainees by nationality and tossed each group a cell phone. They gave one to the Eritreans, one to the Somalis, and one to the Sudanese. The detainees were told to call their families and beg, Yasser recalled.
Those who couldn’t pay languished in the centre until they were sold for a lower sum to another militia, which would try to extort them for a smaller ransom to earn a profit. This is a widely reported trend all across Libya: Militias sell migrants they can’t extort to make space for new hostages.
Yasser’s friends and family were too poor to pay for his release, yet he clung to hope that he would somehow escape. He watched as the militia commander beat and intimidated other asylum seekers and migrants in the centre, but he was too scared to intervene. As the weeks passed, he started to believe nobody would find him.
Then, one day, he saw a couple of aid workers. They came to document the situation and treat the wounded. “The migrants who spoke English whispered for help, but [the aid workers] just kept silent and nodded,” Yasser said.
The aid workers were from the same NGO that identified the data-collection facility to TNH. The aid group said it suspects that Libyan authorities are taking migrants to two other locations in Tripoli after disembarkation: a data-collection and investigation facility in a neighbourhood called Hay al-Andulus, and an abandoned tobacco factory in another Tripoli suburb. “I know the factory exists, but I have no idea how many people are inside,” the source said, adding that the aid group had been unable to negotiate access to either location.
“We were treated like animals.”
Msehli confirmed that IOM believes migrants have been taken to both compounds, neither of which are under DCIM control. She added that more migrants are ending up in another unofficial location in Tripoli.
After languishing for two months, until November, in Shaaria Zawiya, Yasser said he was sold to a militia manning what he thinks was an official detention centre. He assumed the location was official because uniformed UNHCR employees frequently showed up with aid. When UNHCR wasn’t there, the militia still demanded ransoms from the people inside.
“We were treated like animals,” Yasser said. “But at least when UNHCR visited, the militia fed us more food than usual.”
Tariq Argaz, the spokesperson for UNHCR in Libya, defended the agency’s aid provision to official facilities like this one, saying: “We are against the detention of refugees, but we have a humanitarian imperative to assist refugees wherever they are, even if it is a detention centre.”https://assets.irinnews.org/s3fs-public/styles/responsive_large/public/libya-migrants-3.jpg?UkSPuQAkQCKXdh2ySNiJ9qn_RppXe4ej&itok=2DSYuk44#.jpg
Growing pressure on EU to change tack
The surge in disappearances raises further concerns about criminality and human rights abuses occurring within a system of interception and detention by Libyan authorities that the EU and EU member states have funded and supported since 2017.
The aim of the support is to crack down on smuggling networks, reduce the number of asylum seekers and migrants arriving in Europe, and improve detention conditions in Libya, but critics say it has resulted in tens of thousands of people being returned to indefinite detention and abuse in Libya. There is even less oversight now that asylum seekers and migrants are ending up in data-collection and investigation facilities, beyond the reach of UN agencies.
The escalating conflict in Libya and the coronavirus crisis have made the humanitarian situation for asylum seekers and migrants in the country “worse than ever”, according to IOM. At the same time, Italy and Malta have further turned their backs on rescuing people at sea. Italy has impounded NGO search and rescue ships, while both countries have repeatedly failed to respond, or responded slowly, to distress calls, and Malta even hired a private fishing vessel to return people rescued at sea to Libya.
“We believe that people shouldn’t be returned to Libya,” Msehli told TNH. “This is due to the lack of any protection mechanism that the Libyan state takes or is able to take.”
There are currently estimated to be at least 625,000 migrants in Libya and 47,859 registered asylum seekers and refugees. Of this number, around 1,760 migrants – including 760 registered asylum seekers and refugees – are in the DCIM-run detention centres, according to data from IOM and UNHCR, although IOM’s data only covers eight out of the 11 DCIM facilities.
The number of detainees in unofficial centres and makeshift compounds is unknown but, based on those unaccounted for and the reported experiences of migrants, could be many times higher. A recent estimate from Liam Kelly, director of the Danish Refugee Council in Libya, suggests as many as 80,000 people have been in them at some point in recent years.
There remains no clear explanation why some people intercepted attempting the sea journey appear to be being taken to data-collection and investigation facilities, while others end up in official centres. But researchers believe migrants are typically taken to facilities that have space to house new detainees, or other militias may strike a deal to purchase a new group to extort them.
In a leaked report from last year, the EU acknowledged that the GNA “has not taken steps to improve the situation in the centres”, and that “the government’s reluctance to address the problems raises questions of its own involvement”.
The UN, human rights groups, researchers, journalists and TNH have noted that there is little distinction between criminal groups, militias, and other entities involved in EU-supported migration control activities under the GNA.
A report released last week by UNHCR and the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) at the Danish Refugee Council said that migrants being smuggled and trafficked to the Mediterranean coast had identified the primary perpetrators of abuses as state officials and law enforcement.
Pressure on the EU over its proximity to abuses resulting from the interception and detention of asylum seekers and migrants in Libya is mounting. International human rights lawyers have filed lawsuits to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UN human rights committee, and the European Court of Human Rights to attempt to hold the EU accountable.
Peter Stano, the EU Commission’s official spokesperson for External Affairs, told TNH that the EU doesn’t consider Libya a safe country, but that its priority has always been to stop irregular migration to keep migrants from risking their lives, while protecting the most vulnerable.
“We have repeated again and again, together with our international partners in the UN and African Union, that arbitrary detention of migrants and refugees in Libya must end, including to Libyan authorities,” he said. “The situation in these centres is unacceptable, and arbitrary detention of migrants and refugees upon disembarkation must stop.”
For Yasser, it took a war for him to have the opportunity to escape from detention. In January this year, the facility he was in came under heavy fire during a battle in the war for Tripoli. Dozens of migrants, including Yasser, made a run for it.
He is now living in a crowded house with other Sudanese asylum seekers in the coastal town of Zawiya, and says that returning to the poverty and instability in Sudan is out of the question. With his sights set on Europe, he still intends to cross the Mediterranean, but he’s afraid of being intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard, trafficked, and extorted all over again.
“It’s a business,” said Yasser. “Militias pay for your head and then they force you to pay for your freedom.”
#chronologie #timeline #time-line #migrations #asile #réfugiés #chiffres #statistiques #pull-back #pull-backs #push-backs #refoulements #disparitions #torture #décès #morts #gardes-côtes_libyens #détention #centres_de_détention #milices
The legal battle to hold the EU to account for Libya migrant abuses
‘It’s a well known fact that we’re all struggling here, as human rights practitioners.’
More than 6,500 asylum seekers and migrants have been intercepted at sea and returned to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard so far this year. Since the EU and Italy began training, funding, equipping, and providing operational assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard in 2017, that number stands at around 40,000 people.
Critics say European support for these interceptions and returns is one of the most glaring examples of the trade-off being made between upholding human rights – a fundamental EU value – and the EU’s determination to reduce migration to the continent.
Those intercepted at sea and returned to Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard – predominantly asylum seekers and migrants from East and West Africa – face indefinite detention, extortion, torture, sexual exploitation, and forced labour.
