• Ce que le génocide a fait à la Turquie - Susam-Sokak
    http://www.susam-sokak.fr/2019/09/ce-que-le-genocide-a-fait-a-la-turquie.html

    Me basant sur l’hypothèse de l’existence parmi la population turque d’un #sentiment_de_culpabilité généralisé, consécutif au #génocide de 1915, je reconsidère ici le #nationalisme et l’écriture de l’histoire en #Turquie (dans leurs caractères excessifs même) comme des effets du génocide. Le sentiment de culpabilité et l’impossibilité (ou le refus) du deuil ont en effet nécessité d’ouvrir des « issues de secours », selon l’expression d’A. Mitscherlich, par la création de préjugés et stéréotypes aptes à faciliter le processus de refoulement ou de déni des violences commises.

    Appliquer la notion de sentiment de culpabilité à une population me parait risqué mais le texte est intéressant, très éclairant.

  • Who killed the poor villager, Fahriye Gürbüz ? https://www.duvarenglish.com/columns/2019/12/17/who-killed-the-poor-villager-fahriye-gurbuz

    O

    n December 5, employees of the electricity distribution company, with masked security forces accompanying them, raided the village of Dilekli in the Yüksekova district very early in the morning, HDP deputy Sait Dede went on to reference, quoting from the local press. According to Dede’s statement, “During this raid, 45-year-old Fahriye Gürbüz, mother of five, suffered a heart attack and died after witnessing masked people raid her house.”

    “Türkerler Holding, which bought 100 percent of the shares of the Van Lake Electricity Distribution Company (VEDAŞ), started a new practice in 2016. They chose Van province’s Gevaş district as a pilot region and began installing consumers’ electric meters at the top of the connecting posts, a practice never seen in the rest of the country. According to the regulation on Measures to Minimize the Losses in the Distribution System, Article 11, first paragraph, there is a clause that allows the distribution company to install the electric meters at places other than those specified within the regulation. This is to fight against the illegal use of electricity and other losses. This clause has been interpreted broadly by the distribution company against the consumer, and a humiliating practice has been introduced. Today, this practice, which has been put into effect in almost all of east and southeastern Turkey, has also created several problems. The fact that electric meters have been somehow snatched away from the access and control of consumers has made it so that the figures cannot be monitored. The consumer is unable to monitor their consumption, and most of the time they are subject to high bills. When faced with an objection, the private company accepts that the excessive consumption bills were due to software mistakes or misreading of the meters, and it corrects them. Naturally, the consumer objects to any bills they receive that are very high, and apart from that, bills that seem normal are out of their control. When the enormous number of subscribers is taken into consideration, this results in a very big total. None of the consumers know how much power they have spent in a given period. The physical search for the illegal usage of electricity, and the reading of the electric meters, are usually done by VEDAŞ during the night with the support of security forces, creating a fearful and tense atmosphere for the citizens — like in the medieval era. Often, walls are ruptured and electric systems are damaged, but most importantly, the attitude of the employees of the private company and the security forces are degrading for citizens.

    #Turquie #Électricité #Kurdistan

  • Turkey’s intelligence agency to expand covert operations around the World: President Erdogan

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Monday that Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT) will gradually increase its capacity to carry out covert intelligence operations around the World.

    “In the near future, we are going to cut down on the inland duties of the Turkish intelligence in order to expand its capacity to carry out covert intelligence operations around the World,” Erdogan said during a speech he delivered during inauguration of a new headquarters for the MİT.

    He also praised the organization for conducting international operations, especially in Syria and now in Libya, the Turkish media reported.

    “In shedding light on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, MİT made our nation proud in the international arena. And now, it’s playing the same kind of role in Libya,” Erdoğan said.

    A Saudi journalist critical to the royal family, Khashoggi was killed at the İstanbul consulate building of Saudi Arabia in Oct. 2018.

    “[MİT] has combined its experience in gathering intelligence with high technology [provided by the government] and performed well in Syria,” he added.

    Turkey has been backing Syrian rebels since the start of the civil war in 2011. In Libya, Ankara supports Fayez al-Serraj’s UN-recognized Tripoli government against Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

    The new MİT headquarters, a 500-hectare complex, is named “The Castle,” according to the state-run Anadolu news agency.

    The Hürriyet daily had reported that MİT’s budget was increased from $410 million in 2010 to nearly $2 billion in 2017.

    https://turkeypurge.com/turkeys-intelligence-agency-to-expand-covert-operations-around-the-worl
    #Turquie #services_secrets

    ping @etraces

    • Over 100 Gulenists forcibly brought back to Turkey so far: ministry

      More than 100 people allegedly affiliated with Turkey’s Gülen group have been forcibly brought back from abroad so far, according to Deputy Foreign Minister Yavuz Selim Kiran.

      “Over 20 FETO schools [abroad] were taken over . The latest of such incident was in Pakistan. We got some remarkable results in Afghanistan as well. So far, over 100 FETO terrorists were brought back to Turkey. Rest assured that, wherever they are in the world, we will keep chasing these terrorists and take them accountable before the courts for the crimes they committed against humanity while they were in the country,” Kiran told media over the weekend.

      FETÖ [Fethullahist Terrorist Organization] is a buzzword, coined by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to refer the the Gülen group as.

      Turkish government accuses the group of masterminding the July 15, 2016 coup attempt although the latter denies involvement. More than 150,000 people have been detained and some 90,000 were put in pretrial arrest while over 150,000 have lost their jobs amid the government’s post-coup crackdown against people deemed to have ties to the group.

      So far, a number of countries like Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Georgia and Myanmar handed over academics, businessmen and school principals upon the Turkish government’s request despite the fact that some of those victims already had refugee status with the United Nations.

      Meanwhile, forced disappearances by law enforcement have become common occurrence within the country, too. On Feb 13, 2019, Yasin Ugan and Ozgur Kaya, the people wanted for their links to the Gulen movement, were removed from their homes in Ankara’s Camlik neighborhood by a group of armed people, claimed to be undercover police officers. According to family records, the armed group put black sacks onto the pair’s heads and forced them into a white van before leaving the scene.

      https://turkeypurge.com/over-100-gulenists-forcibly-brought-back-to-turkey-so-far-ministry

  • Assets in Flight: Libya’s Flying Armories

    On December 26, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced provisional plans to deploy Turkish troops to Libya in defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Since April 2019, the GNA has faced a months-long offensive led by rival leader, General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA). Days later, social media outlets, including Twitter, erupted in multiple posts alleging the deployment of Syrian rebels in and around Tripoli. Open-source plane spotters elsewhere identified aircraft transiting between Turkey and Libya, including one operated by Aerotranscargo, a Moldova-based company that in 2017, appeared in a UN Panel of Experts report as one of several Eastern European air freight providers that have operated suspicious flights into Libya, some of which are linked to potentially illicit weapons transfers.

    The aerial re-supply of weapons, materiel, and personnel into conflict zones is not new. However, recent advancements in open source research tools and techniques – especially in publicly accessible flight data – have opened a new frontier in conflict reporting. Using these tools, researchers and investigators can connect conflict events with the underlying logistics that enable the commission of violence and mass atrocities.

    In Libya, the sprawling corporate and logistics networks that connect Europe, Turkey, Sudan, the UAE, Qatar and other regional neighbors have their origins in decades of instability and state collapse on multiple continents. Far from relics of a past era, companies in these jurisdictions have serviced rival factions in the ongoing Libyan civil war now entering its 6th year of sustained conflict.

