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Why using Google VPN is a terrible idea
▻https://protonvpn.com/blog/google-vpnIf there has ever been a year that demonstrates how central the internet is to society, it is 2020. We have relied on the internet this year for work, entertainment, and to keep us close to family. But the freedom and privacy of the internet are under attack. We have seen authoritarian governments around the world, including in Hong Kong, Iran, Belarus, and many other places, increasingly clamp down on internet freedoms to maintain power against the will of their citizens. We have also (...)
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Internet access deal allows Chinese government censorship in our UK university (virtual) classrooms
1. Introduction
We are a group of academics with many years of experience of teaching on China, including Hong Kong, in the fields of law, political sociology, labour relations, human rights, and gender politics. We are deeply concerned that, in their eagerness to maintain fee income from Chinese international students as near to pre-Covid levels as possible, some UK universities have signed up to a China-based system for providing access to online teaching to students who choose to study for their UK degrees from their homes in the PRC. We are concerned this system potentially endangers our students and invites censorship of the curriculum in our universities.
2. UK HE and the Great Fire Wall of ChinaAs has been widely reported, many UK universities that have become dependent on steep international fees from Chinese students faced a sharp fall in their incomes this academic year if applicants failed to enroll on their courses (see #USSBriefs94). In the event, the fall has apparently been less precipitous than forecasted, although reliable data is not yet available, due in part to last minute marketing of courses to students in China. But a significant proportion of these students are joining courses from their homes in China, due to a variety of factors, including worries among students and parents about the UK’s shambolic approach to coronavirus control and late issuance of letters students need to apply for UK visas. The Chinese Ministry of Education has announced that, unlike in the past, it will recognize UK degrees that involve online study.
But studying online for a UK degree from inside China presents specific challenges. The ‘Great Fire Wall’ restricts access to the internet outside China, imposing mechanisms to filter content and block ‘blacklisted’ sites, including major platforms such as Google, Youtube, Facebook, Twitter; news providers such as the Guardian and the New York Times; and transnational activist networks, among others. The ‘virtual private networks’ (VPNs) that UK universities routinely provide to their staff and students to access much of their content from off campus are blocked as part of a generalized Chinese government ban on VPNs and other forms of encrypted communication. Students in China joining some UK university courses (such as pre-sessional English programmes) during the summer reported significant connection problems.
3. Over the wall: the Alibaba ‘solution’In this context, institutions representing UK universities are rolling out a dedicated service to enable students studying for UK degrees from China to access their course materials. This has been piloted over the summer at a number of UK HEIs, and is a joint project by promoters of all things digital in UK HE Jisc and Ucisa, the British Council (which is involved in marketing UK HE) and Universities UK. The service provides access to UK universities’ online platforms for students within China via a government-approved VPN enabled by Chinese internet and e-commerce giant Alibaba. UK universities want to ensure that students in China can have reliable access to course materials, including recorded lectures, readings and live activities, and are able to participate in their courses, posting comments on discussion boards and submitting assignments.
From the publicly available information, this service, which has been piloted in a number of UK universities over the summer, and is now being rolled out at some of our institutions, will allow students to access their UK university’s content via a login to a dedicated Alibaba Cloud service on its Cloud Enterprise Network. Although the documentation on the Alibaba service describes this being routed via the company’s ‘virtual private cloud’ on servers in locations outside China, this does not mean that Chinese government surveillance and censorship mechanisms would be avoided, because all traffic would initially be routed through Alibaba’s servers in China.
4. Censorship, surveillance and students at risk?As well as claiming that it will provide ‘fast and reliable access’ to course materials, the documentation states that the Alibaba ‘solution’ would be ‘fully legal and compliant with Chinese laws and regulations’. These laws allow for extensive censorship of public content on social media and news websites, as well as of personal communications, based on broad and vague criteria. While parameters for what is forbidden are set by the authorities, responsibility for deleting and blocking related content, activity and users rests with social media platforms and services, including Alibaba. China’s 2016 Cybersecurity Law makes companies that fail to carry out these responsibilities subject to massive fines, prosecution and even cancellation of business licenses. This legal responsibility implies that Alibaba could face legal sanctions if it failed to block course content on prohibited topics such as protests in Hong Kong or the detention camps in Xinjiang.
