• Des graphiques pour mesurer l’#impéritie et l’#incurie.

    Dans le discours de Macron de mercredi 28 octobre, on pouvait entendre : « Nous sommes surpris » et quelques phrases plus loin, « Nous nous y attendions ». En fait si on les comprend bien, ils s’attendaient à être surpris.

    Thread by Panda31808732 on Thread Reader App – Thread Reader App
    https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1321935155041361921.html

    Félicitations au gouvernement pour son grand chelem ! Par sa nullité stupéfiante, l’exécutif est parvenu à noircir toute la France métropolitaine en 15 semaines. Nous pouvons à présent lui décerner le label IOC (Incompétence d’Origine Contrôlée).

  • Un salon, un bar et une classe : c’est ainsi que le #coronavirus se propage dans l’air
    Le media espagnol El Pais propose une nouvelle mise à jour de la #visualisation des différentes formes de transmission du #Covid19 en espaces clos :
    1/ privés (un salon)
    2/ scolaires (une classe)
    3/ publics (un bar)
    selon des processus :
    1/ sans protection
    2/ avec masques
    3/ avec masques & ventilation
    Ainsi que des visualisations de la propagation par gouttelettes & aérosol selon qu’on ne parle pas, qu’on parle, ou qu’on crie/chante.
    https://elpais.com/ciencia/2020-10-24/un-salon-un-bar-y-una-clase-asi-contagia-el-coronavirus-en-el-aire.html [en espagnol]

    Les visualisations proviennent du « Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences at the University of Colorado Boulder » qui avait été initié lancé ça en juin avec une première médiatisation par le même El Pais nous ayant permis de mieux faire comprendre ce processus #aérosol si difficile à faire admettre. (je mettrai le lien de l’article précédent #seenthisé quand je le retrouverai)

  • Un salón, un bar y una clase: así contagia el #coronavirus en el aire | Ciencia | EL PAÍS
    https://elpais.com/ciencia/2020-10-24/un-salon-un-bar-y-una-clase-asi-contagia-el-coronavirus-en-el-aire.html?ssm=

    Los interiores son más peligrosos, pero es posible minimizar los riesgos si se ponen en juego todas las medidas disponibles para combatir el contagio por #aerosoles. Estas son las probabilidades de infección en estos tres escenarios cotidianos dependiendo de la ventilación, las mascarillas y la duración del encuentro

  • Chronique d’une communication cartographique ratée. Déconstruction critique des cartes du gouvernement français pendant la crise de la COVID-19 au printemps 2020

    Le gouvernement français[1] a montré 40 cartes différentes concernant les enjeux sanitaires de la crise liée à l’#épidémie de COVID-19 entre mars et juin 2020[2]. Le Premier ministre Édouard Philippe, son ministre de la Santé Olivier Véran et le directeur général de la santé, Jérôme Salomon, ont tour à tour présenté lors de leurs conférences de presse régulières des #cartes représentant les transferts de patients en #réanimation [3], le #taux_d’occupation des services de réanimation [4], les rapatriements [5], les passages aux urgences dus à des suspicions de COVID-19 [6], la couverture des besoins en #tests_virologiques [7], la positivité de ces tests, l’évolution du R-effectif [8], et des synthèses de certaines de ces différentes informations [9]. La quasi-totalité des cartes (93 %) représente l’un de ces #indicateurs à l’échelle de la France métropolitaine et des Départements et Régions d’Outre-Mer (DROM), selon les mailles départementales (59 % des cartes) ou régionales (37 %).

    Il y a trente ans, les travaux de John Brian Harley sur la #déconstruction des cartes (Harley, 1989), de Dennis Woods sur leur pouvoir (Woods, 1992), ou encore de Mark Monmonier sur les mensonges dont elles peuvent être porteuses (Monmonier, 1991), avertissaient de l’intrication du #pouvoir et des #techniques_cartographiques, du caractère construit et discursif des cartes, et donc de la nécessité d’un #décodage_critique de ces images et des #croyances_positivistes qui y sont associées. Il est aujourd’hui encore nécessaire d’adopter cette démarche critique pour comprendre le statut et la portée des quarante cartes gouvernementales du Coronavirus. Ainsi peut-on mettre en lumière que ces cartes ne sont pas dissociables des #discours qui les accompagnent (ou qu’elles accompagnent) et qu’ensemble ils servent finalement moins à l’exposition de faits scientifiques, qu’à la gestion d’une #crise_politique.

    http://www.jssj.org/article/chronique-dune-communication-cartographique-ratee-deconstruction-critique-des-

    #cartographie #cartes_gouvernementales #France #visualisation #confinement #covid-19 #coronavirus #vert #rouge

    On avait parlé de ces cartes sur seenthis... mais je ne retrouve pas le fil de discussion...

    via @reka
    ping @simplicissimus @visionscarto

  • Sur la #chute de l’Université, en quatre graphes
    d’après Guillaume Miquelard, maître de conférences habilité en physique des polymères, auteur d’un blog EducPros Un tout petit monde : http://blog.educpros.fr/guillaume-miquelard-et-paul-francois/2015/11/10/evolution-des-effectifs-a-luniversite-personnels-et-etudiants

    Évolution du nombre d’étudiant∙es à l’Université (modulo de petites incertitudes liées à des chiffres concaténés de sources différentes), par Guillaume Miquelard, 2020 :

    Il s’agit de l’évolution du nombre de postes ouverts aux concours MCF sur plus de 20 ans1. Les chiffres 2020 sont provisoires (mais d’ores et déjà légèrement meilleurs que 2019)

    Par « postes proposés », entendre « ouvertures autorisées par le MESRI ». Toutes ne sont pas transformées en postes ouverts (publiés) par les établissements. Tous les postes publiés ne sont pas pourvus. Enfin les « nouveaux postes » sont les nouveaux entrants (donc minoré de détachement/mutation). « Postes proposés total » somme les postes MCF et PU.

    Depuis trois ans, on observe moins de 1000 nouveaux recrutés MCF. Le passage sous la barre des 2000 nouveaux recrutés a eu lieu autour de 2007. Dix ans auparavant, on était à 3000 nouveaux recrutés par an. Pour « MCF + PU », on est passé à moins de 2000 postes en 2018. Nous sommes à 1700 postes proposés MCF + PU aujourd’hui.

    Évolution du « stock » des personnels enseignants à l’Université (modulo de petites incertitudes liées à des chiffres concaténés de sources différentes), par Guillaume Miquelard, 2020 :

    Pour résumer, il y a quinze ans, 20% des docteurs formé·es devenaient MCF. Iels sont aujourd’hui 7%.

    « Je ne sais pas pourquoi [mais@ je repense toujours à cette planche de Pétillon où Jack Palmer écoute la radio qui annonce une chute vertigineuse de toutes les actions à la bourse, avant de s’éteindre et Jack Palmer se dit « soit les piles sont mortes soit c’est vraiment la fin » (Tweet de Guillaume Miquelard, 17 octobre 2020).

    https://academia.hypotheses.org/26900
    #université #statistiques #France #facs #chiffres #personnel #effectifs #étudiants #visualisation #graphique #MCF #doctorat #ESR

    ping @simplicissimus

  • La géographie du programme d’hébergement des demandeurs d’asile « #ESTIA » à Athènes

    A partir de 2015, avec l’arrivée massive de populations réfugiées en Grèce, toute une série de programmes destinés aux demandeurs d’asile et aux réfugiés ont été élaborés et mis en œuvre par divers acteurs, principalement dans l’espace urbain athénien. Ces programmes recouvrent (directement ou indirectement) différents aspects de la problématique d’implantation socio-spatiale des demandeurs d’asile et des réfugiés dans le cadre de la ville, ce qui soulève des questions concernant les tendances à l’œuvre, ainsi que les actions institutionnelles visant à favoriser la cohabitation des différentes communautés au niveau local.

    Cet article analyse les dimensions socio-spatiales et la géographie du programme d’hébergement « ESTIA » pour les demandeurs d’asile à Athènes. En dépit du fait que ces dimensions n’aient pas été strictement et publiquement déterminées au cours de l’élaboration du programme, elles seront ici explorées de façon sélective à travers : a) les critères de localisation des structures de l’ESTIA (appartements et bâtiments) au sein du tissu urbain, et b) le discours et la vision des acteurs compétents en matière de diversité ethnique, de répartition et de ségrégation socio-spatiale à Athènes. En outre, nous commenterons le cadre d’élaboration de l’ESTIA, entre « urgence » et « intégration », ainsi que l’importance d’un certain nombre d’actions urbaines qui ont été réalisées. Les aspects ainsi analysés sont liés à l’interaction entre les différents groupes ethniques au sein de la ville, ils entrent en résonance avec les conceptions véhiculées par les études urbaines et la cohabitation interethnique comme processus inextricablement dépendant de l’espace, et rappellent le caractère fondamental de questions telles que la diversité ethnique, la mixité et la ségrégation socio-spatiales.

    Cette recherche a été menée dans le cadre de la thèse de doctorat de l’auteure. La méthodologie suivie consiste en une analyse de la législation relative au sujet, d’un suivi systématique des politiques menées, du rassemblement, traitement et cartographie de données quantitatives, et d’interviews semi-formelles de représentants des structures impliquées.

    https://www.athenssocialatlas.gr/fr/article/la-geographie-du-programme-estia
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #hébergement #logement #Athènes #Grèce #cartographie #visualisation

  • Le quartier d’habitat social à #Tavros

    La zone étudiée est l’un des quartiers créés à Athènes (comme ceux de Dourgouti, Asyrmatos, Ambelokipi, etc.) afin de loger les réfugiés d’Asie Mineure de la décennie 1920. L’installation des réfugiés s’est faite soit par auto-installation dans des baraquements, soit de manière organisée dans des logements construits par l’État. Au cours des années qui ont suivi le quartier a reçu un grand nombre de migrants de l’intérieur, tandis que dès les années 1950 débute la construction progressive d’immeubles dédiés au relogement des réfugiés et ouvriers vivant dans les baraquements. Contrairement à d’autres zones d’habitation de réfugiés (comme par exemple Ilissos, Polygono, Kountouriotika), qui ont été rasés et dont les traces se sont perdues puisqu’elles se sont totalement fondues dans le tissu urbain environnant, Tavros est parvenu, à travers la création d’ensembles de logements sociaux, à conserver ses particularités vis-à-vis de son environnement large.


    https://www.athenssocialatlas.gr/fr/article/lhabitat-social-a-tavros
    #urbanisme #géographie_urbaine #Grèce #Athènes #habitat_social #cartographie #visualisation #réfugiés #histoire #quartiers_de_réfugiés