    Using flight data and corporate records, the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats (CFIT) team at C4ADS takes a deeper look at these aerial supply operations, revealing potential ownership and management ties between Libya’s flying armories and air freight providers in Libya, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the UAE. This series specifically exposes the logistical architecture that has for years channeled weapons, materiel, and personnel in and out of Libya, often using commercial businesses and aircraft that are identifiable through open source research.
    Libya’s TransNational Weapons Air Bridge

    On September 27, 2006 an Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (Registration number: 5A-DQA) touched down in Baidoa, Somalia carrying two armored vehicles and an unspecified number of senior Ugandan military officers. The plane, which traveled from Kufra, Libya on its way to Baidoa, was reportedly operated by Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG), a chartered air freight service provider based in Tripoli, Libya. Seven years later, GASG appeared on an air waybill issued for the unofficial transfer of several thousand Caracel F Pistols, which the UN report stated were purchased by a US-based company and exported by UAE-based Caracel International LLC to Libyan forces then-organized under the Ministry of Interior in Mitiga, Libya.

    UN investigators found that the transfer to Libya was one of several potential embargo violations reportedly aided by air freight companies such as GASG. UN investigators specifically found operational ties between air freight companies operating between Libya, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though the relationship between these operators was not fully explored.

    Tracing Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) Ownership and Management

    Despite the lack of publicly available commercial registries in Libya, C4ADS used open data sources – including social media – to identify and verify GASG’s ownership and management as well as the company’s aerial operations.

    Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) was founded in 2003 and headquartered in Tripoli, Libya with offices in Benghazi and Istanbul, Turkey. A 2006 version of the company’s website identified a “Captain Abdussalam I. Aradi” as the company Chairman and Managing Director alongside several other company officials. GASG’s chairman separately appeared as “Abdussalam Aradi” according to a Linkedin Profile that seems to be registered to the company’s managing director. An open-source review of Facebook accounts registered under the name: “Abdussalam Aradi” elsewhere revealed an account with several profile photos that seemingly resemble Captain A. Aradi’s likeness.

    On January 21 2014, an image from a business article identified a “Capt. A. Aradi” as Chairman of GASG during a meeting with officials from Skylink Aviation, an air cargo company which operates in several conflict areas including in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan, among others. The article included an image that depicted “Capt. A. Aradi” shaking hands with an individual identified as the President of Skylink Aviation with a Libyan flag and GASG logo set in the background. A separate image of what appears to be the same scene appeared on GASG’s Facebook page on March 3, 2014, this time exposing the company’s three letter ICAO designator – GAK – within the company’s banner as displayed below.

    GASG seemingly re-branded to Global Air in 2006, according to the date listed on the GASG Facebook account (now re-branded to Global Air). Despite the alleged name change, the company is still identified as “Global Aviation and Service Group (GASG)” in the mission and vision sections of the new Global Air Facebook Account as displayed below.

    Additionally, the contact information listed on the new Global Air Facebook account matches the physical address and contact phone number listed on both the GASG and Global Air websites.

    Separately, at least one flyer posted on the GASG Facebook account displayed both the “Global Air” logo and the GASG web address www.global-aviationgroup.com within the same image. This flyer also included the same contact phone number that appeared on the GASG and Global Air websites, suggesting that the two companies are potentially linked despite the change in name and logo.

    Additional images posted on the GASG Facebook account suggest that the change in company logo coincided with the migration from GASG to Global Air. A thorough survey of these images revealed multiple photos bearing both the GASG and Global Air logos as displayed below. In some cases, some of the images retained the full mention of “Global Aviation & Services Group” with a “Global Air” logo appearing at the borders.

    The Mitiga-Baidoa Connection

    C4ADS investigators reviewed additional images posted on the GASG/Global Air Facebook account and the account registered to “Abdussalam Aradi” and found an image of an Ilyushin-76 which matched the aircraft identified by UN investigators in 2006, and again 2013, as the transport aircraft for military equipment sent to Somalia and Libya in potential violation of existing UN restrictions.

    The Facebook account registered to “Abdussalam Aradi” contained an image of an Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (Registration Number: 5A-DQA) bearing the Arabic inscription for Global Air (العالمية للطيران) on the front left side of the aircraft as displayed below.

    The same aircraft appeared on an August 23, 2013 post on GASG’s Facebook account, this time photographed with the English “Global Air” visible on the front side of the aircraft as displayed below. While both images lacked Exif data, aircraft spotters have elsewhere attributed the aircraft to GASG in public sightings in both Mitiga and Benghazi in 2007 and 2008 respectively. These sightings seemingly confirm the aircraft’s link to GASG as well its operations in Mitiga specifically, and in Libya at large.

    Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) Links to Turkey

    Further open source review of GASG’s global operations revealed corporate ties to Turkey as well flight operations elsewhere in Libya, Turkey, and the UAE. According to the company’s website, GASG operated direct cargo flights from Istanbul to Tripoli and Benghazi as well as from Dubai to various other African destinations, specifically Njdamena (Chad). GASG’s website also included several flight schedules for international flights between Sabiha International Airport (Turkey) to Mitiga (Libya). Flights between Benghazi and Dubai operated three days a week while those between Sabiha (Turkey) and Mitiga (Libya) operated twice a week.

    A March 23, 2007 filing in the Turkish Gazette confirmed the registration of “Global Aviation and Services Group” (listed as Merkezi Libya ’Da Bulunan Global Aviation and Services Group Türkiye İstanbul Şubesi) under registration number: 619595. The gazette filling also identifies a “Kaptain Abdusalam Ibrahim Aradi” as the company’s general manager, confirming GASG’s corporate presence in Turkey.

    The Moldovan Connection

    In 2017, UN investigators reported that Global Aviation and Services Group (GASG) had previously chartered aircraft owned and/or operated by Moldovan company AerotransCargo. The company was registered on August 12, 2011 (Registration Number: 1011600028436) at MD-2026, bd. Dacia 60/5, ap.(of.) 115, sec.Botanica, mun. Chişinău, RM according to the Moldovan company gazette. This address is shared with another Moldova-based company, Air Stork (Registration Number: 1015600032031). Air Stork was established on September 30, 2015 and according to corporate documentation shares some directors and personnel with Aerotransport.

    AerotransCargo and Air Stork also share the same address: MD-2026, bd. Dacia 60/5, ap.(of.) 115, sec.Botanica, mun. Chişinău, RM with five additional companies: Tiramavia Air Transport Company SRL, Tehnoaer LLC, Gelfex-M LLC, Alanar Grup LLC, and Valan Voiaj LLC. Four of the five companies operate in the air transport sector and provide passenger and freight transport services, warehousing, and the supply and repair of flight equipment. C4ADS investigators found similar co-location in other air freight service providers located in Moldova, which like GASG, Aerotranscargo, and Air Stork connect Libya to Eastern Europe.

    On April 15, 2019, the European Union banned Air Stork from operating within EU airspace. This restriction, however, did not include AerotransCargo, potentially allowing Air Stork aircraft to fly under AerotransCargo’s operator code. As noted above, both companies are also co-located and share some of the same owners. In 2017, UN investigators found that at least two Air Stock aircraft ­– Registration Numbers: ER-IBI and ER-IBU – had been transferred from another Moldovan company – Sky Prim Air – whose aircraft was sighted transporting officers and armed groups allied to General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army in 2016.

    Additionally, at least one other Air Stork freight aircraft–Registration Number: ER-ABE–was leased to Global Aviation and Services Group on September 19, 2017. A rendered model of this aircraft appears on GASG’s new “Global Air” webpage. An aircraft with tail code ER-ABE was also spotted on April 4, 2018 traveling between Istanbul Sabiha Goken Airport and Misrata International airport by Plane Finder, an open source flight data aggregator.

    GASG and AerotransCargo’s Forays into Libya

    According to the Moldovan aircraft registry, AerotransCargo operates four Boeing 747-412 cargo aircraft with the following registration and ICAO numbers: ER-BAM (ICAO: 504E27), ER-BBJ (ICAO: 504E43), ER-JAI (ICAO: 504E36), and ER-BAJ.

