#uss_fitzgerald

  • #USS_Fitzgerald : le rapport de l’Amiral Fort sur la collision de juin 2017, produit moins de 6 semaines après l’événement et resté secret, fuite dans le Navy Times depuis le 14 janvier. Une succession d’articles décrit une situation catastrophique : des marins non formés, ne sachant pas utiliser les équipements, les équipements qui dysfonctionnent et sont bricolés ou carrément ignorés, absence de communication et de confiance entre les équipes, commandement dépassé dont un commandant absent de la passerelle…

    Plusieurs articles, tous aussi effrayants les uns que les autres…

    The ghost in the Fitz’s machine : why a doomed warship’s crew never saw the vessel that hit it
    https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/14/the-ghost-in-the-fitzs-machine-why-a-doomed-warships-crew-never-saw-the-v


    The warship Fitzgerald returns to Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan, following a collision with a merchant vessel on June 17, 2017.
    U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart/Released

    When Navy Rear Adm. Brian Fort stepped aboard the guided-missile destroyer Fitzgerald in the aftermath of the 2017 collision with a commercial cargo ship, everything was off.

    Any warship would seem a little off after a catastrophe that claimed the lives of seven sailors, but this was different.

    It didn’t look right, smell right, sound right,” Fort said during a hearing last year for a Fitzgerald officer facing court-martial in the wake of the June 17, 2017, disaster.

    After gazing at the gash in the hull through which gushed the seawater that drowned the Fitz’s dead, Fort and his team of investigators walked to the destroyer’s electronic nerve center, the combat information center everyone calls the “CIC.”

    It hadn’t taken a direct hit from the bow of the Philippine-flagged ACX Crystal, but it was trashed nonetheless and smelled like urine.

    He found a pee bottle that had tipped and spilled behind a large-screen display. Fort’s eyes started to take over for his nose, and he took it all in.

    There was debris everywhere,” Fort said under oath. “Food debris, food waste, uneaten food, half-eaten food, personal gear in the form of books, workout gear, workout bands, kettlebells, weightlifting equipment, the status boards had graffiti on them.

    I’d never seen a CIC like that in my entire time in the Navy,” the surface warfare officer of more than 25 years recollected.

    The more Fort looked, the worse it got: broken sensors that were reported for repairs but never fixed, schedule changes ordered by superiors high above the Fitz’s command triad that delayed crucial maintenance, taped-up radar controls and, worse, sailors who had no idea how to use the technology.

    About six weeks after the Fitzgerald collision, Fort signed and submitted his damning internal report to superiors.

    Designed in part to help federal attorneys defend against a wave of lawsuits from the owners and operators of the ACX Crystal and, indirectly, the families of the Fitz’s injured, traumatized and drowned, the Navy sought to keep Fort’s findings from the public.

    But Navy Times obtained a copy of it and began stitching his details to a growing body of court testimony by the crew of the Fitzgerald to reveal just how much worse conditions were on the destroyer than the Navy previously shared with the public.

    What it all reveals is that a mostly green crew joined the Fitzgerald shortly after the warship left dry dock maintenance in early 2017.

    They learned to make do with broken equipment, a lack of communication between departments and, especially in the CIC, a world in which failure had become “systemic across the board,” as Fort put it at last year’s hearing.

    Or as his secret report described it, a lack of training in basic seamanship fatally combined with material deficiencies to create “a culture of complacency, of accepting problems, and a dismissal of the use of some of the most important, modern equipment used for safe navigation.

    • A warship doomed by ‘confusion, indecision, and ultimately panic’ on the bridge
      https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/14/a-warship-doomed-by-confusion-indecision-and-ultimately-panic-on-the-brid


      The guided-missile destroyer Fitzgerald’s heavily damaged starboard side as the warship made its way back to port following a 2017 collision off the coast of Japan.
      Photo courtesy Sean Babbitt

      The Navy has paraded out a series of public reports addressing both the Fitzgerald tragedy and the Aug. 21, 2017, collision involving the John S. McCain and the Liberian-flagged tanker Alnic MC that killed 10 more American sailors.

