• Il est temps pour moi de faire une #recension sur #appropriation_culturelle et #Palestine, qui recouvre des sujets aussi larges que : #Houmous #Hummus #rrroumous #Chakchouka #falafel #couscous #Shawarma #zaatar #Nourriture #Cuisine #Danse #dabke #vêtements #langage #arabe #Art #Cinéma #Photos #Littérature #Poésie #Photographie #Documentaire ...

    Le Rrrizbollah aime le rrroumous
    @nidal, Loubnan ya Loubnan, le 10 octobre 2008

    Israel’s cuisine not always kosher but travelling well
    Stephen Cauchi, The Age, le 22 mai 2011

    Make Hummus Not War
    Trevor Graham, 2012

    NYC Dabke Dancers respond to ZviDance "Israeli Dabke"
    Dabke Stomp, Youtube, le 3 août 2013

    La Chakchouka, nouveau plat tendance (PHOTOS)
    Rebecca Chaouch, HuffPost Maghreb, le 15 avril 2014

    Exploring Israel’s ‘ethnic’ cuisine
    Amy Klein, JTA, le 28 janvier 2015

    International Hummus Day : Israeli Entrepreneur’s Middle Eastern Food Celebration Is Still Political For Some
    Lora Moftah, IB Times, le 13 mai 2015

    Israel’s obsession with hummus is about more than stealing Palestine’s food
    Ben White, The National, le 23 mai 2015

    Palestine : étude d’un vol historique et culturel
    Roger Sheety, Middle East Eye, le 15 juillet 2015

    La « guerre du houmous »
    Akram Belkaïd, Le Monde Diplomatique, septembre 2015

    L’appropriation culturelle : y voir plus clair
    LAETITIA KOMBO, Le Journal En Couleur, le 31 août 2016

    Hummus restaurant
    The Angry Arab News Service, le 5 novembre 2016

    Le Houmous israélien est un vol et non une appropriation
    Steven Salaita, Al Araby, 4 September 2017

    Looted and Hidden – Palestinian Archives in Israel (46 minutes)
    Rona Sela, 2017


    Avec Cyril Lignac, Israël fait découvrir son patrimoine et sa gastronomie
    Myriam Abergel, Le Quotidien du Tourisme, le 27 janvier 2018

    Why does Virgin find “Palestinian couscous” offensive ?
    Gawan Mac Greigair, The Electronic Intifada, le 10 février 2018

    Maghreb : une labellisation du couscous moins anodine qu’il n’y paraît
    Le Point, le 13 février 2018

    Medieval Arabic recipes and the history of hummus
    Anny Gaul, Recipes, le 27 mars 2018

    Que font de vieilles photos et de vieux films de Palestiniens dans les archives de l’armée israélienne ?
    Ofer Aderet, Haaretz, le 2 juillet 2018

    En Israël, une exposition montre des œuvres arabes sans le consentement des artistes
    Mustafa Abu Sneineh, Middle East Eye, le 17 juillet 2018


    Houmous, cuisine et diplomatie
    Zazie Tavitian, France Inter, le 21 août 2018

    Pourquoi un éditeur israélien a-t-il publié sans agrément un livre traduit d’essais en arabe ?
    Hakim Bishara, Hyperallergic, le 13 septembre 2018

    La nouvelle cuisine israélienne fait un carton à Paris
    Alice Boslo, Colette Monsat, Hugo de Saint-Phalle, Le Figaro, le 26 septembre 2018

    Cuisine, art et littérature : comment Israël vole la culture arabe
    Nada Elia, Middle East Eye, le 3 octobre 2018

    Pins Daddy - Israel Costume

    Shawarma, the Iconic Israeli Street Food, Is Slowly Making a Comeback in Tel Aviv
    Eran Laor, Haaretz, le 8 janvier 2019

    What is Za’atar, the Israeli Spice You Will Want to Sprinkle on Everything
    Shannon Sarna, My Jewish Learning, le 7 mars 2019

    #Vol #appropriation_culinaire #racisme #colonialisme #Invisibilisation #Histoire #Falsification #Mythologie #Musique #Musique_et_Politique #Boycott_Culturel #BDS


    En parallèle, un peu de pub pour la vraie cuisine palestinienne ou moyen-orientale :

    Rudolf el-Kareh - Le Mezzé libanais : l’art de la table festive

    Marlène Matar - Ma’idat Marlene min Halab

    La cuisine palestinienne, c’est plus que ce qu’on a dans l’assiette
    Laila El-Haddad, Electronic Intifada, le 15 Juin 2017

    Palestine : la cuisine de Jerusalem et de la diaspora
    Alain Kruger, France Culture, le 25 février 2018

    La Palestine, ce n’est pas seulement de la géographie, c’est notre façon à nous de faire la cuisine, de manger, de bavarder
    Shira Rubin, Eater, le 9 novembre 2018

    Une écrivaine décrit la cuisine palestinienne et le monde qui l’entoure
    Mayukh Sen, The New-York Times, le 4 février 2019

    La Troika Libanaise

    Les Ptits Plats Palestiniens de Rania

    Une Palestinienne à Paris

    Hind Tahboub - Bandora

    Karim Haidar, 195 rur Saint Maur, Paris 10eme

    #Livres_de_recettes #Restaurants #Traiteurs #Cheffes

  • What is Za’atar, the Israeli Spice You Will Want to Sprinkle on Everything | The Nosher

    a’atar is everywhere these days in America. Just do a quick Pinterest search for za’atar and you will come up with dozens and dozens of mouth-watering recipes using the spice.

    But what exactly is it?

    L’auteure qui ose écrire cette m... est la petite-fille du type qui a inventé le Tang... C’est dire si elle s’y connaît en goût !

  • Zaatari’s children: poverty, conflict and displacement in refugee camp

    According to UNHCR around 80,000 people live in Zaatari and more than half of them are children.

    Aysar Waseem Ryabi spent most of his nearly 6 years on this side of the border.

    “I wake up in the morning, have breakfast, go to the playground then go back home. I sit for a bit then go out again and play football. And then I take my brother and play more football," he said.

    Syria’s children are either growing up amid conflict, or living in poverty and displacement.

    Inside Zaatari, UNICEF partnered with NGOs and Syrians to create “safe spaces” for children to be children.

    Volunteers focus on extracurricular activities – like painting or playing – to help children with the tools they need to build up resilience.

    “This is so they can reach a level where they can get their needs and adapt to any condition,” Hussein Al-Qassem, UNICEF Volunteer told Euronews’ Anelise Borges.

    “No matter what might happen in the long run, they will have the solutions. It can be difficult, but I hope that the things they are witnessing will help them become more lenient.”

    #camps_de_réfugiés #Zaatari #Jordanie #pauvreté #réfugiés #asile #migrations

  • The #compact experiment. Push for refugee jobs confronts reality of Jordan and Lebanon

    In September 2015, as Europe veered between fear and compassion in response to the refugee crisis, the outline of a radical reform to refugee policy appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs. Its authors – Paul Collier, an influential development economist, and Alexander Betts, a social scientist and then-head of the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford – proposed a pathway for Syrian refugees into Jordan’s labor market.