    According to the Moldovan civilian aircraft registry, the AerotransCargo fleet operates under the following ICAO designator: ATG, which allows for the identification of individual flights operated by the airline. In 2017, UN investigators reported that GASG had previously chartered AerotransCargo aircraft on an undisclosed number of trips to Libya. These trips would have likely occurred under GASG’s ICAO designator: GAK making the relationship between GASG and AerotransCargo potentially visible in open flight data. Using flight data from ADS-B Exchange, C4ADS investigators found multiple flights by all four AerotransCargo aircraft flying under the GAK designator, including some that involved flights between Turkey and Libya.

    This flight data also revealed that between April 19, 2017 and May 5, 2019, three of the four AerotransCargo aircraft – Registration Numbers: ER-JAI, ER-BBJ, and ER-BAM –used GASG call signs – GAK3011 and GAK3012 – during trips between Turkey and Mitiga International Airport in Tripoli, Libya.

    While the available ADSB data is incomplete, each aircraft transmitted low altitude readings (between 25 and 50 feet) while near Mitiga airport, suggesting potential landing at the airport. Each of these aircraft also appeared on the Aerotranscargo webpage and were linked to the airline by the Moldovan civilian aircraft register though they operated under the GASG operator code during this time period. These findings seemingly confirm GASG’s use of Aerotranscargo aircraft as originally reported by the UN Panel of Experts.

    Whereas public reporting on weapons flows into Libya has dominantly relied on traditional reporting methods, ADS-B data provides an additional mode of verification and attribution not extensively used in conflict reporting. When combined with satellite imagery, ADS-B data opens up a new frontier in open source investigations, especially in data scarce environments.

    Over the next weeks and months, C4ADS will delve deeper into the airborne re-supply of Libyan armed groups with a principal focus on the role of commercial airliners in this pipeline movement of weapons, materiel, and personnel. This reporting will focus on the combined use of ADS-B flight data and satellite imagery, and highlight the innovative use of new technologies in open source reporting in conflict zones. This approach emphasizes the use of open data to expose the illicit logistic architectures that fuel and sustain conflict as a core thematic prerogative of the Conflict Finance and Irregular Threats initiative at C4ADS.

    https://c4ads.org/blogposts/2019/7/30/assets-in-flight-libyas-flying-armories
    #armes #commerce_d'armes #Turquie #armement #Libye

    ping @fil @reka @simplicissimus

  • DERNIÈRE HEURE : Sept manifestantes arrêtées hier en Turquie risquent deux ans de prison pour avoir chanté l’hymne « Un violeur sur votre chemin »
    https://tradfem.wordpress.com/2019/12/10/derniere-heure-sept-manifestantes-arretees-hier-en-turquie-risque

    Le parquet turc a accusé sept féministes arrêtées hier d’avoir « offensé l’Etat » après avoir chanté lors d’une manifestation à Istanbul l’hymne contre les violences faites aux femmes, « Un violeur sur votre chemin », comme l’ont confirmé lundi des membres du groupe organisateur.

    La police a dispersé hier une manifestation au cours de laquelle quelque 300 femmes ont interprété la chanson du groupe chilien Lastesis en turc et en espagnol, qui est devenu populaire ces derniers jours comme protestation contre la violence sexiste dans de nombreux pays du monde, du Pérou jusqu’en Inde.

    Sept militantes ont été arrêtées et, comme l’a confirmé leur avocat, Tuba Torun, au journal numérique Bianet, ont été accusées d’avoir violé la loi sur les manifestations, pour « insulte au président » et en application de l’article 301 du Code pénal.

    Cet article sanctionne par des peines allant de six mois à deux ans de prison « l’infraction publique contre la nation turque, l’Etat, le Parlement, le gouvernement et les organes judiciaires ».

    #Turquie #justice_patriarcale #mobilisation_féministe

  • Syria’s Kurds and the Turkish border

    The news from Syria has been nothing but bad for several years now, but things have been particularly desperate in the last few days—since Turkish forces, with a green light from the American president, invaded the region of northern Syria that had been under autonomous Kurdish rule, as Rojava. (You can read an overview of the situation and what is at stake in this Guardian article: What is the situation in north-eastern Syria? —> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/what-is-situation-north-eastern-syria-turkey-kurds)

    Although I mainly work on refugee history these days, earlier in my career I was a Syria specialist, and I spent a lot of time researching the history of the area that Turkey has just invaded. The demarcation of the Syrian-Turkish border in the 1920s and 30s was crucial to the constitution of state sovereignty on either side of it. Turkey and Syria were newly established states, though they were quite different: Turkey was ruled by a nationalist government that had successfully fought off multiple invasions, while Syria was only nominally independent under French colonial ‘supervision’. What I was really interested in, though, was how these interconnected processes shaped the political identities of the people living in what became the northern Syrian borderlands. A lot of them were Kurdish, and the border made them a minority in a new Syrian nation-state.

    As a historian, I don’t have privileged knowledge about current events, and I’m feeling pretty helpless and hopeless about them. But if it’s helpful for anyone reading this to get some background on how this part of the world came to be divided between Syria and Turkey, and what that meant for Kurds living there, with permission from the publishers I’m making some of the things I’ve written on the subject freely available.

    First, here is a PDF of a chapter of my book (2011) on ‘The border and the Kurds’ (https://singularthings.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/chapter-4.pdf). It explains the impact that the demarcation of the border had on Kurds across the new Syrian nation-state. Right through the 1920s and 30s, Syria’s borders didn’t have much meaningful physical presence on the ground. But increasingly, the border as a line between two state jurisdictions made it a meaningful presence in people’s lives (and in people’s minds) nonetheless. The drawing of Syria’s borders tended to make all Kurds in the country—whether they lived in the borderlands or in Damascus—into one ‘minority’ community.

    Second, my article ‘Refugees and the definition of Syria, 1920-1939’ (2017) (https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtw048) argues that the arrival and settlement of refugees brought the geographical borders of Syria into much sharper definition, and accelerated the spread of effective state authority across its territory—as well as raising questions about whether Syrian national identity should be defined to include or exclude the incomers. Kurdish refugees from the new Turkish Republic were one of the three main groups of refugees entering Syria in this period, and the places that became Syrian included the areas that Kurds have governed autonomously for the last few years. The Turkish army’s invasion has prompted the Kurdish government to invite the Syrian regime back in.

    Finally, an older article in French, ‘Frontières et pouvoir d’Etat: La frontière turco-syrienne dans les années 1920 et 1930’ (2009) (https://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=VING&ID_NUMPUBLIE=VIN_103&ID_ARTICLE=VING_103_0091#), written with my colleague and friend Seda Altuğ, goes into more detail on the process of how the border was drawn on the ground, and what role it played in the constitution of state authority on both sides. For Turkey, a national frontier was being created, that needed defending against local populations that were viewed as a threat (especially Kurds and Armenians) as well as against French imperialism. On the Syrian side, where the border was both a Syrian national and French imperial frontier, the situation was more complicated.

    https://singularthings.wordpress.com/2019/10/15/syrias-kurds-and-the-turkish-border
    #Kurdistan #kurdistan_syrien #Syrie #Turquie #frontières #Kurdes #histoire
    signalé par @isskein

  • An Assessment Report on Blocked Websites, News Articles and Social Media Content from Turkey

    İfade Özgürlüğü Derneği (İFÖD – Freedom of Expression Association) has been set up formally in August 2017 protect and foster the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The Association envisions a society in which everyone enjoys freedom of opinion and expression and the right to access and disseminate information and knowledge.

