• Haïti - Social : 17,271 passages frontaliers entre Haïti et la RD ont été enregistrés en 8 jours - HaitiLibre.com : Toutes les nouvelles d’Haiti 7/7
    #Covid19#Haiti#frontiere#migrant#migration#RepubliqueDominicaine

    https://www.haitilibre.com/article-30838-haiti-social-17-271-passages-frontaliers-entre-haiti-et-la

    Haïti - Social : 17,271 passages frontaliers entre Haïti et la RD ont été enregistrés en 8 jours
    L’Organisation internationale pour les Migrations (OIM) rapporte 17,271 passages frontaliers entre Haïti et la République dominicaine dans 50 points de passage (4 officiels et 46 non officiels) entre le 26 avril et le 3 mai. Parmi ceux-ci, 11,310 personnes provenaient de la République Dominicaine.

  • La Chine aide la RDC à lutter contre le coronavirus - BBC News Afrique
    https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-52642556

    Ces experts chinois sont arrivés à Kinshasa ce Mardi pour aider la République Démocratique du Congo dans la lutte contre la Covid-19.
    L’équipe constituée de douze experts chinois va travailler avec son homologue congolais de riposte contre la Covid-19. Elle va apporter son expérience dans la prévention et la prise en charge des malades.
    La Chine étant le pays de départ du coronavirus devenu une pandémie mondiale a décidé de soutenir le pays de Tshisekedi. Raymond Tchedya, vice-ministre congolais des affaires étrangères, qui les a accueillis à l’aéroport a estimé que « c’est dans les difficultés qu’on reconnait ses vrais amis ». Ces experts ont apporté un don du gouvernement chinois de 4 tonnes de matériel de santé anti Covid-19.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#Chine#RépubliqueDémocratiqueCongo#expert#matériel-médical#riposte

  • Ouverture des écoles le 11 mai… – Citoyenne Enseignante
    https://maitresserepublique.wordpress.com/2020/04/27/ouverture-des-ecoles-le-11-mai
    https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/e2e8ed6aabcfc03464cb7adb99981049?s=200&ts=1588153296

    Nos missions seront donc sanitaires et sociales. Moi qui pensais être « vecteur de transmission de savoirs ».
    Mais depuis quand se préoccupe-t-on du côté sanitaire des établissements scolaires qui collectionnent les toilettes vétustes, les savons invisibles, les essuie-mains collectifs en éponge ?
    Depuis quand se préoccupe-t-on du social alors qu’on a noyé les élèves et leurs familles avec une école à distance et du travail à réaliser en laissant sur le bas-côté du chemin de l’instruction les enfants des familles qui ne maîtrisent pas les codes, qui n’ont pas d’équipement informatique, qui souffrent financièrement et psychologiquement du confinement, qui travaillent pour nous soigner, nous accompagner, nous nourrir, ramasser nos ordures…

    • /me souvenirs de la maitresse de maternelle qui a refusé catégoriquement que ma fille se brosse les dents après la cantine :
      – « il n’en est pas question, vous imaginez le problème si tous les enfants se mettent à vouloir se brosser les dents »
      Ah oui, ça lui aurait peut-être juste éviter de multiples visites chez le dentiste une fois ado …

      #école_française #scolarisation #république_mon_cul

  • CERREMEN appelle les États haïtien et dominicain à une gestion responsable du flux migratoire pour éviter l’augmentation des cas en Haïti | Rezo Nòdwès
    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#Haiti#RepubliqueDominicaine#diffusion

    https://rezonodwes.com/2020/04/21/cerremen-appelle-les-etats-haitien-et-dominicain-a-une-gestion-responsab

    Covid-19 : 3252 migrant-e-s reviennent de la République Dominicaine au cours du mois d’avril, le CERREMEN appelle les États haïtien et dominicain à une gestion responsable du flux migratoire en toute dignité pour éviter l’augmentation des cas en Haïti

  • Info Park Weekly 8– 14 April 2020

    Flashback

    Serbia
    ➢ In the reporting period, Info Park identified 109 new arrivals to Belgrade - mostly from Afghanistan, followed by Pakistan and Syria. The number shows that COVID- 19 pandemic and the imposed state of emergency did not prevent migrants from coming to Serbia. Given no local or national public transport, the new arrivals completely depend on smugglers’ networks. This was proven by the arrest in Vranje of a local with 9 migrants he transported. In the reporting period, 90 of the newly arrived benefited from Info Park services and a provision of a warm meal during waiting time for transportation to camps. All of them were temporarily accommodated overnight in OSP Miksalište, expecting adequate referral, mainly to a new makeshift camp in Miratovac for 28 days long quarantine, or to a newly open tent camp in the village of Morović (Vojvodina, near the border with Croatia) originally planned to quarantine the locals, with dubious hygienic standards. Given that the overcrowding remained the main issue with nearly 9,000 residents in the camps originally built for 6,000, it was not surprising that Miratovac RC got filled up with 280 migrants in mere 24 hours upon opening.
    ➢ Serbia registers a constant rise of confirmed COVID-19 cases (tested: 20,958; confirmed cases: 4,054; deaths: 85) making refugees and all other migrants even more concerned about their safety. Dr. Predrag Kon, lead Serbian epidemiologist, said that Roma and migrant population are at higher risk from COVID-19 since they are accommodated in collective centers often lacking adequate conditions for successful prevention. So far, there are no infected among these communities. However, it is encouraging that medical workers continued testing migrants, treating them as equal as Serbian nationals.
    ➢ Situation in some of the Serbia’s biggest reception and asylum centers did not get any calmer in the past week. On contrary, a further rise of tensions has continued in Krnjača AC, peaking with a riot police intervention on Saturday 12 April which was carried out with an aim to detain the perpetrators of Monday 7 incident we already reported in Weekly 012. Unfortunately, as reported by various witnesses, the police used excessive force including tear gas in an inappropriate manner so unnecessary stress was put on vulnerable population, including children. Two buses of “troublemakers” were sent to newly open camp Morović. It seems that a relation of trust between beneficiaries and authorities is currently on an extremely low level; most of the refugees and migrants in Krnjača AC complain that MoI special units sadly continued intimidating beneficiaries with loud night visits of riot police or helicopters flying low above the camp.
    ➢ After a long break, the first serious pushback from Serbia was reported on the border with North Macedonia. A group of migrants from Tutin AC (from Algeria, Morocco and Iran) was told by the camp authorities they will be transported to Preševo RC, south of Serbia; instead they were pushed 350km away to a North Macedonia territory near Lojane village. This was a regular practice before 2018, especially with mischiefs from Preševo camp. Lojane village is a long-term smuggling hub and organize crime stronghold.
    Hungary
    ➢ A number of intercepted attempts to cross the Serbo-Hungarian border remained
    low, with 48 attempts for 7 days, ranging between 1 and 11 per day.
    Info Park
    ➢ Info Park remained its daily presence in Belgrade Savamala area and continued the outreach operations in Pirot and Bujanovac camps with 4 information sharing workshops last week. We are happy to report a reasonably peaceful atmosphere in these camps where almost none of the gaps and issues typical for big camps are noticeable thanks to significant efforts of the SCRM staff and proactive approach of the clients.
    Last week, Info Park organized the 7th coordination meeting online, with the participation of representatives from Atina, Praxis, CYI and CRPC. The main topics included current state of emergency and Covid-19 crisis response. None of them have plans of coming back to the field work in the coming weeks, at least not before May.
    Greece
    ➢ The emergency suspension of asylum applications between 1 and 31 March has ended and got replaced by general suspension of activities of the Greek Asylum Service until at the end of April. Meanwhile, Malakasa camp, north of Athens has been quarantined due to a confirmed corona virus case. This is the second Greek camp which had to be closed over the pandemic.
    Europe
    ➢ Nine European member states (Germany, France, Portugal, Finland, Lithuania, Croatia, Ireland, Belgium and Bulgaria) pledged in early 2020 to accept a total of 1,600 unaccompanied children to be relocated from camps on the Greek islands. Germany is the first to fulfil the promise. According to DW, German officials have expressed regret over the lackluster response from other eight EU states on resettling unaccompanied boys and girls. Two non-EU countries, Switzerland and Serbia, also pledged to do the same, but with no follow up so far. Serbian authorities agreed to relocate 100 unaccompanied children from Greece.

    Info Park Weekly 08-14 April 2020 5

    #Covid-19 #Migration #Migrant #Balkans #Grèce #Serbie #RépubliquedeMacédoine #Refoulement #Frontières #Camps #Transfert ##Belgrade #Miksaliste #Morovic #Croatie
    #Miratovac #Presevo #Krnjaca #Encampement #Tutin #Lojane #Pirot #Bujanovac #Malakasa #Suspensionasile #Allemagne, #France, #Portugal, #Finlande,#Lituanie, #Croatie #Irlande, #Belgique and #Bulgarie #Révolte

  • Balkan Countries Close Border Crossings to Stop Coronavirus

    https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/13/balkan-countries-close-border-crossings-to-stop-coronavirus

    To slow the spread of the coronavirus, several Balkan countries have closed most of their border crossings with neighbouring states, making travel in some parts of the region practically impossible.

    Serbia, Albania and Romania have closed many of their border crossings in order to combat the spread of the coronavirus, leaving some parts of the Balkans practically cut off for civil traffic.

    All countries of the region have either banned entry or introduced special restrictive measures for passengers arriving from countries with mid to high to risk of coronavirus.

    Serbia has closed 44 border crossings with neighbouring Romania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia, so that its border police can focus on the main and most frequently used crossings. Crossings have been closed mainly to increase staff numbers on the main crossings that remain open. Most closed borders are road border crossings but river, railway and ferry transport is also affected.

    Romania has closed several crossing points that connect the country by land with its neighbours. The closures affect crossings to Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Moldova, the Interior Minister, Marcel Vela, announced on Thursday night. He also said the Serbian authorities had unilaterally closed several crossing points, presumably without informing Romania first. The crossings at the Iron Gates, Moravita and Jimbolia remain open on the border with Serbia, Vela added.

    Albania has unilaterally closed several border crossings with neighbouring Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia.

    North Macedonia has not closed any borders so far, but, as a result of the unilateral moves made by its neighbours, two crossings with Serbia and three with Albania are closed. Traffic with Serbia continues only through the main Tabanovce crossing.

    Bosnia and Herzegovina has not closed any of its borders, though passenger control measures have been strengthened and a temporary entry ban has been imposed on arrivals from the countries worst affected by the coronavirus pandemic.

    Croatia has also not closed its borders, even with Italy, the worst affected country in Europe. A government session on Friday was expected to clarify whether the crossings will remain open or not.

    In Montenegro, the border crossing with Albania at Sukobin-Muricani was closed on Friday morning on the request of Albania. Border crossings with Serbia in Jabuka near Pljevlja and at Godovo near Rozaje were closed on Thursday at the request of Serbia.

    Moldova has not closed border crossings, but its neighbours, Ukraine and Romania, have closed some crossings, making travel there harder. Bulgaria also has not closed any border crossings, except those closed from the Serbian side.

    #Covid-19 #migrant #migration #Balkans #Serbie #Albanie #Roumanie #Bulgarie #RépubliquedeMacédoine #Monténégro #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Kosovo #Croatie #Frontière

  • Varsovie, Budapest et Prague ont manqué à leurs obligations sur l’accueil des réfugiés, décide la justice européenne

    Fin 2017, la Commission européenne avait saisi la #CJUE, car les trois pays avaient refusé leurs #quotas d’#accueil de réfugiés décidés dans le cadre du programme de #répartition par Etat membre de dizaines de milliers de demandeurs d’asile lancé en 2015 et qui a pris fin en septembre 2017.

