• Un tremblement de terre : Unilever stoppe ses pubs sur Facebook et Twitter jusque fin 2020, au moins...
    https://fr.businessam.be/un-tremblement-de-terre-unilever-stoppe-ses-pubs-de-facebook-et-twitte

    Que ce soit une simple posture ou plus, la décision d’Unilever est une petite bombe dans le monde de la publicité en ligne. Le géant industriel suspend ses annonces américaines de Facebook, Instagram et Twitter ‘jusqu’à la fin de l’année au moins’, rapporte le Wall Street Journal. ‘Compte tenu du cadre de notre responsabilité et de l’atmosphère polarisée aux États-Unis, nous avons décidé que nous ne diffuserons plus de publicité de (nos) marque(s) sur les plateformes Facebook, Instagram et Twitter aux (...)

    #Unilever #Facebook #Instagram #Twitter #manipulation #élections #BlackLivesMatter (...)

    ##publicité

  • Big Tech Zeros In on the Virus-Testing Market
    https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/technology/big-tech-google-verily-virus-testing.html

    As businesses grapple with how to safely reopen the workplace, companies like Fitbit and Verily, Google’s sister company, are rushing out new work force health-vetting and tracking tools. Verily Life Sciences, a sister company of Google, scrambled to introduce a free coronavirus-screening site for the public and set up testing locations in March after President Trump made an off-the-cuff announcement about the program. It had a rocky start, but has since helped more than 220,000 people get (...)

    #Alphabet #Fitbit #Google #Microsoft #UnitedHealthGroup #Verily #algorithme #CCTV #technologisme #température #prédiction #COVID-19 #marketing #santé (...)

    ##santé ##travail

  • Asylum Outsourced : McKinsey’s Secret Role in Europe’s Refugee Crisis

    In 2016 and 2017, US management consultancy giant #McKinsey was at the heart of efforts in Europe to accelerate the processing of asylum applications on over-crowded Greek islands and salvage a controversial deal with Turkey, raising concerns over the outsourcing of public policy on refugees.

    The language was more corporate boardroom than humanitarian crisis – promises of ‘targeted strategies’, ‘maximising productivity’ and a ‘streamlined end-to-end asylum process.’

    But in 2016 this was precisely what the men and women of McKinsey&Company, the elite US management consultancy, were offering the European Union bureaucrats struggling to set in motion a pact with Turkey to stem the flow of asylum seekers to the continent’s shores.

    In March of that year, the EU had agreed to pay Turkey six billion euros if it would take back asylum seekers who had reached Greece – many of them fleeing fighting in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan – and prevent others from trying to cross its borders.

    The pact – which human rights groups said put at risk the very right to seek refuge – was deeply controversial, but so too is the previously unknown extent of McKinsey’s influence over its implementation, and the lengths some EU bodies went to conceal that role.

    According to the findings of this investigation, months of ‘pro bono’ fieldwork by McKinsey fed, sometimes verbatim, into the highest levels of EU policy-making regarding how to make the pact work on the ground, and earned the consultancy a contract – awarded directly, without competition – worth almost one million euros to help enact that very same policy.

    The bloc’s own internal procurement watchdog later deemed the contract “irregular”.

    Questions have already been asked about McKinsey’s input in 2015 into German efforts to speed up its own turnover of asylum applications, with concerns expressed about rights being denied to those applying.

    This investigation, based on documents sought since November 2017, sheds new light on the extent to which private management consultants shaped Europe’s handling of the crisis on the ground, and how bureaucrats tried to keep that role under wraps.

    “If some companies develop programs which then turn into political decisions, this is a political issue of concern that should be examined carefully,” said German MEP Daniel Freund, a member of the European Parliament’s budget committee and a former Head of Advocacy for EU Integrity at Transparency International.

    “Especially if the same companies have afterwards been awarded with follow-up contracts not following due procedures.”

    Deal too important to fail

    The March 2016 deal was the culmination of an epic geopolitical thriller played out in Brussels, Ankara and a host of European capitals after more than 850,000 people – mainly Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans – took to the Aegean by boat and dinghy from Turkey to Greece the previous year.

    Turkey, which hosts some 3.5 million refugees from the nine-year-old war in neighbouring Syria, committed to take back all irregular asylum seekers who travelled across its territory in return for billions of euros in aid, EU visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens and revived negotiations on Turkish accession to the bloc. It also provided for the resettlement in Europe of one Syrian refugee from Turkey for each Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece.

    The EU hailed it as a blueprint, but rights groups said it set a dangerous precedent, resting on the premise that Turkey is a ‘safe third country’ to which asylum seekers can be returned, despite a host of rights that it denies foreigners seeking protection.

    The deal helped cut crossings over the Aegean, but it soon became clear that other parts were not delivering; the centrepiece was an accelerated border procedure for handling asylum applications within 15 days, including appeal. This wasn’t working, while new movement restrictions meant asylum seekers were stuck on Greek islands.

    But for the EU, the deal was too important to be derailed.

    “The directions from the European Commission, and those behind it, was that Greece had to implement the EU-Turkey deal full-stop, no matter the legal arguments or procedural issue you might raise,” said Marianna Tzeferakou, a lawyer who was part of a legal challenge to the notion that Turkey is a safe place to seek refuge.

    “Someone gave an order that this deal will start being implemented. Ambiguity and regulatory arbitrage led to a collapse of procedural guarantees. It was a political decision and could not be allowed to fail.”

    Enter McKinsey.

    Action plans emerge simultaneously

    Fresh from advising Germany on how to speed up the processing of asylum applications, the firm’s consultants were already on the ground doing research in Greece in the summer of 2016, according to two sources working with the Greek asylum service, GAS, at the time but who did not wish to be named.

    Documents seen by BIRN show that the consultancy was already in “initial discussions” with an EU body called the ‘Structural Reform Support Service’, SRSS, which aids member states in designing and implementing structural reforms and was at the time headed by Dutchman Maarten Verwey. Verwey was simultaneously EU coordinator for the EU-Turkey deal and is now the EU’s director general of economic and financial affairs, though he also remains acting head of SRSS.

    Asked for details of these ‘discussions’, Verwey responded that the European Commission – the EU’s executive arm – “does not hold any other documents” concerning the matter.

    Nevertheless, by September 2016, McKinsey had a pro bono proposal on the table for how it could help out, entitled ‘Supporting the European Commission through integrated refugee management.’ Verwey signed off on it in October.

    Minutes of management board meetings of the European Asylum Support Office, EASO – the EU’s asylum agency – show McKinsey was tasked by the Commission to “analyse the situation on the Greek islands and come up with an action plan that would result in an elimination of the backlog” of asylum cases by April 2017.

    A spokesperson for the Commission told BIRN: “McKinsey volunteered to work free of charge to improve the functioning of the Greek asylum and reception system.”

    Over the next 12 weeks, according to other redacted documents, McKinsey worked with all the major actors involved – the SRSS, EASO, the EU border agency Frontex as well as Greek authorities.

    At bi-weekly stakeholder meetings, McKinsey identified “bottlenecks” in the asylum process and began to outline a series of measures to reduce the backlog, some of which were already being tested in a “mini-pilot” on the Greek island of Chios.

    At a first meeting in mid-October, McKinsey consultants told those present that “processing rates” of asylum cases by the EASO and the Greek asylum service, as well as appeals bodies, would need to significantly increase.

    By December, McKinsey’s “action plan” was ready, involving “targeted strategies and recommendations” for each actor involved.

    The same month, on December 8, Verwey released the EU’s own Joint Action Plan for implementing the EU-Turkey deal, which was endorsed by the EU’s heads of government on December 15.

    There was no mention of any McKinsey involvement and when asked about the company’s role the Commission told BIRN the plan was “a document elaborated together between the Commission and the Greek authorities.”

    However, buried in the EASO’s 2017 Annual Report is a reference to European Council endorsement of “the consultancy action plan” to clear the asylum backlog.

    Indeed, the similarities between McKinsey’s plan and the EU’s Joint Action Plan are uncanny, particularly in terms of increasing detention capacity on the islands, “segmentation” of cases, ramping up numbers of EASO and GAS caseworkers and interpreters and Frontex escort officers, limiting the number of appeal steps in the asylum process and changing the way appeals are processed and opinions drafted.

    In several instances, they are almost identical: where McKinsey recommends introducing “overarching segmentation by case types to increase speed and quality”, for example, the EU’s Joint Action Plan calls for “segmentation by case categories to increase speed and quality”.

    Much of what McKinsey did for the SRSS remains redacted.

    In June 2019, the Commission justified the non-disclosure on the basis that the information would pose a “risk” to “public security” as it could allegedly “be exploited by third parties (for example smuggling networks)”.

    Full disclosure, it argued, would risk “seriously undermining the commercial interests” of McKinsey.

    “While I understand that there could indeed be a private and public interest in the subject matter covered by the documents requested, I consider that such a public interest in transparency would not, in this case, outweigh the need to protect the commercial interests of the company concerned,” Martin Selmayr, then secretary-general of the European Commission, wrote.

    SRSS rejected the suggestion that the fact that Verwey refused to fully disclose the McKinsey proposal he had signed off on in October 2016 represented a possible conflict of interest, according to internal documents obtained during this investigation.

    Once Europe’s leaders had endorsed the Joint Action Plan, EASO was asked to “conclude a direct contract with McKinsey” to assist in its implementation, according to EASO management board minutes.

    ‘Political pressure’

    The contract, worth 992,000 euros, came with an attached ‘exception note’ signed on January 20, 2017, by EASO’s Executive Director at the time, Jose Carreira, and Joanna Darmanin, the agency’s then head of operations. The note stated that “due to the time constraints and the political pressure it was deemed necessary to proceed with the contract to be signed without following the necessary procurement procedure”.

    The following year, an audit of EASO yearly accounts by the European Court of Auditors, ECA, which audits EU finances, found that “a single pre-selected economic operator” had been awarded work without the application of “any of the procurement procedures” laid down under EU regulations, designed to encourage transparency and competition.

    “Therefore, the public procurement procedure and all related payments (992,000 euros) were irregular,” it said.

    The auditor’s report does not name McKinsey. But it does specify that the “irregular” contract concerned the EASO’s hiring of a consultancy for implementation of the action plan in Greece; the amount cited by the auditor exactly matches the one in the McKinsey contract, while a spokesman for the EASO indirectly confirmed the contracts concerned were one and the same.

    When asked about the McKinsey contract, the spokesman, Anis Cassar, said: “EASO does not comment on specifics relating to individual contracts, particularly where the ECA is concerned. However, as you note, ECA found that the particular procurement procedure was irregular (not illegal).”

    “The procurement was carried under [sic] exceptional procurement rules in the context of the pressing requests by the relevant EU Institutions and Member States,” said EASO spokesman Anis Cassar.

    McKinsey’s deputy head of Global Media Relations, Graham Ackerman, said the company was unable to provide any further details.

    “In line with our firm’s values and confidentiality policy, we do not publicly discuss our clients or details of our client service,” Ackerman told BIRN.

    ‘Evaluation, feedback, goal-setting’

    It was not the first time questions had been asked of the EASO’s procurement record.

    In October 2017, the EU’s fraud watchdog, OLAF, launched a probe into the agency (https://www.politico.eu/article/jose-carreira-olaf-anti-fraud-office-investigates-eu-asylum-agency-director), chiefly concerning irregularities identified in 2016. It contributed to the resignation in June 2018 of Carreira (https://www.politico.eu/article/jose-carreira-easo-under-investigation-director-of-eu-asylum-agency-steps-d), who co-signed the ‘exception note’ on the McKinsey contract. The investigation eventually uncovered wrongdoings ranging from breaches of procurement rules to staff harassment (https://www.politico.eu/article/watchdog-finds-misconduct-at-european-asylum-support-office-harassment), Politico reported in November 2018.

    According to the EASO, the McKinsey contract was not part of OLAF’s investigation. OLAF said it could not comment.

    McKinsey’s work went ahead, running from January until April 2017, the point by which the EU wanted the backlog of asylum cases “eliminated” and the burden on overcrowded Greek islands lifted.

    Overseeing the project was a steering committee comprised of Verwey, Carreira, McKinsey staff and senior Greek and European Commission officials.

    The details of McKinsey’s operation are contained in a report it submitted in May 2017.

    The EASO initially refused to release the report, citing its “sensitive and restrictive nature”. Its disclosure, the agency said, would “undermine the protection of public security and international relations, as well as the commercial interests and intellectual property of McKinsey & Company.”

    The response was signed by Carreira.

    Only after a reporter on this story complained to the EU Ombudsman, did the EASO agree to disclose several sections of the report.

    Running to over 1,500 pages, the disclosed material provides a unique insight into the role of a major private consultancy in what has traditionally been the realm of public policy – the right to asylum.

    In the jargon of management consultancy, the driving logic of McKinsey’s intervention was “maximising productivity” – getting as many asylum cases processed as quickly as possible, whether they result in transfers to the Greek mainland, in the case of approved applications, or the deportation of “returnable migrants” to Turkey.

    “Performance management systems” were introduced to encourage speed, while mechanisms were created to “monitor” the weekly “output” of committees hearing the appeals of rejected asylum seekers.

    Time spent training caseworkers and interviewers before they were deployed was to be reduced, IT support for the Greek bureaucracy was stepped up and police were instructed to “detain migrants immediately after they are notified of returnable status,” i.e. as soon as their asylum applications were rejected.

    Four employees of the Greek asylum agency at the time told BIRN that McKinsey had access to agency staff, but said the consultancy’s approach jarred with the reality of the situation on the ground.

    Taking part in a “leadership training” course held by McKinsey, one former employee, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told BIRN: “It felt so incompatible with the mentality of a public service operating in a camp for asylum seekers.”

    The official said much of what McKinsey was proposing had already been considered and either implemented or rejected by GAS.

    “The main ideas of how to organise our work had already been initiated by the HQ of GAS,” the official said. “The only thing McKinsey added were corporate methods of evaluation, feedback, setting goals, and initiatives that didn’t add anything meaningful.”

    Indeed, the backlog was proving hard to budge.