    The 2018 EngelliWeb Report of the Freedom of Expression Association (“İFÖD”) written by Yaman Akdeniz and Ozan Güven includes overview of and considerations on increasing Internet censorship and access blocking practices by the end of 2018 in Turkey. This assessment is predominantly conducted by reference to the application of Law No. 5651 on Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes Committed by Means of Such Publications, which was enacted about 12 years ago and other subsequent regulations in Turkey.

    As a matter of fact, no statistical data on websites blocked from Turkey was published either by the former Telecommunications Communication Presidency (“TIB”) or its successor Information Technologies and Communication Board (“BTK”). Moreover, no statistical data on blocked websites, news articles (URL-based) and/or social media content has ever been published by the Association of Access Providers (“ESB”).

    İFÖD report includes detailed statistical information for the year of 2018 and also provides an overview for the 2007-2018 period on blocked websites, news articles (URL-based) and social media content. It is the intention of İFÖD to share such data and analysis with the general public on a regular basis. Therefore, further reports will be prepared and published; the first in September 2019 with regards to the first half of 2019 and a subsequent report in February 2020 as a year-end report for 2019.

    According to the İFÖD report access to 245.825 websites was blocked from Turkey by the end of 2018.Access to a total of 54.903 websites and domain names was blocked only in 2018. Furthermore, the report highlights that over 45.000 URL based blocking orders were issued since 2014 resulting with over 100.000 URLs blocked from Turkey to protect individual rights such as reputation.

    Since the personal rights violations related URL-based access blocking measure came into force in February 2014 with the amendment of Article 9 of Law No. 5651, as of 31 December 2018, it was determined that a total of 7334 news articles (URL-based) were blocked. These URLs were blocked by 2129 separate orders issued by 287 separate criminal judgeships of peace. Table 2 shows statistical information from 2014 to end of 2018 in relation to top twenty news sites from Turkey in terms of blocked news articles and how many URLs on these sites were blocked, how many of those blocked URLs have been deleted or removed from the website, and the figures of blocked URLs against deleted/removed URLs are also shown in figures 8 and 9.

    The EngelliWeb report also includes a section on most blocked and most removed news articles by newspapers and online news providers. For this purpose, 7334 blocked news articles (URL-based) were identified. These URLs were blocked by 2129 separate orders issued by 287 separate criminal judgeships of peace in Turkey.

    The EngelliWeb 2018: An Assessment Report on Blocked Websites, News Articles and Social Media Content from Turkey was prepared by Professor Yaman Akdeniz (Professor, Faculty of Law, İstanbul Bilgi University) and Expert Researcher Ozan Güven. EngelliWeb 2018 report was prepared within the scope of a project funded by the Human Rights Programme of the Government of the Netherlands and can be accessed in full as a PDF formatted book at:

    https://ifade.org.tr/reports/EngelliWeb_2018_Eng.pdf
    İFÖD Web Address: https://ifade.org.tr
    İFÖD Twitter Address: @ifadeorgtr

    https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/publications/engelliweb-2018-an-assessment-report-on-blocked-
    #rapport #réseaux_sociaux #censure #Turquie #internet

    Pour télécharger le rapport en pdf
    https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/EngelliWeb_2018_Eng.pdf

  • James Le Mesurier: White Helmets backer found dead near his home in Istanbul | The Independent
    https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/james-le-mesurier-death-white-helmets-istanbul-fall-syria-spy-russia-

    Encore un coup des Russes ! insinue très fortement le Gardian...

    A former British army officer, who helped start the “White Helmets”, an emergency response group in Syria, has been found dead near his home in Istanbul, just days after the Russian foreign ministry menaced him, accusing him of being a spy.

    James le Mesurier, 43, was the director of Mayday Rescue charity that trained members of the Syria Civil Defence, nicknamed the White Helmets, playing a major role in its creation in Turkey in 2013.

    He was awarded an Order of the British Empire for his work helping Syrians three years later.

    The police have yet to confirm how Mr Mesurier died, but he is believed to have fallen from the balcony of his apartment in the Turkish city at dawn on Monday.

    His death comes just three days after he was publicly attacked by Maria Zakharova, Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman, who on Friday claimed he was a “former agent of Britain’s MI6, who has been spotted all around the world”.

    He and the White Helmets had been the subject of a disinformation campaign spearheaded by Moscow and their allies in Damascus for years.

    #faits_alternatifs #fakenews #Turquie

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

  • Réfugiés en #Turquie : évaluation de l’utilisation des #fonds de l’#UE et de la coopération avec Ankara

    Les députés évalueront mercredi la situation des #réfugiés_syriens en Turquie et les résultats du #soutien_financier fourni par l’UE au gouvernement turc.

    Des représentants de la Commission européenne informeront les députés des commissions des libertés civiles, des affaires étrangères et du développement avant de participer à un débat. Ils se concentreront sur la facilité de l’UE en faveur des réfugiés en Turquie, mise en place en 2015 pour aider les autorités turques à venir en aide aux réfugiés sur leur territoire. Elle dispose d’un #budget total de six milliards d’euros à distribuer au plus tard en 2025.

    Sur les 5,6 millions de réfugiés syriens dans le monde, près de 3,7 millions seraient en Turquie, selon les données du HCR.

    #Accord_UE-Turquie et situation en Grèce

    Les députés de la commission des libertés civiles débattront également de la mise en œuvre de la déclaration UE-Turquie, l’accord conclu par les dirigeants européens avec le gouvernement turc en mars 2016 pour mettre un terme au flux de réfugiés en direction des îles grecques.

    Ils échangeront dans un premier temps avec #Michalis_Chrisochoidis, le ministre grec en charge de la protection des citoyens. Les conséquences de l’accord ainsi que la situation dans les #îles grecques feront ensuite l’objet d’une discussion avec des représentants de la Commission européenne, de l’Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’UE, du Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile et de Médecins sans frontières.

    DATE : mercredi 6 novembre, de 9h à 12h30

    LIEU : Parlement européen, Bruxelles, bâtiment Paul-Henri Spaak, salle 3C50

    https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/fr/press-room/20191104IPR65732/refugies-en-turquie-evaluation-de-l-utilisation-des-fonds-de-l-ue
    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #EU #accord_UE-Turquie #aide_financière #financement #catastrophe_humanitaire #crise_humanitaire #externalisation #hotspot

    –-------------

    Ici le lien vers la vidéo de la deuxième partie de la séance : https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/fr/committees/video?event=20191106-1000-COMMITTEE-LIBE

    Vous pouvez y voir l’intervention d’MSF sur le deal avec la Turquie et la situation en Grèce à la min 11:55.
    #suicide #santé_mentale #violences_sexuelles #santé #enfants #mineurs #enfance #surpopulation #toilettes #vulnérabilité #accès_aux_soins

    • Pour la #Cour_européenne_des_droits_de_l’Homme, tout va bien dans les hotspots grecs

      La Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme vient de rejeter pour l’essentiel la requête dont l’avaient saisie, le 16 juin 2016, 51 personnes de nationalités afghane, syrienne et palestinienne - parmi lesquelles de nombreux mineurs -, maintenues de force dans une situation de détresse extrême dans le hotspot de #Chios, en Grèce [1].

      Les 51 requérant.es, soutenu.es par nos associations*, avaient été identifié.es lors d’une mission d’observation du Gisti dans les hotspots grecs au mois de mai 2016 [2]. Privées de liberté et retenues dans l’île de Chios devenue, comme celles de #Lesbos, #Leros, #Samos et #Kos, une prison à ciel ouvert depuis la mise en œuvre de la #Déclaration_UE-Turquie du 20 mars 2016, les personnes concernées invoquaient la violation de plusieurs dispositions de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme [3].

