Ukraine’s Borderline Disorder : How Ukraine’s Bizarre Internal Politics Created A European War | Peter Korotaev
▻https://arena.org.au/ukraines-borderline-disorder
Why was this politicised section of Ukrainian society so unhappy with #Minsk? Because Minsk would have inevitably taken ‘#Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions’ off the table. It would betray the aims of the Maidan revolution. If the industrial Donbass was given special economic rights, there could be none of the ‘brave liberal reforms’ (read: deindustrialisation) so important to the EU for admitting new, especially Eastern members. Giving constitutionally secured ‘special political rights’ to the Donbass would also allow for easy vetoing of any moves to join NATO or EU. The population of the Donbass had always been especially opposed to EU–NATO integration, especially after a year of bombardment by the new pro-NATO government. Furthermore, Minsk included political amnesty for leaders of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (L/DPR). This meant that a new centre of radically anti-Euro-Atlantic politicians would emerge. The worst part of Minsk was that it stipulated the holding of elections in the Donbass before the area was ‘secured’ by the Ukrainian army, meaning that it would be impossible to remove undesirable political figures.
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This is why such a paradoxical situation emerged—‘nationalist’ Ukrainians refusing to allow the peaceful reintegration of lost territories. This is where a bit of class analysis is useful. The term ‘nationalists’ paints a somewhat misleading picture. The most important opponents of Minsk—the true winners of the Euromaidan revolution, to the chagrin of some nationalists, who felt they deserved the fruits of the revolution—were liberals, neoliberals, classical liberals, however one wants to call them. Their priority is trade liberalisation, privatisation, the eradication of state intervention in the economy. Hence their bitter animus against the industrial, working-class population concentrated in the Donbass, whom they generally call ‘bydlo’ (unthinking oxen), ‘sovki’ (Soviet rubbish) and so on. Hence their fear of the return of this population into Ukraine’s electoral politics. Hence various forms of denial of the right to vote for parts of the Donbass under Ukrainian control from 2014 onwards, often with reference to ‘security threats’, along with suspension of voting rights for over a million internally displaced people from the region.
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Ever since 2014, radical economic liberals have been in charge of economic policy, and radical ethnocentrist nationalists given crucial positions in the police and army, along with the right to commit street violence against peace activists and other undesirable ‘separatists and antifascists’. This quite comfortable alliance agreed on the need to deny any possibility of implementing the Minsk Agreement.