  • Fiches de l’Observatoire de l’#Arctique

    Fiche n°1 : flotte de #brise-glaces en Arctique
    https://m365.eu.vadesecure.com/safeproxy/v3?f=4W-_LNCpVh4OQ4LaYcPIUtIGcU6NseFpwdBX0wHgVGkQLGZvTOLqk2EDbYd

    Fiche n°2 : la #route_maritime du Nord-Est - #NSR
    https://m365.eu.vadesecure.com/safeproxy/v3?f=KDbyoJSal_7U4bEftb81LeVUo4hPD8tGc1U3ST3I3yXqo8a_RbixIBe4R5r

    Fiche n°3 : l’étendue de la #banquise et ses conséquences sur les #routes_maritimes
    https://m365.eu.vadesecure.com/safeproxy/v3?f=-Gwzjcun3_eFbd9Pjv-Wwh-oQLYKm-pQi8W-xHxBGID68u4aSQfhCbhJ_8j

    Fiche n°4 : les moyens de communications en Arctique
    http://www.polar-navigation.com/pdf/F4_moyens_COMMS_Arctique_BAUDU.pdf

    Fiche n°7 : les moyens de #navigation le long de la route maritime du Nord
    http://www.polar-navigation.com/pdf/F7_organisation_Nav_Arctique_BAUDU.pdf

    Fiche n°12 : les #tankers LNG #brise-glaces #ARC7 #YamalMax
    http://www.polar-navigation.com/pdf/F12_ARC7%20LNG%20YamalMax%20tanker_BAUDU.pdf

    A venir :

    Fiche n°5 : les terminaux gaziers et pétroliers de l’Arctique russe
    Fiche n°6 : l’organisation SAR en Arctique
    Fiche n°8 : l’organisation de la NSR
    Fiche n°9 : la réglementation maritime de l’Arctique
    Fiche n°10 : les bases militaires russes le long de la NSR
    Fiche n°11 : le corridor maritime russe

    http://www.polar-navigation.com
    #cartographie #visualisation

    ping @reka @simplicissimus

  • Accaparement de terres numérique en Amérique du Sud
    https://www.cetri.be/Accaparement-de-terres-numerique

    Un rapport publié par l’ONG de défense des luttes paysannes GRAIN décrit comment les technologies numériques sont aujourd’hui utilisées en Amérique du Sud pour renforcer les processus de concentration des terres agricoles dans les mains d’une poignée d’acteurs privés au détriment des petits paysans et des communautés indigènes. L’Amérique latine est tristement célèbre pour ses niveaux records d’inégalités socio-économiques, y compris et d’abord en matière d’accès à la terre. Un pour cent des propriétaires (...) #Le_regard_du_CETRI

    / Amérique latine & Caraïbes, #Enjeux_numériques, #Agrobusiness,_Agro-industrie, Agriculture & luttes pour la terre, #Homepage_-_Actualités_à_la_une, #Le_Sud_en_mouvement, Le regard du (...)

    #Amérique_latine_&_Caraïbes #Agriculture_&_luttes_pour_la_terre #Le_regard_du_CETRI

  • Mon combat pour la toponymie aïnoue
    https://topophile.net/savoir/mon-combat-pour-la-toponymie-ainoue

    Si tout le monde sait que « la géographie, ça sert d’abord à faire la guerre » (selon l’expression d’Yves Lacoste), on ignore plus souvent la puissance culturelle de la toponymie dans l’oppression d’un peuple par un pouvoir colonial. C’est précisément ce que nous révèle le géographe japonais Ono Yûgo à travers son combat pour la réhabilitation... Voir l’article

    • « Nous avons besoin d’établissements universitaires à taille humaine, structurés en petites entités autonomes »

      Pour répondre à l’augmentation du nombre d’étudiants et à la crise sanitaire, un collectif d’universitaires propose, dans une tribune au « Monde », un plan d’urgence pour 2021. Et recommande notamment l’ouverture de trois nouvelles universités dans des villes moyennes.

      A l’université, la rentrée prend des airs de cauchemar. Nous payons le fait qu’en dix ans, l’ensemble des instances locales de délibération et de décision, qui auraient été les plus à même d’anticiper les problèmes, ont été privées de leurs capacités d’action au profit de strates bureaucratiques.

      Le pouvoir centralisé de celles-ci n’a d’égal que leur incapacité à gérer même les choses les plus simples, comme l’approvisionnement en gel hydroalcoolique et en lingettes. Le succès instantané du concept de « démerdentiel » est un désaveu cinglant pour ces manageurs qui ne savent que produire des communiqués erratiques jonglant entre rentrée en « présentiel » et en « distanciel ».

      On sait pourtant à quelles conditions les universités, au lieu de devenir des foyers de contagion, auraient pu contribuer à endiguer la circulation du virus : des tests salivaires collectifs pour chaque groupe de travaux dirigés (TD), à l’instar de ce qui est mis en place à Urbana-Champaign, aux Etats-Unis ; la mise à disposition de thermomètres frontaux ; une amélioration des systèmes de ventilation de chaque salle et de chaque amphi, avec adjonction de filtres à air HEPA et de flashs UV [des rayons désinfectants] si nécessaire ; l’installation de capteurs de qualité de l’air dans chaque pièce, avec un seuil d’alerte ; la réquisition de locaux vacants et le recrutement de personnel pour dédoubler cours et TD, partout où cela est requis.

      Un budget insuffisant

      Les grandes villes ne manquent pas d’immeubles sous-exploités, souvent issus du patrimoine de l’Etat, qui auraient pu être très vite transformés en annexes universitaires. De brillants titulaires d’un doctorat capables d’enseigner immédiatement à temps plein attendent, par milliers, un poste depuis des années. Tout était possible en l’espace de ces huit derniers mois, rien n’a été fait.

      De prime abord, on serait tenté d’attribuer ce bilan au fait que la crise sanitaire, inédite, a pris de court les bureaucraties universitaires, très semblables à celles qui, depuis vingt ans, entendent piloter les hôpitaux avec le succès que l’on a vu.

      Mais une autre donnée vient éclairer cette rentrée : les universités accueillent 57 700 nouveaux étudiants, sans amphithéâtre ni salle supplémentaire, sans le moindre matériel, sans le plus petit recrutement d’universitaires et de personnel administratif et technique. Ces trois dernières années, le budget des universités a crû de 1,3 % par an, ce qui est inférieur à l’effet cumulé de l’inflation et de l’accroissement mécanique de la masse salariale.

      Certains se prévaudront sans doute de l’« effort sans commune mesure depuis 1945 » qu’est censée manifester la loi de programmation de la recherche en discussion au Parlement. Las : le projet de budget du gouvernement ne prévoit qu’un accroissement, pour les universités, de 1,1 % en 2021… Du reste, les 8,2 milliards d’euros d’abondement sur dix ans du budget de l’université proviennent des 11,6 milliards d’euros qui seront prélevés dans les salaires bruts des universitaires, en application de la réforme des retraites.

      Réquisitions et réaménagements

      Il y a quinze ans, les statistiques prévisionnelles de l’Etat annonçaient que la population étudiante allait croître de 30 % entre 2010 et 2025 (soit 400 000 étudiants en plus), pour des raisons démographiques et grâce à l’allongement de la durée des études. On aurait donc largement pu anticiper ces 57 700 nouveaux étudiants. Mais rien n’a été fait là non plus, hormis annoncer des « créations de places » jamais converties en moyens.

      Le pic démographique n’est pas derrière nous ; nos étudiants sont là pour plusieurs années, et les gestes barrières pourraient devoir être maintenus durablement. Le ministère ne peut pas persévérer comme si de rien n’était, voire arguer qu’il est déjà trop tard.

      Face à cette situation désastreuse, nous demandons une vaste campagne de recrutement de personnels titulaires dans tous les corps de métiers, tout en amorçant les réquisitions et réaménagements de locaux, afin d’aborder la rentrée 2021 dans des conditions acceptables.

      Parallèlement, si nous ne voulons pas être en permanence en retard d’une crise, un saut qualitatif est nécessaire. Nous demandons donc, outre un plan d’urgence pour 2021, la création rapide de trois universités expérimentales de taille moyenne (20 000 étudiants), correspondant à ce qui aurait dû être fait pour accueillir 57 700 étudiants dans de bonnes conditions. Cela requiert le recrutement sous statut de 4 200 universitaires et 3 400 personnels d’appui et de soutien supplémentaires, soit un budget de 500 millions d’euros par an.

      S’extraire du cauchemar

      Nous avons besoin d’établissements à taille humaine, structurés en petites entités autonomes, mises en réseau confédéral, si besoin grâce au numérique ; d’établissements qui offrent à notre jeunesse maltraitée des perspectives d’émancipation vis-à-vis du milieu d’origine et de la sclérose intellectuelle qui frappe le pays ; d’établissements qui permettent une recherche autonome, collégiale et favorisant le temps long, ce qui nous a manqué dans l’anticipation et la prévention de la pandémie.

      Pour cela, nous préconisons l’installation de ces trois universités dans des villes moyennes, hors des métropoles, en prenant appui sur le patrimoine bâti abandonné par l’Etat et sur les biens sous-utilisés des collectivités. En effet, celles-ci possèdent d’anciens tribunaux, des garnisons, voire des bâtiments ecclésiastiques qui tombent aujourd’hui en déshérence.

      Réinvesti par l’université, ce patrimoine retrouverait une utilité sociale. Sur la base des dépenses de l’« opération Campus » [un plan lancé en 2008 en faveur de l’immobilier universitaire], la construction de ces pôles dotés de résidences étudiantes en nombre suffisant nécessiterait un milliard d’euros d’investissement, à quoi il faudrait ajouter cent millions d’euros de frais de maintenance et d’entretien. C’est le prix pour s’extraire du cauchemar. Le virus se nourrit de nos renoncements. Pour sortir les campus de l’ornière, nous devons retrouver l’ambition d’une université forte, exigeante, libre et ouverte.

      Stéphane André, professeur en ingénierie à l’université de Lorraine ; Bruno Andreotti, professeur en physique à l’université de Paris ; Pascale Dubus, maîtresse de conférences en histoire de l’art à l’université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne ; Julien Gossa, maître de conférences en informatique à l’université de Strasbourg ; Jacques Haiech, professeur honoraire de biotechnologie à l’université de Strasbourg ; Pérola Milman, directrice de recherche en physique quantique au CNRS ; Pierre-Yves Modicom, maître de conférences en linguistique allemande à l’université Bordeaux-Montaigne ; Johanna Siméant-Germanos, professeure en sciences politiques à l’Ecole normale supérieure.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/09/28/nous-avons-besoin-d-etablissements-universitaires-a-taille-humaine-structure

    • Comment la loi de programmation de la recherche aggrave les inégalités entre territoires en France

      La loi de programmation pluriannuelle de la recherche (LPR) qui est actuellement en débat au Parlement et crispe le monde universitaire français s’inscrit dans le prolongement de réformes menées en France depuis 20 ans.