    Throughout successive “progress updates”, McKinsey repeatedly warned the steering committee that productivity “levels are insufficient to reach target”. By its own admission, deportations never surpassed 50 a week during the period of its contract. The target was 340.

    In its final May 2017 report, McKinsey touted its success in “reducing total process duration” of the asylum procedure to a mere 11 days, down from an average of 170 days in February 2017.

    Yet thousands of asylum seekers remained trapped in overcrowded island camps for months on end.

    While McKinsey claimed that the population of asylum seekers on the island was cut to 6,000 by April 2017, pending “data verification” by Greek authorities, Greek government figures put the number at 12,822, just around 1,500 fewer than in January when McKinsey got its contract.

    The winter was harsh; organisations working with asylum seekers documented a series of accidents in which a number of people were harmed or killed, with insufficient or no investigation undertaken by Greek authorities (https://www.proasyl.de/en/news/greek-hotspots-deaths-not-to-be-forgotten).

    McKinsey’s final report tallied 40 field visits and more than 200 meetings and workshops on the islands. It also, interestingly, counted 21 weekly steering committee meetings “since October 2016” – connecting McKinsey’s 2016 pro bono work and the 2017 period it worked under contract with the EASO. Indeed, in its “project summary”, McKinsey states it was “invited” to work on both the “development” and “implementation” of the action plan in Greece.

    The Commission, however, in its response to this investigation, insisted it did not “pre-select” McKinsey for the 2017 work or ask EASO to sign a contract with the firm.

    Smarting from military losses in Syria and political setbacks at home, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan tore up the deal with the EU in late February this year, accusing Brussels of failing to fulfil its side of the bargain. But even before the deal’s collapse, 7,000 refugees and migrants reached Greek shores in the first two months of 2020, according to the United Nations refugee agency.

    German link

    This was not the first time that the famed consultancy firm had left its mark on Europe’s handling of the crisis.

    In what became a political scandal (https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/bamf-skandal-im-news-ticker-jetzt-muessen-sich-seehofer-und-cordt-den-fragen-d), the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, according to reports, paid McKinsey more than €45 million (https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/Millionenzahlungen-Was-hat-McKinsey-beim-Bamf-gemacht-id512950) to help clear a backlog of more than 270,000 asylum applications and to shorten the asylum process.

    German media reports said the sum included 3.9 million euros for “Integrated Refugee Management”, the same phrase McKinsey pitched to the EU in September 2016.

    The parallels don’t end there.

    Much like the contract McKinsey clinched with the EASO in January 2017, German media reports have revealed that more than half of the sum paid to the consultancy for its work in Germany was awarded outside of normal public procurement procedures on the grounds of “urgency”. Der Spiegel (https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/fluechtlinge-in-deutschland-mckinsey-erhielt-mehr-als-20-millionen-euro-a-11) reported that the firm also did hundreds of hours of pro bono work prior to clinching the contract. McKinsey denied that it worked for free in order to win future federal contracts.

    Again, the details were classified as confidential.

    Arne Semsrott, director of the German transparency NGO FragdenStaat, which investigated McKinsey’s work in Germany, said the lack of transparency in such cases was costing European taxpayers money and control.

    Asked about German and EU efforts to keep the details of such outsourcing secret, Semsrott told BIRN: “The lack of transparency means the public spending more money on McKinsey and other consulting firms. And this lack of transparency also means that we have a lack of public control over what is actually happening.”

    Sources familiar with the decision-making in Athens identified Solveigh Hieronimus, a McKinsey partner based in Munich, as the coordinator of the company’s team on the EASO contract in Greece. Hieronimus was central in pitching the company’s services to the German government, according to German media reports (https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-147594782.html).

    Hieronimus did not respond to BIRN questions submitted by email.

    Freund, the German MEP formerly of Transparency International, said McKinsey’s role in Greece was a cause for concern.

    “It is not ideal if positions adopted by the [European] Council are in any way affected by outside businesses,” he told BIRN. “These decisions should be made by politicians based on legal analysis and competent independent advice.”

    A reporter on this story again complained to the EU Ombudsman in July 2019 regarding the Commission’s refusal to disclose further details of its dealings with McKinsey.

    In November, the Ombudsman told the Commission that “the substance of the funded project, especially the work packages and deliverable of the project[…] should be fully disclosed”, citing the principle that “the public has a right to be informed about the content of projects that are financed by public money.” The Ombudsman rejected the Commission’s argument that partial disclosure would undermine the commercial interests of McKinsey.

    Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen responded that the Commission “respectfully disagrees” with the Ombudsman. The material concerned, she wrote, “contains sensitive information on the business strategies and the commercial relations of the company concerned.”

    The president of the Commission has had dealings with McKinsey before; in February, von der Leyen testified before a special Bundestag committee concerning contracts worth tens of millions of euros that were awarded to external consultants, including McKinsey, during her time as German defence minister in 2013-2019.

    In 2018, Germany’s Federal Audit Office said procedures for the award of some contracts had not been strictly lawful or cost-effective. Von der Leyen acknowledged irregularities had occurred but said that much had been done to fix the shortcomings (https://www.ft.com/content/4634a3ea-4e71-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5).

    She was also questioned about her 2014 appointment of Katrin Suder, a McKinsey executive, as state secretary tasked with reforming the Bundeswehr’s system of procurement. Asked if Suder, who left the ministry in 2018, had influenced the process of awarding contracts, von der Leyen said she assumed not. Decisions like that were taken “way below my pay level,” she said.

    In its report, Germany’s governing parties absolved von der Leyen of blame, Politico reported on June 9 (https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-german-governing-parties-contracting-scandal).

    The EU Ombudsman is yet to respond to the Commission’s refusal to grant further access to the McKinsey documents.

    https://balkaninsight.com/2020/06/22/asylum-outsourced-mckinseys-secret-role-in-europes-refugee-crisis
    #accord_UE-Turquie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #privatisation #sous-traitance #Turquie #EU #UE #Union_européenne #Grèce #frontières #Allemagne #EASO #Structural_Reform_Support_Service (#SRSS) #Maarten_Verwey #Frontex #Chios #consultancy #Joint_Action_Plan #Martin_Selmayr #chronologie #Jose_Carreira #Joanna_Darmanin #privatisation #management #productivité #leadership_training #îles #Mer_Egée #Integrated_Refugee_Management #pro_bono #transparence #Solveigh_Hieronimus #Katrin_Suder

    ping @_kg_ @karine4 @isskein @rhoumour @reka

  • Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples Fr_pressrelease
    https://www.achpr.org/fr_pressrelease/detail?id=511

    La crise du COVID-19 a remis en cause notre manière de vivre et de concevoir la vie, mais elle a eu un plus grand impact sur les personnes vulnérables, telles que les réfugiés qui font partie des populations les plus marginalisées de la société, dans les réponses humanitaires au COVID-19. En effet, la crise sanitaire du COVID’19 est perçue comme une double peine pour ces personnes, dont le sort est déjà incertain et qui pour beaucoup d’entre eux vivent dans des conditions désastreuses.
    Du fait de leur vulnérabilité, les réfugiés sont particulièrement exposés au coronavirus car ils ont souvent un accès limité à l’eau, aux installations sanitaires et aux soins de santé.
    En ce jour de célébration sous le thème : « chacun peut agir-chaque geste compte », la Rapporteure Spéciale sur les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile, les personnes déplacées internes et les migrants en Afrique de la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, voudrait rappeler l’importance de la solidarité et l’entraide que nous devons exprimer à l’endroit des personnes refugiés au cours de cette pandémie.
    La protection et l’assistance aux refugiées, prend une autre dimension dans ce contexte international exceptionnel et nous devons redoubler d’efforts et de compassion afin de ne pas abandonner les plus démunis, du fait de la peur et de l’anxiété que peuvent engendrer la pandémie.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#unionafricaine#refugie#droit

  • Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples Fr_pressrelease
    https://www.achpr.org/fr_pressrelease/detail?id=512

    La Rapporteure Spéciale sur les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile, les déplacés internes et les migrants en Afrique de la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, a été informée du naufrage d’un bateau transportant des migrants à majorité d’origine d’Afrique subsaharienne qui s’est produit dans les eaux territoriales de la Tunisie, et qui a causé la mort d’au moins 52 migrants au large des îles Kerkennah, le 5 juin 2020.
    Ce naufrage tragique s’ajoute à la longue liste des nombreux naufrages d’embarcations de migrants ayant endeuillés notre continent.
    La Rapporteure spéciale tout en déplorant ces pertes en vie humaines, constate que malgré la pandémie du COVID-19 et la réduction sensible des flux migratoires, les craintes justifiées qu’elle a fait naitre au sein des populations, la situation de certaines personnes est telle qu’elles n’hésitent pas braver les interdits au péril de leur vie.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#unionafricaine#tunisie#naufrage#droit

  • Migrants : les échecs d’un #programme_de_retour_volontaire financé par l’#UE

    Alors qu’il embarque sur un vol de la Libye vers le Nigeria à la fin 2018, James a déjà survécu à un naufrage en Méditerranée, traversé une demi-douzaine d’États africains, été la cible de coups de feu et passé deux ans à être maltraité et torturé dans les centres de détention libyens connus pour la brutalité qui y règne.

    En 2020, de retour dans sa ville de Benin City (Etat d’Edo au Nigéria), James se retrouve expulsé de sa maison après n’avoir pas pu payer son loyer. Il dort désormais à même le sol de son salon de coiffure.

    Sa famille et ses amis l’ont tous rejeté parce qu’il n’a pas réussi à rejoindre l’Europe.

    « Le fait que tu sois de retour n’est source de bonheur pour personne ici. Personne ne semble se soucier de toi [...]. Tu es revenu les #mains_vides », raconte-t-il à Euronews.

    James est l’un des quelque 81 000 migrants africains qui sont rentrés dans leur pays d’origine avec l’aide de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) des Nations unies et le #soutien_financier de l’Union européenne, dans le cadre d’une initiative conjointe de 357 millions d’euros (https://migrationjointinitiative.org). Outre une place sur un vol au départ de la Libye ou de plusieurs autres pays de transit, les migrants se voient promettre de l’argent, un #soutien et des #conseils pour leur permettre de se réintégrer dans leur pays d’origine une fois rentrés chez eux.

    Mais une enquête d’Euronews menée dans sept pays africains a révélé des lacunes importantes dans ce programme, considéré comme la réponse phare de l’UE pour empêcher les migrants d’essayer de se rendre en Europe.

    Des dizaines de migrants ayant participé au programme ont déclaré à Euronews qu’une fois rentrés chez eux, ils ne recevaient aucune aide. Et ceux qui ont reçu une aide financière, comme James, ont déclaré qu’elle était insuffisante.

    Nombreux sont ceux qui envisagent de tenter à nouveau de se rendre en Europe dès que l’occasion se présente.

    « Je ne me sens pas à ma place ici », confie James. « Si l’occasion se présente, je quitte le pays ».

    Sur les 81 000 migrants qui ont été rapatriés depuis 2017, près de 33 000 ont été renvoyés de Libye par avion. Parmi eux, beaucoup ont été victimes de détention, d’abus et de violences de la part de passeurs, de milices et de bandes criminelles. Les conditions sont si mauvaises dans le pays d’Afrique du Nord que le programme est appelé « retour humanitaire volontaire » (VHR), plutôt que programme de « retour volontaire assisté » (AVR) comme ailleurs en Afrique.

    Après trois ans passés en Libye, Mohi, 24 ans, a accepté l’offre d’un vol de retour en 2019. Mais, une fois de retour dans son pays, son programme de réintégration ne s’est jamais concrétisé. « Rien ne nous a été fourni ; ils continuent à nous dire ’demain’ », raconte-t-il à Euronews depuis le nord du Darfour, au Soudan.

    Mohi n’est pas seul. Les propres statistiques de l’OIM sur les rapatriés au Soudan révèlent que seuls 766 personnes sur plus de 2 600 ont reçu un soutien économique. L’OIM attribue cette situation à des taux d’inflation élevés et à une pénurie de biens et d’argent sur place.

    Mais M. Kwaku Arhin-Sam, spécialiste des projets de développement et directeur de l’Institut d’évaluation Friedensau, estime de manière plus générale que la moitié des programmes de réintégration de l’OIM échouent.

    « La plupart des gens sont perdus au bout de quelques jours », explique-t-il.
    Deux tiers des migrants ne terminent pas les programmes de réintégration

    L’OIM elle-même revoit cette estimation à la baisse : l’agence des Nations unies a déclaré à Euronews que jusqu’à présent, seul un tiers des migrants qui ont commencé à bénéficier d’une aide à la réintégration sont allés au bout du processus. Un porte-parole a déclaré que l’initiative conjointe OIM/EU étant un processus volontaire, « les migrants peuvent décider de se désister à tout moment, ou de ne pas s’engager du tout ».

    Un porte-parole de l’OIM ajoute que la réintégration des migrants une fois qu’ils sont rentrés chez eux va bien au-delà du mandat de l’organisation, et « nécessite un leadership fort de la part des autorités nationales », ainsi que « des contributions actives à tous les niveaux de la société ».

    Entre mai 2017 et février 2019, l’OIM a aidé plus de 12 000 personnes à rentrer au Nigeria. Parmi elles, 9 000 étaient « joignables » lorsqu’elles sont rentrées chez elles, 5 000 ont reçu une formation professionnelle et 4 300 ont bénéficié d’une « aide à la réintégration ». Si l’on inclut l’accès aux services de conseil ou de santé, selon l’OIM Nigéria, un total de 7 000 sur 12 000 rapatriés – soit 58 % – ont reçu une aide à la réintégration.

    Mais le nombre de personnes classées comme ayant terminé le programme d’aide à la réintégration n’était que de 1 289. De plus, les recherches de Jill Alpes, experte en migration et chercheuse associée au Centre de recherche sur les frontières de Nimègue, ont révélé que des enquêtes visant à vérifier l’efficacité de ces programmes n’ont été menées qu’auprès de 136 rapatriés.