    #Liban #travail #réfugiés #réfugiés_syriens #Jordanie #Zaatari #marché_du_travail

  • Kathryn Clark - Home

    Inspired by the historical storyboard of the Bayeux Tapestry, Refugee Stories is a series of embroidery panels that follow the journey of the Syrian refugees into Europe. The monumental scale of the crisis, the second largest mass migration in history, is documented in various points along the refugees’ journey out of Syria and into Western Europe. Each point along their journey was affected by geography: whether by sea or land, pastoral farmland or war torn desert. Using international news stories, Google Earth, and numerical data from the United Nations, each panel pieces together the journey in one schematic map.


    #art #cartographie #narration #Syrie #conflit #réfugié·es

    • Not Without Dignity: Views of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon on Displacement, Conditions of Return, and Coexistence

      Discussions about a future return of refugees and coexistence among groups currently at war in Syria must begin now, even in the face of ongoing violence and displacement. This report, based on interviews with refugees, makes it clear that the restoration of dignity will be important to creating the necessary conditions for return and peaceful coexistence — and building a stable post-war Syria one day.


    • New ICTJ Study: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon See Security, Restoration of Dignity as Key Conditions for Return

      A new report from the International Center for Transitional Justice argues that discussions about a future return of refugees and coexistence among groups currently at war in Syria must begin now, even in the face of ongoing violence and displacement. The report makes it clear that the restoration of refugees’ sense of dignity will be important to creating the necessary conditions for return and peaceful coexistence — and building a stable post-war Syria one day.


    • We Must Start the Conversation About Return of Syrian Refugees Now

      If millions of displaced Syrians are to go home one day, we need to understand refugees’ conditions for returning, attitudes to justice and the possibility of coexistence, say the authors of an International Center for Transitional Justice study of refugees in Lebanon.


    • Nowhere Left to Run: Refugee Evictions in Lebanon in Shadow of Return

      Lebanon wants to evict 12,000 refugees who live near an air base where foreign military assistance is delivered. The evictions, which began in spring and recently resumed after a short respite, have left refugees more vulnerable amid rising demands they return to Syria.


    • Syrian Refugees Return From Lebanon Only to Flee War Yet Again

      Refugees who returned to Syria from Lebanon under cease-fire deals this summer have been displaced again by fighting. Those who stayed behind are pressing for international guarantees of safety on return, as Lebanese officials explore ways to get more refugees to leave.


    • Dangerous Exit: Who Controls How Syrians in Lebanon Go Home

      AS HALIMA clambered into a truck leaving Lebanon in late June, she resolved that if the men driving the vehicle were arrested at the Syrian border, she would get out and walk back to her village on her own. The 66-year-old grandmother had not seen the son and daughter she left behind in Syria for five years. Wearing an embroidered black dress and a traditional headdress, her crinkled eyes shone with determination. “I’m coming back to my land,” she said.

      Having begged her not to leave, Halima’s two daughters staying in Lebanon wept on her shoulders. “We’re afraid she won’t come back,” 42-year-old Sherifa said, as her voice cracked. Sherifa cannot follow her mother to Syria; her eldest son, who has single-handedly kept the family afloat with odd jobs because of his father’s disability, would be sent to war.

      Huddled in groups at the checkpoint in northeast Lebanon, other families also said their goodbyes. A teenage girl knelt on the dirt road, refusing to let go of her 19-year-old brother’s legs. Their mother, Nawal, held her as he left for a truck to the border. “I don’t know how he will live on his own in Syria. Only God knows what will happen to him,” Nawal said. “I didn’t think he would actually leave. It all happened very fast.”

      A few months earlier, 3,000 Syrians in the Lebanese border town of Arsal had registered their names with Syrian and Lebanese intelligence agencies to return to their villages just over the mountains in Syria’s Qalamoun region. When the first group of several hundred people was approved to leave on June 28, many families were separated, as some members either decided not to register or were not approved by Syrian authorities.

      “We need a political solution for these people to go back, but the politics doesn’t start here in Lebanon,” a Lebanese intelligence agent said, as a scuffle broke out that scorching June morning. A Syrian man lunged at Khaled Abdel Aziz, a real estate businessman who had been put in charge of signing up fellow refugees to return. Abdel Aziz sweated in his suit as he dashed between television interviews, repeating that Syrians had a country of their own to go back to. “You’re protecting the army, not protecting yourself,” the man yelled, before being pulled away.

      The TV cameras rolled as dozens of trucks and tractors piled high with timber, water tanks and chicken coops were checked off a list by Lebanese intelligence agents and headed with an army escort to the Syrian border. A line of TV reporters announced to their Lebanese viewers that these refugees were going home.

      The next day, on the other side of Arsal, a small group of refugees held a sit-in, to much less fanfare. “We’re asking for return with dignity,” one banner read, “with guarantees from the international community and the U.N.”

      “We’re not against the return, but we want conditions, guarantees,” said Khaled Raad, one of the organizers. His refugee committee has been petitioning the U.N. and sympathetic Lebanese politicians for international protection for returning Syrians for a year. “I mean, this is not like taking a cup of tea or coffee to say, after seven years, go ahead and return to your houses. It’s not an easy thing.”


      By then, Halima had arrived back in Syria. Apart from some tractors breaking down en route, they had no problem crossing the border. Halima went to stay with her son while she waited to hear about the situation in her hometown, the mountaintop village of Fleeta. Her granddaughters had grown up quickly while she was in Lebanon, and she loved spending time with them in the neighboring town.

      But as more of their friends and relatives returned to Fleeta, with subsequent groups departing Arsal in July, word came to the family of empty homes and little power, water or work in the Syrian village. Sherifa received messages from relatives who had returned to Fleeta but now wanted to escape again. With no easy way to come back to Lebanon legally, they planned to smuggle themselves back across the border.

      Without her mother, and with bad news from Fleeta making it less likely she would ever return to Syria, Sherifa became increasingly desperate. Her husband, who is unable to work for health reasons, sunk into depression. “By God, dying is better than living,” Sherifa said. “I seek refuge in God from this return.”

      RETURNING TO SYRIA during this eighth year of conflict is both an excruciating personal decision and a political calculation: by refugees, the government in Syria, and other nations with a stake in the war. As the government recaptures more territory from opposition groups, and fighting quells in certain areas, some refugees are considering returning, while others are terrified of the increasing pressure to go back. After Lebanon began organizing small group returns this year, including from Arsal, these dilemmas became more urgent.

      To return is to take a political gamble: Refugees must weigh the risks of staying against the risks of going. They try to figure out who can be trusted to tell them the truth. They gather snippets of information from their cities, towns and villages about what happens to people who return. They struggle to decipher the intentions of the mercurial and multi-layered Syrian authorities and their foreign allies.

