Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

Archives (en rapport avec #les_chemins_de_damas) :

– Novembre 2010. Après le reportage de la CBC qui « réoriente » l’enquête du TSL sur la piste du décorticage des communications téléphoniques, vers le Hezbollah, Qifa Nabki plonge dans les rapports de Mehlis et Brammertz, et montre que c’est une piste présente depuis le début :
►http://seenthis.net/messages/5725
source :
►http://qifanabki.com/2010/11/26/hariri-tribunal-reports-tell-a-different-story-than-cbc-account

– Décembre 2010. Jean-Pierre Perrin « redécouvre », en décembre 2010, ce que Mehlis avait écrit dans son premier rapport en octobre 2005 :
▻http://seenthis.net/messages/6078#message6092
source :
▻http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2010/12/01/mort-d-hariri-la-piste-mene-au-hezbollah_697491

– Décembre 2010. Le fameux article de Malbrunot sur le même sujet, qui avait à l’époque fait du bruit (je crois que Nasrallah l’a même cité comme preuve des fuites et des manipulations politiques de l’enquête). Article qu’à l’époque je disais qu’il reprenait la mauvaise narrative en vogue à Beyrouth :
►http://seenthis.net/messages/6078
source :
►http://blog.lefigaro.fr/malbrunot/2010/12/assassinat-de-rafic-hariri-les.html

Lebanon’s New Government (Feb 15, 2014) | Qifa Nabki
▻http://qifanabki.com/2014/02/15/lebanons-new-government-feb-15-2014

There are twenty-three men in the cabinet and one woman. (Update: Alice Shabtini is a judge who previously headed the Military Appeals Tribunal, and was reportedly President Michel Sleiman’s preferred candidate to head the Judicial Supreme Council. As the head of the Military Affairs Tribunal, she played a role in knocking down the sentence of Fayez Karam to just two years, despite being convicted of collaborating with Israel. Fun fact…)
The two main blocs (March 14 and March 8) are each represented by eight ministers, while the Prime Minister, the President, and Walid Jumblatt control another eight ministers between them, in the so-called “centrist” bloc.
The one-third share for each bloc is designed to prevent passage of any significant legislation by denying quorum to the cabinet. This innovation dates back to the Doha Accord of 2008 and has more or less guaranteed the paralysis of the executive branch ever since.
In addition to the one-third share, it appears that each bloc also has a mole in the centrist bloc, whose sole function is to help bring down the government if one side decides to resign. (A cabinet falls when more than one third of its ministers resign). March 14′s mole is Ramzi Jreij; March 8th’s mole is Abd al-Muttalib Hennawi. In other words, this probably isn’t an 8-8-8 cabinet but a 9-9-6 cabinet. Why both blocs have agreed to keep up appearances is not yet clear.

A Levantine Dystopia | Qifa Nabki
▻http://qifanabki.com/2014/01/03/a-levantine-dystopia

What is the worst-case scenario? Let’s dispense with the PG-rated version and be adults, shall we? In 2014, Lebanon’s worst-case scenario begins with a sequence of car bombs targeting various mosques, embassies, and party headquarters in al-Dahiya, Tripoli, Sidon, and downtown Beirut. The tit-for-tat bombings rapidly become more brazen and spectacular, going after busy residential and commercial areas, major hotels, and even that long-discussed assassination attempt of a Shiite leader that Nabih Berri has been warning us about for years.

#Liban

The Generalissimos of Tripoli’s Streets | Qifa Nabki
▻http://qifanabki.com/2013/12/04/the-generalissimos-of-tripolis-streets

Asa’d Abu Khalil’s

description of the decentralized character of the battle in Tripoli makes sense. It’s hard to know whether the situation in the north is a symptom of the general fragmentation of the Sunni community or a reflection of some kind of factional political game between Hariri and Mikati. Certainly Ashraf Rifi’s recent comments about Mikati’s need to solve the problem or resign would lend credence to this theory.

The cynical reading holds that Hariri and the Information Branch are using the Tripoli unrest to pressure Hizbullah, frighten the international community, and make Mikati look bad. Rather than setting up an army of clean-cut, Saudi-funded, American-armed, and Jordanian trained glorified security guards to confront Hizbullah, they might simply co-opt the existing militias that are boiling over with rage about the situation in Syria and Hizbullah’s role there. That’s where the qāda al-maḥāwir come in, but as I said, this is the grossly cynical reading.