      Au-delà des alternances politiques, les lois successives ont eu pour point commun de se fonder sur ce que certains chercheurs ont appelé des croyances inspirées pour la plupart de modèles macro-économiques prônant la compétition et la destruction créatrice. Elles peuvent être résumées à l’aide d’un petit nombre d’axiomes, ces vérités admises sans démonstration.

      La recherche française est en déclin et n’arrive pas à faire face à la concurrence mondiale.

      Il découle de ce premier axiome la nécessité d’imposer des réformes au nom de l’intérêt national.

      La concentration des moyens de la recherche publique autour de quelques grands pôles est plus efficace que leur équipartition entre l’ensemble des établissements.

      Ce second axiome a justifié la mise en place successive d’une dizaine de conglomérats (PRES, COMUE ou IDEX) supposés répondre le mieux aux critères d’excellence et de taille.

      La compétition est le moteur principal de la performance, tant au niveau des individus que des établissements de recherche ou des territoires qui les accueillent.

      Ce dernier axiome justifie, d’une part, la mise en place d’avantages spécifiques pour les individus réputés les plus performants (accès au statut de membre de l’Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), obtention d’un poste de tenure tracks) et, d’autre part, un cumul de crédits au profit des établissements de recherche qui en ont obtenu antérieurement (notamment avec l’accroissement du préciput dans la LPR).

      Mais ces axiomes sont-ils démontrés ? Et quel est l’impact de leur application en matière d’aménagement du territoire ?
      La position de la recherche française dans les réseaux internationaux

      En 2016, d’après le dernier rapport de l’OST-HCERES, la France se situait au 8e rang mondial en production et au 5e rang en part de citations reçues par sa production. Malgré une augmentation continue du volume de ses publications internationales, la place relative de la France a baissé depuis le début des années 2000 ce qui contribue à alimenter l’idée d’un déclin… sauf que sur la même période, la Chine est passée du 8e au 2e rang mondial et l’Inde du 12e au 6e. Aussi, cette évolution traduit bien davantage la montée en puissance des pays émergents qu’une crise spécifique à la France.

      Le fait même de totaliser le volume de recherche par pays tend à masquer le fonctionnement réel de la recherche qui s’opère en réseau. L’examen détaillé des dynamiques de coopération scientifique montre d’ailleurs le rôle croissant joué par les petites villes universitaires françaises dans la production mondiale.

      Cette évolution résulte du rôle croissant des établissements d’enseignement supérieur dans la recherche mondiale. Les universités s’étant multipliées et diffusées dans l’armature urbaine au cours du XXᵉ siècle, la recherche est devenue plus polycentrique et l’on peut sans exagérer affirmer qu’elle n’est plus exclusivement le fait de quelques savants concentrés dans quelques hauts lieux de la connaissance, et a fortiori pour le cas de la France, à Paris.

      Sur le plan international, la France est bien intégrée au réseau scientifique mondial du fait des nombreux liens de coopération plutôt que de compétition qu’elle a su tisser et qui bénéficient à la fois de proximités spatiales et linguistiques, en témoignent encore une fois les derniers rapports de l’OST-HCERES.
      Concentration et rendements décroissants

      La recherche s’opérant à travers un réseau de villes universitaires, est-il pertinent comme le propose la LPR de concentrer les moyens dans quelques établissements des grandes métropoles françaises ?

      Un ensemble de travaux repris dans un dossier de La Vie des Idées montrent le rôle contre-productif de la concentration des crédits de recherche sur une petite élite et suggèrent que la meilleure recherche ne se fait ni nécessairement dans les plus grosses équipes, ni dans les plus grandes villes.

      Comme l’écrivait déjà la géographe Madeleine Brocard en 1991 dont les propos n’ont pas été démentis depuis :

      « La notion de “pôle d’excellence scientifique” revient régulièrement dans les discours concernant la recherche publique, puisqu’il s’agit de répartir les moyens de l’État. Elle s’appuie sur l’idée qu’il existe des effets de seuil : au-delà d’un certain seuil quantitatif de chercheurs dans une discipline donnée, la concentration de matière grise et d’équipements déclencherait l’étincelle. Cela n’a jamais été prouvé. »

      Les politiques menées depuis le début des années 2000 se sont pourtant employées à créer de grands pôles universitaires au prétexte de remonter les universités françaises dans le classement de Shanghai.

      En observant les dynamiques de recherche françaises entre 1980 et 2017, on observe cependant que les villes ayant bénéficié des financements issus des politiques d’excellence n’ont pas, suite à l’application de ces politiques, participé davantage que les villes petites et moyennes à la production scientifique du pays. Depuis la fin des années 1970, on assiste au contraire à une déconcentration et à une diversification des espaces de production du savoir, quelle que soit l’échelle d’analyse.
      L’importance des petits centres et des réseaux de proximité

      Créative, de qualité, la recherche menée dans les petits sites est en mesure de se connecter aux réseaux de recherche internationaux comme aux tissus locaux par le biais de coopérations avec des entreprises, d’actions de médiations et de valorisation des savoirs.

      On peut prendre le cas de la Fédération de recherche en chimie durable connue sous le nom du réseau INCREASE, dont le siège se trouve à Poitiers, qui mobilise des industriels locaux et internationaux, ainsi que des équipes de recherche en pointe réparties dans plusieurs villes de l’arc atlantique, et qui organise tous les deux ans un grand colloque international dans la ville de La Rochelle.

      Priver des universités de taille modeste comme Poitiers ou La Rochelle de moyens pour faire de la recherche, c’est risquer de nuire à la capacité de production académique du pays dans son ensemble, à la vitalité des territoires, et de fragiliser les réseaux de recherche tel que le réseau INCREASE. Or, nous l’avons vu, la circulation des idées que ce réseau permet entre villes de différentes régions ainsi qu’entre scientifiques de différentes spécialités et nationalités alimente les avancées scientifiques.

      Analyse prospective des effets démographiques et économiques de la LPR

      L’aménagement du territoire, cette « ardente obligation » selon le mot du général de Gaulle, semble bien mis à mal par la concentration croissante des moyens publics de recherche et d’enseignement supérieur au profit d’un très petit nombre de campus et d’initiatives d’excellences.

      En concentrant les populations de jeunes diplômés dans quelques points du territoire, la LPR risque d’amplifier la décroissance démographique des espaces périphériques ou des villes petites et moyennes. Elle va également accentuer les inégalités entre les régions et à l’intérieur de celle-ci.

      Une étude réalisée pour le Parlement européen sur les régions en décroissance et ultérieurement complétée par un ouvrage de synthèse en français permet de situer les effets prévisibles de la LPR par rapport trois types de stratégies d’aménagement du territoire et de décentralisation.

      La stratégie de métropolisation correspond à une politique de laissez-faire dénoncée en 2017 par un rapport du Sénat :

      « le développement économique se concentre essentiellement autour de quelques pôles métropolitains. Par contraste, de nombreux territoires connaissent un sentiment d’abandon et de « décrochage »).

      Or, notre analyse montre que les impacts négatifs de cette politique en termes de cohésion sociale et territoriale ne semblent nullement compensés par une efficacité économique supérieure.

      La stratégie de sacrifice territorial correspond davantage à la stratégie d’université d’excellence développée en Allemagne où le réseau urbain est moins polarisé par la capitale nationale. Mais il permet d’anticiper en France les effets de la LPR dans les nouvelles régions fusionnées issues des réformes territoriales de 2014-2015.

      Les anciennes régions affaiblies par la perte de leur capitale régionale (Champagne-Ardennes, Lorraine, Auvergne, Limousin, Poitou-Charentes, Picardie…) risquent de voir leur tissu scientifique et économique destructurés au profit d’une nouvelle métropole éloignée concentrant les crédits de recherche.

      La stratégie du polycentrisme en réseau supposerait au contraire la mise en place de réseaux scientifiques à la fois territoriaux et thématiques visant à maximiser les synergies locales et les connexions nationales et internationales. Leur objectif consisterait tout d’abord à développer d’authentiques politiques régionales de mise en réseau des acteurs de la recherche et de l’innovation. Mais également à mettre en place des fédérations de recherche d’échelle nationale et internationale autour de domaines scientifiques ou d’enjeux industriels précis, à l’exemple de la chimie.

      Une politique aveugle au fonctionnement des territoires et des réseaux

      En l’absence d’une concertation suffisante avec les représentants légitimes des territoires et de toute consultation des citoyens, la Loi de programmation pluriannuelle de la recherche tourne résolument le dos à plus d’un demi-siècle de politique d’aménagement du territoire en France.

      Aveugle à l’espace, cette politique remet en cause la politique de décentralisation et risque par là même de renforcer le mécontentement des citoyens face aux nouvelles régions ou métropoles issues de la loi MAPTAM. À l’intérieur des grandes métropoles, elle va pourrait également contribuer au renforcement de la ségrégation sociale en opposant les étudiants des établissements universitaires sélectifs à des universités périphériques ouvertes à tous mais paupérisées.

      Rejoignant les conclusions du rapport sénatorial de 2017 nous constatons que la conséquence de la « passivité » de l’État est un accroissement sans précédent des inégalités entre les territoires et le sentiment pour une partie de la population d’être « oubliée de la République ».