The Alibaba scheme could also put students at risk, as their engagement with their courses can be monitored through Chinese government electronic surveillance systems. This is the case not only for students studying for their degrees remotely from China, but also potentially other students who are in the UK but in the same courses, whose engagement could potentially be monitored via the access of the students joining course activities remotely. This is no idle fear in a context where there have been significant tensions among students over support for the 2019 protests in Hong Kong, for example.
Repression in China is targeted, and depends on identifying people regularly accessing content or online activities seen as problematic (particularly those engaging in any form of collective action national or local authorities find problematic), and focusing monitoring on such ‘suspect’ people. Using the Alibaba Cloud service, UK universities will not be able identify what kinds of monitoring and censorship happen when and to whom. Given the Chinese government’s demonstrated AI capacities, this monitoring could include automated profiling of student use of materials or interaction with the teaching to infer political reliability or political inclinations. By providing the Alibaba service to their students, UK universities could be complicit in enabling such profiling, and in our view this would be a failure in our duty of care to our students.
5. China and the chilling effectThere are broader concerns about the potential chilling effects for teaching of China-related material in UK universities, both short term and long term. This is not an idle concern: in recent years, controversies have erupted as the Chinese government has sought to pressure academic publishers to censor ‘politically sensitive’ content, including Cambridge University Press. It also comes in the context of the newly passed National Security Law in Hong Kong, which criminalizes a broad range of previously acceptable speech, and exerts extraterritorial powers that have raised deep concerns among scholars working on China-related issues. In such an environment, content deemed potentially offensive to the Chinese government may be at risk from (self-)censorship, either because teachers opt to eliminate it or because institutions decide that certain ‘problem’ courses are no longer viable. Documentation for staff at a number of universities offering this service has made vague references to ‘problematic’ content that may result in some teachers preemptively removing any China-related material from their courses.
Some institutions have effectively started justifying such censorship of courses for Chinese students studying remotely, asking teachers to provide ‘alternatives’ to ‘problematic’ China related content for these students. Such moves presume that all Chinese students will be offended by or want to avoid such content; in our view this is a mistaken assumption based on stereotyped notions of Chinese students. Some of our students from China choose to study at UK universities precisely because they will encounter a different range of approaches and opinions to those they have encountered in universities in mainland China, and some specifically want to hear about alternative analysis of developments in their own country at a time when such debate is being closed down at home. Pro-government, nationalist students may be vocal, but there are many others with a variety of viewpoints. One indication of this in the UK context is a finding from a representative sample of mainland Chinese students studying for undergraduate and postgraduate taught degrees at UK universities. The Bright Futures survey, conducted in 2017–18, found that 71% of respondents said they ‘never’ participated in activities of the Chinese Students Association (which is supported and funded by the Chinese authorities) and a further 22% said they participated once a month or less.
6. Alternative solutions and academic freedomGiven the concerns outlined above, we do not believe that UK universities have done enough to find alternatives to the Alibaba service that might mitigate some of the risks we describe. Other academic institutions, including joint-venture universities with campuses in China, have apparently negotiated exceptions to the ban on foreign VPNs. For obvious reasons, these universities do not publicize the ad hoc solutions they have been able to find, as these would technically be violations of Chinese law. In the current context other possibilities for UK HE might include approaching the Chinese Ministry of Education to negotiate access for students in China to UK university VPNs, or to a collectively managed joint UK-university ‘VPN concentrator’ located in China. Another part of a solution could be a joint-UK university project to mirror UK university server content in locations nearer to China (such as Singapore, South Korea or Japan) that would allow for faster access to content via VPNs. These solutions could address some of the key surveillance concerns, but would nonetheless still be subject to censorship demands by Chinese authorities.
Universities should not plead that they cannot consider alternatives on cost grounds, since the Alibaba service is reportedly costly (although rates have not been made public), with prices likely reaching £100,000 per institution annually depending on data volume. With a model of payment by data volume, UK universities are in the invidious (and likely unworkable) position of distinguishing between ‘study-related’ and other usage of the service. More importantly, no saving of expenditure or maintaining of pre-Covid income levels can justify the ‘costs’ of exposing our students to the risk of persecution as a result of taking UK university courses, or of inviting Chinese government censorship into our university systems.