This year alone, thousands have disappeared beyond the reach of UN agencies after being disembarked. Migration detention in Libya functions as a business that generates revenue for armed groups, some of whom have also pressed asylum seekers and migrants into military activities – a practice that is likely a war crime, according to Human Rights Watch.
All of this has been well documented and widely known for years, even as the EU and Italy have stepped up their support for the Libyan Coast Guard. Yet despite their key role in empowering the Coast Guard to return people to Libya, international human rights lawyers have struggled to hold the EU and Italy to account. Boxed in by the limitations of international law, lawyers have had to find increasingly innovative legal strategies to try to establish European complicity in the abuses taking place.
As the EU looks to expand its cooperation with third countries, the outcome of these legal efforts could have broader implications on whether the EU and its member states can be held accountable for the human rights impacts of their external migration policies.
“Under international law there are rules… prohibiting states to assist other states in the commission of human rights violations,” Matteo de Bellis, Amnesty International’s migration researcher, told The New Humanitarian. “However, those international rules do not have a specific court where you can litigate them, where individuals can have access to remedy.”
In fact, human rights advocates and lawyers argue that EU and Italian support for the Libyan Coast Guard is designed specifically to avoid legal responsibility.
“For a European court to have jurisdiction over a particular policy, a European actor must be in control... of a person directly,” said Itamar Mann, an international human rights lawyer. “When a non-European agent takes that control, it’s far from clear that [a] European court has jurisdiction. So there is a kind of accountability gap under international human rights law.”
‘The EU is not blameless’
When Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding in February 2017 with Libya’s internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) “to ensure the reduction of illegal migratory flows”, the agreement carried echoes of an earlier era.
In 2008, former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi signed a friendship treaty with Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi that, among other things, committed the two countries to working together to curb irregular migration.
The following year, Italian patrol boats began intercepting asylum seekers and migrants at sea and returning them to Libya. In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights, an international court based in Strasbourg, France – which all EU member states are party to – ruled that the practice violated multiple articles of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The decision, in what is known as the Hirsi case, was based on the idea that Italy had established “extraterritorial jurisdiction” over asylum seekers and migrants when it took them under their control at sea and had violated the principle of non-refoulement – a core element of international refugee law – by forcing them back to a country where they faced human rights abuses.
Many states that have signed the 1951 refugee convention have integrated the principle of non-refoulement into their domestic law, binding them to protect asylum seekers once they enter a nation’s territory. But there are divergent interpretations of how it applies to state actors in international waters.
By the time of the Hirsi decision, the practice had already ended and Gaddafi had been toppled from power. The chaos that followed the Libyan uprising in 2011 paved the way for a new era of irregular migration. The number of people crossing the central Meditteranean jumped from an average of tens of thousands per year throughout the late 1990s and 2000s to more than 150,000 per year in 2014, 2015, and 2016.https://assets.irinnews.org/s3fs-public/styles/responsive_medium/public/libya-eu-migrants-graphic-final.jpg?Xhka2ZtRDYOiLAgqSkZ.2WpUY0B2.r0X&itok=jjlpZSSx#.jpg
Reducing these numbers became a main priority for Italy and the EU, and they kept the lessons of the Hirsi case in mind as they set about designing their policies, according to de Bellis.
Instead of using European vessels, the EU and Italy focused on “enabling the Libyan authorities to do the dirty job of intercepting people at sea and returning them to Libya”, he said. “By doing so, they would argue that they have not breached international European law because they have never assumed control, and therefore exercised jurisdiction, over the people who have then been subjected to human rights violations [in Libya].”
The number of people crossing the central Mediterranean has dropped precipitously in recent years as EU policies have hardened, and tens of thousands of people – including those returned by the Coast Guard – are estimated to have passed through formal and informal migration detention centres in Libya, some of them getting stuck for years and many falling victim to extortion and abuse.
“There is always going to be a debate about, is the EU responsible… [because] it’s really Libya who has done the abuses,” said Carla Ferstman, a human rights law professor at the University of Essex in England. “[But] the EU is not blameless because it can’t pretend that it didn’t know the consequences of what it was going to do.”
The challenge for human rights lawyers is how to legally establish that blame.
The accountability gap
Since 2017, the EU has given more than 91 million euros (about $107 million) to support border management projects in Libya. Much of that money has gone to Italy, which implements the projects and has provided its own funding and at least six patrol boats to the Libyan Coast Guard.
One objective of the EU’s funding is to improve the human rights and humanitarian situation in official detention centres. But according to a leaked EU document from 2019, this is something the Libyan government had not been taking steps to do, “raising the question of its own involvement”, according to the document.
The main goal of the funding is to strengthen the capacity of Libyan authorities to control the country’s borders and intercept asylum seekers and migrants at sea. This aspect of the policy has been effective, according to a September 2019 report by the UN secretary-general.
“All our action is based on international and European law,” an EU spokesperson told the Guardian newspaper in June. “The European Union dialogue with Libyan authorities focuses on the respect for human rights of migrants and refugees.”
The EU has legal obligations to ensure that its actions do not violate human rights in both its internal and external policy, according to Ferstman. But when it comes to actions taken outside of Europe, “routes for those affected to complain when their rights are being violated are very, very weak,” she said.
The EU and its member states are also increasingly relying on informal agreements, such as the Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, in their external migration cooperation.
“Once the EU makes formal agreements with third states… [it] is more tightly bound to a lot of human rights and refugee commitments,” Raphael Bossong, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, told TNH. “Hence, we see a shift toward less binding or purely informal arrangements.”
Lawyers and researchers told TNH that the absence of formal agreements, and the combination of EU funding and member state implementation, undermines the standing of the EU Parliament and the Court of Justice, the bloc’s supreme court, to act as watchdogs.
Efforts to challenge Italy’s role in cooperating with Libya in Italian courts have also so far been unsuccessful.
“It’s a well known fact that we’re all struggling here, as human rights practitioners… to grapple with the very limited, minimalistic tools we have to address the problem at hand,” said Valentina Azarova, a lawyer and researcher affiliated with the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), a nonprofit organisation that pursues international human rights litigation.
With no clear path forward, human rights lawyers have ventured into uncharted territory to try to subject EU and Italian cooperation with Libya to legal scrutiny.
Lawyers called last year for the International Criminal Court to investigate the EU for its alleged complicity in thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean, and legal organisations have filed two separate complaints with the UN Human Rights Committee, which has a quasi-judicial function.
In November last year, GLAN also submitted a case, called S.S. and others v. Italy, to the European Court of Human Rights that aims to build on the Hirsi decision. The case argues that – through its financial, material, and operational support – Italy assumes “contactless control” over people intercepted by Libyan Coast Guard and therefore establishes jurisdiction over them.
“Jurisdiction is not only a matter of direct, effective control over bodies,” Mann, who is part of GLAN, said of the case’s argument. “It’s also a matter of substantive control that can be wielded in many different ways.”
GLAN, along with two Italian legal organisations, also filed a complaint in April to the European Court of Auditors, which is tasked with checking to see if the EU’s budget is implemented correctly and that funds are spent legally.