#Tripoli
#Liban

A Political Solution in Syria : The Readership’s View | Qifa Nabki
▻http://qifanabki.com/2013/09/07/a-political-solution-in-syria-the-readerships-view

There’s no question that this debate has already been going for a long time in Washington and other capitals, but very few government officials have been willing to speak publicly or even anonymously about what kinds of scenarios are envisioned. This is interesting, given the insistence of the Obama administration, the EU, Russia, Iran, and China that the Syrian crisis cannot be solved militarily. Here are some informed speculations about the alternatives:

Prospectives intéressantes et de fait, on ne lit pas grand choise de ce type dans la presse française... Les scénarios de Nadim Shehadi et ses craintes ne sont pas les moins intéressante.

Hizbullah and Rational Choice | Qifa Nabki
▻http://qifanabki.com/2013/05/30/hizbullah-and-rational-choice

If we step back and consider Hizbullah’s military activities over the past eight years, they tell a straightforward story. Whenever the resistance’s strategic position has been threatened, no response has been off the table, no matter the costs in terms of bad PR or sectarian strife. The party made a calculated decision to go forward with the operation that led to the July War in 2006 knowing full well that Israel’s reaction would be severe and would exacerbate the deep political divide in the country. The military takeover of Beirut in May 2008 came when the government threatened to shut down the party’s telecommunications network and to remove a loyal officer in airport security. The assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and perhaps several others (at least according to the STL narrative) was allegedly carried out by individuals connected with Hizbullah in the wake of international pressure to isolate Syria and disarm the party.

Why should we be surprised when Hizbullah acts like a state? Why is it not obvious that the party would routinely use its military assets to protect its interests? In the deliberation process that precedes military action, public opinion and long-term “soft” consequences (like aggravating sectarian tensions) apparently count for very little.

Liban, en finir avec le système confessionnel ? un serpent de mer

Deux articles pour aider à comprendre les enjeux et les blocages

Lebanon : Taking on the Sectarian System
| Al Akhbar English
▻http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-taking-sectarian-system

Highly Unorthodox : The Week Lebanon Went Secular (And Ended Up More Sectarian Than Ever…)
►http://qifanabki.com/2013/02/20/highly-unorthodox

Highly Unorthodox : The Week Lebanon Went Secular (And Ended Up More Sectarian Than Ever…) « Qifa Nabki
►http://qifanabki.com/2013/02/20/highly-unorthodox

When some future historian writes a chronicle of 21st-century Lebanon, she will likely devote a bemused footnote to the odd events of February 2013, when the country’s leaders saw fit to tear down a pillar of the confessional regime one week, only to erect another one a week later.

http://qifanabki.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/car_en.jpg?w=300&h=199

What to Read on Lebanon’s Proposed 2013 Electoral Law « Qifa Nabki
▻http://qifanabki.com/2013/02/20/what-to-read-on-lebanons-proposed-2013-electoral-law
Un best of des commentaires sur la loi dite du rassemblement orthodoxe sur l’organisation des #élections au #Liban

The Myth of Christian Under-Representation « Qifa Nabki
▻http://qifanabki.com/2013/01/16/the-myth-of-christian-under-representation

under-representation through the simple fact of unequal suffrage. When Sunni and Shiite votes are worth half the weight of some Christian votes… what are we supposed to call this if not under-representation?

#Liban
#élections

Ce pays est formidable : encore des enregistrements secrets ! Ce soir : des révélations sur l’implication de Hariri dans les livraisons d’armes aux rebelles syriens.
►http://qifanabki.com/2012/11/29/okab-sakr-purveyor-of-fine-armaments-explosives

Today, OTV and al-Akhbar are teaming up to put Okab back on primetime with an exposé of his involvement in Syrian arms trafficking, including promised recordings of conversations between him and people who want to do things with guns.

