• Les enjeux de l’alimentation en eau potable des villes

    Mathilde Resch et Émilie Lavie
    Les enjeux de l’alimentation en eau potable des villes
    Introduction
    Issues associated with drinking water supply in cities
    Introduction
    –-
    Sandrine Petit, Marie-Hélène Vergote et Emmanuel Dumont
    #Dijon, « ville sur la Saône ». Frontières urbaines, #réseaux_d’eau_potable et territoires de la #ressource en eau

    –-

    Sébastien Hardy et Jérémy Robert
    Entre grand système et #alternatives d’#approvisionnement en eau à #Lima et  #La_Paz
    –-

    Ismaël Maazaz
    Hydraulic bricolages : coexisting water supply and access regimes in #N’Djamena, #Chad
    –-

    Xavier May, Pauline Bacquaert, Jean-Michel Decroly, Léa de Guiran, Chloé Deligne, Pierre Lannoy et Valentina Marziali
    Formes, facteurs et importance de la #vulnérabilité_hydrique dans une métropole européenne. Le cas de #Bruxelles

    –-

    Angela Osorio
    La #gestion_communautaire de l’eau dans les #páramos de #Bogota (#Colombie). Le cas du réseau #Piedra_Parada y #Cerrito_blanco

    –-

    Audrey Vincent et Philippe Fleury
    Reconquérir la #qualité de l’eau potable par le développement de l’#agriculture_biologique et de systèmes alimentaires dédiés. Le cas de la #vallée_de_la_Vanne et de la ville de #Paris

    https://journals.openedition.org/echogeo/22090
    #revue #eau #eau_potable #villes #alimentation #urban_matter #géographie_urbaine #TRUST #master_TRUST

  • Manifeste pour une ville accueillante
    https://metropolitiques.eu/Manifeste-pour-une-ville-accueillante.html

    En plaçant l’hospitalité au centre de sa réflexion, l’architecte Chantal Deckmyn propose un riche manuel sur l’espace public contemporain. L’auteure interroge les conditions d’un réenchantement de l’urbain, s’inscrivant ainsi dans une longue généalogie de manifestes pour la ville. Avec Lire la ville, l’architecte Chantal Deckmyn entend aborder de front la manière dont l’urbain contemporain se rend hostile aux populations les plus fragiles : « Pour ceux qui n’ont pas de maison et sont de fait enfermés #Commentaires

    / #espace_public, hospitalité, #sans-abri, urbanité, #rue

    #hospitalité #urbanité
    https://metropolitiques.eu/IMG/pdf/met-fe_riel4.pdf

  • #Jardins_ouvriers d’#Aubervilliers : quelle place pour la #nature_en_ville ?

    Une partie des jardins ouvriers des #Vertus à Aubervilliers doit être sacrifiée à des projets d’#aménagement_urbain en vue des JO de 2024. Comment l’expliquer, alors que les pouvoirs publics disent par ailleurs lutter contre la #bétonisation et l’#artificialisation_des_sols ?

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/sous-les-radars/jardins-ouvriers-d-aubervilliers-quelle-place-pour-la-nature-en-ville


    #JAD #nature #villes #urban_matter #Grand_Paris #JO #jeux_olympiques
    #podcast #audio
    #TRUST #master_trust

  • Barcelona Will Supersize its Car-Free ‘#Superblocks’

    Since the Spanish city of Barcelona introduced its first “superblock” in 2016, the concept of carving out islands of car-free space by routing traffic around multi-block areas has been influential in cities around the world. Now the Catalan capital plans a major super-sizing of the idea: Over the next decade, Barcelona will convert its entire central grid into a greener, pedestrian-friendly area almost totally cleared of cars.

    At a press conference Wednesday, Mayor Ada Colau announced that 21 streets in Barcelona’s Eixample district will become a kind of super-superblock — vehicle traffic will only be permitted around the perimeter, leaving streets within the district only accessible by motor vehicle to residents, essential services or deliveries. By all-but-barring cars, Barcelona will free up space for 21 new pedestrian plazas at intersections.

    These squares and streets will be planted with trees that will shade 6.6 hectares (16 acres) of new green space when mature, in a zone that will contain an extra 33.4 hectares of pedestrian space. With work beginning in 2022 to a budget of 38 million euros ($45 million), the plan represents one of the most thorough revamps of a major European city so far this century. It is an attempt, Mayor Colau said in a statement, to “think of the new city for the present and the future — with less pollution, new mobility and new public space.”

    The new district is an order of magnitude larger than the first Superilla (“Super-island” in Catalan) in the district of Poblenou. Taking over nine city blocks, the 2016 redesign banished through-traffic to streets on its border. Within the block, car lanes were narrowed, and vehicles that still made it inside were required to give way to pedestrians and restricted to a maximum speed of 10 kilometers per hour. A further six superblocks have since been introduced. The city has long expressed an aspiration (albeit without a fixed end date) to ultimately transform its entire surface area with superblocks — this week’s announcement is the largest step towards that goal to date.

    In a city of few parks and extreme population density, the superblocks have proved to be an effective way to free up street space for other uses, including new squares, public seating areas and tree-lined green avenues. But they have also faced resistance from motorists, who in the past have organized demonstrations to protest the car restrictions.

    Those objections may re-emerge given the scale of the new superblock announced Wednesday, which covers one of the densest sections of the city. So large the city is referring to it as the “Barcelona superblock,” the project will probably prove more difficult to implement than those installed in quieter areas. While bustling parts of the city have been given the superblock treatment before — the current plan will extend from a smaller existing superblock around the Sant Antoni covered market — they have never extended for as great a distance as the new zone. The city is thus proposing a staggered introduction, one that starts by redesigning intersections along a single east-west axis and extends gradually across the neighborhood.

    The plan kicks off with a public competition to create four new plazas along a main artery in the area — the Carrer del Consell de Cent — which is being revamped, along with three intersecting streets. From these four streets, the superblock will gradually march across the district until all 21 streets have been remodeled by 2030.

    This is a process made somewhat easier by the connecting street in question having already been partly redesigned to permit more social distancing during the pandemic. Indeed, while the superblock expansion is not being framed by the city as a response provoked by Covid-19, the widespread adoption of remote work during the pandemic and the partial emptying of business districts has provided an opportunity to call for a reset to the ways urban space is used, and by whom, when the crowds return.

    The exact design of these streets will be chosen from a public competition in May 2021, but the city has already created some tight specifications: At least 80% of the street should be shaded by trees in summer, while at least 20% of surfacing should be permeable, and half of this total planted with grass, to allow the ground to soak up rainwater and improve flood resilience. Priority should be given to creating safe spaces for children and older people, while all public areas need to be equipped with drinking fountains.

    While the upheaval involved in the project — and the ultimate extension of the superblock model across all Barcelona — could be considerable, so is the public health payoff. The city believes it could free up 70% of its current road space for active travel and recreation space if it reaches its aspiration of covering its whole surface area in superblocks, slashing air pollution, carbon emissions and noise pollution in the process. Expanded tree cover could also reduce summer temperatures. According to a 2019 study published in the journal Environment International, a full realization of the city’s 503-block plan could prevent 667 premature deaths per year.

    That transformation is still years off, but the announcement of the new super-superblock suggests that the city is well on its way.

    The Catalan capital’s celebrated pedestrian-first zones are expanding to cover most of the city center, Mayor Ada Colau announced.

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-11/barcelona-s-new-car-free-superblock-will-be-big
    #piétons #Barcelone #urbanisme #trafic #villes #urban_matter #car-free #Eixample #Superilla #îlots
    #TRUST #master_TRUST

  • From Form‑Trans‑Inform to Atelier d’Architecture Autogérée. A Discussion with Doina Petrescu and Constantin Petcou
    Zeppelin
    https://e-zeppelin.ro/en/from-form%e2%80%91trans%e2%80%91inform-to-atelier-darchitecture-autogeree

    Summer 2021

    Interview: Alex Axinte

    Co-founded by Constan­tin Petcou and Doina Petrescu, atelier d’architecture autogérée (aaa) is “a collective platform of research and action around urban change and emerging cultural, social and political practices in the contemporary city. aaa initiates and supports strategies of ecological transition involving citizen locally and internationally. aaa acts against global crisis (ecological, economic, political, social, etc) by creating the conditions for citizen to participate in the ecological transition and adopting resilient ways of living. aaa functions within an open interdisciplinary network, where different viewpoints cross each other: architects, artists, students, researchers, pensioners, politicians, activists, residents, etc.

    aaa is an international reference in the field of participative architecture and urban resilience, aaa’s projects have been exhibited at Venise Biennale 2012 and 2016, MoMA New York, Berlin Biennale, Pavilion d’Arsenal Paris, Untied Nation Pavilion Geneva, etc. For its activity, aaa has received international recogni­tion and numerous awards across the years including the International Resilient Award Building for Humanity (2018), The Innovation in Politics Award for Ecology (2017) being one of the “100 projects for the climate” selected by the public at COP21 (2015). (Alex Axinte)

    The passages bellow are extracted from a series of conversations I had during several days with Doina Petrescu and Constantin Petcou. At their studio, at home, in cafes and metros or visiting their projects located in different Paris suburbs, we spoke about their beginnings in Romania, about their current practice atelier d’architecture autogérée (aaa) and about future plans. While still in school, within the social and political context of 1980’s Romania, they were involved in initiating groups and networks, they engaged in experiment and innovation, building after graduation an alternative practice through a critically approach of architecture.

    Visiting aaa. Drawing by Alex Axinte

    Alex Axinte: Let’s start from the time when you were professionally and humanly trained in Romania within the socialist education system of that time. Has this contributed to what your practice became?

    Doina Petrescu: Certainly it was a seed there, which wasn’t enough by itself, but it was important because this prepared us to face practical situations, knowing everything that a traditional architect should know. And this thing was a solid base, for knowing how to build, knowing about materials, knowing about structure, knowing history, you can see now that this is not taught in schools anymore, that these became specializations, you specialize in such things. We learned them all. And somehow this general formation counted a solid base, as a foundation. On top of this you can add other more sophisticated things, you may try to position yourself, you can take a stand, and you can develop certain interests. So this was one of the good things. Other good thing from the school, not necessarily different from the school, but one that we took or created in the school, was some sort of parallel school, of which Constantin can say more because he initiated it, adding the fact that the school allowed us the freedom to do other things.

    Constantin Petcou: I did two interesting things in school: first is that I walked a lot through Bucharest and I took the street as a teacher. I had also good teachers, but I studied a lot vernacular architecture. And second is that I initiated a group, a sort of school in school, which was called Form-Trans-Inform and which was based on knowledge theory, and other theories as well. [Stratford H, Petrescu D & Petcou C (2008) Form-Trans-Inform: the ‘poetic’ resistance in architecture. arq: Architectural Research Quarterly, 12(02)] Basically it was a transdisciplinary group: there were students from scenography, we had interactions with others too, we also organized some events in Club A, we invited philosophes, art critiques, until they spotted me and wanted me to enrol in the party…

    “Inner Gesture“ – happening, Baneasa 1982, team: Constantin Petcou, Constantin Gorcea, Florin Neagoe, Lavinia Marșu, Doru Deacu, Sorin Vatamaniuc, Constantin Fagețean ©Form-Trans-Inform

    AA: What vernacular Bucharest meant?

    CP: It meant some fabulous neighbourhoods, because many they were self-constructed, this being usual in mahalas (ie. popular neighbourhoods). The inhabitants were partly self-sufficient: they were already controlling the household climate, having a lot of courtyards covered with vine, they were trying to produce energy, and there were quite a lot of wind mills, they were trying to produce food by raising pigeons in big cages , which were flying all around… It was like in Garcia Marquez. If you were really sensitive to space and wind and light, you were blown away by how much you could see and feel…

    AA: Is this something that you were looking for also in Paris, or you rather came with this type of looking from Bucharest?

    CP: In Paris you don’t have such a thing. I think it was a root that we came from there.

    DP: Yes, and we applied this later in projects like R-Urban and other projects which we developed later. It was a lesson we have learned, we have understood from those conditions. Also, we still kept having this sensibility to “read” spaces’ potentiality. For example you see a square and some trees: you realise that there is a place there with a certain urban quality and in Bucharest there were many such places with very special qualities due to the urban typologies and ways of living. This mahala type of living was actually a sensitive urban typology.

    Constantin rises on his tops and waters the plants hanging from the studio’s ceiling. We flip through black and white magazines in which there were published some of their projects receiving prizes in paper architecture competitions. They tell me about how they became involved in organizing exhibitions, about working with clothing, about publications which didn’t make it past the 1st issue and where many articles finished with ‘to be continued’. Than, they continued with their architect’s life in Romania before ’89: Doina working in sistematizare (state planning) and Constantin as ‘mister Design’ in a factory of clothing and shoes. Here, with found materials, they worked together for redesigning an office space as a sort of ‘participative deconstructivist’ manifesto, quite provocative at the time. Doina goes out in the courtyard and ransacks bended over some compost containers. Here are their pets, some big earthworms which just received banana peels as their favourite meal. After ’90 they left for Paris guided by the idea to continue their postgraduate studies and than to come back.

    “Catarg towards Ithaca“ –“Honorable mention“ at Shinkenchiku Residential Competition, Japan, 1986. Echipa de proiect/Project team: Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu, Mircea Stefan, Victor Badea

    *The Design section atelier – Valceana Leather Factory, 1988. Project team : Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu ©ConstantinPetcou

    AA: It is a fairly quite spread perception, that architecture is architecture and politics is politics. We are doing our job, we design, we build. If this supports an ideology or not, this is not architecture’s business. How architecture became for you a political acting?

    DP: I think that in a way it was the context that forced us when we started. We started from scratch. And we had to invent ways of negotiating to gain access to space, to gain access to ways of practicing architecture, and we quickly realized that such a negotiation is political and that actually you need to learn to speak with people caring political responsibilities. But at the same time, we realized that the very fact of asking, of doing the practice differently is a political act. There were some things we refused to do, such as the conventional capitalist practice. We wanted to facilitate the inhabitants’ access to space, for any city inhabitant, we wanted to open urban spaces that are closed and that are controlled either by the municipalities or other institutions, and this is already a political act. We managed to ensure access to space, and afterwards, slowly, the self-management of the space, which was also a process, by persuading people that they have to become responsible if they want to use the space, that they need to learn how to manage it, to get along, to organize. This is in fact what Deleuze and Guatarri are calling micro-politics, meaning politics at the level of the subject, transformations at the subjective level. [Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (2004), Anti-Oedipus, London: Continuum] We always worked with people. Our architecture always included this subjective and social architecture into the project. The fact that we formed a social group around the project, that people have changed, that they changed their interest, all these are for us part of architecture.

    AA: Do you tend towards consensus in your projects?

    CP: We don’t really use the word consensus. It is about temporary equilibrium. In any such a project, as there are many people involved, and here we speak about governance, co-management and self-management, there are various interests, there are people with different cultural backgrounds – some are employed, others not -­ and people with more or less time. So they cannot have the same vision over the use of space, over the type of activities, and then you need to reach some agreements, some temporary, partial deals, which should not suffocate the others and allow others to emerge. What we do is to give the inhabitants the opportunity to appropriate a space, an equipment, a way of organising time together, of organising the neighbourhood’s life, which are ecological, solidary, all this obviously with some guidance. Because the majority of inhabitants of the banlieue are very much excluded. And we are offering them an emancipatory space, or, in Guatarri’s language, a re-subjectivation capacity, very useful in today’s society which excludes many. [F. Guattari (1977), La révolution Moléculaire, Paris: ed. Recherches] In such spaces they gain new qualities; someone is a gardener, someone else takes care of the chickens, somebody else of the compost, one of the kitchen…

    DP: This is actualy the micro-politics.

    CP: Including until the kids’ level. I remember when we were at the Ecobox I had a lot of keys and a kid asked me, mais Constantin, you have keys from every space in the neighbourhood?! Can you open any space? And obviously that I answered yes, because, for his imaginary it was very important to know that you can open spaces, that you can make this urban space to evolve, which has become now more and more expensive, inaccessible and segregated. Such imaginary is fundamental for the “right to the city”, it is to know that, even for a kid, space could be negotiable, accessible and welcoming, that there are no barriers and walls. Actually, we don’t make walls: we make doors, windows, bridges… this is the kind of things we are building.

    Steering to the passers-by, Doina recollects her diploma project for which she collaborated with an ethnologist to design something which today could be called an ethnological cultural hub. Once arrived in Paris, after a master, they began teaching, being among others the co-founders of Paris-Malaquais architecture school. Step by step, they began to act as citizens, teachers and architects in the neighbourhood where they were living: La Chapelle. This is how aaa started. In the same time, they kept on teaching and initiating projects also in Romania, in Brezoi, but which got stuck. Constantin starts the fire in a small godin in the Agrocite, located in southern Paris, at Bagneux, which is a sort of ecological prototype spatializing aaa’s concepts: short circuits, popular ecology, urban resilience.

    Mobile modules – EcoBox project, 2003. Project team: Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu, Denis Favret, Giovanni Piovene ©aaa

    *Eco interstice “Passage 56“ – street view, 2007, Project team: Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu, Raimund Binder, Sandra Pauquet, Nolwenn Marchand ©aaa

    AA: 100 years after Bauhaus, 50 years after the May ’68 revolt and 30 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, within the current global capitalism crisis, all Bauhaus’ principles of how to live and work together are becoming again relevant. In this context, how legitimate is still Bauhaus’s questions if design can change society, and what it means to be modern today?