    C’est un #arrêt essentiellement symbolique. La justice européenne a considéré jeudi 2 avril que la #Pologne, la #Hongrie et la #République_tchèque n’ont pas respecté le droit de l’Union européenne en refusant d’accueillir en 2015, au plus fort des arrivées de migrants, des demandeurs d’asile relocalisés depuis l’Italie ou la Grèce.

    Dans son arrêt, la Cour de justice de l’UE (CJUE) considère que les trois pays ont « manqué à leurs obligations » en ne respectant pas la décision prise collectivement par l’UE d’accueillir un #quota de réfugiés par Etat membre.

    La Cour estime que les trois capitales « ne peuvent invoquer ni leurs responsabilités en matière de maintien de l’ordre public et de sauvegarde de la sécurité intérieure, ni le prétendu dysfonctionnement du mécanisme de relocalisation, pour se soustraire à la mise en œuvre de ce mécanisme ».

    Fin 2017, la Commission européenne avait saisi la CJUE, constatant que les trois pays avaient refusé leurs quotas d’accueil de réfugiés décidés dans le cadre du programme de répartition par Etat membre de dizaines de milliers de demandeurs d’asile depuis l’#Italie et la #Grèce, lancé en 2015 et qui a pris fin en septembre 2017.

    Décision « sans conséquence » pour la Hongrie

    Cela rend impossible l’idée de forcer désormais ces pays à accueillir des migrants. « Cette décision n’aura aucune conséquence. La politique de quotas étant depuis longtemps caduque, nous n’avons aucune obligation de prendre des demandeurs d’asile », a réagi la ministre de la justice hongroise, Judit Varga. « Nous avons perdu le différend, mais ce n’est pas important. Ce qui est important, c’est que nous n’avons rien à payer », a abondé le premier ministre tchèque, Andrej Babis. « Le fait est que nous n’accepterons aucun migrant car les quotas ont expiré entre-temps ». La Commission peut désormais seulement demander des amendes contre les trois pays.

    La Cour a repoussé l’argument selon lequel le recours de la Commission n’était pas valable étant donné que, le programme ayant expiré, les trois pays ne pouvaient plus s’y conformer, estimant qu’il suffisait à la Commission de constater le manquement allégué.

    La Pologne et la Hongrie n’ont accueilli aucun réfugié, la République tchèque se contentant d’en recevoir une douzaine avant de se désengager du programme. Varsovie et Budapest estimaient avoir le droit de se soustraire à leurs #obligations en vertu de leur #responsabilité de « #maintien_de_l’ordre_public » et de la « #sauvegarde_de_la_sécurité_intérieure ». Or, pour que l’argument soit recevable, les deux pays auraient dû « pouvoir prouver la nécessité de recourir à (cette) #dérogation ».

    Pour cela, les « autorités devaient s’appuyer, au terme d’un examen au cas par cas, sur des éléments concordants, objectifs et précis, permettant de soupçonner que le demandeur en cause représente un danger actuel ou potentiel ». La Cour a jugé que la décision prise par Varsovie et Budapest avait un caractère « général », et ne se prévalait d’aucun « rapport direct avec un cas individuel ».

    De son côté, Prague a avancé que le dispositif n’était pas efficace pour justifier de ne pas l’appliquer. Une « appréciation unilatérale » qui ne peut servir d’argument pour ne pas appliquer une décision de l’UE, a souligné la Cour.

    Le #plan_de_relocalisation découlait de deux décisions successives du Conseil européen, qui concernaient potentiellement jusqu’à 40 000 et 120 000 demandeurs de protection internationale. Au total, 12 706 personnes ont été relocalisées d’Italie et 21 199 de Grèce vers les autres Etats membres, soit « quasiment toutes les personnes qui rentraient dans les critères ».

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/04/02/varsovie-budapest-et-prague-ont-manque-a-leurs-obligations-sur-l-accueil-des

    #relocalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #justice #hotspots

  • – Le médecin : "L’hôpital public est en train de flamber à la même vitesse que Notre-Dame a failli flamber, ça s’est joué à rien et, là, en ce moment, ça se joue à rien...
    – Macron : « Je compte sur vous... »
    – Le médecin : « vous pouvez compter sur moi, l’inverse reste à prouver... »

    «  On est à bout, reprenez la main car vous n’êtes pas là !
    Refinancez en urgence l’ #hopitalpublic, donnez nous les moyens de soigner !
     »

    Bravo à ce médecin de l’ hôpital de la #PitiéSalpetrière qui dit ses 4 vérités à Emmanuel Macron.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfKmYcDQF7k


    De moins en moins flamboyant, Jupiter, dans ses confrontations avec la résistance…

    Qui lui a happé intelligemment la main, l’empêchant du coup de filer. Et a eu le temps de lui dire ce que tout le monde (même non toubib, juste patient) sait.
    #coronavirus
    https://www.franceinter.fr/politique/le-medecin-qui-a-interpelle-macron-il-fallait-qu-il-recoive-le-message-d

    Jeudi matin le médecin François Salachas a interpellé, avec des mots forts, le président de la République sur la crise de l’hôpital public. Il s’en explique : « Si on veut sauver l’hôpital public, ce qui est notre bien commun national, auquel les Français sont attachés, il y a un caractère d’urgence ».

  • #ONU, le #scandale des #abus_sexuels

    De la Centrafrique à New York, une investigation sur les abus sexuels commis par les collaborateurs de l’ONU et l’impuissance de l’organisation à les combattre.

    « Tout ceci est hautement immoral et en totale contradiction avec notre mission. » En 2004, l’ONU et son secrétaire général, Kofi Annan, affrontaient un vaste scandale d’abus sexuels commis par des militaires et des employés de l’organisation en République démocratique du Congo. Dans la foulée, le conseiller Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein présentait ses préconisations pour éradiquer le fléau et l’impunité qui l’accompagne : mise en place de cours martiales dans les pays où des casques bleus sont déployés et adoption d’une convention internationale permettant à l’ONU d’engager des poursuites pénales contre son personnel civil. Près de quinze ans plus tard, alors que les États membres s’opposent toujours au morcellement de leur compétence juridictionnelle, l’exploitation et les violences sexuelles perdurent sur les terrains d’opération, comme en Centrafrique. Malgré les mesures déployées (création d’un poste de défenseur des droits des victimes, couvre-feux pour éviter les contacts entre la population locale et les employés des Nations unies en dehors des heures de service, travail de sensibilisation et d’éducation…) et la tolérance zéro prônée par l’actuel secrétaire général, António Guterres, près de cinquante nouvelles plaintes ont été enregistrées l’année dernière.

    Victimes oubliées
    Cette enquête recueille la parole de victimes oubliées – non signalées ou abandonnées par l’organisation –, les tentatives d’explication de responsables onusiens et le témoignage effarant du Français Didier Bourguet, seul civil condamné à ce jour, pour deux viols sur mineures, alors qu’il reconnaît avoir eu des rapports sexuels avec au moins une vingtaine d’enfants. Elle pointe ainsi l’intolérable impunité qui prédomine dans la grande majorité des cas.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/074593-000-A/onu-le-scandale-des-abus-sexuels
    #viols #impunité #pédophilie #pédocriminalité #documentaire #film_documentaire #casques_bleus #RDC #MINUSCA #Didier_Bourguet #plaintes #justice #faille_juridique #République_Centrafricaine #Centrafrique #abus_sexuels #code_blue #viols_sur_mineurs #Régiment_des_Diables_Rouges #casques_bleus_français #Innocence_en_danger (ONG) #tolérance_zéro #Fondation_Femme_Plus #grossesse #MONUSCO

    • Code Blue

      The Code Blue Campaign works to end impunity for sexual abuse by un personnel.


      The UN has a longstanding crisis caused, first, by UN personnel who commit sexual offenses against members of the populations they’re intended to serve and against other UN personnel and, second, by the institution’s response—the policies, procedures, and practices that create and sustain an institutional culture of impunity.

      We have identified three root causes of the UN’s culture of impunity:

      The institution has taken the liberty to manage its crisis internally.

      UN senior managers responsible for responding to and deliberating on individual cases are all rendered non-neutral by the conflicts of interest inherent in their positions: each is simultaneously called upon to represent and defend the best interests of the UN, the rights of the Organization’s accused employees and witnesses, and the rights of claimants.

      UN immunity makes the Organization’s “words and deeds” uniquely impervious to oversight or audit, shielding its functions and functionaries from external scrutiny and effectively negating the freedom of information that is a cornerstone of due process and a necessary precondition to equal justice for all.

      The Code Blue Campaign is concerned with overhauling several UN practices now in place that allow the UN Organization to dismiss and violate claimants’ fundamental rights to due process and neutral justice before the law:

      In addressing claims of “sexual exploitation and abuse” and “sexual harassment and assault” made against UN personnel, UN officials consistently misinterpret, misrepresent, and misapply UN immunity (an important legal protection intended to protect the multilateral work of the world body) to shield individual personnel from accountability and the Organization’s officials from reputational damage.

      The license to manage its sexual abuse crisis internally has evolved in tandem with the linear, largely unplanned growth of the UN system into a sprawling bureaucracy with many dozens of semi-autonomous “entities” that operate in relative isolation with barely monitored and rarely questioned authority accorded the heads.

      This combination of rapid de-centralization and unmonitored, quasi-independence and authority has in turn given rise within the various “entities” to dozens of inharmonious, non-coherent, and often conflicting policies, procedures, and practices for addressing sexual offense claims made against the personnel of those entities.

      The result is a non-system in which claimants and accused UN personnel associated with one entity of the UN Organization are subject to policies and procedures that may bear no resemblance to those followed by other entities of the same UN Organization. The only unifying factors across the system are the root causes of the UN’s culture of impunity for sexual offenses: the internal handling of all cases including those in which crimes beyond the UN’s “jurisdiction” are alleged; the misinterpretation and misapplication of UN immunity; and the inherent conflicts of interest underlying every case.

      The Code Blue Campaign has arrived at these conclusions through years of intense research. We have exposed several cases that illustrate the injustice, the incoherence, the innate and insurmountable conflicts of interest, and the long history of rights violations and abusive treatment by the UN Organization, primarily of victims but also of the accused. We argue that unjust UN policies and practices have, over decades, resulted in a culture of impunity for sexual “misconduct” ranging from breaches of UN rules to grave crimes. This represents a contravention of the UN Charter. Member States must intervene immediately. The General Assembly could end this crisis by divesting the UN Organization of any role in cases of “sexual misconduct,” and delegating the authority instead to an appropriate entity created, staffed by and reporting directly to the Member States, and entirely independent of the Organization.

      Member States have not yet come to the realization that the day of reckoning is approaching. If they do not take the initiative to fully recognize, understand, and solve a problem that has become an attention-getting Achilles heel, the UN’s sexual abuse crisis is likely to reach a pinnacle soon that could hobble the United Nations’ ability and authority to perform any of its functions. The UN could follow in the unenviable footsteps of another enormously powerful, largely secretive global institution whose former heights of moral authority are now universally queried: the Catholic Church.

      http://www.codebluecampaign.com

    • Taking action on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers: Report of an independent review on sexual exploitation and abuse by international peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic

      Executive Summary

      I. Introduction

      When peacekeepers exploit the vulnerability of the people they have been sent to protect, it is a fundamental betrayal of trust. When the international community fails to care for the victims or to hold the perpetrators to account, that betrayal is compounded.