      But none of those investigations so starkly blueprinted the cascade of failures at all levels of the Navy that combined to cause the Fitzgerald disaster, especially the way the doomed crew of the destroyer was staffed, trained and led in the months before it the collision.

      Fort’s team of investigators described a bridge team that was overworked and exhausted, plagued by low morale, facing a relentless tempo of operations decreed by admirals far above them, distrustful of their superiors and, fatally, each other.

      And Navy officials knew all of that at least a year before the tragedy.
      […]
      [The Commanding Officer (CO) Commander] Benson was “a little more active” on the bridge than Shu [his predecessor], but “it was not routine for the CO or (executive officer) to come up to the Bridge from (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.),” Fort wrote.

      Out of 78 underway days from February to May of that year, the CO was on the bridge just four times between the dark hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., according to the report.

      Et donc logiquement, absent de la passerelle quand le navire a croisé le “rail” de nuit…

    • A watery hell: how a green crew fought the Fitz to save her
      https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/15/a-watery-hell-how-a-green-crew-fought-the-fitz-to-save-her


      The inside of the destroyer Fitzgerald after it collided with a merchant vessel on June 17, 2017, killing seven sailors.
      U.S. Navy photo

      On the day after the Fitzgerald limped back to Yokosuka, a plane carrying Rear Adm. Brian Fort landed in Japan.

      A surface warfare officer with a quarter-century in uniform, Fort had been tasked with creating a report the Navy would use, in part, to defend itself against potential negligence lawsuits brought by ACX Crystal’s owners and operators and, indirectly, by the families of the Fitz’s dead sailors.

      Completed 41 days after the disaster, it remained secret from the public until it was obtained by Navy Times.

      Far more candid than the parade of public pronouncements by senior Navy officials since 2017, Fort’s report details how the the skills of Fitzgerald’s crew had atrophied in the months since it went into dry dock.

      For example, after reporting to the Fitz, sailors were supposed to receive instruction on how to escape flooded berthing areas, a crucial course that was to be followed up by retraining every six months.

      Of the 38 sailors assigned to Berthing 2, which flooded minutes after the ACX Crystal collision, 36 of 39 “were delinquent in the six-month periodic egress training,” Fort wrote.

    • Et si, le rapport de l’amiral Fort est resté secret, c’est parce qu’"il recouvre très largement les informations fournies dans les rapports publiés" (publiés d’ailleurs, nettement plus tard…

      CNO defends hiding scathing internal report on Fitzgerald collision from public
      https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/02/16/cno-defends-hiding-scathing-internal-report-on-fitzgerald-collision-from-

      The Navy’s top officer Friday defended the decision to keep from the public eye a damning internal report on the 2017 warship Fitzgerald collision that killed seven sailors.

      Speaking to reporters after his appearance at the U.S. Naval Institute’s West 2019 conference here, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said much of the report overlapped with what the service publicly released.

      But much of the probe overseen by Rear Adm. Brian Fort portrayed a far grimmer picture of what the crew of the guided-missile destroyer faced. It also prompted hard questions about the actions taken by the Fitz’s squadron and Navy officials back in the United States.

      First revealed by Navy Times, the Fort report chronicled details that Richardson, other Navy leaders and their public reports never mentioned, such as specifics about the destroyer’s brutal operational tempo, officers who didn’t trust each other, radars that didn’t work and sailors who didn’t know how to operate them.

      The investigators also portrayed the warship’s chiefs mess as ineffective and their sailors plagued by low morale in the months leading up to the June 17, 2017, collision.

      (les 3 expressions en gras sont des liens vers les articles ci-dessus)

  • U.S. Navy Pacific commander misses promotion, retiring after collisions
    http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-asia/u-s-navy-pacific-commander-misses-promotion-retiring-after-collisions-idUSK

    U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Scott Swift said he plans to retire after being passed over for promotion to the chief of all military forces in the region in the wake of two deadly collisions involving U.S. warships.