    DP: So all these ideas are reaching some sort of anniversary and one needs to take them together, one cannot take only Bauhaus ideas, but also other ideas which came after in order to understand what can design do today: participation, global democracy, ecology. Design need to remain open, as Ezio Manzini was saying: ‘design when everybody designs’. There is an acknowledgement of the fact that we are all designing, in our own way, we design our life, we design our decisions. How can you put all those things together in a strategic way, at a moment when the society and the humanity need to take some decisions, need to be prepared for a civilizational change, otherwise we become extinct? I think design has a role in this, by helping, by mediating, by formulating questions, decisions, or solutions together. And how to do design together is the big question, and there is not only one way of doing it, there are many ways. We also need to imagine what are these places where ways of designing together are possible. Which are the new institutions, the new mediating agents? – all these seem to me to be the questions of our times.

    Constantin confesses that Bauhaus changed his life, when, after an exhibition, improbable for that time, where 1:1 modernist furniture was exhibited, he quits the arts high school in Iași and joined the architecture school.

    CP: I am sure that design has an immense capacity to change society until even distorting it (see the tablet, the iPhone…). As architects, we are working a lot in a broader sense of design, and that’s why we are trying to launch not just projects, but also movements like One Planet Site or R-Urban which can be adopted also by others, because we have the capacity and the responsibility, so you have the capacity, but you have also the responsibility to act. It’s like a doctor. If you are in a plane and someone is sick, you have the capacity and responsibility to act. This is the case for us architects: we acted here in the neighbourhood we are living because there were many difficulties. The planet is now in great difficulty and you need to act. We know how to design, to project into the future, to find money, to create a horizon of hope, a model which becomes interesting for others too, so we have this capacity to design, in a broader sense, complex, temporal and functional. All these including re-balancing how much technology, how many resources, how much mutualisation, how much governance, all these are in fact design.

    DP: For example, with R-Urban we proposed a resilience strategy as designers. We have used design and the organization and shaping of space, of making visible specific practices, as a catalyst. We succeed in a way to organize a social group around the project, by giving it also a political dimension, again, by using architecture’s capacity to make visible, to make real the idea of short circuits for example. People could finally see what happens if you collect rain water, where it goes, that you have to think differently about space to make passive heating, and that you need to think differently about the heating system if you want to reduce the fuel consumption. That by using space in a certain way, in 1 year time you will have this amount of reduction of carbon emissions, which is much better than the national rate. So, all these things can be made visible through the way you design their experience. We didn’t just design a building, or a site, but we designed a usage and a way of creating an activity there.

    “ R-Urban “ – Diagrams on the ecological transition principles 2008. Echipa de proiect/Project team: Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu cu Nolwenn Marchand, Sara Carlini, Clémence Kempnich ©aaa

    ““Agrocité”—micro-farm for urban agriculture and ecological training, Colombes, 2013-2014

    “Recyclab”—social economy hub, urban waste recycling and eco-design, Colombes, 2013. Project team: Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu, Clémence Kempnich

    “Agrocité”—micro-farm for urban agriculture and ecological training, Bagneux, 2019. Project team: Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu, Anna Laura Bourguignon, Alex Gaiser, Rémi Buscot, Juliette Hennequin

    AA: So you could say that this means modernity now?

    DP: The concept of modernity is very much contested in fact, but in a way you could say that this means a hope for the future.

    CP: Modernity I think it had the quality of promoting progress, a democratic progress for all, through small prices, standardization, through in fact what they knew back then. And I think that these ideals remain somehow valid. Such as fablabs are in a way a continuity of this progressive modernist ideal of making accessible and democratic the use to technology. And it’s good. But the problem is the excess. When standardization becomes excessive and exploitative. I think modernity needs to be revisited, keeping what is good, like democracy, ethics, progress and others, and readapting it. Because modernity couldn’t address at that time the problems of limited resources issues, climate change, extractive capitalism, or extinction of species; those problems weren’t visible back than.

    AA: What is the relation with technology in your projects?

    DP: We document and present all our technological devices with an interface accessible to the users and we make them with means that makes them transferable and reproducible. I think we need to take into account the democratization of technology and the fact that the reproduction is not made by the industry, but by the masses, everyone being able to take part. What is important is to keep a degree of creativity, of appropriateness, of participative innovation possible at all levels. All these technological devices were conceived together with experts. The grey water filtration system was made together with a specialist in phyto-remediation. What we brought new is that we designed the first prototype used in urban contexts. This approach is also situated, is specific for a certain situation, you work with the specialist to find the solution there, and afterwards you integrate also local and traditional knowledge. For example, for the phyto-remediation device it was very cool that we built it with a team of Romanians having a construction company in France. Due to the fact we were in a flooding area, we needed to raise the device above the ground by 1 meter and we didn’t know how to build it. And then, the team of Romanians which knew how to make… barrels, manage with what we had, with found boards that were boarded like for barrels… and this is how we made the phyto-remediation device. This shows that all skills and ways of knowledge are useful in a certain situation.

    They choose together the tomatoes, than Doina the aubergines and Constantin the potatoes from a temporary market installed in the Paris former mortuary house. This is now a cultural centre, open to everyone and full of life. Recently they participated in the biggest architectural competition organized by the city of Paris which offered some difficult sites for development – “Reinventer Pars”. The brief was very close to the R-Urban model. They haven’t officially won, but their proposal was very good and this is how they were able to develop it in a different location. The project is called Wiki Village Factory (VWF) and is a cluster of technological and social innovation of 7000 sqm which aims to become a sort of central node in the R-Urban network towards developing the city 2.0 (ecological and collaborative).

    “Wiki-Village-Factory” – cluster of social and ecological innovation, Paris, 2016. Project team: Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu, Benjamin Poignon, Pierre Marie Cornin, Grégoire Beaumont © aaa-REI-Deswarte

    AA: With WVF for example, how important is for you the materiality and the aesthetics? Or is the program more important?

    CP: Aesthetics for as is a result. You need to take care for the building to be well integrated in the context, you need to express well what’s going on. For example, the coop spaces are trying to make you to wish to collaborate with others; it’s not just like any other office. The ground floor, we try to have it open towards the neighbourhood, despite it is a difficult neighbourhood.

    DP: I would say that aesthetics are trying to express not necessary the programme, but what is important in the program and beyond the program. We are using architecture tactically if you want, as a way of exposing and communicating principles of functioning, of governance, of construction and the ethics of using a building today.

    CP: We are exposing the ecology of the building in fact, and this is beyond function. In order to become more ecologic. This is to make you use fewer materials, less insulation, but count on the passive insulation of the building’ skin. We also succeeded in convincing them to have dry toilets. This will be the largest building with dry toilets in Europe. We will build a special device, like a large scale prototype, which doesn’t exist right now. In fact, although they are on a tight budget, they will put more money into this than into usual toilets, because also the developer and everybody want this aspect to be exemplary. And it will be quite vegetal, with urban agriculture; we will try to remediate the grey waters. All the principles that we are using in R-Urban hubs will be implementing as much as we can also here.

    AA: So, the city 2.0 should look differently because it values and creates hierarchies in a different way?

    DP: Yes, it is important to create a new discourse, but also governance is important, social and ecological governance, that is what we try to express through architecture. There are many layers which add up to the modernist functional layer. And there is also the idea of being reversible, the fact that a building needs to evolve, to adapt, to disappear if necessary after a while, so it is not built to last hundreds of years. Because we need to leave room for future generations to build the architecture they need, don’t we?

    #ville #écologie #participation #auto_gestion #urban_planning

  • L’urbanisme écologique : un nouvel impératif ?
    https://metropolitiques.eu/L-urbanisme-ecologique-un-nouvel-imperatif.html

    L’extension rapide des surfaces urbanisées affecte la biodiversité, homogénéise les paysages et transforme les modes de vie en raréfiant les expériences sensibles des milieux naturels. Ce dossier explore les réponses que les concepteurs d’espaces urbains peuvent apporter aux urgences écologiques et politiques. ▼ Voir le sommaire du dossier ▼ À l’échelle mondiale et depuis trois décennies, les surfaces urbanisées gagnent en moyenne 110 km² par jour, soit environ la superficie de la ville de Paris. D’ici #Dossiers

    / #écologie, #urbanisme, biodiversité, #environnement, #architecture

    #biodiversité
    https://metropolitiques.eu/IMG/pdf/introduction_dossierurbanisme-ecologique.pdf

  • Data et nouvelles technologies, la face cachée du contrôle des mobilités

    Dans un rapport de juillet 2020, l’#Agence_européenne_pour_la_gestion_opérationnelle_des_systèmes_d’information_à_grande_échelle (#EU-Lisa) présente l’#intelligence_artificielle (#IA) comme l’une des « #technologies prioritaires » à développer. Le rapport souligne les avantages de l’IA en matière migratoire et aux frontières, grâce, entre autres, à la technologie de #reconnaissance_faciale.

    L’intelligence artificielle est de plus en plus privilégiée par les acteurs publics, les institutions de l’UE et les acteurs privés, mais aussi par le #HCR et l’#OIM. Les agences de l’UE, comme #Frontex ou EU-Lisa, ont été particulièrement actives dans l’expérimentation des nouvelles technologies, brouillant parfois la distinction entre essais et mise en oeuvre. En plus des outils traditionnels de #surveillance, une panoplie de technologies est désormais déployée aux frontières de l’Europe et au-delà, qu’il s’agisse de l’ajout de nouvelles #bases_de_données, de technologies financières innovantes, ou plus simplement de la récupération par les #GAFAM des données laissées volontairement ou pas par les migrant·e·s et réfugié∙e∙s durant le parcours migratoire.

    La pandémie #Covid-19 est arrivée à point nommé pour dynamiser les orientations déjà prises, en permettant de tester ou de généraliser des technologies utilisées pour le contrôle des mobilités sans que l’ensemble des droits des exilé·e·s ne soit pris en considération. L’OIM, par exemple, a mis à disposition des Etats sa #Matrice_de_suivi_des_déplacements (#DTM) durant cette période afin de contrôler les « flux migratoires ». De nouvelles technologies au service de vieilles obsessions…

    http://migreurop.org/article3021.html

    Pour télécharger la note :
    migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/note_12_fr.pdf

    #migrations #réfugiés #asile #frontières #mobilité #mobilités #données #technologie #nouvelles_technologies #coronavirus #covid #IOM
    #migreurop

    ping @etraces

    voir aussi :
    Migreurop | Data : la face cachée du contrôle des mobilités
    https://seenthis.net/messages/900232

    • European funds for African IDs: migration regulation tool or privacy risk?

      The first person you meet after you land at Blaise Diagne Airport in Dakar is a border guard with a digital scanner.

      The official will scan your travel document and photograph and take a digital print of your index fingers.

      It’s the most visible sign of the new state-of-the-art digital biometrics system that is being deployed in the airport with the help of EU funding.

      The aim is to combat the increasingly sophisticated fake passports sold by traffickers to refugees.

      But it also helps Senegal’s government learn more about its own citizens.

      And it’s not just here: countries across West Africa are adopting travel documentation that has long been familiar to Europeans.

      Passports, ID cards and visas are all becoming biometric, and a national enrolment scheme is underway.

      In Europe too, there are proposals to create a biometric database of over 400 million foreign nationals, including fingerprints and photographs of their faces.

      The new systems are part of efforts to battle illegal migration from West Africa to the EU.

      ‘Fool-proof’ EU passport online

      Many are still plying the dangerous route across the Sahara and the Mediterranean to reach Europe, but a growing number are turning to the criminal gangs selling forged passports to avoid the treacherous journey over desert and sea.

      There’s a burgeoning market in travel documents advertised as ‘fake but real”.

      Prices vary according to the paperwork: an EU Schengen transit visa costs €5,000, while a longer-stay visa can be twice as high.

      Some forgers have even mastered the ability to incorporate holograms and hack the biometric chips.

      “Morphing” is an image processing technique that merges two people’s photographs into a single new face that appears to contain entirely new biometric data.

      Frontex, the EU’s border guard agency, says 7,000 people were caught trying to enter the Schengen area in 2019 carrying such documents — but it admits the true figure could be much higher.

      Sending migrants back

      Last year, the largest number of travellers with fake documents arrived via Turkish and Moroccan international airports.

      Many were caught in Italy, having arrived via Casablanca from sub-Saharan countries like Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal.

      A Frontex team responsible for deporting migrants without the correct paperwork was deployed this year at Rome’s Fiumicino Airport.

      It’s the first sign of a new European Commission regulation expanding the agency’s role, which includes access to biometric data held by member states, according to Jane Kilpatrick, a researcher at the civil liberties think-tank Statewatch.

      “The agency’s growing role in the collection of data, it links overtly to the agency’s role in deporting individuals from the EU,” she said.

      Over 490,000 return decisions were issued by member states last year, but only a third were actually sent back to a country outside the EU.

      There are multiple reasons why: some countries, for example, refuse to accept responsibility for people whose identity documents were lost, destroyed or stolen.

      Legally binding readmission agreements are now in place between the EU and 18 other countries to make that process easier.
      There are no records

      But a bigger problem is the fact that many African countries know very little about their own citizens.

      The World Bank estimates the continent is home to roughly half of the estimated one billion people on the planet who are unable to prove their identities.

      An absence of digitisation means that dusty registers are piling up in storage rooms.

      The same goes for many borders: unlike the scene at Dakar’s airport, many are still without internet access, servers, scanners and cameras.

      That, the Commission says, is why EU aid funds are being used to develop biometric identity systems in West African countries.

      The EU Trust Fund for Africa has allotted €60 million to support governments in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in modernising their registry systems and creating a national biometric identity database.

      Much of the funding comes through Civipol, a consulting firm attached to France’s interior ministry and part-owned by Milipol, one of the most important arms trade fairs in the world.

      It describes the objective of the programme in Côte d’Ivoire as identifying “people genuinely of Ivorian nationality and organising their return more easily”.
      Data security concerns

      European sources told Euronews that the EU-funded projects in West Africa were not designed to identify potential migrants or deport existing ones.

      A Commission spokesperson insisted no European entity — neither Frontex, nor member states, nor their partners — had access to the databases set up by West African countries.

      But the systems they are funding are intimately connected to anti-migration initiatives.

      One is the Migrant Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS), a migration database that can send automatic queries to Interpol watchlists to detect travel documents and people possibly linked to organised crime, including human trafficking.

      Connections like these, and the role of French arms giants like Thales in the growing biometric market, has led data protection experts to become worried about possible abuses of privacy.
      World’s newest biometric market

      As Africa becomes the coveted market for biometric identification providers, the watchdog Privacy International has warned it risks becoming a mere testing ground for technologies later deployed elsewhere.

      So far 24 countries on the continent out of 53 have adopted laws and regulations to protect personal data.

      A letter by Privacy International, seen by Euronews, says EU must “ensure they are protecting rights before proceeding with allocating resources and technologies which, in absence of proper oversight, will likely result in fundamental rights abuses.”

      It has published internal documents tracking the development of Senegal’s system that suggest no privacy or data protection impact assessments have been carried out.

      Civipol, the French partner, denies this: it told Euronews that the Senegalese Personal Data Commission took part in the programme and Senegalese law was respected at every stage.

      Yet members of Senegal’s independent Commission of Personal Data (CDP), which is responsible for ensuring personal data is processed correctly, admit implementation and enforcement remained a challenge — even though they are proud of their country’s pioneering role in data governance in Africa.

      For the Senegalese cyber activist Cheick Fall, the charge is more serious: “Senegal has sinned by entrusting the processing of these data to foreign companies.”

      https://www.euronews.com/2021/07/30/european-funds-for-african-ids-migration-regulation-tool-or-privacy-risk

      #biométrie #aéroport #Afrique #étrangers #base_de_données_biométrique #empreintes_digitales #passeports #visas #hologramme #Morphing #image #photographie #Frontex #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Trust_Fund #Civipol #Milipol #armes #commerce_d'armes #Côte_d’Ivoire #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Migrant_Information_and_Data_Analysis_System (#MIDAS) #Interpol #Thales #Sénégal #Senegalese_Personal_Data_Commission #Commission_of_Personal_Data (#CDP)

  • Mediterranean carcerality and acts of escape

    In recent years, migrants seeking refuge in Europe have faced capture and containment in the Mediterranean – the result of experimentation by EU institutions and member states.

    About two years ago, in June 2019, a group of 75 people found themselves stranded in the central Mediterranean Sea. The migrant group had tried to escape from Libya in order to reach Europe but was adrift at sea after running out of fuel. Monitored by European aerial assets, they saw a vessel on the horizon slowly moving toward them. When they were eventually rescued by the Maridive 601, an offshore supply vessel, they did not know that it would become their floating prison for nearly three weeks. Malta and Italy refused to allocate a port of safety in Europe, and, at first, the Tunisian authorities were equally unwilling to allow them to land.

    Over 19 days, the supply vessel turned from a floating refuge into an offshore carceral space in which the situation for the rescued deteriorated over time. Food and water were scarce, untreated injuries worsened, scabies spread, as did the desperation on board. The 75 people, among them 64 Bangladeshi migrants and dozens of minors, staged a protest on board, chanting: “We don’t need food, we don’t want to stay here, we want to go to Europe.”

    Reaching Europe, however, seemed increasingly unlikely, with Italy and Malta rejecting any responsibility for their disembarkation. Instead, the Tunisian authorities, the Bangladeshi embassy, and the #International_Organisation_for_Migration (#IOM) arranged not only their landing in Tunisia, but also the removal of most of them to their countries of origin. Shortly after disembarkation in the harbour of Zarzis, dozens of the migrants were taken to the runways of Tunis airport and flown out.

    In a recently published article in the journal Political Geography, I have traced the story of this particular migrant group and their zig-zagging trajectories that led many from remote Bangladeshi villages, via Dubai, Istanbul or Alexandria, to Libya, and eventually onto a supply vessel off the Tunisian coast. Although their situation was certainly unique, it also exemplified the ways in which the Mediterranean has turned into a ‘carceral seascape’, a space where people precariously on the move are to be captured and contained in order to prevent them from reaching European shores.