      Some of the broader dangers are well-known: an estimated half a million people killed in Syria’s war, including thousands dead this year; some one million people forced to leave their homes this year alone; a third of all houses and half of all schools and hospitals damaged or destroyed; in government-controlled areas, mandatory conscription into battle for men under 43, fear of arrest and torture, and the difficulties of reintegrating into a society and economy fractured by war.

      Until now, few refugees have considered this a risk worth taking. In 2017, the U.N. said 77,300 refugees went back independently to Syria, out of 5.6 million who had fled the country. The vast majority of Syrian refugees have consistently told U.N. and independent surveys they hoped to return home one day, but do not yet feel safe to do so.

      There are also risks to staying. More than 80 percent of Syrian refugees remain in three neighboring countries: Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. There, they face soaring poverty, years out of work or school, lack of official documents, risk of arrest and, above all, an increasing public clamoring for Syrians to be sent back.

      In Lebanon, where at least 1.5 million Syrians have sought refuge – increasing the country’s population by a quarter – the pressure to leave is the most intense. Few Syrians have legal status, even fewer can work. Many towns have imposed curfews or carried out mass evictions. At the U.N. General Assembly last year, Lebanon’s president Michel Aoun insisted Syrians must return, voluntarily or not. “The claim that they will not be safe should they return to their country is an unacceptable pretext,” he told world leaders.


    • Turkish minister: 255,300 Syrian refugees have returned home

      Turkish Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu said on Sunday that 255,300 Syrian refugees have returned home over the past two years, the state-run Anadolu news agency reported.

      “Some 160,000 of them returned to the Euphrates Shield region after Turkey brought peace there,” added Soylu, speaking to reporters in the southern province of Hatay bordering Syria.

      Turkey carried out Operation Euphrates Shield between August 2016 and March 2017 to eliminate the terrorist threat along the border in the northern Syrian regions of Jarabulus, Al-Rai, Al-Bab and Azaz with the help of the Free Syrian Army.

      Expressing concern about a possible operation in the Idlib region of Syria by regime forces, the minister underlined that Turkey would not be responsible for a wave of migration in the event of an offensive.

      Soylu also noted that an average of 6,800 irregular migrants a day used to enter Greece from western Turkey in 2015 and that now it has been reduced to 79.


    • The fate of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Between forced displacement and forced return

      Recent news reports have surfaced on a possible United States-Russia deal to arrange for the return of refugees to Syria—reports that coincided both with the announcement that thousands of Syrians have died in regime prisons, and with one of the worst massacres in the conflict, perpetrated by ISIS in the city of Swaida. The US-Russia deal has been welcomed by Lebanese politicians, particularly those who have been scheming to repatriate Syrians for years now. But, unsurprisingly, the absence of a clear and coherent strategy for repatriation by the Lebanese government puts Syrian refugees at grave risk.

      In June, UNHCR interviewed Syrian refugees in Arsal who had expressed their willingness to go back to Syria in order to verify that they had the documentation needed for return and to ensure they were fully aware of the conditions in their home country. In response, caretaker Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil accused the agency of impeding refugees’ free return and ordered a freeze on the renewal of agency staff residency permits.

      This tug of war raises two main questions: What are the conditions in Lebanon that are pushing refugees toward returning to Syria while the conflict is ongoing and dangers persist? And what are the obstacles preventing some Syrians from returning freely to their homes?

      Conditions for Syrians in Lebanon

      Syrians began fleeing to Lebanon as early as 2011, but the Lebanese government failed to produce a single policy response until 2014, leading to ad-hoc practices by donors and host communities.

      By the end of 2014, the government began introducing policies to “reduce the number of displaced Syrians,” including closing the borders and requiring Syrians to either register with UNHCR and pledge not to work, or to secure a Lebanese sponsor to remain legally in the country and pay a $200 residency permit fee every six months. In May 2015, the government directed UNHCR to stop registering refugees. These conditions put many Syrians in a precarious position: without documentation, vulnerable to arrest and detention, and with limited mobility. Municipalities have been impeding freedom of movement as well, by imposing curfews on Syrians and even expelling them from their towns.

      In addition to the difficulties imposed by the state, Syrians face discrimination and violence on a day-to-day basis. Refugee settlements have been set on fire, Syrians have been beaten in the streets, and camps are regularly raided by the Lebanese army. All the while, Lebanese politicians foster and fuel the hatred of Syrians, blaming them for the country’s miseries and painting them as existential and security threats.

      Despite the polarization among Lebanese politicians regarding the situation in Syria, there is a consensus that the Syrian refugees are a burden that Lebanon cannot bear. Politicians across the board have been advocating for the immediate repatriation of refugees, and state officials are beginning to take action. President Michel Aoun made a statement in May declaring that Lebanon would seek a solution regarding the refugee crisis without taking into account the preferences of the UN or the European Union. This was followed by Bassil’s move, to freeze the residency permits of UNHCR staff, the leading agency (despite its many shortcomings) providing services for, and protecting the interests of, Syrian refugees. While UNHCR maintains that there are no safe zones in Syria as of yet, Lebanon’s General Security has begun facilitating the return of hundreds of refugees from Arsal and nearby towns. This process has been monitored by UNHCR to ensure that the returns are voluntary. Hezbollah has also established centers to organize the return of Syrians to their homes in collaboration with the Syrian regime.

      Syrian regime obstructing refugees’ free return

      As the situation for Syrian refugees in Lebanon becomes more and more unbearable, conditions for them back home remain troubling. Since 2012, the Syrian regime has been taking deliberate measures that would effectively make the situation for returning Syrians extremely difficult and dangerous.


      Syrian males aged 18 to 42 must serve in the Syrian Armed Forces. While exemptions were allowed in the past, a decree issued in 2017 bans exemptions from military service. Refusing to serve in the Syrian army results in imprisonment or an $8,000 fine, which most Syrians are unable to pay, thus risking having their assets seized by the regime.

      Property as a weapon of war

      Law No. 66 (2012) allowed for the creation of development zones in specified areas across the country. Under the pretense of redeveloping areas currently hosting informal settlements or unauthorized housing, the law is actually being used to expropriate land from residents in areas identified in the decree, which are mostly former opposition strongholds such as Daraya and Ghouta.

      Law No. 10 (2018), passed in April, speeds up the above process. This law stipulates the designation of development or reconstruction zones, requiring local authorities to request a list of property owners from public real estate authorities. Those whose have property within these zones but are not registered on the list are notified by local authorities and must present proof of property within 30 days. If they are successful in providing proof, they get shares of the redevelopment project; otherwise, ownership reverts to the local authority in the province, town, or city where the property is located. Human Rights Watch has published a detailed Q&A that explains the law and its implications.

      These laws, coupled with systematic destruction of land registries by local authorities, fully equip the regime to dispossess hundreds of thousands of Syrian families. Reports indicate that the regime has already begun reconstruction in areas south of Damascus.