The GLAN complaint alleges that funding border management activities in Libya makes the EU and its member states complicit in the human rights abuses taking place there, and is also a misuse of money intended for development purposes – both of which fall afoul of EU budgetary guidelines.
The complaint asks for the EU funding to be made conditional on the improvement of the situation for asylum seekers and migrants in the country, and for it to be suspended until certain criteria are met, including the release of all refugees and migrants from arbitrary detention, the creation of an asylum system that complies with international standards, and the establishment of an independent, transparent mechanism to monitor and hold state and non-state actors accountable for human rights violations against refugees and migrants.
The Court of Auditors is not an actual courtroom or a traditional venue for addressing human rights abuses. It is composed of financial experts who conduct an annual audit of the EU budget. The complaint is meant to encourage them to take a specific look at EU funding to Libya, but they aren’t obligated to do so.
“To use the EU Court of Auditors to get some kind of human rights accountability is an odd thing to do,” said Ferstman, who is not involved in the complaint. “It speaks to the [accountability] gap and the absence of clear approaches.”
“[Still], it is the institution where this matter needs to be adjudicated, so to speak,” Azarova, who came up with the strategy, added. “They are the experts on questions of EU budget law.”
Closing the gap?
If successful, the Court of Auditors complaint could change how EU funding for Libya operates and set a precedent requiring a substantive accounting of how money is being spent and whether it ends up contributing to human rights violations in other EU third-country arrangements, according to Mann. “It will be a blow to the general externalisation pattern,” he said.
Ferstman cautioned, however, that its impact – at least legally – might not be so concrete. “[The Court of Auditors] can recommend everything that GLAN has put forward, but it will be a recommendation,” she said. “It will not be an order.”
Instead, the complaint’s more significant impact might be political. “It could put a lot of important arsenal in the hands of the MEPs [Members of the European Parliament] who want to push forward changes,” Ferstman said.
A European Court of Human Rights decision in favour of the plaintiffs in S.S. and others v Italy could be more decisive. “It would go a long way towards addressing that [accountability] gap, because individuals will be able to challenge European states that encourage and assist other countries to commit human rights violations,” de Bellis said.
If any or all of the various legal challenges that are currently underway are successful, Bossong, from SWP, doesn’t expect them to put an end to external migration cooperation entirely. “Many [external] cooperations would continue,” he said. “[But] policy-makers and administrators would have to think harder: Where is the line? Where do we cross the line?”
The Court of Auditors will likely decide whether to review EU funding for border management activities in Libya next year, but the European Court of Human Rights moves slowly, with proceedings generally taking around five years, according to Mann.
Human rights advocates and lawyers worry that by the time the current legal challenges are concluded, the situation in the Mediterranean will again have evolved. Already, since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, states such as Malta and Greece have shifted from empowering third countries to intercept people at sea to carrying out pushbacks directly.
“What is happening now, particularly in the Aegean, is much more alarming than the facts that generated the Hirsi case in terms of the violence of the actual pushbacks,” Mann said.
Human rights lawyers are already planning to begin issuing challenges to the new practices. As they do, they are acutely aware of the limitations of the tools available to them. Or, as Azarova put it: “We’re dealing with symptoms. We’re not addressing the pathology.”
Infographic: The History of Pandemics, by Death Toll
The History of Pandemics
Pan·dem·ic /panˈdemik/ (of a disease) prevalent over a whole country or the world.
As humans have spread across the world, so have infectious diseases. Even in this modern era, outbreaks are nearly constant, though not every outbreak reaches pandemic level as the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) has.
Today’s visualization outlines some of history’s most deadly pandemics, from the Antonine Plague to the current COVID-19 event.
A Calais, la frontière tue ! In Calais, the border kills !
Deaths at the Calais Border
Uncountable lives are wasted and suffer at the hands of the Calais border regime. There is no accurate count of how many people have died. This is a list of people known in Calais or from news reports.
For sure there will have been more, their deaths ignored, the facts covered up or altogether unreported. Many already go unnamed, without vigils and protests, without families or friends to advocate on their behalf.
But we will never let these deaths be silenced. We will not forgive and we will never forget.
These borders kill! One death is too many!
#morts #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #Calais #France #frontières #Angleterre #UK #migrations #asile #réfugiés #base_de_données #database #liste #timeline #ligne_du_temps #mourir_dans_la_forteresse_Europe #visualisation #infographie #frise #frise_chronologique #time-line #chronologie
Un article de février 2018
The deadly roads into Calais
Since 1999, an estimated 170 migrants desperately seeking a clandestine passage across the Channel to Britain have died in road accidents in and around the port of Calais in northern France, 37 of them since 2015. One former police officer said the situation became so grim “it was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road”. One of the most recent victims was a 22-year-old Eritrean whose mutilated body was found on a motorway last month after he was run over by a truck whose driver fled the scene. Elisa Perrigueur reports from Calais, where she met with Biniam’s relatives as they prepared the return of his body home to north-east Africa.
The temperature was below freezing point on a bleak dawn last month when Biniam’s remains were found near the port of Calais, lying on the smooth tarmac of the A16 motorway that runs parallel to the Channel coast. According to statements given to the police afterwards by those who knew him, Biniam L. (full last name withheld here), a 22-year-old Eritrean, had probably spent all night looking for a truck he could climb onto in the hope of smuggling his way to England.
He was successful, at first. He had managed to mount one of them, hiding in its cargo hold, most certainly hoping, like so many others who attempt the same, that once it passed through the fortified perimeter of the port, which is surrounded by 39 kilometres of fencing, it would be one of the vehicles that occasionally escapes the heat scanners and sniffer-dog searches, first in Calais and then, after the brief sea passage, through the British port of Dover. With no ID documents and no baggage, just the clothes he would hope could adequately keep out the biting cold.
But on that early morning of January 9th this year, his plan went horribly wrong. The truck he had hidden in did not turn off the motorway into Calais, but instead continued its route eastwards. The young man must have panicked when he realised the fact, for he tried to jump from the truck onto the motorway despite the speeding traffic. According to members of the local French migrant aid association, l’Auberge des migrants, who spoke to police afterwards, Biniam landed on his head and was run over by another truck following behind. But neither vehicle stopped, and there remains doubt over the exact circumstances of his final moments.
Between December 2017 and January this year two other migrants, 15-year-old Abdullah Dilsouz and Hussein Abdoullah, 32, both Afghan nationals, lost their lives in accidents on the roads around Calais. “Since 2015, there have been 37 migrants who have died in [and around] Calais,” said a spokesperson for the local prefecture. “The highest number date back to 2015 and 2016, the great majority are road accidents.” In 2015, the death toll reached 18, followed by 14 in 2016.
Maël Galisson, a coordinator for the network of associations in the region providing aid for migrants, the Plate-forme de services aux migrants, has carried out research to establish the number of victims over the past almost 20 years and, where possible, to record their identities. “Since 1999, we estimate that at least 170 people have died while trying to cross this frontier area,” he said. The majority of road accidents occur on the stretches of the A16 and A26 motorways close to Calais, and the ring road into the port centre.