      In the spring of 2014, allegations came to light that international troops serving in a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (“CAR”) had sexually abused a number of young children in exchange for food or money (the “Allegations”). The alleged perpetrators were largely from a French military force known as the Sangaris Forces, which were operating as peacekeepers under authorization of the Security Council but not under UN command.

      The manner in which UN agencies responded to the Allegations was seriously flawed. The head of the UN mission in CAR failed to take any action to follow up on the Allegations; he neither asked the Sangaris Forces to institute measures to end the abuses, nor directed that the children be removed to safe housing. He also failed to direct his staff to report the Allegations higher up within the UN. Meanwhile, both UNICEF and UN human rights staff in CAR failed to ensure that the children received adequate medical attention and humanitarian aid, or to take steps to protect other potential victims identified by the children who first raised the Allegations.

      Instead, information about the Allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the serious human rights violations. Indeed, even when the French government became aware of the Allegations and requested the cooperation of UN staff in its investigation, these requests were met with resistance and became bogged down in formalities. Staff became overly concerned with whether the Allegations had been improperly “leaked” to French authorities, and focused on protocols rather than action. The welfare of the victims and the accountability of the perpetrators appeared to be an afterthought, if considered at all. Overall, the response of the UN was fragmented and bureaucratic, and failed to satisfy the UN’s core mandate to address human rights violations.

      By examining these failures and recommending reforms to deter future incidents of sexual violence by peacekeepers, this Report provides an opportunity for the UN to chart a new course of action and to undertake meaningful organizational change. If the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy is to become a reality, the UN as a whole—including troop contributing countries (“TCCs”)—must recognize that sexual abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers is not a mere disciplinary matter, but a violation of the victims’ fundamental human rights, and in many cases a violation of international humanitarian and criminal law. Regardless of whether the peacekeepers were acting under direct UN command or not, victims must be made the priority.

      In particular, the UN must recognize that sexual violence by peacekeepers triggers its human rights mandate to protect victims, investigate, report and follow up on human rights violations, and to take measures to hold perpetrators accountable. In the absence of concrete action to address wrongdoing by the very persons sent to protect vulnerable populations, the credibility of the UN and the future of peacekeeping operations are in jeopardy.

      https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Independent-Review-Report.pdf

      #rapport

    • Innocence en danger. Mouvement mondial de protection des enfants contre toutes formes de #violences notamment sexuelles.

      Innocence en Danger (IED) est un mouvement mondial de protection des enfants contre toutes formes de violences notamment sexuelles, présent dans une dizaine de pays et partenaire d’associations internationales actives dans la lutte contre la pédocriminalité.

      Le Directeur Général de l’Unesco, Fédérico Mayor, nomme en 1999, Homayra Sellier Présidente du mouvement de protection mondial de l’enfance. Depuis avril 2000, Innocence en Danger (IED) est une association Loi 1901 en France à vocation internationale. Elle est indépendante de tout organisme, déclarée à la préfecture de Paris, à but non lucratif et reconnue d’intérêt général.

      Innocence en Danger regroupe tous les acteurs militants de notre société : spécialistes d’internet, juristes, experts de l’enfance, décideurs des mondes politiques, économiques et médiatiques. Son but est de sensibiliser l’opinion internationale aux fléaux croissants rencontrés par l’enfance, afin de peser sur les décisions des gouvernements.

      Innocence en Danger constitue une force d’action, de sensibilisation, de proposition, d’éducation et d’information auprès des organisations gouvernementales ou non gouvernementales, des instances européennes et internationales, des entreprises, des écoles, des collectivités locales, des groupes de jeunes…

      Innocence en Danger tient le rôle de relais d’informations entre le public et les institutions publiques. Elle accompagne au quotidien les enfants victimes et le(s) parent(s) protecteur(s). Elle est la première et la seule association à avoir mis en place des séjours de résilience.

      https://innocenceendanger.org

      #violence #violences_sexuelles

  • Le donne della Repubblica
    Wikiradio del 2/06/2016 - Rai Radio 3
    https://www.raiplayradio.it/audio/2016/05/Le-donne-della-Repubblica-494c87cf-ea1e-4b06-897d-9d6383349623.html

    Il 2 giugno #1946, le donne italiane votano per la prima volta in una consultazione politica nazionale con Simonetta Soldani

    Repertorio

    – Frammento di un intervista a Nadia Spano, membro dell’Assemblea costituente italiana e deputato del Partito comunista italiano
    – Frammento di un intervista a Laura Lombardo, insegnante, partigiana e politica italiana
    – Frammento di un’intervista a Giovanna Marturano, partigiana, esponente di rilievo del movimento femminista

    Brano musicale

    – 18 aprile, cantata dal coro delle Mondine di Porporana, dal cd “Cante dal cuore”
    http://www.mondineporporana.com/senonciconoscete.htm

    #podcast #wikiradio #RaiRadio3 #Italie #république #genre #votation #féminisme #société #politique

  • Décolonisations (1/3) - L’apprentissage | ARTE
    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/086124-001-A/decolonisations-1-3

    1. L’apprentissage
    De la #révolte des #cipayes de 1857 à l’étonnante République du #Rif, mise sur pied de 1921 à 1926 par #Abdelkrim_el-Khattabi avant d’être écrasée par la #France, ce premier épisode montre que la #résistance, autrement dit la #décolonisation, a débuté avec la #conquête. Il rappelle comment, en 1885, les puissances européennes se partagent l’#Afrique à #Berlin, comment les Allemands commettent le premier #génocide du XXe siècle en #Namibie, rivalisant avec les horreurs accomplies sous la houlette du roi belge #Léopold_II au #Congo. Il retrace aussi les parcours de l’anthropologue haïtien #Anténor_Firmin, de la Kényane #Mary_Nyanjiru, de la missionnaire anglaise #Alice_Seeley_Harris ou de #Lamine_Senghor, jeune tirailleur sénégalais devenu #militant #communiste et #anticolonialiste.

  • En #Europe_centrale, une « #alliance des villes libres » contre le populisme

    Les maires de #Budapest, #Varsovie, #Prague et #Bratislava ont signé un #pacte contre les dérives des gouvernements du #groupe_de_Visegrad.

    Ils ont la quarantaine ou presque, sont de fervents défenseurs de la #démocratie_libérale et fermement proeuropéens. A l’occasion d’une journée hautement symbolique, les maires de Prague, Varsovie, Budapest et Bratislava ont célébré, lundi 16 décembre dans la capitale hongroise, la naissance d’une « #alliance_des_villes_libres » destinée à contrecarrer les tendances populistes de leurs gouvernements respectifs.

    Dans ce « groupe de Visegrad » constitué de la #Pologne, la #Hongrie, la #République_tchèque et la #Slovaquie, qui fait régulièrement l’actualité pour ses dérives en matière d’Etat de droit et de refus des #valeurs_européennes, l’initiative des élus des quatre capitales montre que la #résistance_locale est réelle, même si elle est souvent encore minoritaire au niveau national.

    « Ilots de #liberté »

    « Nous venons de différents partis politiques, mais nous avons les mêmes #valeurs. Nos villes sont libres, progressistes, tolérantes et surtout proeuropéennes », a vanté le maire de Varsovie, Rafal Trzaskowski, largement élu en 2018 contre un candidat ultraconservateur du parti Droit et justice, qui gouverne la Pologne depuis 2015 en multipliant les atteintes à l’indépendance des médias et de la justice.

    Cette alliance a été rendue possible par la victoire historique d’un candidat de l’opposition à la mairie de Budapest le 13 octobre. Alors que la capitale hongroise était gouvernée depuis 2010 par le Fidesz, le parti du premier ministre nationaliste Viktor Orban, Gergely Karacsony, président d’un petit parti de centre gauche, a réussi à l’emporter avec 50,9 % des voix. Le Fidesz a aussi perdu à cette occasion le contrôle de six autres grandes villes du pays.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/12/17/en-europe-centrale-une-alliance-des-villes-libres-contre-le-populisme_602311
    #urban_matter #villes #résistance #populisme #pro-Europe #progressisme #tolérance

    ping @karine4

    via @mobileborders

    • Irlande du Nord : les accords de paix d’avril 1998
      https://journal.lutte-ouvriere.org/2023/04/12/irlande-du-nord-les-accords-de-paix-davril-1998_609602.html

      L’accord fut signé au terme de trente ans d’une guerre, appelée par euphémisme « Troubles », qui ravagea l’Irlande du Nord de 1968 à 1998. Aux origines du conflit se trouvait la volonté de la puissance coloniale britannique, au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, de garder la main sur une partie de cette Irlande insurgée. En effet, pour mettre fin au soulèvement armé des nationalistes irlandais (1919-1921), les dirigeants de ce qui était alors le plus grand empire colonial au monde avaient scindé l’île en deux, concédant l’#indépendance à la plus grande part du territoire mais gardant le nord-est, plus industriel et plus riche que le reste de l’île. Londres pouvait garder sous tutelle cette « Irlande du Nord » grâce à une majorité protestante unioniste, c’est-à-dire favorable à l’union avec la Grande-Bretagne, contre les aspirations des nationalistes, largement majoritaires dans l’île mais en minorité au nord-est.

      À la fin des années 1960, une part croissante de la classe ouvrière catholique d’Irlande du Nord n’acceptait plus la pauvreté, le chômage, les inégalités criantes et les discriminations dont elle faisait l’objet. Les protestations, d’abord pacifiques au sein d’un mouvement pour les droits civiques et le droit au logement, furent brutalement réprimées par la police, puis par l’armée britannique d’occupation, comme lors du « #Bloody_Sunday », le « dimanche sanglant », de 1972. L’#État\britannique était ainsi responsable de l’escalade violente qui s’engageait. Parmi les unionistes, des milices se constituaient, suppléant les forces britanniques et ciblant souvent des catholiques de façon aveugle. Du côté des nationalistes, les organisations paramilitaires comme l’IRA s’érigeaient en bras armé des catholiques, frappant l’armée, les paramilitaires unionistes, ainsi que de nombreux civils lors d’attentats dans des centres commerciaux, des centres-villes, etc. Les Troubles allaient faire quelque 3 500 morts et 38 000 blessés, un bilan considérable à l’échelle d’une province de 1,5 million d’habitants. Aujourd’hui encore, de nombreuses familles gardent des séquelles de cette guerre. Et c’est d’abord au sein de la population que l’aspiration à la cessation des violences s’est exprimée.

      En 1998, l’accord de paix fut négocié sous la houlette du Premier ministre britannique #Tony Blair et, derrière lui, des États-Unis. Il était censé mettre un terme aux trente années de guerre civile. Pour cela, les dirigeants britanniques ont confié des prérogatives aux différents protagonistes du conflit. Les anciens paramilitaires ont enfilé le costume et obtenu des postes de pouvoir. Les partis nationalistes et unionistes ont obtenu un droit de veto dans les institutions locales, par conséquent souvent paralysées, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui où le principal parti unioniste (#DUP) refuse de reconnaître sa défaite aux dernières élections. L’accord de 1998 prévoyait également l’ouverture de la frontière avec la #République_d’Irlande, une ouverture dont les unionistes se sont accommodés… jusqu’au #Brexit, qui s’est traduit, à leur grand dam, par la mise en place d’une frontière douanière entre l’Irlande du Nord et la Grande-Bretagne.