      Statements by Syrian officials

      Syrian officials have made several public statements that reveal their hostility toward refugees. On August 20, 2017, at the opening ceremony of a conference held by Syria’s foreign ministry, President Bashar al-Assad gave a speech in which he said: “It’s true that we lost the best of our young men as well as our infrastructure, but in return we gained a healthier, more homogeneous society.” On another occasion, Assad stated his belief that some refugees are terrorists.

      In September 2017, a video of Issam Zahreddine, a commander in the Syrian Armed Forces, went viral. In the video, Zahreddine threatens refugees against returning, saying: “To everyone who fled Syria to other countries, please do not return. If the government forgives you, we will not. I advise you not to come back.” Zahreddine later clarified that his remarks were meant for rebels and ISIS followers, but that clarification should be taken with a grain of salt given his bloody track record in the war up until his death in October 2017. Along similar lines, leaked information from a meeting of top-ranking army officers just last month reported the following statement by the head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence administration, General Jamil Al-Hassan: “A Syria with 10 million trustworthy people obedient to the leadership is better than a Syria with 30 million vandals.”

      Unknown fate

      Considering the unwelcoming policies in Lebanon and the treacherous conditions in Syria, what is the fate of Syrian refugees, specifically those who oppose the Assad regime? Until now, the return championed by Lebanese politicians implies return to a fascist regime that has caused the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War and unapologetically committed countless war crimes. While Lebanese politicians continue to focus on repatriation, they are failing to acknowledge the major barriers preventing Syrians from returning home: the Assad regime and ongoing mass violence.

      We cannot speak of safe, dignified, and sustainable returns without demanding justice and accountability. Regime change and trials for those who committed war crimes over the span of the last seven years are a long way off, and all evidence currently points toward the Assad regime retaining power. Any strategy must therefore prioritize the safety of Syrians who are likely to be detained, tortured, and killed for their political views upon return, or simply denied entry to Syria altogether. Lebanese policy makers must take into account that Syrians residing in Lebanon are not a homogenous entity, and some may never be able to return to their homes. Those Syrians should not be forced to choose between a brutal regime that will persecute them and a country that strips away their rights and dignity. It is time for Lebanon to adopt clear policies on asylum, resettlement, and return that ensure the right of all Syrians to lead a safe and dignified life.


    • Le retour des réfugiés en Syrie commence à préoccuper la communauté internationale

      Lors d’une conférence sur la Syrie à Bruxelles, le retour des réfugiés syriens dans leur pays a été évoqué. Démarrée en 2011, la guerre en Syrie touche à sa fin

      La situation en Syrie est loin d’être stabilisée. Les besoins de financement, de nourriture de matériel sont même en constante augmentation. Selon un haut fonctionnaire de l’ONU, un éventuel assaut contre la dernière enclave rebelle pourrait entraîner une « catastrophe humanitaire ». Pourtant, alors que 12 millions de Syriens, soit près de la moitié de la population syrienne avant la guerre, a fui le pays ou a été déplacée à l’intérieur, la question du retour, étape indispensable à la reconstruction, commence à se poser.

      C’est le principal message ressorti de la conférence « Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region » , qui vient de se tenir à Bruxelles. Les diplomates européens ont mis l’accent sur les difficultés de l’Europe à isoler le Président Bashar al-Assad, vainqueur de la guerre, soutenu par la Russie et l’Iran, pendant que les États-Unis retirent leurs troupes.

      L’UE a rappelé qu’un soutien à la reconstruction à long terme dépendrait du processus de paix de l’ONU pour mettre fin à une guerre responsable de la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes.

      Les Européens sont toutefois divisés sur la question de la reconstruction du pays, dans la mesure où le processus de paix de l’ONU est bloqué, que l’intervention militaire russe de 2015 s’avère décisive et que les pays arabes voisins envisagent de rétablir des liens diplomatiques.

      « Les États-Unis se retirent et les Russes n’ont pas l’argent. Voilà le contexte », a expliqué un haut fonctionnaire de l’UE, cité par Reuters. L’Allemagne, la France et les Pays-Bas défendent ouvertement l’idée de libérer les fonds de reconstruction uniquement quand le pays aura démarré sa transition politique et que Bashar-al-Assad ne sera plus au pouvoir. Aucun représentant officiel de la Syrie n’a été invité à la conférence. L’Italie, l’Autriche et la Hongrie, grands détracteurs de la politique migratoire européenne, plaident en revanche pour une négociation avec les autorités syriennes pour que les millions de réfugiés puissent rentrer chez eux.

      Mogherini craint le « ni guerre ni paix »

      La cheffe de la diplomatie européenne, Federica Mogherini, a déclaré qu’il y avait un risque que le pays se retrouve coincé dans une situation de « ni guerre ni paix ». Le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, Filippo Grandi, a déclaré qu’il était prévisible que 2019 soit la première année depuis le début de la guerre « où il y aura plus de Syriens (réfugiés et déplacés internes) qui rentreront chez eux que de nouveaux déplacés. S’étant rendu en Syrie la semaine dernière, le Haut Commissaire a déclaré avoir été « marqué et touché » par la résilience du peuple syrien.

      « C’est dans un contexte de grandes destructions, avec des zones encore dangereuses et un manque de produits de première nécessité (nourriture, médicaments, eau) et d’emplois que de nombreux Syriens rentrent chez eux. Les agences humanitaires font ce qu’elles peuvent, mais un très grand nombre de déplacés internes et quelques réfugiés prennent la décision difficile de rentrer chez eux, et les besoins en produits de première nécessité ne font qu’augmenter », a-t-il expliqué, ajoutant que la plupart des réfugiés voyaient leur avenir dans leur pays natal et que « nous savons que 56 000 Syriens sont rentrés chez eux via des mouvements organisés l’année dernière, mais ce chiffre est certainement plus élevé ».

      Engagements financiers

      « Je suis heureux de vous annoncer que nous collaborons notamment avec le gouvernement syrien. Et j’aimerais particulièrement remercier la Fédération de Russie pour sa coopération face aux problèmes que le retour des réfugiés syriens implique pour eux », a ajouté Filippo Grandi. Dans le cadre de l’appel de l’ONU, 3,3 milliards de dollars seraient nécessaires pour venir en aide aux déplacés internes et 5,5 milliards de dollars pour les réfugiés et les communautés d’accueil dans les pays voisins.

      Le Secrétaire général adjoint aux affaires humanitaires, Marc Lowcock, a déclaré à la presse que les engagements financiers s’élevaient « au moins à 6,5 milliards de dollars » et peut-être même à près de 7 milliards de dollars. « C’est un très bon résultat, et si nous y parvenons vraiment en fin de compte, nous serons très heureux », a-t-il déclaré. Federica Mogherini a déclaré que l’UE contribuerait à hauteur de 560 millions d’euros pour venir en aide au peuple syrien durant l’année 2019 et que le même montant serait libéré les années suivantes.

      Filippo Grandi a également exprimé son inquiétude quant à la situation en déclin de la ville d’Idlib, près de la frontière turque. Près de 90 personnes y ont été tuées par des obus et des frappes aériennes, et la moitié d’entre elles étaient des enfants.