      Et par ailleurs que :

      « La seule issue serait d’engager une nouvelle politique d’aménagement du territoire forte et volontariste impliquant des évolutions institutionnelles et l’ensemble des parties prenantes (élus, administrations locales et centrales, acteurs privés, etc.). »

      A contrario de la LPR, le plan « Université 2000 » (1990-1995) puis le plan « Université du 3ᵉ millénaire » (1999-2000) avaient permis d’assurer un rééquilibrage qualitatif et quantitatif de l’offre de formation à tous les niveaux urbains. Face à des décisions qui vont engager l’avenir des territoires français, il apparaît nécessaire d’examiner plus précisément les conséquences prévisibles de la LPR en matière d’aménagement du territoire et de décentralisation. Et d’explorer la possibilité de mettre en place d’autres stratégies n’impliquant pas la destruction supposée « créatrice » des réseaux scientifiques et territoriaux.

      https://theconversation.com/comment-la-loi-de-programmation-de-la-recherche-aggrave-les-inegali

  • The Frontier Within: The European Border Regime in the Balkans

    In the summer of 2015, the migratory route across the Balkans »entered into the European spotlight, and indeed onto the screen of the global public« (Kasparek 2016: 2), triggering different interpretations and responses. Contrary to the widespread framing of the mass movement of people seeking refuge in Europe as ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹ of unseen proportions, we opt for the perspective of »the long Summer of Migration« (Kasparek/Speer 2015) and an interpretation that regards it as »a historic and monumental year of migration for Europe precisely because disobedient mass mobilities have disrupted the European regime of border control« (Stierl/Heller/de Genova 2016: 23). In reaction to the disobedient mass mobilities of people, a state-tolerated and even state-organized transit of people, a »formalized corridor« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016), was gradually established. To avoid the concentration of unwanted migrants on their territory, countries along the route—sometimes in consultation with their neighboring countries and EU member states, sometimes simply by creating facts—strived to regain control over the movements by channeling and isolating them by means of the corridor (see e.g. Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Speer 2017; Tošić 2017). »Migrants didn’t travel the route any more: they were hurriedly channeled along, no longer having the power to either determine their own movement or their own speed« (Kasparek 2016). The corridor, at the same time, facilitated and tamed the movement of people. In comparison to the situation in Serbia, where migrants were loosely directed to follow the path of the corridor (see e.g. Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017; Kasparek 2016: 6), migrants in other states like North Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia were literally in the corridor’s power, i.e. forced to follow the corridor (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Chudoska Blazhevska/Flores Juberías 2016: 231–232; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47; Petrović 2018). The corridor was operative in different and constantly changing modalities until March 2016. Since then, migration through the Balkan region still takes place, with migrants struggling on a daily basis with the diverse means of tightened border controls that all states along the Balkan route have been practicing since.

    This movements issue wants to look back on these events in an attempt to analytically make sense of them and to reflect on the historical rupture of the months of 2015 and 2016. At the same time, it tries to analyze the ongoing developments of bordering policies and the struggles of migration. It assembles a broad range of articles reaching from analytical or research based papers shedding light on various regional settings and topics, such as the massive involvement of humanitarian actors or the role of camp infrastructures, to more activist-led articles reflecting on the different phases and settings of pro-migrant struggles and transnational solidarity practices. In an attempt to better understand the post-2015 border regime, the issue furthermore presents analyses of varying political technologies of bordering that evolved along the route in response to the mass mobilities of 2015/2016. It especially focuses on the excessive use of different dimensions of violence that seem to characterize the new modalities of the border regime, such as the omnipresent practice of push-backs. Moreover, the articles shed light on the ongoing struggles of transit mobility and (transnational) solidarity that are specifically shaped by the more than eventful history of the region molded both by centuries of violent interventions and a history of connectivity.

    Our transnational editorial group came together in the course of a summer school on the border regime in the Balkans held in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2018. It was organized by the Network for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies (kritnet), University of Göttingen, Department of Cultural Anthropology/European Ethnology (Germany), the Research Centre of the Academy of Sciences and Arts (Slovenia), the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research (Croatia), and the Institute of Ethnography SASA (Serbia). The summer school assembled engaged academics from all over the region that were involved, in one form or another, in migration struggles along the route in recent years.1 The few days of exchange proved to be an exciting and fruitful gathering of critical migration and border regime scholars and activists from different regional and disciplinary backgrounds of the wider Balkans. Therefore, we decided to produce this movements issue by inviting scholars and activists from the region or with a deep knowledge on, and experience with, regional histories and politics in order to share their analyses of the Balkan route, the formalized corridor, and the developments thereafter. These developments have left a deep imprint on the societies and regional politics of migration, but they are very rarely taken into consideration and studied in the West as the centuries long entanglements that connect the Balkan with the rest of Europe.

    In this editorial, we will outline the transnational mobility practices in the Balkans in a historical perspective that includes the framework of EU-Balkan relations. With this exercise we try to historize the events of 2015 which are portrayed in many academic as well as public accounts as ›unexpected‹ and ›new‹. We also intend to write against the emergency and escalation narrative underlying most public discourses on the Balkans and migration routes today, which is often embedded in old cultural stereotypes about the region. We, furthermore, write against the emergency narrative because it erodes the agency of migration that has not only connected the region with the rest of the globe but is also constantly reinventing new paths for reaching better lives. Not only the history of mobilities, migrations, and flight connecting the region with the rest of Europe and the Middle East can be traced back into the past, but also the history of political interventions and attempts to control these migrations and mobilities by western European states. Especially the EU accession processes produce contexts that made it possible to gradually integrate the (Western) Balkan states into the rationale of EU migration management, thus, setting the ground for today’s border and migration regime. However, as we will show in the following sections, we also argue against simplified understandings of the EU border regime that regard its externalization policy as an imperial top-down act. Rather, with a postcolonial perspective that calls for decentering western knowledge, we will also shed light on the agency of the national governments of the region and their own national(ist) agendas.
    The Formalized Corridor

    As outlined above, the formalized corridor of 2015 reached from Greece to Northern and Central Europe, leading across the states established in the 1990s during the violent breakdown of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, today, are additionally stratified vis-à-vis the EU. Slovenia and Croatia are EU member states, while the others are still in the accession process. The candidate states Serbia, North Macedonia and Montenegro have opened the negotiation process. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo—still not recognized as a sovereign state by Serbia and some EU member states—have the status of potential candidates. However, in 2015 and 2016, the states along the corridor efficiently collaborated for months on a daily basis, while, at the same time, fostering separate, sometimes conflicting, migration politics. Slovenia, for example, raised a razor-wire fence along the border to Croatia, while Croatia externalized its border to Serbia with a bilateral agreement (Protokol) in 2015 which stated that the »Croatian Party« may send a »train composition with its crew to the railway station in Šid [in Serbia], with a sufficient number of police officers of the Republic of Croatia as escort« (Article 3 Paragraph 2).

    Despite ruptures and disputes, states nevertheless organized transit in the form of corridor consisting of trains, buses, and masses of walking people that were guarded and directed by the police who forced people on the move to follow the corridor’s direction and speed. The way the movements were speedily channeled in some countries came at the cost of depriving people of their liberty and freedom of movement, which calls for an understanding of the corridor as a specific form of detention: a mobile detention, ineligible to national or EU legislation (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47). In the context of the corridor, camps became convergence points for the heterogeneous pathways of movements. Nevertheless, having in mind both the proclaimed humanitarian purpose of the corridor, and the monumental numbers of people to whom the corridor enabled and facilitated movement, the corridor can be designated as an unprecedented formation in recent EU history. In other words: »The corridor – with all its restrictions – remains a historical event initiated by the movement of people, which enabled thousands to reach central Europe in a relatively quick and safe manner. […] But at the same time it remained inscribed within a violent migration management system« (Santer/Wriedt 2017: 148).

    For some time, a broad consensus can be observed within migration and border studies and among policy makers that understands migration control as much more than simply protecting a concrete borderline. Instead, concepts such as migration management (Oelgemoller 2017; Geiger/Pécoud 2010) and border externalization (as specifically spelled out in the EU document Global Approach to Migration of 2005) have become increasingly important. In a spatial sense, what many of them have in common is, first, that they assume an involvement of neighboring states to govern migration in line with EU migration policies. Second, it is often stated that this leads to the creation of different zones encircling the European Union (Andreas/Snyder 2000). Maribel Casas-Cortes and Sebastian Cobarrubias, for instance, speak of four such zones: the first zone is »formed by EU member states, capable of fulfilling Schengen standards«, the second zone »consists of transit countries« (Casas-Cortes/Cobarrubias 2019), the third zone is characterized by countries such as Turkey, which are depicted by emigration as well as transit, and the fourth zone are countries of origin. While Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias rightly criticize the static and eurocentric perspective of such conceptualizations, they nevertheless point to the unique nature of the formalized corridor because it crisscrossed the above mentioned zones of mobility control in an unprecedented way.

    Furthermore, the corridor through the Balkans can be conceived as a special type of transnational, internalized border. The internalized European borders manifest themselves to a great extent in a punctiform (see Rahola 2011: 96–97). They are not only activated in formal settings of border-crossings, police stations, or detention centers both at state borders and deep within state territories, but also in informal settings of hospitals, hostels, in the streets, or when someone’s legal status is taken as a basis for denying access to rights and services (i.e. to obtain medical aid, accommodation, ride) (Guild 2001; Stojić Mitrović/Meh 2015). With the Balkan corridor, this punctiform of movement control was, for a short period, fused into a linear one (Hameršak/Pleše 2018).

    The rules of the corridor and its pathways were established by formal and informal agreements between the police and other state authorities, and the corridor itself was facilitated by governmental, humanitarian, and other institutions and agencies. Cooperation between the countries along the route was fostered by representatives of EU institutions and EU member states. It would be too simple, though, to describe their involvement of the countries along the route as merely reactive, as an almost mechanical response to EU and broader global policies. Some countries, in particular Serbia, regarded the increasing numbers of migrants entering their territory during the year 2015 as a window of opportunity for showing their ›good face‹ to the European Union by adopting ›European values‹ and, by doing so, for enhancing their accession process to the European Union (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017). As Tošić points out, »this image was very convenient for Serbian politicians in framing their country as ›truly European‹, since it was keeping its borders open unlike some EU states (such as Hungary)« (2017: 160). Other states along the corridor also played by their own rules from time to time: Croatia, for example, contrary to the Eurodac Regulation (Regulation EU No 603/2013), avoided sharing registration data on people in transit and, thus, hampered the Dublin system that is dependent on Eurodac registration. Irregular bureaucracies and nonrecording, as Katerina Rozakou (2017) calls such practices in her analysis of bordering practices in the Greek context, became a place of dispute, negotiations, and frustrations, but also a clear sign of the complex relationships and different responses to migration within the European Union migration management politics itself.

    Within EU-member states, however, the longer the corridor lasted, and the more people passed through it, the stronger the ›Hungarian position‹ became. Finally, Austria became the driving force behind a process of gradually closing the corridor, which began in November 2015 and was fully implemented in March 2016. In parallel, Angela Merkel and the European Commission preferred another strategy that cut access to the formalized corridor and that was achieved by adopting a treaty with Turkey known as the »EU-Turkey deal« signed on 18 March 2016 (see Speer 2017: 49–68; Weber 2017: 30–40).