Unfortunately, there is little sign that the leaders of the sector are considering the complexity of the risks involved. On 15 October 2020, UUK issued a report entitled ‘Managing risks in internationalisation: security related issues’. Deplorably, this report suggests that universities are, or should become, guardians of UK national security, but fails to recognise the nature of the risks to academic freedom that staff and students in the UK are actually facing. The report certainly makes no mention of the concerns we outline above, despite UUK being a co-sponsor of the Alibaba scheme. Addressing itself exclusively to ‘senior leaders’ in universities, the report also suggests a top-down, managerial approach to addressing the risks of academic internationalisation, without giving sufficient thought to the need to involve academic staff. Self-governance is an important dimension of academic freedom. One reason we are publishing this piece is that we have had little or no say in how our institutions are making policy in this area, despite the evident relevance of our expertise, and the gravity of the concerns we raise. At this moment, we believe UK universities need to commit to strong defense of academic freedom, ensure that this applies equally to staff and students and prevent this key value of our universities being undermined by ‘technical’ or market considerations.
▻https://medium.com/ussbriefs/internet-access-deal-allows-chinese-government-censorship-in-our-uk-universi
#Chine #UK #Angleterre #censure #université #distanciel #enseignement #taxes_universitaires #frais_d'inscription #Great_Fire_Wall #internet #étudiants_chinois #VPN #Jisc #Ucisa #Alibaba #Alibaba_cloud #surveillance #liberté_académique
ping @etraces
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Spy agency ducks questions about ’back doors’ in tech products
▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-congress-insight-idUSKBN27D1CSSAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) - The U.S. National Security Agency is rebuffing efforts by a leading Congressional critic to determine whether it is continuing to place so-called back doors into commercial technology products, in a controversial practice that critics say damages both U.S. industry and national security. The NSA has long sought agreements with technology companies under which they would build special access for the spy agency into their products, according to disclosures by former (...)
#Juniper #algorithme #backdoor #surveillance #NSA #VPN
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VPN beim Speedport W 724 V | Telekom hilft Community
▻https://telekomhilft.telekom.de/t5/Geraete-Zubehoer/VPN-beim-Speedport-W-724-V/td-p/1030965...er unterstützt nur VPN passthrough....
von wegen.
Der W724V ist genauso kastriert, wie seine beiden älteren Brüder W921V und W723V.
Die können alle nur in begrenztem Umfang UDP und TCP Ports weiterleiten.
Für „VPN Passthrough“ müssten sie aber auch direkt IP-Protokolle weiterleiten können.
Für IpSec-basiertes VPN (z.B. das Fritz-Box VPN von AVM) müsste z.B. das IP-Protokoll 50 (ESP) weitergeleitet werden.Somit ist das Teil genauso unbrauchbar.
Für VPN-Zwecke könnte man allenfalls ein Open-VPN Lösung einsetzen, da diese mit nur 1 TCP oder UDP Port auskommt.
Hat man dann erfolgreich den Open-VPN Tunnel aufgebaut, so steht man aber schon wieder vor dem nächsten Problem.
Will man über den VPN-Tunnel mit Geräten im Netzwerk kommunizieren, so benötigt man noch jeweils auf Client und Server-Seite einen Routing-Eintrag in der Routing-Tabelle.
Auf der Server-Seite macht man das normalerweise im Standard-Gateway des Netzwerks - und das ist dann der liebe Speedport W724V - nur sucht man hier mal wieder vergeblich nach den Einstellungen für die Routing-Tabelle, die gibt es nämlich nicht (d.h. geben tut es sie schon im Engineering-Menü - aber natürlich Read-Only.)Eine Registrierung der IP-Telefonnummern in einer hinter dem Speedport W724v angeschlossenen Fritzbox funktioniert ebenfalls nicht - das kennt man ja schon vom W723v Typ A - gleicher Hersteller: Huawei.
Bei Verwendung einer alternativen IP-Adresse für den Speedport (also nicht 192.168.2.1) funktioniert der Zugriff via „speedport.ip“ nicht mehr —> man kann nur noch via IP-Adresse über den Web-Browser auf das Konfig-Menü zugreifen ???
Ach ja, da gibt´s ja noch WlanToGo - im Kundencenter ist die Anmeldung hierzu mit grünem Haken bestätigt. Im W724v bleibt der Hotspot aber auf „Aus“ stehen - bei Klick auf Anmeldung kommt dann: „Die gewünschte Anmeldung ist leider nicht möglich. Die Bereitstellung des Produktes WLAN TO GO ist nicht möglich, da die Voraussetzung nicht erfüllt ist.“ <--- Welche Voraussetzungen müssen denn noch erfüllt sein ???