    While forms of migrant capture and containment have, of course, a much longer history in the European context, the past ten years have seen particularly dramatic transformations in the central Mediterranean Sea. When the Arab Uprisings ‘re-opened’ this maritime corridor in and after 2011, crossings started to increase significantly – about 156,000 people crossed to Europe on average every year between 2014 and 2017. Since then, crossings have dropped sharply. The annual average between 2018 and 2020 was around 25,000 people – a figure resembling annual arrivals in the period before the Arab Uprisings.

    One significant reason for this steep decrease in arrivals is the refoulement industry that EU institutions and member states have created, together with third-country allies. The capture of people seeking to escape to Europe has become a cruel trade, of which a range of actors profit. Although ‘refouling’ people on the move – thus returning them to places where they are at risk of facing torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – violates international human rights laws and refugee conventions, these practices have become systemic and largely normalised, not least as the COVID pandemic has come to serve as a suitable justification to deter potential ‘Corona-spreaders’ and keep them contained elsewhere.

    That migrants face capture and containment in the Mediterranean is the result of years of experimentation on part of EU institutions and member states. Especially since 2018, Europe has largely withdrawn maritime assets from the deadliest areas but reinforced its aerial presence instead, including through the recent deployment of drones. In this way, European assets do not face the ‘risk’ of being forced into rescue operations any longer but can still monitor the sea from above and guide North African, in particular Libyan, speed boats to chase after escaping migrant boats. In consequence, tens of thousands have faced violent returns to places they sought to flee from.

    Just in 2021 alone, about 16,000 people have been caught at sea and forcibly returned to Libya in this way, already more than in the whole of 2020. In mid-June, a ‘push-back by proxy’ occurred, when the merchant vessel Vos Triton handed over 170 migrants to a Libyan coastguard vessel that then returned them to Tripoli, where they were imprisoned in a camp known for its horrendous conditions.

    The refoulment industry, and Mediterranean carcerality more generally, are underpinned by a constant flow of finances, technologies, equipment, discourses, and know-how, which entangles European and Libyan actors to a degree that it might make more sense to think of them as a collective Euro-Libyan border force.

    To legitimise war-torn and politically divided Libya as a ‘competent’ sovereign actor, able to govern the maritime expanse outside its territorial waters, the European Commission funded, and the Italian coastguard implemented, a feasibility study in 2017 to assess “the Libyan capacity in the area of Search and Rescue” (SAR). Shortly after, the Libyan ‘unity government’ declared its extensive Libyan SAR zone, a zone over which it would hold ‘geographical competence’. When the Libyan authorities briefly suspended the establishment of its SAR zone, given its inability to operate a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), an Italian navy vessel was stationed within Tripoli harbour, carrying out the functions of the Libyan MRCC.

    Since 2017, €57.2m from the EU Trust Fund for Africa has funded Libya’s ‘integrated border management’, on top of which hundreds of millions of euros were transferred by EU member states to Libyan authorities through bilateral agreements. Besides such financial support, EU member states have donated speed boats and surveillance technologies to control the Libyan SAR zone while officers from EU military project Operation Sophia and from European Border Agency Frontex have repeatedly provided training to the Libyan coastguards. When out to search for escaping migrants, the Libyan speed boats have relied on Europe’s ‘eyes in the sky’, the aerial assets of Frontex and EU member states. Migrant sightings from the sky would then be relayed to the Libyan assets at sea, also via WhatsApp chats in which Frontex personnel and Libyan officers exchange.

    Thinking of the Mediterranean as a carceral space highlights these myriad Euro-Libyan entanglements that often take place with impunity and little public scrutiny. It also shows how maritime carcerality is “often underscored by mobilities”. Indeed, systematic forms of migrant capture depend on the collaboration of a range of mobile actors at sea, on land, and in the sky. Despite their incessant movements and the fact that surveillance and interception operations are predominantly characterised as rescue operations, thousands of people have lost their lives at sea over recent years. Many have been left abandoned even in situations where their whereabouts were long known to European and North African authorities, often in cases when migrant boats were already adrift and thus unable to reach Europe on their own accord.

    At the same time, even in the violent and carceral Mediterranean Sea, a range of interventions have occurred that have prevented both deaths at sea and the smooth operation of the refoulment industry. NGO rescuers, activists, fishermen and, at times, merchant vessel crews have conducted mass rescues over recent years, despite being harassed, threatened and criminalised by Euro-Libyan authorities at every turn. Through their presence, they have documented and repeatedly ruptured the operations of the Euro-Libyan border force, shedding light on what is meant to remain hidden.

    Maybe most importantly, the Mediterranean’s carceral condition has not erased the possibility of migratory acts of escape. Indeed, tactics of border subversion adapt to changing carceral techniques, with many migrant boats seeking to cross the sea without being detected and to reach European coasts autonomously. As the UNHCR notes in reference to the maritime arrival of 34,000 people in Italy and Malta in 2020: “Only approximately 4,500 of those arriving by sea in 2020 had been rescued by authorities or NGOs on the high seas: the others were intercepted by the authorities close to shore or arrived undetected.”

    While most of those stuck on the Maridive supply vessel off Tunisia’s coast in 2019 were returned to countries of origin, some tried to cross again and eventually escaped Mediterranean carcerality. Despite Euro-North African attempts to capture and contain them, they moved on stubbornly, and landed their boats in Lampedusa.

    https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/mediterranean-carcerality-and-acts-escape

    #enfermement #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #expérimentation #OIM #Tunisie #Zarzis #externalisation #migrerrance #carcéralité #refoulement #push-backs #Libye #Vos_Triton #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Trust_Fund #carceral_space

    via @isskein

  • Decolonizzare la città. Dialoghi Visuali a Padova -
    Decolonizing the city. Visual Dialogues in Padova

    Il video partecipativo, realizzato con studenti e studentesse del laboratorio Visual Research Methods (prof.ssa Annalisa Frisina) del corso LM Culture, Formazione e Società Globale, esplora l’eredità coloniale inscritta nelle vie e piazza di Padova. I sei protagonisti/e del video, artist* e attivit* afrodiscendenti, dialogano con questi luoghi, mettendo in atto contronarrazioni intime e familiari che sfidano la storia ufficiale, lasciando tracce del loro passaggio.

    –—

    The participatory video made by the students of Visual Research Methods laboratory (prof. Annalisa Frisina), Master’s degree in Cultures, Education and Global Society, explores the colonial legacy of Padova’s roads and squares. Six afro-descendent artists and activists interact with these places, giving life to intimate counter-narratives that challenge the official history, leaving their personal traces.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6CtMsORajE

    Quelques images tirées du film :


    –-

    –-

    Où on apprend que les enfants « métissés » étaient appelés « #figli_di_due_bandiere » (fils de deux drapeaux)

    #villes #décolonial #décoloniser_la_ville #Italie #Padoue #Padova #héritage_colonial #colonialisme #toponymie #toponymie_politique #géographie_urbaine #historicisation #histoire #traces #mariage_mixte #Corne_de_l'Afrique #colonialisme_italien #Antenore #fascisme #histoire_coloniale #impérialisme #piazza_Antenore #citoyenneté #néo-colonialisme #pouvoir #Amba_Aradam #blessure
    #TRUST #Master_TRUST
    #film #film_documentaire

    ping @cede @karine4 @isskein

    –—

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur le #colonialisme_italien :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/871953

  • Les transitions socio-écologiques peuvent-elles changer l’agriculture ?

    Les transitions peuvent-elles changer l’agriculture ? L’article se propose d’analyser le « #plan_français_de_transition_agroécologique » lancé en 2012 et la circulation internationale des modèles en matière d’#agroécologie. Il souligne en particulier en quoi le plan de transition agroécologique français a pu réutiliser des savoirs issus originellement de pays du Sud, originellement critiques à l’égard du modèle agro-productiviste dominant, pour en tirer certains enseignements. Dans la première partie, nous présentons le plan français, ses partis pris et influences, avant de souligner dans la deuxième partie de l’article les échanges Nord-Sud et certaines réinterprétations dont l’agroécologie a pu faire l’objet depuis le début des années 2000.

    https://www.revues.scienceafrique.org/naaj/texte/arrignon2021

    #TRUST #Master_TRUST #transitions #transition #agriculture #circulation_des_savoirs

    –----

    Article paru dans :
    Volume 2, numéro 1 – 2021 : T ransitions environnementales et écologie politique des savoirs en Afrique : de la commotion coloniale et néo-libérale à la « co-motion » sociale et écologique
    https://www.revues.scienceafrique.org/naaj/numero/2-2021

  • A Bagnolet, la bergerie qui ne voulait pas transhumer | L’Humanité
    https://www.humanite.fr/bagnolet-la-bergerie-qui-ne-voulait-pas-transhumer-711859

    Rien n’y fait : entre refus de se laisser apprivoiser et crainte de donner du ressort à la gentrification qui pèse sur la ville, les protagonistes s’accrochent à leur carré de ferme. « En dix ans notre sens critique sur la rénovation urbaine s’est aiguisé », reprend Gilles Amar. « Les projets de jardins partagés tels que les voient les villes visent tous le même modèle, productif, propret, squatté par quelques-uns », poursuit le jardinier. « Nous n’avons pas voulu de cela, mais d’un bordel constructif. Ici, c’est le jardin des habitants. Ici, c’est la branche jardinage du hip-hop. »

    Surtout, les plans de la nouvelle école, un bâtiment tout en verre et béton prévu sur trois étages, ne siéent ni au berger, ni aux parents d’élèves. « Rien n’est à la dimension d’une école maternelle », assure Sabrina, leur représentante. « L’infrastructure va coûter cher à entretenir et l’encadrement va manquer pour couvrir une telle surface. »

    Épaulée d’une architecte, Sors de Terre avance aujourd’hui un projet alternatif. Moins lourd et tout en bois, il serait plus ouvert sur la rue et jouerait avec l’existant plutôt que contre lui.

  • Research: Transforming Cities - Pathways to Sustainability
    University of Utrecht
    https://www.uu.nl/en/research/transforming-cities/research/inclusive-cities-and-global-urban-transformation

    Inclusive cities and global urban transformation

    In the face of current events such as the pandemic, climate crises, Black Lives Matter, and continually widespread urban evictions, how to envision cities to become more inclusive is increasingly an urgent question. International agendas such as the United Nations’ New Urban Agenda and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development push forward the ideal of ‘making cities inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable (SDG11)’. However, they tend to result in more top-down physical infrastructural development, which create new dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. We need a set of alternative global urban strategies that address various forms of urban exclusion and survival and bottom-up experiences of sustainable development in order to establish how sustainable cities that prioritize social inclusion of vulnerable and excluded groups will look like. We propose here that the kind of sustainable urban development towards social inclusions is conceptually underpinned by agencies of urban dwellers in various urban settlements and neighborhoods, which scholars and activists are increasingly observing and analysing as everyday urban forms of socio-cultural practices and heterogeneous infrastructural constellations.
    Andheri West, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India
    Andheri West, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India, photo by Alfarnas Solkar on Unsplash

    With this platform of Global Urban Transformation and Inclusive Cities, where the critical urban scholarship and activities unpack the relationship between urban and social transformations and address questions of power relationships and political equality that underlie existing vulnerability, exclusion and marginalization of urban dwellers. The platform hopefully becomes a network where we can discuss urban social justice and inclusion, not just within the academic circles, but more specifically in city planning, policy development and public debates that shape our common urban futures.

    Planned activities:

    Call for chapter proposals for a book: Inclusive cities in times of global urban transformations: Intersectionalities, infrastructures and sustainable development.

    Workshop for sharing case studies of global urban transformation and inclusive cities for an edited book (August 2021)

    Book launch (November 2021)

    #Trust #critical_urbanism

  • Territoires des #déchets. Agir en régime de proximité

    Du #compostage_collectif urbain aux ressourceries de #ville, les initiatives pour ancrer le traitement des déchets dans la ville se multiplient en s’appuyant sur l’investissement des usagers.
    Mais si la réglementation communautaire et nationale promeut la #proximité et l’#autosuffisance comme principes directeurs de la #gestion_des_déchets ménagers pour optimiser le #bilan_carbone, cet ouvrage montre que paradoxalement trop de proximité peut remettre en cause l’autosuffisance des territoires pourtant visée.
    En confrontant les politiques menées en #France et dans divers projets européens (#Suède, #Catalogne, #Belgique), ce livre propose d’analyser en profondeur les expériences de la proximité dans le traitement des déchets : expériences des gestionnaires, des usagers, des militants écologistes.


    https://pufr-editions.fr/produit/territoires-des-dechets
    #géographie #livre #ressources_pédagogiques #urban_matter #géographie_urbaine #urbanisme #TRUST #master_TRUST #déchets_ménagers

  • How Vienna built a gender equal city

    In the Austrian capital, all aspects of public life, including transportation and language, are impacted by Vienna’s aim of being an inclusive and gender-neutral destination.

    Walk through the Reumannplatz, one of the best-known squares in Austria’s capital city, Vienna, and you will probably spot an outdoor platform, prominently labelled Mädchenbühne (girls’ stage). The large podium, which can be used by everyone, was requested as a performance space by the girls of the nearby school when asked what they would like from the urban area.

    The girls’ stage joins workout stations, a playground and more than 50 new trees as new additions to the square, which reopened last year following a gender-sensitive redesign. But in Vienna, it’s not only the urban spaces that are developed with gender in mind. All aspects of public life, including transportation and language, are impacted by the capital’s aim of being an inclusive and gender-neutral destination.

    The strategy Vienna uses to achieve this aim is called “gender mainstreaming”. The head of the Department for Gender Mainstreaming, Ursula Bauer, describes it as a tool to achieve gender equality in society based on equal structures, settings and conditions for both women and men.

    She says that it differs from women’s policy in that it makes sure regulations and procedures take into account that there is a structural difference between women and men, mainly stemming from traditional gender roles. “Women’s policy is repair work, whereas gender mainstreaming is prevention,” Bauer said.

    She explained that the department looks at gender-differentiated data and provides guidelines as well as training to make sure government services are gender-sensitive and accessible. Over the years, a network of gender experts in key areas has also been set up. Bauer likens the department’s cross-sectional role to that of a watchdog making sure all areas of the city’s government take gender inequalities into account. “No-one can escape,” she said jokingly. “We are like a spiderweb.”

    In practice, gender mainstreaming takes many forms, such as ensuring government bodies use gender-sensitive language to communicate, or that public transportation includes illustrations of men with children to signal seats reserved for parents. A visitor to the capital might also notice the wide pavements for mothers navigating the city with prams or children, or the fact that a large proportion of the city, including the whole public transportation network, is wheelchair accessible.

    Another key area is urban planning. Gender planning expert, Eva Kail, was central to making sure Vienna was one of the first cities to look to gender to shape its public spaces. Inspired by feminist planning literature, Kail began exploring the topic 30 years ago and received the budget and political backing to make it a priority. “It was time to look at the whole city from the female perspective,” she said.

    Kail began collecting data on how and by whom Vienna’s public spaces were being used and discovered that the female perspective had often been missing. She explained that the predominantly male urban planners had been basing their designs on male interests and their everyday life experiences, meaning they tended to neglect the perspectives of other population groups.

    Kail noticed that the perspective of teenage girls in particular was missing from the city’s parks, and, together with her team, worked with them to understand how to make these urban spaces more appealing. The result was larger areas dedicated to soccer being divided into smaller spaces so that multiple groups could play; and creating additional seating areas, such as hammocks, to retreat to. “It may sound trivial but having public toilets in parks is also important for many park users,” she said.

    The new park designs, which were tested in six pilot projects in 1999 and 2000, also addressed the safety fears held by many females. “We made sure the main path was well lit, as straight as possible, and that bushes weren’t too close,” she said.

    Observations showed that the pilots were a success. “They worked really well,” said Kail. “More girls were using the parks and they were taking up a larger amount of space in them.” Now visitors to the city will see that every new or refurbished park in Vienna follows the same principles.

    The planning pioneer says she is often asked how to spot gender mainstreamed urban design around the city. “When it is done well, it is invisible,” she said. “A well-functioning public space, where no group is missing or struggling to use it, doesn’t stand out.”

    But sometimes Vienna’s public spaces are purposefully used to make females more visible. For example, in the city’s urban development project Seestadt Aspern, the majority of the streets, squares and parks have been named after women, such as Janis Joplin, as a small counter to the historically predominant male naming. And there’s the symbolic identification of the podium in the Reumannplatz as the girls’ stage.

    While Vienna’s gender mainstreaming approach helps it to position highly in quality-of-life rankings, political science professor at the University of Vienna, Birgit Sauer, says the rest of Austria hasn’t yet implemented it to the same extent. “We have a gap between Vienna and the country’s more rural areas and smaller cities,” she said.

    Sometimes Vienna’s public spaces are purposefully used to make females more visible

    Sauer says that while there is a tradition of gender equality in Austria, including public housing projects dating back to the 1920s, women in Vienna have more access to support, such as free childcare, which tends to be costly and have limited opening hours elsewhere in the country. “This means that mothers can work if they want to,” she said, but adds that gender pay gaps are still common.

    Many travellers will think of Vienna, which is known for its formal balls, as a very traditional society, but the professor says that multiple factors have resulted in the capital being ahead of the gender equality curve in Central and Western Europe. Sauer explains that already in the 1970s, the city was home to many active women’s groups and that Vienna has a history of having Social Democratic governments that invested in creating social equality.

    And this does not just stop with gender. According to Sauer, there has also been a lot of activism and political support for the LGBTQ community.

    Berni Ledinski, who is the Vienna coordinator for QueerCityPass, a tourist ticket for lesbian, gay and trans visitors highlighting queer-friendly institutions, agrees. Ledinski, who also performs as the drag queen Candy Licious, says that “Vienna as a city is a really safe space for queer people.” He says that it not only offers a good range of queer-friendly cafes, bars, shops and museums, but also has a division within the city administration focused on combating LGBTQ discrimination.