    The humanitarian aspect for the people on the move who were supposed to reach a safe place through the corridor was the guiding principle of public discourses in most of the countries along the corridor. In Serbia, »Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić officially welcomed refugees, spoke of tolerance, and compared the experience of refugees fleeing war-torn countries to those of refugees during the wars of Yugoslav Succession« (Greenberg/Spasić 2017: 315). Similar narratives could also be observed in other countries along the corridor, at least for some period of time (see, for Slovenia, Sardelić 2017: 11; for Croatia, Jakešević 2017: 184; Bužinkić 2018: 153–154). Of course, critical readings could easily detect the discriminatory, dehumanizing, securitarizing, and criminalizing acts, practices, tropes, and aspects in many of these superficially caring narratives. The profiling or selection of people, ad hoc detentions, and militarization—which were integral parts of the corridor—were, at the time, only denounced by a few NGOs and independent activists. They were mostly ignored, or only temporarily acknowledged, by the media and, consequently, by the general public.

    Before May 2015, ›irregular‹ migration was not framed by a discourse of ›crisis‹ in the countries along the route, rather, the discourse was led by a focus on ›separate incidents‹ or ›situations‹. The discursive framing of ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹, accompanied by reports of UN agencies about ›unprecedented refugee flows in history‹, has been globally adopted both by policy makers and the wider public. »In the wake of the Summer of Migration, all involved states along the Balkan route were quick to stage the events as an ›emergency‹ (Calhoun 2004) and, in best humanitarian fashion, as a major humanitarian ›crisis‹, thus legitimizing a ›politics of exception‹« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). Following the logic that extraordinary situations call for, and justify, the use of extraordinary measures, the emergency framework, through the construction of existential threats, resulted, on the one hand, in a loosely controlled allocation of resources, and, on the other hand, in silencing many critical interpretations, thus allowing various ›risk management activities‹ to happen on the edge of the law (Campesi 2014). For the states along the route, the crisis label especially meant a rapid infusion of money and other resources for establishing infrastructures for the urgent reception of people on the move, mainly deriving from EU funds. Politically and practically, these humanitarian-control activities also fastened the operational inclusion of non-EU countries into the European border regime.

    As Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek have pointed out, the politics of proclaiming a ›crisis‹ is at the heart of re-stabilizing the European border regime, »making it possible to systematically undermine and lever the standards of international and European law without serious challenges to date« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). The authors:

    »have observed carefully designed policy elements, which can be labelled as anti-litigation devices. The design of the Hungarian transit zones is a striking case in point. They are an elementary part of the border fence towards Serbia and allow for the fiction that the border has not been closed for those seeking international protection, but rather that their admission numbers are merely limited due to administrative reasons: each of the two transit zones allows for 14 asylum seekers to enter Hungary every day« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66; on the administrative rationale in Slovenia see e.g. Gombač 2016: 79–81).

    The establishment of transit zones was accompanied by a series of legislative tightenings, passed under a proclaimed ›crisis situation caused by mass immigration‹, which, from a legal point of view, lasts until today. Two aspects are worth mentioning in particular: First, the mandatory deportation of all unwanted migrants that were detected on Hungarian territory to the other side of the fence, without any possibility to claim for asylum or even to lodge any appeal against the return. Second, the automatic rejection of all asylum applications as inadmissible, even of those who managed to enter the transit zones, because Serbia had been declared a safe third country (Nagy/Pál 2018). This led to a completely securitized border regime in Hungary, which might become a ›role model‹, not only for the countries in the region but also for the European border regime as a whole (ECtHR – Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary Application No. 47287/15).
    The Long Genealogy of the Balkan Route and its Governance

    The history of the Balkan region is a multiply layered history of transborder mobilities, migration, and flight reaching back as far as the times of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires connecting the region with the East and Western Europe in many ways. Central transportation and communication infrastructures partially also used by today’s migratory projects had already been established at the heydays of Western imperialism, as the Orient Express, the luxury train service connecting Paris with Istanbul (1883), or the Berlin-Baghdad railway (built between 1903 and 1940) indicate. During World War II, a different and reversed refugee route existed, which brought European refugees not just to Turkey but even further to refugee camps in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine and was operated by the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA).

    The Yugoslav highway, the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity (Autoput bratstva i jedinstva) often simply referred to as the ›autoput‹ and built in phases after the 1950s, came to stretch over more than 1,000 km from the Austrian to the Greek borders and was one of the central infrastructures enabling transnational mobilities, life projects, and exile. In the 1960s, direct trains departing from Istanbul and Athens carried thousands of prospective labor migrants to foreign places in Germany and Austria in the context of the fordist labor migration regime of the two countries. At the end of that decade, Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia, fostering and formalizing decades long labor migrations from Croatia, Serbia, and other countries to Germany (Gatrell 2019, see e.g. Lukić Krstanović 2019: 54–55).

    The wars in the 1990s that accompanied the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the consequent establishment of several new nation states, created the first large refugee movement after the Second World War within Europe and was followed by increasing numbers of people fleeing Albania after the fall of its self-isolationist regime and the (civil) wars in the Middle East, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan since the mid-1990s. As the migratory route did not go north through the Balkan Peninsula, but mainly proceeded to Italy at the time, the label Balkan route was mostly used as a name for a drugs and arms smuggling route well known in the West. Although there was migration within and to Europe, the Balkan migratory route, with the exception of refugee movements from ex-Yugoslavia, was yet predominantly invisible to the broader European public.

    Sparse ethnographic insights from the beginning of the 2000s point this out. Academic papers on migrant crossings from Turkey to the island of Lesbos mention as follows: »When the transport service began in the late 1980s it was very small and personal; then, in the middle of the 1990s, the Kurds began to show up – and now people arrive from just about everywhere« (Tsianos/Hess/Karakayali 2009: 3; see Tsianos/Karakayali 2010: 379). A document of the Council of the European Union from 1997 formulates this as following:

    »This migration appears to be routed essentially either through Turkey, and hence through Greece and Italy, or via the ›Balkans route‹, with the final countries of destination being in particular Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several suggestions were put forward for dealing with this worrying problem, including the strengthening of checks at external borders, the stepping up of the campaign against illegal immigration networks, and pre-frontier assistance and training assignments in airports and ports in certain transit third countries, in full cooperation with the authorities in those countries« (ibid. quoted in Hess/Kasparek 2020).

    During this time, the EU migration management policies defined two main objectives: to prevent similar arrivals in the future, and to initiate a system of control over migration movements toward the EU that would be established outside the territories of the EU member states. This would later be formalized, first in the 2002 EU Action Plan on Illegal Immigration (see Hayes/Vermeulen 2012: 13–14) and later re-confirmed in the Global Approach to Migration (2005) framework concerning the cooperation of the EU with third states (Hess/Kasparek 2020). In this process, the so-called migratory routes-approach and accompanying strategies of controlling, containing, and taming the movement »through epistemology of the route« (Hess/Kasparek 2020) became a main rationale of the European border control regime. Thus, one can resume that the route was not only produced by movements of people but also by the logic, legislation, investment etc. of EU migration governance. Consequently, the clandestine pathways across the Balkans to Central and Western Europe were frequently addressed by security bodies and services of the EU (see e.g. Frontex 2011; Frontex 2014), resulting in the conceptual and practical production of the Balkan as an external border zone of the EU.

    Parallel to the creation of ›Schengenland‹, the birth of the ›Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‹ inter alia as an inner-EU-free-mobility-zone and EU-based European border and migration regime in the late 1990s, the EU created the Western Balkans as an imaginary political entity, an object of its neighborhood and enlargement policy, which lies just outside the EU with a potential ›European future‹. For the purpose of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) initiated in 1999, the term Western Balkan was launched in the EU political context in order to include, at that moment, ›ex-Yugoslav states minus Slovenia plus Albania‹ and to presumably avoid potential politically sensitive notions. The Western Balkans as a concept represents a combination of a political compromise and colonial imagery (see Petrović 2012: 21–36). Its aim was to stabilize the region through a radical redefinition that would restrain from ethno-national toponyms and to establish a free-trade area and growing partnership with the EU. The SAP set out common political and economic goals for the Western Balkan as a region and conducted political and economic progress evaluations ›on a countries’ own merits‹. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 strengthened the main objectives of the SAP and formally took over elements of the accession process—institutional domains and regulations that were to be harmonized with those existing in the EU. Harmonization is a wide concept, and it basically means adopting institutional measures following specific demands of the EU. It is a highly hierarchized process in which states asked to ›harmonize‹ do not have a say in things but have to conform to the measures set forth by the EU. As such, the adoption of the EU migration and border regime became a central part of the ongoing EU-accession process that emerged as the main platform and governmental technology of the early externalization and integration of transit and source countries into the EU border regime. This was the context of early bilateral and multilateral cooperation on this topic (concerning involved states, see Lipovec Čebron 2003; Stojić Mitrović 2014; Župarić-Iljić 2013; Bojadžijev 2007).

    The decisive inclusion of the Western Balkan states in the EU design of border control happened at the Thessaloniki European Summit in 2003, where concrete provisions concerning border management, security, and combating illegal migration were set according to European standards. These provisions have not been directly displayed, but were concealed as part of the package of institutional transformations that respective states had to conduct. The states were promised to become members of the EU if the conditions were met. In order to fulfill this goal, prospective EU member states had to maintain good mutual relations, build statehoods based on ›the rule of law‹, and, after a positive evaluation by the EU, begin with the implementation of concrete legislative and institutional changes on their territories (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019). The control of unwanted movements toward the EU was a priority of the EU accession process of the Western Balkan states from the very beginning (Kacarska 2012). It started with controlling the movement of their own nationals (to allow the states to be removed from the so-called Black Schengen list) during the visa facilitation process. If they managed to control the movement of their own nationals, especially those who applied for asylum in the EU via biometric passports and readmission obligations (asylum seekers from these states comprise a large portion of asylum seekers in the EU even today), they were promised easier access to the EU as an economic area. Gradually, the focus of movement control shifted to third-country nationals. In effect, the Western Balkan states introduced migration-related legislative and institutional transformations corresponding to the ones already existing in the EU, yet persistent ›non-doing‹ (especially regarding enabling access to rights and services for migrants) remained a main practice of deterrence (Valenta/Zuparic-Iljic/Vidovic 2015; Stojić Mitrović 2019).