The day after his death, Biniam’s brother Bereket, 26, arrived in Calais from Germany, accompanied by a cousin and uncle who had travelled from Norway. “He had no ‘dream’ as people put it, he just wanted a country where he was accepted,” said Bereket, who said he had difficulty believing the news that his brother, who he said was “so young to die”, had been killed in a road accident, which he received in a phone call from a friend.
Bereket said he was not aware of the daily reality of the migrants in Calais, the road blocks migrants mount to try and slow traffic and the clandestine crossings in trucks. In his case, he had crossed to Europe by boat across the Mediterranean Sea. Biniam, he explained, had left the family village in Eritrea, north-east Africa, one-and-a-half years ago, to escape conscription into the army. At one point, he joined up with his brother Bereket in Germany, where the latter had been granted residence. “I obtained [official residency] papers close to Stuttgart and today I work in Germany, I had begun to have a stable life,” recounted Bereket. “His asylum demand was rejected, I don’t understand why.” Biniam had re-applied a second time for right of asylum, but was again turned down. It was after that, in November, that he set off for Calais, where between 550 and 800 migrants – according to figures respectively from the prefecture and the migrant aid associations – live rough, mostly in surrounding woodland.
The few friends of Biniam who Bereket met with in Calais were little forthcoming about his time there. Loan Torondel of the Auberge des migrants association, which had offered Biniam shelter, said he was never seen at the daily distribution of meals. “A month here is not very long for finding a truck,” he said. “Often, migrants spend months before succeeding, for those who manage to.”
During his visit to Calais on February 2nd, French interior minister Gérard Collomb, hoping to dissuade migrants from gathering there, described the frontier point as “a wall” and “a mirage”. But from the beach, the migrants can see the English coast, where some have family and friends they hope to join, in a country with lower unemployment than in France and where finding work, undeclared, is easier. Others say they would stay in France but fear that, if they engaged in the official procedures, because their fingerprints are registered in the first European Union (EU) country they reached before travelling to France they would be sent back there, in accordance with the regulations of the EU’s so-called Dublin Agreement.
The victims are often young men’
For the migrants hoping to cross to Britain from Calais there are few options in how to do so. The British government has handed France about 140 million euros over the past three years to part fund the increased security measures at the port, which is the frontier point before departure for the English coast. On January 18th, at a summit meeting between British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron, London announced that it was to provide a further 50.5 million euros, for a further beefing up of security and for establishing a centre for migrants at a site distanced from the town.
For the migrants who can afford their fees, one option is to use the services of people smugglers. They charge between 1,500 euros and 10,000 euros per person for a clandestine passage in a truck, operating out of vehicle parks which they reign over as their own territory. Clashes which broke out in Calais on February 1st between Afghan and Eritrean migrants, which left 22 needing medical treatment, including four teenagers wounded by gunfire, appear to have been linked to turf wars between people smugglers.
Others try blocking trucks on the approach roads to the port, operating in small groups to lay down obstacles to slow or even halt the vehicles in order to jump on. The method is a dangerous one, for both the migrants and the drivers. In June 2017, the polish driver of a truck died after his vehicle crashed into another truck that was blocked by migrants on the A16 motorway, burned alive in his cabin.
Then there are those, and who probably included Biniam, who try to mount the vehicles on their own. Eupui is a 19-year-old migrant from Cameroun, in West Africa, and has lived since 2016 on the ‘Dunes’ industrial zone of the port, the site of the notorious and now razed migrant camp known as “the Jungle”. His solitary sorties to find a truck that would take him across the Channel somehow allow him “to keep going”, he told Mediapart. “I sleep three hours and then I try,” he said. “As soon as I see a truck that isn’t going too fast, even a car, I see if I can get into the boot.” He said he hides “near the bends of the motorways” because vehicles reduce speed there. “I’m not afraid, I’ve lived much worse,” he added. “I crossed the Sahara in horrible conditions to come here. I have nothing left to lose. I’ve injured my knee, but never mind.”
Biniam’s brother Bereket said his brother did not realise the danger in the risks he was taking. “I spoke to him three weeks before he died,” said Bereket. “He told me that everything was fine for him in France. But he lied to me, he didn’t tell me he was at Calais. If I had known, I would have told him to get out of this dangerous place.”
Bereket said he was “disappointed” by what he saw on this, his first trip to France. He has been supported by local charitable associations, including the Réveil voyageur and the Secours catholique, who usually look after relatives of those who have died. “You don’t see many officials, politicians, as if Biniam’s death had no importance,” he said bitterly.
“The associations have been managing this for years,” said Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group. “When relatives arrive in Calais they are disappointed at not seeing many officials. They have the impression that they are not taken into account. Mr Macron referred to the death of the Polish driver, but not that of migrants,” she added, referring to a speech by the French president during his visit to Calais on January 16th.
Undertaker Brahim Fares, based in nearby Grande-Synthe, says he charges a “lower than average” price to migrant families out of solidarity. “The dead are repatriated to Afghanistan for between about 3,400-3,500 euros, depending on the weight and the size,” he detailed. “For Eritrea, it begins at around 3,200 euros. Burials in Calais are about 1,600 euros, as opposed to a usual 2,400 euros.” Since 2015, Fares says he has organised the return home of about 15 bodies of migrants, and also the burials of about the same number in the north Calais cemetery managed by the Town Hall. The burial spots are simple ones, covered in earth and marked by crosses made of oak. “The victims are often young men, almost all of them identified,” he added. “I once had an Ethiopian woman. Not all the families can come all the way here. Those who manage to are very shocked, because the bodies are sometimes very damaged, as those in road accidents are.”
Fares was given charge of Biniam’s body, which he recalled had “the hands cut off, the arms smashed up”. The corpse will be returned to Eritrea, where his parents live. Bereket, with his uncle and cousin, made up a large wreath of plastic flowers. “It’s really not so good but we had only that,” he said. But at the hospital in Lille where the body was placed in the coffin, they were told that they could not place the wreath on top of it, nor the white drape they had wanted to cover it with, according to their custom. “The airport authorities will end up throwing the wreath away, it’s not allowed in the hold,” Fares explained to them. After a poignant moment of silence, they asked him why it would be so complicated to do so.
Biniam’s relatives spent two weeks attempting to find out the exact circumstances of what happened to him. At the police station in Calais, they were shown a photo of his injured face. Members of the motorway patrol police gave them the few details they had, which were the approximate time of the accident, a statement from a witness who had not seen very much, and the fact that the driver of the truck that ran over Biniam had fled the scene. “France is a developed country […] so why can’t the driver who did that be found?” asked Bereket. “Even in Eritrea we’d have found the killer of my brother.”
Loan Torondel of the association l’Auberge des migrants said he had seen similar outrage by relatives before. “Many don’t understand why their close family member died under a lorry and that the driver did not act voluntarily,” he said. “Biniam’s family thought that there would be the launch of an investigation, like in American films. They think that the police is not [bothered into] carrying out an investigation, but in reality there are few witnesses.”
Meanwhile, Bereket has lodged an official complaint over his brother’s death “against persons unknown”, explaining: “I won’t be able to sleep as long as I don’t know how he died, and while the person responsible is free.”