      L’#accord_de_1998 a figé les Nord-Irlandais dans deux « communautés » confessionnelles, #protestants et #catholiques, en créant des institutions partagées où leurs partis respectifs, unionistes et nationalistes, doivent siéger ensemble. Le poids de ces partis ainsi que celui des Églises font que la plupart des écoles restent ségréguées et que, encore aujourd’hui, des dizaines de « #murs_de_la_paix » séparent quartiers catholiques et protestants. La politique coloniale de « diviser pour régner » a éloigné ainsi les travailleurs les uns des autres pendant longtemps, mais n’a pas pu les empêcher d’entretenir d’innombrables liens de solidarité. Une partie des #Nord-Irlandais, qui côtoient dans leurs relations de travail, amicales voire familiales, des membres de « l’autre » #communauté, refusent désormais de s’inscrire dans ce #clivage_confessionnel gravé dans le marbre par les accords de 1998.

      Si la fin des affrontements a fait le bonheur des capitalistes qui font des affaires en Irlande du Nord, elle n’a mis fin ni aux inégalités, ni à la pauvreté, aujourd’hui plus importante qu’en #Grande-Bretagne. Le NHS, le système national de santé, est dans un état catastrophique dans la province d’Irlande du Nord où, par exemple, 6 000 patients attendent une opération depuis plus de cinq ans.

      Il y a donc quelque chose d’indécent à voir les dirigeants du monde impérialiste célébrer aujourd’hui l’accord sordide qu’ils négocièrent pour mettre fin à une guerre civile dont ils étaient largement responsables.

  • Africa: povertà e denutrizione in aumento nonostante la crescita economica e l’aumento dell’import di prodotti agro-industriali

    L’Africa nel suo insieme, nonostante i progressi intrapresi a partire dall’inizio del nuovo millennio, si presenta tutt’oggi, sia dal punto di vista economico che sociale, come il continente meno sviluppato.

    Sotto il primo aspetto, benché la ricchezza prodotta dall’intero continente, secondo l’Ocse, sia triplicata fra il 2000 e il 2016,[1], il pil pro capite medio africano risulta ancora di soli 2.000 $ annui[2]. Un valore che uniforma differenze anche marcate, non solo macroregionali fra la parte Mediterranea, più sviluppata, e quella sub-sahariana, più arretrata in assoluto su scala globale, ma anche fra i vari stati all’interno delle stesse, dove, ad esempio, entro quest’ultima, nel 2017[3], troviamo il Burundi con un pil pro capite di soli 312 $ a fronte della Guinea Equatoriale che invece raggiunge i 12.727 $. Avallando la definizione di alcuni analisti che preferiscono utilizzare il termine Afriche per indicare appunto una situazione di relativa differenziazione interna al continente.

    Il quadro sociale

    Anche sotto l’aspetto dello sviluppo sociale complessivamente l’Africa evidenzia una marcata arretratezza: nonostante la speranza di vita media alla nascita sia cresciuta fra il 2015 e il 2018 di ben 3 anni (da 50,8 a 53,9)[4], risulta ancora inferiore rispetto agli altri continenti e la mortalità infantile, benché scesa solo negli ultimi anni al di sotto della soglia del 100 per 1.000, vede gli stati della parte sub-sahariana situati in blocco nelle ultime posizioni nell’apposita graduatoria dell’Unicef relativa al 2018 (tab. 1).

    Tabella 1: mortalità infantile nel primo anno di vita. Fonte (Unicef 2018)[5]

    Un quadro sociale generale ancora indubbiamente critico come certificato dai valori della povertà assoluta dichiarati dalla presidente della Banca africana di sviluppo Celestine Monga[1], con addirittura oltre il 40% della popolazione continentale, a fronte di una media mondiale dell’10%, che cerca di sopravvivere con meno di 1,90 $ al giorno e la sottoalimentazione che nel 2018, secondo la Fao[2], colpiva il 20% degli africani. Una drammatica situazione che vede concentrarsi, nel continente che accoglie solo il 17% della popolazione mondiale, circa un terzo del totale dei denutriti sulla Terra (con meno di 2.000 calorie al giorno), confermando che il binomio fame-povertà, lungi dall’essere sradicato, presenta addirittura un inquietante trend in fase di aggravamento.

    [1] studio americano del Brookings Institution (classifica dei paesi più poveri al mondo)

    [2] http://www.fao.org/news/story/it/item/1180461/icode

    A fronte di un tendenza globale di lungo periodo di riduzione della povertà estrema dai 1,850 miliardi (35%) del 1990 ai 735 milioni (10%) del 2015, nel periodo compreso fra il 2013 e il 2015, al cospetto di una contrazione mondiale di 68 milioni di unità, in Africa sub-sahariana, secondo la Banca Mondiale si è registrato invece un aumento di 8 milioni e addirittura 9 milioni in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente (Tab. 2). In quest’ultima area la situazione è risultata peggiore visto che i poveri sono quasi raddoppiati da 9,5 a 18,6 milioni a causa delle cosiddette Primavere arabe in Tunisia ed Egitto e delle guerre in Libia e in Siria che hanno destabilizzato dal punto di vista politico ed economico la macroregione.

    Tabella 2: povertà assoluta in percentuale e in valore assoluto 2013-2015. Fonte: Banca Mondiale[8]

    La gravità della situazione è testimoniata dallo studio realizzato dai ricercatori del World Poverty Clock con il sostegno delle Nazioni Unite e del governo tedesco concluso nel 2018 dal quale emerge che si trovano in Africa sub-shariana 12 dei 14 paesi dove la povertà estrema risulta in aumento in valore assoluto: Nigeria, Niger, Ciad, Repubblica Centrafricana, Somalia, Repubblica Democratica del Congo, Repubblica del Congo, Angola, Zambia, Madagascar, Burundi e Sud Sudan, sul quale ci soffermeremo in seguito.

    Caso paradigmatico è rappresentato, ad esempio, dalla Nigeria, stato più popoloso del continente con circa 195 milioni di abitanti, che in base alle proiezioni del World Poverty Clock 2018 del World Data Lab di Vienna[10], ad inizio 2018, risultava, nonostante le ingenti riserve petrolifere, il paese con il più elevato numero di persone in condizione di povertà assoluta, stimate a fine maggio 2018 in ben 87 milioni scalzando l’India (73 milioni) dal vertice della poco gratificante graduatoria mondiale (grafico 1). La reale gravità della situazione tuttavia emerge dal rapporto fra la consistenza demografica dei due paesi che nel 2018 risultava di ben 7:1 a favore del colosso asiatico.

    Grafico 1: stati per numero di persone in povertà assoluta. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Una situazione molto critica in Nigeria, al cui interno convive il 44,2%[11] della popolazione in situazione di estrema povertà (tab. 3) e al contempo è il Paese d’origine del miliardario più ricco del continente, l’uomo d’affari Aliko Dangote, e quello dove cresce un’elite di benestanti sempre più abbienti. Povertà e disuguaglianza, fenomeno che in Europa dopo la crisi del 2008 è andato sempre consolidandosi.

    Tabella 3: primi 4 paesi africani per numero di abitanti in povertà assoluta. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Riguardo alla sottoalimentazione rileviamo una situazione ancora più critica rispetto a quella della povertà: infatti, in base al report dell’Unicef 2018[12], dopo aver toccato, a livello mondiale, il minimo storico nel 2015 a 785 milioni di persone è risalita nel 2017 a 821, dato confermato anche nel 2018[13], con l’Africa che assorbe la quasi totalità dell’aumento: ben 34,5 su 36 milioni di aumento globale. Il numero di persone sottoalimentate in Africa sale così nel 2017 a 257 milioni di unità, suddivise fra i 20 milioni nella parte Mediterranea ed i 237 in quella sub-sahariana. Quasi la metà dell‘incremento è dovuta all’aumento del numero di persone denutrite nell’Africa occidentale, mentre un altro terzo proviene dall’Africa orientale.

    L’ampia porzione di Africa posta sud del Sahara si conferma così come la macroregione in stato di maggior sofferenza a livello mondiale, con la speranza di vita media più bassa, la più elevata mortalità infantile e con le maggior percentuali di persone sottoalimentate e in condizioni di povertà assoluta.

    Le previsioni

    Dal rapporto del World Poverty Clock pubblicato il 7 settembre 2018[14] fuoriesce, del continente africano, una situazione a luci e ombre: se da un lato, nell’Africa sub-sahariana, la povertà assoluta è prevista in riduzione dal 39% del 2018 al 27% del 2030, lo stesso problema sta invece assumendo, per alcuni paesi, i connotati di una piaga sociale endemica per la quale non si intravedono prospettive di risoluzione nemmeno a medio termine. Infatti, in base alle stime dello stesso report del World Poverty Clock pubblicato il 5 maggio 2018, è previsto che nel Continente Nero nel 2030 si troveranno sia i 13 dei 15 paesi in cui la povertà avrà registrato un aumento in valore assoluto che i primi 4, fra i soli 5, che vedranno aumentare il tasso di povertà assoluta a livello mondiale (tab. 4). Per il 2018 invece è stato calcolato un ulteriore aumento di 3 milioni di unità a livello continentale.

    Tabella 4: stati africani col più elevato tasso di povertà assoluta in percentuale: stime 2018-previsioni 2030. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Sud Sudan: l’ultimo nato in peggiori condizioni

    Particolarmente drammatica risulta, dal report del Word Poverty Clock pubblicato il 1 agosto 2018[15], la situazione del Sud Sudan, paese di più recente formazione della Terra (2011), che vedrà aumentare il numero di poveri assoluti dagli 11,5 milioni del 2018 ai 14 del 2030, con una incidenza sulla popolazione che passerà dall’85,1% al 95,8% (tab. 4). Il conflitto per la leadership politica fra il presidente, Salva Kiir di etnia Dinka, e il suo vice, Riek Machar leader dei Nuer, il secondo gruppo etnico nazionale, ha insanguinato e destabilizzato il Paese per quasi 5 anni sino al luglio 2018 minandone lo sviluppo e la diversificazione economica: ancora oggi circa l’85% della popolazione attiva risulta impegnata in attività non salariate, principalmente agricoltura di sussistenza e allevamento (circa il 78% degli attivi)[16]. La sostanziale assenza dell’industria manifatturiera costringe all’importazione di quasi tutti i beni sia di consumo che intermedi; l’unico settore industriale moderno risulta quello petrolifero, nel quale dominano gli investimenti stranieri, in particolare cinesi, indiani e malesi[17]. Ricco di risorse del sottosuolo, il Sud Sudan, detiene, oltre ai pozzi petroliferi, giacimenti di oro, argento, ferro e rame.

    Ricoprendo il 99% dell’export e il 60% della ricchezza nazionale, il settore petrolifero risulta di gran lunga dominante, causando tuttavia fragilità alla struttura economica nazionale a seguito della dipendenza della stessa dall’andamento delle quotazioni borsistiche: il pil pro capite secondo la Banca Mondiale è infatti crollato, insieme al valore del petrolio, dai 1.111 $ del 2014 ai meno di 228 $ del 2017[18]. Il conseguente deficit fiscale ha causato un’ondata inflazionistica e gravissime carenze alimentari: nel Paese ben 7 milioni di persone (pari al 63%) sono stati colpiti da carestia e vengono assistite tramite gli aiuti umanitari del World Food Programme (Wfp), mentre quasi 2 milioni sono gli sfollati interni e altri 2,5 milioni sono fuggiti dal Paese, dando vita alla più grave crisi dei rifugiati in Africa dopo quella del Ruanda di metà anni ’90.