    From the very beginning, becoming an active part of the European border regime and implementing EU-centric migration policies, or, to put it simply, conducting control policies over the movements of people, has not been the goal of the states along the Balkan route per se but a means to obtain political and economic benefits from the EU. They are included into the EU border regime as operational partners without formal power to influence migration policies. These states do have a voice, though, not only by creating the image of being able to manage the ›European problem‹, and accordingly receive further access to EU funds, but also by influencing EU migration policy through disobedience and actively avoiding conformity to ›prescribed‹ measures. A striking example of creative state disobedience are the so-called 72-hour-papers, which are legal provisions set by the Serbian 2007 Law on Asylum, later also introduced as law in North Macedonia in June 2015: Their initial function was to give asylum seekers who declared their ›intention to seek asylum‹ to the police the possibility to legally proceed to one of the asylum reception centers located within Serbia, where, in a second step, their asylum requests were to be examined in line with the idea of implementing a functioning asylum system according to EU standards. However, in practice, these papers were used as short-term visas for transiting through North Macedonia and Serbia that were handed out to hundreds of thousands of migrants (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 17–19, 36).

    Furthermore, the introduction of migration control practices is often a means for achieving other political and economic goals. In the accessing states, migration management is seen as services they provide for the EU. In addition, demands created by migration management goals open new possibilities for employment, which are essential to societies with high unemployment rates.

    Besides direct economic benefits, migration has been confirmed to be a politically potent instrument. States and their institutions were more firmly integrated into existing EU structures, especially those related to the prevention of unwanted migration, such as increased police cooperation and Frontex agreements. On a local level, political leaders have increasingly been using migration-related narratives in everyday political life in order to confront the state or other political competitors, often through the use of Ethno-nationalist and related discourses. In recent times, as citizens of the states along the Balkan route themselves migrate in search for jobs and less precarious lives, migration from third states has been discursively linked to the fear of foreigners permanently settling in places at the expense of natives.
    Contemporary Context

    According to a growing body of literature (e.g. Hess/Kasparek 2020; Lunaček Brumen/Meh 2016; Speer 2017), the Balkan route of the year 2015 and the first months of 2016 can be conceptualized in phases, beginning with a clandestine phase, evolving to an open route and formalized corridor and back to an invisible route again. It is necessary to point to the fact that these different phases were not merely the result of state or EU-led top-down approaches, but the consequence of a »dynamic process which resulted from the interplay of state practices, practices of mobility, activities of activists, volunteers, and NGOs, media coverage, etc. The same applies for its closure« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 6).

    The closure of the corridor and stricter border controls resulted in a large transformation of the Balkan route and mobility practices in the recent years, when push-backs from deep within the EU-territory to neighboring non-EU states, erratic movements across borders and territories of the (Western) Balkan states, or desperate journeys back to Greece and then back to the north became everyday realities. In the same period, the route proliferated into more branches, especially a new one via Bosnia and Herzegovina. This proliferation lead to a heightened circulation of practices, people, and knowledge along these paths: a mushrooming of so-called ›jungle camps‹ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an escalation of border violence in Croatia, chain push-backs from Slovenia, significant EU financial investments into border control in Croatia and camp infrastructures in neighboring countries, the deployment of Frontex in Albania, etc. As the actual itineraries of people on the move multiplied, people started to reach previously indiscernible spots, resulting in blurring of the differences between entering and exiting borders. Circular transit with many loops, involving moving forward and backwards, became the dominant form of migration movements in the region. It transformed the Balkan route into a »Balkan Circuit« (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019: 540; see also Stojić Mitrović/Ahmetašević/Beznec/Kurnik 2020). The topography changed from a unidirectional line to a network of hubs, accommodation, and socializing spots. In this landscape, some movements still remain invisible—undetected by actors aiming to support, contain, and even prevent migration. »We have no information about persons who have money to pay for the whole package, transfer, accommodation, food, medical assistance when needed, we have no idea how many of them just went further«, a former MSF employee stressed, »we only see those who reach for aid, who are poor or injured and therefore cannot immediately continue their journey.« Some movements are intentionally invisibilized by support groups in order to avoid unwanted attention, and, consequently, repressive measures have also become a common development in border areas where people on the move are waiting for their chance to cross. However, it seems that circular transnational migration of human beings, resulting directly from the securitarian practices of the European border regime, have also become a usual form of mobility in the region.

    The Balkan route as a whole has been increasingly made invisible to spectators from the EU in the last years. There were no mass media coverage, except for reports on deplorable conditions in certain hubs, such as Belgrade barracks (Serbia), Vučjak camp (Bosnia and Herzegovina), or violent push-backs from Croatia that received global and EU-wide attention. However, this spectacularization was rarely directly attributed to the externalization of border control but rather more readily linked to an presumed inability of the Balkan states to manage migration, or to manage it without the blatant use of violence.

    As Marta Stojić Mitrović and Ana Vilenica (2019) point out, practices, discourses, knowledge, concepts, technologies, even particular narratives, organizations, and individual professionals are following the changed topography. This is evident both in the securitarian and in the humanitarian sector: Frontex is signing or initiating cooperation agreements with non-EU member Balkan states, border guards learn from each other how to prevent movements or how to use new equipment, obscure Orbanist legislative changes and institutionalized practices are becoming mainstream, regional coordinators of humanitarian organizations transplant the same ›best practices‹ how to work with migrants, how to organize their accommodation, what aid to bring and when, and how to ›deal‹ with the local communities in different nation-states, while the emergency framework travels from one space to another. Solidarity groups are networking, exchanging knowledge and practices but simultaneously face an increased criminalization of their activities. The public opinion in different nation states is shaped by the same dominant discourses on migration, far-right groups are building international cooperations and exploit the same narratives that frame migrants and migration as dangerous.
    About the Issue

    This issue of movements highlights the current situation of migration struggles along this fragmented, circular, and precarious route and examines the diverse attempts by the EU, transnational institutions, countries in the region, local and interregional structures, and multiple humanitarian actors to regain control over the movements of migration after the official closure of the humanitarian-securitarian corridor in 2016. It reflects on the highly dynamic and conflicting developments since 2015 and their historical entanglements, the ambiguities of humanitarian interventions and strategies of containment, migratory tactics of survival, local struggles, artistic interventions, regional and transnational activism, and recent initiatives to curb the extensive practices of border violence and push-backs. In doing so, the issue brings back the region on the European agenda and sheds light on the multiple historical disruptions, bordering practices, and connectivities that have been forming its presence.

    EU migration policy is reaffirming old and producing new material borders: from border fences to document checks—conducted both by state authorities and increasingly the general population, like taxi drivers or hostel owners—free movement is put in question for all, and unwanted movements of migrants are openly violently prevented. Violence and repression toward migrants are not only normalized but also further legalized through transformations of national legislation, while migrant solidarity initiatives and even unintentional facilitations of movement or stay (performed by carriers, accommodation providers, and ordinary citizens) are increasingly at risk of being criminalized.

    In line with this present state, only briefly tackled here, a number of contributions gathered in this issue challenge normative perceptions of the restrictive European border regime and engage in the critical analysis of its key mechanisms, symbolic pillars, and infrastructures by framing them as complex and depending on context. Furthermore, some of them strive to find creative ways to circumvent the dominance of linear or even verbal explication and indulge in narrative fragments, interviews, maps, and graphs. All contributions are focused and space- or even person-specific. They are based on extensive research, activist, volunteer or other involvement, and they are reflexive and critical towards predominant perspectives and views.

    Artist and activist Selma Banich, in her contribution entitled »Shining«, named after one of her artistic intervention performed in a Zagreb neighborhood, assembles notes and reflections on her ongoing series of site-specific interventions in Zagreb made of heat sheet (hallmarks of migrants’ rescue boats and the shores of Europe) and her personal notes in which she engages with her encounters with three persons on the move or, rather, on the run from the European border control regime. Her contribution, formulated as a series of fragments of two parallel lines, which on the surface seem loosely, but in fact deeply, connected, speaks of the power of ambivalence and of the complexities of struggles that take place everyday on the fringes of the EU. Andrea Contenta visualizes and analyzes camps that have been mushrooming in Serbia in the recent years with a series of maps and graphs. The author’s detailed analysis—based on a critical use of available, often conflicting, data—shows how Serbia has kept thousands of people outside of the western EU territory following a European strategy of containment. Contenta concludes his contribution with a clear call, stating: »It is not only a theoretical issue anymore; containment camps are all around us, and we cannot just continue to write about it.« Serbia, and Belgrade in particular, is of central importance for transmigration through the Balkans. On a micro-level, the maps of Paul Knopf, Miriam Neßler and Cosima Zita Seichter visualize the so-called Refugee District in Belgrade and shed light on the transformation of urban space by transit migration. On a macro-level, their contribution illustrates the importance of Serbia as a central hub for migrant mobility in the Balkans as well as for the externalization of the European border regime in the region. The collective efforts to support the struggle of the people on the move—by witnessing, documenting, and denouncing push-backs—are presented by the Push-Back Map Collective’s self-reflection. In their contribution to this issue, the Push-Back Map Collective ask themselves questions or start a dialogue among themselves in order to reflect and evaluate the Push-Back map (www.pushbackmap.org) they launched and maintain. They also investigate the potentials of political organizing that is based on making an invisible structure visible. The activist collective Info Kolpa from Ljubljana gives an account of push-backs conducted by the Slovenian police and describes initiatives to oppose what they deem as systemic violence of police against people on the move and violent attempts to close the borders. The text contributes to understanding the role of extralegal police practices in restoring the European border regime and highlights the ingenuity of collectives that oppose it. Patricia Artimova’s contribution entitled »A Volunteer’s Diary« could be described as a collage of diverse personal notes of the author and others in order to present the complexity of the Serbian and Bosnian context. The genre of diary notes allows the author to demonstrate the diachronic line presented in the volunteers’ personal engagements and in the gradual developments occurring in different sites and states along the route within a four-year period. She also traces the effects of her support for people on the move on her social relations at home. Emina Bužinkić focuses on the arrest, detention, and deportation of a non-EU national done by Croatia to show the implications of current securitization practices on the everyday lives and life projects of migrants and refugees. Based on different sources (oral histories, official documentation, personal history, etc.), her intervention calls for direct political action and affirms a new genre one could provisionally call ›a biography of a deportation‹. In her »Notes from the Field« Azra Hromadžić focuses on multiple encounters between the locals of Bihać, a city located in the northwestern corner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people on the move who stop there while trying to cross into Croatia and the EU. Some of the sections and vignettes of her field notes are written as entries describing a particular day, while others are more anthropological and analytical reflections. Her focus lies on the local people’s perspectives, the dynamics of their daily encounters with migrants and alleged contradictions, philigram distinctions, as well as experiences of refugeeness that create unique relationships between people and histories in Bihać. Karolína Augustová and Jack Sapoch, activists of the grassroots organization No Name Kitchen and members of the Border Violence Monitoring Network, offer a systematized account of violence towards people on the move with their research report. The condensed analysis of violent practices, places, victims, and perpetrators of the increasingly securitized EU border apparatus is based on interviews conducted with people on the move in border areas with Croatia, Šid (Serbia) and Velika Kladuša (BiH). They identify a whole range of violence that people on the move are facing, which often remains ignored or underestimated, and thus condoned, in local national settings as well as on the EU and global level. They conclude that border violence against people on the move cannot be interpreted as mere aggression emanating from individuals or groups of the police but is embedded in the states’ structures.