’It’s incredible that nobody saw anything’
While the police systematically open investigations into the road deaths of migrants, they are often complex, beginning with the identification of the victim. Patrick Visser-Bourdon, a former Calais-based police detective, recalled the death of a Sudanese migrant whose body was found one morning in 2016 close to the port’s ring road, with “the head opened, abandoned, wearing a pair of jeans and a long-sleeved T-shirt”.
During his enquiries, Visser-Bourdon approached the head of the Sudanese community of migrants living in the camp known as “the Jungle”, but nobody recognised the body. “We also put out his photo in the police stations,” he said. “In the majority of such cases, we mostly called on the NGOs for help.” As in the case of Biniam, the driver of what was apparently a truck that had hit the Sudanese man had not stopped. “There was blood on the road, there was necessarily some on the bumpers of the truck,” said Visser-Bourdon. “The driver therefore must have stopped his vehicle at some point to clean it, between the Jungle and the port. It’s incredible that nobody saw anything.”
Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group added that because some local sections of the motorways are unlit, “It is entirely possible to not realise that one has hit someone and to carry on”.
A section of the numerous investigations into such events end up being closed, unsolved. Someone who is charged with involuntary homicide in France faces a sentence of three years in prison, and up to five years in jail in the case of aggravating circumstances such as fleeing the scene. “Sometimes, some of them don’t remain at the scene of the accident, notably in the case of dangerous [migrant] road blocks, but they go directly to present themselves to the police,” said Pascal Marconville, public prosecutor of the nearby port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, whose services have jurisdiction for events in Calais. “In that case, it’s regarded more as a hit-and-run offence which is exonerated by the circumstances.”
Patrick Visser-Bourdon said he had welcomed the building of a wall surrounding the ring road in 2016 aimed at deterring migrants from the traffic. “It was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road,” he said.
En français :
A Calais, les routes de la mort pour les migrants
Voir Calais et mourir
Si, depuis quelques années, militants et chercheurs commencent à compter les morts sur les routes migratoires, ils ont tendance à se focaliser sur l’arc méditerranéen, négligeant la frontière franco-britannique que l’on pourrait qualifier de nasse calaisienne. Accords européens, traités bilatéraux et leurs corollaires sécuritaires font en effet de cette frontière un mur meurtrier. Et les migrants n’ont d’autre choix que de prendre toujours plus de risques pour le franchir… au péril de leur vie.
Nawall Al Jende avait 26 ans. Elle était originaire de Nawa, une ville située à une trentaine de kilomètres de Deraa, dans le sud de la Syrie. Elle avait fui la guerre et laissé derrière elle son époux et deux de ses enfants. Avec son troisième enfant, Mohamed, âgé de 9 ans, et le frère de son mari, Oussama, son périple l’avait amenée à traverser neuf pays avant d’atteindre Calais. Sa sœur, Sawson, avait réalisé un parcours quasi similaire deux mois plus tôt et l’attendait de l’autre côté de la Manche. Nawall est décédée le 15 octobre 2015, après avoir été percutée par un taxi sur l’autoroute A16, alors qu’elle tentait de se glisser dans un camion afin de franchir la frontière franco-britannique. Comme sur les autres routes de l’exil, des personnes migrantes meurent à Calais et dans sa région. Depuis 1999, on estime qu’au moins 170 personnes sont décédées en tentant de franchir cet espace frontalier reliant la France à l’Angleterre.
Pourquoi prêter attention aux personnes mortes en migration à la frontière franco-britannique ? Il n’existe pas de données officielles à ce sujet. Par conséquent, participer au travail de collecte d’informations contribue à documenter l’histoire du fait migratoire dans la région. En l’espace de quelques années, la question des exilés morts aux frontières s’est imposée dans le débat public. Elle a été d’abord portée, par des acteurs militants, à l’image des travaux réalisés par United for Intercultural Action, Fortress Europe ou encore Watch the Med. Puis, des journalistes se sont intéressés au sujet (The Migrants Files), ainsi que des chercheurs (Deaths at the Borders Database). Aujourd’hui, une institution officielle telle que l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) commence à recenser les personnes mortes en migration. Toutefois, dans ces différents relevés, la situation à la frontière franco-britannique est peu prise en compte, le focus étant davantage dirigé sur la mortalité aux portes de l’Europe, dans l’arc qui va des Iles Canaries à la mer Égée, en passant par le détroit de Gibraltar et le canal de Sicile. Par conséquent, travailler à la collecte d’informations sur les personnes mortes à Calais et dans la région répond à un réel besoin et rend visible une réalité méconnue.
Redonner un nom aux morts
Ce travail d’enquête ne veut pas s’en tenir au traitement simplement comptable ou anecdotique de la question des morts en migration. Il cherche, quand cela est possible, à redonner une identité et une histoire à ces « corps sans nom » ou à ces « noms sans histoire ». Tenter de reconstituer des récits de vie, (re)donner une dimension personnelle à chaque décès est un moyen d’éviter leur dilution dans ce qu’on nomme communément, de façon globalisante, les « drames de la migration ». Il s’agit également de rompre avec l’idée que cette hécatombe résulterait de la fatalité. Réduire ces tragédies à des accidents (accident de la route, noyade, etc.), à des violences ou des règlements de compte entre migrants est une façon d’occulter la responsabilité des pouvoirs publics dans une situation qui dure depuis plus de vingt ans dans le nord de la France. Au contraire, c’est bien l’addition d’accords européens et de traités bilatéraux, destinés à empêcher les indésirables d’accéder au territoire britannique qui a fait de cette région un mur meurtrier. De même, considérer que les seules violences exercées à l’encontre des exilés sont dues aux « réseaux de passeurs » est une manière d’occulter celles qui sont liées aux conditions de vie et à l’absence de dispositifs d’accueil adaptés, au harcèlement policier et à la surenchère de dispositifs de surveillance de la frontière.
On constate en effet que la majorité des décès sont liés aux tentatives de passage, qu’ils soient immédiats ou qu’ils surviennent des suites de blessures que ces tentatives occasionnent. Le long de la frontière franco-britannique, les exilés meurent principalement après avoir été percutés par un train sur le site d’Eurotunnel, renversés par un véhicule – parfois volontairement – sur un axe routier non loin d’un point de passage ou écrasés sous l’essieu d’un poids lourd. Et finalement, les « règlements de compte » ou les violences « inter ou intra-communautaires » se concluant par des morts restent des événements marginaux.
La majeure partie des exilés tentent de passer la frontière cachés dans la remorque d’un camion ou en dessous. Cette méthode s’avère extrêmement dangereuse et les risques de mourir écrasé par le contenu de la marchandise, par suffocation ou en tombant du camion (en particulier une fois arrivé sur le territoire britannique) sont importants. On pense notamment aux 58 personnes migrantes de nationalité chinoise cachées dans un camion frigorifique et découvertes mortes par asphyxie à Douvres en juin 2000. Un événement qui fait terriblement écho à la tragédie survenue 15 ans plus tard en Autriche, quand 71 exilés syriens cachés dans un camion furent abandonnés sur le bord d’une autoroute par le conducteur et décédèrent par suffocation.