    Parallèlement, une étude de Harvard sur les Nigérians de retour de Libye (https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2464/2019/11/Harvard-FXB-Center-Returning-Home-FINAL.pdf) estime que 61,3 % des personnes interrogées ne travaillaient pas après leur retour, et que quelque 16,8 % supplémentaires ne travaillaient que pendant une courte période, pas assez longue pour générer une source de revenus stable. À leur retour, la grande majorité des rapatriés, 98,3 %, ne suivaient aucune forme d’enseignement régulier.

    La commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, a admis à Euronews que « c’est un domaine dans lequel nous avons besoin d’améliorations ». Mme Johansson a déclaré qu’il était trop tôt pour dire quelles pourraient être ces améliorations, mais a maintenu que l’UE avait de bonnes relations avec l’OIM.

    Sandrine, Rachel et Berline, originaires du Cameroun, ont elles accepté de prendre un vol de l’OIM de Misrata, en Libye, à Yaoundé, la capitale camerounaise, en septembre 2018.

    En Libye, elles disent avoir subi des violences, des abus sexuels et avoir déjà risqué leur vie en tentant de traverser la Méditerranée. À cette occasion, elles ont été interceptées par les garde-côtes libyens et renvoyées en Libye.

    Une fois rentrées au Cameroun, Berline et Rachel disent n’avoir reçu ni argent ni soutien de l’OIM. Sandrine a reçu environ 900 000 fcfa (1 373,20 euros) pour payer l’éducation de ses enfants et lancer une petite entreprise – mais cela n’a pas duré longtemps.

    « Je vendais du poulet au bord de la route à Yaoundé, mais le projet ne s’est pas bien déroulé et je l’ai abandonné », confie-t-elle.

    Elle se souvient aussi d’avoir accouché dans un centre de détention de Tripoli avec des fusillades comme fond sonore.

    Toutes les trois ont affirmé qu’au moment de leur départ pour le Cameroun, elles n’avaient aucune idée de l’endroit où elles allaient dormir une fois arrivées et qu’elles n’avaient même pas d’argent pour appeler leur famille afin de les informer de leur retour.

    « Nous avons quitté le pays, et quand nous y sommes revenues, nous avons trouvé la même situation, parfois même pire. C’est pourquoi les gens décident de repartir », explique Berline.

    En novembre 2019, moins de la moitié des 3 514 migrants camerounais qui ont reçu une forme ou une autre de soutien de la part de l’OIM étaient considérés comme « véritablement intégrés » (https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ENG_Press%20release%20COPIL_EUTF%20UE_IOM_Cameroon.pdf).

    Seydou, un rapatrié malien, a reçu de l’argent de l’OIM pour payer son loyer pendant trois mois et les factures médicales de sa femme malade. Il a également reçu une formation commerciale et un moto-taxi.

    Mais au Mali, il gagne environ 15 euros par jour, alors qu’en Algérie, où il travaillait illégalement, il avait été capable de renvoyer chez lui plus de 1 300 euros au total, ce qui a permis de financer la construction d’une maison pour son frère dans leur village.

    Il tente actuellement d’obtenir un visa qui lui permettrait de rejoindre un autre de ses frères en France.

    Seydou est cependant l’un des rares Maliens chanceux. Les recherches de Jill Alpes, publiées par Brot für die Welt et Medico (l’agence humanitaire des Églises protestantes en Allemagne), ont révélé que seuls 10 % des migrants retournés au Mali jusqu’en janvier 2019 avaient reçu un soutien quelconque de l’OIM.

    L’OIM, quant à elle, affirme que 14 879 Maliens ont entamé le processus de réintégration – mais ce chiffre ne révèle pas combien de personnes l’ont achevé.
    Les stigmates du retour

    Dans certains cas, l’argent que les migrants reçoivent est utilisé pour financer une nouvelle tentative pour rejoindre l’Europe.

    Dans un des cas, une douzaine de personnes qui avaient atteint l’Europe et avaient été renvoyées chez elles ont été découvertes parmi les survivants du naufrage d’un bateau en 2019 (https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/21407/mauritanian-coast-guard-intercepts-boat-carrying-around-190-migrants-i se dirigeait vers les îles Canaries. « Ils étaient revenus et ils avaient décidé de reprendre la route », a déclaré Laura Lungarotti, chef de la mission de l’OIM en Mauritanie.

    Safa Msehli, porte-parole de l’OIM, a déclaré à Euronews que l’organisation ne pouvait pas empêcher des personnes de tenter de repartir vers l’Europe une fois revenues.

    « C’est aux gens de décider s’ils veulent ou non émigrer et dans aucun de ses différents programmes, l’OIM ne prévoit pas d’empêcher les gens de repartir », a-t-elle expliqué.

    Qu’est-ce que l’OIM ?

    A partir de 2016, l’OIM s’est redéfinie comme agence des Nations unies pour les migrations, et en parallèle son budget a augmenté rapidement (https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/110/C-110-10%20-%20Director%20General%27s%20report%20to%20the%20110). Il est passé de 242,2 millions de dollars US (213 millions d’euros) en 1998 à plus de 2 milliards de dollars US (1,7 milliard d’euros) à l’automne 2019, soit une multiplication par huit. Bien qu’elle ne fasse pas partie des Nations unies, l’OIM est désormais une « organisation apparentée », avec un statut similaire à celui d’un prestataire privé.

    L’UE et ses États membres sont collectivement les principaux contributeurs au budget de l’OIM (https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/110/Statements/EU%20coordinated%20statement%20-%20Point%2013%20-%20final%20IOM), leurs dons représentant près de la moitié de son financement opérationnel.

    De son côté, l’OIM tient à mettre en évidence sur son site web les cas où son programme de retour volontaire a été couronné de succès, notamment celui de Khadeejah Shaeban, une rapatriée soudanaise revenue de Libye qui a pu monter un atelier de couture.

    –-
    Comment fonctionne le processus d’aide à la réintégration ?
    Les migrants embarquent dans un avion de l’OIM sur la base du volontariat et retournent dans leur pays ;
    Ils ont droit à des conseils avant et après le voyage ;
    Chaque « rapatrié » peut bénéficier de l’aide de bureaux locaux, en partenariat avec des ONG locales ;
    L’assistance à l’accueil après l’arrivée peut comprendre l’accueil à l’aéroport, l’hébergement pour la nuit, une allocation en espèces pour les besoins immédiats, une première assistance médicale, une aide pour le voyage suivant, une assistance matérielle ;
    Une fois arrivés, les migrants sont enregistrés et vont dans un centre d’hébergement temporaire où ils restent jusqu’à ce qu’ils puissent participer à des séances de conseil avec le personnel de l’OIM. Des entretiens individuels doivent aider les migrants à identifier leurs besoins. Les migrants en situation vulnérable reçoivent des conseils supplémentaires, adaptés à leur situation spécifique ;
    Cette assistance est généralement non monétaire et consiste en des cours de création d’entreprise, des formations professionnelles (de quelques jours à six mois/un an), des salons de l’emploi, des groupes de discussion ou des séances de conseil ; l’aide à la création de micro-entreprises. Toutefois, pour certains cas vulnérables, une assistance en espèces est fournie pour faire face aux dépenses quotidiennes et aux besoins médicaux ;
    Chaque module comprend des activités de suivi et d’évaluation afin de déterminer l’efficacité des programmes de réintégration.

    –-

    Des migrants d’#Afghanistan et du #Yémen ont été renvoyés dans ces pays dans le cadre de ce programme, ainsi que vers la Somalie, l’Érythrée et le Sud-Soudan, malgré le fait que les pays de l’UE découragent tout voyage dans ces régions.

    En vertu du droit international relatif aux Droits de l’homme, le principe de « #non-refoulement » garantit que nul ne doit être renvoyé dans un pays où il risque d’être torturé, d’être soumis à des traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants ou de subir d’autres préjudices irréparables. Ce principe s’applique à tous les migrants, à tout moment et quel que soit leur statut migratoire.

    L’OIM fait valoir que des procédures sont en place pour informer les migrants pendant toutes les phases précédant leur départ, y compris pour ceux qui sont vulnérables, en leur expliquant le soutien que l’organisation peut leur apporter une fois arrivés au pays.

    Mais même lorsque les migrants atterrissent dans des pays qui ne sont pas en proie à des conflits de longue durée, comme le Nigeria, certains risquent d’être confrontés à des dangers et des menaces bien réelles.

    Les principes directeurs du Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) sur la protection internationale considèrent que les femmes ou les mineurs victimes de trafic ont le droit de demander le statut de réfugié. Ces populations vulnérables risquent d’être persécutées à leur retour, y compris au Nigeria, voire même d’être à nouveau victime de traite.
    Forcer la main ?

    Le caractère volontaire contestable des opérations de retour s’étend également au Niger voisin, pays qui compte le plus grand nombre de migrants assistés par l’OIM et qui est présenté comme la nouvelle frontière méridionale de l’Europe.

    En 2015, le Niger s’est montré disposé à lutter contre la migration en échange d’un dédommagement de l’UE, mais des centaines de milliers de migrants continuent de suivre les routes à travers le désert en direction du nord pendant que le business du trafic d’êtres humains est florissant.

    Selon le Conseil européen sur les réfugiés et les exilés, une moyenne de 500 personnes sont expulsées d’Algérie vers le Niger chaque semaine, au mépris du droit international.

    La police algérienne détient, identifie et achemine les migrants vers ce qu’ils appellent le « #point zéro », situé à 15 km de la frontière avec le Niger. De là, les hommes, femmes et enfants sont contraints de marcher dans le désert pendant environ 25 km pour atteindre le campement le plus proche.

    « Ils arrivent à un campement frontalier géré par l’OIM (Assamaka) dans des conditions épouvantables, notamment des femmes enceintes souffrant d’hémorragies et en état de choc complet », a constaté Felipe González Morales, le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies, après sa visite en octobre 2018 (https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23698%26LangID).

    Jill Alpes, au Centre de recherche sur les frontières de Nimègue, estime que ces expulsions sont la raison principale pour laquelle les migrants acceptent d’être renvoyés du Niger. Souvent repérés lors d’opérations de recherche et de sauvetage de l’OIM dans le désert, ces migrants n’ont guère d’autre choix que d’accepter l’aide de l’organisation et l’offre de rapatriement qui s’ensuit.

    Dans ses travaux de recherche, Mme Alpes écrit que « seuls les migrants qui acceptent de rentrer au pays peuvent devenir bénéficiaire du travail humanitaire de l’OIM. Bien que des exceptions existent, l’OIM offre en principe le transport d’Assamakka à Arlit uniquement aux personnes expulsées qui acceptent de retourner dans leur pays d’origine ».

    Les opérations de l’IOM au Niger

    M. Morales, le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies, semble être d’accord (https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23698%26LangID). Il a constaté que « de nombreux migrants qui ont souscrit à l’aide au retour volontaire sont victimes de multiples violations des droits de l’Homme et ont besoin d’une protection fondée sur le droit international », et qu’ils ne devraient donc pas être renvoyés dans leur pays. « Cependant, très peu d’entre eux sont orientés vers une procédure de détermination du statut de réfugié ou d’asile, et les autres cas sont traités en vue de leur retour ».

    « Le fait que le Fonds fiduciaire de l’Union européenne apporte un soutien financier à l’OIM en grande partie pour sensibiliser les migrants et les renvoyer dans leur pays d’origine, même lorsque le caractère volontaire est souvent douteux, compromet son approche de la coopération au développement fondée sur les droits », indique le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies.
    Des contrôles insuffisants

    Loren Landau, professeur spécialiste des migrations et du développement au Département du développement international d’Oxford, affirme que le travail de l’OIM souffre en plus d’un manque de supervision indépendante.

    « Il y a très peu de recherches indépendantes et beaucoup de rapports. Mais ce sont tous des rapports écrits par l’OIM. Ils commandent eux-même leur propre évaluation , et ce, depuis des années », détaille le professeur.

    Dans le même temps, le Dr. Arhin-Sam, spécialiste lui de l’évaluation des programmes de développement, remet en question la responsabilité et la redevabilité de l’ensemble de la structure, arguant que les institutions et agences locales dépendent financièrement de l’OIM.

    « Cela a créé un haut niveau de dépendance pour les agences nationales qui doivent évaluer le travail des agences internationales comme l’OIM : elles ne peuvent pas être critiques envers l’OIM. Alors que font-elles ? Elles continuent à dire dans leurs rapports que l’OIM fonctionne bien. De cette façon, l’OIM peut ensuite se tourner vers l’UE et dire que tout va bien ».

    Selon M. Arhin-Sam, les ONG locales et les agences qui aident les rapatriés « sont dans une compétition très dangereuse entre elles » pour obtenir le plus de travail possible des agences des Nations unies et entrer dans leurs bonnes grâces.

    « Si l’OIM travaille avec une ONG locale, celle-ci ne peut plus travailler avec le HCR. Elle se considère alors chanceuse d’être financée par l’OIM et ne peuvent donc pas la critiquer », affirme-t-il.

    Par ailleurs, l’UE participe en tant qu’observateur aux organes de décision du HCR et de l’OIM, sans droit de vote, et tous les États membres de l’UE sont également membres de l’OIM.

    « Le principal bailleur de fonds de l’OIM est l’UE, et ils doivent se soumettre aux exigences de leur client. Cela rend le partenariat très suspect », souligne M. Arhin-Sam. « [Lorsque les fonctionnaires européens] viennent évaluer les projets, ils vérifient si tout ce qui est écrit dans le contrat a été fourni. Mais que cela corresponde à la volonté des gens et aux complexités de la réalité sur le terrain, c’est une autre histoire ».
    Une relation abusive

    « Les États africains ne sont pas nécessairement eux-mêmes favorables aux migrants », estime le professeur Landau. « L’UE a convaincu ces États avec des accords bilatéraux. S’ils s’opposent à l’UE, ils perdront l’aide internationale dont ils bénéficient aujourd’hui. Malgré le langage du partenariat, il est évident que la relation entre l’UE et les États africains ressemble à une relation abusive, dans laquelle un partenaire est dépendant de l’autre ».

    Les chercheurs soulignent que si les retours de Libye offrent une voie de sortie essentielle pour les migrants en situation d’extrême danger, la question de savoir pourquoi les gens sont allés en Libye en premier lieu n’est jamais abordée.