    A prescindere dalla grave crisi alimentare in atto, nel complesso il Sud Sudan presenta un quadro strutturale disastroso caratterizzato dall’83% di popolazione rurale, da un elevato analfabetismo (73% maschile e l’84% femminile), da una carenza di servizi pubblici che esclude il 75% della popolazione dall’assistenza sanitaria e dalla maggior percentuale di popolazione in povertà assoluta (85%) a livello mondiale, ai quali si aggiungono carenze infrastrutturali, debolezza delle istituzioni politiche, corruzione al pari del resto del continente, frammentazione etnica (ben 64 gruppi) e dispute di confine[19].

    Fame in aumento e boom dell’import di prodotti agricoli: un’apparente contraddizione

    Dal report del Dipartimento dell’Agricoltura degli Stati Uniti (Usda) del 2 novembre 2015[20] emerge che nel ventennio 1995-2014 le importazioni di cibo e prodotti agricoli intermedi e primari ha subito in Africa sub-sahariana un incremento medio del 13% annuo come effetto combinato della sostenuta crescita economica (60% di incremento del pil totale nei 10 anni precedenti) e del consistente incremento demografico (dai 720 del 1995 ai 1.156 milioni del 2014)[21]. Le importazioni agricole totali hanno raggiunto nel 2014 un controvalore pari a 48,5 miliardi $, secondo solo al 2013, ripartito fra i 11,7 miliardi proveniente da altri Paesi della macroregione e i 36,8 da fuori del continente. Emerge tuttavia un aspetto incoraggiante per il progetto di integrazione panafricano riconducibile alla crescita del commercio agricolo intra-africano, che fra il 2009 e il 2014, ha superato quello proveniente dall’esterno: 100% contro 60% (grafico 2).

    Grafico 2: importazioni agricole in Africa sub-sahariana in miliardi $ 1994-2014

    Per individuare le cause della contraddizione sottoalimentazione/aumento dell’import agroalimentare è opportuno sovrapporre alla dinamica demografica quella sociale: in Africa sub-sahariana infatti nel decennio 2005-2014 si è registrata un’espansione della classe media addirittura del 90%, ceto sociale che, al pari di quello di altre aree emergenti del Sud del mondo, persegue consumi di tipologia e livello occidentale, alimentando una sensibile crescita della domanda di tali prodotti. Infatti, dall’analisi merceologica del comparto rileviamo come le principali importazioni agroalimentari dell’Africa sub-sahariana siano prodotti orientati al consumatore: alimenti preparati, latticini, pollame, vino/birra e verdure. Tali prodotti diretti al consumo finale hanno registrato nel quinquennio 2010-2014 addirittura un incremento del 70% arrivando, in quell’anno, a rappresentare oltre il 40% delle importazioni totali della macroregione.

    Al pari le importazioni di prodotti intermedi, principalmente olio di palma e zucchero, utilizzati come materie prime dall’industria agroalimentare, sono cresciute anch’esse rapidamente, mentre quelle di merci sfuse, prodotti primari destinati all’alimentazione di base, sono state invece più contenute, tant’è che l’import di cereali, in un sub-continente “affamato” rappresentavano solo il 21% nel 2014: grano 9% e riso 12% (grafico 3).

    Grafico 3: paniere merceologico dell’import agroalimentare in Africa sub-sahariana 2014

    Lo stesso report prospetta un futuro addirittura prosperoso per l’export agricolo statunitense verso l’Africa sub-sahariana teso al recupero delle quote perse, scese nel ventennio 1994-2005 dal 15 al 5%, in quanto la classe media della macroregione dovrebbe crescere di un ulteriore 90% nel successivo decennio 2014-2024 (grafico 4) determinando un incremento della domanda di prodotti orientati al consumatore di un altro 60%. Un business plan che, tuttavia, non mostra particolare attenzione alle fasce sociali in sofferenza.

    Grafico 4: crescita in % della classe media nelle principali macroregioni terrestri 2014 – 2024

    Un modello agroalimentare contraddittorio

    La critica situazione alimentare del Continente Nero, e in particolare della parte sub-sahariana, è riconducibile alle distorsioni del modello agroalimentare mondiale, sempre più caratterizzato dall’Agrobusiness e dalle sue perverse dinamiche. Un settore, definito dal dizionario curato da Aldo Gabrielli come “il complesso di attività e mezzi connessi allo sviluppo capitalistico dell’agricoltura”, nel quale le finalità esulano dalla funzione primaria di soddisfacimento del fabbisogno alimentare per perseguire invece la massimizzazione del profitto in linea con le logiche capitalistiche.

    Basato sull’integrazione fra agricoltura e industria, al suo interno operano poche grandi imprese multinazionali che controllano l’intera filiera: dalla produzione alla trasformazione industriale sino alla commercializzazione dei prodotti finiti. Le produzioni agricole avvengono in ogni area del pianeta, sia del Nord che del Sud, mentre i prodotti finiti vengono indirizzati dove esiste facoltà di spesa, la famosa domanda, quindi principalmente nei paesi sviluppati e verso i ceti sociali emergenti (nuovi ricchi e classi medie) di quelli in via di sviluppo (Cina, India ecc.) e addirittura di quelli ad economia meno sviluppata, come nel caso africano.

    L’agricoltura costituisce l’asse portante del sistema in quanto produttrice delle indispensabili materie prime ma l’attività industriale economicamente ha la preminenza poiché gran parte del valore aggiunto deriva dalla trasformazione dei prodotti agricoli. Negli Stati Uniti, ad esempio, il sistema agroalimentare industriale assorbe il 20% della popolazione attiva ma soltanto l’1% è impiegato nel settore primario. A rimanere schiacciati da questo sistema sono i produttori locali, soprattutto quelli piccoli, del Sud del mondo ai quali vengono dettate le scelte colturali, a discapito della sovranità alimentare quindi dei prodotti di sussistenza, e imposto prezzi di acquisto molto bassi, a causa dell’asimmetria contrattuale fra le parti contraenti. Emblematico risulta a tal proposito il caso del caffè che, contrariamente ad altri prodotti di piantagione, è coltivato da una moltitudine di piccoli contadini che si trovano in condizione di subalternità rispetto alle multinazionali che acquistano la materia prima per la trasformazione e la commercializzazione.

    In base al rapporto “Scopri il marchio“ di Oxfan le 10 più grandi aziende agroalimentari vale a dire Associated British Foods (Abf), Coca-Cola, Danone, General Mills, Kellogg’s, Mars, Mondelez International (ex Kraft Foods), Nestlé, PepsiCo e Unilever generano collettivamente entrate superiori a 1,1 miliardi di dollari al giorno[22] 1 con un volume d’affari stimato intorno ai 7.000 miliardi annui, addirittura 18 volte superiore al settore dell’energia, rappresentando circa il 10% dell’economia globale. Nei vari comparti in cui operano tendono a crearsi oligopoli egemonizzati da queste imprese di enormi proporzioni, come nel comparto del cacao in cui tre aziende controllano il 30% del mercato mondiale[23] o quello della frutta tropicale dove cinque multinazionali ne coprono addirittura l’80%[24] .

    Le dimensioni economiche di queste macroaziende superano talvolta quelle di stati del Sud del mondo consentendo loro di esercitare pressioni sui governi tese ad influenzarne le scelte politiche a proprio vantaggio, ma che finiscono per concretizzarsi in dinamiche vessatorie per le popolazioni locali quali: l’espansione dei latifondi, delle monocolture da esportazione e del land grabbing (l’accaparramento delle terre). Quest’ultimo fenomeno, attuato sia da imprese che da stati, affligge Sud America, Sud-est asiatico, Asia centrale e, soprattutto, l’Africa, nella quale quasi 30 milioni di ettari di terreni coltivabili, di cui ben il 64% per colture non alimentari (carta 1), sono controllati attraverso due forme contrattualistiche: acquisizioni e leasing. In particolare, principali vittime risultano i piccoli contadini che vengono schiacciati dal potere soverchiante delle grandi aziende che ne provoca un impoverimento sino a costringerli a vendere loro i terreni; in altri casi vengono addirittura espulsi con la violenza, da eserciti o paramilitari, dalle proprie terre trasformandoli in profughi, spesso costretto a fuggire all’estero. Il Centro Studi Internazionali, riporta alcuni casi emblematici relativi all’Africa come quello della regione di Gambella in Etiopia dove, dal 2010 l’esercito ha costretto molti abitanti ad abbandonare le terre e a spostarsi in altre aree a vantaggio delle imprese straniere fra le quali spicca l’impresa Saudi Star (Arabia Saudita) che è riuscita ad impossessarsi di ben 15.000 ettari di territorio per la coltivazione di canna da zucchero e riso[25]

    Carta tematica 1: i principali attori attivi e passivi del land grabbing. Fonte: land matrix 2018[26]

    Crescita senza redistribuzione

    Un continente che, dopo la lunga recessione del ventennio 1980-2000, causata dalla contrazione delle quotazioni delle commodities, ha finalmente imboccato col nuovo millennio il percorso di sviluppo economico, triplicando, in base ai dati Ocse[27], la ricchezza prodotta tra il 2000 e il 2016 con una crescita media annua del 4,6% (tab. 5), la seconda più elevata a livello mondiale dopo i paesi asiatici in via di sviluppo

    Tabella 5: crescita economica media annua nelle principali macroregioni del Sud del mondo fra 2.000 e 2016 in base ai dati Ocse 2018[28]

    Parallelamente, l’Africa nel suo complesso è risultato l’unico continente a registrare un aumento della povertà assoluta da 405 a 413 milioni fra il 2013 e il 2015 (tab. 2) ed ha assorbito nel 2017 la quasi totalità dell’incremento mondiale della sottoalimentazione, 34,5 su 36 milioni, facendo salire il numero di coloro che soffrono la fame a 257 milioni, paradossalmente in contemporanea all’aumento dell’import di prodotti agroalimentari che, fra il 1995 e il 2014, si è attestato su un valore medio annuo del +13%. Indubbiamente la rapida crescita demografica che sta interessando il continente, quasi 60 milioni fra il 2013 e il 2015 (tab. 6), ha creato problemi sociali aggiuntivi ma non è stata determinante visto che la povertà al contempo ha registrato un incremento di 8 milioni nella parte sub-sahariana e altrettanti in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente.

    Tabella 6: crescita della popolazione in Africa fra il 2013 e il 2010. Fonte: population pyramid [29]

    Causa principale della situazione è un modello economico non inclusivo che evidentemente va a beneficio dei ricchi e del ceto medio, quest’ultimo in espansione nell’Africa sub-sahariana fra il 2005 e il 2015 addirittura del 90%, al quale vanno aggiunti problemi economici strutturali quali un’eccessiva dipendenza dall’export di prodotti primari grezzi e una massiccia penetrazione delle multinazionali, tipica dei rapporti di subordinazione neocoloniale, che fanno incetta delle abbondanti risorse minerarie, energetiche, agricole e naturali drenando ingenti profitti.

    Conclusioni

    Sullo sfondo di questo quadro economico e sociale resta la questione delle disparità sociali, che seppur ridottesi a livello continentale fra il 1998 e il 2013, nella parte sub-sahariana rimangono ancora le più elevate a livello mondiale dopo l’America Latina (tab. 7).