    For Ledinski, a central moment for the capital’s queer community was when Thomas Neuwirth won the 2014 Eurovision song contest, performing in drag as Conchita Wurst. “It definitely had a really big impact, and marketing campaigns started to include same-sex couples,” he said.

    The event also inspired the City of Vienna to make the queer community more visible in public spaces, for example, by including illustrations of same-sex couples in traffic lights. But while much progress has been made for the queer community, Ledinski says there is a potential to do more. “There is always room for improvement, especially when it comes to the recognition of inter and trans people,” he said.

    And it appears that important steps in that direction are taking place. Vienna recently unveiled its first transgender crosswalk, located close to the Vienna General Hospital, which is home to the nation’s only transgender healthcare centre. “Due to Covid-19, there have been a lot of problems with trans healthcare, and we thought it would be a great sign of solidarity,” said Dominique Mras who came up with the idea.

    Mras, who is the member of parliament in Vienna’s 9th district responsible for diversity, says it is important to note that the pink, blue and white crossing received support from all political parties, including the conservative one. And while it is the only such crosswalk planned for now, Mras believes that it is an important symbol to help open up the conversation around gender diversity and make trans people more visible in Vienna.

    “It’s a first step,” she said.

    https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20210524-how-vienna-built-a-gender-equal-city?ocid=ww.social.link.email

    #genre #ville #Vienne #ressources_pédagogiques #TRUST #master_trust #villes #urban_matter #espace_public #femmes #visibilité #in/visibilité #Mädchenbühne #urbanisme #féminisme

  • #Bamako. De la ville à l’agglomération

    Longtemps perçue comme un gros village, réceptacle des migrations rurales, la capitale du Mali est devenue une métropole illustrant remarquablement la #croissance_démographique et l’#étalement spatial des grandes agglomérations ouest-africaines. Avec trois décennies de recul, ce livre-atlas met en lumière ces enjeux et les processus de renouvellement de la population bamakoise : le poids désormais décisif des #jeunes ; l’impact de #flux_résidentiels redistribuant familles et demandes de #logement au-delà du district urbain ; le déplacement des fortes #inégalités d’accès au #sol vers les #périphéries de l’agglomération.

    S’appuyant sur une combinaison de données censitaires, d’enquêtes quantitatives et d’observations recueillies jusqu’à la fin des années 2010, l’ouvrage montre comment les pratiques des habitants en matière de #logement, de migration et de #mobilité_urbaine impriment des #discriminations croissantes dans ce cadre expansif. La trajectoire de la ville se lit au fil de plusieurs générations qui ont marqué l’histoire des quartiers, densifié les lignées de propriétaires, forgé de nouveaux besoins dans les plus récents fronts de peuplement.

    Prendre le pouls de la #transition_urbaine oblige à déconstruire les visions simplistes, opposant émigration et immigration, #croissance_spontanée et #urbanisme_réglementaire, une ville « prédatrice » et une campagne « spoliée », sans pour autant négliger leurs échos dans les représentations locales et les modèles globalisés de #gouvernance_urbaine. Véritable manuel d’investigation, ce livre rappelle donc la nécessité d’une connaissance précise des cycles d’expansion urbaine et des acteurs de cette double fabrique, sociale et territoriale. Il donne à voir l’agglomération de Bamako à la fois dans sa dimension régionale et dans l’intimité de ses #quartiers.

    https://www.editions.ird.fr/produit/632/9782709928908/bamako
    #ville #géographie_urbaine #TRUST #master_TRUST #urban_matter #livre #villes #Mali #ressources_pédagogiques

  • RENCONTRE 4 BENEDICTE GROSJEAN : 17 MAI 2021

    QUESTIONS
    Comment définir aujourd’hui les liens possibles entre
    recherche-action et urbanisme ?
    Comment les resituer dans le cadre de la recherche
    par le projet ?
    Quelles peuvent être les relations entre recherche-action et pédagogie ?

    PARCOURS
    Professeure, ENSA de Lille, Ville et territoire ; Chercheure au laboratoire LACTH, ENSAP de Lille
    Chercheure associée au laboratoire IPRAUS (UMR
    AUSser) ; chargée de cours à la Faculté d’Architecture
    de l’Université de Louvain (LOCI), site de Tournai.
    Formations : 1995, Ingénieur civil architecte (Ecole
    Polytechnique de Louvain) ; 2000, DEA « projet urbain :
    théories et dispositifs » (ENSA Paris-Belleville) ; 2007,
    Docteur en architecture, urbanisme et aménagement
    du territoire (UCLouvain / Université de Paris VIII) ; 2008,
    Grand Prix de la Thèse sur la Ville ; 2019, Habilitation à
    diriger les Recherches
    Thèmes de recherches : les formes territoriales alternatives à la métropolisation (entre-deux, transfrontaliers, ville diffuse, etc.) et les modes de projet « dans un
    monde incertain » (urbanisme descriptif, stratégique,
    bottom-up).

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sXPuaJstvMQ

    #Bénédicte_Grosjean #recherche #recherche-action #urbanisme #TRUST #master_TRUST #conférence #research_by_design #pédagogie #constructivisme #positionnement #immersion #méthodologie #émancipation #empowerment #rationalisme_scientifique #RAP #recherche-action_participative #ressources_pédagogiques

  • #Marseille privatopia : les #enclaves_résidentielles à Marseille : logiques spatiales, formes et représentations

    Marseille : privatopia ?

    La forte multiplication des « #résidences_fermées_sécurisées » est une tendance observée dans les #villes européennes et françaises, après celles d’Amérique latine, des USA, d’Afrique du sud etc. En #France, elle a surtout été repérée et analysée en contextes péri-urbains (Ile de France, Côte d’Azur, banlieues de Toulouse et Montpellier). Partout où elle se développe, cette tendance est souvent attribuée aux inquiétudes des habitants pour la #sûreté, ou leur #qualité_de_vie, ainsi qu’à des #replis_sociaux, thèmes récurrents dans les médias et discours politiques. Elle est aussi liée au rôle d’une « offre » portée par les majors de l’immobilier. Mais elle est aussi soutenue indirectement, dans le contexte néolibéral, par des pouvoirs publics qui se déchargent ainsi de l’aménagement et de la gestion d’#espaces_de_proximité.

    Nous observons et analysons depuis 2007 cette prolifération des #fermetures à Marseille. Après un premier état des lieux (Dorier et al, 2010), nous avons mené une second #inventaire exhaustif en 2013-2014. Et depuis lors, nous menons une veille ciblée sur certains secteurs. Démarrée au début des années 90, la diffusion des #enclosures atteint des sommets à Marseille où elle n’a quasiment pas été régulée : des #marges et des #enclaves se construisent ainsi dès qu’on s’éloigne du centre historique (Dorier, Dario, 2016). Au point que la #fermeture des #espaces_résidentiels, de leurs #rues et espaces de plein air semble en train de devenir la norme (Dorier, Dario, 2018)

    Depuis 25 ans, Marseille n’a cessé de se cloisonner de plus en plus et ce processus est venu aggraver les #inégalités d’#accès_aux_équipements et aux « #aménités » urbaines. Le #parc bâti du centre ville paupérisé s’est dégradé jusqu’à l’effondrement et au risque de péril imminent de centaines d’immeubles, qui ont du être évacués en urgence depuis novembre 2018, comme on le voit sur la carte de droite (voir aussi page dédiée). Pendant ce temps, les quartiers du sud et de l’est, ainsi que les zones en rénovation, se sont transformées en mosaïques résidentielles clôturées, sous le double effet de la #promotion_immobilière et de ré-aménagements voulus par les associations de #copropriétaires. Ils dessinent des espaces pour classes moyennes à aisées, sous forme de #lotissements et d’#ensembles_immobiliers majoritairement fermés et sécurisés, chacun doté de ses propres espaces « communs » privés : parkings, voirie privée, jardins.

    Cette « #Privatopia » tourne d’abord le dos au centre historique, à ses ilots anciens décrépis où l’action publique s’est illustrée par son inefficience pendant des décennies. La fermeture se diffuse d’abord dans les zones favorisées, puis dans les périphéries ouvertes à l’urbanisation, enfin dans les zones de rénovation urbaine : la création de nouvelles résidences fermées est devenue un moyen pour valoriser des opérations immobilières et y attirer des classes moyennes, face aux copropriétés dégradées et aux ensembles HLM appauvris. Lorqu’un bailleur rénove un ensemble de logements sociaux, celui-ci est également « résidentialisé », même si, avec des années de recul sur cette pratique, on sait désormais que clôturer ne résoud pas les problèmes socio-économiques des quartiers, ni même les problèmes de sécurité. Au contraire, la fragmentation physique pourrait bien alimenter les tendances aux séparatismes sociaux en tous genres.

    D’après nos enquêtes, en dehors des formes d’entresoi spécifique de quartiers particulièrement aisés, comme la colline Périer, et ses « gated communities » surplombant la mer, la fermeture est d’abord fortement associée au « tout voiture » qui caractérise encore Marseille et à la concurrence pour le stationnement résidentiel : les premiers espaces à être clôturés sont les parkings. Elle est également liée à 25 années de désengagement croissant de la municipalité dans la gestion de proximité (propreté, entretien des espaces verts, sécurisation publique des rues) ainsi qu’un encouragement de l’urbanisation privée par des ventes de parcelles publiques ou des zones d’aménagement favorisant la promotion immobilière. La fermeture résidentielle traduit l’affirmation d’une économie résidentielle, le rôle des promoteurs, syndics, copropriétés étant crucial : la « sécurisation » (privée) est supposée faire augmenter la valeur marchande des biens immobiliers… Enfin, la fermeture traduit une accentuation des replis sociaux : à Marseille la clôture « a posteriori » de rues qui étaient auparavant ouvertes au passage représente 55% des cas observés.

    Certains espaces du 8ème, 9ème, 12ème , nord du 13ème arrondissements (Les Olives), caractéristiques de cette urbanisation privée, deviennent un assemblage désordonné de copropriétés et d’enclaves de moins en moins accessibles et traversantes. La fermeture se diffuse par mimétisme, les ensembles résidentiels forment des « agrégats », qui bloquent les circulations : une véritable situation de thrombose dans certains quartiers, anciens comme récents (les Olives, Ste Marthe). Le comble, c’est que dans ces quartiers, les plus favorisés, au cadre de vie « a priori » le plus agréable, les déplacements à pied ou en vélo tiennent désormais de l’exploit. Les détours imposés par les barrières qui enserrent chaque rue ou jardin privé de résidence obligent à prendre la voiture pour accompagner un enfant à l’école du coin, acheter le pain… La ville perd de plus en plus en cohérence, et, avec cette juxtaposition de résidences sécurisées certains quartier ressemblent plus à une mosaïque de co-propriétés qu’à… une ville. Cela a été mis en évidence et modélisé par la toute récente thèse de Julien Dario (2019), réalisée dans le cadre de ce projet.

    A Marseille, depuis 2007, nous avons opté pour une étude empirique, directe, sur le terrain. Nous pu ainsi vérifier l’hypothèse qu’aux initiatives spontanées de fermeture de rues et de lotissements a posteriori, longtemps après leur construction, s’ajoutent des stratégies nouvelles. Elles associent promotion privée et action publique, et sont destinées à faire évoluer le peuplement de quartiers de la ville, à travers la production de logement « de qualité » attirant des classes moyennes et supérieures. Promoteurs et décideurs semblent juger utile de les rassurer à travers la livraison d’ensembles qui sont quasiment tous fermés dès la construction … En 12 ans, de 2008 à 2020 une série d’études, de masters et thèses ont permis de décrire et quantifier ce processus, d’observer la progression d’une fragmentation urbaine qui s’accroît aux échelles fines et d’évaluer ses impacts.

    Nos études se sont focalisées sur les fermetures massives des aires privilégiées (Colline Périer, Littoral Sud, Nord-Est avec la technopole de Chateau Gombert), et la transformation résidentielle de certains territoires périphériques en zones d’investissements immobiliers rentables, attirant des classes moyennes et supérieures (Littoral Nord, Sainte Marthe, grand centre ville/Euromed, franges du parc National des Calanques comme la ZAC de la Jarre). les résidences fermées deviennent ainsi un outil de plus value foncière… et de recompositions urbaines, valorisant toutes les zones ayant un attrait environnemental, tout en en restreignant l’accès.

    La diffusion d’un modèle

    Notre méthodologie a permis de prendre la mesure du phénomène à l’échelle d’une ville entière, et sur la durée, ce qui n’a pas été réalisé ailleurs en France. A deux reprises (2008-2009 et 2013-2014), la commune entière a été arpentée, chaque ensemble résidentiel fermé a été géolocalisé dans un SIG, inventorié, décrit, photographié, afin d’établir un corpus exhaustif : 1001 résidences ou lotissements étaient enclos en 2009, plus de 1550 en 2014. L’ensemble des clôtures ont été datées à partir d’enquête directe ou par photo-interprétation. Cette démarche est relatée dans deux rapports de recherche (Dorier et al., 2010 et 2014), 13 masters et une thèse (Dario, 2019).

    Le recours au SIG (Système d’information géographique) a permis de tracer leur histoire, en croisant les localisations avec des images aériennes anciennes, le cadastre, la chronologie des programmes immobiliers. En 2011 et 2012, la première étude du LPED est actualisée à travers plusieurs mémoires d’étudiants sous la direction d’E.Dorier et S.Bridier. Ceux-ci observent une accélération des dynamiques d’enclosures dans les quartiers sud (Dario J. 2010, Toth P.2012), leur multiplication et leur diffusion dans les quartiers nord (Balasc et Dolo 2011, Dolo 2012, Robillard 2012). La propagation se fait beaucoup par mimétisme : plus de la moitié des ensembles fermés sont collés les uns aux autres, par grappes, transformant la physionomie et les usages possibles de l’espace urbain et développant des « marges » urbaines cloisonnées. On peut le vérifier, à travers l’exemple d’une marge Nord-Est de Marseille, sur les franges ville-espaces péri-urbains Les Olives : une juxtaposition désordonnée de lotissements fermés.

    Nous avons aussi beaucoup observé, recueilli de nombreux témoignages auprès de résidents, de riverains, de syndics, d’agences, de techniciens de l’urbanisme… Nous avons séjourné dans plusieurs de ces résidences. Nous poursuivons la veille sur certains contextes sensibles à haut potentiel spéculatif immobilier, comme la frange du massif des calanques ou sainte Marthe, ou encore des espaces où les fermetures sont conflictuelles. Par des analyses d’archives, des enquêtes fines sur des contextes urbains, des entretiens avec acteurs et habitants, des analyses de périmètres de la politique de la ville, le suivi de conflits de voisinages nous avons ensuite analysé les facteurs historiques et les impacts associés à cette dynamique d’enclosures, les inégalités sociales, les impacts sur la circulation, les inégalités environnementale (D.Rouquier 2013, J.Dario, 2019 et la thèse en cours de P. Toth, consacrée aux 8ème et 9ème arrondissements).

    Au final, on met à jour une dynamique de transition libérale, individualiste et sécuritaire, associée au règne de la voiture dans la ville (beaucoup de clôtures ont au départ pour justification le seul parking), qui freine d’autres évolutions souhaitables (transition écologique, inclusion sociale). Si le phénomène se banalise, on constate aussi une complexité territoriale du processus et son épaisseur historique. Dans des contextes de fortes recompositions urbaines (spatiales, foncières, sociales, démographiques), et dans les périmètres de nouvellement urbain, la fermeture d’espaces résidentiels est utilisée comme outil de diversification de l’habitat et de mixité sociale. Le processus n’a pas partout les mêmes motifs ni les mêmes impacts socio-environnementaux. D’où l’intérêt d’approches qualitatives par observations sensibles, entretiens avec des acteurs et habitants, dépouillements d’archives historiques (histoires de rues).

    Les quartiers sud

    En observant le facteur de proximité dans la diffusion, ainsi que le potentiel de valorisation immobilière des terrains vacants ou susceptibles de l’être, plusieurs scénarios de prospective ont été mis au point par Julien Dario pour anticiper l’évolution des espaces susceptibles d’être fermés, transmis à la Ville dans le cadre d’un contrat, comme aide à la décision (Dario 2011, 2014 et 2019). Dans les quartiers sud, on est frappé par la perspective de 53% de taux d’évolution spontané probable de la fermeture dans les 8ème et 9ème arrondissements, si aucune intervention publique ne vient réguler la tendance. Les surfaces touchées par les enclosures (résidences et périmètres d’entreprises) déjà localement très importantes pourraient y atteindre le tiers de la surface totale urbanisée. Des études de cas à échelle fine ont permis d’anticiper plusieurs conflits liés à ces processus (progressifs ou brutaux) en lien avec des dynamiques sociale locales.

    Les cas des lotissements « Coin Joli » et « Barry » (analysés ici par J.Dario entre 2011 et 2019) montrent comment certains dispositifs informels préfigurant l’enclosure sont mis en place progressivement, informellement, parfois subrepticement : enrochements, systèmes physiques fixes contraignants (plots métalliques) permettant encore le passage prudent de deux roues et piétons ; panneaux de sens interdit « privés » et informels apposés à l’extrémité de certaines rues. On passe d’une délimitation par panneautage à une fermeture symbolique et partielle, avant d’évoluer vers l’enclosure, qui peut être conflictuelle en privant de passage les riverains, en réduisant les perméabilités urbaines.

