country:tanzania

  • Wearing the Lead Glasses
    https://placesjournal.org/article/wearing-the-lead-glasses

    There is a room full of soil in downtown #New_Orleans. The soil is parceled into large baggies inside plastic tubs arranged on metal shelves. It’s like a library, except instead of books there are bags of earth. This is the soil archive of Dr. Howard W. Mielke, whose lab belongs to the Environmental Signaling Laboratory at the Tulane University School of Medicine. Mielke established the archive at Xavier University of Louisiana in 1991, and moved it to Tulane in 2006. He has catalogued some 17,000 bags of soil. They come from as far away as Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania; La Oroya, Peru; and Oslo, Norway — and as close as the daycare centers and playgrounds of New Orleans. All are contaminated with lead.

    #pollution #sol #plomb

  • The trouble with plans to send 116,000 Burundian refugees home

    Under pressure to go home, Burundian refugees in Tanzania face two bad options: return to face social and economic hardship and possible rights violations; or remain in chronically under-resourced camps that restrict their opportunities.

    With both governments confirming plans to return 116,000 Burundians by the end of 2019, it’s crunch time for the international community if it wants to ensure returns are truly voluntary and offer returnees the level of support they will need to reintegrate properly back in Burundi.

    More than 400,000 people fled Burundi, most into neighbouring Tanzania, following violent unrest and repression that accompanied 2015 elections, which saw former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza returned to power for a controversial third presidential term.

    Limited repatriations began in 2017, but funding shortages mean the process has so far been little more than an offer of free transport back across the border, with a return package of food, non-food items, and cash that doesn’t even last the three months it’s expected to cover.

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2019/03/05/Burundian-refugees-Tanzania-plans-send-home
    #retour_au_pays #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tanzanie #réfugiés_burundais

    Pour les #retours_volontaires initiés en 2017, voir le doc publié par @reka:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/636524
    #retour_volontaire

    • Tanzania wants Burundian refugees sent home. But they face big challenges

      Tanzania says it has reached an agreement with Burundi to begin sending back all Burundian refugees from October. The repatriation effort will take place in collaboration with the United Nations. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Amelia Kuch to give some insights into the decision.

      How many Burundian refugees are there in Tanzania and why did they migrate there?

      Tanzania has long been held up as a safe haven for refugees in the region. There’s a long history of refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mozambique seeking refuge and safety there. Burundians have been seeking refuge in Tanzania since 1960, with major waves of displacement happening in 1972, 1988, 1993, and 2015. This was due to several civil wars and genocidal violence.

      The current displacement crisis started in 2015 when President Pierre Nkurunziza sought a third term in office and eventually won. Street protests led to violent clashes. The growing fear and uncertainty pushed over 400 000 Burundians to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. About 60% of them went to Tanzania.

      Interviews with Burundian refugees revealed that if they were not a member of the leading party they faced violent persecution. They shared personal accounts of torture and rape by the Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the ruling party, and of disappearances and executions of family members.

      There’s now a total of about 342 867 Burundian refugees and asylum seekers in Tanzania that are mostly settled in three refugee camps: Nyarugusu, Nduta and Mtendeli.

      Tanzania had previously granted some Burundian refugees citizenship. Why do you think they’re choosing repatriation now?

      Tanzania offered citizenship, through naturalisation, to 160 000 Burundian refugees. But this only benefited individuals and families who fled to Tanzania in 1972 and were settled in the three rural settlements –- Mishamo, Urambo and Katumba. It didn’t include more recent arrivals.

      As much as the announcement of forced repatriation is troubling, it is not surprising. Over the past 15 years Tanzania has been making moves away from acting as a host country.

      The 2005 election manifesto of Tanzania’s ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, included a pledge to make Tanzania “refugee-free” by 2010. Their justification was that there wasn’t enough international aid to support the camps and that the camps were having a negative impact on neighbouring host communities and Tanzania’s security situation.

      This has already led to repatriations. In 2012 residents of Mtabila refugee camp, most of whom fled to Tanzania in the 1990s, were returned to Burundi against their will and the camp was closed.

      In 2018, Tanzania pulled out of the UN’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework – a declaration by countries to commit to respect the human rights of refugees and migrants and to support the countries that welcome them – citing a lack of international funding. The Burundian refugee situation is the lowest funded in the world. In 2018, UNHCR and its partners received just 33% of the required US$391 million requested to support Burundian refugees.

      How should the repatriation process happen?

      First and foremost Burundian refugees need to be able to make an informed decision if they wish to repatriate or remain in Tanzania. It must be a voluntary decision. At the moment it seems like refugees won’t be given a choice and will be forced to repatriate. Tanzanian Interior Minister Kangi Lugola announced that Tanzania will return Burundian refugees at the rate of 2 000 people a week.

      Ideally, people should be allowed to travel back to Burundi to assess the situation for themselves and decide, after that initial first-hand experience, if they wish to repatriate voluntarily.

      If they decide to repatriate, they should be given access to land and the ability to re-establish their livelihoods in Burundi. The support might come in the form of a financial grant, basic household items, food items, as well as financial support so they can access shelter and rent land.

      Following repatriation, it’s essential that the safety of refugees is monitored. Repatriation is a political process and it will be necessary to ensure that returnees are protected and can access the same rights as other citizens.

      Monitoring the reintegration of returnees is a UNHCR commitment under the Tripartite Agreement from 2017 and it is critical that journalists and researchers are safe to report on the reintegration process.

      What do the prospects look like for the refugees once they’re back in Burundi?

      Through current and previous research I’ve done on Burundian refugees who repatriated and then returned to Tanzania, I’ve seen a complex matrix of challenges that they face. These include hunger, the inability to access land and shelter, and a shortage of medicine.

      There are also safety concerns. Today the Burundian government controls the political space and refuses to engage in dialogue with opposition parties. While there is less open violence, refugees still fear going back and for some, that’s with good reason.

      With the closing migratory space in Tanzania, those who won’t be able to safely stay in Burundi will have to seek other destinations of refuge.

      What are Tanzania’s international obligations in terms of protection of refugees?

      The 1951 Refugee Convention – whose core principle asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom – has been ratified by 145 states, including Tanzania.

      The Tanzanian government’s decision to repatriate Burundian refugees, despite evidence that their life and freedom might be threatened in Burundi, breaches the core principle of non-refoulement.

      This, however, must be seen in the global context. The decision of the Tanzanian government to expel refugees is not happening in a political void. Rather, it emulates the policies implemented by some Western countries, including the US, Australia, France, Hungary and Italy.

      These countries are also breaching the Convention; by obstructing refugees from coming, putting their lives in danger and even penalising those who try to assist refugees.

      Rather than an exception, the recent decision by the Tanzanian government to forcefully repatriate Burundian refugees is a reflection of a growing, global hostility towards refugees and other migrants.

      https://theconversation.com/tanzania-wants-burundian-refugees-sent-home-but-they-face-big-chall

    • Tanzania to send back all Burundian refugees from October

      Tanzanian and Burundian officials announce deal but UNHCR says Burundi conditions are not conducive to promote returns.

      Tanzania says it has reached an agreement with neighbouring Burundi to begin sending back all Burundian refugees from October, adding that the repatriation will take place in collaboration with the United Nations.

      However, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) said in a statement on Tuesday that the conditions in Burundi, which was plunged into a political crisis four years ago, are not “conducive to promote returns” and noted that it is assisting refugees who indicate they have made a voluntary choice to return home.

      Hundreds of people were killed and more than 400,000 fled to neighbouring countries due to violence the UN says was mostly carried out by state security forces following President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision in April 2015 to run for a third, disputed, term in office.

      Nkurunziza won re-election and, the following year, Burundi suspended all cooperation with the UN human rights office in the country after a UN-commissioned report accused the Bujumbura government and its supporters of being responsible for crimes against humanity.

      Currently, some 200,000 Burundians are in Tanzania, according to government figures.

      Speaking to the AFP news agency, Tanzanian Interior Minister Kangi Lugola said: “In agreement with the Burundian government and in collaboration with the High Commissioner for Refugees, we will start the repatriation of all Burundian refugees on October 1.”

      “Under this agreement, it will be 2,000 refugees who will be repatriated every week until there are no more Burundian refugees in Tanzania,” he said.
      ’Returns should be voluntary’

      Lugola said that Burundi is currently at peace, adding that he had “information whereby people, international organisations, are deceiving people, telling them there is no peace in Burundi”.

      He was speaking after he and Burundian Interior Minister Pascal Barandagiye on Sunday visited a camp where they annouced the return to the refugees themselves.

      In an emailed statement to Al Jazeera, Dana Hughes, the UNHCR spokesperson for East Horn and Great Lakes, said around 75,000 Burundians had returned home in the past two years. She added, however, that hundreds still flee Burundi each month and urged governments in the region to maintain open borders and access to asylum for those who need it.

      UNHCR also called upon the governments of Tanzania and Burundi “to uphold international obligations and ensure that any returns are voluntary in line with the tripartite agreement signed in March of 2018”, referring to a deal covering refugees who wish to return on a voluntary basis.

      “The UNHCR urges states to ensure that no refugee is returned to Burundi against their will, and that measures are taken to make conditions in Burundi more conducive for refugees returns, including confidence-building efforts and incentives for those who have chosen to go home,” Hughes said.

      One Burundian refugee, a man in his 40s who crossed over with his family and now lives in Tanzania’s Nduta camp, said he would not be returning home.

      “We heard that the governments agreed on forced repatriation ... There is no way we can go to Burundi, there is no security there at all,” the man, who declined to be named, told Reuters news agency on Tuesday.

      Human Rights Watch says Burundi’s government does not tolerate criticism, and security services carry out summary executions, rapes, abductions and intimidation of suspected political opponents.

      Burundi’s ruling party denies it carries out systematic human rights violations.

      https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/tanzania-send-burundian-refugees-october-190827180318193.html

    • Tanzania begins repatriating Burundian refugees

      Tanzania and Burundi agree to facilitate voluntary repatriation of refugees by the end of 2019.

      Tanzania on Thursday began repatriating 1000 Burundians, who had taken refuge in 2015, following political violence and instability in their country.

      “Today [Thursday] we are repatriating 1000 refugees with all their belongings. All international organizations are aware of this operation,” Director of Information Services and Government Spokesperson, Hassan Abbasi told reporters.

      In April 2015 protests broke out in the landlocked East African country Burundi, when President Pierre Nkurunziza decided to seek a third term in office. A coup attempt failed to dislodge him, leading to a clamp down and arrests. Over 300,000 people left the country, causing a humanitarian crisis.

      In August, Tanzania and Burundi agreed to repatriate all the refugees peacefully to their homes, by the end of 2019. The mass repatriation was supposed to commence from Oct.1.

      Reports said that the first batch of 1000 refugees were transported by buses to Gisuru transit center in eastern Burundi, where they stayed overnight.

      According to officials, they will be transported to their home districts along with rations, that will sustain them for three months.

      Abbasi said the Tanzanian government and the international agencies will ensure the refugees are at peace in their country.

      The UN High Commission for Refugees has asked Tanzania’s government to avoid forceful repatriation of refugees.

      “While an overall security has improved, UNHCR is of the opinion that conditions in Burundi are not currently conducive to promote returns,” the UN agency responsible for the welfare for refugees said in a statement in August.

      However, Abbasi emphasized that repatriation is voluntary. “All those refugees, leaving camps were eager to go home,” he said.

      He stressed that Tanzania respects international agreements on refugees and would ensure the repatriation process takes place well within international humanitarian laws.

      Nestor Bimenyimana, the director general of repatriation and rehabilitation department in Burundi’s Home Ministry told local media that the UNHCR is involved in the identification and registration of Burundian refugees, willing to be repatriated from Tanzania.

      “We don’t force anyone to register,” he said.

      According to the UN agency, as many as 343,000 refugees, were living in the neighboring countries of Tanzania, Rwanda, DR Congo and Uganda as of August 2019.

      Over past two years, refugee agency has facilitated repatriation of 74,600 refugees to their homes in Burundi.

      https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/tanzania-begins-repatriating-burundian-refugees/1602122

    • Tanzania: Burundians Pressured into Leaving

      Mounting Intimidation for 163,000 Burundian Refugees and Asylum Seekers.

      The fear of violence, arrest, and deportation is driving many of the 163,000 Burundian refugees and asylum seekers in Tanzania out of the country. Tanzanian authorities have also made it very difficult for the United Nations refugee agency to properly check whether hundreds of refugees’ recent decision to return to Burundi was voluntary.

      In October and November 2019, Tanzanian officials specifically targeted parts of the Burundian refugee population whose insecure legal status and lack of access to aid make them particularly vulnerable to coerced return to Burundi. The actions come after the Tanzanian president, John Magufuli, said on October 11 that Burundian refugees should “go home.”

      “Refugees say police abuses, insecurity in Tanzania’s refugee camps, and deportation threats drove them out of the country,” said Bill Frelick, refugee rights director at Human Rights Watch. “Tanzania should reverse course before it ends up unlawfully coercing thousands more to leave.”

      In mid-November, Human Rights Watch interviewed 20 Burundian refugees in Uganda who described the pressure that caused them to leave Tanzania between August 2018 and October 2019. Seven returned to Burundi but said they then fled to Uganda to escape members of the Burundian ruling party’s youth league, the Imbonerakure, who threatened, intimidated, or arbitrarily arrested them. Thirteen went directly to Uganda.