Tolle Sache, liebe Telekom, was ihr da auf die Kundschaft los lasst *gebleckte_zaehne
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خمس دول عربية تتصدّر قائمة أكثر دول العالم اسخداماً لـVPN - رصيف 22
▻https://raseef22.net/article/1079689-%D8%AE%D9%85%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%Cinq pays arabes (Emirats, Qatar, Oman, Arabie saoudite, Koweït) en tête des Etats dans le monde où les internautes utilisent le plus un VPN pour protéger leurs navigations sur internet.
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« Xi Jinping : la société sous surveillance » – par Qiu Xiaolong, écrivain
▻https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/xi-jinping-societe-surveillance-qiu-xiaolong-221176Le numéro un chinois n’a de cesse de renforcer le contrôle sur la population afin de d’assurer la stabilité politique et sociale du régime Ces dernières années, j’ai rencontré de plus en plus de difficultés pour retourner en Chine afin de mener des recherches liées à mes romans mettant en scène l’inspecteur Chen (publiés en France aux Editions Liana Levi). La principale raison ? Le renforcement et l’omniprésence de la surveillance dans le pays. Tout a commencé dès ma demande de visa pour laquelle je devais (...)
#algorithme #CCTV #drone #Skynet #VPN #biométrie #censure #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #COVID-19 #santé #surveillance (...)
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À propos de l’amendement anti-porno inséré discrètement dans un projet de loi qui n’a rien à voir. « Un amendement de la sénatrice Marie Mercier (LR) a remis sur la place publique, la question de l’accès à la pornographie. Le résultat est médiocre. »
▻https://www.zdnet.fr/blogs/zapping-decrypte/naufrage-politique-39905145.htm
« il est plus rentable politiquement d’instaurer une mesure rapide et inefficace que d’investir dans le temps long et l’éducation »
#pornographie #censure #VPN #CSA
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Russia’s Internet, already dim, gets darker
▻https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/russia-internet-censorshipCensorship and new laws block online information and stifle digital life The Russian internet is becoming less free, more isolated from the rest of the world, and on a path resembling countries with strictly controlled online spaces like in Iran. A recent report by a leading digital rights group in Russia paints a bleak picture of state censorship of the country’s internet. The research, published by Roskomsvoboda, a Moscow-based group that advocates for internet freedom and the protection (...)
#activisme #surveillance #censure #DeepPacketInspection-DPI #VPN #Roskomnadzor
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Huge rise in hacking attacks on home workers during lockdown
▻https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/may/24/hacking-attacks-on-home-workers-see-huge-rise-during-lockdownCybercriminals are exploiting fears and chaos caused by coronavirus, says security firm Hackers have launched a wave of cyber-attacks trying to exploit British people working from home, as the coronavirus lockdown forces people to use often unfamiliar computer systems. The proportion of attacks targeting home workers increased from 12% of malicious email traffic before the UK’s lockdown began in March to more than 60% six weeks later, according to to data from cybersecurity company (...)
#GCHQ #VPN #manipulation #COVID-19 #hacking #santé #télétravail
##santé
▻https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/617879e94d3fba14c6d52497a8dd3130793e8ab0/0_232_3500_2101/master/3500.jpg -
prism-break.org - Zintv
▻https://zintv.org/outil/prism-breakMettons fin à notre dépendance à l’égard des services propriétaires. LE SITE PRISM-BREAK.org LUTTE CONTRE LA SURVEILLANCE Échapper aux programmes de surveillance nécessite de changer la manière dont on utiliser Internet. Néanmoins, trouver et utiliser les bons outils numériques alternatifs n’est pas forcément à la portée de tout le monde. Dans ce sens, le site prism-break.org propose toute une série de logiciels qui n’ont pas été développés par les géants du web qui collaborent avec la NSA. (...)
#Altaba/Yahoo ! #Apple #GCHQ #Google #Microsoft #Facebook #PalTalk #Skype #YouTube #TOR #cryptage #Android #Linux #smartphone #Tempora #Windows #XKeyscore #DuckDuckGo #VPN #iOS #historique #FiveEyes #PRISM (...)