    Les quartiers nord : diffusion des ensembles résidentiels fermés dans les contextes de rénovation urbaine

    Un fait remarquable est la diffusion des enclaves résidentielles fermées au cœur et en bordure des zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS) telles qu’elles ont été définies par l’Agence Nationale de la Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU). Bénéficiant de la TVA réduite, les promoteurs sont incités à y produire une nouvelle offre de logement privée, afin de permettre une diversification et l’installation de classes moyennes. Mais les enclosures, supposées rassurer les candidats à l’accession à la propriété, et maintenir un niveau de prix élevé ne favorisent pas les relations sociales … et nos études montrent qu’en fait de « mixité », apparaissent de nouvelles formes de fragmentations et même de tensions résidentielles (Dorier et al, 2010, 2012), qui s’accompagnent, par ailleurs de formes d’évitement fonctionnel (Audren, 2015, Audren Baby-Collin, Dorier 2016 , Audren, Dorier, Rouquier, 2019). Le secteur du Plan d’Aou dans le 15ème arrondissement de Marseille, où la restructuration résidentielle est achevée a été analysé à l’aide d’étudiants (Balasc et Dolo 2011). Dans ce secteur cohabitent des zones de logements HLM en fin de réhabilitation, des lotissements anciens qui se sont fermés ou sont en cours de fermeture, des projets immobiliers récents, conçus sécurisés. La juxtaposition de ces différents types d’habitats aux profils sociaux différenciés engendre plus une fragmentation qu’une mixité Fonctionnelle, malgré la proximité. Les interrelations sont faibles entre les ensembles et les espaces. (Dorier, Berry-Chikahoui et Bridier, 2012)

    une crise des urbanités

    Tandis que cette transformation des espaces de copropriétés et rues privées de Marseille se poursuit, des pans entiers de vieux quartiers populaires se délabrent. En 2019, notre cartographie de ces ensembles résidentiels privés fermés ainsi que des HLM « résidentialisés » et enclos (dans les projets de rénovation urbaine) tranche avec la géographie des constructions déclarées en péril et brutalement évacuées de leurs habitants, suite à l’effondrement de deux immeubles vétustes du quartier Noailles, près du Vieux port de Marseille. Notre carte révèle des politiques de l’habitat à plusieurs vitesses, où des décennies de laisser-faire public face à la ville privée s’expriment d’un côté par la dégradation du bâti, et de l’autre par la multiplication de formes de repli et d’entre soi urbain ayant des impacts sur les circulations et sur l’accès aux équipements. A ce stade, des rééquilibrages publics sont indispensables. Quelques initiatives publiques pour maintenir des traverses piétonnières ont été lancées dans certains quartiers très touchés, elles sont compliques par les évolutions législatives (qui facilitent la clôture des espaces privés) ainsi que par la dévolution de la compétence en matière de voirie à la Métropole. Rétablir des accès et servitudes de passage pour les piétons est compliqué dans les espaces privés : il faut passer par une DUP, puis par l’achat d’une bande de terrain par la collectivité pour tracer un cheminement piétonnier. Des interventions seraient possibles dans certains cas où les clôtures ont été posées sur des rues non privées, ou hors de la légalité. Mais la collectovité ne s’auto-saisit pas des cas d’infraction. Les actions au cas par cas risquent de ne pas suffire à endiguer cette véritable crise d’urbanité.

    (observations menées conjointement à nos études sur le mal logement et des évacuations à Marseille).

    le projet ci-dessous a fait l’objet d’une exposition art-science, présentée à l’Espace Pouillon, campus centre Saint Charles de l’Université Marseille Privatopia 8-24 octobre 2020.

    Depuis 2014, une collaboration avec l’artiste peintre Anke Doberauer (photos et tableaux) a été rendue possible grâce à une résidence commune à la Fondation Camargo (2014). La jeune cinéaste Marie Noëlle Battaglia a également réalisé en 2020 un documentaire « En remontant les murs » inspiré par nos recherches, et en lien avec l’équipe (avant première le 18 octobre 2020, dans le cadre du festival Image de ville). Ces collaborations ont déjà donné lieu à des présentations croisées, comme celle du 3 avril 2019 organisée par le Goethe Institut à la Friche de la belle de mai, et pourraient déboucher sur une exposition et un ouvrage commun.

    Rapports de recherche-action :

    Dorier E. Dario J. Rouquier D. Bridier S. , (2014), Bilan scientifique de l’étude « Marseille, ville passante », Contrat de collaboration de recherche : « Développement urbain durable à Marseille » n°12/00718, 13 cartes, 18 croquis, 24 tableaux. juin 2014, 90 p.

    Dorier E. (dir), BERRY-CHIKHAOUI I., BRIDIER S., BABY-COLLIN V., AUDREN G., GARNIAUX J. (2010), La diffusion des ensembles résidentiels fermés à Marseille. Les urbanités d’une ville fragmentée, rapport de recherche au PUCA, Contrat de recherche D 0721 ( E.J. 07 00 905), 202 p, 35 cartes et croquis, 30 graphiques, 68 illustrations photographiques.

    Ces rapports ont donné lieu à de nombreuses restitutions publiques auprès des services de l’Urbanisme de la Ville, la Communauté urbaine, l’Agence d’Urbanisme (Agam), le département.

    Articles scientifiques :

    Dorier E. Dario J., 2018, « Gated communities in Marseille, urban fragmentation becoming the norm ? », L’Espace géographique, 2018/4 (Volume 47), p. 323-345. URL : https://www.cairn.info/journal-espace-geographique-2018-4-page-323.htm (traduction texte intégral ) texte intégral (ENG.) DORIER DARIO Espace geo anglais EG_474_0323

    Dorier E. Dario J., 2018, « Les espaces résidentiels fermés à Marseille, la fragmentation urbaine devient-elle une norme ? » l’Espace géographique, 2018-4 pp. 323-345.

    Dorier E., Dario J., 2016, « Des marges choisies et construites : les résidences fermées », in Grésillon E., Alexandre B., Sajaloli B. (cord.), 2016. La France des marges, Armand Colin, Paris, p. 213-224.

    Audren, G., Baby-Collin V. et Dorier, É. (2016) « Quelles mixités dans une ville fragmentée ? Dynamiques locales de l’espace scolaire marseillais. » in Lien social et politiques, n°77, Transformation sociale des quartiers urbains : mixité et nouveaux voisinages, p. 38-61 http://www.erudit.org/revue/lsp/2016/v/n77/1037901ar.pdf

    Audren, G., Dorier, É. et Rouquier, D., 2015, « Géographie de la fragmentation urbaine et territoire scolaire : effets des contextes locaux sur les pratiques scolaires à Marseille », Actes de colloque. Rennes, ESO, CREAD, Université de Rennes 2. Actes en ligne.

    Dorier E, Berry-Chickhaoui I, Bridier S ., 2012, Fermeture résidentielle et politiques urbaines, le cas marseillais. In Articulo– – Journal of Urban Research, n°8 (juillet 2012).

    Thèses

    Audren Gwenaelle (2015), Géographie de la fragmentation urbaine et territoires scolaires à Marseille, Université d’Aix Marseille, LPED. Sous la dir. d’Elisabeth Dorier et de V.Baby-Collin

    Dario Julien (2019) Géographie d’une ville fragmentée : morphogenèse, gouvernance des voies et impacts de la fermeture résidentielle à Marseille, Sous la dir. d’Elisabeth Dorier et de Sébastien Bridier. Telecharger ici la version complète. Cette thèse est lauréate du Grand prix de thèse sur la Ville 2020 PUCA/ APERAU/ Institut CDC pour la Recherche, Caisse des Dépôts

    Toth Palma (soutenance prévue 2021), Fragmentations versus urbanité(s) : vivre dans l’archipel des quartiers sud de Marseille Université d’Aix Marseille, LPED , Sous la direction de Elisabeth Dorier

    Posters scientifiques :

    Dario J. Rouquier D. et Dorier E., 2014, Les Ensembles résidentiels fermés à Marseille, in SIG 2014, Conférence francophone ESRI, 1-2 octobre 2014 – http://www.esrifrance.fr/iso_album/15_marseille.pdf

    Dario J. Rouquier D. et Dorier E, 2014, Marseille, fragmentation spatiale, fermeture résidentielle, LPED – Aix-Marseille Université, poster scientifique, Festival international de géographie de Saint Dié, oct 2014. https://www.reseau-canope.fr/fig-st-die/fileadmin/contenus/2014/conference_Elisabeth_Dorier_poster_LPED_1_Marseille.pdf

    Dario J. Rouquier D. et Dorier E., 2014, Marseille, Voies fermées, Ville passante, LPED – Aix-Marseille Université, poster. http://www.reseau-canope.fr/fig-st-die/fileadmin/contenus/2014/conference_Elisabeth_Dorier_poster_LPED_2_Marseille.pdf

    Contributions presse et médias

    Dorier E. Dario J. Audren G. aout 2017, collaboration avec le journal MARSACTU. 5 contributions à la série « Petites histoires de résidences fermées », collaboration journal MARSACTU / LPED, aout 2017. https://marsactu.fr/dossier/serie-petites-histoires-de-residences-fermees

    Dorier E. et Dario J. 23 aout 2017, interview par B.Gilles, [Petites histoires de résidences fermées] Les beaux quartiers fermés de la colline Périer, interview pr B.Gilles, MARSACTU, https://marsactu.fr/residences-fermees-dorier

    Dorier E. Dario J. 30 janv. 2017, interview par L.Castelly, MARSACTU : https://marsactu.fr/discussion-ouverte-residences-fermees

    Dorier E. , et Dario.J. 20 mars 2014, interview in MARSACTU , société : 29% de logements sont situes en residences fermees à Marseille

    Dorier E. Dario J., 4 oct 2013, « Hautes clôtures à Marseille », in Libération, le libé des géographes. (1 p, 1 carte) http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2013/10/03/hautes-clotures-a-marseille_936834
    Dorier E. , 7 avril 2013, « Le phénomène des résidences fermées est plus important à Marseille qu’ailleurs », Marsactu, talk quartiers, archi et urbanisme, http://www.marsactu.fr/archi-et-urbanisme/le-phenomene-des-residences-fermees-est-plus-important-a-marseille-quailleu

    Dorier E. Dario J., 10 fev 2013, « Fermetures éclair » in revue Esprit de Babel, Fermetures éclair

    télévision

    M6, Résidences fermées à Marseille – étude du LPED. Journal national, octobre 2013 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDM

    FR3, 19/20, Résidences fermées à Marseille – étude du LPED, 24 mai 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-O

    FR 5 (minutes 38 à 50) : « En toute sécurité », documentaire de B.Evenou, http://www.france5.fr/emission/en-t

    podcast radio

    Collaboration entre chercheurs et cinéaste, janvier 2021 : https://ecoleanthropocene.universite-lyon.fr/documenter-la-geographie-sociale-grand-entretien-a

    Collaboration entre chercheurs et artiste peintre, octobre 2020 : Sonographies marseillaises – Radio Grenouille et Manifesta 13 « Ce monde qui nous inspire #4 Marseille ville privée ? »

    https://urbanicites.hypotheses.org/688

    #sécurisation #privatisation #espace_public #classes_sociales #urban_matter #géographie_urbaine #TRUST #master_TRUST #immobilier #foncier #rénovation_urbaine #urbanisme #fragmentation_physique #inégalités #tout_voiture #voiture #automobile #stationnement_résidentiel #parkings #proximité #promotion_immobilière #urbanisation_privée #détours #barrières #mosaïque #
    #cartographie #visualisation

  • La città post-pandemica non potrà esistere senza giustizia sociale e spaziale

    Dove eravamo arrivati

    Parlare oggi di rigenerazione urbana e innovazione sociale non può avere lo stesso significato di qualche mese fa. È chiaro come l’emergenza pandemica lascerà un segno sia sulla capacità delle comunità urbane di attivarsi, sia sulla possibilità delle istituzioni di sostenerle.

    La letteratura sull’innovazione sociale sottolinea da tempo come le forme di innovazione sociale si attivino soprattutto in aree urbane a forte capitale sociale e che abbiano già sperimentato forme di attivazione dal basso; troviamo inoltre innovazione sociale soprattutto in quelle aree urbane capaci di favorire spazi di relazione caratterizzati da diversità sociale e culturale. Esiste quindi una relazione problematica tra innovazione sociale e diseguaglianze urbane.

    Le ricerche condotte in questi anni hanno inoltre dimostrato che l’innovazione sociale ha un forte bisogno di spazio e delle istituzioni per potersi ancorare e definire progettualità durature nel tempo e potenzialmente inclusive.
    Quali cambiamenti

    Capitale sociale, spazi in disuso, presenza delle istituzioni. L’emergenza pandemica avrà sicuramente un impatto su come questi 3 “ingredienti” dell’innovazione sociale si comporranno nei territori.

    Ci troveremo probabilmente di fronte ad una città mutata, dove le diseguaglianze sono destinate ad aumentare con un impatto su come il capitale sociale e la presenza di vuoti urbani saranno distribuiti nello spazio. Ci troveremo presumibilmente di fronte ad un aumento della dotazione di spazi vuoti, in maniera simile a quanto accadde dopo la crisi del 2008, ma ancora non conosciamo le geografie dell’abbandono e nemmeno le traiettorie con cui le società riabiteranno le città e le aree interne.

    Abbiamo di fronte un enorme spazio di opportunità. Quello di ripensare alla rigenerazione urbana via innovazione sociale non più come un insieme di pratiche, di sperimentazioni. Ma come una componente essenziale della pianificazione urbana se pensiamo che la città post-pandemica debba moltiplicare i suoi anticorpi per combattere le forme crescenti di diseguaglianze sociali e nell’accesso ai servizi pubblici di base.
    Nuove infrastrutture di comunità

    Questo orizzonte di opportunità si è intravisto in pieno lockdown alcuni mesi fa. In tantissimi comuni, in piena emergenza, gli spazi di rigenerazione sono diventati infrastrutture di comunità, servendo i territori e le persone più in difficoltà. Luoghi in cui lasciare la spesa sospesa, dove organizzare i volontari per le distribuzioni di quartiere, dove raccogliere fondi per le famiglie più in difficoltà. In diversi casi si sono create delle collaborazioni inedite tra comunità e istituzioni, andando oltre le classiche frammentazioni tra corpi sociali, per rispondere ad una emergenza sanitaria senza precedenti. Anche la collaborazione tra città e comuni più piccoli su scala metropolitana è spesso stata facilitata dai legami a rete tra questi spazi di comunità. Una infrastruttura sociale importante che in diversi casi ha saputo uscire dai confini comunali.

    In una crisi epocale, ‘le iniziative di innovazione sociale si sono moltiplicate uscendo spesso da classici steccati di appartenenza perché al centro è sembrato tornare l’essere umano più che le categorie a cui appartiene’. In un articolo scritto su The Guardian in piena pandemia, Richard Sennett aveva aperto ad alcuni interessanti ragionamenti in questo senso.

    Le esperienze di innovazione sociale, in particolare in emergenza Coronavirus, mostrano che lo spazio conta: spazi innesco specifici o sistemi di spazi da cui partono azioni variegate con effetti territoriali più o meno rilevanti. Senza spazi a cui ancorare il lavoro di comunità, tante azioni di mutuo aiuto non sarebbero state attivate in emergenza Coronavirus.

    È all’interno di spazi che abbiamo visto organizzarsi le comunità. Spazi che sono diventati infrastrutture di prossimità: luoghi capaci non solo di essere spazi di welfare, ma di essere infrastrutture per le istituzioni che hanno provato ad adattarsi per rispondere meglio all’emergenza. Non è un caso che la VII Commissione del Parlamento italiano abbia per la prima volta riconosciuto con una risoluzione il ruolo degli spazi rigenerati a base culturale come vere e proprie infrastrutture sociali a cui le istituzioni si possono ancorare per definire percorsi di welfare innovativi.

    Nella situazione eccezionale che ha portato a collaborare oltre i soliti steccati di appartenenza, spazi abitativi, servizi socio-sanitari, servizi educativi e religiosi, spazi commerciali e spazi abitativi hanno dimostrato la potenzialità, insieme, di generare o catalizzare forme di capitale sociale. In ognuno di questi spazi è stato mobilitato capitale sociale da utilizzare in chiave di cambiamento, a riprova del fatto che quando parliamo di innovazione sociale, si intendono processi capaci di rigenerare a partire dal supporto di tutte le infrastrutture sociali e spazi di welfare presenti sul territorio.
    Le sfide alla pianificazione urbana

    Come questo scritto ha provato a far vedere, gli spazi di rigenerazione urbana via innovazione sociale hanno dimostrato un valore potenziale nuovo. Quello di essere finalmente riconosciuti anche per il loro valore di presidi e infrastrutture di comunità, capaci di mettere in campo forme inedite di sostegno e di welfare, in collaborazione con le istituzioni e altri corpi intermedi.

    A maggior ragione in questo momento torna al centro la necessità per la pianificazione urbana di riconoscere il valore di questo micro-spazi di relazione. Siamo di fronte alla necessità di un cambio di paradigma, non solo per le forme di analisi urbana e territoriale. La pianificazione ha sempre di più il compito di definire possibili traiettorie di cambiamento di cui soggetti diversi si possono appropriare per definire forme di collaborazione anche inedite con la pubblica amministrazione. La pianificazione è posta di fronte sempre di più alla necessità di facilitare processi più che solo progettarli e in quest’ottica lo spazio di prossimità appare come una palestra per l’azione importante. La pianificazione, in particolare in emergenza, necessita di tempi di azione diversi, di saper lavorare per scenari intermedi senza perdere un orizzonte di cambiamento.

    Il Comune di Bologna, spesso pioniere in questo campo, ha lavorato alla definizione di un Piano Urbanistico Generale che identifica 24 strategie di prossimità in cui gli spazi di innovazione sociale diventano occasioni stabili di interazione, luoghi importanti non solo per l’analisi dei bisogni ma anche per definire future traiettorie di trasformazione. Spazi intermedi di progettazione dove poter davvero mettere al valore su scala di prossimità proposte su più settori (abitare, economia, sociale, ambiente, infrastrutture) senza però rinunciare ad una pianificazione su scala più ampia, quella urbana.