      Refugees said their reasons for leaving Tanzania include fear of getting caught up in a spate of arrests, and alleged disappearances and killings in or near refugee camps and fear of suspected members of the Imbonerakure and of abusive Burundian refugees working with Tanzanian police on camp security. They also cited the government’s threats to deport Burundian refugees, the closing and destruction of markets, restrictions on commercial activities, and lack of access to services in the camps and freedom of movement.

      On December 3, Tanzanian Home Affairs Minister Kangi Lugola denied that the government is “expelling” refugees, and said the Tanzanian and Burundian authorities “merely mobilize, to encourage those who are ready to return on their own accord, to go back.”

      A refugee who returned from Tanzania to Burundi in August said: “I returned to Burundi because the Tanzanian authorities said those staying would be forced back… The police became increasingly violent and insecurity was the main reason I decided to return.” In late August, Imbonerakure members targeted him: “They arrested me, tied my arms behind my back and said, ‘you said you fled [Burundi] because of the Imbonerakure, but we are still here.’” He said his wife paid a bribe for his release and he fled to Uganda.

      A December 6 Human Rights Watch report documented widespread abuses by members of the youth league, often working with local Burundian administrators. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said in August that conditions in Burundi were not safe or stable enough for it to encourage refugees to return, and that it would only facilitate voluntary returns.

      The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 African Refugee Convention prohibit refoulement, the return of refugees in any manner whatsoever to places where their lives or freedom would be threatened. UNHCR says that refoulement occurs not only when a government directly rejects or expels a refugee, but also when indirect pressure is so intense that it leads people to believe they have no option but to return to a country where they face a serious risk of harm.

      Between September 2017 and end of October 2019, 78,380 Burundians – about 725 a week – left Tanzania under an agreement between Burundi, Tanzania, and the UNHCR, which tasks UNHCR with conducting detailed interviews with refugees to ensure they are leaving Tanzania voluntarily. The number is well below the target of 2,000 a week Tanzania and Burundi agreed on in March 2018. An August 24, 2019 agreement between Tanzania and Burundi says all the refugees “are to return to their country of origin whether voluntarily or not” by December 31.

      On November 9, UNHCR said that some Burundians signing up for voluntary return with UNHCR had “cited insecurity in refugee camps, fear of enforced return …, deteriorating living conditions …, prohibition of small commercial activities and closure of camp markets as the main reasons for their return.” The agency previously told Human Rights Watch that “push factors play a significant role” in refugees’ return decision, but that UNHCR considers their return to be voluntary because they have “made an informed decision” and “many other refugees” have decided to stay.

      A government’s duty to protect refugee rights should not be assessed based on statistics but on a case-by-case basis, Human Rights Watch said. The fact that some or many refugees can stay in a host country is not evidence that those who leave do so voluntarily or that they did not leave due to coercion.

      Seven of the refugees Human Rights Watch interviewed said they returned to Burundi between March 2018 and June 2019. One refugee who left Tanzania’s Nduta camp for Uganda in August said he had helped many families register for return to Burundi: “Before August 2018, UNHCR asked people who registered many questions about their decision to return and gave them time to change their minds,” he said. “But now they don’t give time to think or ask questions. They immediately process people for return.”

      UNHCR’s mandate requires it to ask refugees signing up for voluntary return about the reasons behind the decision to ensure the decision is truly voluntary.

      A well-informed source said that after a recent “validation exercise” to verify the number of registered and unregistered Burundians living in camps in Tanzania, about 3,300 people were registered but not given “active status,” which means they have no clear legal status or access to assistance, and are particularly vulnerable to government intimidation and coerced return to Burundi.

      In October, the Tanzanian authorities summoned these people and registered “hundreds” who said they wanted to return to Burundi. The authorities told them to report to a departure center, leaving UNHCR, which usually speaks to people leaving a few days beforehand to make sure they are leaving voluntarily, to conduct some interviews at the departure center “in less than ideal circumstances,” it said.

      Human Rights Watch previously reported on the coerced return of hundreds of Burundian asylum seekers on October 15, after camp authorities said that if they did not register to return, they would be in the camps without legal status and aid.

      In late October, UNHCR said Tanzania was increasing “pressure on Burundian refugees and asylum-seekers to return home.” In the second week of November, Tanzanian authorities banned 10 UNHCR staff involved in managing the refugee registration database from the camp.

      Tanzanian authorities should ensure that UNHCR staff are able to properly verify the voluntary nature of refugees’ decision to return to Burundi, Human Rights Watch said. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Union should send a team to visit the refugee camps and urge Tanzania not to directly or indirectly forcibly return asylum seekers or refugees.

      “The African Union should publicly press the Tanzanian authorities to stop trying to bully refugees and the UN into submission,” Frelick said. “Tanzania claims it isn’t doing anything wrong, but Burundian refugees are telling us in clear terms that they are being driven out of the country.”

      Factors Driving Burundian Refugees out of Tanzania

      Twenty Burundian refugees formerly living in three camps – Nduta, Nyarugusu, and Mtendeli – in Tanzania’s northwestern Kigoma region spoke with Human Rights Watch in Uganda in November.

      Tanzanian Deadline; Memories of 2012 Forced Return

      All 20 said they left due to Tanzanian officials’ statements that Burundian refugees should go home. Some said that the combination of Burundian and Tanzanian officials telling refugees to go home, and refugees’ memories of Tanzanian forced refugee return in 2012 had created a climate in which they felt they had no choice but to leave Tanzania.

      Thirteen who went directly to Uganda said they feared for their lives if forced to return to Burundi. Many said they knew other refugees who had returned to Burundi only to flee again to Tanzania to escape ongoing insecurity in Burundi.

      Ten left the camps between August and October, with most citing increased pressure at that time. On August 24, Burundi and Tanzania signed an agreement to ensure that all Burundian refugees would leave Tanzania by the end of 2019. Both countries’ interior ministers jointly visited the camps the following day and said returns would start on October 1.

      A 40-year-old woman said: “I decided to leave the camp when the authorities said they would start sending people back on October 1 and that they didn’t want any more refugees in Tanzania. During the meeting, [the authorities] said they had agreed with the Burundian government to repatriate us. That’s why I left.” She left for Uganda on foot with her young child on September 10. She spent a night in a local family’s compound but became frightened that Tanzanian authorities would catch her and ran away, leaving all her belongings behind.

      Many refugees said they feared Tanzanian officials’ threatening language would turn into forced return. Several cited camp authorities’ phrases such as, “The last cow of the herd is always beaten” or “the cows that go to the trough first drink clean water, those that go last get the dirty water,” which they interpreted as saying that those who do not leave the camp now may be beaten or left without a return support package.

      A refugee who left Mtendeli camp in October said: “Tanzanian authorities intimidated people to make them sign up for repatriation. They said otherwise they would use force and we wouldn’t even have time to collect our belongings or get any assistance. People were afraid, so they registered [to return].”

      Tanzania has hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees over the past few decades and offered citizenship to tens of thousands who had been in the country since 1972. But the country also has a troubling history of forced return. After the forced return of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans in 1996, Tanzania began in 2006 to reduce the number of what it termed “illegal immigrants” by violently expelling thousands of registered Rwandan and Burundian refugees.

      In June 2009, Tanzanian authorities announced the closure of a camp sheltering more than 37,000 Burundian refugees, at Mtabila. Pressure mounted until the camp was closed in December 2012. Some refugees in Uganda said that they had been in Mtabila camp in late 2012 when Tanzanian authorities forced people into returning to Burundi and that they were afraid the Tanzanian authorities would use similar tactics again.

      A refugee leader from Nduta camp said he was summoned to a meeting with Tanzanian authorities on March 14, where refugees were asked: “Do you remember what happened in Mtabila? Our guns still work, you know. Burundi and Tanzania are one country.” A 25-year-old woman who left Tanzania for Uganda in August said: “I left because of what happened in Mtabila. I didn’t want to be forced back while there is insecurity in Burundi.”

      Fear of Insecurity in and Around Refugee Camps

      Most of the refugees said growing insecurity in the camps contributed to their decision to leave Tanzania.

      All said they feared the Tanzanian police, who they believe work closely with the Burundian authorities to encourage refugees to return. Fourteen also said they were afraid of Burundian refugees in charge of refugee camp security, called “Sungu Sungu,” a term used to describe neighborhood militias in Tanzania. Refugees, including a former Sungu Sungu member, and an independent well-informed source in the camps said that Tanzanian police approve the appointment of the most senior Sungu Sungu representatives in the camps, some of whom refugees believed to be Imbonerakure.

      Refugees said Sungu Sungu members had arrested refugees and helped Tanzanian authorities carry out what some called “mobilization efforts” to encourage their return.

      One interviewee said: “In the camps, they [Sungu Sungu members] targeted the [political] opposition, arrested people at night, confiscated phones and demanded bribes. They organized meetings to tell people to return, and said if we don’t return voluntarily, we will be forced back.”

      Some refugees said that Sungu Sungu members came to the houses of those who had registered for return, but had failed to show up on the day of the return convoy, and told people to leave Tanzania, but Human Rights Watch was not able to independently verify these allegations.

      One refugee said he knew four Sungu Sungu members in Nyarugusu camp who were also Imbonerakure members in his home commune in Burundi. He said: “If a normal refugee comes home after 8 p.m., it’s fine, but if an opposition member goes home after 8 p.m., he’s beaten and made to pay a fine of up to 10.000 Shillings (US$4.3).”

      Human Rights Watch independently verified the identity of the four men, as well as that of three other Imbonerakure members in Nduta camp, with a well-informed source in Burundi, who confirmed that at least five of the seven men were Imbonerakure members who either had ties with Tanzania or who had left their home communes in Cankuzo, Ruyigi, Karuzi, and Makamba provinces in Burundi.

      Thirteen interviewees said they had heard of killings, disappearances, and arrests of Burundians in and around Tanzania’s refugee camps since 2018, including when refugees left the camps to look for firewood. The resulting climate of fear and suspicion triggered their decision to leave.

      A 44-year-old man said: “After the August agreement … arrests increased. There were new ones every day. The camp authorities said they wanted to close the camps and that we had to register to go back.” A well-informed source confirmed that reports of disappearances and arrests by Tanzanian police have increased since August. Refugees also said that they believe Tanzanian authorities arrested people suspected of opposing their refugee-return “mobilization efforts.”

      Market Closures; Other Restrictions

      Most refugees said that restrictions that led to market closures, a ban on motorbikes and bicycles, and restrictions on access to services and commercial activities in the camps convinced them that Tanzanian authorities were planning to close the camps. Several also said that police and Sungu Sungu members prevented refugees from moving around the camps at night and prohibited refugees from listening to radio broadcasts by Burundian exiles.

      One refugee who was repatriated to Burundi in August 2018 said: “I didn’t want to leave but they put us in an untenable situation… [The Sungu Sungu] forbade us from listening to the radio and beat us if they found us out after 7 p.m. They worked with the Tanzania police, which collaborates with the Burundian police.”

      “In August, camp authorities closed Nduta camp market,” a 25-year-old woman who left Tanzania in August said. “This meant we had to survive on food rations, as we couldn’t buy vegetables and other small things in the camps anymore.”

      A 35-year-old carpenter, who left Tanzania for Uganda with his wife and four children on September 24 said: “Something changed after August 2019. Assistance for building houses or education programs were suspended. Aid for refugees definitely diminished.”

      Although these restrictions were added incrementally, refugees said that in August they became more severe. One refugee said: “After August, things changed. Markets inside and outside the camps were closed. The camp authorities said it would continue this way until all infrastructure is closed down.”

      Increasing Pressure on Certain Groups

      Human Rights Watch research indicates that as of October 31, there were about 151,000 registered refugees living in Tanzania’s camps together with 12,000 registered asylum seekers who were waiting for the Tanzanian authorities to decide on their individual asylum applications. In their August agreement, the Tanzanian and Burundian authorities erroneously referred to the 12,000 as “illegal migrants.”

      The source said that a recent “validation exercise” in the camps also identified about 2,800 Burundians who arrived in the camps after January 2018, when the Tanzanian authorities stopped registering asylum seekers. The authorities registered their presence in October, but refused to give them “active status,” leaving them without clear legal status and assistance.

      The source said that the exercise also identified and registered the presence of another 500 people whose refugee or asylum seeker status had been deactivated by UNHCR after they failed to show up for three consecutive food distributions, indicating they had left, but who had subsequently returned to the camps. As of early December, hundreds of them remain in the camp without “active status” or assistance.

      In October, sources in the camps said Tanzanian authorities posted lists in the camps of people without active legal status and access to assistance, saying they should report to Home Affairs Ministry officials in the camps. Hundreds did and signed up to return to Burundi. Tanzanian authorities did not follow standard procedure, requiring them to report to UNHCR to verify the Burundians were leaving Tanzania voluntarily. Instead, the authorities told them to report to Nduta camp’s departure center, where returning refugees go with all their belongings ahead of their scheduled return to Burundi. UNHCR said they had to conduct some voluntariness interviews at the departure center “in less than ideal circumstances.”

      UNHCR’s Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation says that “registration for repatriation should not be viewed as a merely clerical task” and that staff should “interview…the potential repatriates to obtain … relevant information, counselling them on issues of concern, answering questions on repatriation related issues [and] assessing vulnerability.”

      The source said that between September 2017 and mid-November 2019, about 10,500 refugees signed up for voluntary return to Burundi but then decided to stay in Tanzania. They informed UNHCR, which took them off the agency’s “pending departure” list.

      Nonetheless, in early October, the Tanzanian authorities posted a list of names in the camps of about 4,000 refugees who had signed up for return but had not shown up on the departure date and summoned them to Home Affairs Ministry representatives in the camps. A few hundred responded and said they wanted to return to Burundi and left in October and November. The rest remain in the camps.