      « La pire des catastrophes humanitaires »

      « Permettez-moi de répéter ce que nous avons déjà dit à maintes reprises. Une attaque militaire d’envergure sur la ville d’Idlib occasionnerait la pire catastrophe humanitaire du 21ème siècle. Ce serait tout simplement inacceptable », a déclaré Filippo Grandi.

      Avec l’aide d’avions russes, l’armée syrienne a attaqué des villes au mains des forces rebelles dans la région d’Idlib, dernier bastion rebelle du pays. Ce bombardement a été le plus important depuis des mois. Les forces rebelles qui se sont battues depuis 8 ans pour faire tomber le Président al-Assad sont désormais confinées dans une enclave du nord est du pays, près de la frontière turque. Près de 4 millions de Syriens y vivent aujourd’hui, dont des centaines de milliers d’opposants au régime qui ont fui d’autres régions du pays.

      La Turquie, qui a commencé à patrouiller dans la zone tampon vendredi, a condamné ce qu’elle a qualifié de provocations croissantes pour mettre fin à la trêve et a averti qu’une offensive des forces russes et syriennes causerait une crise humanitaire majeure. De nombreux résidents sont exaspérés de l’incapacité des forces turques à répondre aux bombardements. L’armée syrienne a appelé au retrait des forces turques.

      L’enclave est protégée par une zone de « désescalade », un accord négocié l’an dernier par les pays qui soutiennent Bashar al-Assad, la Russie, l’Iran ainsi que la Turquie, qui avait auparavant soutenu les forces rebelles et envoyé des troupes pour surveiller la trêve. Le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, a déclaré que 320 000 Syriens avaient pu rentrer chez eux grâce aux « opérations anti-terrorisme » menées par la Turquie et la Syrie.


  • A Marketplace Solely for Women to Provide Space for Taboo Breakers

    In the third of our interviews with Ideation Competition finalists, we spoke to architect students Maria Årthun and Nicole Lilly Gros about their design for a marketplace in Jordan’s Zataari camp that aims to break taboos and integrate women into the workforce.

    #femmes #genre #camp_de_réfugiés #architecture #Zaatari #espace_privé #espace_public

  • As Resources Run Dry, Syrian Refugees Cling to Survival in Jordan’s Urban Hubs

    Four hours at the Za’atari refugee camp — a stifling, dusty maze of tents and makeshift shelters 30 miles from the Syrian border — was enough to convince Abd Mawla Juma’a that his family had to move on.

    “There was no way we could stay in the camp,” said Juma’a, 37, who fled his home in Syria four years ago with his family.

    #camps_de_réfugiés #urban_refugees #réfugiés_urbains #Jordanie #réfugiés_syriens #asile #migrations #réfugiés #villes #Zaatari

    • Profughi siriani: in Giordania uscire da un campo costa caro

      Condizioni di vita durissime per i profughi siriani scappati dalla guerra che vivono nei campi in Giordania. Ma va ancora peggio, spesso, a chi abbandona i centri d’accoglienza, che si ritrova senza documenti e senza diritti. Una situazione che coinvolge donne, bambini e uomini, vittime di sfruttamento e a rischio di trasferimento forzato in Siria

      Invisibili, senza tutele e senza documenti. Perdono la loro identità e vivono in condizioni di vita durissime. Sono i rifugiati siriani in Giordania che escono dall’accoglienza dei campi per vivere negli insediamenti informali. A causa della loro vulnerabilità sono spesso vittime di sfruttamento lavorativo, anche minorile, di abusi e corrono il rischio di essere trasferiti a forza nei campi o rimandati in Siria.

      Circa 655 mila persone, tra il 2011 e il 2017, secondo i dati dell’Unhcr, hanno trovato rifugio in Giordania fuggendo dalla Siria.
      Dove vanno i profughi siriani in Giordania

      79 mila sono stati ospitati nel campo di Zaatari nel nord del Paese, 53 mila sono stati registrati nel campo di Azaraq, a 100 chilometri da Amman, e più di 7 mila nell’Emirates Jordan Camp di Zarqa.

      Tutti gli altri vivono fuori dai campi profughi formali, principalmente nei governatorati centrali e settentrionali di Amman, Mafraq, Irbid e Zarqa, dove si trovano privati dell’accesso ai servizi, alle opportunità lavorative e dell’assistenza umanitaria.

      In migliaia negli ultimi anni hanno lasciato i campi di Zaatari e Azraq per mancanza di opportunità di sostentamento, per le condizioni di vita estreme dei campi, nonché per i numerosi ostacoli per ottenere il regolare permesso di trasferirsi in altre aree del paese. Chi esce dai campi ha permessi di 2 o 3 giorni, se non rientra perde i documenti e si ritrova senza identità esposto al rischio di essere deportato in Siria.

      La mancanza di documentazione in cui si trovano centinaia di uomini, donne e bambini mette a serio rischio la loro vita. Tra le conseguenze più gravi ed evidenti: l’emarginazione, l’abbandono scolastico, le problematiche di genere, l’accesso limitato agli aiuti umanitari e ai servizi pubblici, violenze, abusi, sfruttamento lavorativo, separazione familiare e, non ultimo, la carenza di cure sanitarie.
      Sanità sempre più cara per i rifugiati siriani

      In Giordania un recente provvedimento aumenta i costi delle cure mediche per i rifugiati: dallo scorso febbraio sono stati cancellati i servizi sanitari sovvenzionati per i siriani che vivono in Giordania e che oggi devono pagare l’80% della “tariffa straniera”. Questo potrebbe avere un impatto sul loro accesso all’assistenza sanitaria e aumentare la loro vulnerabilità, denuncia Medici Senza Frontiere (Msf).

      L’accesso all’assistenza sanitaria di base era stato già messo a rischio da un precedente provvedimento del novembre 2014 che aveva eliminato i servizi sanitari gratuiti per i siriani che vivono fuori dai campi profughi.
      Immigrazione siriana: in arrivo l’amnistia per i profughi

      A metà del 2017 si parlava ufficiosamente di un’amnistia che potesse regolarizzazione lo stato della documentazione dei rifugiati. Sebbene non siano stati ancora chiariti i requisiti specifici, l’amnistia si applicherà a coloro che hanno lasciato i campi prima di luglio 2017 e dovrebbe essere presto implementata formalmente.

      «I più vulnerabili rischiano spesso di essere invisibili. Per questo in Giordania abbiamo scelto di lavorare negli insediamenti informali, non riconosciuti dalle autorità, per aiutare centinaia di famiglie di rifugiati siriani che affrontano la sfida di regolarizzare lo stato della propria documentazione legale e civile in Giordania», scrive Monica Matarazzo, senior protection advisor di Intersos, nel rapporto “Sul Campo” diffuso in aprile.
      Immigrati siriani senza documentazione legale

      Fino a luglio 2014 i rifugiati potevano lasciare i campi regolarmente, con tutta la documentazione. A gennaio 2015 è stata sospesa la procedura di rilascio e chi è uscito dai campi dopo luglio 2014 non ha diritto a ottenere la documentazione legale, ovvero la carta dei servizi del ministero dell’Interno (Carta Moi) e il Certificato per richiedenti asilo dell’Unhcr (Asc dell’Unhcr).