    We also gathered scientific papers discussing and analyzing different aspects of the corridor and the years thereafter. In their article, Andrej Kurnik and Barbara Beznec focus on assemblages of mobility, which are composed of practices of migrants and local agencies that strive to escape what the authors call ›the sovereign imperative‹. In their analysis of different events and practices since 2015, they demonstrate how migratory movements reveal the hidden subalternized local forms of escape and invigorate the dormant critique of coloniality in the geopolitical locations along the Balkan route. In their concluding remarks, the authors ask to confront the decades-long investments into repressive and exclusionary EU migration policies and point to the political potential of migration as an agent of decolonization. The authors stress that post-Yugoslav European borderland that has been a laboratory of Europeanization for the last thirty years, a site of a ›civilizing‹ mission that systematically diminishes forms of being in common based on diversity and alterity is placed under scrutiny again. Romana Pozniak explores the ethnography of aid work, giving special attention to dynamics between emotional and rational dimensions. Based primarily on interviews conducted with humanitarians employed during the mass refugee transit through the Balkan corridor, she analyzes, historizes, and contextualizes their experiences in terms of affective labor. The author defines affective labor as efforts invested in reflecting on morally, emotionally, and mentally unsettling affects. She deals with local employment measures and how they had an impact on employed workers. Pozniak discusses the figure of the compassionate aid professional by it in a specific historical context of the Balkan corridor and by including personal narrations about it. The article of Robert Rydzewski focuses on the situation in Serbia after the final closure of the formalized corridor in March 2016. Rydzewski argues that extensive and multidirectional migrant movements on the doorstep of the EU are an expression of hope to bring a ›stuckedness‹ to an end. In his analysis, he juxtaposes the representations of migrant movements as linear with migrant narratives and their persistent unilinear movement despite militarized external European Union borders, push-backs, and violence of border guards. Rydzewsky approaches the structural and institutional imposition of waiting with the following questions: What does interstate movement mean for migrants? Why do migrants reject state protection offered by government facilities in favor of traveling around the country? In her article, Céline Cantat focuses on the Serbian capital Belgrade and how ›solidarities in transit‹ or the heterogeneous community of actors supporting people on the move emerged and dissolved in the country in 2015/2016. She analyzes the gradual marginalization of migrant presence and migration solidarity in Belgrade as an outcome of imposing of an institutionalized, official, camp-based, and heavily regulated refugee aid field. This field regulates the access not only to camps per se, but also to fundings for activities by independent groups or civil sector organizations. Teodora Jovanović, by using something she calls ›autoethnography of participation‹, offers a meticulous case study of Miksalište, a distribution hub in Belgrade established in 2015, which she joined as a volunteer in 2016. The transformation of this single institution is examined by elaborating on the transformation within the political and social contexts in Serbia and its capital, Belgrade, regarding migration policies and humanitarian assistance. She identifies three, at times intertwined, modes of response to migration that have shaped the development of the Miksalište center in corresponding stages: voluntarism, professionalization, and re-statization. She connects the beginning and end of each stage of organizing work in Miksalište by investigating the actors, roles, activities, and manners in which these activities are conducted in relation to broader changes within migration management and funding.

    Finishing this editorial in the aftermath of brutal clashes at the borders of Turkey and Greece and in the wake of the global pandemic of COVID-19—isolated in our homes, some of us even under curfew—we experience an escalation and normalization of restrictions, not only of movement but also of almost every aspect of social and political life. We perceive a militarization, which pervades public spaces and discourses, the introduction of new and the reinforcement of old borders, in particular along the line of EU external borders, a heightened immobilization of people on the move, their intentional neglect in squats and ›jungles‹ or their forceful encampment in deplorable, often unsanitary, conditions, where they are faced with food reductions, violence of every kind, and harrowing isolation. At the same time, we witness an increase of anti-migrant narratives not only spreading across obscure social networks but also among high ranked officials. Nonetheless, we get glimpses of resistance and struggles happening every day inside and outside the camps. Videos of protests and photos of violence that manage to reach us from the strictly closed camps, together with testimonies and outcries, are fragments of migrant agency that exist despite overwhelming repression.

    https://movements-journal.org/issues/08.balkanroute
    #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #revue #humanitarisme #espoir #attente #mobilité #Belgrade #Serbie #solidarité #Miksaliste #Bihac #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #encampement #corridor #cartographie #visualisation

  • California wildfires Shifting smoke
    https://graphics.reuters.com/USA-WILDFIRE/POLLUTION/xlbpgjgervq/index.html

    Last week, smoke from the fires covered the entire U.S. West Coast before spreading west out over the Pacific Ocean. This week the smoke has travelled thousands of miles east, turning skies from New York to Washington D.C. hazy and reaching as far as the skies above Britain.

    In the animation above, Reuters visualises organic carbon released into the atmosphere during the fires. The smoke contains a substantial portion of fine particulate matter known by the particles’ size as PM2.5, which can have a major impact on people’s health.

    #feu #fumée #visualisation #cartographie

  • Shifting smoke

    How wildfires ravaging the U.S. West Coast are sending smoke between continents and up to record heights in the atmosphere.

    Last week, smoke from the fires covered the entire U.S. West Coast before spreading west out over the Pacific Ocean. This week the smoke has travelled thousands of miles east, turning skies from New York to Washington D.C. hazy and reaching as far as the skies above Britain.

    In the animation above, Reuters visualises organic carbon released into the atmosphere during the fires. The smoke contains a substantial portion of fine particulate matter known by the particles’ size as PM2.5, which can have a major impact on people’s health.

    Smoke can hurt the eyes, irritate respiratory systems, and worsen chronic heart and lung diseases, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It can make healthy people sick if there is enough in the air.

    Smoke traveling with air currents high in the atmosphere, however, is unlikely to alter air quality on the ground in faraway places, said Santiago Gassó, an atmospheric scientist at the University of Maryland who works on contract for NASA.

    But that does not mean high-altitude smoke has no impact. Wildfire smoke, made up largely of dark carbon particles, can block some sunshine from reaching the ground. And that solar dimming can affect ground temperatures as well as how much energy plants can convert through photosynthesis, or how certain animals might behave, Gassó told Reuters.

    “If these smoke layers stayed up there for a month, you would see changes in temperatures, weather patterns, just because you’re putting something up there that doesn’t belong there. You’re changing the dynamics of the atmosphere,” Gassó said.

    High-altitude smoke may also have a heating impact. Being dark, carbon particles absorb solar radiation, effectively warming a thin layer in the atmosphere. The net effect on Earth’s climate of these two processes – solar dimming and particle heating – is still a matter of scientific debate.
    At ground level

    The wildfires – burning across a record total of some 4.8 million acres (1.9 million hectares) as of Thursday – have destroyed towns in Oregon while also devouring forests in California, Washington and Idaho. The ground-level blanket of ash and smoke has made the region’s air quality among the worst in the world.

    “Air quality this poor causes health issues for everyone, not just those with existing respiratory conditions,” said Ryan Stauffer, a research scientist at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center.

    He described pollution levels across the region, and as far as British Columbia, Canada, as “unprecedented.” “Parts of California, Oregon and Washington state have recorded hazardous air quality for over a week straight,” Stauffer said.
    Reaching new heights

    Smoke from the fires has also pushed the limits vertically, reaching altitudes previously unseen, according to NASA. When extreme fires generate enough heat, it is propelled into the atmosphere creating thunderstorms.

    With more fuel to burn, fires also can become hot and energetic enough for the smoke cloud to punch through the natural atmospheric layers above if conditions are right.

    That happened on Sept. 7, when huge storm clouds – known as pyrocumulonimbus – rose to a height of more than 15 kilometers, pushing into the stratosphere, as illustrated by data from NASA’s CALIPSO satellite.

    The CALIPSO satellite sends laser pulses to measure light scattered back to it from particles in the atmosphere. The data shows a cross section of the atmosphere and distinguishes what the particles are, such as aerosol smoke, clouds, or ice particles.

    “The fact that it punched through that layer is very unusual,” Gassó said. “That’s what volcanoes do.”

    In the stratosphere, where the ozone layer resides, wildfire smoke particles can spread globally and can take several years, rather than months, to dissipate. Inject enough particles into that layer, and you could be blocking sunshine for a longer time period.

    “Whether those particulates would lead to net warming or cooling is a bit of an open question,” Gassó said. “The only experience we have so far has been with volcanoes.” And the evidence from volcanoes is only so helpful, because unlike wildfires, volcanoes send up particles that also reflect and scatter light, rather than absorb it.

    The fires across much of Australia in 2019 and 2020 also reached stratospheric levels, NASA reported in January. And smoke from fires in British Columbia in 2017 broke through, too.

    “When you have these events so frequently, you start to get concerned,” Gassó said.

    Another pyrocumulonimbus cloud was spotted in satellite imagery on Sept. 9, towering above fires around California’s Mendocino National Forest, though to what height is unclear. Those data are not available.

    Another tall plume of smoke, possibly a pyrocumulonimbus cloud, was also captured in satellite imagery on Sept. 9. This one was east of San Francisco, further south than the one above.

    The fire-induced clouds essentially create their own weather systems. The clouds form from the smoke plume, as the fire’s intense heat warms the surrounding air, causing it to rise rapidly, drawing in cooler air.

    The smoke cloud cools as it climbs into the chilly upper atmosphere, colliding with ice particles and building up electrical charge, which can sometimes be released as lightning.

    Fire tornadoes

    The warm updrafts can pull in so much air lower down that strong winds develop at the ground level, fanning the fire even further so it burns hotter and spreads farther. On rare occasions, these strong and sometimes erratic surface winds can swirl into a dangerous fire tornado.

    A fire tornado tore through neighborhoods in Redding, California, during the 2018 Carr Fire. In January this year, an Australian firefighter in New South Wales was killed when a fire tornado flipped over the fire truck he was in.

    During this year’s West Coast wildfires, images shared on social media show a tornado funnel appearing on Aug. 16 in a thick plume of smoke from the Loyalton Fire in Lassen County, California.
    The challenge for science

    Scientists’ understanding of these high-energy fire clouds and how they behave is still an area of active research, now being aided by satellites and other new technologies.

    “What’s fascinating about these events is that we’re getting a prime-time view of everything from space,” Gassó said. “We have so many excellent satellite systems right now, and actually this is just the beginning. It’s going to get better.”