    Swift was in the running to replace Admiral Harry Harris as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Whoever the Pentagon chooses to replace Harris will be taking over at a time when North Korea poses a rising threat and China is flexing its military muscle.
    […]
    Under Swift’s command the U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet, which normally operates east of the international date line in the Pacific has taken a command role in Asia alongside the Seventh Fleet, which is headquartered in Japan.

    The move aimed to bolster U.S. forces in the region as a counterweight to China’s growing military might.

    Swift did not refer to the spate naval collisions in the Pacific in recent months when announcing his retirement on Monday in the United States.

    But, he is the most senior naval officer to step down after collisions in June and August in which a total of 17 U.S. sailors were killed.

    #USS_John_S_McCain #USS_Fitzgerald

  • Did a Must-Do Attitude Contribute to Collisions ? | U.S. Naval Institute
    https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-09/did-must-do-attitude-contribute-collisions

    Dans les Proceedings de l’USNI, un questionnement très axé sur la sociologie des organisations autour des abordages des #USS_Fitzgerald et #USS_John_S_McCain
    Il commence par affirmer :

    It is likely that technical failure played little or no role.

    This is why we hypothesize that both warships had information that they were standing into danger, which, if acted upon, would have avoided the collisions.

    With that hypothesis in mind, the following are three areas of inquiry for the Navy investigators:

    What were the barriers to speaking up at the operator level? If there was information on the warship and it was known to operators, did they voice it? If they kept it to themselves, what got in the way of their speaking up? Specifically, the question to be answered is what were the organizational and cultural factors that presented obstacles to saying something. This should not be an investigation into the performance or character flaws of the particular operator; this is an inquiry into the practices around expressing dissenting and differing opinions.

    • What were the barriers to taking action at the officer level? If information was voiced, why was it dismissed or not acted upon? To what degree was there a bias against action by the bridge teams, as evidenced by their day-to-day interactions with the captain? The investigation should examine the language used among the officers and between the teams and the captains. The mindset of decision-makers relative to performance goals should be probed. Was their objective to achieve excellence—what psychologists call a performance-approach mindset—or was it to avoid errors, which psychologists call a performance-avoid mindset? Understanding this is important, because studies have correlated performance-avoid mindsets with worse outcomes. This is an inquiry into the practices around initiative and action.

    What were the barriers to certification at the command level? The Navy has a process for readiness that requires the captain and the commodore to certify that the ship is ready to deploy. The question is how rigorous are those certifications, and how many of the previous ones resulted in failures. How often in the past three years, for example, were ships delayed in deploying because of inadequacies in training readiness? No certifying officer wants to rush a ship out on deployment that isn’t ready, but reporting up the Navy chain that a ship will not make a deployment date is also embarrassing and comes at a cost to professional reputation. If ships never fail certification then this step is simply another performance step preceding deployment. This is an inquiry into the practices of speaking truth to power.
    […]
    The thrust of the three areas of inquiry listed here is to see if Navy crews, like the El Faro crew, are trapped in production work. It is natural to want to do our jobs well, and we don’t want to feel like failures. We don’t want to tell our bosses we can’t do something. This is particularly true for the men and women of the U.S. Navy, which is a #can-do organization. Unfortunately, this dedication to doing can result in a #must-do attitude that sometimes clouds judgment. That is worth investigating.

    • Ball Diamond Ball - The U.S. Navy’s Failure To Reorient To Danger – gCaptain
      http://gcaptain.com/ball-diamond-ball-u-s-navys-failure-reorient-approaching-danger


      USN Guided-missile destroyer USS Mitscher (DDG 57) lights up its mast to indicate restricted in ability to maneuver (RAM) during night delayed landing qualifications.
      Photo via US Navy

      (le Mitscher porte la version nocturne (feux) des marques navire à capacité de manœuvre restreinte dont la version diurne (soit la superposition des marques boule, bicône, boule) se dit en anglais ball, diamond, ball)

      Such is the case with Captain L. David Marquet, US Navy retired who, as Commanding Officer of a submarine, developed a radical new method of leadership that may be the missing link between the psychological research of Gary Klein, innovative communication structures (e.g. Donald Vandergriff’s Mission Command philosophy) and the proven teachings of John Boyd.