      Dans leur requête étaient abondamment et précisément documentés l’insuffisance et le caractère inadapté de la nourriture, les conditions matérielles parfois très dangereuses (tentes mal fixées, serpents, chaleur, promiscuité, etc.), les grandes difficultés d’accès aux soins, l’absence de prise en charge des personnes les plus vulnérables - femmes enceintes, enfants en bas âge, mineurs isolés -, aggravées par le contexte de privation de liberté qui caractérise la situation dans les hotspots, mais aussi l’arbitraire administratif, particulièrement anxiogène du fait de la menace permanente d’un renvoi vers la Turquie.

      La seule violation retenue par la Cour concerne l’impossibilité pour les requérant.es de former des recours effectifs contre les décisions ordonnant leur expulsion ou leur maintien en détention, du fait du manque d’informations accessibles sur le droit au recours et de l’absence, dans l’île de Chios, de tribunal susceptible de recevoir un tel recours.

      Pour le reste, il aura fallu plus de trois ans à la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme pour juger que la plainte des 51 de Chios n’est pas fondée. Son argumentation se décline en plusieurs volets :

      s’agissant du traitement des personnes mineures, elle reprend à son compte les dénégations du gouvernement grec pour conclure qu’elle n’est « pas convaincue que les autorités n’ont pas fait tout ce que l’on pouvait raisonnablement attendre d’elles pour répondre à l’obligation de prise en charge et de protection » ;

      elle reconnaît qu’il a pu y avoir des problèmes liés à l’accès aux soins médicaux, à la mauvaise qualité de la nourriture et de l’eau et au manque d’informations sur les droits et d’assistance juridique, mais les relativise en rappelant que « l’arrivée massive de migrants avait créé pour les autorités grecques des difficultés de caractère organisationnel, logistique et structurel » et relève qu’en l’absence de détails individualisés (pour chaque requérant.e), elle « ne saurait conclure que les conditions de détention des requérants [y ayant séjourné] constituaient un traitement inhumain et dégradant » ;

      s’agissant de la surpopulation et de la promiscuité, elle n’en écarte pas la réalité – tout en relevant que les requérant.es n’ont « pas indiqué le nombre de mètres carrés dans les conteneurs » – mais pondère son appréciation des risques que cette situation entraîne en précisant que la durée de détention « stricte » n’a pas dépassé trente jours, délai dans lequel « le seuil de gravité requis pour que [cette détention] soit qualifiée de traitement inhumain ou dégradant n’avait pas été atteint ».

      *

      L’appréciation faite par la Cour de la situation de privation de liberté invoquée par les requérant.es est en effet au cœur de sa décision, puisqu’elle s’en sert pour relativiser toutes les violations des droits qu’elles et ils ont subies. C’est ainsi que, sans contester les très mauvaises conditions matérielles qui prévalaient au camp de Vial, elle (se) rassure en précisant qu’il s’agit d’« une structure semi-ouverte, ce qui permettait aux occupants de quitter le centre toute la journée et d’y revenir le soir ». De même, « à supposer qu’il y eut à un moment ou à un autre un problème de surpopulation » au camp de Souda, elle estime « ce camp a toujours été une structure ouverte, fait de nature à atténuer beaucoup les nuisances éventuelles liées à la surpopulation » [4].

      Autrement dit, peu importe, pour la Cour EDH, que des personnes soient contraintes de subir les conditions de vie infrahumaines des camps insalubres du hotspot de Chios, dès lors qu’elles peuvent en sortir. Et peu importe qu’une fois hors de ces camps, elles n’aient d’autre solution que d’y revenir, puisqu’elles n’y sont pas officiellement « détenues ». Qu’importe, en effet, puisque comme dans le reste de « l’archipel des camps » de la mer Égée [5], c’est toute l’île de Chios qu’elles n’ont pas le droit de quitter et qui est donc leur prison.

      En relayant, dans sa décision, l’habillage formel donné par les autorités grecques et l’Union européenne au mécanisme des hotspots, la Cour EDH prend la responsabilité d’abandonner les victimes et conforte l’hypocrisie d’une politique inhumaine qui enferme les exilé.es quand elle devrait les accueillir.

      Contexte

      Depuis trois ans, des dizaines de milliers de personnes sont confinées dans les cinq hotspots de la mer Égée par l’Union européenne, qui finance la Grèce afin qu’elle joue le rôle de garde-frontière de l’Europe.

      Dès leur création, des associations grecques et des ONG, mais aussi des instances européennes et internationales comme, le Haut-Commissariat de l’ONU pour les réfugiés (HCR), le rapporteur spécial de l’ONU pour les droits de l’Homme des migrants, le Comité de prévention de la torture du Conseil de l’Europe, l’Agence de l’UE pour les droits fondamentaux, n’ont cessé d’alerter sur les nombreuses violations de droits qui sont commises dans les hotspots grecs : des conditions d’accueil marquées par la surpopulation, l’insécurité, l’insalubrité et le manque d’hygiène, des violences sexuelles, des atteintes répétées aux droits de l’enfant, le défaut de prise en compte des situations de vulnérabilité, un accès à l’information et aux droits entravé ou inexistant, le déni du droit d’asile. On ne compte plus les témoignages, rapports et enquêtes qui confirment la réalité et l’actualité des situations dramatiques engendrées par ces violations, dont la presse se fait périodiquement l’écho.

      http://www.migreurop.org/article2939.html?lang=fr
      #CEDH

  • Syria: U-turn over investigation into ‘white phosphorus injuries’ after Turkey’s clash with Kurds

    A team of international investigators have refused to examine tissue samples taken from civilian casualties suspected of being burnt by white phosphorus during the Turkish offensive into northern Syria, arguing the cases fall outside their remit.
    The decision halts efforts to verify whether or not incendiary weapons were used in northern Syria during Turkey’s operations in the region, and means time-sensitive tissue samples taken from burns casualties will be left to degrade in a refrigerator unit in Iraq.
    It comes amid the growing politicisation of an issue that is now a source of embarrassment for Nato, whose member states appear

    https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/syria-un-refuses-to-investigate-claims-of-white-phosphorus-use-in-turkis

    #Syrie #Turquie #Kurdes #bombes-au-phosphore

  • Terrorist, sagt Erdoğan

    Ein in Deutschland aufgewachsener Kurde wird in die Türkei abgeschoben und flüchtet zurück nach Deutschland. Nun lebt er in einem #Ankerzentrum.

    #Murat_Akgül sitzt in einem Café in der Nürnberger Südstadt und legt einen Finger auf seine Stirn. Dort, wo die Haut noch leicht gerötet ist, ist der Anflug einer Beule zu sehen. Die Narbe ist seine Erinnerung an Bosnien und die Balkanroute. Akgül lebt seit 30 Jahren in Nürnberg, er ist hier aufgewachsen, hat hier die Schule besucht, eine Lehre gemacht, eine Familie gegründet, Eigentumswohnung, vier Kinder. Ende Mai erhielt der Kurde aus dem Südosten der Türkei einen Ausweisungsbescheid.

    Man hat ihn abgeschoben und Akgül ist zurückgeflüchtet. Das ist die Geschichte. Jetzt sitzt er hier, unweit seiner Wohnung, und darf nicht die Nacht dort verbringen. Er muss zurück ins Ankerzentrum Donauwörth. Er scheint noch nicht einmal wütend, nur müde. „Manchmal denke ich“, sagt Murat Akgül, „sie sollen mich einfach nur in Ruhe lassen.“

    Als Akgül Ende Mai der Brief mit dem Ausweisungsbescheid erreicht, hat er eine Niederlassungserlaubnis. Dass er jetzt, als politisch aktiver Kurde in die Türkei abgeschoben werden soll, kann er zuerst nicht glauben. Als Begründung listet der Verfassungsschutz auf 35 Seiten „sicherheitsrechtliche Erkenntnisse“ auf.