      «Senza i due principali documenti legali, i rifugiati in Giordania non sono in grado di ottenere la documentazione civile (certificati di nascita, matrimonio o morte) e permessi di lavoro. Allo stesso tempo, i rifugiati privi di documenti non hanno, o hanno accesso ridotto, ai servizi pubblici e all’assistenza umanitaria e spesso devono ricorrere a meccanismi di risposta negativi come il lavoro minorile, i matrimoni precoci, l’indebitamento e l’accettazione di vivere in condizioni abitative degradanti. Inoltre, si trovano di fronte a un concreto rischio di reinsediamento forzato nei campi o di deportazione in Siria», si legge nell’Annual report 2017 di Intersos.

      I rifugiati siriani che escono dal sistema dell’accoglienza dei campi profughi di Zaatari e Azraq, si insediano su terreni privati chiamati Informal Tented Settlements. Migliaia di persone pagano i proprietari terrieri con il lavoro quotidiano nei campi, svolto prevalentemente da donne e spesso anche da bambini. Queste persone hanno un accesso limitato ad alimenti, acqua, servizi igienici, sanità, istruzione e altri servizi essenziali.
      Espulsi 400 profughi siriani al mese tra bambini e adulti

      La paura più grande dei rifugiati siriani senza documenti, o con documenti non regolari, è quella di essere riportati in Siria. «Chi viene deportato fuori dalla Giordania è considerato morto. Non c’è nessuna sicurezza a Daara o in qualsiasi altro posto in Siria», dice un rifugiato che vive nell’area di Irbid. «Evito di andare in giro e di avere problemi. Vado al lavoro o sto a casa, niente di più. Evito i problemi limitando la mia libertà di movimento».

      Secondo l’organizzazione Human Right Watch la Giordania ha espulso centinaia di rifugiati siriani – anche con espulsioni collettive di intere famiglie – senza fornire alcuna alternativa all’espulsione e senza considerare in nessun modo il loro bisogno di protezione internazionale.

      Nei primi cinque mesi del 2017 le autorità giordane, sempre secondo Hrw, hanno espulso circa 400 rifugiati siriani al mese. Ogni mese 300 rifugiati siriani tornano in Siria in circostanze che sembrano volontarie, mentre altri 550 circa ritornano in circostanze non chiare.

      Le principali motivazioni delle misure di espulsione verso la Siria – riporta l’Annual report 2017 di Intersos – risultano essere le minacce alla sicurezza nazionale e la mancanza di documentazione civile e legale, in particolare i permessi di lavoro.
      Perché i profughi siriani scappano: la storia di Nora

      «Quando il mio paese è stato distrutto non avevo nessun posto dove vivere. Ogni notte ero costretta a bussare la porta di parenti e amici per farmi ospitare. Ho trascorso un mese facendo questa vita “miserabile”. Poi ho sentito di persone che si trasferivano in Giordania. Così ho incontrato l’uomo che con la macchina poteva portarci in Giordania. Io ho 10 bambini e al tempo erano tutti piccoli».

      Nora è siriana, di Busra Alharir in Daraa. Lei e i suoi 10 bambini sono fuggiti dalla Siria. Ha vissuto nel campo di Zaatari poi, insieme ai figli e al marito, se ne è andata per vivere negli insediamenti nella zona di Mafraq. Uno dei suoi figli, a causa del mancato rinnovo del documento di identità, è stato fermato dalla polizia e poi espulso in Siria. E questa è solo una delle tante storie raccolte dal progetto multimediale Relocated Identities realizzato da Alessio Cupelli e Katia Marinelli per Intersos.

      Molte persone vivono anche nel timore di essere fermate dalla polizia e trasferite forzatamente in un campo ufficiale. Si stima che da aprile 2014 a novembre 2016 circa 20.000 rifugiati siriani sono stati trasferiti nei campi profughi giordani, la stragrande maggioranza delle strutture remote del campo di Azraq, poiché il campo di Zaatari aveva da tempo raggiunto la capienza massima.
      I numeri della separazione dei nuclei familiari

      La principale conseguenza del trasferimento forzato è la separazione familiare: nel 55,1% dei casi valutati da Intersos il trasferimento riguardava quattro o meno membri della famiglia, molto spesso incluso il capofamiglia, con meno del 20% dei casi riguardanti l’intera famiglia.

      I capifamiglia sono i più esposti ai controlli di polizia nei loro spostamenti o quando si recano al lavoro. Di conseguenza, chi rimane sono generalmente donne e bambini. Lavoro minorile, matrimoni precoci e abbandono scolastico sono solo alcuni degli effetti negativi a questa condizione.

      Altre ripercussioni, oltre alla difficoltà economica, riguardano aspetti legati alla sfera psicologica degli individui: traumi, paure, abusi, sfruttamenti e violenze sessuali o di genere.


  • La vita si ferma nel campo profughi di #Zaatari

    Il campo profughi di Zaatari si trova nel nord della Giordania, non lontano dal confine con la Siria. Da quando è stato fondato, nel luglio del 2012, ha accolto mezzo milione di profughi scappati dalla guerra in Siria, scoppiata nel 2011. È diventato il terzo agglomerato più grande della Giordania, con una popolazione che ha raggiunto le 125mila persone: l’alto numero dei residenti ha permesso l’apertura di diverse attività che offrono di tutto, dai beni di prima necessità ai telefoni cellulari e ai vestiti da sposa.

    #photographie #réfugiés #asile #migrations #camps_de_réfugiés
    cc @albertocampiphoto


    In April 2016 Hannah returned to Jordan to organise an art project with Syrian refugees living in Azraq and Za’atari refugee camps, with the support of Relief International.

    The first canvas painted in Za’atari camp was an expression of the children’s experience of war. After various groups of boys and girls had painted, the canvas was an abstract chaos of splashes of red paint, dark colours and drawings of tanks, soldiers, dead bodies and destroyed homes. Only a small glimpse of the traumas they have faced.

    Many of the children confessed to Hannah that they did not want to think about or paint the war any more. Therefore the second canvas painted with the children was a vibrant expression of their memories of Syria, inspired by Islamic art and arabesque design.

    After a couple of days at Za’atari, home to 80,000 Syrian refugees, the art project moved to Azraq refugee camp close to the Iraqi border. The two canvases painted in Azraq are a reflection of the children’s daily life in the refugee camp. Hannah also painted a mural on one of the new school caravans.