Même si le phénomène reste minoritaire, on recense plusieurs cas de noyades. Si quelques-unes se sont produites à la suite de rixes ou afin d’échapper à des violences policières, la plupart sont survenues pendant des tentatives de franchissement de la frontière. On observe ainsi plusieurs cas désespérés, et finalement mortels, survenus lors de la traversée du détroit du Pas-de-Calais, par embarcation ou à la nage. Le 12 juin 2002, un exilé russe parti en canoë s’est noyé dans la Manche. Son corps n’a jamais été retrouvé et le camarade qui l’accompagnait est resté accroché pendant cinq heures à l’embarcation à la dérive avant d’être secouru. Le précieux travail d’investigation du journaliste norvégien Anders Fjellberg  a permis de retracer le parcours de deux exilés syriens, Mouaz Al Balkhi et Shadi Omar Kataf. Après plusieurs semaines passées entre les Jungles de Calais et de Grande-Synthe et une douzaine de tentatives de passage « classiques » ratées, les deux compatriotes optèrent pour une autre stratégie. Le 7 octobre 2014, ils se procurèrent une combinaison de plongée au magasin Décathlon de Calais. Leurs corps ont été retrouvés quelques semaines plus tard, l’un sur une plage de Norvège, l’autre sur une plage des Pays-Bas.
Petits arrangements entre voisins
Les modes de franchissement de la frontière évoluent en fonction de son niveau de sécurisation. Plus un point de passage est rendu inaccessible, plus il y a de prises de risque et plus ces tentatives impliquent le recours à un « tiers », le passeur. En septembre 2014, le ministre de l’intérieur français, Bernard Cazeneuve, signait avec son homologue britannique, Theresa May, un accord bilatéral « incluant une contribution britannique de 5 millions d’euros par an pendant trois ans » dont l’une des mesures principales visait à « renforcer la sécurité, à la fois autour du port et dans la zone portuaire  ». Cet accord visait à empêcher, d’une part, les tentatives d’intrusions collectives sur le site portuaire et, d’autre part, les incursions sur la rocade accédant au port, technique consistant à profiter des embouteillages pour se cacher dans la remorque d’un camion La mise en œuvre du versant « sécurisation » de cet accord a été confiée à l’entreprise Zaun, une firme britannique , et s’est déroulée en plusieurs étapes. Dans un premier temps, à partir d’octobre 2014, les barrières ont été doublées à l’intérieur du site portuaire. Puis, au printemps 2015, sur une distance de deux kilomètres le long de la rocade accédant à la zone portuaire, a été érigée une double clôture, l’une de 4 mètres de haut et l’autre d’un peu moins de 3 mètres, équipée d’une rampe d’accès incurvée pour éviter qu’on ne s’y s’agrippe, et surmontée d’un fil barbelé. Entre les deux clôtures, un espace de détection infrarouge a été installé. La mise en place de cet arsenal autour de la zone portuaire a obligé les exilés à se détourner du port pour trouver d’autres voies de passage, plus dangereuses, notamment celle du tunnel sous la Manche. Les conséquences ne se sont pas fait attendre : alors qu’aucun des 17 décès recensés en 2014 n’avait eu lieu sur le site d’Eurotunnel, on en comptait 15 sur les 25 enregistrés en 2015. Il serait difficile d’en conclure que plus on boucle la frontière franco-britannique, plus celle-ci devient meurtrière. En effet, l’augmentation significative du nombre de morts entre 2014 et 2015 s’explique aussi par celle du nombre d’exilés présents dans le Calaisis. Les militants locaux estiment qu’il a crû, en un an, de 1 500 à environ 5 000 personnes. Il est en revanche certain qu’à la multiplication des barrières et des dispositifs dissuasifs, se sont ajoutées les désastreuses conditions de vie des exilés, obligés de survivre dans une extrême précarité et dans un contexte de surpopulation croissante, tout en tentant d’échapper aux violences policières : un cocktail explosif qui les a poussés plus nombreux à prendre des risques pour espérer passer. En août 2015, un nouvel accord franco-britannique fut signé dans lequel les deux ministres reconnaissaient que « depuis la fin du mois de juin, en raison de la sécurisation du port, les migrants ont changé de stratégie, cherchant au péril de leur vie, à s’introduire au niveau des points d’entrée dans le tunnel sous la Manche ». Mais qu’imaginent-ils pour remédier à ce constat inquiétant ? Que « la France renforce l’actuel dispositif de sécurité et l’action de ses policiers et de ses gendarmes, grâce au déploiement d’unités mobiles additionnelles » et que le Royaume-Uni alloue des moyens supplémentaires pour « sécuriser le périmètre de l’entrée du tunnel, grâce à un dispositif de clôtures, de vidéosurveillance, de technologie de détection infrarouge et de projecteurs lumineux » tout en « [aidant] la société Eurotunnel à augmenter nettement ses effectifs en charge de la sécurité et de la protection du site  ». Ce qui s’est traduit par l’installation de 29 kilomètres de nouvelles barrières et le « renforcement » de 10 kilomètres déjà existants. Le paysage du site d’Eurotunnel a été radicalement bouleversé : 100 hectares ont été rasés afin de faciliter la surveillance et une partie de cette zone a été volontairement inondée « pour créer des obstacles naturels qui empêchent l’accès aux clôtures » .
Cette séquence n’est finalement qu’une étape supplémentaire dans la longue histoire de la fortification de la frontière franco-britannique. Elle a commencé avec le code international pour la sûreté des navires et des installations portuaires (code ISPS) régissant les zones portuaires fournissant des services internationaux et s’est prolongée, depuis le début des années 1990, par une succession d’accords bilatéraux. Alors que le protocole de Sangatte (1991) avait initié la mise en place de contrôles juxtaposés français et britanniques des deux côtés de la frontière, son protocole additionnel (2000) les a étendus aux principales gares du nord de la France et du sud de l’Angleterre.
Au tournant des années 2000, la fortification de la frontière prend une autre dimension. Du côté du site portuaire, « en 2000, un premier programme de 6 millions d’euros est engagé pour clôturer une partie du port, installer un réseau de vidéo surveillance ainsi qu’un bâtiment spécifique au département sûreté ». Jusqu’alors, la zone portuaire n’était que très sommairement clôturée. « À partir de 2005, un deuxième programme d’investissement de 7 millions d’euros est engagé […] [permettant] de finaliser l’année suivante, un réseau de 48 caméras fixes et mobiles de vidéo surveillance . » De son côté, Eurotunnel renforce la surveillance de son site à partir du printemps 2001 et bénéficie, en février 2002, du prêt d’un radar PMMW (système à détection thermique) de l’armée britannique. Tandis que la signature du traité du Touquet (2003) étend les dispositions relatives aux contrôles juxtaposés à tous les ports de la Manche et de la mer du Nord, « l’arrangement » franco-britannique de 2009 accentue le recours aux dispositifs de détection et crée un centre de coordination conjoint « chargé de recueillir et partager toutes les informations nécessaires au contrôle des biens et de personnes circulant entre la France et le Royaume-Uni » . Les accords franco-britanniques de 2014 et 2015 sont venus compléter cet empilement de textes.