    Tabella 7: riduzione dell’indice Gini nelle principali macroregioni nel breve periodo 2008-2013

    La situazione risulta critica soprattutto nell’Africa australe, dove si trovano, a parte Haiti, 4 fra i 5 paesi con il più alto livello di disuguaglianza nella graduatoria mondiale nella distribuzione del reddito fra le fasce sociali, calcolata in base all’Indice Gini: Sudafrica, Botswana, Namibia e Zambia, seguiti dalla Repubblica Centrafricana nell’area equatoriale (tab. 8).

    Tabella 8: stati per indice indice Gini più elevato. Fonte: World Population Rewiew 24/10/2019[30]

    Ed è lo stesso Ocse a confermare il rapporto disparità sociali/povertà: “Se l’Africa abbassasse ulteriormente il proprio coefficiente di Gini, da 41 a 35 (il livello dei Paesi asiatici in via di sviluppo), ciascun punto percentuale di crescita del PIL ridurrebbe i dati sulla povertà di un altro mezzo punto percentuale l’anno. Un tale calo nelle disuguaglianze diminuirebbe il numero di persone che vivono in povertà di 130 milioni. I progressi compiuti per ridurre la povertà estrema sono troppo lenti: nel periodo 2009-16, il 36% della popolazione africana (circa 400 milioni di persone) viveva con 1,90 dollari USA al giorno o meno, rispetto al 49% degli anni ‘90. Per una più rapida lotta alla povertà, la crescita deve diventare più inclusiva e le disuguaglianze devono essere ridotte“[31].

    Rileviamo, a conforto della nostra analisi, la coincidenza di conclusioni con il Rapporto regionale 2018 sulla sicurezza alimentare e la nutrizionedella Fao[32], il quale testualmente riporta che “È interessante notare come le economie africane siano cresciute a ritmi impressionanti, spesso superiori al 5% negli ultimi dieci anni, dal 2004 al 2014. Tuttavia, la povertà e la fame sono ancora in sospeso poiché una crescita economica significativa non è risultata né integrata e né inclusiva“ aggiungendo che “L’insicurezza alimentare in alcuni paesi dell’Africa è stata aggravata dai conflitti, spesso in combinazione con condizioni meteorologiche avverse (riconducibili ai cambiamenti climatici ndr.)” e che è necessario “Orientare le politiche nazionali di sicurezza alimentare verso una maggiore autosufficienza alimentare interna“, vale a dire eliminare il land grabbing, ridurre i latifondi ed estromettere le monocolture da esportazione e riacquisire la sovranità alimentare.

    Una sfida impegnativa per il Continente nero quella dello sviluppo autonomo, integrato ed inclusivo che passa attraverso un processo di integrazione continentale (un passo significativo in tal senso è rappresentato dall’entrata in vigore dell’Area di Libero Scambio dell’Africa – Afcfta – il 30 maggio 2019 che secondo la Commissione economica Onu per l’Africa potrebbe incrementare del 53% il commercio intra-africano[33]) e per il superamento della subordinazione neocoloniale, imposta dalle potenze Occidentali e in forme diverse, recentemente, anche dalla Cina.

    Un percorso, come tutti i processi emancipatori, che non può prescindere da una rottura della storica subalternità politica dei Paesi africani e la riscrittura di un nuovo ordine economico, commerciale e finanziario che può essere implementato solo da una nuova classe dirigente preparata, non corrotta e con un efficace progetto panafricano. In pratica l’effettiva indipendenza, 60 anni dopo quella formale.

    http://www.pisorno.it/africa-poverta-e-denutrizione-in-aumento-nonostante-la-crescita-economica-e-

    #Afrique #pauvreté #économie #croissance_économique #exportation #importation #industrie_agro-alimentaire #sous-alimentation #alimentation #mortalité_enfantile #pauvreté_absolue #Nigeria #RDC #République_démocratique_du_congo #statistiques #chiffres #Sud_Soudan #Soudan_du_Sud #land_grabbing #accaparement_des_terrres

  • Un vrai communiste : Werner Scholem
    Le livre que lui a consacré le spécialiste de la révolution (allemande) de Novembre (1918/19), Ralf Hoffrogge, est disponible en anglais. Pour celles et ceux qui se sont toujours demandé ce que pouvait bien être cette révolution allemande et qui était le frère rebelle de Gershom Scholem.

    Ralf Hoffroge, A Jewish Communist in Weimar Germany: The Life of Werner Scholem (1895-1940)

    Merilyn Moos reviews a new biography of Werner Scholem: an implacable opponent of any accommodation with the far right, and an uncompromising critic of Soviet state capitalism.

    Werner Scholem is a figure rarely heard of in the UK. That he fell out with the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in the direction of Trotskyism has not helped. This new biography uses Scholem’s life to reveal the long-term impact of the revolutionary days of 1918-19 in Munich and Berlin on both the left and hard right in Germany and the isolation of the Russian Revolution after the failure of the German revolution. It also exposes how early the KPD leadership saw its task as to appeal to members of the ultra-right, rather than to defeat them.

    This 600-page book requires a strong interest in revolutionary politics in Germany in the early 1920s. For those who persevere, the author presents much detail on the period 1919-1926, drawing on a remarkable number of original sources about Scholem’s personal and political life, although not always providing a full analysis of the material it presents.

    Despite the book’s title, the ‘Jewish’ aspect is brief. Scholem was originally a part of a Zionist youth group, Jung Juda. Zionism of the time was secular and had broken with traditional Judaism and with the prevalent assimilationist perspective. Although the book does not suggest this, maybe this involvement encouraged Scholem’s later resilience and refusal to bow to instruction. He soon fell out with Zionism, criticising its ‘war objectives’, which would end up with the occupation of Syria and parts of the Sinai Peninsula.

    [...]

    https://www.rs21.org.uk/2019/10/18/review-a-jewish-communist-in-weimar-germany

    #Werner_Scholem #révolution_de_novembre #révolution_allemande_de_1918 #république_de_Weimar #communisme #parti_communiste_allemand #KPD #Buchenwald

  • Après les #milices qui surveillent les #frontières en #Hongrie, #Bulgarie, #République_Tchèque :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/719995

    ... voici le même type de groupes en #Slovénie...
    Vigilantes in Slovenia patrol borders to keep out migrants

    Blaz Zidar has a mission: patrol along a razor-wire fence on Slovenia’s border with Croatia, catch migrants trying to climb over, hand them to police and make sure they are swiftly sent out of the country.

    The 47-year-old former Slovenian army soldier, dressed in camouflage trousers with a long knife hanging from his belt, is one of the vigilantes who call themselves “home guards” — a mushrooming anti-migrant movement that was until recently unthinkable in the traditionally liberal Alpine state. The name of the self-styled group evokes memories of the militia that sided with fascists during World War II.

    “I would prefer to enjoy my retirement peacefully, but security reasons are preventing this,” Zidar said as he embarked on yet another of his daily foot patrols together with his wife near their home village of Radovica nestled idyllically among vineyards and lush green forested hills.

    Zidar complained that he had to act because Slovenian police aren’t doing their job of guarding the borders from the migrant flow which peaked in 2015 when hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East, Africa and Asia, fleeing wars and poverty, crossed from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia via Hungary or Croatia and Slovenia toward more prosperous Western European states.

    Zidar said that his six children often join them in the border monitoring mission “because they have to learn how to protect their nation from intruders.”

    Slovenia’s volunteer guards illustrate strong anti-migrant sentiments not only in the small European Union nation of 2 million people, but also across central and eastern Europe which is a doorway into Western Europe for migrants and where countries such as Hungary have faced criticism for open anti-migrant policies. Similar right-wing guards that frequently attacked migrants crossing the borders previously openly operated in Hungary and Bulgaria.

    Police in Croatia — an EU member state that is still not part of the borderless EU travel zone — routinely face accusations of pushbacks and violence against migrants trying to come in from Bosnia. In Slovenia, the authorities are putting up additional fences on the border with Croatia after Italy’s former hard-line interior minister, Matteo Salvini, threatened “physical barriers” would be built between Slovenia and Italy if the migrant flow wasn’t completely stopped.

    The fiery anti-migrant rhetoric by Salvini and Hungarian President Victor Orban, who was the first to order fences on Hungary’s border with Serbia at the start of the migrant crisis, have resonated among some in Slovenia, an exceptionally calm, nature-loving country.

    Miha Kovac, a Slovenian political analyst who is a professor at the University of Ljubljana, described the anti-migrant guards as “guys with big beer bellies who don’t have much of an education, who didn’t have much of a career, who don’t know what to do with themselves in the contemporary world.

    “They find their meaning in this kind of movement and this kind of hatred toward migrants.”

    Kovac said that in the short run, the right-wing groups represent no real danger to the tiny EU nation. But if the European migrant crisis continues “this kind of movement might become more aggressive.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zte9nDFcACY

    “Slovenia is a country of 2 million and if you would become a kind of immigrant pocket with the population of ... 20, 30, 40, 50,000 immigrants, this could cause quite significant problems,” Kovac said.

    Slovenian authorities don’t seem to mind the self-styled guards patrolling the country’s borders, as long as they don’t do anything against the law.

    “The self-organization of individuals does not in any way imply mistrust of police work,” said France Bozicnik, the head of criminal police at a police station near the border. “It’s just the opposite.”

    “People call us on the phone every day and give us information about suspicious vehicles and suspicious persons, and we sincerely thank them for this information,” he said. “They are welcome to continue with this reporting.”

    Nevertheless, the images of masked men in military uniforms that appeared about a year ago have shocked many in Slovenia, the birthplace of U.S. first lady Melania Trump. The largest volunteer group called the Stajerska Garda was filmed taking an oath to secure public order in the country.

    The group commander, Andrej Sisko, said his goal is “to train people to defend their country and help the military and police at a time of massive migrations from the African and Asian states, mostly Muslims.”


    Sisko, who spent six months in prison for his paramilitary activities, insisted that his guards don’t carry real weapons or do anything illegal.

    “People are mostly supporting us, they are stopping and congratulating us on the streets,” Sisko said in an interview with The Associated Press as four of his men in camouflage uniforms, wearing genuine-looking mock guns, stood watch at his house in the suburb of the northern Slovenian town of #Maribor.

    With the continuing migrant flow in the region, human rights groups have accused authorities in Slovenia, Serbia, Greece, Hungary and particularly Croatia of illegal and forced pushbacks from their borders.

    Witnesses cited by the Border Violence Monitoring Network described Croatian police officers at the border with Bosnia burning clothes, sleeping bags, backpacks and tents in addition to targeting other possessions such as cellphones, cash and personal documents. Croatian officials have repeatedly denied the claims.

    “The police first attacked by shooting up in the air, and then they ordered us to lay down,” said Shabbir Ahmed Mian from Pakistan, adding that after police body searches they “pushed” the group of 15 that included women, children and the elderly into a small van that dumped them back to Bosnia.