      Returning Refugees Fleeing Burundi Again

      In its September report, the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Burundi said that “serious human rights violations – including crimes against humanity – have continued…across the country” and that the targets were real and suspected opposition supporters, including Burundians who had returned from abroad.

      Seven refugees said they had returned to Burundi between March 2018 and August 2019 under the voluntary repatriation program. Four said that members of the Imbonerakure had stolen the money and goods they had received from UNHCR, which include 70,000 Burundian Francs ($37), perishable goods, and cooking and other utensils. All said they left Burundi for Uganda to escape insecurity in Burundi.

      A man who returned to Burundi on September 27, 2018 and left again for Uganda one year later, described the challenges returning refugees face in Burundi:

      The Imbonerakure said we were ibipinga [a pejorative Kirundi expression to designate those who are against the party] and that we would pay for it in [the] 2020 [elections]. When they saw us at the market, they made us pay more. In July, August, and September [2019], CNDD-FDD [ruling party] members forced us to pay contributions for the elections and the ruling party. The Imbonerakure monitored our houses, especially if they suspected people might try and flee, and said they were going to kill us. The [local] authorities made me sign up to become a member of the ruling party... I thought I would be killed.

      Several interviewees said Imbonerakure members accused them of joining rebel groups abroad and threatened to arrest them. One person said that Imbonerakure members beat people trying to get goods at distributions by aid agencies and prevented people from getting food. He said he was forced to give up much of the repatriation-assistance money he had received from UNHCR:

      Of the 70,000 Francs I received [from UNHCR], I had to give 10,000 ($5.3) to the communal counsellor, 5,000 ($2.6) to the hill-level authorities, and 3,000 ($1.6) to the local Imbonerakure chief. Then, whenever an Imbonerakure came to my house, I had to give them 1,000 Francs ($0.5) …The Imbonerakure said they were going to kill me because I didn’t tell them how rebel groups were planning on attacking Burundi. They said they would cut my head off. I was afraid and decided to leave without any belongings – if the Imbonerakure suspected I was fleeing; they would have prevented me from crossing the border.

      An interviewee who returned to Burundi in August said Imbonerakure members arrested and accused him of denouncing Imbonerakure abuses while he was abroad. He said his wife had to sell all the goods they had received from UNHCR in Tanzania to pay for his release, and they both fled the country later the same month.

      https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/12/tanzania-burundians-pressured-leaving

  • Who Maps the World ?

    Too often, men. And money. But a team of OpenStreetMap users is working to draw new cartographic lines, making maps that more accurately—and equitably—reflect our space.

    “For most of human history, maps have been very exclusive,” said Marie Price, the first woman president of the American Geographical Society, appointed 165 years into its 167-year history. “Only a few people got to make maps, and they were carefully guarded, and they were not participatory.” That’s slowly changing, she said, thanks to democratizing projects like OpenStreetMap (OSM).

    OSM is the self-proclaimed Wikipedia of maps: It’s a free and open-source sketch of the globe, created by a volunteer pool that essentially crowd-sources the map, tracing parts of the world that haven’t yet been logged. Armed with satellite images, GPS coordinates, local community insights and map “tasks,” volunteer cartographers identify roads, paths, and buildings in remote areas and their own backyards. Then, experienced editors verify each element. Chances are, you use an OSM-sourced map every day without realizing it: Foursquare, Craigslist, Pinterest, Etsy, and Uber all use it in their direction services.

    When commercial companies like Google decide to map the not-yet-mapped, they use “The Starbucks Test,” as OSMers like to call it. If you’re within a certain radius of a chain coffee shop, Google will invest in maps to make it easy to find. Everywhere else, especially in the developing world, other virtual cartographers have to fill in the gaps.

    But despite OSM’s democratic aims, and despite the long (albeit mostly hidden) history of lady cartographers, the OSM volunteer community is still composed overwhelmingly of men. A comprehensive statistical breakdown of gender equity in the OSM space has not yet been conducted, but Rachel Levine, a GIS operations and training coordinator with the American Red Cross, said experts estimate that only 2 to 5 percent of OSMers are women. The professional field of cartography is also male-dominated, as is the smaller subset of GIS professionals. While it would follow that the numbers of mappers of color and LGBTQ and gender-nonconforming mappers are similarly small, those statistics have gone largely unexamined.

    There is one arena where women’s OSM involvement, specifically, is growing, however: within organizations like Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) and Missing Maps, which work to develop parts of the map most needed for humanitarian relief, or during natural disasters.
    When women decide what shows up on the map

    HOT has worked on high-profile projects like the “crisis mapping” of Puerto Rico in the wake of Hurricane Maria, and on humble but important ones, like helping one Zimbabwe community get on their city’s trash pickup list by highlighting piles of trash that littered the ground. Missing Maps is an umbrella group that aids it, made up of a coalition of NGOs, health organizations like the Red Cross, and data partners. It works to increase the number of volunteers contributing to humanitarian mapping projects by educating new mappers, and organizing thousands of map-a-thons a year.

    In HOT’s most recent gender equity study, it found that 28 percent of remote mappers for its projects were women. And in micro-grant-funded field projects, when organizations worked directly with people from the communities they were mapping, women participants made up 48 percent.

    That number dwarfs the percentage in the rest of the field, but parity (or majority) is still the ultimate aim. So in honor of International Women’s Day, Missing Maps organized about 20 feminist map-a-thons across the country, including one at the American Red Cross headquarters in downtown Washington, D.C., led by Levine along with a team of women volunteers. Price spoke as the guest of honor, and around 75 people attended: members of George Washington University’s Humanitarian Mapping Society, cartography enthusiasts, Red Cross volunteers and employees. There were women and men; new mappers and old.

    I turned up with my computer and not one cartographical clue.

    The project we embarked on together was commissioned by the Tanzanian Development Trust, which runs a safe house for girls in Tanzania facing the threat of genital mutilation. Its workers pick up and safely shelter girls from neighboring villages who fear they’ll be cut. When a girl calls for help, outreach workers need to know where to go pick them up, but they’re stuck in a Google Maps dead zone. Using OSM, volunteers from all over the world—including girls on the ground in Tanzania—are filling in the blanks.

    When it comes to increasing access to health services, safety, and education—things women in many developing countries disproportionately lack—equitable cartographic representation matters. It’s the people who make the map who shape what shows up. On OMS, buildings aren’t just identified as buildings; they’re “tagged” with specifics according to mappers’ and editors’ preferences. “If two to five percent of our mappers are women, that means only a subset of that get[s] to decide what tags are important, and what tags get our attention,” said Levine.

    Sports arenas? Lots of those. Strip clubs? Cities contain multitudes. Bars? More than one could possibly comprehend.

    Meanwhile, childcare centers, health clinics, abortion clinics, and specialty clinics that deal with women’s health are vastly underrepresented. In 2011, the OSM community rejected an appeal to add the “childcare” tag at all. It was finally approved in 2013, and in the time since, it’s been used more than 12,000 times.

    Doctors have been tagged more than 80,000 times, while healthcare facilities that specialize in abortion have been tagged only 10; gynecology, near 1,500; midwife, 233, fertility clinics, none. Only one building has been tagged as a domestic violence facility, and 15 as a gender-based violence facility. That’s not because these facilities don’t exist—it’s because the men mapping them don’t know they do, or don’t care enough to notice.
    In 2011, the OSM community rejected an appeal to add the “childcare” tag at all. It was finally approved in 2013, and in the time since, it’s been used more than 12,000 times.

    So much of the importance of mapping is about navigating the world safely. For women, especially women in less developed countries, that safety is harder to secure. “If we tag something as a public toilet, does that mean it has facilities for women? Does it mean the facilities are safe?” asked Levine. “When we’re tagging specifically, ‘This is a female toilet,’ that means somebody has gone in and said, ‘This is accessible to me.’ When women aren’t doing the tagging, we just get the toilet tag.”

    “Women’s geography,” Price tells her students, is made up of more than bridges and tunnels. It’s shaped by asking things like: Where on the map do you feel safe? How would you walk from A to B in the city without having to look over your shoulder? It’s hard to map these intangibles—but not impossible.

    “Women [already] share that information or intuitively pick it up watching other women,” Price said. “Those kinds of things could be mapped. Maybe not in an OSM environment, but that happens when cartography goes into many different hands and people think of different ways of how we know space, classify space, and value space.”

    That’s why Levine believes that the emphasis on recruiting women mapmakers, especially for field projects like the Tanzanian one, is above all else a practical one. “Women are the ones who know the health facilities; they know what’s safe and unsafe; they know where their kids go to play; they know where to buy groceries,” she said. “And we have found that by going to them directly, we get better data, and we get that data faster.”

    Recording more women-centric spaces doesn’t account for the many LGBTQ or non-binary spaces that go unmapped, a gap the International Women’s Day event didn’t overtly address. But elsewhere on the internet, projects like “Queering the Map” seek to identify queer spaces across the globe, preserving memories of LGBTQ awakenings, love stories, and acts of resistance. Instead of women’s health centers, the Queered Map opens a space to tag gay bars, or park benches where two women once fell in love, or the street in Oakland someone decided to change their “pronouns to they/them.” It’s a more subjective way to label space, and less institutionalized than the global OSM network. But that’s sort of the point.
    Service through cartography

    The concentration of women mappers in humanitarian projects is partly due to the framing of cartography as a service-driven skill, Levine said, rather than a technical one. That perception reflects the broader dynamics that alienate women from STEM fields—the idea that women should work as nurturers, not coders—but many women at the map-a-thon agreed that it was a drive to volunteer that first drew them to OSM.

    Maiya Kondratieff and Grace Poillucci, freshmen at George Washington University, are roommates. Both of them unexpectedly fell into digital mapping this year after seeing GW’s Humanitarian Mapping Society advertised at the university club fair. They were joined at the Missing Maps event by fellow society member Ethan Casserino, a third-year at GW.

    “It wasn’t presented as a tech-y thing; more like service work,” said Kondratieff. “And our e-board is mostly even” in terms of gender representation, she added. One of those older leaders of the group spent much of the night hurrying around, dishing out pizza and handing out stickers. Later, she stopped, leaned over Kondratieff’s shoulder, and helped her solve a bug in her map.

    Rhys, a cartography professional who asked not to be identified by last name, graduated from GW in 2016 and majored in geography. A lot of her women peers, she said, found their way into cartography based on an interest in art or graphic design. As things become more technology-heavy, she’s observed a large male influx. “It’s daunting for some people,” she said.

    Another big barrier to women’s involvement in OSM, besides the already vast disparities in the tech sphere, Levine said, is time. All OSM work is volunteer-based. “Women have less free time because the work we’re doing in our free time is not considered work,” said Levine. “Cleaning duties, childcare, are often not considered shared behaviors. When the women are putting the baby asleep, the man is mapping.”

    As a designer with DevelopmentSeed, a data technology group that is partnering with OSM to improve its maps, Ali Felski has been interviewing dozens of OSM users across the country about how they interact with the site. Most of them, she said, are older, retired men with time on their hands. “Mapping is less community-based. It’s technically detailed, and there aren’t a lot of nice instructions,” she said, factors that she thinks might be correlated with women’s hesitance to join the field. “I think it’s just a communication problem.”

    Building that communication often starts with education. According to a PayScale gender-by-major analysis conducted in 2009, 72 percent of undergraduate geography majors were men. At GW, that may be changing. While the geography major is small, it’s woman-dominated: 13 women and 10 men are in the graduate program. Price has taught generations of GW students (including Rhys, who counts her as a mentor), and leads the department with six other women, exactly matching the department’s seven men.

    Organizations like YouthMappers, which has 113 chapters spread among 35 countries, are supporting students in creating their own university OSM communities. And a lot of the students who participate are women. An estimated 40 percent of the 5,000 students who take part in YouthMappers are female, and a quarter of their chapters have more than 50 percent participation, said Marcela Zeballos, a research associate and 2009 graduate of GW. The group also champions women’s empowerment initiatives like Let Girls Map, which runs from International Women’s Day in March to International Day of the Girl in October.

    I didn’t get to map much at the event, but that night I kicked off the Let Girls Map season snuggled in bed, tagging buildings and drawing roads. I learned to curve paths and square edges, hypnotized by the seemingly endless satellite footage of Starbucks-free woods.

    The gaps in my local geographical knowledge, though, were unsurprisingly vast: I didn’t know if the buildings I was outlining were bathrooms or houses or restaurants, and couldn’t really discern a highway from a path from a driveway. And when my “unknown line” is a Tanzanian woman’s escape route, the stakes are high. That’s why HOT projects also depend on community members, some equipped with old-fashioned pens and paper, to hone in on the details.

    But map-a-thons like this get people engaged, and OSM-literate. They begin to build the sense of community that DevelopmentSeed’s Felski wished OSM didn’t lack. At an event like this, led and attended by women in the cartography field (or who may soon enter it), it’s easy to forget how few there really are.

    Down the table, the undergraduates Kondratieff and Casserino chatted, eyes trained at the rural Tanzanian landscape unfolding on their laptop screens. “You should minor in GIS,” Casserino urged.

    “Maybe I will,” she replied.

    https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/who-maps-the-world/555272
    #femmes #cartographie #cartes #genre #argent #femmes_cartographes
    ping @reka @odilon

    via @isskein

  • #Pro-savana

    Vision

    Improve the livelihood of inhabitants of #Nacala_Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.

    Missions

    1. Improve and modernise agriculture to increase productivity and production, and diversify agricultural production.

    2. Create employment through agricultural investment and establishment of a supply chain.

    Objective

    Create new agricultural development models, taking into account the natural environment and socio-economic aspects, and seeking market-orientated agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge.