    Nella città post-pandemica, il concetto di giustizia sociale e spaziale riprenderà ancora più senso. Porre attenzione (e quindi intervenire) sull’inserimento differenziato allo spazio abitativo, allo spazio pubblico e alla sfera pubblica, alle opportunità lavorative, nonché al reale coinvolgimento nei processi di policy, significa agire in alcune dimensioni sociali e materiali che sono all’origine delle diseguaglianze urbane.

    Sono questi alcuni dei ragionamenti che ci hanno portato, anche quest’anno, a rivedere l’offerta formativa di Master U-Rise dell’Università Iuav di Venezia, potenziandole l’interdisciplinarietà e la capacità progettuale. Perché un professionista che vuole lavorare in ambienti complessi non può rinunciare ad essere allo stesso tempo riflessivo e pratico, a mantenere uno sguardo alto sul mondo ma sapendone maneggiare gli attrezzi giusti una volta sul campo.

    https://www.che-fare.com/urise-citta-post-pandemica-giustizia-sociale-spaziale

    #Elena_Ostanel
    #villes #coronavirus #pandémie #post-pandémie #urban_matter #urbanisme #géographie_urbaine #innovation_sociale #régénération_urbaine #inégalités #friches_urbaines #vide #planification_urbaine #justice_sociale
    #TRUST #master_TRUST

    • Le projet #Neighbourchange de Elena Ostel

      #Neighbourchange

      In and beyond Europe today we witness strengthened structural spatial divisions within city neighbourhoods, with increased inequality and sharper lines of division. Neighbourhoods are increasingly diverse in socio-economic, social and ethnic terms, but many differences also exist in lifestyles, attitudes and activities. Continuing immigration and increasing socio-economic and ethnic concentration in neighbourhoods question social cohesion in local societies worldwide.

      In Europe, high rates of unemployment, austerity and poverty make diverse neighbourhoods and local societies increasingly complex and contested. The polarisation of urban space exacerbates and ethnic concentration in neighbourhoods overlaps with situations of social exclusion and deprivation.

      Against this backdrop, we witness a stalled urban regeneration investment as well as the welfare state provisions across many European cities and disadvantaged neighbourhoods, with finance enormously inhibited outside core economic areas following the 2007 financial crisis; more importantly, dissimilar top-down revitalisation strategies have resulted in new urban dynamics and urban tensions, gentrification processes and social exclusion.

      In this context, urban neighbourhoods have become a privileged unit of policy intervention where community-based initiatives have been experimented with the aim to produce social cohesion and transforming power relations and socio-spatial inequalities. Social innovation has become a buzzword often associated to community-led regeneration processes.

      But the efficacy of community-based initiatives inspired by a social innovative approach needs to be further assessed in a condition when the State is constantly retreating.

      https://www.elenaostanel.com/neighbourchange

  • The big wall


    https://thebigwall.org/en

    An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent.

    There are satellites, drones, ships, cooperation projects, police posts, repatriation flights, training centers. They are the bricks of an invisible but tangible and often violent wall. Erected starting in 2015 onwards, thanks to over one billion euros of public money. With one goal: to eliminate those movements by sea, from North Africa to Italy, which in 2015 caused an outcry over a “refugee crisis”. Here we tell you about the (fragile) foundations and the (dramatic) impacts of this project. Which must be changed, urgently.

    –---

    Ready, Set, Go

    Imagine a board game, Risk style. The board is a huge geographical map, which descends south from Italy, including the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa and almost reaching the equator, in Cameroon, South Sudan, Rwanda. Places we know little about and read rarely about.

    Each player distributes activity cards and objects between countries and along borders. In Ethiopia there is a camera crew shooting TV series called ‘Miraj’ [mirage], which recounts the misadventures of naive youth who rely on shady characters to reach Europe. There is military equipment, distributed almost everywhere: off-road vehicles for the Tunisian border police, ambulances and tank trucks for the army in Niger, patrol boats for Libya, surveillance drones taking off from Sicily.

    There is technology: satellite systems on ships in the Mediterranean, software for recording fingerprints in Egypt, laptops for the Nigerian police. And still: coming and going of flights between Libya and Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia. Maritime coordination centers, police posts in the middle of the Sahara, job orientation offices in Tunisia or Ethiopia, clinics in Uganda, facilities for minors in Eritrea, and refugee camps in Sudan.

    Hold your breath for a moment longer, because we still haven’t mentioned the training courses. And there are many: to produce yogurt in Ivory Coast, open a farm in Senegal or a beauty salon in Nigeria, to learn about the rights of refugees, or how to use a radar station.

    Crazed pawns, overlapping cards and unclear rules. Except for one: from these African countries, more than 25 of them, not one person should make it to Italy. There is only one exception allowed: leaving with a visa. Embassy officials, however, have precise instructions: anyone who doesn’t have something to return to should not be accepted. Relationships, family, and friends don’t count, but only incomes, properties, businesses, and titles do.

    For a young professional, a worker, a student, an activist, anyone looking for safety, future and adventure beyond the borders of the continent, for people like me writing and perhaps like you reading, the only allies become the facilitators, those who Europe calls traffickers and who, from friends, can turn into worst enemies.

    We called it The Big Wall. It could be one of those strategy games that keeps going throughout the night, for fans of geopolitics, conflicts, finance. But this is real life, and it’s the result of years of investments, experiments, documents and meetings. At first disorderly, sporadic, then systematized and increased since 2015, when United Nations agencies, echoed by the international media, sounded an alarm: there is a migrant crisis happening and Europe must intervene. Immediately.

    Italy was at the forefront, and all those agreements, projects, and programs from previous years suddenly converged and multiplied, becoming bricks of a wall that, from an increasingly militarized Mediterranean, moved south, to the travelers’ countries of origin.

    The basic idea, which bounced around chancelleries and European institutions, was to use multiple tools: development cooperation, support for security forces, on-site protection of refugees, repatriation, information campaigns on the risks of irregular migration. This, in the language of Brussels, was a “comprehensive approach”.

    We talked to some of the protagonists of this story — those who built the wall, who tried to jump it, and who would like to demolish it — and we looked through thousands of pages of reports, minutes, resolutions, decrees, calls for tenders, contracts, newspaper articles, research, to understand how much money Italy has spent, where, and what impacts it has had. Months of work to discover not only that this wall has dramatic consequences, but that the European – and Italian – approach to international migration stems from erroneous premises, from an emergency stance that has disastrous results for everyone, including European citizens.
    Libya: the tip of the iceberg

    It was the start of the 2017/2018 academic year and Omer Shatz, professor of international law, offered his Sciences Po students the opportunity to work alongside him on the preparation of a dossier. For the students of the faculty, this was nothing new. In the classrooms of the austere building on the Rive Gauche of Paris, which European and African heads of state have passed though, not least Emmanuel Macron, it’s normal to work on real life materials: peace agreements in Colombia, trials against dictators and foreign fighters. Those who walk on those marble floors already know that they will be able to speak with confidence in circles that matter, in politics as well as diplomacy.

    Shatz, who as a criminal lawyer in Israel is familiar with abuses and rights violations, launched his students a new challenge: to bring Europe to the International Criminal Court for the first time. “Since it was created, the court has only condemned African citizens – dictators, militia leaders – but showing European responsibility was urgent,” he explains.

    One year after first proposing the plan, Shatz sent an envelope to the Court’s headquarters, in the Dutch town of The Hague. With his colleague Juan Branco and eight of his students he recounted, in 245 pages, cases of “widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population”, linked to “crimes against humanity consciously committed by European actors, in the central Mediterranean and in Libya, in line with Italian and European Union policies”.

    The civilian population to which they refer comprises migrants and refugees, swallowed by the waves or intercepted in the central Mediterranean and brought back to shore by Libyan assets, to be placed in a seemingly endless cycle of detention. Among them are the 13.000 dead recorded since 2015, in the stretch of sea between North Africa and Italy, out of 523.000 people who survived the crossing, but also the many African and Asian citizens, who are rarely counted, who were tortured in Libya and died in any of the dozens of detention centers for foreigners, often run by militias.

    “At first we thought that the EU and Italy were outsourcing dirty work to Libya to block people, which in jargon is called ‘aiding and abetting’ in the commission of a crime, then we realized that the Europeans were actually the conductors of these operations, while the Libyans performed”, says Shatz, who, at the end of 2020, was preparing a second document for the International Criminal Court to include more names, those of the “anonymous officials of the European and Italian bureaucracy who participated in this criminal enterprise”, which was centered around the “reinvention of the Libyan Coast Guard, conceived by Italian actors”.

    Identifying heads of department, office directors, and institution executives in democratic countries as alleged criminals might seem excessive. For Shatz, however, “this is the first time, after the Nuremberg trials, after Eichmann, that Europe has committed crimes of this magnitude, outside of an armed conflict”. The court, which routinely rejects at least 95 percent of the cases presented, did not do so with Shatz and his students’ case. “Encouraging news, but that does not mean that the start of proceedings is around the corner”, explains the lawyer.

    At the basis of the alleged crimes, he continues, are “regulations, memoranda of understanding, maritime cooperation, detention centers, patrols and drones” created and financed by the European Union and Italy. Here Shatz is speaking about the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya to “reduce the flow of illegal migrants”, as the text of the document states. An objective to be achieved through training and support for the two maritime patrol forces of the very fragile Libyan national unity government, by “adapting” the existing detention centers, and supporting local development initiatives.

    Signed in Rome on February 2, 2017 and in force until 2023, the text is grafted onto the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed by Silvio Berlusconi and Muammar Gaddafi in 2008, but is tied to a specific budget: that of the so-called Africa Fund, established in 2016 as the “Fund for extraordinary interventions to relaunch dialogue and cooperation with African countries of priority importance for migration routes” and extended in 2020 — as the Migration Fund — to non-African countries too.

    310 million euros were allocated in total between the end of 2016 and November 2020, and 252 of those were disbursed, according to our reconstruction.

    A multiplication of tools and funds that, explains Mario Giro, “was born after the summit between the European Union and African leaders in Malta, in November 2015”. According to the former undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 2013, and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs between 2016 and 2018, that summit in Malta “sanctioned the triumph of a European obsession, that of reducing migration from Africa at all costs: in exchange of this containment, there was a willingness to spend, invest”. For Giro, the one in Malta was an “attempt to come together, but not a real partnership”.

    Libya, where more than 90 percent of those attempting to cross the central Mediterranean departed from in those years, was the heart of a project in which Italian funds and interests support and integrate with programs by the European Union and other member states. It was an all-European dialogue, from which powerful Africans — political leaders but also policemen, militiamen, and the traffickers themselves — tried to obtain something: legitimacy, funds, equipment.

    Fragmented and torn apart by a decade-long conflict, Libya was however not alone. In October 2015, just before the handshakes and the usual photographs at the Malta meeting, the European Commission established an Emergency Trust Fund to “address the root causes of migration in Africa”.

    To do so, as Dutch researcher Thomas Spijkerboer will reconstruct years later, the EU executive declared a state of emergency in the 26 African countries that benefit from the Fund, thus justifying the choice to circumvent European competition rules in favor of direct award procedures. However “it’s implausible – Spijkerboeker will go on to argue – that there is a crisis in all 26 African countries where the Trust Fund operates through the duration of the Trust Fund”, now extended until the end of 2021.

    However, the imperative, as an advisor to the Budget Commission of the European Parliament explains, was to act immediately: “not within a few weeks, but days, hours“.

    Faced with a Libya still ineffective at stopping flows to the north, it was in fact necessary to intervene further south, traveling backwards along the routes that converge from dozens of African countries and go towards Tripolitania. And — like dominoes in reverse — raising borders and convincing, or forcing, potential travelers to stop in their countries of origin or in others along the way, before they arrived on the shores of the Mediterranean.

    For the first time since decolonization, human mobility in Africa became the keystone of Italian policies on the continent, so much so that analysts began speaking of migration diplomacy. Factors such as the number of migrants leaving from a given country and the number of border posts or repatriations all became part of the political game, on the same level as profits from oil extraction, promises of investment, arms sales, or trade agreements.

    Comprising projects, funds, and programs, this migration diplomacy comes at a cost. For the period between January 2015 and November 2020, we tracked down 317 funding lines managed by Italy with its own funds and partially co-financed by the European Union. A total of 1.337 billion euros, spent over five years and destined to eight different items of expenditure. Here Libya is in first place, but it is not alone.

    A long story, in short

    For simplicity’s sake, we can say that it all started in the hot summer of 2002, with an almost surrealist lightning war over a barren rock on the edge of the Mediterranean: the Isla de Persejil, the island of parsley. A little island in the Strait of Gibraltar, disputed for decades between Morocco and Spain, which had its ephemeral moment of glory when in July of that year the Moroccan monarchy sent six soldiers, some tents and a flag. Jose-Maria Aznar’s government quickly responded with a reconquista to the sound of fighter-bombers, frigates, and helicopters.

    Peace was signed only a few weeks later and the island went back to being a land of shepherds and military patrols. Which from then on, however, were joint ones.

    “There was talk of combating drug trafficking and illegal fishing, but the reality was different: these were the first anti-immigration operations co-managed by Spanish and Moroccan soldiers”, explains Sebastian Cobarrubias, professor of geography at the University of Zaragoza. The model, he says, was the one of Franco-Spanish counter-terrorism operations in the Basque Country, exported from the Pyrenees to the sea border.

    A process of externalization of Spanish and European migration policy was born following those events in 2002, and culminating years later with the crisis de los cayucos, the pirogue crisis: the arrival of tens of thousands of people – 31,000 in 2006 alone – in the Canary Islands, following extremely dangerous crossings from Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco.

    In close dialogue with the European Commission, which saw the Spanish border as the most porous one of the fragile Schengen area, the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero reacted quickly. “Within a few months, cooperation and repatriation agreements were signed with nine African countries,” says Cobarrubias, who fought for years, with little success, to obtain the texts of the agreements.

    The events of the late 2000s look terribly similar to what Italy will try to implement a decade later with its Mediterranean neighbors, Libya first of all. So much so that in 2016 it was the Spanish Minister of the Interior himself, Jorge Fernández Díaz, who recalled that “the Spanish one is a European management model, reproducible in other contexts”. A vision confirmed by the European Commission officials with whom we spoke.

    At the heart of the Spanish strategy, which over a few short years led to a drastic decrease of arrivals by sea, was the opening of new diplomatic offices in Africa, the launch of local development projects, and above all the support given to the security forces of partner countries.

    Cobarrubias recounts at least four characteristic elements of the Madrid approach: the construction of new patrol forces “such as the Mauritanian Coast Guard, which did not exist and was created by Spain thanks to European funds, with the support of the newly created Frontex agency”; direct and indirect support for detention centers, such as the infamous ‘Guantanamito’, or little Guantanamo, denounced by civil society organizations in Mauritania; the real-time collection of border data and information, carried out by the SIVE satellite system, a prototype of Eurosur, an incredibly expensive intelligence center on the EU’s external borders launched in 2013, based on drones, satellites, airplanes, and sensors; and finally, the strategy of working backwards along migration routes, to seal borders, from the sea to the Sahara desert, and investing locally with development and governance programs, which Spain did during the two phases of the so-called Plan Africa, between 2006 and 2012.

    Replace “Spain” with “Italy”, and “Mauritania” with “Libya”, and you’ll have an idea of what happened years later, in an attempt to seal another European border.

    The main legacy of the Spanish model, according to the Italian sociologist Lorenzo Gabrielli, however, is the negative conditionality, which is the fact of conditioning the disbursement of these loans – for security forces, ministries, trade agreements – at the level of the African partners’ cooperation in the management of migration, constantly threatening to reduce investments if there are not enough repatriations being carried out, or if controls and pushbacks fail. An idea that is reminiscent both of the enlargement process of the European Union, with all the access restrictions placed on candidate countries, and of the Schengen Treaty, the attempt to break down internal European borders, which, as a consequence, created the need to protect a new common border, the external one.
    La externalización europea del control migratorio: ¿La acción española como modelo? Read more

    At the end of 2015, when almost 150,000 people had reached the Italian coast and over 850,000 had crossed Turkey and the Balkans to enter the European Union, the story of the maritime migration to Spain had almost faded from memory.

    But something remained of it: a management model. Based, once again, on an idea of crisis.

    “We tried to apply it to post-Gaddafi Libya – explains Stefano Manservisi, who over the past decade has chaired two key departments for migration policies in the EU Commission, Home Affairs and Development Cooperation – but in 2013 we soon realized that things had blown up, that that there was no government to talk to: the whole strategy had to be reformulated”.

    Going backwards, through routes and processes

    The six-month presidency of the European Council, in 2014, was the perfect opportunity for Italy.

    In November of that year, Matteo Renzi’s government hosted a conference in Rome to launch the Khartoum Process, the brand new initiative for the migration route between the EU and the Horn of Africa, modeled on the Rabat Process, born in 2006, at the apex of the crisis de los cayucos, after pressure from Spain. It’s a regional cooperation platform between EU countries and nine African countries, based on the exchange of information and coordination between governments, to manage migration.
    Il processo di Khartoum: l’Italia e l’Europa contro le migrazioni Read more

    Warning: if you start to find terms such as ‘process’ and ‘coordination platform’ nebulous, don’t worry. The backbone of European policies is made of these structures: meetings, committees, negotiating tables with unattractive names, whose roles elude most of us. It’s a tendency towards the multiplication of dialogue and decision spaces, that the migration policies of recent years have, if possible, accentuated, in the name of flexibility, of being ready for any eventuality. Of continuous crisis.

    Let’s go back to that inter-ministerial meeting in Rome that gave life to the Khartoum Process and in which Libya, where the civil war had resumed violently a few months earlier, was not present.