Retracer de manière précise et tenter de cartographier l’évolution des dispositifs mis en place autour de la frontière franco-britannique n’est pas chose aisée. En effet, l’accès à l’information est relativement restreint, du fait notamment de la multiplicité des acteurs impliqués (services de l’État, gestionnaires des sites portuaires et du tunnel, prestataires de sécurité privés, etc.) et du manque de transparence qui en résulte. Dans ses déclarations, le porte-parole d’Eurotunnel indique que « depuis l’apparition des clandestins [sic] dans le Calaisis, Eurotunnel a, au-delà de ses obligations contractuelles, investi massivement dans les moyens physiques (clôtures, éclairages, caméras, barrières infrarouges) et humains de protection du terminal de Coquelles : plus de 160 millions d’euros, dont 13 millions d’euros au premier semestre 2015 » . Difficile d’évaluer finement ce que coûte cette surenchère. Cette question fait l’objet d’une bataille de communication, notamment entre l’État et Eurotunnel, le premier reprochant au second de ne pas en faire assez en matière de sûreté tandis que le second réclame toujours plus d’aides pour protéger le site. L’affaire, connue sous le nom de « contentieux de Sangatte », s’est d’ailleurs conclue devant les tribunaux en 2003 par une victoire d’Eurotunnel qui a obtenu de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne une indemnisation pour les investissements qu’il avait consentis à cet effet .
Du coût humain, il n’en est bien entendu pas question. Aux morts recensées s’ajoutent celles qui n’ont pu l’être. Par manque de sources, car « il y a suffisamment à faire avec les vivants  » ou par oubli tout simplement. Et puis il y a les personnes blessées, « des jeunes aux mains et aux jambes lacérées par les barbelés qui entourent le site d’Eurotunnel […] ces clôtures [qui] déchiquettent la peau de manière anarchique  ». Mutilées ou accidentées, ces personnes n’entrent dans aucun décompte. Le 21 octobre 2001, dans La Voix du Nord, la journaliste Sophie Leroy titrait son article « Assez de mort aux frontières »  en reprenant l’un des slogans de la manifestation organisée à Calais par le collectif C’Sur  pour dénoncer cette frontière meurtrière. Quinze années plus tard, la liste des morts n’a cessé de s’allonger.
Deadly Crossings and the militarisation of Britain’s borders
#Frise_chronologique. Histoire des luttes des immigrations
La #frise chronologique « Histoires de luttes des immigrations » est un outil multimédia de valorisation des expériences collectées dans les ateliers de récits de vie « Petits Histoires- Grandes Histoires ».
Cette mini-encyclopédie est nourrie des #souvenirs des participant-e-s, leurs expériences, leurs parcours familiaux et migratoires, avec des événements qui font le lien entre l’histoire personnelle, locale, nationale et internationale.
Infographic: 4,000 Years Of Human History Captured In One Retro Chart
If time is a river, the Histomap, created by John B. Sparks and first published by Rand McNally back in 1931, is a raging Mississippi. In that massive river of time, each of humanity’s great civilizations becomes a confluence that ebbs, wanes, and sometimes ebbs again, each a separate current in a river that inexorably rages down to the mouth of the present day.
Parfois, retrouver un post est vraiment difficile.
En fait, je m’attendais à le retrouver sur 2018... mais il datait de 2013. Et j’ignore comment j’ai pu tomber dessus en 2018...
Je la trouve en meilleure qualité ici :
Informations accompagnant le fichier :
Author Rand McNally and Company
Author Sparks, John B.
Short Title The Histomap.
Publisher Rand McNally and Company
Publisher Location Chicago
Obj Height cm 158
Obj Width cm 31
Note Histomap is accompanied by a Foreword explaining the purpose and layout of the history. Map and Foreword slide into a green folder with title and relevant information, such as price, on the outside.
World Area World
Subject Pictorial map
Subject Data Visualization
Full Title The Histomap. Four Thousand Years Of World History. Relative Power Of Contemporary States, Nations And Empires. Copyright by John B. Sparks. Published by Histomap, Inc. Chicago, Ill. Printed and distributed in the U.S.A. by Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Ill.
List No 1810.001
Series No 2
Publication Author Sparks, John B.
Publication Author Rand McNally and Company
Pub Date 1931
Pub Title The Histomap. Four Thousand Years Of World History. Relative Power Of Contemporary States, Nations And Empires. Copyright by John B. Sparks. Published by Histomap, Inc. Chicago, Ill. Printed and distributed in the U.S.A. by Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Ill.
Pub Note See note field above.
Pub List No 1810.000
Pub Type Timeline
Pub Height cm 158
Pub Width cm 31
Image No 1810001
Download 1 ►http://www.davidrumsey.com/rumsey/download.pl?image=/D5005/1810001.sid Full Image Download in MrSID Format
Download 2 ▻https://www.extensis.com/support/geoviewer-9 GeoViewer for JP2 and SID files
Authors Rand McNally and Company; Sparks, John B.
The Future of the Schengen Area : Latest Developments and Challenges in the Schengen Governance Framework since 2016
This Study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE-Committee), takes stock of the main developments that have occurred in the Schengen Governance Framework since 2016. It analyses the legitimacy of a number of States’ decisions to maintain internal border controls. Also, most recent policy proposals in the field of internal police checks are assessed in light of relevant EU legal standards. The paper also questions the legality of the border walls and fences, which have been recently erected at the EU external borders and within the Schengen area.
#Schengen (fin de -) #frontières #murs #barrières_frontalières #contrôles_frontaliers #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières #frontière_sud-alpine
Lien vers l’étude (pdf) :
Source de la carte (c’est intéressant le fait qu’elle a été faite par le HCR) :
Avec ce commentaire de Polly Pallister-Wilkins sur twitter :
We should be clear that the reimposition of controls by say France do not effect everyone equally. If you’re white and well-off you won’t even notice the border. This differentiation matters because this is not an equal control, but one based on race and class. #violentborders
Schengen, quand l’exception se propage...
Menace terroriste. La France va prolonger ses contrôles aux frontières jusqu’à fin octobre
Jusqu’à fin octobre, la France, qui fait partie de l’espace Schengen, va continuer à mener des contrôles à ses frontières en raison de la menace terroriste. Elle en a informé la Commission européenne.
Protéger les frontières pour assurer la libre-circulation en Europe
Depuis le début de la crise migratoire, certains États membres se sont laissés tentés par le #rétablissement_des_frontières. Une mauvaise idée, selon le directeur de Frontex, qui plaide pour une meilleure protection des frontières externes.
–-> Leggeri fait ici le lien entre frontières extérieures (mieux protégées) et frontières intérieures (ouvertes)...
La transformation en cours de Frontex en Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes en est une. Elle nous permet d’aller au-delà de notre mandat initial – la gestion des flux migratoires – pour contribuer davantage à la sécurité des frontières extérieures de l’UE en participant plus activement à la lutte cruciale contre toutes les formes de criminalité organisée, terrorisme compris.