    Principles of ProSAVANA

    1. ProSAVANA will be aligned with the vision and objectives of the national agricultural development strategy of Mozambique, the “Strategy Plan for the Agricultural Sector Development – 2011 – 2020 (PEDSA)”,

    2. ProSAVANA supports Mozambican farmers in order to contribute to poverty-reduction, food security and nutrition,

    3. Activities of ProSAVANA, in particular those involving the private sector, will be designed and implemented in accordance with Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests,

    4. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of Mozambique (MASA) and Local Government, in collaboration with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), will strengthen dialogue and involvement of civil society and other appropriate parties,

    5. Appropriate consideration will be given for mitigation of the environmental and social impacts, which might be provided through the activities under ProSAVANA.

    Approaches of ProSAVANA

    1. Incorporate the results of relevant studies on the natural conditions and socio-economic situations, to support the establishment of appropriate agricultural development models,

    2. Increase agricultural productivity and production through appropriate measures, including improvement of farming systems, access to agricultural extension services including techniques and quality/quantity of inputs, value chain system and expansion of farmland,

    3. Promote diversification of agricultural production, based on research results to increase profitability,

    4. Provide opportunities to change from subsistence agriculture into a sustainable agriculture, with respect given to the farmers´ sovereignty,

    5. Strengthen the capacity and the competitiveness of farmers and farmers’ organisations,

    6. Enhance the enabling environment to promote responsible investments and activities, aiming to establish a win-win relationship between small-scale farmers and agribusiness firms,

    7. Promote and strengthen local leading farmers to disseminate and scale-up development impacts,

    8. Establish regional agricultural clusters and develop value chain systems,

    9. Promote public and private partnership as one of the driving forces for inclusive and sustainable agricultural development.

    http://www.prosavana.gov.mz
    #Pro_savana #land_grabbing #terres #Mozambique #accaparement_de_terres

    ping @odilon

    Apparemment, le programme a été arrêté avant d’être implémenté.
    Programme qui avait été promu par #Lula

    • What Happened to the Biggest Land Grab in Africa? Searching for #ProSavana in Mozambique

      What if you threw a lavish party for foreign investors, and no one came? By all accounts, that is what’s happening in Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor, the intended site for Africa’s largest agricultural development scheme – or land grab, depending on your perspective.

      The ProSavana project, a Brazilian-and-Japanese-led development project, was supposed to be turning Mozambique’s fertile savannah lands in the north into an export zone, replicating Brazil’s success taming its own savannah – the cerrado – and transforming it into industrial mega-farms of soybeans. The vision, hatched in 2009, but only revealed to Mozambicans in 2013, called for 35 million hectares (nearly 100 million acres) of “underutilized” land to be converted by Brazilian agribusiness into soybean plantations for cheaper export to China and Japan.

      In my two weeks in Mozambique, including one week in the Nacala Corridor, I had a hard time finding evidence of any such transformation. It was easy, though, to find outrage at a plan seen by many in the region as a secret land grab. That resistance, which has evolved into a tri-national campaign in Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique to stop ProSavana, is one of the reasons the project is a currently a dud.

      The new face of South-South investment?

      I came to look at ProSavana because, out of all the large-scale projects I studied over the course of the last year, this one sounded almost plausible. It wasn’t started by some fly-by-night venture capitalist, growing a biofuel crop he’d never produced commercially for a market that barely existed. That’s what I saw in Tanzania, and such failed land grabs litter the African landscape.

      ProSavana at least knew its investors: Brazil’s agribusiness giants. The planners also knew their technology: Brazil’s soybeans, which had adapted to the harsh tropical conditions of Brazil’s cerrado. And they knew their market: Japan’s and China’s hog farms and their insatiable appetite for feed, generally made with soybeans. That was already more than a lot of these grand schemes had going for them.

      I was also compelled by the sheer scale of the project. When first announced, ProSavana was to encompass 35 million hectares of land, an area the size of North Carolina. That would have made it the largest land acquisition in Africa.

      ProSavana also interested me because it was not the usual neo-colonial megaproject promoted by the Global North. It was a projection of Brazil’s agro-export prowess. This was South-South investment, the new wave of development in a multipolar world. Wouldn’t Brazil do this differently, I wondered, with the kind of strong developmental focus that had characterized the country’s ascendance under the leadership of the left-leaning Workers’ Party?

      ProSavana’s premise was that the soil and climate in the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique were similar to those found in the cerrado, so technology could be easily adapted to tame a region inhospitable to agriculture.

      Someone should have gone there before they issued the press releases.

      It turns out that the two regions differ dramatically. The cerrado had poor soils, which technology was able to address. That’s also why it had few farmers, and those that were there could be moved by Brazil’s then-military dictatorship. The Nacala Corridor, by contrast, has good soils, which is precisely why it is the most densely-populated part of rural Mozambique. (If there are good lands, you can bet civilization has discovered them and is farming them.)

      Mozambique also has a democratic government, forged in an independence movement rooted in peasant farmers’ struggle for land rights. So the country has one of the stronger land laws in Africa, which grants use rights to farmers who have been farming land for ten years or more.

      The disconnect between the claims ProSavana was making to its investors and the reality of the situation reached almost laughable proportions. Agriculture Minister Jose Pacheco led sales visits to Mozambique, organized by Brazil’s Getulio Vargas Foundation, which had put together the agribusiness-friendly draft “Master Plan” that was leaked to Mozambican civil society organizations in March 2013. Brazil’s biggest farmers came looking for thousands of hectares of land, only to find three disappointments: they couldn’t own land in Mozambique; what land they could lease was by no means empty; and it was far from the ports, with no decent roads to transport their soybeans. Brazil’s soybean mega-farmers packed up their giant combines and went back to the cerrado, where there are still millions of hectares of undeveloped land.

      A kinder, gentler ProSavana

      There are a few large soybean farms in Gurue, producing for the domestic poultry industry; but nothing like the export boom promised by ProSavana. According to Americo Uaciquete of ProSavana’s Nampula office, Brazilian farmers came expecting 40,000 hectares free and clear. He told me no investor could expect that in the Nacala Corridor. The only foreign investors who will farm there, he said, are those willing to take 2,000 hectares and involve local farmers.

      To me, that sounded like a very quick surrender on the ProSavana battlefield. Couldn’t the Mozambican government open larger swaths of land?

      “Not without a gun,” Uaciquete said, clearly rejecting that path. “We are not going to impose the Brazilian model here.” He went on to describe ProSavana as a support program for small-scale farmers, based on its two non-investment components: research into improved locally adapted seeds, and extension services to improve productivity.

      In Maputo, the ProSavana Directorate did its best to polish up the new, development-friendly ProSavana. Jusimere Mourao, of Japan’s cooperation agency, had it down best. She lamented that ProSavana was “poorly timed” because its “announcement” (a leak) “coincided” with international concerns about land grabbing. Hmmm….

      After taking civil society concerns into account, she said, the program had issued a new “concept note” and the Master Plan is under revision. “Small and medium producers are the main beneficiaries of ProSavana,” she said. “We have no intention of promoting the taking of their land. It would be a crime.” It’s not about promoting foreign investment, she assured me; that is up to the Mozambican government.

      The turnaround was stunning, and welcome, if not quite believable. It certainly had not quieted the coalition calling for an end to ProSavana until farmers and civil society groups are consulted on the agricultural development plan for the Nacala Corridor.

      Luis Sitoe, Economic Adviser to the Minister of Agriculture, smirked when I told him I’d been in the region researching ProSavana. “Did you find anything?” For him, ProSavana had failed.

      But lest I think anything profound had been learned from that experience, he reassured me that the Mozambican government remains firmly committed to relying on large-scale foreign investment to address its agricultural underdevelopment.

      He pulled out a two-inch-thick binder to show me he was serious. It was the project proposal for the Lurio River Valley Development Project, a 200,000-hectare irrigation scheme right there in the northern Nacala Corridor. Was it part of ProSavana? Absolutely not. Had the communities been consulted on this ambitious project along the heavily populated river valley?

      “Absolutely not,” said Vicente Adriano, research director at UNAC, Mozambique’s national farmers’ union, which had just presented its own agricultural development plan, based on the country’s three million family farmers.

      The ProSavana directorate is still promising a new Master Plan for the project in early 2015. So it would be a mistake to think that ProSavana is dead. Large-scale land deals certainly aren’t, however they are branded. Investors may just be waiting for the Mozambican government to bring more to the table than just promotional brochures. Things like land, which turns out to be rather important for a successful land grab. In the Nacala Corridor, that land is anything but unoccupied.

      https://foodtank.com/news/2014/12/what-happened-to-the-biggest-land-grab-in-africa-searching-for-prosavana-i

  • Disneyland ‘robs’ Kenya of famous ‘Hakuna Matata’ phrase – Nairobi News
    https://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/news/disneyland-robs-kenya-hakuna-matata

    Disneyland has been granted a US trademark over the phrase under the registration number 27006605 for use on clothing.

    (…) The ‘Hakuna Matata’ phrase was popularized in 1982 by a Kenyan band Them Mushrooms in their popular song Jambo Bwana.

    In January, Maasai Intellectual Property Initiative (MIPI), a non-profit organisation, took legal steps to protect the cultural heritage of the nearly 2 million Maasais living in Kenya and Tanzania after Louis Vuitton’s Spring/Summer collection featured the Maasai shuka, which they later patented.

    The Maasai are not the first community to seek to protect and profit from their brand.

    Aboriginal Australians have, after years of struggle, established protocols that mean they are now routinely paid fees when companies use their image or ancestral lands for commercial or marketing.

    #copyright_madness #appropriation_culturelle #hakuna_matata #disney

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fK0wPpLryc4

  • Iranian Tanker That Sank Months Ago Among Ships Hit by Sanctions - Bloomberg
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-05/iranian-tanker-that-sank-months-ago-among-ships-hit-by-sanctions

    Among the hundreds of Iranian-linked banks, companies and vessels that the U.S. slapped sanctions against on Monday was an Iranian crude oil tanker called the Sanchi. There’s one problem: The ship sank after a collision and fiery explosion in January.

    The U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions list distributed Monday leaves no doubt about the identity of the vessel targeted with sanctions. It’s the Sanchi, otherwise known as the Gardenia, the Seahorse and the Sepid, that’s flown under flags including those of Tanzania, Malta and Tuvalu. Its International Maritime Organization number is 9356608, and it’s linked to the National Iranian Tanker Company.

    Tanker tracking data compiled by Bloomberg shows that’s the same ship that sank in the East China Sea — with all 32 people aboard — after colliding with another vessel on Jan. 6. The tanker was laden with more than 1 million barrels of light crude oil and burned for several days, creating a large oil spill, before an explosion destroyed what was left of it and sent the vessel to the bottom of the sea.

  • Uganda’s refugee policies: the history, the politics, the way forward

    Uganda’s refugee policy urgently needs an honest discussion, if sustainable solutions for both refugees and host communities are to be found, a new policy paper by International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) reveals.

    The paper, entitled Uganda’s refugee policies: the history, the politics, the way forward puts the “Ugandan model” in its historical and political context, shines a spotlight on its implementation gaps, and proposes recommendations for the way forward.

    Uganda has since 2013 opened its borders to hundreds of thousands of refugees from South Sudan, bringing the total number of refugees to more than one million. It has been praised for its positive steps on freedom of movement and access to work for refugees, going against the global grain. But generations of policy, this paper shows, have only entrenched the sole focus on refugee settlements and on repatriation as the only viable durable solution. Support to urban refugees and local integration have been largely overlooked.

    The Ugandan refugee crisis unfolded at the same time as the UN adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and states committed to implement a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). Uganda immediately seized this opportunity and adopted its own strategy to implement these principles. As the world looks to Uganda for best practices in refugee policy, and rightly so, it is vital to understand the gaps between rhetoric and reality, and the pitfalls of Uganda’s policy. This paper identifies the following challenges:

    There is a danger that the promotion of progressive refugee policies becomes more rhetoric than reality, creating a smoke-screen that squeezes out meaningful discussion about robust alternatives. Policy-making has come at the expense of real qualitative change on the ground.
    Refugees in urban areas continue to be largely excluded from any support due to an ongoing focus on refugee settlements, including through aid provision
    Local integration and access to citizenship have been virtually abandoned, leaving voluntary repatriation as the only solution on the table. Given the protracted crises in South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo, this remains unrealistic.
    Host communities remain unheard, with policy conversations largely taking place in Kampala and Geneva. Many Ugandans and refugees have neither the economic resources nor sufficient political leverage to influence the policies that are meant to benefit them.

    The policy paper proposes a number of recommendations to improve the Ugandan refugee model:

    First, international donors need to deliver on their promise of significant financial support.
    Second, repatriation cannot remain the only serious option on the table. There has to be renewed discussion on local integration with Uganda communities and a dramatic increase in resettlement to wealthier states across the globe.
    Third, local communities hosting refugees must be consulted and their voices incorporated in a more meaningful and systematic way, if tensions within and between communities are to be avoided.
    Fourth, in order to genuinely enhance refugee self-reliance, the myth of the “local settlement” needs to be debunked and recognized for what it is: the ongoing isolation of refugees and the utilization of humanitarian assistance to keep them isolated and dependent on aid.


    http://refugee-rights.org/uganda-refugee-policies-the-history-the-politics-the-way-forward
    #modèle_ougandais #Ouganda #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    Pour télécharger le #rapport:
    http://refugee-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/IRRI-Uganda-policy-paper-October-2018-Paper.pdf

    • A New Deal for Refugees

      Global policies that aim to resettle and integrate displaced populations into local societies is providing a way forward.