      After being assigned to command the nuclear-powered submarine USS Santa Fe, then ranked last in retention and operational standing, Marquet realized the traditional leadership approach of “take control, give orders,” wouldn’t work. He turned his ship around by creating a leader-leader command structure… treating the crew as leaders, not followers, and giving control, not taking control. This approach took the Santa Fe from “worst to first,” achieving the highest retention and operational standings in the navy.

      The leader-leader model not only achieves great improvements in effectiveness and morale but also makes the organization stronger,” says Marquet in his bestselling book Turn the Ship Around!: A True Story of Turning Followers into Leaders. “Most critically, these improvements are enduring, decoupled from the leader’s personality and presence. Leader-leader structures are significantly more resilient, and they do not rely on the designated leader always being right. Further, leader-leader structures spawn additional leaders throughout the organization naturally. It can’t be stopped.

      Éditorial de Joseph Konrad (gCaptain) mettant fortement en avant les idées de David Marquet (qui a l’avantage, de son point de vue, d’être un ancien de la maison…) qui se termine par la vidéo du commentaire précédent.

  • Over a Third of U.S. Navy Ships in Pacific Lack Training Certification -Watchdog – gCaptain
    http://gcaptain.com/over-a-third-of-u-s-navy-ships-in-pacific-lack-training-certification-watc

    Speaking before a House of Representatives Armed Services Committee hearing, John Pendleton, from the U.S. #Government_Accountability_Office (#GAO), said that a report had found that 37 percent of U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers based out of Japan had expired warfare certifications as of June 2017. That was a five-fold increase from the number in May 2015.

    The certification is a measurement of whether a ship and its crew are well trained and ready for operations.

    The GAO report also found that a reduction in crew sizes was contributing to safety risks, with some sailors working over 100 hours a week and there was limited training because of an increased demand for operations.

    The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented,” the report said.

    #USS_John_S_McCain #USS_Fitzgerald

    Ah ouais !
    note : on est plus près de 40% que du tiers…

    • On est encore en dessous de cela : 8 sur 11 navires (72,7% !) n’ont pas la qualification « navigation » en juin 2017…

      Readiness of U.S. Ships in Japan Focus of USS John S. McCain, USS Fitzgerald Collision Hearing - USNI News
      https://news.usni.org/2017/09/07/readiness-u-s-ships-japan-focus-uss-john-s-mccain-uss-fitzgerald-collisio

      I have had made the assumption for many, many years that our forward deployed forces in Japan were the most proficient, well-trained, most experienced force we have because they were operating all the time,” [Navy’s second in command, VCNO Adm.] Moran told a Thursday joint hearing before the House Armed Services readiness and seapower and projection forces subcommittees.

      It was the wrong assumption.
      […]
      As of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired, and over two-thirds of the expired certifications—including mobility-seamanship and air warfare—had been expired for five months or more

      There were specific areas that were higher than 37 percent and one of those was seamanship. Eight of the 11 ships had expired certification for seamanship,” he told the panel

      This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since our May 2015 report.

      Both the Fitzgerald and McCain had expired certifications, but Pendleton wouldn’t detail the precise certifications that were out of date.

      Faut-il s’en étonner quand on voit la programmation du temps consacré aux différentes activités ?


      2015 GAO Image

      Donc, si on lit le graphique, en 2015 le GAO constate sereinement (?) que pour la flotte déployée au Japon, sur un cycle de 2 ans, il n’y aucune séquence consacrée à l’entrainement ou la formation…

      On rappelle par ailleurs que depuis 2003, il n’y a plus non plus de séquence de formation initiale des futurs officiers à la navigation qu’elle soit théorique (uniquement sur CD ou DVD) ou pratique (sur le tas pendant les prochains embarquements)…

    • Arf ! 3 jours après, CNN se réveille. Mais c’est Exclusive !

      Exclusive : US Navy ships in deadly collisions had dismal training records - CNNPolitics
      http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/11/politics/navy-ships-training-expired/index.html

      The two US Navy destroyers involved in deadly collisions in the Pacific this summer both had lengthy records of failure to fulfill key training requirements, according to Government Accountability Office data provided to Congress and obtained by CNN.