    #art #réfugiés #asile #migrations #peinture #Hannah_Rose_Thomas #camps_de_réfugiés #Jordanie #Zaatari
    cc @reka

  • Kingdom of Refugees. Investigating the Syrian Narrative in Jordan

    Over 3.8 million Syrians have been uprooted and forced to flee to the safety of neighboring states causing strands of the Syrian spirit to be gradually woven into a much broader regional tapestry. Refugees bring pieces of their homeland with them: memories of the past, pains of the present and dreams for the future. While official UN camps have received the bulk of the international media’s attention, over 80% of Syrians are living in the shadows of Jordan’s cities, towns and villages. Journalists Emma Pearson and Katie Welsford, along with photographer Tom Bradley, journey through the desert to Amman to explore the Syrian narrative in Jordan.

    #Jordanie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_syriens #camps_de_réfugiés #Zaatari

  • Israel’s obsession with hummus is about more than stealing Palestine’s food | The National


    Pep Montserrat for The National

    son travail ici http://pepmontserrat.com/artwork

    When Israel expelled hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their villages and homes in 1948, many left with little more than the clothes on their back. Food was left on the stove. Crops were left unharvested. But the land emptied of its inhabitants was soon occupied by new residents.

    From 1948 to 1953, almost all new Jewish settlements were established on refugees’ property. The myth of making the desert bloom is belied by the facts: in mid-1949, two-thirds of all land sowed with grain in Israel was Palestinian land. In 1951, “abandoned” land accounted for nearly 95 per cent of all Israel’s olive groves and almost 10,000 acres of vineyards.

    During these early years, many Palestinian refugees attempted to return to their lands. By 1956, as many as 5,000 so-called “infiltrators” had been killed by Israeli armed forces, the vast majority of them looking to return home, recover possessions, or search for loved ones. Palestinian women and children who crossed the frontier to gather crops were murdered.

    The Nakba in 1948 was the settler colonial conquest of land and the displacement of its owners, a dual act of erasure and appropriation. Citing “reasons of state”, Israel’s first premier David Ben-Gurion appointed a Negev Names Committee to remove Arabic names from the map. By 1951, the Jewish National Fund’s “Naming Committee” had “assigned 200 new names”.

    reference page 6 (State Archives; Prewar Archive, C/2613, cited in Benvenisti, 1997:8–9).

    But it did not stop with dynamite and new maps. The Zionist colonisation of Palestine has also included culture, notably cuisine. This is the context for the so-called “hummus wars”: it is not about petty claims and counterclaims, rather, the story is one of colonial, cultural appropriation and resistance to those attempts.

    In the decades since the establishment of the State of Israel on the ruins and ethnically cleansed lands of Palestine, various elements of the indigenous cuisine have been targeted for appropriation: falafel, knafeh, sahlab and, of course, hummus.

    Though these dishes are common to a number of communities across the Mediterranean and Middle East, Israel claims them as its own: falafel is the “national snack”, while hummus, according to Israeli food writer Janna Gur, is “a religion”.

    In a 2002 article on recipes, the Israeli embassy in Washington acknowledged that “Israel lacks a long-standing culinary heritage”, adding that “only a few years ago, Israelis even doubted the existence of their own authentic cuisine”.

    Introduction to Israeli Foods | Jewish Virtual Library

    Such an admission is hard to find these days, as appropriation has become propaganda.

    In 2011, Jerusalem-based chef Michael Katz visited Australia and told a local newspaper how the Israeli government had “decided, through culture, to start improving Israel’s image”.

    “They started sending artists, singers, painters, filmmakers and then the idea came of sending chefs.”

    Israel’s cuisine not always kosher but travelling well

    In 2010, the Israeli government decided to distribute pamphlets at Tel Aviv airport, to equip Israelis who go abroad with, in the words of then-public diplomacy minister Yuli Edelstein, the “tools and tips to help them deal with the attacks on Israel in their conversations with people”. Included in the literature was the claim that “Israel developed the famous cherry tomato.”


    Now, as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency put it earlier this year, “Israel has been on the culinary ascent of late, with dozens of food blogs, new high-end restaurants, cooking shows and celebrity chefs, and a fascination with everything foodie”.


    It is not just food that is enlisted in Israel’s global PR initiatives. A few year ago, pro-Israel students at Brandeis University, in Massachusetts, held a “hookah night” with the help of campus-based “hasbara fellows”, professional Israel advocates who noted without any irony that “hookah is not specifically an Israeli cultural facet”.

    In addition to smoking and snacks, the “cultural” evening also included belly dancers. Explaining the rationale for the event, a member of the Brandeis Zionist Alliance said they had found that “students are more receptive to Israel-related education when we use a cultural lens”.


    Now we have “International Hummus Day”, launched by an Israeli, Ben Lang, who is explicit about the propaganda value of his project: “The idea was to connect people around hummus and get more people talking about it and hopefully get people to see the good things that are happening in Israel.”

    “I just wanted to make sure that people saw that the initiative started in Israel.”


    As everything from food to the keffiyeh is used to “rebrand” the state that colonised Palestine in the first place, Palestinians and their supporters have fought back.

    When an Israeli choreographer included the dabke traditional dance in his company’s repertoire in 2013,


    a New York-based dabke troupe responded with a thoughtful critique that noted how, by “appropriating dabke, and labelling it Israeli”, the “power imbalance” is only furthered.

    They added: “This makes us feel taken advantage of. Exploited. Commodified.”

    NYC Dabke Dancers respond to ZviDance “Israeli Dabke” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JM9-2Vmq524

    In December 2014, after a campaign by Palestinian students and their allies, the student assembly at Wesleyan University in Connecticut agreed to remove Sabra hummus from campus dining facilities. The product symbolises Israeli appropriation and ongoing brutality; its parent company, the Strauss Group, donates to the Israeli military.


    Accusations of cultural appropriation can produce some misleading responses. It’s not about who is “allowed” to eat what, or even about an objection to the natural cross-pollination that occurs in culture through language, cuisine and more.

    That is not the point. It is about the claim of ownership in a context of historic and ongoing violent erasure and displacement.

    It is about efforts to create an artificial history that justifies the establishment and continued existence of a settler colonial state.

    Even a mainstream Israeli food writer like Gil Hovav has pointed to this reality. “Food is about memory and identity,” he told the Israeli media last year. “Claiming ownership over a food is a way to assert a nation’s narrative. Israeli Jews have made hummus their own.”


    Cuisine is where efforts to both deny the existence of Palestine and appropriate its land and heritage meet. It is both an act of theft itself, and a way of justifying that theft.

    Ben White is a journalist and the author of Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide

    On Twitter: @benabyad

    #Palestine #Israel #Appropriation_Culturelle #Cuisine #Houmouss #Propagande #Héritage

    • Ici au Canada, ils ont aussi inventé le « israeli couscous », c’est très énervant ! C’est juste une céréale, une autre céréale, du moyen orient, qui existait bien avant 1948 (on me dit que c’est du Maftoul), mais c’est un outil de propagande très efficace, les gens ne pensant pas faire de la politique en utilisant ce terme...