      For many years now, groups that work with refugees have fought to put an end to the refugee camp. It’s finally starting to happen.

      Camps are a reasonable solution to temporary dislocation. But refugee crises can go on for decades. Millions of refugees have lived in their country of shelter for more than 30 years. Two-thirds of humanitarian assistance — intended for emergencies — is spent on crises that are more than eight years old.

      Camps are stagnant places. Refugees have access to water and medical care and are fed and educated, but are largely idle. “You keep people for 20 years in camps — don’t expect the next generation to be problem-free,” said Xavier Devictor, who advises the World Bank on refugee issues. “Keeping people in those conditions is not a good idea.” It’s also hard to imagine a better breeding ground for terrorists.

      “As long as the system is ‘we feed you,’ it’s always going to be too expensive for the international community to pay for,” Mr. Devictor said. It’s gotten more and more difficult for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to raise that money; in many crises, the refugee agency can barely keep people from starving. It’s even harder now as nations turn against foreigners — even as the number of people fleeing war and violence has reached a record high.

      At the end of last year, nearly 70 million people were either internally displaced in their own countries, or had crossed a border and become a refugee. That is the largest number of displaced in history — yes, more than at the end of World War II. The vast majority flee to neighboring countries — which can be just as badly off.

      Last year, the United States accepted about 30,000 refugees.

      Uganda, which is a global model for how it treats refugees, has one-seventh of America’s population and a tiny fraction of the wealth. Yet it took in 1,800 refugees per day between mid-2016 and mid-2017 from South Sudan alone. And that’s one of four neighbors whose people take refuge in Uganda.

      Bangladesh, already the world’s most crowded major nation, has accepted more than a million Rohingya fleeing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. “If we can feed 160 million people, then (feeding) another 500,00-700,000 …. We can do it. We can share our food,” Shiekh Hasina, Bangladesh’s prime minister, said last year.

      Lebanon is host to approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, in addition to a half-million Palestinians, some of whom have been there for generations. One in three residents of Lebanon is a refugee.

      The refugee burden falls heavily on a few, poor countries, some of them at risk of destabilization, which can in turn produce more refugees. The rest of the world has been unwilling to share that burden.

      But something happened that could lead to real change: Beginning in 2015, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees crossed the Mediterranean in small boats and life rafts into Europe.

      Suddenly, wealthy European countries got interested in fixing a broken system: making it more financially viable, more dignified for refugees, and more palatable for host governments and communities.

      In September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution stating that all countries shared the responsibility of protecting refugees and supporting host countries. It also laid out a plan to move refugees out of camps into normal lives in their host nations.

      Donor countries agreed they would take more refugees and provide more long-term development aid to host countries: schools, hospitals, roads and job-creation measures that can help both refugees and the communities they settle in. “It looked at refugee crises as development opportunities, rather than a humanitarian risk to be managed,” said Marcus Skinner, a policy adviser at the International Rescue Committee.

      The General Assembly will vote on the specifics next month (whatever they come up with won’t be binding). The Trump administration pulled out of the United Nations’ Global Compact on Migration, but so far it has not opposed the refugee agreement.

      There’s a reason refugee camps exist: Host governments like them. Liberating refugees is a hard sell. In camps, refugees are the United Nations’ problem. Out of camps, refugees are the local governments’ problem. And they don’t want to do anything to make refugees comfortable or welcome.

      Bangladesh’s emergency response for the Rohingya has been staggeringly generous. But “emergency” is the key word. The government has resisted granting Rohingya schooling, work permits or free movement. It is telling Rohingya, in effect, “Don’t get any ideas about sticking around.”

      This attitude won’t deter the Rohingya from coming, and it won’t send them home more quickly. People flee across the closest border — often on foot — that allows them to keep their families alive. And they’ll stay until home becomes safe again. “It’s the simple practicality of finding the easiest way to refuge,” said Victor Odero, regional advocacy coordinator for East Africa and the Horn of Africa at the International Rescue Committee. “Any question of policies is a secondary matter.”

      So far, efforts to integrate refugees have had mixed success. The first experiment was a deal for Jordan, which was hosting 650,000 Syrian refugees, virtually none of whom were allowed to work. Jordan agreed to give them work permits. In exchange, it got grants, loans and trade concessions normally available only to the poorest countries.

      However, though the refugees have work permits, Jordan has put only a moderate number of them into jobs.

      Any agreement should include the views of refugees from the start — the Jordan Compact failed to do this. Aid should be conditioned upon the right things. The deal should have measured refugee jobs, instead of work permits. Analysts also said the benefits should have been targeted more precisely, to reach the areas with most refugees.

      To spread this kind of agreement to other nations, the World Bank established a $2 billion fund in July 2017. The money is available to very poor countries that host many refugees, such as Uganda and Bangladesh. In return, they must take steps to integrate refugees into society. The money will come as grants and zero interest loans with a 10-year grace period. Middle-income countries like Lebanon and Colombia would also be eligible for loans at favorable rates under a different fund.

      Over the last 50 years, only one developing country has granted refugees full rights. In Uganda, refugees can live normally. Instead of camps there are settlements, where refugees stay voluntarily because they get a plot of land. Refugees can work, live anywhere, send their children to school and use the local health services. The only thing they can’t do is become Ugandan citizens.

      Given the global hostility to refugees, it is remarkable that Ugandans still approve of these policies. “There have been flashes of social tension or violence between refugees and their hosts, mostly because of a scarcity of resources,” Mr. Odero said. “But they have not become widespread or protracted.”

      This is the model the United Nations wants the world to adopt. But it is imperiled even in Uganda — because it requires money that isn’t there.

      The new residents are mainly staying near the South Sudan border in Uganda’s north — one of the least developed parts of the country. Hospitals, schools, wells and roads were crumbling or nonexistent before, and now they must serve a million more people.

      Joël Boutroue, the head of the United Nations refugee agency in Uganda, said current humanitarian funding covered a quarter of what the crisis required. “At the moment, not even half of refugees go to primary school,” he said. “There are around 100 children per classroom.”

      Refugees are going without food, medical care and water. The plots of land they get have grown smaller and smaller.

      Uganda is doing everything right — except for a corruption scandal. It could really take advantage of the new plan to develop the refugee zone. That would not only help refugees, it would help their host communities. And it would alleviate growing opposition to rights for refugees. “The Ugandan government is under pressure from politicians who see the government giving favored treatment to refugees,” Mr. Boutroue said. “If we want to change the perception of refugees from recipients of aid to economic assets, we have to showcase that refugees bring development.”

      The World Bank has so far approved two projects — one for water and sanitation and one for city services such as roads and trash collection. But they haven’t gotten started yet.

      Mr. Devictor said that tackling long-term development issues was much slower than providing emergency aid. “The reality is that it will be confusing and confused for a little while,” he said. Water, for example, is trucked in to Uganda’s refugee settlements, as part of humanitarian aid. “That’s a huge cost,” he said. “But if we think this crisis is going to last for six more months, it makes sense. If it’s going to last longer, we should think about upgrading the water system.”

      Most refugee crises are not surprises, Mr. Devictor said. “If you look at a map, you can predict five or six crises that are going to produce refugees over the next few years.” It’s often the same places, over and over. That means developmental help could come in advance, minimizing the burden on the host. “Do we have to wait until people cross the border to realize we’re going to have an emergency?” he said.

      Well, we might. If politicians won’t respond to a crisis, it’s hard to imagine them deciding to plan ahead to avert one. Political commitment, or lack of it, always rules. The world’s new approach to refugees was born out of Europe’s panic about the Syrians on their doorstep. But no European politician is panicking about South Sudanese or Rohingya refugees — or most crises. They’re too far away. The danger is that the new approach will fall victim to the same political neglect that has crippled the old one.

      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/opinion/refugee-camps-integration.html

      #Ouganda #modèle_ougandais #réinstallation #intégration

      avec ce commentaire de #Jeff_Crisp sur twitter :

      “Camps are stagnant places. Refugees have access to water and medical care and are fed and educated, but are largely idle.”
      Has this prizewinning author actually been to a refugee camp?

      https://twitter.com/JFCrisp/status/1031892657117831168

    • Appreciating Uganda’s ‘open door’ policy for refugees

      While the rest of the world is nervous and choosing to take an emotional position on matters of forced migration and refugees, sometimes closing their doors in the face of people who are running from persecution, Uganda’s refugee policy and practice continues to be liberal, with an open door to all asylum seekers, writes Arthur Matsiko

      http://thisisafrica.me/appreciating-ugandas-open-door-policy-refugees

    • Ouganda. La générosité intéressée du pays le plus ouvert du monde aux réfugiés

      L’Ouganda est le pays qui accueille le plus de réfugiés. Un million de Sud-Soudanais fuyant la guerre s’y sont installés. Mais cette noble intention des autorités cache aussi des calculs moins avouables : l’arrivée massive de l’aide internationale encourage l’inaction et la #corruption.

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/ouganda-la-generosite-interessee-du-pays-le-plus-ouvert-du-mo

    • Refugees in Uganda to benefit from Dubai-funded schools but issues remain at crowded settlement

      Dubai Cares is building three classrooms in a primary school at Ayilo II but the refugee settlement lacks a steady water supply, food and secondary schools, Roberta Pennington writes from Adjumani


      https://www.thenational.ae/uae/refugees-in-uganda-to-benefit-from-dubai-funded-schools-but-issues-remai

    • FUGA DAL SUD SUDAN. LUIS, L’UGANDA E QUEL PEZZO DI TERRA DONATA AI PROFUGHI

      Luis zappa, prepara dei fori per tirare su una casa in attesa di ritrovare la sua famiglia. Il terreno è una certezza, glielo ha consegnato il Governo ugandese. Il poterci vivere con i suoi cari non ancora. L’ultima volta li ha visti in Sud Sudan. Nel ritornare a casa sua moglie e i suoi otto figli non c’erano più. É sicuro si siano messi in cammino verso l’Uganda, così da quel giorno è iniziata la sua rincorsa. É certo che li ritroverà nella terra che ora lo ha accolto. Quella di Luis è una delle tante storie raccolte nei campi profughi del nord dell’Uganda, in una delle ultime missioni di Amref, in cui era presente anche Giusi Nicolini, già Sindaco di Lampedusa e Premio Unesco per la pace. 



      Modello Uganda? Dell’Uganda il mondo dice «campione di accoglienza». Accoglienza che sta sperimentando da mesi nei confronti dei profughi sud sudanesi, che scappano da uno dei Paesi più drammaticamente in crisi al mondo. Sono 4 milioni le persone che in Sud Sudan hanno dovuto lasciare le proprie case. Chi muovendosi verso altri Paesi e chi in altre regioni sud sudanesi. In questi ultimi tempi arrivano in Uganda anche persone che fuggono dalla Rep. Democratica del Congo.

      https://www.amref.it/2018_02_23_Fuga_dal_Sud_Sudan_Luis_lUganda_e_quel_pezzo_di_terra_donata_ai_pro

    • As Rich Nations Close the Door on Refugees, Uganda Welcomes Them

      President Trump is vowing to send the military to stop migrants trudging from Central America. Europe’s leaders are paying African nations to block migrants from crossing the Mediterranean — and detaining the ones who make it in filthy, overcrowded camps.

      But Solomon Osakan has a very different approach in this era of rising xenophobia. From his uncluttered desk in northwest Uganda, he manages one of the largest concentrations of refugees anywhere in the world: more than 400,000 people scattered across his rural district.

      He explained what he does with them: Refugees are allotted some land — enough to build a little house, do a little farming and “be self-sufficient,” said Mr. Osakan, a Ugandan civil servant. Here, he added, the refugees live in settlements, not camps — with no barbed wire, and no guards in sight.

      “You are free, and you can come and go as you want,” Mr. Osakan added.

      As many nations are securing their borders and turning refugees away, Uganda keeps welcoming them. And they keep coming, fleeing catastrophes from across this part of Africa.

      In all, Uganda has as many as 1.25 million refugees on its soil, perhaps more, making it one of the most welcoming countries in the world, according to the United Nations.

      And while Uganda’s government has made hosting refugees a core national policy, it works only because of the willingness of rural Ugandans to accept an influx of foreigners on their land and shoulder a big part of the burden.

      Uganda is not doing this without help. About $200 million in humanitarian aid to the country this year will largely pay to feed and care for the refugees. But they need places to live and small plots to farm, so villages across the nation’s north have agreed to carve up their communally owned land and share it with the refugees, often for many years at a time.

      “Our population was very few and our community agreed to loan the land,” said Charles Azamuke, 27, of his village’s decision in 2016 to accept refugees from South Sudan, which has been torn apart by civil war. “We are happy to have these people. We call them our brothers.”

      United Nations officials have pointed to Uganda for its “open border” policy. While the United States, a much more populous nation, has admitted more than three million refugees since 1975, the American government settles them in the country after they have first been thoroughly screened overseas.

      By contrast, Uganda has essentially opened its borders to refugees, rarely turning anyone away.

      Some older Ugandans explain that they, too, had been refugees once, forced from their homes during dictatorship and war. And because the government ensures that spending on refugees benefits Ugandans as well, younger residents spoke of how refugees offered them some unexpected opportunities.

      “I was a farmer. I used to dig,” Mr. Azamuke said. But after learning Arabic from refugees from South Sudan, he got a better job — as a translator at a new health clinic that serves the newcomers.

      His town, Ofua, is bisected by a dirt road, with the Ugandans living on the uphill side and the South Sudanese on the downhill side. The grass-thatched homes of the Ugandans look a bit larger and sturdier, but not much.