    Italy thus began looking beyond Libya, to the so-called countries of origin and transit. Such as Ethiopia, a historic beneficiary of Italian development cooperation, and Sudan. Indeed, both nations host refugees from Eritrea and Somalia, two of the main countries of origin of those who cross the central Mediterranean between 2013 and 2015. Improving their living conditions was urgent, to prevent them from traveling again, from dreaming of Europe. In Niger, on the other hand, which is an access corridor to Libya for those traveling from countries such as Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, and Mali, Italy co-financed a study for a new law against migrant smuggling, then adopted in 2015, which became the cornerstone of a radical attempt to reduce movement across the Sahara desert, which you will read about later.

    A year later, with the Malta summit and the birth of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, Italy was therefore ready to act. With a 123 million euro contribution, allocated from 2017 through the Africa Fund and the Migration Fund, Italy became the second donor country, and one of the most active in trying to manage those over 4 billion euros allocated for five years. [If you are curious about the financing mechanisms of the Trust Fund, read here: https://thebigwall.org/en/trust-fund/].

    Through the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), born in 2014 as an operational branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy immediately made itself available to manage European Fund projects, and one idea seemed to be the driving one: using classic development programs, but implemented in record time, to offer on-site alternatives to young people eager to leave, while improving access to basic services.

    Local development, therefore, became the intervention to address the so-called root causes of migration. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newborn AICS, it seemed a winning approach. Unsurprisingly, the first project approved through the Trust Fund for Africa was managed by the Italian agency in Ethiopia.

    “Stemming irregular migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia” received 19.8 million euros in funding, a rare sum for local development interventions. The goal was to create job opportunities and open career guidance centers for young people in four Ethiopian regions. Or at least that’s how it seemed. In the first place, among the objectives listed in the project sheet, there is in fact another one: to reduce irregular migration.

    In the logical matrix of the project, which insiders know is the presentation – through data, indicators and figures – of the expected results, there is no indicator that appears next to the “reduction of irregular migration” objective. There is no way, it’s implicitly admitted, to verify that that goal has been achieved. That the young person trained to start a micro-enterprise in the Wollo area, for example, is one less migrant.

    Bizarre, not to mention wrong. But indicative of the problems of an approach of which, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains to us, “Italy had made itself the spokesperson in Europe”.

    “The mantra was that more development would stop migration, and at a certain point that worked for everyone: for AICS, which justified its funds in the face of political landscape that was scared by the issue of landings, and for many NGOs, which immediately understood that migrations were the parsley to be sprinkled on the funding requests that were presented”, explains the official, who, like so many in this story, prefers to remain anonymous.

    This idea of the root causes was reproduced, as in an echo chamber, “without programmatic documents, without guidelines, but on the wave of a vague idea of political consensus around the goal of containing migration”, he adds. This makes it almost impossible to talk about, so much so that a proposal for new guidelines on immigration and development, drawn up during 2020 by AICS, was set aside for months.

    Indeed, if someone were to say, as evidenced by scholars such as Michael Clemens, that development can also increase migration, and that migration itself is a source of development, the whole ‘root causes’ idea would collapse and the already tight cooperation budgets would risk being cut, in the name of the same absolute imperative as always: reducing arrivals to Italy and Europe.

    Maintaining a vague, costly and unverifiable approach is equally damaging.

    Bram Frouws, director of the Mixed Migration Center, a think-tank that studies international mobility, points out, for example, how the ‘root cause’ approach arises from a vision of migration as a problem to be eradicated rather than managed, and that paradoxically, the definition of these deep causes always remains superficial. In fact, there is never talk of how international fishing agreements damage local communities, nor of land grabbing by speculators, major construction work, or corruption and arms sales. There is only talk of generic economic vulnerability, of a country’s lack of stability. An almost abstract phenomenon, in which European actors are exempt from any responsibility.

    There is another problem: in the name of the fight against irregular migration, interventions have shifted from poorer and truly vulnerable countries and populations to regions with ‘high migratory rates’, a term repeated in dozens of project descriptions funded over the past few years, distorting one of the cardinal principles of development aid, codified in regulations and agreements: that of responding to the most urgent needs of a given population, and of not imposing external priorities, even more so if it is countries considered richer are the ones doing it.

    The Nigerien experiment

    While Ethiopia and Sudan absorb the most substantial share of funds destined to tackle the root causes of migration — respectively 47 and 32 million euros out of a total expenditure of 195 million euros — Niger, which for years has been contending for the podium of least developed country on the planet with Central African Republic according to the United Nations Human Development Index — benefits from just over 10 million euros.

    Here in fact it’s more urgent, for Italy and the EU, to intervene on border control rather than root causes, to stop the flow of people that cross the country until they arrive in Agadez, to then disappear in the Sahara and emerge, days later — if all goes well — in southern Libya. In 2016, the International Organization for Migration counted nearly 300,000 people passing through a single checkpoint along the road to Libya. The figure bounced between the offices of the European Commission, and from there to the Farnesina, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: faced with an uncontrollable Libya, intervening in Niger became a priority.

    Italy did it in great style, even before opening an embassy in the country, in February 2017: with a contribution to the state budget of Niger of 50 million euros, part of the Africa Fund, included as part of a maxi-program managed by the EU in the country and paid out in several installments.

    While the project documents list a number of conditions for the continuation of the funding, including increased monitoring along the routes to Libya and the adoption of regulations and strategies for border control, some local and European officials with whom we have spoken think that the assessments were made with one eye closed: the important thing was in fact to provide those funds to be spent in a country that for Italy, until then, had been synonymous only with tourism in the Sahara dunes and development in rural areas.

    Having become a priority in the New Partnership Framework on Migration, yet another EU operational program, launched in 2016, Niger seemed thus exempt from controls on the management of funds to which beneficiaries of European funds are normally subject to.

    “Our control mechanisms, the Court of Auditors, the Parliament and the anti-corruption Authority, do not work, and yet the European partners have injected millions of euros into state coffers, without imposing transparency mechanisms”, reports then Ali Idrissa Nani , president of the Réseau des Organizations pour la Transparence et l’Analyse du Budget (ROTAB), a network of associations that seeks to monitor state spending in Niger.

    “It leaves me embittered, but for some years we we’ve had the impression that civil liberties, human rights, and participation are no longer a European priority“, continues Nani, who —- at the end of 2020 — has just filed a complaint with the Court of Niamey, to ask the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the possible disappearance of at least 120 million euros in funds from the Ministry of Defense, a Pandora’s box uncovered by local and international journalists.

    For Nani, who like other Nigerien activists spent most of 2018 in prison for encouraging demonstrations against high living costs, this explosion of European and Italian cooperation didn’t do the country any good, and in fact favoured authoritarian tendencies, and limited even more the independence of the judiciary.

    For their part, the Nigerien rulers have more than others seized the opportunity offered by European donors to obtain legitimacy and support. Right after the Valletta summit, they were the first to present an action plan to reduce migration to Libya, which they abruptly implemented in mid-2016, applying the anti-trafficking law whose preliminary study was financed by Italy, with the aim of emptying the city of #Agadez of migrants from other countries.

    The transport of people to the Libyan border, an activity that until that point happened in the light of day and was sanctioned at least informally by the local authorities, thus became illegal from one day to the next. Hundreds of drivers, intermediaries, and facilitators were arrested, and an entire economy crashed

    But did the movement of people really decrease? Almost impossible to tell. The only data available are those of the International Organization for Migration, which continues to record the number of transits at certain police posts. But drivers and foreign travelers no longer pass through them, fearing they will be arrested or stopped. Routes and journeys, as always happens, are remodeled, only to reappear elsewhere. Over the border with Chad, or in Algeria, or in a risky zigzagging of small tracks, to avoid patrols.

    For Hamidou Manou Nabara, a Nigerien sociologist and researcher, the problems with this type of cooperation are manifold.

    On the one hand, it restricted the free movement guaranteed within the Economic Community of West African States, a sort of ‘Schengen area’ between 15 countries in the region, making half of Niger, from Agadez to the north, a no-go areas for foreign citizens, even though they still had the right to move throughout the national territory.

    Finally, those traveling north were made even more vulnerable. “The control of borders and migratory movements was justified on humanitarian grounds, to contrast human trafficking, but in reality very few victims of trafficking were ever identified: the center of this cooperation is repression”, explains Nabara.

    Increasing controls, through military and police operations, actually exposes travelers to greater violations of human rights, both by state agents and passeurs, making the Sahara crossings longer and riskier.

    The fight against human trafficking, a slogan repeated by European and African leaders and a central expenditure item of the Italian intervention between Africa and the Mediterranean — 142 million euros in five years —- actually risks having the opposite effect. Because a trafiicker’s bread and butter, in addition to people’s desire to travel, is closed borders and denied visas.

    A reinvented frontier

    Galvanized by the activism of the European Commission after the launch of the Trust Fund but under pressure internally, faced with a discourse on migration that seemed to invade every public space — from the front pages of newspapers to television talk-shows — and unable to agree on how to manage migration within the Schengen area, European rulers thus found an agreement outside the continent: to add more bricks to that wall that must reduce movements through the Mediterranean.

    Between 2015 and 2016, Italian, Dutch, German, French and European Union ministers, presidents and senior officials travel relentlessly between countries considered priorities for migration, and increasingly for security, and invite their colleagues to the European capitals. A coming and going of flights to Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tunisia, Senegal, Chad, Guinea, to make agreements, negotiate.

    “Niamey had become a crossroads for European diplomats”, remembers Ali Idrissa Nani, “but few understood the reasons”.

    However, unlike the border with Turkey, where the agreement signed with the EU at the beginning of 2016 in no time reduced the arrival of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi citizens in Greece, the continent’s other ‘hot’ border, promises of speed and effectiveness by the Trust Fund for Africa did not seem to materialize. Departures from Libya, in particular, remained constant. And in the meantime, in the upcoming election in a divided Italy, the issue of migration seemed to be tipping the balance, capable of shifting votes and alliances.

    It is at that point that the Italian Ministry of the Interior, newly led by Marco Minniti, put its foot on the accelerator. The Viminale, the Italian Ministry of the Interior, became the orchestrator of a new intervention plan, refined between Rome and Brussels, with German support, which went back to focusing everything on Libya and on that stretch of sea that separates it from Italy.

    “In those months the phones were hot, everyone was looking for Marco“, says an official of the Interior Ministry, who admits that “the Ministry of the Interior had snatched the Libyan dossier from Foreign Affairs, but only because up until then the Foreign Ministry hadn’t obtained anything” .

    Minniti’s first move was the signing of the new Memorandum with Libya, which gave way to a tripartite plan.

    At the top of the agenda was the creation of a maritime interception device for boats departing from the Libyan coast, through the reconstruction of the Coast Guard and the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS), the two patrol forces belonging to the Ministry of Defense and that of the Interior, and the establishment of a rescue coordination center, prerequisites for Libya to declare to the International Maritime Organization that it had a Search and Rescue Area, so that the Italian Coast Guard could ask Libyan colleagues to intervene if there were boats in trouble.

    Accompanying this work in Libya is a jungle of Italian and EU missions, surveillance systems and military operations — from the European Frontex, Eunavfor Med and Eubam Libya, to the Italian military mission “Safe Waters” — equipped with drones, planes, patrol boats, whose task is to monitor the Libyan Sea, which is increasingly emptied by the European humanitarian ships that started operating in 2014 (whose maneuvering spaces are in the meantime reduced to the bone due to various strategies) to support Libyan interception operations.

    The second point of the ‘Minniti agenda’ was to progressively empty Libya of migrants and refugees, so that an escape by sea would become increasingly difficult. Between 2017 and 2020, the Libyan assets, which are in large part composed of patrol boats donated by Italy, intercepted and returned to shore about 56,000 people according to data released by UN agencies. The Italian-European plan envisages two solutions: for economic migrants, the return to the country of origin; for refugees, the possibility of obtaining protection.

    There is one part of this plan that worked better, at least in terms of European wishes: repatriation, presented as ‘assisted voluntary return’. This vision was propelled by images, released in October 2017 by CNN as part of a report on the abuse of foreigners in Libya, of what appears to be a slave auction. The images reopened the unhealed wounds of the slave trade through Atlantic and Sahara, and helped the creation of a Joint Initiative between the International Organization for Migration, the European Union, and the African Union, aimed at returning and reintegrating people in the countries of origin.

    Part of the Italian funding for IOM was injected into this complex system of repatriation by air, from Tripoli to more than 20 countries, which has contributed to the repatriation of 87,000 people over three years. 33,000 from Libya, and 37,000 from Niger.

    A similar program for refugees, which envisages transit through other African countries (Niger and Rwanda gave their availability) and from there resettlement to Europe or North America, recorded much lower numbers: 3,300 evacuations between the end of 2017 and the end of 2020. For the 47,000 people registered as refugees in Libya, leaving the country without returning to their home country, to the starting point, is almost impossible.

    Finally, there is a third, lesser-known point of the Italian plan: even in Libya, Italy wants to intervene on the root causes of migration, or rather on the economies linked to the transit and smuggling of migrants. The scheme is simple: support basic services and local authorities in migrant transit areas, in exchange for this transit being controlled and reduced. The transit of people brings with it the circulation of currency, a more valuable asset than usual in a country at war, and this above all in the south of Libya, in the immense Saharan region of Fezzan, the gateway to the country, bordering Algeria, Niger, and Chad and almost inaccessible to international humanitarian agencies.

    A game in which intelligence plays central role (as also revealed by the journalist Lorenzo D’Agostino on Foreign Policy), as indeed it did in another negotiation and exchange of money: those 5 million euros destined — according to various journalistic reconstructions — to a Sabratha militia, the Anas Al-Dabbashi Brigade, to stop departures from the coastal city.

    A year later, its leader, Ahmed Al-Dabbashi, will be sanctioned by the UN Security Council, as leader for criminal activities related to human trafficking.

    The one built in record time by the ministry led by Marco Minniti is therefore a complicated and expensive puzzle. To finance it, there are above all the Trust Fund for Africa of the EU, and the Italian Africa Fund, initially headed only by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and unpacked among several ministries for the occasion, but also the Internal Security Fund of the EU, which funds military equipment for all Italian security forces, as well as funds and activities from the Ministry of Defense.

    A significant part of those 666 million euros dedicated to border control, but also of funds to support governance and fight traffickers, converges and enters this plan: a machine that was built too quickly, among whose wheels human rights and Libya’s peace process are sacrificed.

    “We were looking for an immediate result and we lost sight of the big picture, sacrificing peace on the altar of the fight against migration, when Libya was in pieces, in the hands of militias who were holding us hostage”. This is how former Deputy Minister Mario Giro describes the troubled handling of the Libyan dossier.

    For Marwa Mohamed, a Libyan activist, all these funds and interventions were “provided without any real clause of respect for human rights, and have fragmented the country even more, because they were intercepted by the militias, which are the same ones that manage both the smuggling of migrants that detention centers, such as that of Abd el-Rahman al-Milad, known as ‘al-Bija’ ”.

    Projects aimed at Libyan municipalities, included in the interventions on the root causes of migration — such as the whole detention system, invigorated by the introduction of people intercepted at sea (and ‘improved’ through millions of euros of Italian funds) — offer legitimacy, when they do not finance it directly, to the ramified and violent system of local powers that the German political scientist Wolfram Lacher defines as the ‘Tripoli militia cartel‘. [for more details on the many Italian funds in Libya, read here].
    Fondi italiani in Libia Read more

    “Bringing migrants back to shore, perpetuating a detention system, does not only mean subjecting people to new abuses, but also enriching the militias, fueling the conflict”, continues Mohamed, who is now based in London, where she is a spokesman of the Libyan Lawyers for Justice organization.

    The last few years of Italian cooperation, she argues, have been “a sequence of lost opportunities”. And to those who tell you — Italian and European officials especially — that reforming justice, putting an end to that absolute impunity that strengthens the militias, is too difficult, Mohamed replies without hesitation: “to sign the Memorandum of Understanding, the authorities contacted the militias close to the Tripoli government one by one and in the meantime built a non-existent structure from scratch, the Libyan Coast Guard: and you’re telling me that you can’t put the judicial system back on its feet and protect refugees? ”

    The only thing that mattered, however, in that summer of 2017, were the numbers. Which, for the first time since 2013, were falling again, and quickly. In the month of August there were 80 percent fewer landings than the year before. And so it would be for the following months and years.

    “Since then, we have continued to allocate, renewing programs and projects, without asking for any guarantee in exchange for the treatment of migrants”, explains Matteo De Bellis, researcher at Amnesty International, remembering that the Italian promise to modify the Memorandum of Understanding, introducing clauses of protection, has been on stop since the controversial renewal of the document, in February 2020.

    Repatriations, evacuations, promises

    We are 1500 kilometers of road, and sand, south of Tripoli. Here Salah* spends his days escaping a merciless sun. The last three years of the life of the thirty-year-old Sudanese have not offered much else and now, like many fellow sufferers, he does not hide his fatigue.

    We are in a camp 15 kilometers from Agadez, in Niger, in the middle of the Sahara desert, where Salah lives with a thousand people, mostly Sudanese from the Darfur region, the epicenter of one of the most dramatic and lethal conflicts of recent decades.

    Like almost all the inhabitants of this temporary Saharan settlement, managed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and — at the end of 2020 — undergoing rehabilitation also thanks to Italian funds, he passed through Libya and since 2017, after three years of interceptions at sea and detention, he’s been desperately searching for a way out, for a future.

    Salah fled Darfur in 2016, after receiving threats from pro-government armed militias, and reached Tripoli after a series of vicissitudes and violence. In late spring 2017, he sailed from nearby Zawiya with 115 other people. They were intercepted, brought back to shore and imprisoned in a detention center, formally headed by the government but in fact controlled by the Al-Nasr militia, linked to the trafficker Al-Bija.

    “They beat us everywhere, for days, raped some women in front of us, and asked everyone to call families to get money sent,” Salah recalls. Months later, after paying some money and escaping, he crossed the Sahara again, up to Agadez. UNHCR had just opened a facility and from there, as rumour had it, you could ask to be resettled to Europe.