    “We couldn’t breathe, there was no oxygen,” he said.

    https://www.apnews.com/57424e6bf60046e594b4c052bac86b6c

    #Stajerska_Garda #Andrey_Sisko
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #xénophobie #racisme #patrouilles #chasse_aux_migrants #anti-réfugiés #milices #milices_privées #extrême_droite #néo-nazis

    ping @reka @isskein @marty

    • Nouvelle reçu via le rapport « Border violence monitoring network - Balkan Region » de septembre 2019 (p. 13 et segg.) :
      https://www.borderviolence.eu/balkan-region-report-september-2019

      Extrait :

      SloveniaVigilante groups patrol the Slovenian border with CroatiaOn September 17th the Associated Press reported (https://www.apnews.com/57424e6bf60046e594b4c052bac86b6c) on the alarming activities of a Slovenian para-military group called “#Stajerska_Varda”, operating along the border with Croatia. Members of the group are reportedly taking part in vigilante activities, apprehending people-in-transit who try to cross the border, and calling the police to push them back. Until now the groups’ members have not been observed carrying out any violent actions, but their rise in numbers and presence on the border is deeply concerning. A video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2KOSTXp4fA

      ) from October 2018 shows a large number of armed people taking an oath nearMaribor, stating their intent to take border security into their own hands.

      Andrey Sisko, the leader of the far-right group, confirmed that at that time the militia had existed for longer than a year. Sisko himself was arrested and detained (https://www.total-slovenia-news.com/politics/3328-militia-leader-jailed-for-trying-to-subvert-the-constituti) for six months with the charge of “trying to subvert the constitutional order”. He was released in March. The open activities of far-right groups at the border are a telling development, not only for pressure on transit conditions, but also the growth in nationalist logic pervading Slovenia today. Stajerska Varda have stepped into the political void opened up by centre and right-wing politicians who have stoked domestic opinion against people-in-transit. While extreme right activists frame their role as a necessary defense, their actual ideology is explicitly aggressive. As shown in a report (https://eeradicalization.com/the-militarization-of-slovenian-far-right-extremism) by European Eye on radicalization, Stajerska Varda has the nationalist ideas of “Greater Slovenjia” (https://eeradicalization.com/the-militarization-of-slovenian-far-right-extremism) as a reference point, and has inserted itself in a context of growing militarization as part of Slovenia’s right.

      Yet media response to this rise in armed groups presented some worrying attitudes towards the issue. Namely the views of Miha Kovac, a political analyst interviewed by AP for their report, is dangerous in two senses. Kovac dismisses radical groups as “guys with big beer bellies [...] who don’t know what to do with themselves”, and even goes on to allege that the root cause of facism is the presence of migrants in Slovenia. Marking out people-in-transit as instigators falls into a traditional cycle of victim blaming, a route which absolves the role of fear mongering party politics in abetting radicalization.
      As shown by right wing leaders around Europe, such as Matteo Salvini and Victor Orban, open praise for and facilitation of radical groups is an explicit tactic used to build a right wing consensus on the ground. The example of vigilantes operating in Hungaryas early as 2015, suggests that the development of state borders and growth of the extra-parliamentary right go hand in hand. These two strands are evidently complicit in Slovenia, seen especially in the silence at the party and state levels in regards to a self publicized military juntaoperating on state soil. September’s revelations again highlight the liminal space between conservative migration politics and paramilitary fascism. The existence of these activities call into direct question the responsibilities of the Slovenian state, and are a concerning augmentation of the current institutional pushback framework.

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/September-2019-Report-1.pdf

    • Patriot games: Slovenian paramilitaries face down migrant ’threat’ on border

      Dressed in camouflage and armed with air rifles, Slovenian paramilitaries moves in formation through woods a stone’s throw from Croatia, patrolling a border zone where the group’s leader says illegal migration is rife.

      The more than 50-strong group, some of whom mask their faces with balaclavas and which includes a handful of women, is led by Andrej Sisko, who also heads Gibanje Zedinjena Slovenija, a fringe nationalist party that has so far failed to win seats in parliament.

      He believes authorities are failing in their duty to protect Slovenia against what he views as the migrant threat, and founded Stajerska and Krajnska Varda (Stajerska and Krajnska Guard) to fill that gap.

      Members of both organistions were participating in the patrol when Reuters TV met them.

      “It is a duty of all of us to ensure security in our own country,” he said. “If state bodies who are paid for that cannot or do not want to ensure security we can help ensure it, that is what we do.”

      Anti-migrant sentiment in Slovenia and other ex-Communist states has risen sharply since 2015, when eastern Europe bore the initial brunt of a refugee crisis.

      Much of the region has since then resisted attempts by EU authorities in Brussels to enforce a continent-wide quota system for new arrivals, which Slovenia has however signed up for.

      According to Slovenian police, numbers of migrants crossing illegally from Croatia to Slovenia - where a razor-wire fence has been erected along stretches of the border since 2015 - rose to 11,786 in the first nine months of this year from 6,911 a year earlier.

      Sisko this year served time in jail for forming Stajerska Varda and urging the overthrow of state institutions.

      He says the group, which generally meets in the border zone at weekends, does not intercept migrants - which he emphasises would be against the law - but advertises their presence to security forces.

      Police told Reuters they were monitoring the group’s behaviour and had not detected any recent illegal activities.

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovenia-paramilitary/patriot-games-slovenian-paramilitaries-face-down-migrant-threat-on-border-i

    • On en parle ici aussi :
      Patrouille de miliciens d’extrême-droite

      « C’est une honte, il y a la police, l’armée, maintenant cette clôture et il y a même une milice ! », fulmine à son tour Katarina Bernad Sterva, directrice de l’association slovène d’aide aux réfugiés, qui se désespère de la situation à la frontière.

      Depuis quelques jours en effet, des #milices en treillis militaires, visages cachés derrière des cagoules noires, patrouillent aussi le long de la rivière #Kolpa. Dirigée par le leader d’extrême-droite, #Andrej_Sisko,cette #milice se veut un « renfort » à l’armée régulière pour « défendre la frontière » et intercepter les migrants. « Nous sommes le point d’entrée de l’espace Schengen », se justifie Andrej Sisko. « Nous voulons faire passer un message. Nous voulons dire aux étrangers de rester chez eux. La clôture est fragile, elle ne permet pas de stopper les migrants alors nous venons contrôler les abords de la rivière nous-mêmes ».

      La milice d’Andrej Sisko n’a aucun mandat légal. Et visiblement, les villageois s’expliquent mal leur présence.

      Si certains rient à leur passage - « C’est le carnaval quand ils sont là », entend-t-on ici et là dans les villages frontaliers – d’autres comme Katarina Bernad Sterva regarde cette armée parallèle avec une inquiétude grandissante. « Ce qui m’effraie, c’est qu’ils existent. Publiquement, le gouvernement a condamné leurs actions, mais, dans les faits, les autorités ne font rien. Ces hommes sont fous, nous nous attendions à une réaction forte du gouvernement, comme par exemple l’annonce de la dissolution de ces patrouilles ».

      Interrogée par InfoMigrants, la police reste muette sur le sujet. « Je n’ai rien à dire sur ces hommes. Ils n’ont pas le soutien de la police », déclare simplement Vicjem Toskan, l’un des commandants en chef de la police de Koper, à l’ouest du pays.

      Ce soir-là, à Kostel, les amis du café s’interrogent surtout sur le sort réservé aux migrants interceptés par cette milice d’extrême-droite. « On a déjà la police et l’armée pour intercepter les migrants. On a une clôture pour les empêcher de continuer leur route. Eux, qu’est-ce qui vont leur faire, la nuit, dans la montagne ? », s’inquiète Rudy. « Ils portent des masques, ils marchent dans la forêt. J’ai plus peur d’eux que des immigrés qui traversent la rivière », chuchote à son tour, une jeune fille en bout de table. « Si j’étais migrante, je n’aimerais vraiment pas tomber sur eux ».

      https://seenthis.net/messages/791703#message811227

  • Evaluation of #Emergency_Transit_Centres in Romania and the Slovak Republic

    Executive summary

    The Emergency Transit Centres were established to provide emergency protection and the possibility to evacuate refugees who could not be protected in their countries of asylum. Temporary relocation of refugees who required resettlement on an urgent or emergency basis to an Evacuation Transit Facility (ETF) was expected to serve five objectives, namely:

    Provide timely and effective protection to an individual or group of individuals of concern to UNHCR;

    Demonstrate a tangible form of burden‐ and responsibility‐sharing, enabling States not otherwise involved in emergency resettlement to accept cases from an ETF;

    Enable officials from UNHCR and resettlement countries to undertake interviews in a stable, safe and secure environment;

    Promote the subsequent realization of the durable solution of permanent resettlement; and - Encourage States hosting ETFs to become involved in resettlement.

    To date, three ETFs have become operational, namely the Emergency Transit Centres (ETCs) in Romania in 2008 and the Slovak Republic in 2011(although the Tri-Partite Agreement was signed in 2010), and the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in the Philippines in 2009. The ETCs are managed on the basis of Tri-Partite Agreements signed by their hosting governments, UNHCR and IOM. The ETC in Timisoara, Romania, can accommodate a maximum of 200 refugees, whereas the one in Humenné, Slovak Republic, a total of 150 refugees (from mid-2012 onwards). As of 30 September 2015, 1,717 refugees had departed from the ETC in Timisoara, and 797 refugees from Humenné to resettlement countries. Since 2012, the main resettlement countries using the two centres are the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and Finland, with the USA the sole resettlement country using Humenné since 2013.

    At the request of UNHCRs Resettlement Service in the Division of International Protection UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service commissioned an evaluation of the ETCs in Romania and the Slovak Republic. As the ETCs have been in place for seven (Timisoara) and four years (Humenné) respectively, the evaluation presented UNHCR with an opportunity to assess whether the objectives set out at their establishment have been met. A comparative approach was used to assess the functioning of the two ETCs. The evaluation’s main findings should inform the development of strategies to meet emergency resettlement needs. Additionally, the results of the evaluation contribute to reflections on minimum standards and on whether the ETCs should continue with the same or similar objectives, or if there are other objectives that could lead to enhanced protection dividends for refugees.

    The evaluation team was composed of one PDES staff member and one external evaluation consultant.

    The ETCs in Timisoara, Romania, and in Humenné, Slovak Republic, have been relevant and appropriate for UNHCR, IOM, the ETC-hosting governments, resettlement countries and refugees. The ETCs offer a mechanism to UNHCR to provide a safe environment for refugees pending resettlement processing, including those classified under emergency or urgent priority, and to realize the durable solution of resettlement. While the number of refugees with emergency prioritization is small relative to the total number of refugees transferred to the centres, interlocutors described the ETCs as “life-saving” and “indispensable” for those few high-profile or high-risk refugees. This function for the most compelling protection cases is seen as core to UNHCR’s protection mandate.

    The centres also have an advocacy function. This is of pivotal importance to UNHCR and the hosting countries, as the agency must be seen to be able to respond immediately to lifethreatening situations to provide immediate protection. Although the overall contribution to global resettlement figures is small, the positive change brought about by the immediate safety and security (and access to basic services) and the overall realization of resettlement for hundreds of refugees has considerable value. In the evaluation period from the beginning of 2012 until 30 September, 2015 a total of 1,568 refugees were resettled through the two ETCs. The life-saving dimension in compelling protection cases is seen as vital even if there are very few emergency cases.

    Moreover, ETCs provided resettlement countries (and the IOM as part of its Resettlement Service Centre function for the US-government) access to refugees to undertake activities necessary to complete the resettlement process, including the selection of municipalities in resettlement countries. Some countries, in particular the US, are unable to process emergency cases due to long and complicated state procedures. The existence of the ETCs allows the US to process resettlement cases of persons who have been evacuated, and thereby increase accessibility of resettlement to some refugees, even if not on an emergency basis. The centre in Humenné has gradually expanded into one which solely caters to US-government processing, while only Timisoara has received emergency cases due to the shorter Romanian government clearance, and the absence of visa requirements. For the ETC-hosting governments, Romania and the Slovak Republic, the centres provided an opportunity to show their solidarity with countries hosting large refugee case-loads, while neither providing a permanent home to larger groups of refugees nor carrying all the operational costs of these centres.