      As the sun began to set one recent afternoon, a group of men on the Ugandan side began to pass around a large plastic bottle of waragi, a home brew. On the South Sudanese side, the men were sober, gathered around a card game.

      On both sides, the men had nothing but tolerant words for one another. “Actually, we don’t have any problems with these people,” said Martin Okuonzi, a Ugandan farmer cleaning his fingernails with a razor blade.

      As the men lounged, the women and girls were still at work, preparing dinner, tending children, fetching water and gathering firewood. They explained that disputes did arise, especially as the two groups competed for limited resources like firewood.

      “We’ve been chased away,” said Agnes Ajonye, a 27-year-old refugee from South Sudan. “They say we are destroying their forests.”

      And disputes broke out at the well, where Ugandan women insist they should be allowed to skip ahead of refugees.

      “If we hadn’t given you the land you live on, wouldn’t you be dying in Sudan?” said Adili Chandia, a 62-year-old refugee, recounting the lecture she and others got from a frustrated Ugandan woman waiting in line.

      Ugandan officials often talk about the spirit of Pan-Africanism that motivates their approach to refugees. President Yoweri Museveni, an autocratic leader who has been in power for 32 years, says Uganda’s generosity can be traced to the precolonial days of warring kingdoms and succession disputes, when losing factions often fled to a new land.

      This history of flight and resettlement is embedded in some of the names of local groups around western Uganda, like Batagwenda, which means “the ones that could not continue traveling.”

      The government encourages the nation to go along with its policy by directing that 30 percent of foreign aid destined for refugees be spent in ways that benefit Ugandans nearby. So when money for refugees results in new schools, clinics and wells, Ugandans are more likely to welcome than resent them.

      For Mr. Museveni, hosting refugees has given him relevance and political capital abroad at a time when he would otherwise have little.

      A former guerrilla fighter who quickly stabilized much of his country, Mr. Museveni was once hailed as an example of new African leadership. He was relatively quick to confront the AIDS epidemic, and he invited back Ugandans of Indian and Pakistani descent who had been expelled during the brutal reign of Idi Amin in the 1970s.

      But his star has fallen considerably. He has clung to power for decades. His security forces have beaten political opponents. Freedom of assembly and expression are severely curtailed.

      Even so, Uganda’s openness toward refugees makes Mr. Museveni important to European nations, which are uneasy at the prospect of more than a million refugees heading for Europe.

      Other African nations also host a significant number of refugees, but recent polls show that Ugandans are more likely than their neighbors in Kenya or Tanzania to support land assistance or the right to work for refugees.

      Part of the reason is that Ugandans have fled their homes as well, first during the murderous reign of Mr. Amin, then during the period of retribution after his overthrow, and again during the 1990s and 2000s, when Joseph Kony, the guerrilla leader who terrorized northern Uganda, left a trail of kidnapped children and mutilated victims.

      Many Ugandans found refuge in what is today South Sudan. Mark Idraku, 57, was a teenager when he fled with his mother to the area. They received two acres of farmland, which helped support them until they returned home six years later.

      “When we were in exile in Sudan, they also helped us,” Mr. Idraku said. “Nobody ever asked for a single coin.”

      Mr. Idraku has since returned the favor, loaning three acres to a South Sudanese refugee named Queen Chandia, 37. Ms. Chandia said the land — along with additional plots other Ugandans allow her to farm — has made all the difference.

      Her homestead of thatched-roof huts teemed with children tending their chores, grinding nuts into paste and maize into meal. Ms. Chandia is the mother of a girl and two boys. But over the years, as violence hollowed out her home country, Ms. Chandia started taking in the orphaned children of relatives and friends. Now 22 children call her “mom.”

      A refugee for nearly her entire life, Ms. Chandia arrived in Uganda as a young girl nearly 30 years ago. For years, she worried about being expelled.
      Image

      “Maybe these Ugandans will change their minds on us,” she said, describing the thought that plagued her. Then one day the worry stopped.

      But Mr. Osakan, the administrator who oversees refugee affairs in the country’s extreme northwest, is anxious. There is an Ebola outbreak over the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mr. Osakan fears what might happen if — or when — a refugee turns up in Uganda with the dreaded illness.

      “It would destroy all the harmony between refugees and host communities,” he said, explaining that it would probably lead to calls to seal the border.

      For now, the border is very much open, although the number of refugees arriving has fallen significantly. In one of the newer settlements, many of the refugees came last year, fleeing an attack in a South Sudanese city. But some complained about receiving too little land, about a quarter acre per family, which is less than previous refugees had received.

      “Even if you have skills — in carpentry — you are not given a chance,” said one refugee, Simon Ludoru. He looked over his shoulder, to where a construction crew was building a nursery school. The schoolhouse would teach both local Ugandan and South Sudanese children together, but the workers were almost entirely Ugandan, he said.

      At the construction site, the general contractor, Sam Omongo, 50, said he had hired refugees for the job. “Oh, yes,” he exclaimed.

      How many?

      “Not a lot, actually,” he acknowledged. “I have about three.” Mr. Omongo called one over.

      “Are you a refugee?” Mr. Omongo asked the slight man.

      “No, I’m from Uganda,” he said softly. His name was Amos Chandiga, 28. He lived nearby and owned six acres of land, though he worked only four of them. He had lent the other two to a pair of refugees.

      “They asked me, and I gave it to them,” Mr. Chandiga explained. He patted his chest. “It comes from here, in my heart.”


      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/world/africa/uganda-refugees.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes

    • Uganda: a role model for refugee integration?

      Uganda hosts the largest refugee population in Africa and is, after Turkey and Pakistan, the third-largest refugee recipient country worldwide. Political and humanitarian actors have widely praised Ugandan refugee policies because of their progressive nature: In Uganda, in contrast to many other refugee-receiving countries, these are de jure allowed to work, to establish businesses, to access public services such as education, to move freely and have access to a plot of land. Moreover, Uganda is a pilot country of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). In this Working Paper the authors ascertain whether Uganda indeed can be taken as a role model for refugee integration, as largely portrayed in the media and the political discourse. They identify the challenges to livelihoods and integration to assess Uganda’s self-reliance and settlement approach and its aspiration towards providing refugees and Ugandan communities receiving refugees with opportunities for becoming self-reliant. Drawing on three months of field research in northern and southern Uganda from July to September of 2017 with a particular focus on South Sudanese refugees, the authors concentrate on three aspects: Access to land, employment and education, intra- and inter-group relations. The findings show that refugees in Uganda are far from self-reliant and socially integrated. Although in Uganda refugees are provided with land, the quality and size of the allocated plots is so poor that they cannot earn a living from agricultural production, which thus, rather impedes self-reliance. Inadequate infrastructure also hinders access to markets and employment opportunities. Even though most local communities have been welcoming to refugees, the sentiment has shifted recently in some areas, particularly where local communities that are often not better off than refugees feel that they have not benefitted from the presence of refugees....

      https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/62871

    • Uganda has a remarkable history of hosting refugees, but its efforts are underfunded

      Uganda has agreed to a request from the United States to temporarily accommodate 2,000 refugees from Afghanistan while Washington processes their applications to live in the US. The move underscores the reputation Uganda has of being progressive on refugee issues. Refugee expert Dr Evan Easton-Calabria provides insights into why.
      When did Uganda start hosting refugees?

      Uganda has a long history of hosting refugees. This started in the early 1940s with Polish refugees who fled from Nazi-occupied Europe. The Nakivale refugee settlement – formed in 1959 – in southwest Uganda is the oldest refugee camp in Africa.

      Uganda also hosts huge numbers of refugees. In the mid-1950s almost 80,000 Sudanese refugees, fleeing the first civil war, sought refuge in the country. They were only the first of many waves of refugees from different neighbouring countries to arrive. Uganda has hosted significant numbers of refugees ever since.

      Today, almost 1.5 million refugees live in Uganda, making it the top refugee-hosting country in Africa and one of the top five hosting countries in the world.

      Its longstanding ‘open-door’ policy has benefited it both politically and financially, with hundreds of millions of donor funds provided each year for humanitarian and development projects. These target both refugees and locals. While Kenya, for example, has received Euros 200 million in humanitarian aid from the European Union since 2012, Uganda has received this much from the EU in just over four years.
      Is the country more progressive towards refugees than its neighbours?

      Uganda’s policies towards refugees have been hailed as progressive. It has even been called “the world’s best place for refugees”.

      Refugees have the right to work and freedom of movement, thanks to Uganda’s 2006 Refugee Act and 2010 Refugee Regulations, which provide a strong legal and regulatory framework for refugee rights.

      Refugees have the right to the same social services as Ugandans, including health care and free primary education. They are not confined to camps but can also live in urban areas. The country has, therefore, received a lot of positive attention for ‘fostering’ the self-reliance of refugees.

      However, despite rights on paper in Uganda, refugees still struggle.

      They are not legally recognised as refugees if they live in cities besides the capital, Kampala. As ‘self-settled’ urban refugees, they risk being misclassified as economic migrants. Lacking official refugee status (unless they have been registered in a settlement), urban refugees also often lack assistance.

      Although refugees in Uganda are economically diverse – one study even identified over 70 different types of livelihoods activities by refugees in Uganda – for many in settlements, subsistence farming is their primary livelihood. But, despite plots of land being provided in settlements, many don’t have enough land to farm on and soil quality is often low. This means that, for many, farming is no longer a viable livelihood. This shows that liberal refugee policies, like those promoting self-reliance in Uganda, must be backed with adequate resources if they are to be more than just words on paper.

      Comparatively, Uganda’s neighbours – such as Kenya and Ethiopia – have traditionally been more restrictive. Kenya relies on a system of encampment, where most refugees live in camps, and Ethiopia has only recently expanded its out-of-camp policy to all refugees and aslyum-seekers, although regulatory gaps remain. Nevertheless, it’s important to note that both are major refugee-hosting countries. They host far more refugees than many western (and wealthier) countries. Kenya hosts over half a million refugees, mainly from Somalia and South Sudan. Ethiopia hosts over 788,000 and is the third largest refugee-hosting country in Africa.
      How effectively does Uganda manage its refugee community?

      ‘Effectiveness’ is an interesting word in this context. On one hand, Uganda provides an important foundation in terms of providing the legal infrastructure to allow many refugees to lead independent lives. But refugees also enter a challenging context: Uganda struggles to provide adequate services for its own citizens and unemployment is high. It has one of the world’s lowest rankings in the Human Capital Index.

      In addition, the 2021 presidential election saw increased political and social unrest which has led to the violation of rights such as the freedom of assembly and expression for citizens and other residents, including refugees. While many Ugandans have welcomed refugees, there are increasing accounts of overburdened cities and strains on resources, like firewood, in some parts of the country.

      The corruption of humanitarian aid is also a problem, with UNHCR Uganda accused of mismanaging tens of millions of dollars in 2016-2017. This illustrates the clear need for effective financial management so that refugees can actually be helped.

      There is also another important question of responsibility. Despite the positive attention the international community has given the country, donor funds have not often matched the praise. If schools and health facilities are crowded, in part because of refugees, the responsibility to provide additional support should not fall on a refugee-hosting country such as Uganda alone. Limited resources mean limited management. As of June, the 2020-2021 Uganda Refugee Response Plan was only 22% funded, leaving a shortfall of US$596 million to cover all sectors ranging from protection to food security to sanitation.
      Does it look likely that Uganda will continue in its role as a leading refugee destination?

      Uganda has had a strong commitment to hosting refugees for over 70 years –- about the same length that the 1951 Refugee Convention has existed. A spirit of pan-Africanism and first-hand understanding of displacement by many Ugandans have all contributed to its willingness to host refugees. Its recent temporary accommodation of Afghan refugees indicates that it is interested in continuing this role.

      That said, no country should host refugees without significant international support. Many refugee response plans, such as Uganda’s, remain significantly underfunded even as displacement rises and challenges – such as the COVID-19 pandemic – remain. Even though Uganda receives a significant amount of money, it’s not enough to support the number of people arriving as evidenced by a funding appeal by refugee response actors in June this year.

      Mechanisms such as the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework offer a means to channel resources and increase collaboration on refugee hosting. But it is important to consider what displacement in Central, Eastern, and the Horn of Africa would look like if Uganda closed its borders. Uganda is making an effort in a neighbourhood where few other countries have the same enthusiasm.

      https://theconversation.com/uganda-has-a-remarkable-history-of-hosting-refugees-but-its-efforts

  • Lessons from Tanzania’s Historic Bid to Turn Refugees to Citizens

    Tanzania was lauded for offering citizenship to 200,000 Burundians, the largest-ever mass naturalization of refugees. But a political stalemate emerged between humanitarians and the government, leaving refugees stuck in the middle, explains researcher Amelia Kuch.

    During Europe’s so-called migrant crisis of 2015, the Tanzanian government gave over 200,000 Burundian refugees a choice between repatriation – returning to Burundi – and naturalization – obtaining Tanzanian citizenship.

    Given the choice, 79 percent of the refugees – 171,600 people – opted for Tanzanian citizenship. It is understood to be the first time in history any state has naturalized such a large group of refugees under the protection of the U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR) in a single move.

    This group of refugees had fled Burundi following ethnic violence and killings in 1972 and now live in three rural settlements in Tanzania: Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu. Since the 1970s, these settlements had transformed into towns: People made improvements to their homes, electricity poles were laid out and the local markets began to expand.

    Research has shown that access to citizenship is an important means of resolving long-term displacement. Yet in most countries, granting citizenship to refugees is still politically unthinkable.