    • @sinehebdo de plus le terme couscous n’a rien à voir avec la région

      Le couscous est un plat berbère originaire du Maghreb . Il est à base de semoule de blé dur. Les légumes qui composent le couscous varient d’une recette à l’autre.
      Le mot seksu (devenu kuskus, kuskusūn en arabe d’Afrique du Nord, puis couscous en français[1]), existe dans tous les parlers berbères de l’Afrique du Nord et désigne le blé bien modelé et bien roulé [2],[3]. Suivant les régions, le mot a plusieurs prononciations comme kseksu et seksu[4] . Un autre terme qui dérive de la même racine que seksu est le verbe berkukkes, de kukkes « rouler la semoule » et de ber qui signifie « redoubler le travail dans le but d’agrandir les grains »[3]. Le mot taseksut (prononcé en français thasseksouth) est la passoire dans laquelle on fait cuire le couscous.

      Un verbe seksek est utilisé par les Touaregs dans le sens de « passer au crible », rappelant l’usage du tamis dans la préparation[4].



    • La Chakchouka, nouveau plat tendance

      Une origine qui fait débat

      Aux Etats-Unis, la plupart des restaurants israéliens servent de la Chakchouka, et c’est notamment le chef israélien Yotam Ottolenghi qui a fait la réputation de ce plat au Royaume-Uni, d’où un amalgame quant à son origine.

      Ce dernier précise toutefois dans son livre de recettes « Jerusalem » que _ "la Chakchouka est à l’origine un plat tunisien, mais est devenu extrêmement populaire à Jerusalem". _

      Sa provenance exacte fait néanmoins toujours débat, cette spécialité étant également un incontournable des cuisines algérienne, marocaine, égyptienne et libyenne.

      Dans un autre article du site Buzzfeed, la Chakchouka est citée en tant qu’une des « 13 spécialités gastronomiques qui ne sont pas israéliennes », dénonçant une « colonisation » culinaire et soulignant que « l’appropriation culturelle est pour le moins inappropriée ».

      Essayez (à vos risques et périls) de dire à un Tunisien que la Chakchouka est un plat israélien ou américain !

      #Chakchouka #Tunisie

    • Après lecture je ne comprend toujours pas ce qu’est Le #Shawarma israélien. On peut résumer l’article ainsi : Le Shawarma fait son retour, des restaurants turcs et grecs le font très bien, des restaurants « israéliens » aussi => Le Shawarma Israélien est donc celui fait par des Israéliens descendants des colons Juifs ? (en admétant que les turcs et grecs des restaurants de telaviv sont aussi des citoyens israéliens)

      ici l’article

      The end-of-year summaries are over, and in any case this column doesn’t usually make them – we’d rather eat instead – but if there was one pleasing mini-trend that is worth noting, it’s the ostensible return of shawarma. If in the middle of the last decade, Tel Aviv was full of dozens of shawarma joints, most of which closed pretty quickly, fans of this popular delicacy, frequently called the “queen of the street food,” have lately encountered some new eateries that are making successful attempts to return the dish to its glory days. These include the Mutfak and Babacim Turkish restaurants, and the quasi-Greek Pitos.

      This is all good. In fact it’s very good – but it’s not enough. If it’s to be a true revival we need to talk about what is called “Israeli” shawarma. True shawarma connoisseurs tend to wrinkle their noses when confronted with a skewer of turkey meat, but even they will have to admit that during a time of distress or mere craving, this is the (relatively) lightest, most available and popular solution. Two new places have given us the opportunity to examine the possibility of a shawarma comeback.

      Welcome minimalism

      Mifgash Habracha (65 Hakishon St., Tel Aviv) is the type of place that rarely opens in the city anymore, mainly because it looks and acts as if it has been here for at least 20 or 30 years. Who calls themselves by such a name anymore, unless it’s trying to hint at pseudo authenticity? Who makes do with a simple sign, with no “brand,” no website and no Facebook page?

      This welcome minimalism continues inside, with (turkey) shawarma and schnitzel. The shawarma ranges from 34 to 45 shekels ($9.20 to $12.15); the schnitzel sells for 25 to 35 shekels, depending on whether it’s served in a pita, lafa or baguette, or on a plate. And that’s it.

      Shawarma isn’t at all cheap, for its vendors or its consumers, but I’m happy to say that the portions sold at Mifgash go for somewhat less than the average in Tel Aviv. Take an uncharacteristically generous portion of sliced meat (I ordered it in pita, for 34 shekels), and add to it a counter full of pickles, fried eggplant and grilled hot peppers to be sampled freely, plus classic, fresh, oil-drenched (and addictive) french fries – and you get why this place quickly became a hit among the residents and workers in the Florentine neighborhood (including several employees of Haaretz, whose offices are nearby).

      Condiments and salads for shawarmas at Nurman. Eran Laor

      The retro continues with the turkey meat on the rotating spit, which is huge and coarse in texture, with thick pieces sliced off in a manner that is uncharacteristic of our times – not with some cutting robot, not even with an electric slicer, but with a regular knife by the guy at the counter. The result is uneven meat chunks that are far different from the thin shavings we get elsewhere. The use of the wrong spices (whether too weak or too aggressive) or dry spots on the meat can easily ruin such shawarma, but fortunately that doesn’t happen here. This one doesn’t taste much different from any other turkey shawarma, but one does recognize the cautious use of cumin and turmeric, which makes this shawarma no less tempting, but much less yellowish and phosphorescent.

      Branded design

      A small jump to the center-of-the-center of Tel Aviv and the price for shawarma in pita jumps 10 percent: 38 shekels at Nurman (96 Hahashmonaim St.), whose location under the Gindi Towers left it no alternative but to put on a more sophisticated, modern face. Once – okay, 10 years ago – a place like this would have been called a “high-tech shawarma joint,” but today it is now the standard and it’s places like Mifgash Habracha that are considered a sensation.

      There are two shawarma rotisseries here, with veal/lamb or turkey meat (you can mix them if you like), and a spanking-clean glass case in front of them containing a more than ample selection of toppings: two types of hot pepper (red and green), pickled lemons, pepper spread and the other usual suspects in this genre.

      The turkey shawarma was reasonable. Very thin pieces that were a little less juicy than one might expect (the requisite dome of fat on top was already shrunken when we arrived; while it’s correct to give customers a piece of it if they ask, one must remember that it has a role to play here). The seasoning was the type you find in other places. No complaints, but no special praise here, either.

      The second spit was more successful. The shawarma was dark, soft and juicier – and naturally and understandably less seasoned. I know plenty of people who love meat but still avoid lamb because of its dominant taste that remains long after it’s eaten. That doesn’t happen here, because the lamb mostly takes the form of fat, while the meat itself is decent veal. Forgetting the hummus-tahini option and taking advantage of an unexpected addition of pickled (and sharp) lemon created a portion of shawarma that was relatively original and refreshing.

      In both cases there was nothing sensational. But you know what? We weren’t looking for that. We’d be happy with a few other options like these. If Mifgash Habracha and Nurman survive 2019, we could officially declare that shawarma is back. We hope it won’t ever abandon us again.