    Das heißt: Akgül hat an zahlreichen Demonstrationen, Versammlungen, Kundgebungen und Festen des kurdischen Vereins Medya Volkshaus teilgenommen, das zuweilen auch Funktionäre der #PKK empfängt. Von Teilnehmern dieser Veranstaltungen seien verbotene Parolen gerufen und verbotene Symbole gezeigt worden. Gleichzeitig ist das Medya Volkshaus ein Treffpunkt für Kurdinnen und Kurden in Nürnberg und erhält regelmäßig städtische Kulturförderung.

    Akgül bespricht sich mit seinem Anwalt Peter Holzschuher, klagt gegen den Bescheid und erhebt einen Eilantrag, die Abschiebung bis zur Entscheidung über die Klage auszusetzen. Dass er als Vater deutscher Kinder tatsächlich abgeschoben werden würde, glauben beide nicht. Der Eilantrag wird abgewiesen und Akgül reicht Beschwerde ein. Noch während die Beschwerde bearbeitet wird, seien nicht weniger als acht Polizisten zu ihm nach Hause gekommen: Sie holen ihn aus dem Bett, verfrachten ihn in einen Transporter.

    Am selben Nachmittag landet Akgül in Istanbul. Wenn die türkischen Behörden erfahren, dass er sich auf Demos in Deutschland für die kurdische Sache starkgemacht hat, gilt er hier als Terrorist. Akgül erfindet einen Grund. Zwar hätten die Beamten, im Flughafen wie auf der Station in Istanbul, ihm nicht geglaubt, dass er wegen einer Schlägerei abgeschoben worden sei, doch: Noch liegen den Türken keine Akten zu ihm vor, man lässt ihn gehen.
    Bei 30 Grad sitzen 35 Flüchtende im Lkw

    Akgül kann abtauchen, er schläft bei Bekannten, nirgends bleibt er länger als drei Tage. Dann zurück nach Istanbul. „Zuletzt habe ich die Schlepper gefunden“, sagt er, als spräche er von einer Muschel am Strand. Wie, gefunden? „Die findest du.“ 6.500 Euro soll Akgül bezahlen, damit er zurück nach Deutschland geschleust wird. Er werde mit dem Auto heimgefahren. „Nichts, was sie gesagt haben, hat gestimmt.“ Auf den vier Wochen auf der Balkanroute, sagt er, habe er die Hölle erlebt, den Tod überstanden.

    Die Schlepper hätten eine Gruppe von etwa 30 Menschen übers Telefon gelenkt, Wegmarken genannt, die sie ansteuern sollen. Zwischen Bosnien und Kroatien seien sie durch Urwälder gelaufen. Mit Akgül laufen Mütter und Kinder. Sie durchqueren Flüsse und kriechen durch Schlamm. Ihm schwellen die Füße an, ein Ast knallt ihm gegen die Stirn. Zwei Stunden, hatte es geheißen, am Ende seien sie 15 Stunden unterwegs gewesen. Von dem Wald träumt er heute noch.

    In Kroatien aber wartet ein Lkw, der sie nach Slowenien bringen soll. Bei 30 Grad Außentemperatur quetschen sich 35 Flüchtende auf die Ladefläche. Der Laderaum ist nicht belüftet. Die Menschen hämmern gegen die Wände, bis der Fahrer anhält. Akgül kennt diese Nachrichten aus der Zeitung. Er weiß, wie es sich anfühlt, darüber zu lesen, sagt er: 15 Sekunden Mitleid, dann hat man es vergessen. Jetzt ist er selbst einer von denen. Was ist mit seinem Leben passiert? Ein Stock, in die Verkleidung des Lkws geklemmt, sorgt schließlich dafür, dass etwas Luft ins Innere gelangt.

    In Slowenien wird Akgül von der Polizei aufgegriffen und registriert. Um nicht direkt wieder abgeschoben zu werden, habe er Asyl beantragen müssen. Dann lassen die Behörden ihn weiterziehen, schließlich sind seine Kinder in Deutschland. Ende Juli ist Akgül wieder in Franken. Deutlich ärmer, eine Beule auf der Stirn, aber sonst könnte alles wieder sein, wie es vorher war. Sein Arbeitgeber, eine Reinigungsfirma, hat seine Stelle freigehalten. Er will das hinter sich lassen wie einen bösen Traum.

    Noch in der Aufnahmeeinrichtung in Zirndorf ist er wieder in Handschellen. Bei seiner Abschiebung wurde ein zehn Jahre andauerndes Einreiseverbot verhängt. Er soll sofort wieder abgeschoben werden, zurück in die Türkei, in der ihm eine langjährige Haftstrafe droht. „Ich dachte, die machen Spaß. Die wollen mich erschrecken.“ Über Rechtsanwalt Yunus Ziyal beantragt Akgül nun erneut Asyl. Er frühstückt noch mit seiner Familie, danach muss er nach Donauwörth, Ankerzentrum. Ab sofort soll er sich dreimal wöchentlich bei der Polizei melden.
    Stundenlange „Sicherheitsgespräche“

    Es ist nicht leicht, den Anwalt Ziyal zu erreichen. Zwei Wochen vergehen, Akgül wartet in Donauwörth auf seine Anerkennung als Flüchtling, scheinbar. Ziyal ist am Telefon: „Es hat sich etwas Neues ergeben.“ Der Asylantrag ist laut Dublin-Bescheid unzulässig, Akgül soll nach Slowenien ausreisen. Am Freitag, dem 20. 9., erhebt Ziyal Klage und stellt einen Eilantrag gegen den Bescheid, der nun dem Verwaltungsgericht Augsburg vorliegt.

    Die Klage gegen die erste Ausweisung ist noch immer anhängig. ­Ziyal: „Das ist absurd – er hat Familie, sogar deutsche Kinder hier. Das Dublin-Verfahren stellt die Familieneinheit an erste Stelle.“ Er hält den Bescheid daher für rechtswidrig.

    Ziyal beobachtet generell, dass politisch aktive Kurden in Bayern momentan heftiger verfolgt würden als noch vor einigen Jahren. Die KurdInnen im Umfeld des Medya Volkshauses müssten sich immer wieder stundenlangen „Sicherheitsgesprächen“ unterziehen. Das bayerische Innenministerium bestätigt gegenüber den Nürnberger Nachrichten 29 Ausweisungen in drei Jahren. Die Aktivitäten, die von der Ausländerbehörde als ursächlich für die Abschiebung genannt würden, seien aber allesamt komplett legal: eine Demonstration gegen den IS, Kundgebungen für eine friedliche Lösung der Kurdenfrage, das Neujahrsfest …

    Murat Akgül ist längst kein Einzelfall mehr, aber einer, der heraussticht: nicht nur wegen der Kinder und der Wohnung, sondern auch wegen der Unerbittlichkeit im Vorgehen der deutschen Behörden, die sich die Terrorismusdefinition von Präsident Erdoğan zu eigen zu machen scheinen. Eine Antwort auf die Bitte der taz um Stellungnahme sowohl an das Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge als auch an das Bayerische Landesamt für Asyl und Rückführungen steht aus.

    Auf einer Demonstration in Nürnberg habe Akgül eine Fahne der kurdischen Miliz YPG getragen, so der Verfassungsschutz. Die gilt einerseits als bewaffneter Arm der PKK, wurde vom Westen, sprich: USA, Frankreich, andererseits im Krieg gegen den IS unterstützt. Akgül bestreitet, eine solche Fahne zu besitzen, sagt aber auch: „Zehntausende kurdische Soldaten sind im Krieg gegen den IS gefallen.“ Das Ermittlungsverfahren in dieser Sache – das einzige gegen seine Person – wurde eingestellt.