    Faced with sealed maritime borders, and after experiencing torture and abuse, that faint hope set in motion almost two thousand people, who, hoping to reach Italy, found themselves on the edges of the Sahara, along what many, by virtue of investments and negotiations, had started to call the ‘new European frontier’.

    Three years later, a little over a thousand people remain of that initial group. Only a few dozen of them had access to resettlement, while many returned to Libya, and to all of its abuses.

    Something similar is also happening in Tunisia, where since 2017, the number of migrants and refugees entering the country has increased. They are fleeing by land and sometimes by sea from Libya, going to crowd UN structures. Then, faced with a lack of real prospects, they return to Libya.

    For Romdhane Ben Amor, spokesman for the Tunisian Federation for Economic and Social Rights, “in Tunisia European partners have financed a non-reception: overcrowded centers in unworthy conditions, which have become recruitment areas for traffickers, because in fact there are two options offered there: go home or try to get back to the sea “.

    In short, even the interventions for the protection of migrants and refugees must be read in a broader context, of a contraction of mobility and human rights. “The refugee management itself has submitted to the goal of containment, which is the true original sin of the Italian and European strategy,” admits a UNHCR official.

    This dogma of containment, at any cost, affects everyone — people who travel, humanitarian actors, civil society, local governments — by distorting priorities, diverting funds, and undermining future relationships and prospects. The same ones that European officials call partnerships and which in the case of Africa, as reiterated in 2020 by President Ursula Von Der Leyen, should be “between equals”.

    Let’s take another example: the Egypt of President Abdel Fetah Al-Sisi. Since 2016, it has been increasingly isolated on the international level, also due to violent internal repression, which Italy knows something about. Among the thousands of people who have been disappeared or killed in recent years, is researcher Giulio Regeni, whose body was thrown on the side of a road north of Cairo in February 2016.

    Around the time of the murder, in which the complicity and cover-ups by the Egyptian security forces were immediately evident, the Italian Ministry of the Interior restarted its dialogue with the country. “It’s absurd, but Italy started to support Egypt in negotiations with the European Union,” explains lawyer Muhammed Al-Kashef, a member of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Right and now a refugee in Germany.

    By inserting itself on an already existing cooperation project that saw italy, for example, finance the use of fingerprint-recording software used by the Egyptian police, the Italian Ministry of the Interior was able to create a police academy in Cairo, inaugurated in 2018 with European funds, to train the border guards of over 20 African countries. Italy also backed Egyptian requests within the Khartoum Process and, on a different front, sells weapons and conducts joint naval exercises.

    “Rome could have played a role in Egypt, supporting the democratic process after the 2011 revolution, but it preferred to fall into the migration trap, fearing a wave of migration that would never happen,” says Al-Kashef.

    With one result: “they have helped transform Egypt into a country that kills dreams, and often dreamers too, and from which all young people today want to escape”. Much more so than in 2015 or that hopeful 2011.

    Cracks in the wall, and how to widen them

    If you have read this far, following personal stories and routes of people and funds, you will have understood one thing, above all: that the beating heart of this strategy, set up by Italy with the participation of the European Union and vice versa, is the reduction of migrations across the Mediterranean. The wall, in fact.

    Now try to add other European countries to this picture. Since 2015 many have fully adopted — or returned to — this process of ‘externalization’ of migration policies. Spain, where the Canary Islands route reopened in 2019, demonstrating the fragility of the model you read about above; France, with its strategic network in the former colonies, the so-called Françafrique. And then Germany, Belgium, Holland, United Kingdom, Austria.

    Complicated, isn’t it? This great wall’s bricks and builders keep multiplying. Even more strategies, meetings, committees, funds and documents. And often, the same lack of transparency, which makes reconstructing these loans – understanding which cement, sand, and lime mixture was used, i.e. who really benefited from the expense, what equipment was provided, how the results were monitored – a long process, when it’s not impossible.

    The Pact on Migration and Asylum of the European Union, presented in September 2020, seems to confirm this: cooperation with third countries and relaunching repatriations are at its core.

    Even the European Union budget for the seven-year period 2021-2027, approved in December 2020, continues to focus on this expenditure, for example by earmarking for migration projects 10 percent of the new Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, equipped with 70 billion euros, but also diverting a large part of the Immigration and Asylum Fund (8.7 billion) towards support for repatriation, and foreseeing 12.1 billion euros for border control.

    While now, with the new US presidency, some have called into question the future of the wall on the border with Mexico, perhaps the most famous of the anti-migrant barriers in the world, the wall built in the Mediterranean and further south, up to the equator, has seemingly never been so strong.

    But economists, sociologists, human rights defenders, analysts and travelers all demonstrate the problems with this model. “It’s a completely flawed approach, and there are no quick fixes to change it,” says David Kipp, a researcher at the German Institute for International Affairs, a government-funded think-tank.

    For Kipp, however, we must begin to deflate this migration bubble, and go back to addressing migration as a human phenomenon, to be understood and managed. “I dream of the moment when this issue will be normalized, and will become something boring,” he admits timidly.

    To do this, cracks must be opened in the wall and in a model that seems solid but really isn’t, that has undesirable effects, violates human rights, and isolates Europe and Italy.

    Anna Knoll, researcher at the European Center for Development Policy Management, explains for example that European policies have tried to limit movements even within Africa, while the future of the continent is the freedom of movement of goods and people, and “for Europe, it is an excellent time to support this, also given the pressure from other international players, China first of all”.

    For Sabelo Mbokazi, who heads the Labor and Migration department of the Social Affairs Commission of the African Union (AU), there is one issue on which the two continental blocs have divergent positions: legal entry channels. “For the EU, they are something residual, we have a much broader vision,” he explains. And this will be one of the themes of the next EU-AU summit, which was postponed several times in 2020.

    It’s a completely flawed approach, and there are no quick fixes to change it
    David Kipp - researcher at the German Institute for International Affairs

    Indeed, the issue of legal access channels to the Italian and European territory is one of the most important, and so far almost imperceptible, cracks in this Big Wall. In the last five years, Italy has spent just 15 million euros on it, 1.1 percent of the total expenditure dedicated to external dimensions of migration.

    The European Union hasn’t done any better. “Legal migration, which was one of the pillars of the strategy born in Valletta in 2015, has remained a dead letter, but if we limit ourselves to closing the borders, we will not go far”, says Stefano Manservisi, who as a senior official of the EU Commission worked on all the migration dossiers during those years.

    Yet we all know that a trafficker’s worst enemy are passport stamps, visas, and airline tickets.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=HmR96ySikkY

    Helen Dempster, who’s an economist at the Center for Global Development, spends her days studying how to do this: how to open legal channels of entry, and how to get states to think about it. And there is an effective example: we must not end up like Japan.

    “For decades, Japan has had very restrictive migration policies, it hasn’t allowed anyone in”, explains Dempster, “but in recent years it has realized that, with its aging population, it soon won’t have enough people to do basic jobs, pay taxes, and finance pensions”. And so, in April 2019, the Asian country began accepting work visa applications, hoping to attract 500,000 foreign workers.

    In Europe, however, “the hysteria surrounding migration in 2015 and 2016 stopped all debate“. Slowly, things are starting to move again. On the other hand, several European states, Italy and Germany especially, have one thing in common with Japan: an increasingly aging population.

    “All European labor ministries know that they must act quickly, but there are two preconceptions: that it is difficult to develop adequate projects, and that public opinion is against it.” For Dempster, who helped design an access program to the Belgian IT sector for Moroccan workers, these are false problems. “If we want to look at it from the point of view of the security of the receiving countries, bringing a person with a passport allows us to have a lot more information about who they are, which we do not have if we force them to arrive by sea”, she explains.

    Let’s look at some figures to make it easier: in 2007, Italy made 340,000 entry visas available, half of them seasonal, for non-EU workers, as part of the Flows Decree, Italy’s main legal entry channel adopted annually by the government. Few people cried “invasion” back then. Ten years later, in 2017, those 119,000 people who reached Italy through the Mediterranean seemed a disproportionate number. In the same year, the quotas of the Flow decree were just 30,000.

    Perhaps these numbers aren’t comparable, and building legal entry programs is certainly long, expensive, and apparently impractical, if we think of the economic and social effects of the coronavirus pandemic in which we are immersed. For Dempster, however, “it is important to be ready, to launch pilot programs, to create infrastructures and relationships”. So that we don’t end up like Japan, “which has urgently launched an access program for workers, without really knowing how to manage them”.

    The Spanish case, as already mentioned, shows how a model born twenty years ago, and then adopted along all the borders between Europe and Africa, does not really work.

    As international mobility declined, aided by the pandemic, at least 41,000 people landed in Spain in 2020, almost all of them in the Canary Islands. Numbers that take us back to 2006 and remind us how, after all, this ‘outsourcing’ offers costly and ineffective solutions.

    It’s reminiscent of so-called planned obsolescence, the production model for which a technological object isn’t built to last, inducing the consumer to replace it after a few years. But continually renewing and re-financing these walls can be convenient for multinational security companies, shipyards, political speculators, authoritarian regimes, and international traffickers. Certainly not for citizens, who — from the Italian and European institutions — would expect better products. May they think of what the world will be like in 10, 30, 50 years, and avoid trampling human rights and canceling democratic processes in the name of a goal that — history seems to teach — is short-lived. The ideas are not lacking. [At this link you’ll find the recommendations developed by ActionAid: https://thebigwall.org/en/recommendations/].

    https://thebigwall.org/en
    #Italie #externalisation #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #frontières #business #Afrique #budget #Afrique_du_Nord #Libye #chiffres #Niger #Soudan #Ethiopie #Sénégal #root_causes #causes_profondes #contrôles_frontaliers #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Trust_Fund #propagande #campagne #dissuasion

    –—

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    Et plus précisément :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765328

    ping @isskein @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_

  • Feminist City. Claiming Space in a Man-Made World

    Feminist City is an ongoing experiment in living differently, living better, and living more justly in an urban world

    We live in the city of men. Our public spaces are not designed for female bodies. There is little consideration for women as mothers, workers or carers. The urban streets often are a place of threats rather than community. Gentrification has made the everyday lives of women even more difficult. What would a metropolis for working women look like? A city of friendships beyond Sex and the City. A transit system that accommodates mothers with strollers on the school run. A public space with enough toilets. A place where women can walk without harassment.

    In Feminist City, through history, personal experience and popular culture Leslie Kern exposes what is hidden in plain sight: the social inequalities built into our cities, homes, and neighborhoods. Kern offers an alternative vision of the feminist city. Taking on fear, motherhood, friendship, activism, and the joys and perils of being alone, Kern maps the city from new vantage points, laying out an intersectional feminist approach to urban histories and proposes that the city is perhaps also our best hope for shaping a new urban future. It is time to dismantle what we take for granted about cities and to ask how we can build more just, sustainable, and women-friendly cities together.

    https://www.versobooks.com/books/3227-feminist-city

    #féminisme #femmes #villes #urban_matter #TRUST #master_TRUST #livre #Leslie_Kern #espace_public #ressources_pédagogiques #gentrification #travail #maternité #toilettes #harcèlement_de_rue #inégalités #intersectionnalité

  • #Banco_Palmas

    In 1998, residents from the impoverished Palmeira neighborhood of Fortaleza, Brazil, decided to take their economic future into their own hands. The strategy they took would soon spread to other communities around Brazil: creating a community development bank, governed and managed by local residents, for local needs. Banco Palmas’ founding mission was to help revitalize the local economy, create badly needed jobs, and increase the collective self-reliance of the Palmeira district. The bank’s activities are guided by the principles of solidarity economics.

    One of Banco Palmas’ key innovations has been to issue a neighborhood-scale alternative currency called the “Palma”. Like other local currencies, the Palma was designed to support local commerce by restricting its circulation to the Palmeira neighborhood, preventing money from leaking out of the community.

    The result has been impressive. To date, hundreds of local businesses have signed up to accept Palmas, while the currency has helped strengthen or create thousands of local livelihoods. Moreover, the neighborhood’s spending patterns have seen a dramatic shift since the bank’s founding and the release of the currency. According to one estimate, “In 1997, 80% of [Palmeira] inhabitants’ purchases were made outside the community; by 2011, 93% were made in the district” (from People Money, The Promise of Regional Currencies).

    Another key purpose of Banco Palmas has been to extend basic financial services and access to credit to people excluded from – or exploited by – the conventional banking system. The bank provides micro-credit loans for local production and consumption in either Palmas or the national currency (the Brazilian real). Importantly, loans issued in Palmas are interest free, while others are offered at very low interest rates, providing a much-needed alternative to the kind of predatory lenders that exploit people and businesses in other money-poor communities around the world.

    What’s more, rather than awarding loans based on credit history, proof of income, or collateral – something many people in Palmeira lack – many are issued using a neighbor guarantee system. Banco Palma has been so successful that it has inspired the creation of over 60 similar initiatives throughout Brazil, and spurred the development of the Brazilian Network of Community Banks.

    https://www.localfutures.org/programs/global-to-local/planet-local/local-business-finance/banco-palmas
    #économie #banque #finance #alternative #Brésil #Palmeira #Fortaleza #community_development_bank #économie_locale #travail #emploi #économie_solidaire #monnaie_locale #monnaie_alternative #Palma #crédit #micro-crédit #TRUST #Master_TRUST #banque_communautaire

  • Mon engagement à l’extrémité de la science (citoyenne)

    En tant qu’étudiant, je voudrais ici dire pourquoi je me suis engagé en thèse de doctorat en science citoyenne.

    Durant ma dernière année d’étude de master j’ai co-écrit un petit livre intitulé « Nos liens au monde : penser la complexité ». Il examine ce qui n’est pas enseigné à l’école. Il n’est jamais mentionné à l’école que chaque pensée prend forme à partir d’une certaine conception du monde. Ce n’est pas un hasard si au niveau politique, économique et écologique le discours proposé aux citoyens soit globalement homogène. C’est le symptôme d’un large éventail de pensées reposant sur un mode de pensée particulier, basé sur la simplicité. Au prisme de la simplicité, l’être humain, la société, la nature apparaissent comme des entités séparées.

    En tant que jeune, que faire face à ce constat ? Plutôt que d’entrer directement dans l’arène politique et in fine très probablement reproduire à l’identique ce qui est déjà fait, il apparaît plus sage au préalable d’interroger ce qui pourrait redonner du sens, à savoir de développer une conception du monde capable d’aligner à la fois la nature, la société et l’être humain. C’est une question que se posent beaucoup les jeunes, surtout par les temps qui courent. C’est une question fondamentale. Elle en ouvre beaucoup d’autres : comment redonner du sens à l’école ? Comment y insuffler la créativité ? Comment penser au-delà des carcans disciplinaires ? Comment considérer que l’enfant et l’étudiant sont porteurs de germes d’avenir ? Comment penser la grande histoire qui nous relie tous, celle qui contient tout à la fois le Big Bang, les étoiles, l’apparition de la vie, l’émergence des sociétés humaines ? Autant de questions qui tiennent en une seule : comment penser la complexité ?

    Voici ce qui n’est pas enseigné à l’école, ni même à l’université. Cela repose sur une question apparemment très simple : comment penser la complexité ? Penser la complexité nécessite toutes formes de regards et d’intelligences. Mais il faut d’abord comprendre comment les rassembler. C’est là qu’intervient la science citoyenne. Il n’y a pas de définition précise à la science citoyenne. C’est peut-être mieux ainsi car elle reste par conséquent ouverte à de nouvelles contributions innovantes. Globalement, la science citoyenne peut se définir comme un éventail d’activités où les scientifiques professionnels et non-professionnels travaillent ensemble pour répondre à une question posée par un scientifique professionnel.

    L’équipe de recherche ExCiteS de University College London (UCL) pousse ce concept de science citoyenne à ses limites en postulant que tout le monde, y compris les personnes analphabètes ou les personnes marginalisées, peuvent prendre part à la science en posant eux-mêmes une question qu’ils veulent résoudre. Par exemple, les chasseurs-cueilleurs des forêts humides du Congo ont choisi de résoudre les problèmes liés au braconnage illégal. Une fois que la communauté indigène a décidé d’une question de recherche, les scientifiques professionnels lui donnent les moyens de résoudre cette question en récoltant des données, et en les analysant au moyen de cartes (voir ici 7 autres cas d’étude).

    Pourquoi me suis-je engagé en thèse de doctorat dans ce formidable projet ? Parce qu’il constitue une expérimentation pratique qui teste une solution à l’un des plus grands défis du 21e siècle : comment faire face à la complexité du monde ? Si aujourd’hui, la tâche nous apparaît par trop hardie, c’est certainement parce qu’on demeure encore dans un modèle du passé dans lequel seule une minorité d’intelligences a voix au chapitre. Nous pouvons pourtant facilement dépasser ce modèle dès l’instant où le critère de sélection n’est plus « je suis le meilleur » mais « je reconnais que chacun sait quelque chose et que l’on peut construire à partir de ce savoir ». La science citoyenne entreprend l’étape suivante, à savoir, comprendre comment co-produire des connaissances ensemble ?

    Pourquoi me suis-je engagé à l’extrémité de la science (citoyenne) Parce que si l’on démontre que les citoyens peuvent efficacement faire face aux problèmes sociaux, économiques et environnementaux dès lors qu’on part de leurs besoins et qu’on leur donne les moyens de prendre part à la science, alors on change de conception du monde. On passe d’un monde basé sur la compétition à un monde basé sur la coopération. Et c’est tout notre modèle politique qui s’en voit bouleversé. Pour moi, la science est avant tout un engagement politique, vers plus d’#égalité sociale.

    https://uclexcites.blog/2020/09/09/mon-engagement-a-lextremite-de-la-science-citoyenne

    #TRUST #master_TRUST #transformative_studies #justice_sociale #science_citoyenne #sciences_citoyennes #université #Fabien_Moustard