    Une étude réalisée par l’activiste humanitaire libyenne Amera Markous (https://www.cerahgeneve.ch/files/6115/7235/2489/Amera_Markous_-_MAS_Dissertation_2019.pdf) affirme que les migrants et les réfugiés sont dans l’impossibilité d’évaluer en connaissance de cause s’ils doivent retourner dans leur pays quand ils se trouvent dans une situation de détresse, comme par exemple dans un centre de détention libyen.

    « Comment faites-vous en sorte qu’ils partent parce qu’ils le veulent, ou simplement parce qu’ils sont désespérés et que l’OIM leur offre cette seule alternative ? » souligne la chercheuse.

    En plus des abus, le stress et le manque de soins médicaux peuvent influencer la décision des migrants de rentrer chez eux. Jean-Pierre Gauci, chercheur principal à l’Institut britannique de droit international et comparé, estime, lui, que ceux qui gèrent les centres de détention peuvent faire pression sur un migrant emprisonné pour qu’il s’inscrive au programme.

    « Il existe une situation de pouvoir, perçu ou réel, qui peut entraver le consentement effectif et véritablement libre », explique-t-il.

    En réponse, l’OIM affirme que le programme Retour Humanitaire Volontaire est bien volontaire, que les migrants peuvent changer d’avis avant d’embarquer et décider de rester sur place.

    « Il n’est pas rare que des migrants qui soient prêts à voyager, avec des billets d’avion et des documents de voyage, changent d’avis et restent en Libye », déclare un porte-parole de l’OIM.

    Mais M. Landau affirme que l’initiative UE-OIM n’a pas été conçue dans le but d’améliorer la vie des migrants.

    « L’objectif n’est pas de rendre les migrants heureux ou de les réintégrer réellement, mais de s’en débarrasser d’une manière qui soit acceptable pour les Européens », affirme le chercheur.

    « Si par ’fonctionner’, nous entendons se débarrasser de ces personnes, alors le projet fonctionne pour l’UE. C’est une bonne affaire. Il ne vise pas à résoudre les causes profondes des migrations, mais crée une excuse pour ce genre d’expulsions ».

    https://fr.euronews.com/2020/06/22/migrants-les-echecs-d-un-programme-de-retour-volontaire-finance-par-l-u
    #retour_volontaire #échec #campagne #dissuasion #migrations #asile #réfugiés #IOM #renvois #expulsions #efficacité #réintégration #EU #Union_européenne #Niger #Libye #retour_humanitaire_volontaire (#VHR) #retour_volontaire_assisté (#AVR) #statistiques #chiffres #aide_à_la_réintégration #Nigeria #réfugiés_nigérians #travail #Cameroun #migrerrance #stigmates #stigmatisation #Assamaka #choix #rapatriement #Fonds_fiduciaire_de_l'Union européenne #fonds_fiduciaire #coopération_au_développement #aide_au_développement #HCR #partenariat #pouvoir

    –---
    Ajouté à la métaliste migrations & développement (et plus précisément en lien avec la #conditionnalité_de_l'aide) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768702

    ping @rhoumour @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

  • [Fade to Pleasure ] #80.2 feat #snooba
    http://www.radiopanik.org/emissions/ftp/-80-2-feat-snooba

    a mechanical treat of bleep, driving rhythms & buffed-out nu-beat numbers positioning itself well with weird tacteel, spirit & tribe.

    *Archillect illustration & photography source

    Broadcasted & hosted by Snooba on Panik (Brussels-Be) Grenouille (Marseille) Canal B (Rennes-Fr) C’rock (Vienne-Fr) Diversité FM (Dijon-Fr) Louiz Radio (Belgique-Louvain la neuve) You FM (Mons-Be) Woot (Marseille) Campus FM (Toulouse-FR)

    PLAYED

    !sooks era

    Key elements moring boom

    Sunken ft Joseph Efi Lifted To The Sky

    Minus 8 feat Virag Life (Original Version)

    Midlife Rare Air (Apiento Vocal)

    Hiro Ama Anaesthetic

    The Orielles Space Samba (Disco Volador Theme) (Wrongtom’s Dub Rhumba)

    Aiwaska Medicine (Eelke Kleijn Remix) (Exploited Ghetto)

    Paso Doble & MasterShine feat. Idd Aziz Tishiki (...)

    #mix #mixtape #deep #indie_dance #letfield #amalgam #unity #mix,snooba,mixtape,deep,indie_dance,letfield,amalgam,unity
    http://www.radiopanik.org/media/sounds/ftp/-80-2-feat-snooba_09337__1.mp3

  • « Augmentation des frais d’inscription des étudiants étrangers : c’est l’avenir de notre modèle social qui est en jeu »

    La décision prochaine du Conseil d’Etat sur l’augmentation des droits d’inscription pour les non-Européens est cruciale, estiment les économistes David Flacher et Hugo Harari-Kermadec dans une tribune au « Monde », car elle marquera la poursuite ou l’arrêt d’une politique de « marchandisation délétère ».

    L’enseignement supérieur global est en crise. En Australie, le pays le plus inséré dans le marché international de l’enseignement supérieur, les universités prévoient de perdre jusqu’à la moitié de leurs recettes. A l’échelle nationale, la perte de tout ou partie des 25 milliards d’euros qui rentraient en Australie grâce à l’accueil d’étudiants étrangers (le troisième secteur à l’export) pourrait déstabiliser toute l’économie du pays.

    Aux Etats-Unis, les pertes de recettes en 2020-2021 pourraient représenter 20 milliards d’euros, selon l’American Council on Education (une association de l’enseignement supérieur). Au Royaume-Uni, les pertes envisagées sont de l’ordre de 2,8 milliards d’euros. Cambridge a récemment annoncé que ses programmes de licence seront intégralement enseignés à distance, mais cette mise en ligne est coûteuse et ne pourra être assumée que par une petite minorité d’établissements.
    Fort endettement étudiant

    Si la pandémie a frappé une économie mondiale déjà bien mal en point, l’enseignement supérieur « payant » est particulièrement touché : les échanges internationaux d’étudiants – les plus profitables – sont en berne et la fermeture des campus réduit fortement l’attractivité de diplômes hors de prix. Expérience étudiante sur le campus et contenus pédagogiques ne peuvent plus justifier (si tant est qu’ils l’aient pu) des droits de scolarité pouvant atteindre 70 000 dollars (62 000 euros) par an. Les procès se multiplient aux Etats-Unis, intentés par des étudiants cherchant à récupérer une partie des sommes versées pour cette année. Plus proche de nous, les écoles de commerce françaises ont été obligées de recourir au chômage partiel pour encaisser le choc.

    Perspectives d’emploi catastrophiques

    On aurait tort de reprocher aux étudiants de négocier leurs frais d’inscription : les perspectives d’emploi sont catastrophiques, le taux de chômage atteignant des niveaux inédits outre-Atlantique. L’endettement étudiant, qui se monte en moyenne à 32 000 euros aux Etats-unis et 60 000 euros en Angleterre, assombrit un futur professionnel déjà peu amène, et pèse sur les revenus des diplômés pendant vingt ans en moyenne. A l’échelle macroéconomique, l’endettement étudiant total dépasse 1 300 milliards d’euros aux Etats-Unis, 133 milliards d’euros au Royaume-Uni.

    Le
    modèle des universités payantes fait donc
    les frais d’une politique délétère en période
    « normale », et carrément mortifère en ces
    temps agités. C’est pourtant ce modèle que
    le gouvernement français et ses conseillers
    essayent de promouvoir depuis 2018.
    En France, les prochaines semaines seront
    déterminantes pour l’avenir de notre modèle
    social. La décision attendue du Conseil
    d’Etat [qui examine depuis vendredi 12 juin
    le recours des organisations contre l’augmentation
    des droits d’inscription pour les
    étrangers extraeuropéens]
    représentera un
    soulagement doublé d’une révolution ou,
    au contraire, la porte ouverte à une descente
    progressive aux enfers pour de nombreuses
    familles.

    De quoi s’agitil
     ? Alors que le plan Bienvenue
    en France (annoncé le 19 avril 2019) prévoyait
    une forte augmentation des droits de
    scolarité pour les étudiants extraeuropéens
    (2 770 euros en licence et 3 770 euros
    en master, contre 170 et 243 euros), un ensemble
    d’organisations a obtenu que le Conseil
    constitutionnel soit saisi. Ce dernier a
    rendu une décision le 11 octobre 2019 selon
    laquelle « l’exigence constitutionnelle de gratuité
    s’applique à l’enseignement supérieur
    public » tout en considérant que « cette exigence
    [de gratuité] ne fait pas obstacle, pour
    ce degré d’enseignement, à ce que des droits
    d’inscription modiques soient perçus en tenant
    compte, le cas échéant, des capacités financières
    des étudiants ».

    Basculer du bon côté, celui de la gratuité

    Le Conseil d’Etat doit désormais interpréter
    cette décision en précisant ce que « modique
     » signifie. Si cette notion a vraisemblablement
    été introduite pour préserver les
    droits d’inscription habituels (170 et
    243 euros), certains comptent bien s’engouffrer
    dans la brèche. Les enjeux sont
    d’une ampleur inédite : pourraton
    discriminer
    les populations étrangères en leur
    faisant payer des tarifs plus élevés au motif
    qu’elles ne seraient pas contribuables fiscaux
    de leur pays d’accueil ? Le Conseil
    d’Etat pourra garder à l’esprit que ces étudiants
    nous arrivent formés aux frais de
    leur pays d’origine, et qu’ils rapportent, par
    les taxes qu’ils payent, bien plus qu’ils ne
    coûtent (le solde est positif de 1,65 milliard
    d’euros). Seratil
    mis un terme aux velléités
    d’élargissement des droits d’inscription à
    tous les étudiants et à des niveaux de tarification
    toujours plus élevés ? La note d’un
    conseiller du candidat Emmanuel Macron,
    annonçait l’objectif : 4 000 euros en licence,
    8 000 euros en master, jusqu’à 20 000 euros
    par an dans certaines formations.

    Pour basculer du côté de la gratuité de l’enseignement
    supérieur, plutôt que de celui
    de sa délétère marchandisation, il faudrait
    que le Conseil d’Etat retienne une notion de
    modicité cohérente avec la jurisprudence :
    le juriste Yann Bisiou indique ainsi qu’une
    « somme modique est une somme d’un montant
    très faible, qui n’a pas d’incidence sur
    la situation économique du débiteur ; elle est
    anecdotique. Pour les personnes physiques,
    elle est de l’ordre de quelques dizaines
    d’euros, rarement plus d’une centaine, jamais
    plusieurs milliers ». Le Conseil d’Etat
    préféreratil
    les arguments fallacieux de
    ceux qui tremblent dans l’attente de cette
    décision car ils ont augmenté leurs droits
    de scolarité au point d’en dépendre furieusement
     : Sciences Po (14 500 euros par an
    pour le master), Dauphine (6 500 euros en
    master), Polytechnique (15 500 euros pour le
    bachelor), etc.
    Si le Conseil d’Etat venait à respecter le cadre
    fixé par le Conseil constitutionnel, c’est
    l’ensemble de leur modèle qui serait remis
    en cause et c’est un retour à un véritable service
    public de l’éducation auquel nous assisterions.
    Une révolution indéniablement salutaire,
    qui appellerait des assises de l’enseignement
    supérieur. Après un Ségur de la
    santé, c’est à un « Descartes de l’enseignement
    supérieur » qu’il faudrait s’attendre,
    celui d’une refondation autour d’un accès
    gratuit à l’éducation de toutes et tous, sans
    discrimination.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/06/18/augmentation-des-frais-d-inscription-des-etudiants-etrangers-c-est-l-avenir-

    #rebelote
    #taxes_universitaires #France #éducation #université #études_supérieures #frais_d'inscription

    voir aussi cette métaliste :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/739889

    • #Rebelote pour le projet d’#augmentation des #frais_d'inscription à l’#université en #France (arrrghhh).

      Ici une vidéo d’explication d’un avocat du SAF (syndicat des avocat·es de France) :

      #Juan_Prosper : le combat contre « #Bienvenue_en_France » continue !

      « A partir du moment où les digues tombent, où on explique que 2770 euros c’est parfait pour un·e étudiant·e étrangèr·es, on pourra très certainement revenir plus tard en nous disant que si c’est parfait pour un·e étrangèr·es, on peut aussi l’appliquer pour un·e étudiant·e français·e, alors même que le principe du financement d’un service public, du financement de l’enseignement supérieur, repose sur l’impôt. »

      « Si on considère qu’il y a un principe de gratuité, que c’est un service public, ce n’est pas pas à l’usagèr·es de financer le fonctionnement du service public. »

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsfdzYkSgkc&feature=youtu.be

    • La bombe de la dette étudiante a-t-elle explosé ?

      Tribune de David Flacher et Hugo Harari-Kermadec parue dans Le Monde du 18 juin 2020 sous le titre « Augmentation des frais d’inscription des étudiants étrangers : c’est l’avenir de notre modèle social qui est en jeu » (https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/06/18/augmentation-des-frais-d-inscription-des-etudiants-etrangers-c-est-l-avenir-)

      La décision prochaine du Conseil d’Etat sur l’augmentation des #droits_d’inscription pour les non-Européens est cruciale, estiment les économistes David Flacher et Hugo Harari-Kermadec dans une tribune au « Monde », car elle marquera la poursuite ou l’arrêt d’une politique de « #marchandisation délétère ».

      L’enseignement supérieur global est en crise. En Australie, le pays le plus inséré dans le marché international de l’enseignement supérieur, les universités prévoient de perdre jusqu’à la moitié de leurs recettes. A l’échelle nationale, la perte de tout ou partie des 25 milliards d’euros qui rentraient en Australie grâce à l’accueil d’étudiants étrangers (le 3e secteur à l’export) pourrait déstabiliser toute l’économie du pays. Aux États-Unis, les pertes de recettes en 2020-2021 pourraient représenter 20 milliards d’euros selon l’American council on education. Au Royaume-Uni, les pertes envisagées sont de l’ordre de 2,8 milliards d’euros. Si Cambridge a récemment annoncé que ses programmes de licence seront intégralement enseignés à distance, cette mise en ligne est coûteuse et ne pourra être assumée que par une petite minorité d’établissements.