    While the coverage of the ETCs is in principle global, only refugees of some nationalities and countries of first asylum have been accommodated in the centres. Ad hoc planning and the obstacles experienced by some resettlement countries in the process of adjudication or completion of resettlement procedures, including selecting municipalities, has generally driven the use of ETCs. Most of the refugees transferred to the ETCs were resettled to the USA or the UK.

    Male and female refugees of all age groups have been transferred to the ETCs, although some restrictions have been imposed with respect to refugees with high medical needs, including serious mental health needs due to limitations of the ETCs with respect to providing services to persons with high medical needs. There have also been challenges in providing accommodation to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) refugees. Since 2014, Iraqi refugees from Syria for resettlement to the USA are no longer transferred due to the refusal of already pre-vetted cases during the period 2012 - 2014. This has resulted in traumatic experiences for the concerned refugees, as three of them have remained in Timisoara since 2012 without a durable solution. Although alternative resettlement countries have been found for most of the rejected cases, this created an extra burden for UNHCR as well as delays for the concerned refugees.

    The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.

    The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.

    The centres are respectively under the supervision of the UNHCR Country Representative in Bucharest, and the UNHCR Deputy Regional Representative of the Regional Representative Office for Central Europe (RRCE) in Budapest. The resulting reporting lines and management of the budgets has led to limited coordination to ensure commonalities in approach in terms of staffing and assistance provided. Thus, in Timisoara, three UNHCR staff (with UNHCR or UNOPS contracts) work in the centre. In the Slovak Republic, the only UNHCR staff member manages the centre on a UNOPS contract. The difference in ETC-level staffing cannot be fully justified on the basis of their capacity. The above has also led to different budgets and variations in IP capacity, responsibilities and assistance, with the division of responsibilities between the different actors in Timisoara resulting in an overstretched IP with reduced capacity for counseling and other refugee-oriented activities.

    As the host countries’ contributions are different in each of the ETCs, the contribution of UNHCR also differs, the biggest difference being that UNHCR pays the food costs in Timisoara, which amounted to between 40-49% of total expenditures in the period 2012-2014. The overall expenditures for Timisoara, excluding food costs ranged from USD 621,700 in 2012, USD 654,900 in 2013 to USD 657,000 in 2014. If food costs are included, the annual costs are USD 1,031,000 in 2012, USD 1,278,100 in 2013, USD 1,195,800 in 2014 and USD 1,157,000 in 2015. The ETC requires 51% (2015) to 60% (2012, 2013) of the total budget for the Romania operation. The overall expenditure for Humenné was USD 406,700 in 2012, USD 747,800 in 2013, USD 979,900 in 2014, and USD 666,700 in 2015 (first 11 months).

    The underutilization of the ETCs was regularly raised as a concern by interlocutors. Their occupancy rate has historically been relatively low. The average daily occupancy rate for Timisoara is between one third to one half, and for Humenné approximately half of its capacity. Considering the nature of emergency case handling, and the flexibility this requires, the ETCs must always have space available to receive cases with serious protection needs. However, the planning documents for the ETCs do not allocate a specific number of spaces for emergency evacuations. In addition, the turnover of refugees has been slower than envisaged, with some refugees submitted to the US overstaying the maximum period of six months. The overwhelming majority of refugees stay an average of four to five months. Capacity has generally been viewed in terms of the available number of beds instead of in relation to site and shelter space available.

    Minimum standards for ETCs have not been developed. The application of minimum humanitarian standards in the areas of shelter confirms that the centres would not fully comply with these criteria if used to capacity. As the ETCs have become a semi-permanent response mechanism in the resettlement process, it is necessary to consider developing minimum standards for ETCs to guarantee the well-being of refugees. These standards should be based for example on the Sphere minimum humanitarian standards for shelter and non-food items.1 The standards should also take into account the objectives of preparing refugees for life in a resettlement country.

    The Romanian government has received funds from the EU to upgrade an existing facility to house the ETC. Work is expected to begin in 2016 so that refugees could be accommodated in 2017. It is imperative that UNHCR seize the opportunity to be involved at the planning stage of this process in order to ensure that the physical set-up is conducive to providing adequate assistance and protection, and to preparing refugees for resettlement. Some input into planning would also allow cost-savings if, for example, kitchens were included so that refugees could cook for themselves.

    The utilization of the ETCs has also been viewed in connection with the selection of refugees, and the process of obtaining clearances and organizing the transfer to one of the centres. The ETCs are directly linked to UNHCR’s global resettlement operation through the ETC focal point in the Resettlement Service, UNHCR headquarters. UNHCR Field Offices and Regional Resettlement Hubs are vital in identifying refugees for whom transfer to the ETC is an appropriate solution. Yet not all resettlement staff are aware of the existence of these facilities or know how to use these centres. This can be partially attributed to outdated guidance notes and a gap between vision and practice, which has led to different views on the usage of these centres.

    The underutilization of the ETCs is also a consequence of the use of emergency priority quota and/or a direct transfer to the resettlement country, which is the preferred option for all parties. Other obstacles include lengthy exit procedures of some countries of asylum, and a bureaucratic and lengthy process to organize the transfer of cases. Additionally, the part-time nature of the ETC focal point at headquarters does not encourage a more pro-active advocacy role.

    There are some differences in the provision of protection and assistance in the two ETCs. The major protection deficit noted by the evaluation team was the application of “limited freedom of movement” in Romania. Article 2 (2) of the Tri-Partite Agreement states that refugees “shall be required to reside in the ETC facility designated by the Romanian government.” This provision has been implemented in a manner that restricts freedom of movement of refugees as they are not permitted to leave the centre unless escorted by the implementing partner. This limitation is extremely frustrating for refugees and leads to a degree of institutionalization.

    While most of the refugees interviewed during the mission were satisfied with the standards of assistance offered, they felt that their lives in the ETC were on hold and many expressed a desire to have a “normal” life and to move on quickly from the ETC. Especially in Timisoara, concerns were expressed regarding the difficulties arising from living with many other refugees in a relatively small area, including sharing rooms with other families and/or individuals, the limited to no freedom of movement, few opportunities for leisure and language training for adults, and a general sense of boredom. This has produced a living environment in which stress and tensions between individuals can more easily build up. Overall, the services provided in Humenné were more comprehensive than in Timisoara. This was reflected in the level of satisfaction expressed by refugees during the focus group discussions.

    Resettlement is by definition a partnership activity. Cooperation with external stakeholders was generally viewed as efficient and effective by all respondents. Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of Romania was regarded in a positive light, especially with respect to the limited time needed to process clearance requests, and the provision of identification documentation and security in the premises. However, the “limited freedom of movement” for refugees in the town, the lack of maintenance of the premises, and the regular provision of basic household items has led to some concern.

    Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of the Slovak Republic was generally considered efficient and effective by all interlocutors, despite some challenges in obtaining visas from embassies in countries of asylum or neighboring countries. The third partner to the agreements, IOM, has taken effective care of travel logistics, medical assessments and cultural orientation training. Possible challenges were ironed out in the beginning of these local partnerships. Some communication challenges were however noted at the field level in countries of asylum between UNHCR and IOM (and some ICRC delegations) due to staff turnover.

    A similar positive note can be recorded with regard to the cooperation between UNHCR and the nine resettlement countries that used the ETCs in the 2012-2015 period. However, concern was expressed about referring an adequate number of refugees for the US “pipeline” on the one hand, and the US speed of processing, both during the pre-vetting stage and the stay of refugees in the ETCs, on the other hand. The first issue was resolved in 2015 with stronger coordination taking place between the three partners: UNHCR, the US and IOM.

    The two ETCs have been effective to some degree considering the initial objectives established especially considering that a transfer can only be approved if a resettlement country is already identified. Only the centre in Timisoara was used for emergency priority cases in 2013 and 2014. An overall reduction of this function is visible during the period 2012-2015. However, for refugees classified under normal priority, the transfer to an ETC was still viewed as life-saving if evacuated from an unsafe situation.

    The majority of refugees were transferred to the ETCs to support either the processing of resettlement cases by means of interviews, biometrics or to find municipalities in the resettlement country. Providing opportunities for recovery and preparing for the integration process has only been achieved to some degree, depending on the situation in countries of asylum and the protection and assistance provided in the two centres. The centres have however supported the objective “potential for resettlement realized”. The overwhelming majority of refugees arriving in the ETCs actually departed for resettlement. The ETCs have therefore contributed to facilitating the resettlement process of some refugees that otherwise could not have been resettled.

    The main impact of the ETCs has been the provision of immediate and effective protection to refugees. Moreover, as a tangible form of responsibility-sharing, the centres have given Romania and the Slovak Republic the opportunity to present their contribution to the international protection regime in international fora. Romania established a resettlement programme with a quota of 40 refugees per year, with the first group of 38 refugees arriving in 2010, and the second group in 2014. The Slovak Republic also pledged, on a voluntary basis, 100 resettlement places in the period 2015-2017 towards the Council of the European Conclusions on Resettlement of 20 July 2015. However, arrivals under this programme are still pending.

    Given the current situation in Europe it could be argued that more responsibility-sharing could be expected, and the existence of the ETCs should not absolve these governments of the obligation to provide durable solutions to a greater number of refugees. The host governments might also be persuaded to contribute more resources to the running of the ETCs.

    The ETCs have contributed modestly to global resettlement figures and to reducing protracted refugee case-loads in countries of first asylum. But they have provided a safe alternative for cases that could not be transferred directly to resettlement countries, thereby offering the only available durable solution to these refugees. For some refugees, without the ETCs, there would simply be no possibility of resettlement.

    In conclusion, the evolution in the operation of the ETCs shows a move away from their original vision. In the words of one interlocutor “there is nothing emergency about this process.” This has resulted in a situation whereby the policies and practices of resettlement countries to a large extent actually determine the use of the ETCs. Internal factors further impact upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the centres. Thus, replacing the first word of the acronym “ETC” with resettlement (“Resettlement Transit Centres”) would actually give a clearer indication of the main purpose of these centres, namely to support the realization of this durable solution. This could then also cover possible shifts or changes in their functions as RTCs continue to respond to the needs of different stakeholders. The sustainability of these centres must also be viewed in relation to UNHCR’s responsibility to manage the “pipeline” in cooperation with resettlement states.

    The key recommendations of this evaluation are directed to DIP’s Resettlement Service, the RRCE and CO Romania.

    https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/575935d17_0.pdf
    #Roumanie #République_Tchèque #ETC #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #réinstallation #évacuation #protection_d'urgence #Evacuation_Transit_Facility (#ETF) #hub
    –-> document de 2016, mis ici pour archivage

    via @pascaline

  • After peace deal, a bittersweet homecoming for CAR refugees

    ‘If we want to facilitate repatriations, we need to reinforce schools, water points, health centres.’
    More than six months after rebel groups in the Central African Republic signed a peace deal with the government, a trickle of refugees is returning back to the shattered country, but one in four Central Africans remain either internally displaced or living in neighbouring states.

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/photo-feature/2019/09/04/Central-African-Republic-refugees-peace-deal
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #retour_au_pays #République_centrafricaine #Centrafrique #Mongoumba #centres_de_transit