##Altaba/Yahoo_ ! ##surveillance
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Comment aider la montée en charge (scalabilité) de ses liens OpenVPN sous pfSense ; notre article complet : ▻https://www.provya.net/?d=2020/04/14/09/52/56-pfsense-aider-la-montee-en-charge-scalabilite-de-ses-liens-openvpn
#firewall #réseau #open-source #pfSense #openVPN #VPN #sécurité -
Comment un VPN espion a permis à Facebook de s’offrir WhatsApp | korii.
▻https://korii.slate.fr/tech/facebook-onavo-vpn-espion-surveillance-mouchard-rachat-croissance-whatsaUne app israélienne transformée en mouchard servait à observer la croissance du service de messagerie. Quand Facebook a déboursé 19 milliards de dollars (17,5 milliards d’euros) pour acheter WhatsApp en février 2014, beaucoup se sont demandés si Mark Zuckerberg n’avait pas perdu tout sens des réalités. Pourtant, six ans plus tard, le service de messagerie s’est imposé comme l’un des piliers du géant du web social. Il faut dire que, grâce à Onavo racheté quelques mois plus tôt pour environ 120 millions (...)
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[pfSense] Comprendre et analyser les logs de son VPN IPsec - article complet : ▻https://www.provya.net/?d=2020/03/10/09/43/17-pfsense-comprendre-et-analyser-les-logs-de-son-vpn-ipsec
#pfSense #sécurité #VPN #IPsec #firewall #open-source -
Comprendre les pannes courantes sur un VPN IPsec sous pfSense et surtout connaître les solutions associées : ▻https://www.provya.net/?d=2020/02/25/09/55/24-pfsense-les-pannes-courantes-et-leurs-solutions-sur-un-vpn-ipsec
#pfSense #sécurité #réseau #firewall #opensource #vpn #ipsec -
Configurer un VPN IPsec site-à-site sous pfSense, le tuto complet : ▻https://www.provya.net/?d=2020/02/11/08/22/01-pfsense-configurer-un-vpn-ipsec-site-a-site
#pfSense #réseau #open-source #firewall #sécurité #vpn -
Wikipédia de nouveau accessible en Turquie
https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/01/16/wikipedia-de-nouveau-accessible-en-turquie_6026098_4408996.htmlPrès de trois ans après avoir été bloquée par la justice, l’encyclopédie en ligne Wikipédia a été finalement rendue de nouveau accessible en Turquie, mercredi 15 janvier au soir. Dans les heures qui ont suivi cette annonce, certains internautes avaient encore des difficultés pour consulter le site. Mais selon le site spécialiste des mesures de trafic Internet Netblocks, la levée du blocage est désormais quasiment effective pour tous les internautes turcs. La directrice de la fondation Wikimédia, (...)
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How we survive the surveillance apocalypse
▻https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/31/how-we-survive-surveillance-apocalypseOnline privacy is not dead, but you have to be angry enough to demand it. Go, go gadgets has long been the attitude in my house. Perhaps yours, too : A smartphone made it easier to stay in touch. A smart TV streamed a zillion more shows. A smart speaker let you talk to a smart thermostat without getting out of bed. That’s progress, right ? Now I’ve got a new attitude : It’s not just what I can get out of technology — I want to know what the technology gets out of me. For the past year, I’ve (...)
#Apple #GoldmanSachs #Google #MasterCard #Amazon #Facebook #algorithme #Chrome #Alexa #carte #cookies #domotique #iPhone #smartphone #thermostat #voiture #WiFi #VPN (...)
##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##BigData ##CCPA ##data ##écoutes ##profiling ##publicité ##santé
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The Defense Department Says It Needs the Encryption the FBI Wants to Break
▻https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/akwwn5/the-defense-department-says-it-needs-the-encryption-the-fbi-wants-to-breakA bipartisan coalition of lawmakers this week worked overtime to vilify encryption, oblivious to the fact that weakening encryption standards will put the public, and the internet, at risk. Even the Defense Department is now pointing out that the government’s quest to weaken encryption lies somewhere between counterproductive and downright harmful. Attorney General Bill Barr and Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Lindsey Graham have been on a tear lately in a bid to undermine encryption (...)
#Apple #FBI #USDepartmentOfDefense #Facebook #algorithme #cryptage #backdoor #smartphone #VPN #anti-terrorisme #écoutes (...)