      Si la pandémie a frappé une économie mondiale déjà bien mal en point, l’enseignement supérieur « payant » est particulièrement touché : les échanges internationaux d’étudiant-es – les plus profitables – sont en berne, en même temps que la fermeture des campus réduit fortement l’#attractivité de diplômes hors de prix. L’expérience étudiante sur le campus et le contenu pédagogique ne peuvent plus justifier – si tant est qu’ils l’aient pu – jusque 70 000 dollars de #frais_de_scolarité par an. Les #procès se multiplient aux États-Unis, les étudiants cherchant à récupérer une partie des sommes versées pour cette année. Plus proche de nous, les #écoles_de_commerce françaises ont été obligées de recourir au #chômage_partiel pour encaisser le choc.

      On aurait tort de reprocher aux étudiants de négocier leurs #frais_d’inscription : les perspectives d’emploi sont catastrophiques. Le chômage atteignant des niveaux inédits outre atlantique. L’#endettement étudiant, qui atteint en moyenne 32 000 € aux Etats-unis et 60 000 € en Angleterre, assombrit un futur professionnel déjà peu amène, et pèse sur les revenus des diplômés pendant 20 ans en moyenne. A l’échelle macroéconomique, l’#endettement_étudiant total dépasse 1 300 milliards d’euros aux Etats-Unis, 133 milliards d’euros au Royaume-Uni.

      Le modèle des universités payantes fait donc les frais d’une politique délétère en période « normale » et carrément mortifère en ces temps agités. C’est pourtant ce modèle que le gouvernement français et ses conseillers essayent de promouvoir depuis 2018.

      En France, les prochains jours seront déterminants pour l’avenir de notre modèle social. La décision attendue de la part du Conseil d’État représentera un soulagement doublé d’une révolution ou, au contraire, la porte ouverte à une descente progressive aux enfers pour de nombreuses familles.

      De quoi s’agit-il ? Alors que le plan « Bienvenue en France » (annoncé le 19 avril 2019) prévoyait une forte augmentation des droits de scolarité pour les étudiants extra-européens (2770 euros en licence et 3770 euros en master, contre respectivement 170 et 243 euros), un ensemble d’organisations a obtenu la saisie du #Conseil_constitutionnel. Ce dernier a rendu une décision le 11 octobre 2019 selon laquelle « l’exigence constitutionnelle de #gratuité s’applique à l’#enseignement_supérieur_public » tout en considérant que « Cette exigence [de gratuité] ne fait pas obstacle, pour ce degré d’enseignement, à ce que des droits d’inscription modiques soient perçus en tenant compte, le cas échéant, des capacités financières des étudiants. ».

      Le dernier round a eu lieu le 12 juin : le Conseil d’État doit désormais interpréter cette décision en précisant ce que « #modique » signifie. Si cette notion a vraisemblablement été introduite pour préserver les droits d’inscription usuels (170 et 243 euros), certains comptent bien s’engouffrer dans la brèche.

      Les enjeux sont d’une ampleur inédite : pourra-t-on discriminer les populations étrangères en leur faisant payer des tarifs plus élevés au motif qu’ils ne seraient pas contribuables fiscaux de leur pays d’accueil ? Le Conseil d’État pourra garder à l’esprit que ces étudiants nous arrivent, formé aux frais de leurs pays d’origine, et qu’ils rapportent, par les taxes qu’ils payent, bien plus qu’ils ne coûtent (le solde est positif de 1,65 milliards). Sera-t-il mis un terme aux velléités d’élargissement des frais d’inscription à tous les étudiants et à des niveaux de tarification toujours plus élevé ? La note d’un conseiller du candidat Emmanuel Macron annonce l’objectif : 4000 euros en licence, 8000 euros en master et jusqu’à 20000 euros par an dans certaines formations. Pour basculer du bon côté, celui de la gratuité de l’enseignement supérieur, plutôt que de celui de sa délétère marchandisation, il faudrait que le Conseil d’État retienne une notion de modicité cohérente avec la #jurisprudence : le juriste Yann Bisiou indique ainsi qu’une : « somme modique est une somme d’un montant très faible, qui n’a pas d’incidence sur la situation économique du débiteur ; elle est anecdotique. Pour les personnes physiques, elle est de l’ordre de quelques dizaines d’euros, rarement plus d’une centaine, jamais plusieurs milliers ». Le Conseil d’État préfèrera-t-il des arguments fallacieux de ceux qui tremblent dans l’attente de cette décision pour avoir augmenté leur frais de scolarité au point d’en dépendre furieusement : Sciences Po (14 500 € par an), Dauphine (6500 € en master), CentraleSupélec (3500 €), Polytechnique (15 500 € pour la Bachelor), etc. Si le #Conseil_d’État venait à respecter le cadre fixé par le Conseil constitutionnel, c’est l’ensemble de leur modèle qui serait remis en cause et c’est un retour à un véritable #service_public de l’éducation auquel nous assisterions. Une révolution en somme, indéniablement salutaire, qui appellerait des assises de l’enseignement supérieur. Après un Grenelle de l’environnement, un Ségur de la santé, c’est à un « Descartes de l’enseignement supérieur » qu’il faudrait s’attendre, celui d’une refondation autour d’un accès gratuit à l’éducation de toutes et tous, sans discrimination.

      https://acides.hypotheses.org/2446

  • Penser la pandémie

    Le déconfinement relève d’une décision politique. Cette décision, en démocratie, doit pouvoir être prise après un débat contradictoire. Elle doit se fonder sur la compréhension des phénomènes épidémiques par les sciences, toutes les sciences : virologie, épidémiologie et infectiologie, mais aussi sciences humaines et sociales. Si l’on pense aux errements politiques qui ont conduit au confinement pour tous au même moment et aux conséquences économiques, sociales, individuelles d’un tel choix, encore difficiles à mesurer, si l’on observe que suivre l’expérience chinoise signifierait pour la France un déconfinement entre mi-juin et fin juillet, on voit l’intérêt de discuter les stratégies possibles de déconfinement en mobilisant des disciplines et des savoirs complémentaires.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iVH9GJzkxGs&feature=emb_logo

    #déconfinement #épidémie #coronavirus #covid-19 #confinement #démocratie #chronologie #décision_politique #virus #Bruno_Canard #recherche #Hubert_Laude #appels_à_projets #politique_de_la_recherche #ressources_pédagogiques #incubation #patient_zéro #tests #dépistage #désindustrialisation #Allemagne #France #masques #clusters_familiaux #stocks #flux_tendus #LEAN_management #néo-management #santé_publique #OMS #épidémie #Agnès_Buzyn #asymptomatiques #porteurs_asymptomatiques #liberté_publique #Phillippe_Klein #Chine #Didier_Raoult #Raoult #modèle_SIR #taux_de_létalité #hôpitaux #services_hospitalités #hôpital #système_de_santé #UK #Angleterre #Boris_Johnson #immunité_de_groupe #immunité_collective #Dominic_Cummings #Dominic_Mckenzie_Cummings #économie #R0 #taux_de_reproduction #49_3 #49-3 #France #fil_chronologique #vidéo

    –----

    Les sources figurent sur la page dédiée du séminaire :
    https://pds.hypotheses.org/2840

  • Expropriations in the works for creation of closed migrant centers

    The long-awaited creation of closed centers for asylum seekers on five northeastern Aegean islands was announced on Monday by government spokesman Stelios Petsas, who stressed that a legislative act will be issued to allow for the acquisition of properties, land and sites by expropriation.

    Petsas said the legislative act will “authorize” the Migration and Asylum Ministry to proceed “with the expropriation...of the necessary property and land for crisis management in order to address the urgent need to avoid endangering public health and order.”

    The closed centers will be created on Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Kos and Leros.

    Given the objections and concerns of local communities, Petsas said that the site selection was made following an “exhaustive dialogue” with the competent regional and local authorities and after an appeal was made by the regional governor of the north Aegean islands, Costas Moutzouris, for a state of emergency to be declared on the islands.

    However, Petsas’ announcement sparked a backlash on the islands, given that the capacity of some of these structures will be 20,000 people. Emergency meetings were held by municipal councils on Lesvos, Samos and Chios, while a scheduled meeting with government officials in Athens on Thursday has been cast in doubt.

    According to Petsas, the structures will shelter new arrivals in order to facilitate the identification and asylum processes. He added that they will also be used to detain migrants who exhibit abusive behavior and those who are not entitled to asylum and are slated for return to their country of origin.

    In addition, the operation of these new structures foresees internal regulations, such as allowing residents to leave the centers for a limited period of time. Residents will be given special cards for this purpose. The structures will be closed at night. The government has declared that “the violation of any internal rules will adversely affect asylum claims and speed up the process of the offender’s return [to their country of origin].”

    The closed centers are part of a broader four-pronged government plan to resolve the migration problem. This also entails tightening border security, speeding up asylum procedures and increasing returns.

    The government hopes that the creation of the closed structures will eventually dampen the of local communities’ opposition, once conditions on the islands improve. Petsas stressed Monday that the aim is to support local communities.

    http://www.ekathimerini.com/249392/article/ekathimerini/news/expropriations-in-the-works-for-creation-of-closed-migrant-centers
    #centres_fermés #Grèce #îles #migrations #réfugiés #Samos #Lesbos #Chios #asile #Kos #Leros

    ping @karine4

    • En Grèce, des réfugiés enfermés de force dans un camp « coupé du monde »

      L’épidémie de coronavirus peut-elle étouffer des injustices flagrantes et des atteintes aux droits de l’homme, au sein même de l’Europe ? C’est la question qu’on peut se poser alors que depuis le 21 mars, 189 réfugiés et migrants ont été transportés, depuis l’île grecque de #Lesbos, dans un camp récemment improvisé au nord de la Grèce. Dans un endroit totalement isolé, dénommé « #Klidi » (qui signifie aussi « la clef », en grec) où quelques dizaines de tentes ont été installées, entourées d’impressionnants grillages et fils barbelés sous la garde d’une présence policière massive.

      Parmi ces migrants, contraints à un #confinement_forcé, on trouve de nombreuses femmes, au moins un bébé de trois mois, et aussi six mineurs non accompagnés. Tous dorment sur des nattes posées sur le sol de tentes prévues pour cinq. Mais qui accueillent dix personnes chacune, sans que rien n’ait été organisé pour séparer les hommes des femmes. Et encore moins pour les prémunir, dans cette #promiscuité imposée, contre l’éventuelle apparition du coronavirus. D’après les images qui sont parvenues à Libération, des toilettes chimiques et des cabines de douches extérieures ont également été plantées au milieu du décor désolé de ce camp installé sur le lit d’une rivière desséchée. En cas de pluie, il sera rapidement inondé. Il y fait froid la nuit, il y fera bientôt trop chaud la journée sous les tentes en plastique qui ne disposent d’aucun coin d’ombre. « On est loin ! C’est la brousse, ici…Nous sommes totalement coupés du monde ! Depuis hier, il n’y a même plus d’électricité », s’alarme Joshua (1) dans un message reçu mardi soir.

      Procédures pour le droit d’asile gelées

      « De quel crime se sont rendus coupables, ces gens pour être confinés dans cette situation inhumaine ? », s’est ému cette semaine le quotidien Efimerida Ton Syntakton (« Le journal des rédacteurs »), l’un des rares médias grecs à avoir dénoncé cet #enfermement qui ne respecte ni la convention de Genève, ni la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Qui s’en soucie ? Bruxelles se tait. Et le gouvernement grec du Premier ministre, Kyriákos Mitsotákis, a de toute façon gelé toutes les procédures de droit d’asile depuis le 1er mars, réagissant alors à la décision du président turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, d’ouvrir les frontières aux réfugiés et migrants qui se trouvaient en Turquie. La menace d’un afflux massif depuis la Turquie a permis à la Grèce de faire jouer une clause d’urgence, bloquant provisoirement le droit d’asile, tout en négligeant de consulter ses partenaires européens, comme le veut pourtant la règle.

      Et dans l’immédiat, la mise entre parenthèses du droit d’asile permet désormais de considérer de facto comme des migrants illégaux promis à la déportation, tous ceux qui ont accosté depuis mars sur les îles grecques. Avant même de quitter Lesbos, les 189 réfugiés transportés à Klidi avaient d’ailleurs été sommés de signer un document en grec. Sans savoir qu’ils acceptaient ainsi leur future déportation. Le coronavirus (et les mauvaises relations actuelles entre la Grèce et la Turquie) retarde dans l’immédiat ces rapatriements forcés. Mais le confinement dans un camp quasi militaire au nord de la Grèce risque de générer de nouvelles souffrances pour ces réfugiés jugés indésirables.

      Ils avaient pourtant déjà connu bien des épreuves au cours de leur long périple vers l’Europe. Certains avaient même été la cible d’un push back, un refoulement forcé, alors que leur fragile embarcation se dirigeait vers les côtes grecques. Il y a une dizaine de jours, installés sous le vent et la pluie, sur la plage de Skala Sikamia dans le nord de Lesbos, des réfugiés racontaient ainsi avec moult détails comment leur zodiac, avec 43 personnes à bord, avait été violemment attaqué le 5 mars par deux frégates des garde-côtes grecs qui ont pris le risque de les faire tous basculer dans la mer. Sans prêter aucune attention à la douzaine d’enfants présents. Au regard du droit international, les push back sont évidemment totalement illégaux. Mais malgré, de nombreux témoignages, celui du 5 mars n’a suscité aucune réaction officielle de la part des partenaires européens de la Grèce.

      Après avoir passé près de deux semaines sur une plage de l’île, les naufragés qui avaient miraculeusement survécu à cette attaque policière en pleine mer, se retrouvent donc enfermés à Klidi pour une durée indéterminée. Sans recours possible à un avocat ou même, dans l’immédiat, à un médecin.