#European_Border_and_Coast_Guard (Frontex): Security, Democracy, and Rights at the EU Border
The European Border and Coast Guard (#EBCG) was officially launched in October 2016. In the European Commission’s view, it marks a milestone in the history of the integrated management of European Union (EU) borders. This article describes the main features of the new agency, focusing on two key issues. First, it analyzes the powers that the new agency is entrusted with in an attempt to understand whether it will be able to articulate a “European space of control” where an authentically postnational border police will take the lead over national border agencies. Second, it explores whether, and to what extent, the reform of the EU border agency has been accompanied by the development of mechanisms to exercise effective democratic and judicial control over its activities. The discussion concludes by arguing that the views of those who believe that the evolution of EU justice and home affairs policies does not raise particular challenges for the exercise of democratic control over EU security agencies and the protection of fundamental rights during their operations are fundamentally flawed, and that new ways to ensure proper scrutiny over security policies that take account of the peculiarities of EU institutional structure need to be devised.
Dedans, dehors : une Europe qui s’enferme
La Cimade publie un rapport d’enquête et d’analyse sur la situation des personnes exilées aux frontières extérieures et intérieures de l’espace #Schengen. Nourri par des observations récoltées aux frontières de la France, de la Hongrie et en Méditerranée, ce rapport appelle les responsables politiques nationaux à changer radicalement de cap face à des logiques qui excluent, enferment, précarisent et trop souvent, tuent les personnes en migration.
Cette publication construite à partir de l’observation des dispositifs de surveillance et de tri des personnes migrantes aux frontières de la France, de la Hongrie et en Méditerranée entend interroger la question du contrôle des frontières intérieures et extérieures de l’espace Schengen. Des membres de La Cimade ainsi que ses partenaires ont mené des missions d’enquête et d’observation dans ces différentes zones frontalières en 2017 et 2018 afin de nourrir ce travail d’analyse.
Élevée au rang de priorité numéro une de l’Union européenne (UE) depuis 2015, la question migratoire est au cœur des débats des institutions européennes et pays de l’UE. Trois années après que l’opinion publique européenne s’est émue des images de familles réfugiées en exil, il apparaît clairement que l’Europe n’a pas été à la hauteur des enjeux. Au lieu de prendre acte de l’échec de ses politiques migratoires et d’envisager d’autres moyens d’imaginer les mobilités, l’UE et ses États membres ont profité d’une augmentation importante du nombre de personnes tentant de rejoindre l’Europe pour renforcer l’existant : contrôles, surveillance et tri aux frontières internes et externes de l’espace Schengen.
Depuis plus de vingt ans, l’UE et ses États membres s’obstinent à renforcer des politiques migratoires qui ne fonctionnent pas. En témoigne le nombre de personnes ayant perdu la vie aux frontières européennes, en augmentation chaque année. Par ailleurs, alors que des citoyens et citoyennes s’organisent pour soutenir les personnes exilées, les poursuites judiciaires pour criminaliser leurs actes de solidarité se multiplient.
Les réponses européennes se doivent pourtant d’être à la hauteur des ambitions de l’UE : créatives, solidaires et protectrices des droits humains. Les politiques touchant à l’asile et la migration vont actuellement dans le sens inverse, d’où notre appel pressant à changer de cap.
Au sommaire d’un rapport illustré par des cartes, des infographies et des photographies :
Démultiplier les frontières pour un seul objectif : limiter le mouvement des personnes migrantes ;
Frontières violentes : mise en danger et violation des droits des personnes exilées ;
Résistances envers et contre tout.
#Frise_chronologique. Histoire des luttes des immigrations
La frise chronologique « Histoires de luttes des immigrations » est un outil multimédia de valorisation des #expériences collectées dans les ateliers de récits de vie « Petits Histoires- Grandes Histoires ».
Cette mini-encyclopédie est nourrie des #souvenirs des participant-e-s, leurs expériences, leurs #parcours_familiaux et migratoires, avec des événements qui font le lien entre l’histoire personnelle, locale, nationale et internationale.
Cette carte en vidéo retrace 15 ans d’attentats dans le monde
Un designer s’est efforcé de représenter en vidéo toutes les attaques terroristes survenues depuis quinze ans dans le monde et ayant fait au moins 20 morts.
Al-Qaïda, Boko Haram, Daesh, les talibans, les FARC, Al-Shabaab… depuis quinze ans, les mouvements classés dans la liste officielle du terrorisme ont frappé de très nombreux pays : en Irak, en Syrie, aux États-Unis, en Colombie, en Inde, en Espagne, en Russie, en Algérie, au Cameroun, au Royaume-Uni et bien sûr en France.
Cette vague d’attentats qui a frappé aveuglément tous les continents a été une source d’inspiration pour le designer Milan R. Vuckovic. Dans une vidéo intitulée Quinze ans de terreur, il présente un accéléré de toutes les attaques terroristes survenues entre le 1 décembre 2000 et le 13 novembre 2015, et ayant fait au moins vingt morts,
Courrier international | Quarante ans de migrations en une mélodie
Exploiter les données numériques et les retranscrire en musique. C’est le défi que s’est fixé Brian Foo, dont la dernière vidéo retrace l’évolution des flux migratoires dans le monde de 1975 à 2012. Le programmeur informatique et artiste s’est fondé sur des données fournies par l’ONU.
A #timeline of key events and internal displacement in Yemen
The latest outbreak of conflict in Yemen between the al-Houthis and Yemeni security forces has taken a heavy toll on the population, killing around 2,300 people and increasing the number of IDPs to over 1 million as of 1 June 2015. The number of people displaced in Yemen has doubled since early May and is expected to grow further as conflict continues.
A #timeline for Syria
All of Syria’s neighbours have tightened their restrictions on the entry of refugees in recent months as they have suffered under the strain of hosting hundreds of thousands of people. While rights groups call for open borders, governments argue they need more support to continue supporting such high numbers of refugees. In the meantime, fleeing Syrians have dwindling options.
8 January, 2015 (IRIN) - Lebanon’s decision on Monday to tighten restrictions on the entry of Syrian refugees is the latest in a series of measures across the Middle East. In each of the neighbouring countries that accept refugees – Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey – the past six months have seen higher barriers to entry for those fleeing the civil war.
The countries, which collectively host more than three million refugees, have complained that the influx has had a negative effect on their economies, while in some cases leading to increased insecurity. In Lebanon, Syrians now make up over a quarter of the population and the World Bank has estimated up to 170,000 Lebanese have been pushed into poverty by the influx.
While from the beginning of the crisis there have been reports of some restrictions in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, in recent months they have become more common. Neil Sammonds, researcher on Syria, Lebanon and Jordan for Amnesty International, said Western states should better support Syria’s neighbours to keep their borders open. “While there are growing concerns at the seemingly ever-tightening restrictions being imposed on new entrants, it is clear that Lebanon’s resources are over-stretched, that other neighbouring countries are taking similar negative measures and that the international community must do much, much more both to assist those countries’ efforts to host so many refugees and also to open their own doors to people fleeing Syria.”
The Lebanese decision comes the same week the UN announced that Syria is now the origin of the largest number of registered refugees globally – overtaking Afghanistan, which has been top for 30 years. The decision doesn’t include Palestinians, who are not under the remit of the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR.
Below is a timeline of some of the events and restrictions that have made it harder for Syrian refugees in recent months.