    In fact, with so much new data pouring in, the challenge is now finding enough researchers to work on analyzing, debating and coming up with new ideas to understand it. For example, what are the physical and chemical results of these smoke particles getting into the stratosphere, where moisture and temperature conditions are very different than in the lower, warmer troposphere?

    Studying such effects would likely require duplicating the conditions in laboratory experiments.

    With climate change expected to exacerbate fires in the future, by worsening droughts and warming surface ocean temperatures, wildfire research is becoming especially important. Over the last year, the world has seen record fires in Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Siberia and now the U.S. West.

    “I’m concerned that we are starting to see these phenomena more often … everywhere in the world,” Gassó said. “If it’s one year like this, it’s fine, as long as it doesn’t keep repeating itself like this.”

    https://graphics.reuters.com/USA-WILDFIRE/POLLUTION/xlbpgjgervq/index.html
    #visualisation #cartographie #fumée #incendie #dispersion #USA #Etats-Unis

  • The evolution of land uses and population in #Psyrri district

    The Psyrri district is one of the oldest districts of Athens. It is bounded by the streets of Evripidou, Athinas, Ermou, Agion Asomaton, Pireos (PanagiTsaldari) and, despite its limited surface, has changed in recent years, to reflect typical transformations that exist in the wider center of Athens (Καιροφύλας 2000).

    In this text, we track the spatial and social transformations which took place in the Psyrri district via a comparison of land use maps drawn in 1996 and 2019. The land uses maps of 1996 are based on a study by Attiko Metro while the corresponding maps of 2019, are based on fieldwork by the author. During the fieldwork, the uses of ground floors, upper floors, as well as the buildable open spaces were mapped separately, to give a complete picture of the area’s land uses.

    The basemap for 1996, was designed with QGIS software, exactly as it was depicted in the map of Attiko Metro.

    At the same time, the cartographic background for the 2019 map, was provided by ELSTAT and was edited using QGIS software to show the ground floor and upper floor uses, separately. In particular, the outlines of the buildings were redesigned and their ground floors and upper floors were labelled. The ELSTAT basemap was drawn in 2001[1], so, in some cases, the building boundary lines had to be redrawn in order to bring the map up to date.

    From the first visit to the neighborhood of Psyrri, it became clear, that the area’s land use profile has changed significantly. Comparing the area’s land use maps of 1996 and 2019, one observes the changes that have occurred over a period of 23 years. These changes have significantly altered the district’s character


    https://www.athenssocialatlas.gr/en/article/psyrri-district
    #Athènes #démographie #cartographie #visualisation

  • Grèce-Turquie : différends frontaliers en mer Égée
    https://visionscarto.net/mer-egee-differends-frontaliers

    Titre : Grèce-Turquie : différends frontaliers en mer Égée. Mots-clés : #Grèce #Turquie #frontières #espace_Schengen #mer_Égée Sources : Andrew Wilson, « The Aegean Question », Adelphi Papers, n° 155, Londres, 1979 ; Jean Touscoz, Atlas Géostratégique, Larousse, Paris, 1988. Apparition(s) : Atlas du Monde diplomatique 2003. Auteur : Philippe Rekacewicz Date de création : 2002 Grèce-Turquie : différends frontaliers en mer Égée. Ph. R., (...) #Collection_cartographique

  • #Abus_sexuels dans l’#Église : la #carte mondiale de la #justice

    Des dizaines de milliers de victimes, à travers le monde, sur plusieurs décennies : le dossier des abus sexuels impliquant des membres du clergé catholique présente une question de justice inédite. Pour révéler et faire face à l’ampleur des crimes, une multitude de mécanismes de justice transitionnelle sont à l’œuvre. Rapports d’experts, commissions d’enquête, commissions vérité, procès : Justice Info publie la #carte_mondiale de cette #justice parcellaire, très sensible, souvent innovante, face à un #crime institutionnel hors normes.

    https://www.justiceinfo.net/fr/divers/44735-abus-sexuels-eglise-carte-mondiale-justice.html

    #Eglise #cartographie #visualisation #monde #impunité #pédophilie #pédocriminalité

    @justiceinfo

  • Florence Nightingale: how the lady with the lamp was guided by father’s advice | Nursing | The Guardian

    http://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/sep/06/florence-nightingale-how-the-lady-with-the-lamp-was-guided-by-fathers-a

    #Florence_Nightingale: how the lady with the lamp was guided by father’s advice

    Letters reveal that the 19th-century pioneer’s radical approach to healthcare was inspired by a strict family regime
    Florence Nightingale in the hospital at Scutari, Crimean War, 1855
    Florence Nightingale on her rounds in the Barrack hospital at Scutari during the Crimean war, 1855.

    Dalya Alberge
    Sun 6 Sep 2020 08.04 BST

    Last modified on Sun 6 Sep 2020 09.17 BST

    She was the 19th-century pioneer of modern nursing, dubbed the “lady with the lamp” for her continuous care of wounded soldiers in the Crimean war. In an earlier age of contagion, she was far ahead of her time in realising that cleanliness, fresh air and open-air exercise helped patients recover from injury and disease.

    Now a previously unpublished letter that Florence Nightingale received as a teenager from her father reveals that he was a major inspiration in shaping her radical approach to a healthy mind and body.

    In 1835, William Nightingale wrote to his daughter setting out a strict regime for keeping fit: “Exercise for 10 minutes every day before breakfast. Before you dress do the exercise of the arms 20 times. In the course of the day 20 minutes’ exercise must be done and if not well done 10 minutes more. Run down to the gate before breakfast by the road … Every day you must be an hour out of doors before dinner unless you have permission to do otherwise.”

    #cartographie #visualisation #précurseuses #présurseurs #cartoexperiment #information_design

  • Where is the border? - Architecture - e-flux

    https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/at-the-border/325748/where-is-the-border

    The border as a line that separates nations from each other is a signifier. It is an imaginary vector in space, materialized by pen on paper. Thinking about the word “border” produces a collective eidetic memory, removed from the scale of the body; an aerial view of landscapes divided by a thick black line. The border line is what separates two places, demonstrating a difference. It is a mechanism of othering that creates a reality of here and there; of us and them. If seen as a symbol of separation, the border starts to become diffuse, lifted from its geospatial location on a map to become enacted within the experiences and memories of people throughout entire regions. The Mexico-US border divides a region that has long been interconnected through economic, political, and social ties. While we acknowledge that there is a reality in which the border separates California from Baja California, Arizona from Sonora, Texas from Chihuahua, and so on, there exists another reality in which the experiential weight of the border is perpetuated in the mentality of people living in places such as Ulysses, Kansas or Pachuca, Hidalgo. The border is not just a line. It is a psycho-spatial experience carried within people.
    Seeing borders

    Contemporary conceptions of borders are rooted in cartography. Early maps were developed for navigation and to delineate political territories. In North America, survey maps were critical in the colonial endeavors of the French, British, and Spanish empires. These survey maps served to authorize the carving up and dividing of a territory that had previously been made up of much more diffuse edges between native inhabitants. After the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe, for instance, a binational joint survey commission took six years to draw the first detailed border between Mexico and the US. Over the next few decades, the border line solidified through disputes as rivers moved and cities on the border grew. These political maps became the root for a collective image of Mexico-US relations, always refocusing attention to the band between the countries. In the meantime, trade agreements and migration were connecting places far beyond the border region.

    For some immigrants, the border is always close by, as they imagine their adopted land as a neighbor of their homeland. For others, the border is distant as the journey to cross it is filled with danger and their families are unreachable. For many people, the border seems far away, as their own personal experiences don’t engage with transnational issues in a conscious way. The imagination of borders is relative. The stories we tell of borders not only connect faraway places, typically considered as separate. They show how important transborder connections are to sustain each other. Without one side, the other would become pockmarked with voids; a place with character unable to be real.
    Drawing borders

    By visualizing the importance of transborder networks in building the lived reality, we can alter the eidetic memory of borders. Cartography is a tool to redraw how we envision the territory. Maps are a form of representation, and while we consider them scientific and infallible, the way we draw and retrace them involves subjective representational decisions. The colors that underlay each territory, the thicknesses of lines, and the amount of information included all involve careful decision.

    #frontières #murs

    • Maps become dominant images in collective imaginaries, especially in creating national identities. By creating new maps through collages, we can create new images to represent collective realities. This new cartography aims to create images that more accurately depict the psycho-spatial border that blankets the Mexico-US region. People’s experiences distort physical space. Remittances can collapse the space between two cities, using the strings of wire transfers and communications networks to draw two places closer together. Immigration can make a place in which you physically live actually seem like a foreign country, while your own family experiences the same place with the liberty to cross between the two. The migration of bodies, money, and dreams are expanded derives; crossing longer distances, transgressing generations, but just as deserving of mapping. Narratives in combination with tools of mapping reconstruct the malleable reality of the US and Mexico. It also liberates people to draw their own conclusions about the relationship between two places. Rather than borders being othering devices, they can outline two places that work together to enhance each other. Disengaging the border and showing how it blankets the region has the potential to rewrite how two nations can interact with each other.

      #visualisation #cartographie #imaginaire #identités_nationales #collages #cartoexperiment #Mexique #USA #Etats-Unis #liens

      ping @mobileborders

  • Map : Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States

    The sanctuary jurisdictions are listed below. These cities, counties, and states have laws, ordinances, regulations, resolutions, policies, or other practices that obstruct immigration enforcement and shield criminals from ICE — either by refusing to or prohibiting agencies from complying with ICE detainers, imposing unreasonable conditions on detainer acceptance, denying ICE access to interview incarcerated aliens, or otherwise impeding communication or information exchanges between their personnel and federal immigration officers.

    A detainer is the primary tool used by ICE to gain custody of criminal aliens for deportation. It is a notice to another law enforcement agency that ICE intends to assume custody of an alien and includes information on the alien’s previous criminal history, immigration violations, and potential threat to public safety or security.

    https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States
    #cartographie #visualisation #villes-refuge #résistance #USA #Etats-Unis #sanctuary_cities #migrations #asile #réfugiés #ICE #rétention #détention_administrative

    –---

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur les villes-refuge :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/759145#message874450

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • How maps in the media make us more negative about migrants
    https://thecorrespondent.com/664/how-maps-in-the-media-make-us-more-negative-about-migrants/738023272448-bac255ba

    Whether we’re looking at The Correspondent, the world atlas or the national news, migration across the Mediterranean is depicted on maps as thick red arrows heading towards us. Far more than we realise, these arrows define how we view migration. Can that be changed? Source: The Correspondent