      Stratégie cruelle

      Une stratégie cruelle semble refléter la nouvelle politique migratoire du gouvernement grec. Déjà le 14 mars, un bateau militaire avait conduit dans un autre camp fermé proche d’Athènes, 436 migrants et réfugiés arrivés eux aussi en mars à Lesbos. « Il fait très froid la nuit, et les journées se passent à attendre sans rien faire ni savoir ce qu’on va devenir », avait expliqué la semaine dernière par SMS Mohamed (1) enfermé dans ce camp de Malakassa, proche d’Athènes qui accueillerait déjà plus de 2 000 de personnes. « On a pris nos noms et on nous a attribué chacun un numéro. Pour le reste, on ne nous dit rien », souligne de son côté une femme enfermée à Klidi.

      Sur ce nouveau site où les bétonneuses étaient encore en action quand les 189 réfugiés sont arrivés, même les policiers présents se sont émus des conditions de vie imposée aux nouveaux reclus. Dans la lettre qu’ils ont adressée à leur hiérarchie cette semaine, selon le site local Anexartitos.gr, ils signalent que le premier jour ils ont dû distribuer des sandwichs pris sur leurs propres rations à des femmes et des enfants dont « certains au bord de l’évanouissement », qui n’avaient pas été nourris pendant toute la durée de leur transport jusqu’à ce camp. Lequel est qualifié dans cette lettre d’« endroit totalement inapproprié », pour des réfugiés qui ne tarderont pas à ressentir un sentiment d’« asphyxie », préviennent encore les policiers, en raison à la fois de l’#isolement du lieu et de la promiscuité imposée à ceux qui y résident.

      Dans un article récent, intitulé « La clef perdue de l’humanité » (jouant sur le nom du lieu : « klidi »), Efimerida Ton Syntakton s’interroge : « Combien de jours et combien de nuits, un être humain peut-il supporter de vivre dans un tel lieu d’enfermement ? » Tout en s’adressant aux lecteurs : « Pensez-y, sachant combien nous-mêmes, nous avons du mal à supporter la quarantaine dans nos propres maisons. » Mais dans l’immédiat, « la clef » de l’indifférence s’est refermée sur ces destins rendus encore plus invisibles par le confinement de la planète au temps du coronavirus.

      (1) Les prénoms ont été changés.

      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/03/25/en-grece-des-refugies-enfermes-de-force-dans-un-camp-coupe-du-monde_17830

      #coronavirus

      ping @thomas_lacroix

    • Commission approves 130 mln euros for closed migrant centres on three islands

      The European Commission approved on Monday the disbursement of 130 million euros for the construction of the three closed migrant facilities on the Greek islands of #Samos, #Leros and #Kos.

      According to a statement from the Greek Migration Ministry, the European Commission “welcomes the efforts made” by the country to address the migration situation in Greece and “fully recognizes the urgent need for this financial support.”

      The approval came by the EU’s #Asylum_Migration_and_Integration_Fund (#AMIF) following by a positive opinion from the European Commission.

      In june, Migration Minister Notis Mitarakis sought 132.68 million euros from the state budget to press forward with the new reception faciltiies as the request for European Union funding was taking time.

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/255390/article/ekathimerini/news/commission-approves-130-mln-euros-for-closed-migrant-centres-on-three-
      #aide #aide_financière #financement #EU #UE #Union_européenne

  • Pourquoi je démissionne de toutes mes fonctions (administratives) à l’université de Nantes
    https://www.affordance.info/mon_weblog/2020/02/pourquoi-je-demissione-universite-nantes.html

    En 7 ans, je pense avoir exploré toutes les principales failles d’une université qui achève de se renier dans chacune de ses valeurs fondamentales et qui ne tient plus que par la curiosité et l’envie de ses étudiants et le dévouement, hélas souvent mortifère, d’une partie de son personnel enseignant, technique et administratif. Source : affordance.info

  • Le 20 décembre 2019, je reçois, par mail, ce message de "pub" d’une formation qui nous est proposée dans notre #université (#Université_Grenoble_Alpes) :

    L’#UGA nous informe de la mise en place à la formation #communication_assertive et bienveillante dans les relations professionnelles .

    Deux sessions au choix sont ouvertes :

    Soit les 29 & 30 juin 2020
    soit les 03 & 04 décembre 2020

    La date limite d’inscription est : j - 15 avant la date de la formation

    La formation est placée sous le thème " #efficacité professionnelle ".

    Objectifs de la formation :

    A l’issue de la formation, les participants seront capables de :

    – Décoder leur comportement et celui des autres dans les relations professionnelles

    – Communiquer avec #tact et #diplomatie

    – Etablir des #attitudes_positives au quotidien

    – Développer des relations professionnelles harmonieuses et efficaces

    Programme :

    1. Prendre conscience de son comportement

    – Identifier les raisons de ne pas de comprendre

    – Comprendre l’image que l’on renvoie à ses interlocuteurs

    – Prendre conscience de l’image de sa communication écrite

    – Identifier son comportement dans les situations relationnelles

    2. Savoir dialoguer avec tact et souplesse

    – Pratiquer l’écoute active et savoir utiliser les 5 types de questions

    – Utiliser les 3 techniques de reformulation

    – Améliorer sa communication non verbale

    – Etre congruent entre son langage verbal et non-verbal

    – Ajuster sa communication à son interlocuteur

    – Choisir son vocabulaire pour communiquer avec précision et tact à l’écrit

    3. Savoir soutenir une position claire et diplomate

    – Etre assertif : utiliser la méthode DESC

    – Exprimer son avis sans juger l’autre

    – Formuler des critiques constructives

    – Faire face aux critiques

    – Formuler un refus sans provoquer de tension

    – Faire et accepter des compliments dans le monde professionnel

    Durée : 2 jours

    Public : Toute personne souhaitant optimiser sa communication afin d’améliorer ses relations professionnelles

    –--------

    Sur ce, je réponds à une collègue, en colère :

    Plus de moyens, moins de compétition, moins de darwinisme social résoudrait la moitié des problèmes sans formations à la communication bienveillante !

    –-> je fais évidemment allusion aux propos tenus par #Antoine_Petit (à la tête du #CNRS) qui a appelé à une loi « darwinienne » pour le financement de la #recherche. « Une loi ambitieuse, inégalitaire — oui, inégalitaire, une loi vertueuse et darwinienne, qui encourage les scientifiques, équipes, laboratoires, établissements les plus performants à l’échelle internationale, une loi qui mobilise les énergies. »
    https://seenthis.net/messages/815560

    #formation #bienveillance #communication_bienveillante #travail #relations_professionnelles #inégalités #performance #compétition #attitude_positive #harmonie #hypocrisie #image #tact #souplesse #écoute_active #techniques_de_reformulation #communication #communication_non_verbale #langage_verbal #langage_non-verbal #vocabulaire #méthode_DESC #critiques_constructives

    • Et parallèlement à l’#Université d’#Amsterdam... la week of #work_stress !

      Message from the works council

      Dear all,

      The week of 11th of November is the week of work stress. It is the week where the university brings out its petting puppies, makes you bikeblend your smoothie, and has you beat a few djembe tunes to let go of your #stress. Some might argue that it is a nice gesture of the employer, but we of the FNV in the OR find it a slap in the face of the employee. It adds insult to injury.

      This waste of money again shows that the faculty is not taking work pressure seriously. We said it last year, and we said it again this year: “stop monkeying around and actually deal with the causes of work pressure”. Work pressure is not that difficult. There are either too many tasks for the number of people, or there are not enough people for the number of tasks. So the answers are also simple. If an organization is financially healthy, you hire more people. If the organization is financially unhealthy, you are stuck with reducing the tasks. There is no rocket science involved.

      Yet as you can see in this week of work stress, the faculty seems keen to responsiblize the individual for the work pressure he or she is experiencing. This leads to offers such as #time_management (we just received an email that there are two spots still available), #yoga, and #mindfulness. But these are just bandaids ("lapjes voor het bloeden" as the Dutch expression goes) that obscure the structural faults of the system. There are too many administration processes. There is too much institutional distrust that you are not doing your work correctly leading to for instance to ’#jaargesprekken' being moments where you defend yourself instead of discussing how you would like to grow as a professional. There are criteria for promotion that seem to change during the process. We have to accept budget cuts in our teaching programme while at the same time the faculty wants to start new programmes that make new claims on budget and staff.

      Recently, our support staff at EOSS was confronted with a report that was framed as research about the high work pressure they are experiencing. Yet it actually placed all the blame at the staff of EOSS and suggested their so-called inefficient work and non-conformance to instructions from management was the cause of their work pressure. Another signal that work pressure is not taking seriously by management and the individual employee is again responsibilized for his or her work’ stress’. The Works Council will keep pushing the Faculty and the UvA to make meaningful structural changes that address work pressure instead of blaming the victim. Namaste.

      XXXX (FNV Works Council Representative)

      Reçu via email d’une amie/collègue qui y travaille...

    • Et petit exemple d’#Angleterre (#UK):

      Universities have driven their workers into the ground. That’s why I’m striking

      Our eight days of action are in response to a marketised sector that has prioritised profit over the welfare of staff and students.

      Workers in higher education across the UK are on strike. One of the reasons we are striking is because of the poor conditions we face today – which were, in large part, decided by the 2010 election.

      Nearly a decade ago, the Tory and Lib Dem coalition government conspired to transform higher education, unleashing the forces of marketisation. The physical and emotional landscape of the university has fundamentally changed in the intervening years. The devastation wrought cannot be overstated. Contrary to justifications for reform by Tories and Lib Dems, the contemporary university is not sustainable, and reforms have reduced standards and entrenched inequality.

      In public discussion of the – shameful – tripling of student fees and mounting student debt, the changes to university funding that this brought about are often neglected. The 2010 coalition government replaced the old system of block grants with money paid per student per course, and lifted the cap on the number of student places available. Now, universities compete for funding by competing for students, with each other, and between their own departments.

      Most remarkably, this was done in the name of improving standards. It has left its scars on the physical landscape of universities, no longer able to fit in the number of students they have enrolled, and the springing up of new buildings, luxury accommodation and gyms all designed to attract prospective students. If the modern university has a soundtrack, it would be constant drilling for the construction of new, shiny buildings, temples to “student satisfaction”.

      Marketisation does not mean the immediate insertion of the profit motive into previously public goods. It means, at least in the first instance, making those public goods profitable. Students are in more and more debt, workers are paid less and less, while private companies and developers are given access to a potentially lucrative market.

      What does this mean for workers in higher education? They face a proliferation of perverse incentives: instead of research and teaching, lecturers are expected to take part in a perpetual recruitment drive. Instead of supporting students emotionally and academically, staff in student services, often facing cuts and “restructures”, are expected to act as the vanguard of “employability”.

      With more students, permanent staff are expected to take on more and more work. Temporary staff are expected to paper over structural gaps, providing a “flexible” workforce who are hired and fired in response to fluctuations in student numbers. Research shows that part-time staff and those on hourly rates are only paid for 55% of their work. Staff in general work, on average, the equivalent of two days unpaid per week. Given these low wages, many temporary staff are effectively paid less than the minimum wage.

      The expectations placed on staff cannot be met. It is not possible to produce the kind of work expected in the amount of time we are paid to do it. New methods of evaluation and student metrics create even more work, and overlook the key fact that asking students if they enjoyed a course reveals very little about whether that course was well-taught. Student services are stretched to breaking point, and instead of releasing the tension by, for example, increasing funding, services are instead outsourced, with trained counsellors replaced by generic “advisers” and, even, apps.

      When we say that the expectations on staff cannot be met, we mean that it is not possible to live under these conditions. There is nothing else left to squeeze. The doctrines of flexibility and precarity are in no way specific to higher education. They are paradigmatic of contemporary working practices. This means the struggle against precarity is not just a struggle for better conditions for academic workers – it is the insistence that a better life is possible for all of us. The disruption to teaching that comes from workers’ poor health, unnecessary pressure and precarity is much, much greater than the disruption caused by the cancellation of classes.

      Despite the deprivations of the picket line – early mornings, hours standing in the cold, lost pay – I have rarely seen colleagues so happy. The lifting of the neoliberal impulse to be constantly working, every interaction a chance for self-development, every minute a chance to get something done, has profound effects. Reclawing time from management’s extractive demands gives us a glimpse of how the university could be.

      The University and College Union dispute, which runs until next Wednesday, is about pay and pensions for some 43,000 members of the union, all working in academia. Even if we won on both counts, our futures, and the future of higher education, will not be secure without a fundamental rethink of the way in which universities are funded in the UK.

      We cannot afford to merely attempt to reform a marketised sector, based around fees. Almost 10 years on from the seismic higher education reforms of 2010, we face another general election. The only party now offering a rethink of fees and funding, rather than the shuffling of proverbial deckchairs, is Labour.

      We must not let students’ interests be pitted against workers. They are one and the same. So far during the strike, universities have bribed students to cross the picket line with gimmicks like free breakfast and free parking. They have attempted to ban solidarity action by students with a sustained campaign of misinformation, including the suggestion that joining picket lines is illegal and that students must cross them because they are members of NUS and not UCU. We are warned that students might feel anxious about the strike and that by picketing our workplaces we are letting them down.

      In these moments, management attempts to call upon a sense of duty we might feel towards our students. But as workers in higher education, we should not be content to merely provide a better version of the kind of education-as-commodity that management insists on.

      With our strike and the election, we have a chance to start fundamentally re-imagining the university. It’s the only thing that might save it.

      https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/28/universities-workers-strike-marketised-sector-money-staff
      #grève

    • Et hop une autre offre de formation arrivée ce jour dans ma boîte mail :

      "Mieux vivre ses émotions dans les relations professionnelles"

      Public : Tout collaborateur qui souhaite mieux vivre ses émotions afin de favoriser ses relations professionnelles.