      The USS Fitzgerald had expired training certification for 10 out of 10 key warfare mission areas in June, and the USS John S. McCain had let its certifications lapse in six out of the 10 mission areas, the data show.
      The dismal training record for the two ships sheds new light on one factor that may have contributed to the two collisions with commercial ships in June and August, which killed 17 sailors.
      […]
      A Navy official contested the GAO’s training certification data, arguing that the GAO was focused on higher-level warfighting certifications and not the nuts-and-bolts certifications for operating ships where the Pacific fleet’s destroyers and cruisers have a better record. There are 22 certifications required for each ship and the GAO only reported on half, the official noted, though they declined to provide the full training records for the USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain, citing the ongoing investigations into the collisions.

      Mais, apparemment, il ne s’agit pas des compétences de navigation.

      The GAO examined training records in June for all of the Japan-based destroyers and cruisers, focusing on 10 key warfare training areas. They included air warfare, ballistic missile defense, electronic warfare, fire support, cruise missiles and more.
      The USS Fitzgerald had let its training certifications expire for all of them, according to the GAO data.

      The Navy’s preliminary findings in its Fitzgerald investigation found the crew failed to understand and acknowledge the cargo ship was approaching and failed to take any action necessary to avoid the collision.

      (sur ce dernier point, c’était dans le rapport préliminaire de l’US Navy il y a un peu plus de 3 semaines https://seenthis.net/messages/607667#message623706 )

    • Cyber Probes to be Part of All Future Navy Mishap Investigations After USS John S. McCain Collision - USNI News
      https://news.usni.org/2017/09/14/cyber-probes-part-future-navy-mishap-investigations-uss-john-s-mccain-col

      Probing potential cyber tampering and cyber intrusion will now be a standard part of U.S. Navy accident investigation following the Aug. 21 collision of guided missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) with a chemical tanker, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran told Congress last week.

      As part of the investigation into McCain’s collision, a team from the Navy’s U.S. 10th Fleet cyber arm traveled to Singapore to see if a reported steering failure of the destroyer was a result of cyber tampering, USNI News reported last month.
      […]
      I would also offer to you that just about every three letter agency in Washington, D.C. has looked to see if there were indications of an intent or a potential acknowledgement of a cyber attack. We have seen — I have personally not seen any evidence of that. But we’re not stopping there. The team is in place in Singapore today, has been for several days capturing all of the computer and network information to see if they can find any abnormalities or disruptions.” [Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran said]

      The effort, called Operation #Orion’s_Hammer, focused on the reported failure of the aft steering mechanism that early reports say helped cause the collision between McCain and a chemical tanker off the coast of Singapore on Aug. 21 resulting in the death of 10 sailors, several Navy officials have told USNI News.

      On aurait donc bien confirmation d’une avarie de barre.

    • Sen. John S McCain III (R-AZ) dont le grand-père est l’éponyme du USS John S McCain à propos des collisions. Quelles que soient les conclusions des enquêtes, il est facile d’utiliser ces événements pour réclamer une augmentation du budget de la Navy
      #send_more_money

      McCain Laments ’Accident After Accident’ After Military Cuts - Bloomberg
      https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-17/mccain-laments-accident-after-accident-after-military-cuts

      Following a series of deadly accidents, Senator John McCain on Sunday renewed his calls to address what he described as a U.S. failure during the past eight years to ensure that the military is prepared, equipped and trained. 

      Whenever you cut defense capabilities, the first thing that goes is the training and the readiness, because that’s easy enough to cancel,” the Arizona Republican and chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.

      McCain, a Vietnam War veteran from a military family, has been a longtime critic of the automatic cuts in U.S. spending — including reductions in U.S. defense — known as sequestration that began in 2013 under an earlier deal to raise the country’s debt limit.
      […]
      When you really look at how much time they have at actual training and readiness, it’s continued to shrink,” McCain said. “We have accident after accident after accident. We are killing more Americans in uniform in training than we are in engagement with the enemy. That’s not acceptable.