    Warum jetzt, ist die Frage, die unweigerlich am Ende dieser Geschichte steht. Warum geht der deutsche Staatsschutz so gezielt gegen Kurdinnen und Kurden vor, nachdem jahrelang Ruhe herrschte. „Ich kann da nur spekulieren“, schickt Ziyal vorweg. „Aber: Ich weiß, dass der EU-Türkei-Flüchtlingsdeal in diese Zeit fällt, und ich weiß, dass Erdoğan Deutschland vorgeworfen hat, Terroristen zu unterstützen.“ Die Bundesrepublik pflege viele enge Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zur Türkei und rege sei auch die polizeilich-justizielle Zusammenarbeit.

    Akgül kann jeden Tag eine neue gute oder schlechte Nachricht erreichen, ein neuer Bescheid, die Abweisung seiner Klage. Auch sein Anwalt wagt nur noch Hoffnungen zu formulieren.

    Egal wo, sein Leben wird nie wieder so sein wie vor seiner Abschiebung. Er hat die Balkanroute durchlebt und weiß jetzt, wie sich ein Ankerzentrum anfühlt. Er erzählt von miesen hygienischen Bedingungen, Ratten in „Herden“ und der lähmenden Langeweile, die die Bewohner in den Drogenkonsum treibe. Am lautesten klagt er nicht darüber, sondern über die deutsche Bürokratie, über die Behörden, die einander widersprechen, und Polizisten, die nicht zuhören.

    Nach dem gescheiterten Putschversuch 2016 ist Murat Akgül nicht mehr freiwillig in die Türkei gereist. Gerade jetzt, im Krieg, ist die Situation für einen politisch aktiven Kurden in der Türkei umso dramatischer. „Aber hier, denke ich, ich lebe in einem freien, demokratischen Land. Jeder hat doch das Recht zu demonstrieren. Ich habe mich immer gegen Unterdrückung eingesetzt.“ Natürlich will er hier bleiben, natürlich auch in Zukunft zu Demonstrationen gehen. Aber: „Früher hatte ich nur in der Türkei Angst. Jetzt auch hier.“

    https://taz.de/Abschiebung-in-die-Tuerkei/!5632814
    #Turquie #purge #renvois #expulsions #Allemagne #Kurdes #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_kurdes #réfugiés_turcs

    ping @_kg_

  • Turkish activists debut exhibit featuring remainings of Turkey’s purge victims

    #Purge_Museum, “#Tenkil_Müzesi” in Turkish, an initiative that collects and exhibits items belonging to the victims of Turkey’s massive crackdown on the Gülen movement, opened for a ten-day run in Brussels on Friday evening.

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government labeled the movement an “enemy of the state” after a police investigation into corruption implicated Erdoğan’s close circle in late 2013. Overall the objects depict the horror and cruelty of detention and restrictions and a longing for loved ones in prison, the dangers of fleeing Turkey and new beginnings in a strange country.

    From a bloodied pair of shoes to ripped T-shirts, to broken glasses, here is a look at some of the Tenkil Museum’s more than 3,000 artifacts—and the heavy stories they carry.

    This shirt, skirt and pill containers belonged to Halime Gülsu, a Turkish teacher who died in a Mersin prison due to deprivation of the medication she took for lupus erythematosus. According to main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy Sezgin Tanrıkulu, Gülsu was not given her medicines during 15 days of detention and afterwards in a Tarsus Prison cell that she shared with 21 people. Due to health problems she was taken to Mersin City Hospital on April 25. But she was sent back to prison, where she went into a coma and died. Halime Gülsu was among a group of women who were detained for organizing aid activities for the families of people dismissed from their civil service jobs following a coup attempt on July 15, 2016.

    https://twitter.com/tenkilmuzesi/status/1190564245114621953?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

    These broken glasses belonged to Gökhan Açıkkollu, a purged history teacher who died of a heart attack while under detention in 2016. In a video footage released by the Bold Media, Açıkkollu is seen in a one-person cell with four other inmates in the basement of an İstanbul police department building. At around four in the morning on Aug. 5, he starts showing signs of discomfort. He approaches the bars and calls out to police officers for a few minutes, but no one shows up. After he returns to his bed, spasms begin a few minutes later, which wakes up the other detainees in the cell. It takes four more minutes until detention ward officers take him out of the cell, at which point he no longer shows signs of life.

    https://twitter.com/sinan_ozcerit/status/1190334896755089408?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

    These T-shirts and a pair of shoes belonged to Ahmet Turan Özcerit, a UK-educated computer science professor who died of liver cancer in February 2018. Özcerit obtained his master and PhD diplomas from the UK’s Sussex University before he started working at Sakarya University’s Faculty of Computer and Information Science. He was an associate professor at Sakarya University when the government dismissed him from the office over ties to the Gulen movement on Sep 1, 2016.

    When he was dismissed he had already been jailed. While under pretrial detention, Özcerit was diagnosed with cancer in his liver and intestines. His son Sinan Özcerit has regularly shared updates regarding his father’s time in prison and about the academic’s ultimate release from prison to a hospital.

    https://twitter.com/tenkilmuzesi/status/1190664777900662785?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

    Some 500,000 people were subjected to prosecution after the abortive putsch, according to the Justice Ministry, and there are still over 30,000 Gülen followers in prison. More than 700 children under the age of 6 are accompanying their mothers in prison and live in poor conditions.

    Several international reports indicate that incidents of torture and ill treatment have been on the rise since the 2016 failed coup in Turkish detention centers.

    The solution for thousands of Gülen movement members is to flee Turkey, where they face imprisonment or social stigmatization, narrowing their opportunities to maintain a decent life.

    https://turkeypurge.com/turkish-activists-debuts-exhibit-featuring-remainings-of-turkeys-purge-
    #Turquie #exposition #purge #victimes #Bruxelles #objets

  • Il y a un mois

    #Turquie. Les poursuites contre un #lanceur_d’alerte qui a révélé des risques sanitaires doivent être abandonnées | Amnesty International
    https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2019/09/turkey-charges-against-whistleblower-who-exposed-public-health-dangers-must

    Cet ingénieur agroalimentaire, ancien universitaire et directeur adjoint du Centre de recherche sur la sécurité alimentaire et l’agriculture à l’Université d’Akdeniz, a publié les résultats d’une étude qu’il a menée avec d’autres scientifiques pour le ministère de la #Santé entre 2011 et 2015, visant à vérifier s’il existait une corrélation entre d’une part la toxicité du #sol, de l’#eau et des denrées alimentaires et d’autre part l’incidence des #cancers dans une région de l’ouest de la Turquie. L’étude a mis en évidence des niveaux de toxicité supérieurs au seuil de risque acceptable en raison de la présence de #pesticides dans les eaux souterraines et de surface et le sol.

    #Bülent_Şık : Turkish scientist convicted - The Lancet
    https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)32672-8/abstract

    Bülent Şık continues to reside in Antalya, where 60% of the food, as he noted in The Hidden Report, contains pesticide residues—the highest proportion in the country. Last year, Şık published his first book, The Chemist in the Kitchen: How Safe Is Our Food?, to inform readers about these dangers. In July, Turkey’s highest court ruled that the sentencing of the Academics for Peace amounted to a violation of their rights; court cases against scholars were dropped soon afterwards. But Şık’s sentencing from the ministry of health case still stands.

  • Le rêve des Kurdes : Rojava | ARTE
    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/093089-000-A/le-reve-des-kurdes-rojava

    Documentaire de Michael Enger, 2019.

    Que va-t-il désormais se passer dans le nord de la Syrie ? Tous les protagonistes du conflit ont leurs propres stratégies pour la région – les Américains, le régime d’Assad, la Russie, l’Iran et la Turquie. Mais qu’en est-t-il des aspirations des Kurdes ?