      C’est classé dans la rubrique « #efficacité professionnelle »

      Et voici un aperçu du contenu :

      #intelligence_émotionnelle #émotions #réactions_émotionnelles_parasites #dysfonctionnement #mots #visage #corps #couleurs #saveurs #musique #timbres_psychologiques #élastiques_émotionnels #alexitymie #vague_des_émotions #pensée_positive #mots_déclencheurs #respiration

    • 10.12.2021, nouveau message des services centraux de notre université (qui semble de plus en plus inspirée !!) :

      Programme de #pause_active destiné à l’encadrement

      A l’attention des personnels en situation d’encadrement (cadres administratifs et techniques, responsables pédagogiques, responsables scientifiques)

      Madame, Monsieur,

      Suite à une expérimentation menée au printemps dernier et dans le cadre de l’accord-cadre Qualité de Vie au Travail de l’UGA, le SUAPS et la Direction de l’environnement social (DGDRH-DES) vous proposent des séances de Pause Active en visioconférence.

      Ces temps courts, de 20/25 mns vous permettront de :

      Bien débuter la journée

      Apprendre à apprivoiser le stress, prévenir le stress chronique

      Lutter contre l’épuisement professionnel

      – *Prévenir les troubles musculo-squelettiques

      Être plus efficace et concentré

      Ils se déroulent les jeudis à 8h et 8h30, jusqu’au 9 décembre pour le 1er semestre

      Puis au 2nd semestre, à partir du 13 janvier

      Pas d’inscription préalable, juste une connexion !

      Comment se déroulent les séances ?

      Séance à 8h00 : #Sophrologie :

      Prendre conscience des différentes parties de son corps

      Se libérer des tensions physiques, mentales et émotionnelles

      Respirer, se poser, prendre un temps pour soi

      Activer les capacités utiles pour sa journée de travail

      –-

      Séance à 8h30 : Réveil musculaire en douceur :

      Étirements légers, respiration, focus sur l’ensemble du dos pour dénouer les tensions.

    • J’avais oublié d’ajouté cela sur ce fil :

      Arrive aujourd’hui, 21.10.2020, un message de mon #université (#Université_Grenoble_Alpes) qui nous invite à s’inscrire à une #formation...
      La formation s’intitule :
      Gestion du #stress pour les enseignant(e)s

      La troisième annonce en ce genre, les deux précédentes étaient des formations qui portaient sur :

      1. Gestion de #conflits (formation mise sous le thème « #efficacité_professionnelle »)

      2. Mieux vivre ses #émotions dans ses #relations_professionnelles (aussi mise sous le même thème : #efficacité_professionnelle)

      Comme dit ma collègue @mobileborders :
      « De la #responsabilisation_personnelle des #failles_structurelles... »

      https://seenthis.net/messages/882135

    • 07.01.2022... on commence une nouvelle année avec de nouvelles formations. Cette fois-ci c’est... le #co-développement !

      Formation Co-Développement Enseignants/Enseignants-chercheurs

      –-> le plus drôle dans tout ça, c’est la "#méthode_Payette_et_Champagne" (ou "paillettes et champagne" si vous préférez).

      « une méthode subtile et exigeante alors qu’elle paraît simple en apparence » dit A. Payette
      https://esprit-co-developpement.fr

      Pas trop bien réussi à en savoir plus après une brève recherche sur la toile (si il y a des motivé·es...)

      J’en ai fait un mini-tweet :

      https://twitter.com/CDB_77/status/1479350762329280514

    • Avril 2022... Dans notre institut, comme partout ailleurs dans les facs françaises (et au-delà), on souffre d’un déficit STRUCTUREL en personnel enseignant... Pour info, notre institut « tourne » avec environ 40% des heures d’enseignement qui sont données par du personnel précaire, dont des #vacataires... Outre ce problème STRUCTUREL, il y a aussi la difficulté à pouvoir embaucher lesdits vacataires... deux difficultés avant tout :
      – iels sont payé·es, à l’heure, en dessous du smic, donc iels préfèrent faire autre chose dans la vie...
      – iels ne peuvent être embauché·es que si iels ont un contrat par ailleurs (donc, chômeur·es, circulez, on ne peut pas vous donner du taf... qui est payé moins du smic, mais bon...)

      Résultat des courses : c’est une galère pas possible pour les responsables de formations à la fac de trouver des enseignant·es pour les cours présents dans la maquette...

      Donc : problème structurel...

      Or, voici ce que notre direction nous propose, une réunion pour discuter de cette problématique « vacataires » (très bien) :

      "Lors du dernier conseil d’UFR, la problématique des vacataires d’enseignement (recrutement, constitution des dossiers, paiement) a été abordée et il a été émis le souhait d’organiser un temps de travail à ce sujet.

      ... et voici la phrase suivante :

      Ce sujet faisant également écho à celui lié à la qualité de vie au travail, il semble primordial d’y travailler dessus de manière prioritaire."

      –-> le lien avec la fameuse #QVT... ce n’est pas un problème de QVT, c’est un problème de #politique_universitaire, bordel ! Non, on ne va pas résoudre cela avec des séances de sophrologie ou avec des pauses actives !

    • « En termes d’émotions, là c’est moins évident : on parle de plus en plus de burnout, mais à la force physique s’est substituée une injonction à la force mentale, à prendre sur soi. Et si ça ne va pas, on va faire en sorte que les individus s’adaptent au monde du travail, mais on ne va jamais faire en sorte que le monde du travail s’adapte au #corps et à l’esprit des individus. On va donner des sièges ergonomiques, des ergosquelettes, on va créer des formations gestes et postures, on va embaucher des psychologues pour que les gens tiennent au travail, sans s’interroger sur ce qui initialement a causé ces souffrances. »

      https://www.frustrationmagazine.fr/entretien-rivoal

      #adaptation #résilience #force_mentale #émotions

      signalé ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/969443

    • Le business du bonheur

      La psychologie positive, conceptualisée aux États-Unis à la fin des années 1990, s’est imposée en Europe par le biais du management d’entreprise. Enquête sur une discipline contestée, proche du développement personnel.

      https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/099779-000-A/le-business-du-bonheur

      voir aussi le trailer sur twitter :
      https://twitter.com/ARTEfr/status/1567845341793320962

      signalé sur seenthis par @olivier_aubert :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/971462

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox #High-Altitude_Pseudo-Satellites (#HAPS)

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

    • Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

      We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

      From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

      Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

      The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

      The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

      In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

      “In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

      Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

      “They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

      “For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

      Air Surveillance

      Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

      Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

      Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

      German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

      “The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

      “The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

      Sensors and cameras

      EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

      Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

      Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

      Surveillance centres

      In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

      https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

      At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

      Artificial intelligence

      The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

      The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

  • #métaliste sur les #villes-refuge

    –-> v. aussi cette compilation : https://seenthis.net/messages/675436

    Le #HCR se félicite du soutien de 175 villes à travers le #monde entier en faveur des réfugiés
    https://seenthis.net/messages/791115
    #Cities#WithRefugees

    Projet de recherche du #PUCA « L’accueil, la circulation et l’installation des migrants » :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/817229

    Quel rôle pour les villes dans l’accueil et l’intégration des demandeurs d’asile et réfugiés ?
    https://www.vuesdeurope.eu/num/quel-role-pour-les-villes-dans-laccueil-et-lintegration-des-demandeurs-d

    Cities of refuge research

    A research project that explores and explicates the relevance of international human rights, as law, praxis and discourse, to how local governments in Europe welcome and integrate refugees.

    https://citiesofrefuge.eu

    An EU solution, or a local one ?
    –-> une section d’un article publié dans l’article « Germany sees political controversy over rescuing refugees from Greece » :
    https://www.dw.com/en/germany-greece-refugees-asylum-controversy/a-54538520

    Table-ronde organisée lors d’une conférence du réseau Fearless Cities sur les villes-refuge :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/899744

    L’accueil des réfugiés peut-il devenir une #politique_locale ?
    https://seenthis.net/messages/927177

    Visualisation : Cities and civil society networks for a Welcoming Europe


    https://seenthis.net/messages/928867

    Europe welcomes - A decent and humane asylum policy is possible in Europe


    https://seenthis.net/messages/967233

    #ville-refuge #migrations #asile #réfugiés #solidarité #résistance

    ping @isskein

  • Je vois maintenant qu’il n’y a rien sur #Carl_Vogt, pourtant c’était ma honte d’avoir travaillé dans un bâtiment dédié à ce fervant défenseur de la supériorité de la race blanche :
    #Uni_Carl_Vogt :


    https://www.unige.ch/presse/plans/uni-dufour-2
    #Uni_Vogt #Université_de_genève

    Et qu’il y a, devant l’Université des Bastions, une statue en son honneur :

    Carl Vogt :

    August Christoph Carl Vogt est un naturaliste et médecin suisse d’origine allemande, connu par ses prises de position sur le matérialisme et la défense de la théorie de l’évolution de Charles Darwin.


    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Vogt

    Voici un portrait de ce monsieur dont je ne peux pas copier-coller le texte car le site ne le permet pas :
    http://www.audeladuracisme.com/2004/10/08/august-christoph-carl-vogt-1817-1895

    #colonialisme #esclavage #esclavagisme #histoire #suisse #décoloniser_la_ville

    ça peut aussi intéresser @simplicissimus et @maieul ...

    –—

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur la #Suisse_coloniale :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/868109

    • Super, par contre @cdb_77, quand tu es à l’intérieur de Seenthis, il n’y a pas de limite de nombre de caractères comme sur Twitter, et donc c’est mieux si tu mets les vrais liens seenthis.net complet, parce que parfois d’autres personnes ont cité des seens ailleurs, et avec le triangle qui est devant, cela permet de retrouver les autres conversations notamment.

    • Carl Vogt ne pense pas foncièrement différemment des hommes de son époque.

      Pour le site Au delà du racisme, s’ils sont pointilleux sur le copyright les concernant et verrouillent efficacement la sélection du texte ou de l’image, ils ne le sont pas du tout pour celui des autres. Ainsi l’illustration est récupérée très probablement de WP sans aucune mention de la source

      L’auteur (anonyme) de WP donne comme source Brehms Tierleben, Small Edition 1927 mais c’est douteux : le style de l’illustration ne correspond pas du tout avec celui des planches de Brehm, du moins dans l’édition originale (1864 pour le premier volume)


      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Edmund_Brehm

      En revanche la légende fournie (évacuée par le recadrage de l’image sur WP)
      Skelett des Menschen (1) und des Gorillas (2), unnatürlich gestreckt.
      permet de retrouver l’origine probable :
      https://books.google.fr/books?id=UcW1DgAAQBAJ&pg=PA66-IA1&lpg=PA66-IA1&dq=Skelett+des+Menschen+

      Der Mensch : Zweiter Band : Die heutigen und die vorgeschichtlichen Menschenrassen de Johannes Ranke dont le deuxième tome date de 1887
      Il s’agit d’une planche hors-texte insérée entre les pages 66 et 67.
      https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Ranke

    • @simplicissimus je suis bien d’accord sur toi sur ce point :

      Carl Vogt ne pense pas foncièrement différemment des hommes de son époque.

      Toutefois, ce qui m’a mise dans une situation où j’étais très mal à l’aise, c’est que j’ai dû créer une signature à mes mails avec deux fois le nom de ce raciste, raciste de son époque, mais tout de même raciste :
      – la rue : Boulevard Carl-Vogt
      – le bâtiment lui-même (construit il y a moins de 5 ans !!!) : Uni Carl-Vogt
      Et ça, je ne le pardonne pas à l’université qui m’engageait.
      Deux fois en une signature de MES MAILS c’était trop !

    • Carl Vogt, progressiste et raciste

      Juliet Fall, géographe, publie une BD à charge. Le bâtiment qui abrite son département porte le nom du scientifique et politicien genevois qui, au XIXe siècle, prônait la hiérarchisation des races et des sexes.

      « Pourquoi faut-il ­décoloniser la géographie ? » Cette question, Juliet Fall, professeure au département de géographie de l’université de Genève, la pose dans son cours sur l’histoire et l’épistémologie de sa discipline. Elle y répond par ailleurs à sa manière en consacrant une bande dessinée à la figure de Carl Vogt (1817-1895). Dans ce pamphlet de six pages, elle s’adresse directement au naturaliste et médecin suisse d’origine ­allemande pour questionner sa présence persistante dans le paysage urbain. De ce matérialiste convaincu, aux convictions progressistes et anticléricales, Juliet Fall retient moins la contribution à la science que les écrits pétris de racisme et de misogynie.

      Une pensée affligeante sur l’inégalité des races et des sexes qu’on pourrait relativiser, car ancrée dans son époque. Le problème, c’est qu’August Christoph Carl Vogt a son buste bien en vue, à Genève, devant le bâtiment Uni-Bastions. Et son boulevard où se dresse, depuis 2015, une annexe de l’alma mater portant son nom. L’honneur de trop pour Juliet Fall, qui y a son bureau. Profitant du débat qui fait rage sur les statues honorant de douteux personnages, la géographe lance son pavé dans la mare. Nous sommes allés à sa rencontre pour parler de sa BD, à télécharger gratuitement en ligne.

      Comment vous est venue l’idée de cette BD ?

      Juliet Fall : La décision de nommer ce bâtiment en l’honneur de Carl Vogt en 2015 avait fait réagir, mais finalement le nom de l’artère où il se trouve avait été retenu par commodité. Ma démarche s’inscrit dans le sillage du collectif L’Escouade, dont le projet « 100 Elles » soutenu par la Ville de Genève a rebaptisé symboliquement une centaine de rues. Le boulevard Carl-Vogt est ainsi devenu boulevard Jeanne Hersch. Lors de la Grève des femmes, en 2019, plusieurs collègues ont mené une action avec une banderole allant dans le même sens.

      Que reprochez-vous à Carl Vogt ?

      Il a cherché à légitimer un préjugé très en vogue dans les académies au XIXe siècle, celui de l’inégalité des races. Sa crainte était une dilution, un affaiblissement des caractéristiques de la race blanche par le mélange. C’est de la mauvaise science : on compare la taille des crânes, comme on le fait pour les grands singes, afin de prouver la supériorité de la race blanche. Carl Vogt place les « Germains » et les « Nègres » aux deux extrémités de l’évolution.

      Les femmes ne sont pas beaucoup mieux loties.

      Dans ses Leçons sur l’homme ­publiées en 1865, Carl Vogt écrit que le crâne des femmes blanches se rapproche plus de celui du « nègre » que de l’homme blanc. Le degré d’évolution moindre des femmes sur l’échelle de la race les voue à la conservation des valeurs ­immuables, de la famille, etc.