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Les dernières nouvelles du #Great_Firewall_of_China et des #VPN :
▻https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/china-vpn
Un article assez léger (bien qu’il prétende au début qu’il va y avoir de la technique ; en fait, il reste à la surface dans ses explications) mais décrivant une expérience intéressante. L’auteur a loué un VPS Windows en Chine et l’a utilisé pour tester des dizaines de fournisseurs de VPN. Conclusion : la plupart sont bloqués, parce qu’ils utilisent des adresses IP fixes, ou bien parce que le protocole utilisé laisse fuiter trop de métadonnées.
À l’avenir, il faudra se dissimuler beaucoup plus, avec du TLS dans SSH dans IPsec et en faisant très attention aux fuites de métadonnées.
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Je suis en Chine, et c’est vrai, c’est mon combat de tous les jours, avoir un VPN qui fonctionne. (sans un cryptage DNS, la plupart ne fonctionne pas)
Meme zeronet est bloque, et ils arrivent meme a bloquer freenet, vous vous connectez a freenet peut etre 15 minutes, vous avez 30 pairs, puis soudainement, vous etes a zero pairs, et ca reste sur zero, faut fermer freenet, le relancer dans 30 minutes et rebelote.
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Internet en Afrique : Comment les gouvernements le ferment-ils ?
▻https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-47765394Pas de Facebook, Twitter ou WhatsApp.C’est ce qui devient de plus en plus courant dans certains pays africains, où les gouvernements ont périodiquement fermé l’Internet ou bloqué les plateformes de médias sociaux. Cela fait un an que le Tchad a bloqué l’accès aux sites de médias sociaux les plus populaires. Le Soudan en avait limité l’accès pendant les manifestations antigouvernementales, tout comme l’avaient fait les autorités du Zimbabwe. Les militants des droits numériques disent que c’est de la (...)
#VPN #filtrage #web #surveillance #AccessNow
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En bannissant les publicités de VPN en Chine, Google s’assure un avenir (plus) radieux dans l’Empire du Milieu
▻https://cyberguerre.numerama.com/1140-en-bannissant-les-publicites-de-vpn-en-chine-google-sassuGoogle a décidé de mettre un terme aux publicités de produits VPN diffusées auprès des utilisateurs chinois. Un choix qui renforce la censure numérique opérée par les autorités du pays, et évite au géant de la tech’ de perdre un marché lucratif pour une « simple histoire » de serveurs permettant de contourner la censure. Si Google a été contraint de se retirer du marché chinois en 2010, la faute à une politique de censure numérique trop restrictive de la part des autorités du pays, la firme californienne (...)
#Apple #Google #Google_AdSense #VPN #censure #publicité #TheGreatFirewallofChina
##publicité
//c0.lestechnophiles.com/cyberguerre.numerama.com//content/uploads/sites/2/2019/03/andrew-worley-299600-unsplash.jpg -
State Controlled #internet: The Story About VPNs in #china
▻https://hackernoon.com/state-controlled-internet-the-story-about-vpns-in-china-a16ee6de5ec7?souCensorship is closely related to politics. The annual global ranking of Internet freedom clearly illustrates this dependence. States that violate human rights also block undesirable websites or block access to the global network.Only 13 of the 65 countries analyzed by the Freedom House researchers do not interfere with the information freedom of their citizens. Most of the rest of the world’s Internet users can access blocked websites only via #vpn services. Residents of China have hard times with this as the hunt for unlicensed VPNs has recently increased there.Chronology of restrictionsBack in 2008, YouTube was blocked in China. A year later in 2009, Facebook, Twitter, and all Google services were blocked. In 2014, access to Instagram was blocked. Chinese authorities said that all (...)
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The Ultimate Guide to Bypassing Geo-restrictions While Streaming
▻https://hackernoon.com/the-ultimate-guide-to-bypassing-geo-restrictions-while-streaming-5d97d85Image sourceThe internet is known to be a goldmine for streaming videos. Alongside other contents that can be accessed via the internet, the interest in video streaming services is soaring both among the subscribers and service providers.According to Digital TV Research, video streaming subscriptions globally will increase by 409 million between 2017 and 2023 to a total of 777 million.Despite such growth and the global nature of the internet, we’re still victims of geography.We believe in a myth that we’ve erased physical boundaries in the digital world and that the internet is a place where we can freely share and consume content, regardless of where we live.However, with #geo-restriction becoming a prevailing issue in many parts of the world, internet freedom is on a decline.in regions (...)
#vpn #dns-services #hackernoon-top-story #bypass-geo-restrictions