    #kurdistan #rojava #syrie #turquie

  • Les mystères de l’élimination du chef de Daech
    https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/geopolitique/geopolitique-28-octobre-2019

    L’annonce triomphale, hier par Donald Trump, de l’élimination d’Aboubakr El Bagdadi pose un certain nombre de question. Retenons-en trois. La première interrogation porte sur la cohérence entre cette opération et le chaos des décisions de Donald Trump. La deuxième concerne les retombées de cette opération dans la région. Et la dernière, l’avenir de l’État islamique privé de chef...

    #Daesh #EI #Trump #kurdes #turquie

  • Drownings of Turkey’s Purge
    –-> 31 Turkish citizens drowned in the Aegean sea while seeking to escape the ongoing post-coup crackdown in Turkey.

    Thousands of people have fled Turkey over the past three years due to a massive witch-hunt launched by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government against its critics such as academics, Kurdish politicians and especially the real or imagined sympathizers of the Gülen group, in the wake of a failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The gov’t accuses the group of masterminding the failed coup while the group denies any involvement.

    More than 500,000 people have been investigate and some 96,000 including academics, judges, doctors, teachers, lawyers, students, policemen and many from different backgrounds have been put in pre-trial detention over Gulen links July 2016.

    Many try to escape Turkey via illegal ways as the government cancelled their passports. Purge-victim Turks often cross Evros river to escape from the snowballing persecution. Around 14,000 people crossed the Evros frontier from January through September of 2018, a Wall Street Journal said, underlining that around half of those crossing the Evros river were Turkish citizens.


    https://turkeypurge.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/combinepdf.pdf
    #purge #Turquie #morts #décès #Evros #frontières #Mer_Egée #mourir_aux_frontières #Grèce #mourir_en_mer #migrations #asile #réfugiés #coup

    ping @isskein

  • Turkey, Russia agree on northern Syria terror-free zone
    ISTANBUL - Published 22.10.2019 19:49 - Daily Sabah
    https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/10/22/turkey-russia-agree-on-northern-syria-terror-free-zone


    (...)

    Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation (Sochi, October 22, 2019)

    President of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin agreed on the following points:

    1. The two sides reiterate their commitment to the preservation of the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria and the protection of national security of Turkey.

    2. They emphasize their determination to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations and to disrupt separatist agendas in the Syrian territory.

    3. In this framework, the established status quo in the current Operation Peace Spring area covering Tel Abyad and Ras Al Ayn with a depth of 32 km will be preserved.

    4. Both sides reaffirm the importance of the Adana Agreement. The Russian Federation will facilitate the implementation of the Adana Agreement in the current circumstances.

    5. Starting 12.00 noon of October 23, 2019, Russian military police and Syrian border guards will enter the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border, outside the area of Operation Peace Spring, to facilitate the removal of YPG elements and their weapons to the depth of 30 km from the Turkish-Syrian border, which should be finalized in 150 hours. At that moment, joint Russian-Turkish patrols will start in the west and the east of the area of Operation Peace Spring with a depth of 10 km, except Qamishli city.

    6. All YPG elements and their weapons will be removed from Manbij and Tal Rifaat.

    7. Both sides will take necessary measures to prevent infiltrations of terrorist elements.

    8. Joint efforts will be launched to facilitate the return of refugees in a safe and voluntary manner.

    9. A joint monitoring and verification mechanism will be established to oversee and coordinate the implementation of this memorandum.

    10. The two sides will continue to work to find a lasting political solution to the Syrian conflict within Astana Mechanism and will support the activity of the Constitutional Committee.

    #Russie #Turquie #Syrie

  • Entretien avec Eugenia, secrétaire du Comité du Croissant-Rouge Kurde de Suisse [Heyva sor a Kurdistanê Swêsre : http://heyvasor.ch/fr/accueil/]. 20.10.2019.

    Situation et actions du #Croissant-Rouge. Comprendre la tragédie là-bas et comment se solidariser depuis ici :

    Aide d’urgence. Quelques conseils et suggestions par Eugenia :
    _Parler, expliquer, sensibiliser, alerter et interpeller quant à la situation du Rojava.
    _Faire suivre ce lien au plus grand nombre
    _Si l’on peut et à sa mesure, procéder à un don et/ou devenir membre du Croissant-Rouge Kurde en Suisse


    http://libradio.org/?p=7190
    L’audio :
    http://libradio.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CRK_Master.mp3

    #Kurdistan #Kurdes #conflit #Kurdistan_syriens #Turquie #guerre #audio #Rojava

  • Return : voluntary, safe, dignified and durable ?

    Voluntary return in safety and with dignity has long been a core tenet of the international refugee regime. In the 23 articles on ‘Return’ in this issue of FMR, authors explore various obstacles to achieving sustainable return, discuss the need to guard against premature or forced return, and debate the assumptions and perceptions that influence policy and practice. This issue also includes a mini-feature on ‘Towards understanding and addressing the root causes of displacement’.


    https://www.fmreview.org/return

    #revue #retours_volontaires #dignité #retour #retour_au_pays
    #Soudan_du_Sud #réfugiés_sud-soudanais #réfugiés_Rohingya #Rohingya #Inde #Sri_Lanka #réfugiés_sri-lankais #réfugiés_syriens #Syrie #Allemagne #Erythrée #Liban #Turquie #Jordanie #Kenya #réfugiés_Somaliens #Somalie #Dadaab #Myanmar #Birmanie #Darfour #réintégration_économique #réintégration

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

  • Offensive contre les Kurdes : des médias turcs se félicitent de l’exécution de civils
    https://www.courrierinternational.com/revue-de-presse/vu-de-turquie-offensive-contre-les-kurdes-des-medias-turcs-se

    La presse turque, très majoritairement favorable à l’offensive en cours contre les forces kurdes des SDF (forces démocratiques syriennes) dans le nord de la Syrie, n’hésite pas à applaudir aussi l’exécution de civils.

    #Turquie #Kurdistan

  • Clashes amid efforts for Kurd pullout from Syria border town
    By MEHMET GUZEL and BASSEM MROUE 20 àctobre 2019
    https://apnews.com/406a5d997d4f4594b3310500e0958375

    AKCAKALE, Turkey (AP) — Kurdish-led fighters and Turkish-backed forces clashed sporadically Sunday in northeastern Syria amid efforts to work out a Kurdish evacuation from a besieged border town, the first pull-back under the terms of a U.S.-brokered cease-fire. Turkey said one of its soldiers was killed in the day’s violence.

    The planned evacuation of Kurdish fighters and civilians from the town of Ras al-Ayn would open the way to a pull-out of the fighters from a broader swathe of territory along the border, a senior official in the Kurdish-led forces told the Associated Press

    The official, Redur Khalil, said Saturday evening that the evacuation could take place Sunday if there were no new problems.

    Both sides accuse each other of repeatedly violating the three-day old cease-fire. Turkey’s Defense Ministry said the soldier was killed in a Kurdish attack with anti-tank weapons and small arms fire near the border town of Tal Abyad.

    That brought the Turkish military’s death toll to seven soldiers since it launched its offensive against Kurdish-led fighters in northeast Syria on Oct. 9.

    #Syrie #Kurdes #Turquie

  • #Guerre turque : l’appât du gain
    https://joellepalmieri.org/2019/10/20/guerre-turque-lappat-du-gain

    L’actualité turque brûle. Le président du pays a lancé le 9 octobre 2019 une offensive dans le nord de la Syrie qui visait, selon lui, à créer une « zone de sécurité » près de sa frontière. Côté Kurdes, massacres, déplacements se sont accélérés au quotidien. Les commentaires internationaux vont bon train ; on parle d’attaque du président … Lire la suite →

    #Humeurs #Militarisation #Turquie #Violences


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