      « On a une responsabilité, nos étudiants ne sont plus les mêmes qu’il y a cinquante ans. »

      Ces travaux ont-il de l’écho ?

      A l’époque probablement. On retient surtout que Darwin remercie Carl Vogt pour son soutien sur la théorie de l’évolution, ce dernier signant une préface dans une traduction de son œuvre (« De la variation des animaux et des plantes à l’état domestique », ndlr). En revanche, Karl Marx s’en prend violemment à lui et perd un an de sa vie à écrire un livre, Herr Vogt, où il l’accuse d’être un espion à la solde de Napoléon III.

      S’en prendre à Carl Vogt aujourd’hui, c’est faire de l’anachronisme ?

      On choisit ses héros ! Que Carl Vogt possède son buste ancien est une chose – on peut se demander si sa place n’est pas plutôt dans un musée, même si personne n’y prête vraisemblablement attention en passant devant. Choisir de nommer un bâtiment académique en son honneur au XXIe siècle est plus problématique. Personnellement, ça me contrarie de voir figurer son nom en signature de mes emails, qui plus est, dans une Faculté des Sciences de la société. On a une responsabilité, nos étudiants ne sont plus les mêmes qu’il y a cinquante ans. On doit penser le présent de nos disciplines en dialogue avec leur passé. Ma bande dessinée peut contribuer au débat.

      Vos origines anglo-saxonnes vous ­prédisposent-elles à une critique postcoloniale, moins marquée dans la sphère académique francophone ?

      Je ne peux nier l’influence des postcolonial studies, ni des écrits ­féministes. Comme immigrée, je pose aussi un regard distancié sur Genève, où la liberté académique, il faut le souligner, est totale. Cela doit nous encourager à décoloniser l’université et à dépasser les schémas patriarcaux.

      https://lecourrier.ch/2020/06/17/carl-vogt-progressiste-et-raciste
      #BD #Juliet_Fall

      –---

      Pour lire la BD en pdf :


      https://irreductible.ch/pdf/CarlVogt2020.pdf

    • Comme les éléphants et les singes... - Melanine
      http://www.melanine.org/?-Comme-les-elephants-et-les-singes-

      « La race des Nègres est une espèce d’hommes différente de la
      nôtre [...] on peut dire que si leur intelligence n’est pas d’une
      autre espèce que notre entendement, elle est très inférieure. Ils
      ne sont pas capables d’une grande attention, ils combinent peu et ne
      paraissent faits ni pour les avantages, ni pour les abus de notre
      philosophie. Ils sont originaires de cette partie de l’Afrique comme les
      éléphants et les singes ; ils se croient nés en Guinée pour
      être vendus aux Blancs et pour les servir. »
      Voltaire, Essai sur les mæurs,
      Genève, 1755, t. XVI, pp. 269-270

      #voltaire
      #déboulonner_le_racisme

    • Rebaptisez le bâtiment Carl Vogt de l’UNIGE et déboulonnez le #buste à son effigie

      Nous exigeons la rebaptisation du bâtiment universitaire (UniGE) portant le nom de Carl Vogt, ainsi que le déboulonnement du buste à son effigie siégeant devant le bâtiment de l’Uni Bastions.

      Cette pétition demande à ce que le bâtiment faisant partie du campus de l’Université de Genève et portant le nom de Carl Vogt soit rebaptisé. La prochaine appellation de ce même bâtiment devra être établie par un groupe de réflexion pluridisciplinaire, transparent et inclusif essentiellement composé des personnes concernées et affectées par les théories racistes, sexistes et validistes de Carl Vogt.

      Cette pétition appelle également à l’organisation du déboulonnement du buste à l’effigie de Carl Vogt, inauguré en 1999.

      Qui est Carl Vogt ?
      Carl Vogt, naturaliste, médecin suisse d’origine allemande, conseiller national et aux états et recteur de l’Université de Genève, ne fut pas uniquement la figure progressiste anti-cléricale que l’université souhaite nous dépeindre.
      Aux côtés de Louis Agassiz, il figure comme étant l’un des représentants du racisme « scientifique » (Zuber, 2020). Lors de la seconde moitié du XIXème siècle, Carl Vogt prône et développe une pensée raciale et sexiste. Dans son ouvrage “Leçon sur l’Homme” (1865), traduit en 8 langues, on peut ainsi lire : "Le N*[1] adulte, en ce qui concerne ses capacités intellectuelles, ressemble à l’enfant, à la femme et au Blanc sénile”. Dans le même ouvrage il écrit des Noir.e.x.s : “La plupart des caractères que l’on peut reconnaître, déjà dans la conformation extérieure, ainsi que dans les proportions des diverses parties du corps, rappellent irrésistiblement les singes.” On ne peut ignorer la contribution de Carl Vogt à la circulation et la construction raciste du concept de « race » humaine.

      Considérant les personnes Noir.e.x.s comme étant l’intermédiaire entre l’homme blanc et les primates, doté.e.x.s d’une maturité intellectuelle s’arrêtant à la puberté, les théories négrophobes et déshumanisantes auxquelles il participe cherchent à étayer la supposée existence de la supériorité blanche, par opposition à la supposée infériorité noire. Au cours du XIXe siècle, ces théories raciales ont constitué les fondements idéologiques de l’impérialisme colonial, du nationalisme expansionniste et du racisme d’état (Césaire, 1955 ; Taguieff, 2008).

      Les théories raciales ont légitimé un système de domination en le fondant sur les inégalités des races ou/et des sexes. Malgré leur disqualification et condamnation durant le XXe siècle par la communauté internationale et grâce aux mouvements anticoloniaux et antiracistes, ces théories raciales continuent à grandement influencer les systèmes de domination actuels.

      Pourquoi un buste à l’effigie et un bâtiment au nom de Carl Vogt posent-ils problème ?
      Les récents rapports publiés par le Carrefour de Réflexion sur le Racisme AntiNoir (CRAN) et le Service de Lutte contre le Racisme (SLR) relatent que les discriminations et préjugés racistes anti-Noir.e.x.s continuent d’opérer et touchent presque toutes les sphères de la société. Ce sont des réalités que vivent les personnes Noir.e.x.s quotidiennement, et le fait de célébrer un individu ayant participé à l’établissement des discriminations et inégalités raciales nuit à l’intégrité de ces dernier.e.x.s et entrave une réelle égalité.

      Banaliser la réalité du racisme anti-Noir.e.x.s et ses conséquences en célébrant les figures historiques qui ont participé à son élaboration c’est nier l’expérience sociale des personnes afro-descendantes en Suisse.

      Ce faisant, l’université de Genève manque au principe de respect de l’individu, qu’elle prône dans sa charte d’éthique et de déontologie. Dans ce document on peut lire :

      "Le respect de la personne engage la responsabilité des Hautes Écoles envers toute personne appelée à un titre ou à un autre à contribuer à leur mission d’enseignement et de recherche, que ce soit comme acteur, actrice ou comme sujet. Il suppose un traitement équitable des divers membres de la communauté académique."
      Le fait que les institutions dotées du pouvoir public de produire les savoirs, telles que l’UniGe, ne se responsabilisent pas par rapport au passé colonial-racial a pour effet de minimiser, si ce n’est d’invisibiliser, les inégalités raciales dans le présent. En glorifiant les figures d’un passé raciste, l’UniGe envoie le signal que le traitement équitable de certain.e.x.s membres de la communauté académique, affecté.é.x.s par le racisme, n’est pas important. En participant à l’amnésie coloniale, l’établissement silencie l’expérience humaine des personnes afro-descendantes, que celles-ci soient inscrites dans le cadre de l’UniGe, ou alors externe à l’établissement.

      Une nomination à contre-courant :
      Lors de la troisième conférence mondiale contre le racisme de Durban en 2001, la Suisse s’est engagée à éclairer son implication passée dans la traite esclavagiste et le colonialisme. A partir de 2001, c’est grâce à des travaux d’historiens, tels que Hans Fässler, Patrick Minder, et de théoricienn.e.s postcoloniaux tels que Noémi Michel, Patricia Purtschert ou encore Jovita Dos Santos Pinto, ou encore d’ouvrages comme La Suisse et l’esclavage des Noirs que l’implication de la Suisse dans le colonialisme et dans le commerce triangulaire a pu être révélée.
      Près de 20 ans après, ce sujet reste relativement tabou. Il est, aujourd’hui, essentiel que la part coloniale, raciste, sexiste, eugéniste de l’histoire soit également racontée à plus large échelle et enseignée.
      Le fait de baptiser un bâtiment universitaire Carl Vogt en 2015, en connaissance de ses théories racialistes, nous apparait comme surprenant et rétrograde. Rendre hommage à un personnage en dépit de sa contribution raciste et sexiste, c’est falsifier le récit au sujet de ce que nous héritons collectivement, c’est nous empêcher, en tant que collectivité de pouvoir de nous responsabiliser face à ce passé, c’est entraver les réflexions et le chemin vers les réparations de ce passé.

      Rétablir l’histoire :
      Renommer ce bâtiment et déboulonner le buste Carl Vogt ne signifie pas effacer l’Histoire. Au contraire, nous cherchons à la rétablir et lui donner sa juste place dans la société actuelle.
      Il est souvent rétorqué qu’il est anachronique de faire le procès des figures du passé avec les standards du présent, que ces figures baignaient dans un contexte raciste et sexiste.
      Or, bien que le racialisme fût un mouvement important durant le XIXème siècle, il relevait que certains scientifiques de l’époque tel que le géographe, anarchiste et libre penseur Elisée Reclus ou encore le meneur de l’indépendance de Haïti, Toussaint Louverture, se sont érigés contre ces théories raciales. De plus, les préjudices de ces théories ont des effets jusqu’à aujourd’hui : elles informent le racisme qui touche la communauté noire, elles informent également le renouvellement des pratiques et idéologies d’extrême droite. Comme le rappelle l’historien et anthropologue Michel-Rolph Trouillot, dans son ouvrage Silencing the Past, le passé se contemple toujours depuis le présent, et ce sont nos valeurs et nos demandes dans le présent qui impactent notre manière d’appréhender et de faire récit du passé. Le passé historique que nous voulons voir être figuré et incarné dans l’espace institutionnel et public que constitue l’UniGe doit se nourrir d’une préoccupation pour l’égalité et la justice sociale.

      En résumé :
      Le fait de désigner le plus récent bâtiment d’une institution par un nom ayant signé des théories racistes et sexistes, c’est invisibiliser les discriminations vécues par les personnes Noir.e.x.s, les femmes et les minorités de genre et sexuelles. Nous accusons certes les théories de Carl Vogt, mais nous accusons essentiellement l’université d’avoir choisi de le mettre en avant malgré son insertion dans la bio-sociologie raciste et sexiste.

      Ce choix opéré en toute conscience signale un positionnement inacceptable de l’UniGe face aux actes de racisme et de sexisme pouvant se dérouler en son sein. Si une institution décide, en connaissance de cause, de nommer son bâtiment par le nom d’un racialiste notoire, il est légitime de supposer qu’elle ne se positionnera pas de manière équitable lorsqu’un acte de racisme systémique ou ordinaire lui sera dénoncé.
      Ainsi, il est impossible en tant qu’étudiant.e.x.s Noir.e.x.s de sentir ses intérêts protégé.e.x.s par un établissement dont les agissements minimisent le racisme scientifique et ses conséquences, encore bel et bien réelles.

      Une université universaliste ?
      Il est primordial de rappeler que lors du choix de l’appellation du bâtiment situé au Boulevard Carl-Vogt 66, 1205 Genève, des voix s’étaient élevées pour dénoncer la sélection mémorielle dont faisait preuve l’UniGE. Celles-ci n’ont pas été prises en compte par l’établissement.

      Il est donc fondamental de créer des espaces de formation justes pour toute personne. L’égalité entre sujets issus d’histoires, de mémoires et d’origines différentes constitue un enjeu de démocratie dans un espace qui se définit comme universaliste et progressiste. L’espace de formation est une vitrine des valeurs d’une institution, mais aussi de la société. La rebaptisation et le déboulonnement de Carl Vogt permettront de rétablir des espaces de formation et des espaces publics justes rendant possible le respect de l’intégrité de chaque personne.

      Nous vous invitons à signer
      Pour toutes les raisons susmentionnées, nous vous invitons à signer et relayer cette pétition, afin que nos revendications soient entendues et qu’elles débouchent sur le déboulonnement du buste, et la rebaptisation du bâtiment actuellement nommé Carl Vogt.

      Le collectif pour une réflexion décoloniale, Genève / Instagram : @reflexion_decoloniale / adresse e-mail : reflexion.decoloniale@gmail.com

      Signataires de la pétition :

      CUAE, Conférence universitaire des associations d’étudiantEs.
      ADEPSY, Association des Etudiant.e.s en Psychologie
      AEA, association des Etudiant.e.s afrodescendant.e.s, Unil & EPFL
      AEAPA, Association des Etudiant.e.s en Archéologie Préhistorique et Anthropologie
      AEHES, Association des Etudiant.e.s en Histoire Economique et Sociale
      AEL, Association des étudiant.e.s en Lettres
      AESPRI, Association des Etudiant.e.s en Sciences Politique et Relations Internationales
      AJP-UNI, association des juristes et étudiant-e-s progressistes de l’UNIGE
      Amnesty UNIGE
      LCS, Law Career Start
      Kam’Af
      Collectif Amani
      Collectif Afro-Swiss
      Collectif Faites des Vagues
      CRAN (Carrefour de réflexion et d’action contre le racisme anti-Noir - Observatoire du racisme anti-Noir en Suisse), Berne
      Outrage collectif
      Collectif pour la mémoire Neuchâtel
      UPAF (Université populaire africaine en Suisse), Genève

      [1] N* correspond à "nègre", nous ne souhaitons pas reconduire la force blessante de ce mot dans le corps de texte de notre pétition.

      https://www.change.org/p/rectorat-de-l-universit%C3%A9-de-gen%C3%A8ve-rebaptisez-le-b%C3%A2timent-uni

      #pétition