    Tanzania has long been held up as a safe haven for refugees in the region, giving shelter to some 315,000 mainly Burundian and Congolese refugees. The naturalization of Burundian refugees was hailed as a model for progressive solutions to displacement. Yet it has led to a political stalemate between humanitarian organizations and the government, with the “refugees-turned-citizens” stuck in the middle.

    Last month, the Tanzanian government halted the naturalization of another group of more recently arrived Burundian refugees and has since pulled out of the U.N.’s Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, citing lack of international funding.

    During my research in the former Burundian refugee camps in Western Tanzania since 2014, I have spoken with many former refugees about the naturalization process, as well as NGO employees and government officials.

    The difficulties in Tanzania are important to understanding the challenges of mass naturalization. It is not easy to turn a camp of refugees into a settlement of citizens. They also demonstrate how important it is for refugees to be able to hold both governments and humanitarian organizations accountable when things go wrong.
    A Progressive Solution is Born

    Negotiations around Tanzania’s naturalization policy began in 2007. They resulted in the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS), which was adopted that year by the governments of Tanzania and Burundi in partnership with UNHCR. The agreement had three pillars: repatriation to Burundi, granting citizenship to those who opted to pursue naturalization and relocation of naturalized refugees from the settlements to other regions of Tanzania.

    Major investments were promised to facilitate the process. Some $103 million was earmarked for relocation and integration of naturalized refugees in the 2011-15 United Nations Development Assistant Plan (UNDAP).

    Eventually, the resettlement pillar was abandoned because of logistical problems and local resistance to resettling refugees. As a result, the new citizens were permitted to remain in the areas of the settlements in which they had lived for the past four decades. They can now vote in national elections and join political parties.

    “Obtaining citizenship and being allowed to stay here brought peace into my heart. Before I lived in fear,” said one former refugee named Daniel.
    Left in Limbo

    Yet the initial TANCOSS agreement did not include any detailed plans for the refugee settlements after the naturalization of their residents. As a consequence, today the area remains in a governance limbo.

    Every refugee camp had a settlement officer who represented the Ministry of Home Affairs and was responsible for governing the area. Settlement officers remain in power in all three settlements, and they continue to act as the highest authority and arbiters of conflicts.

    “Naturalization certificates are important because they allow us to move, but opening of this space is crucial and still needs to happen,” said one church leader in Ulyankulu, referring to the full integration of the settlements. “As long as we still have a settlement officer and a closed space, the process is not complete.”

    It remains unclear when and how a transition to local governance will take place and what rights to the land the new citizens have. The Tanzania Strategy for Local Integration Program for the New Citizens (TANSPLI), drafted in 2016, stipulates the creation of a master land use plan for the settlements and the surrounding areas, followed by the registration of villages in each settlement and provision of documentation for land rights.

    However, the timeline for implementation is unclear. It “hinges on the availability of funding for the planned development projects,” according to Suleiman Mziray, who is assistant director of refugee services at Ministry of Home Affairs.

    “People here don’t have ownership, you can be taken off your land at any time,” said one elderly man from Kaswa village in Ulyankulu settlement. “It’s like a marriage with no certificate.”
    Lack of Accountability

    Some of these challenges have led to a political stalemate between humanitarian organizations and the government, with each claiming the other has not kept its promises. Meanwhile, residents of the settlements suffer the consequences, as they wait for citizenship documents and investment in infrastructure like access to clean water.

    Due to major delays in the distribution of citizenship certificates by the government, international funding for the promised development projects was redirected to other emergencies. Some of the aid was initially meant for resettlement, so once the refugees were allowed to stay in the former camps, funds were reallocated. Now that they are no longer refugees but citizens, they fall into a responsibility gap. “We have done our part,” a UNHCR official told me on condition of anonymity.

    On the other side is the Tanzanian government: frustrated and disillusioned. They say they were promised that major investments will follow the distribution of citizenship but they never arrived. “We kept our part of the deal and distributed citizenship. But none of the promises materialized,” said an official at the Ministry of Home Affairs.

    The government says it does not intend to invest in the settlements for now, as they are still hoping that international funding might come through eventually.

    Earlier agreements left it ambiguous who would be responsible for implementing the administrative, developmental and social programs that were designed to turn former refugee settlements into properly integrated towns and villages. Without accountability mechanisms, it is hard for former refugees to hold humanitarian organizations or the government to their initial promises.
    Three Lessons from Tanzania

    Clearly, the design and implementation of the naturalization policy was far from perfect. The experience of Tanzania offers a few important lessons.

    First, if similar mass naturalization policies are to be implemented elsewhere, it is key that they are drafted as binding documents, where the parties dedicated to the process (both national governments and international organizations) can be held accountable if they do not deliver on the promises and commitments made within an agreed timeline.

    Second, such policies should be more carefully drafted, incorporating provisions on post-naturalization arrangements regarding local governance and land ownership.

    Finally, despite the pitfalls and unforeseen challenges, my interviews with former refugees shows that naturalization is very important to them. They are acutely aware that citizenship is not a panacea, but firmly maintain that access to legal status provides them with a sense of security and the right to remain in the country, allaying fears of forced repatriation and deportation.

    https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/02/22/lessons-from-tanzanias-historic-bid-to-turn-refugees-to-citizens?platfor
    #naturalisation #citoyenneté #nationalité #modèle_tanzanien #Tanzanie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_burundais

    v. aussi le #modèle_ougandais qui donne un lopin de terre aux réfugiés

  • “There isn’t any”: Tanzania’s land myth and the brave New Alliance - African Arguments
    http://africanarguments.org/2018/05/15/there-isnt-any-tanzanias-land-myth-and-the-brave-new-alliance

    Stanley gestures around him at expanses of rich, fertile land. This has been cultivated by Tanzanians for generations, he explains, but much of it is now owned by large-scale commercial farms that use imported hybrid seeds and over-produce.

    This is in eastern Tanzania, but a similar story is playing out in regions across the country where big agribusinesses have arrived on the scene. Many of their entrances to the country have been facilitated by an ambitious international initiative called the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Launched a few years ago, this scheme brings together governments, NGOs and corporations and promises to lift 50 million Africans out of poverty by 2022.

    So far, however, Stanley is not one of them. “We don’t have any water in the village now,” he says, looking across a new expansive commercial farm. “It’s all being used for tomato production. The price of tomatoes is very weak because there’s overproduction and we’ve not got enough land.”

    #terres #Tanzanie #nasan #pastoralisme

  • ANALYSIS-Data-bait: using tech to hook globe’s multi-billion-dollar fishing cheats
    https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFL8N1Q94J5

    In 2016, a Thai-flagged fishing vessel was detained in Seychelles on suspicion that it had been fishing illegally in the Indian Ocean, one of the world’s richest fishing grounds.

    The Jin Shyang Yih 668 was caught with help from technology deployed by FISH-i Africa, a grouping of eight east African countries including Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya.

    But as the vessel headed to Thailand, which pledged to investigate and prosecute the case, it turned off its tracking equipment and disappeared. Its whereabouts remain unknown.

    Such activity is rampant in the global fishing industry, experts say, where illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is estimated to cost $23.5 billion a year.

    However, a range of non-profit and for-profit organisations that are developing technology solutions to tackle IUU say it is a matter of time before vessels can no longer vanish.

    The industry is developing very fast ... basically the oceans will be fully traceable. There is no place to hide,” said Roberto Mielgo Bregazzi, the co-founder of Madrid-based FishSpektrum, one of the few for-profit platforms.

    With backing from Google, Microsoft’s Paul Allen and Leonardo DiCaprio, among others, such platforms also track fishing on the high seas and in marine reserves, aided by radio and satellite data that send vessels’ locations and movements.

    They use satellite imagery, drones, algorithms and the ability to process vast amounts of data, as well as old-fashioned sleuthing and analysis, to help countries control their waters.

    Algorithms could identify illegal behaviour, Mielgo Bregazzi told the Thomson Reuters Foundation, including predicting when a fishing vessel was about to meet its quota, triggering an alarm.

    Bradley Soule, the chief fisheries analyst at OceanMind, a non-profit, said technology can help even rich countries, which might otherwise struggle to process the volume of data broadcast by hundreds of thousands of vessels.

    Organisations such as his crunch that data and help to differentiate between normal and suspicious activity.

    The bulk of the threat is non-compliance by mainly legal operators who skirt the rules when they think no one’s looking,” said Soule, who helps Costa Rica monitor its waters.
    […]
    Dirk Zeller, who heads the Sea Around Us - Indian Ocean project at the University of Western Australia, said as the ocean’s bounty is a public resource, the world should know who is taking what.

    Part of the problem, he said, is overcapacity in the global fishing fleet.

    But he also points to difficulties in calculating IUU’s scale: the FAO’s estimates of fish stocks, for instance, are based on official government data, which are open to under- and over-reporting.

    His research shows global catches from 1950 to 2010 were 50 percent higher than countries had said.
    […]
    The FAO’s senior fishery officer, Matthew Camilleri, agrees technology is no silver bullet.

    “What use is it if you’re able to detect IUU fishing and find the vessel with illegal fish on board, but you do not have the process in place to enforce, to prosecute?” he said.

    Progress is underway towards that in the form of the FAO’s 2009 Port State Measures Agreement, which is aimed at curbing IUU fishing. Close to half of the 194 U.N. member states have signed it, including four of the top five fishing nations - Indonesia, the United States, Russia and Japan.

    China, though, has not. It is the world’s largest fishing nation, whose 2014 catch of 14.8 million tons, the FAO’s 2016 State of the World’s Fisheries report showed, was as much as the next three nations combined.

    When asked whether it was likely to sign, China’s mission to the FAO in Rome told the Thomson Reuters Foundation it was not authorized to comment.

    Tony Long from GFW - which runs a free-to-access platform that uses Automatic Identification System (AIS) data to track the global movement of vessels - said combining technology with cooperation between countries could close the loopholes.

  • Losing the Serengeti: The Maasai Land that was to Run Forever | The Oakland Institute
    https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/tanzania-safari-businesses-maasai-losing-serengeti

    Losing the Serengeti: The Maasai Land that was to Run Forever is based on field research, never publicly-seen-before documents, and an in-depth investigation into Tanzania’s land laws. This report is the first to reveal the complicity between Tanzanian government officials and foreign companies as they use conservation laws to dispossess the Maasai, driving them into smaller and smaller areas and creating a stifling map of confinement.

    The report specifically exposes the devastating impact of two foreign companies on the lives and livelihoods of the Maasai villagers in the Loliondo area of the Ngorongoro District—Tanzania Conservation Ltd (TCL), a safari business operated by the owners of Boston-based high-end safari outfitter Thomson Safaris; and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Ortello Business Corporation (OBC), which runs hunting excursions for the country’s royal family and their guests.

    According to local villagers, TCL has made their lives impossible by denying them access to water and land and cooperating with local police who have beaten and arrested the Maasai. Meanwhile, for 25 years, the OBC had an exclusive hunting license, during which time there were several violent evictions of the Maasai, many homes were burnt, and thousands of rare animals were killed. Although Tanzania’s Ministry of Natural Resources cancelled OBC’s license last year, the OBC remains active in the area, while the local villagers live in fear.

    #Serengeti #Maasaï #Tanzanie #évictions_forcées #terres #plaisirs_du_prince #safari #chasse

  • La mécanique de marche humaine a évolué avant le genre Homo [apparu entre 200 000 et 300 000 ans] il y a 3.6 millions d’années.
    23 avril 2018

    Human-like walking mechanics evolved before the genus Homo: Ancient footprints help researchers date the switch from a crouched to more straight-legged gait.

    Le résumé : https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/04/180423085443.htm
    L’article original est paru dans “Experimental Biology 2018”.

    Walking upright with the legs fully extended uses less energy than bipedal walking in a more ape-like crouched manner, allowing one to endure longer journeys. This suggests that the switch to a more human-like gait likely had something to do with how our ancestors found food — and how far they had to travel to find it.

    The data suggest that by this time in our evolutionary history, selection for reduced energy expenditures during walking was strong," said Raichlen. "This work suggests that, by 3.6 million years ago, climate and habitat changes likely led to the need for ancestral hominins to walk longer distances during their daily foraging bouts. Selection may have acted at this time to improve energy economy during locomotion, generating the human-like mechanics we employ today.


    Footprints from (A) a modern human walking normally, (B) a modern human walking with a stooped posture known as the “bent knees, bent hip,” or BKBH, posture, and (C) 3.6 million-year-old hominin footprints found in Laetoli, Tanzania. The team’s analysis suggests ancient hominins probably walked in a way that is very similar to modern humans.

    #Préhistoire #mutation #évolution #David_Raichlen #Université_de_l'_Arizona

  • Tanzania introduces $930 fee for bloggers, surveillance cameras in internet cafes - CNN
    https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/12/africa/tanzania-blogging-internet-freedoms-africa/index.html

    As part of sweeping new internet regulations, the Tanzanian government has introduced a $930 fee for those wanting to have an online blog, giving the authorities unprecedented control over the internet.

    The government now requires all bloggers to pay the annual fee and register before they begin publishing material.

    The state-run Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) said in a statement bloggers and content providers have until May 5 to complete the application process.

    It’s not just bloggers affected by the provisions, but online radio stations, online streaming platforms, online forums, social media users and internet cafes.

    Bloggers are asked to provide a lengthy list of details, including share capital, tax certificates, estimated investments and other information to secure accreditation.

    The legislation, officially known as the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations 2018, also sets out a series of prohibited content, including “content that causes annoyance... or leads to public disorder.

    Additionally, internet cafes are required to install surveillance cameras.

    Breaking these stipulations permits the regulatory authorities to revoke licenses.