Selon Angry Arab, un enregistrement révèle que c’est Hariri qui finance Abu Ibrahim, le gangster qui avait enlevé des chiites libanais en Syrie en les accusant d’être membres du Hezbollah – l’affaire avait, réellement, risqué de mettre le feu au poudres au Liban.

Vous n’entendrez certainement jamais parler de cet enregistrement en France. C’est le n-ième enregistrement compromettant Saad Hariri dans des magouilles risquant de déstabiliser le Liban, mais comme à chaque fois, rigoureusement aucun média français ne l’évoquera.

Traduction du billet d’Angry Arab : L’autre sponsor d’Al Qaeda au Liban
►http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2012/05/other-sponsor-of-al-qaidah-in-lebanon.html

Il serait injuste de ne parler que de Hariri en tant que sponsor des salafistes au Liban. Najib Mikati, prêt-à-tout pour obtenir un soutien populaire dans sa ville natale [NdT : Tripoli], a toujours cultivé un soutien parmi les salafistes du Nord. La libération de Shadi Al-Mawlawi et l’empressement de Mikati à le rencontrer immédiatement en sont des exemples. Un reporter libanais qui connaît la région du Nord du Liban m’a dit que, chez les militants de la région de Dinniyeh, il n’est pas rare de voir des photos de Mikati et de Ben Laden sur le mur.

The Orthodox-Maronite Gathering (OMG) Proposal : Proportional Representation Meets Sectarian Nomination « Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog
►http://qifanabki.com/2011/12/22/the-orthodox-maronite-gathering-omg-proposal-proportional-representation-
Intéressante analyse du blogger Qifa Nabki sur la proposition de loi électroale du rassemblement orthodoxe au Liban.

My biggest problem with the proposal is very simple: it leads to enormous inequalities of suffrage. What does this mean?

[...]
Therefore, the current proposal from Elie Ferzli is probably being supported by the Christian leadership only to guarantee that the end result of the bargaining process over the electoral law will be the 2009 law, warts and all.

#élections
#Liban

Qifa Nabki a posté une traduction des passages importants de l’entretien entre Rafik Hariri et le vice-ministre syrien des affaires étrangères quelques temps avant sa mort.

The Last Meeting Between Rafiq al-Hariri and Walid al-Muallim « Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog
►http://qifanabki.com/2011/08/13/the-last-meeting-between-rafiq-al-hariri-and-walid-al-muallim

Hariri: May God judge me for these words on the Day of Resurrection: it is a disgrace to suggest that Rafik Hariri is part of the opposition. Recently I learned from the Spaniards that they were going to put Hizbullah on their terrorism list. Do you know who prevented them from doing so? The French did. Do you know who prevented the French? Me. Why? After all, I’m in a dispute with you and perhaps you will use Hizbullah against me; I have no desire for a “gift”.

J’avais évoqué ce document ici:
►http://seenthis.net/messages/30658

Talking about a Revolution : An Interview with Camille Otrakji « Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog
►http://qifanabki.com/2011/05/02/camille-otrakji-syria-protests

Religion and politics make an explosive mix. Most of the region’s problems come from Saudi Arabia (Sunni Islam’s Kingdom), Iran (Shia Islam’s kingdom) Israel (the Jewish state) and soon from America’s Zionist Christians. If you want Syrian minorities to be less fearful of full democracy get the Salafists off their back first. This one is calling for sacrificing one third of Syria’s population to get rid of the infidels, while the other one is about to explode if he does not see the minorities out of power in Syria immediately. In Egypt, top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are saying their real goal is “to rule the world!”. Salafists in Egypt are already threatening to enter Christian monasteries and to take over Sufi mosques. Even in Tunisia, Jordan and Northern Lebanon, Salafists are increasingly trying to play a big role.

In five years, everything can be resolved. But we have to retire the “moral clarity” mentality that used to consider Hosni Mubarak a part of the “International community” simply because he was a US puppet. Many of the heroes and prophets of moral clarity worked for Qaddafi when he paid the right price. Some of them worked for the Bush Sr. administration when a decision was made to kill tens of thousands of young Iraqi soldiers after they surrendered. That same 1991 war was made possible after many, including the President, lied to the American people to help them support that initially unpopular war. Don’t try again to spend 500 million dollars to manipulate the Lebanese people against Hezbollah before they go to vote. When you do that, the Syrian regime will be more assured that opening up its political system will lead to American (and Saudi) manipulation… until both countries accept to become genuine friends of Syria. It is really wrong for the Obama administration to send an ambassador to Damascus while trying to finance those who are trying to overthrow the regime then to complain that engagement with Damascus is not working too well.