    Local newspapers have reported that the government has introduced the regulations to curb “moral decadence.”

  • #Tanzania, Black Power, and the uncertain future of Pan-Africanism
    http://africasacountry.com/2018/03/tanzania-black-power-and-the-uncertain-future-of-pan-africanism

    Between 1964 to 1974, the East African nation of Tanzania was seen by peoples across Africa and in the diaspora as a nation deeply committed to African liberation and in solidarity with black people worldwide. As a result, many hundreds of African American and Caribbean nationalists, leftists, and Pan Africanists visited or settled in Tanzania to witness and…

    #CULTURE

  • First black rhinos protected by sensor-implants in horns - Shadowview Foundation
    https://shadowview.org/news/first-black-rhinos-protected-sensor-implants-horns

    The Internet of Life and the ShadowView Foundation have successfully implanted LoRaWAN™ -equipped sensors directly into the horns of critically endangered black rhinos. The sensors give park rangers the ability to accurately monitor the whereabouts and activities of the large mammals and keep them safe from poachers.

    The operation took place in Tanzania and is part of a LoRaWAN™ IoT Smart Parks solution that is rolled out in several National Parks throughout Africa. The rhino-trackers show the location of the animals within the sanctuary, providing the park’s security personnel with better actionable intelligence. The deployment in Tanzania was supported by Semtech and Kerlink.

    #rhino #braconnage #surveillance

    https://news.mongabay.com/wildtech/2017/10/black-rhinos-in-tanzania-now-monitored-via-sensors-implanted-directly

  • The New Heart of Darkness
    http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1979/7/13/the-new-heart-of-darkness-pbabccording

    North of South by Shiva Naipaul Simon and Schuster, $10.95
    By Judith E. Matloff, July 13, 1979

    ACCORDING TO SHIVA and V.S. Naipaul, Mistah Kurtz—he ain’t dead. His capacity for barbarism is alive in African dictators who act like capricious children in fatigues, and in Australian tourists who visit Africa to prove racism is justified because the natives are so in competent.

    The two Trinidadian writes are brothers, which partly explains why their recent books on Africa both argue that the heart of darkness has relocated to a new bend in the river, just north of South Africa. They have not left Conrad far behind in their assertion that Africa is a dark and irrational continent.

    The books differ stupendously in their quality, but that’s thoroughly explainable. V.S. Naipaul, who is the superior writer, has more experience. He has produced 15 books since 1952, but his diversity in style is more remarkable than his productivity. V.S. Naipaul has mastered social satire, essays on development, historical accounts and pessimistic novels about racial conflict and independence in the Third world. Although writing about disparate societies, Naipaul displays an astute sociological ability to muster and link problems common to all former colonies.

    A Bend in the River is in the same genre as Naipaul’s later novels-those set in tropical areas where a blacked majority has recently seized power. A Bend takes place in the interior of a guerilla-ridden African nation. It is stifling hot, and the wet bush seems to reinforce the violence lurking in men’s souls. An Amin-like dictator rules the nation, periodically purging his national youth guard and murdering potential rebels.

    Ferdinand, one of the “young black men of Africa who rise from the bottom to the top with nothing, because he is young and a black and African” fears he will not survive the president’s arbitrary purges. A well-meaning missionary is beheaded by the very people he is trying to educate. And the protagionist’s store is seized because he is an East Asian and thus a “traitor.”

    Salim, the protagionist, is an archetypal Naipaul character—East Indian, sallow, passive and alienated. Salim’s lethargy reflects his anxiety about the ultimate, senseless violence. As the president’s forces creep deeper into the interior, Salim becomes more desperate. He tries twice to rouse himself, via an affair and a flight to London where illusions of a Western civilized arcadia lie. But neither succeeds as a safety-value. Salim renounces all hope and returns to Africa, only to find that the violent abyss has widened.

    A Bend is yet another of V.S. Naipaul’s impeccably crafted books. He maintains a level of tension that becomes almost intolerable; the reader can feel the vines and the president’s guard coming too close to his house. This is writing that makes one want to open a window or turn on a fan. Or keep a gun by the bedside.

    The author’s capacity for developing his characters’ humanity forces the reader to empathize with all of them—the wealthy white Europeans, black African cab drivers or Asian shopkeepers. His humanity does not extend, however, to his women characters—nymphomaniacs on whom he vindictively inflicts sexual abuse and mutilation.

    Another weakness is Naipaul’s pessismism about Africa’s future. He fells ruination and debauched immorality will scar Africa’s future as they have scarred its past. Naipaul consistently uses examples from unstable areas like Zaire and Jamaica and ignores relatively stable ones like Tanzania and Kenya.

    But because he is from a developing nation himself, V.S. Naipaul has a perspective a Westerner cannot glean. Naipaul’s perspective as an East Indian in a black nation sets him apart from other Third World writers. This gives him a curiously advantageous literary position—he is both a participant and observer in his society.

    IT MUST BE hard to follow in the footsteps of a famous and brilliant older brother. Unfortunately, Shiva Naipaul cannot compete with his brother’s polish or his sensitivity. Both are missing from North of South. The book is a montage of conversations held or overheard by the author during a six-month visit to Kenya, Zambia and Tanzania. For Shiva Africa is a land of hypocrisy, deceit and irony. Some of his examples are apt: an African student loves books but hates to read; young boys selling peanuts are condemned as capitalists in Tanzania; religious Hindus devour beef sandwiches; a white tourist asks her companion, “In Burundi do the tall ones kill the short ones or do the short ones kill the tall ones?”

    But Shiva’s persistent sardonic tone undermines his anecdotes’ effectiveness. The reader tires quickly of his smug arrogance, and yearns for some affirmative statement about Africa. Everyone on the “dark continent” seems to be a caricature—all racist and drugged white tourists, or insufferably dogmatic bureaucrats.

    The work has two other major flaws. First, Shiva presents no connecting analysis to link his anecdotes. This approach aggravates the reader’s impatience with Naipaul’s tone—as he becomes increasingly weary from traveling overland, so the reader becomes more tired of nasty asides.

    Second, Shiva’s theoretical point that “the African soul is a blank slate in which anything can be written” is offensive. For Shiva, Pan-Africanism, Tanzania’s self-reliance and the rebirth of Swahili mean nothing. He sees only Kenyans worshipping the West’s wealth and culture. And Shiva, like his brother, does not give enough credit to the governments and people of these nations who are struggling with the racial and class problems of a colonial past.

    Shiva Naipaul is most weak where his brother is strongest—the ability to empathize with all the people he writes about. He does not try to understand why a nouveau riche black Kenyan has two freezers (which she never uses), whisky at every meal, gold-painted nails, and an expropriated mansion too large for her needs. He simply finds her ludicrous and tasteless.

    Where V.S. Naipaul is a universalist, drawing parallels among the people he sees, Shiva Naipaul is a defensive separatist. This sense of separation stems in part from the nature of a travelogue, which forces him to keep a distance from his subjects. For hi, sanity only exists in the industrialized West—i.e., England. The nightmare only begins when one boards the flight to Africa.

    Both Naipaul brothers see Africa through Conrad’s eyes—as a ruined land where logic is an anomaly and men become corrupted. But for V.S. Naipaul, the entire world is a senseless, despondent morass. For Shiva, civilization and Mistah Kurtz are only dead in Africa.

    #littérature #afrique #congo

  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network
    http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/hrsl

    The High Resolution Settlement Layer (HRSL) provides estimates of human population distribution at a resolution of 1 arc-second (approximately 30m) for the year 2015. The population estimates are based on recent census data and high-resolution (0.5m) satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe. The population grids provide detailed delineation of settlements in both urban and rural areas, which is useful for many research areas—from disaster response and humanitarian planning to the development of communications infrastructure. The settlement extent data were developed by the Connectivity Lab at Facebook using computer vision techniques to classify blocks of optical satellite data as settled (containing buildings) or not. CIESIN used proportional allocation to distribute population data from subnational census data to the settlement extents. The population data have been developed for 18 countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ghana, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, and Uganda. Read more about the project here.

    ici une image de Cape Town :

    #population #urban_matter #datasource #cartographie

  • FACTBOX-Why are large land deals in Africa under scrutiny?
    http://news.trust.org/item/20171128120956-jd5kf/?cid=social_20171128_74859427&adbid=935520496996687872&adbpl=tw&adbpr=15

    Here are some facts about large land deals in Africa:

    More than 117 large-scale land deals totalling about 22 million hectares, an area the size of the U.S. state of Utah, have been recorded in 21 African countries in the last 12 years.

    The land areas range from 1,000 hectares to 10 million hectares.

    East Africa accounts for 45 percent of these deals, with Ethiopia making up about 27 percent of all deals.

    About 45 percent of investors are Western and North American companies; Asian firms make up 26 percent of investors.

    Lease prices range from $1-$13.80 per hectare per year.

    Lands are primarily used for food crops, industrial crops including biofuels, and for carbon sinks and carbon trading.

    * Following conflicts, Tanzania has announced ceilings on the size of land deals – up to 5,000 hectares for rice and 10,000 hectares for sugarcane.

    Sources: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the Oakland Institute, GRAIN.

    http://news.trust.org/item/20171128120855-guttc
    #terres #Afrique

  • Burundian Refugees Face a Difficult Choice: Stay in Overburdened Camps or Return to Uncertainty · Global Voices
    https://globalvoices.org/2017/10/10/burundian-refugees-face-a-difficult-choice-stay-in-overburdened-camps-

    On 7 September a convoy of 301 refugees from Nduta camp in Tanzania drove back into Burundi, with more Burundians following days after. Overall, 12,000 are registered to voluntarily return this year. While not the first returnees, the number is large; and their journey back is organized by Burundi and Tanzania’s governments and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

    However, the crisis, sparked by 2015 election turmoil, that led so many Burundians to flee is far from resolved. While some refugees, impatient with waiting to return, held sit-ins in Tanzania to demand the process be sped up, many others fear going back.

    #réfugiés #burundi

  • PIATA : A New Way of Doing Business - The Rockefeller Foundation
    https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/piata-new-way-business

    #Piata, le nouveau partenariat qui veut transformer l’agriculture africaine #Rockfeller, #Fondation_Gates et #Usaid... #agra étant déjà un partenariat impliquant Rockfeller et Gates

    Last week at this year’s African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF), the Rockefeller Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the Alliance for Africa’s Green Revolution (AGRA) launched a new $280 million Partnership for Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in Africa (PIATA).

    PIATA is a five year partnership that will spur an inclusive agricultural transformation for at least 11 countries in Africa, to increase incomes and improve the food security of 30 million smallholder farm households. Countries include Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique.

    Agriculture in Africa is the continent’s heartbeat—its most important sector, and its ticket out of poverty. With rising public investments in agriculture, increasing yields and better prospects for farmers, the past decade has yielded significant progress.

    #agriculture #business #agro-industrie

  • #Drone System From Zipline To Launch In #Tanzania, Delivering Medical Supplies : Goats and Soda : NPR
    http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/08/24/545589328/tanzania-gears-up-to-become-a-nation-of-medical-drones


    A Zipline drone is launched in Rwanda. The company is now expanding to set up a national network in Tanzania.
    Courtesy of Zipline

    Rinaudo was visiting a scientist at Ifakara Health Institute who had created the database to track nationwide medical emergencies. Using cell phones, health workers would send a text message whenever a patient needed blood or other critical supplies. Trouble is, while the system collected real-time information about dying patients, the east African country’s rough terrain and poor supply chain often kept them from getting timely help. “We were essentially looking at a database of death,” Rinaudo says.
    […]
    Today the story comes full circle as Tanzania’s government makes a special announcement: In early 2018 the nation will start using Zipline drones for on-demand delivery of blood, vaccines, medications and other supplies such as sutures and IV tubes.

    Last fall, Zipline deployed 15 drones serving 21 clinics from a single base in a smaller neighboring country, Rwanda. The delivery operation planned for Tanzania would be the world’s largest — 120 drones at four bases serving more than 10 million people at 1,000 clinics across the country. Zipline’s 30-pound electric drones fly 68 mph to health centers up to 50 miles away. The drone service costs about the same amount as delivery using traditional road vehicles, says Rinaudo, a Harvard graduate who built DNA computers inside human cells and constructed a rock-climbing wall in a dorm basement before setting his focus on drones.

    • Il y a quelques années j’étais allé au Kenya pour travailler sur le problème de pénurie de médicaments (palu) dans les cliniques. Outre le transport (pas facile vu le réseau), le principal problème logistique était d’avoir des informations fiables et récentes sur l’état des stocks. Ils essayaient de régler ça avec des rapports hebdomadaires par SMS.

  • M-Pesa, MTN, Orange, others lead Africa’s mobile money revolution — Quartz
    https://qz.com/1039896/m-pesa-mtn-orange-others-lead-africas-mobile-money-revolution
    https://qzprod.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/h_50814711-e1501169334527.jpg?quality=80&strip=all&w=1600

    Mobile money accounts in sub-Saharan Africa have surpassed bank accounts, says a report from global trade body GSMA.

    (…) Analysts believe there is still plenty more ground to break by mobile money’s impact in Africa. Only 17% of the viable mobile money rural market has been tapped says GSMA, Tanzania for instance still has up to 92% of its people especially in rural areas still unbanked.

    #mpesa #kenya #banques #mobile

  • My favorite images: Magee McIlvaine
    http://africasacountry.com/2017/07/my-favorite-images-magee-mcilvaine

    My photographic work is and always has been deeply personal to me. The majority of my childhood was spent in Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. I grew to be comfortable with being marked as different, whether in Lusaka or in Washington D.C., and found hip hop as a point of common ground, as a way…