The United States must decide between solving the problems of the region, or letting it explode. Forget what your Syria experts say; Syria is where you need to start. This regime has 40 years of intensive and extensive experience in this region. Make use of it, THEN talk to the regime about what it takes to retire from power while the region is at peace.

Attention : point de vue plutôt original, d’où l’intérêt. Après, on n’est pas obligé d’être d’accord, ni d’être d’accord sur tout.

#syrie

Dimanche soir (16 janvier), Hassan Nasrallah a donné un discours télévisé. Qifa Nabki en a fait un compte rendu en anglais :
►http://qifanabki.com/2011/01/16/nasrallah-to-address-lebanon-on-eve-of-indictments-release

Now Lebanon propose également une traduction :
►http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=231007

#Liban #Hezbollah

Rencontre Hariri-Siddiq : Qifa Nakbi a mis à jour son billet concernant la bande audio diffusée par New TV :
►http://qifanabki.com/2011/01/15/saad-al-hariri-caught-on-tape-with-false-witness-muhammad-zuhair-al-siddi

Il a ajouté des extraits traduits en anglais.

Je poursuis le relevé de dépêches dans le fil d’origine :
►http://seenthis.net/messages/7347

Stop the press!

FLASH: New TV has its own Audio-LEAKS: EXPLOSIVE
►http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2011/01/flash-new-tv-has-its-own-audio-leaks.html

New TV in Beirut just aired an audio tape with mini-Hariri and his chief of intelligence, Wisam Hasan, and German Hariri investigator, Gerhard Lehmann, and... the FAMOUS FALSE WITNESS, MUHAMMAD ZUHAYR AS-SIDDIQ (the most famous of the false witness who has woven so many fabrications about who was responsible for the Hariri investigation and who has been aided by French intelligence and Dubai intelligence). The significance of the audio tape can’t be overstated: this will officially put the last nail in the coffin of the Hariri tribunal. Hariri has officially denied any knowledge of the “false witnesses” and in this meeting he seems to be receiving orders from Siddiq himself. Now we know why the Hariri camp has been fiercely opposing the demand by the opposition to refer the “false witness” matter to the Justice Council in Lebanon. Of course, the testimony of Saddiq was the only reason why the “four generals” were incarcerated. Now you see why I never bothered to take the Hariri tribunal seriously. It was a joke before it was formed by an Israeli/US decision. This is the biggest gift to Hizbullah for the new year. Expect a press conference by Nasrallah this week.

#Liban #TSL

Qifa Nabki ressort les anciens rapports de l’enquête internationale sur le meutre de #Rafic_Hariri. Il démonte ainsi l’un des points-clés du reportage de la #CBC, qui prétend que le réseau de téléphones mobiles utilisés pour organiser l’attentat est une piste nouvelle (et « earth-shattering ») :
►http://qifanabki.com/2010/11/26/hariri-tribunal-reports-tell-a-different-story-than-cbc-account

How does this explain the suggestion that the discovery of the red network by the UNIIIC was “earth-shattering”? After all, they had already discussed this network in eight different reports from 2005-2007!

Mis à jour, le billet met en avant un commentaire très intéressant tiré de ses propres forums :

However, the commission’s reports are clear that the Red team was identified at the initial stages of the investigation and that signal analysis was a key technique used by the commission.

This contradiction with the documented historical record undercuts the report’s credibility. It is obviously trying to sell you something. And what I think what it is selling is the linkage between the Red team and HA [#Hezbollah].

Et en particulier :

I speculate that the attack on Wissam Hassan is to undermine the ISF’s work on Israeli spies and Israel’s penetration of the Lebanese telecom network. At Nahass’s conference this week, Wissam Hassan was specifically named as helping out in the investigation of Israel compromising HA phone lines. By labelling him an HA accomplice, the whole Israel angle can be explained away.