country:greece

  • The Wild Ancient Greek Drinking Game That Required Throwing Wine - Gastro Obscura
    https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/kottabos-ancient-greek-wine-spilling-game

    Spilling red wine may be the ultimate party foul, especially if it lands on the host’s couch or carpet. But for the ancient Greeks, a party wasn’t good unless the wine flowed freely. The Greeks didn’t just fling their glasses of wine about willy-nilly, though. This game of wine-slinging—known as kottabos—had a discernible target, and both pride and prizes were on the line.

    Kottabos had two iterations. The preferred way to play, which is the iteration often depicted in plays and especially on pieces of pottery, involved a pole. Players would balance a small bronze disk, called a plastinx, on top of it. The goal was to flick dregs of one’s wine at the plastinx so that it would fall, making a clattering crash as it hit the manes, a metal plate or domed pan that lay roughly two-thirds down the pole. The competitors reclined on their couches, arranged in a square or circle around the pole a couple of yards away. Each then took turns launching their wine from their kylix, a shallow, circular vessel with a looping handle on each side.

    A less common version of the game featured players aiming at a number of small bowls, which floated in water within a larger basin. In this case, the object of the game was to sink as many of the small bowls as possible with the same arcing shots. Since it lacked the resounding clang of the plastinx striking the manes, this version of kottabos has been regarded as the quieter, more civilized way to play.

    Technique was essential to maintain elegant form, accuracy, and to avoid spilling on oneself. The player, sprawling on a drinking couch and propped up on their left elbow, placed two fingers through the loop of one handle and cast the wine dregs in a high arc toward the target. The technique has been likened to the motion of throwing a javelin, due to the way the player threaded their fingers through the handle the same way one held the leather strap used to throw the spear.


    Since they were on campus, Dr. Sharpe and her students used diluted grape juice rather than wine. “Within about half an hour there was diluted grape juice everywhere, which made me realize it must have gotten pretty messy,” she says. “You’re aiming at the target, but the funny thing is these symposia were typically held in a more-or-less square room, and you had participants on 3 ½ sides. So if you missed the target it wouldn’t have been surprising if you hit someone across the room.”

    Emily Moore and Mara Jean O’Hara, two West Chester University students, play kottabos in Dr. Sharpe’s class. Dr. Heather Sharpe

    The recreation also proved that the temptation to take a shot at a rival across the room must have been strong. In fact, in Aeschylus’s play Ostologoi (The Bone Collectors), Odysseus describes how during a game of kottabos, Eurymachus, one of Penelope’s suitors, repeatedly aimed his wine at Odysseus’s head, rather than at the plastinx, to humiliate him. And it seems that players took the game seriously, too, in spite of their casual reclining poses. “It’s funny because they did seem to be pretty competitive about this,” says Dr. Sharpe. “The Greeks, in a strange way, loved competing against each other, whether in the symposium or out in the gymnasium.”

    Nonetheless, these were not high stakes contests. A winner might typically receive a sweet as a prize. Playing for kisses or other favors from attending courtesans (hetairai, as they were called) was also a possibility. Vases portraying kottabos reveal that women played the game as hetairai, too.

    A hetaira plays kottabos. Dave & Margie Hill / Kleerup / CC BY-SA 2.0

    But eroticism didn’t just stop at prizes. It was customary to dedicate one’s throw to a lover, with the implication that success at kottabos augured success in one’s love life. Others didn’t mince words. In one poem, Cratinus recalls a hetaira dedicating her shot to the Corinthian male organ: “It would kill her to drink wine with water in it. Instead she drinks down two pitchers of strong stuff, mixed one-to-one, and she calls out his name and tosses her wine lees from her ankule [kylix] in honor of the Corinthian dick.”
    It seems that kottabos’s free-wheeling nature and prizes weren’t enough to sustain it as a game, though. It eventually disappeared from artwork and plays, which suggests that it faded from popularity in the 4th century BC. The experiments of Dr. Sharpe and others aside, it seems unlikely to see a revival. Part of that might be due to how difficult it is to play, which doesn’t get any easier after players have had more than a few glasses of wine. The inevitable cleanup afterwards is a deterrent, too.


    A Kylix, shown from below. This one is housed at Berlin’s Altes Museum. Anagoria / CC BY 3.0

    Just ask Hugh Johnson, the wine expert and author, who once tried his hand at the game. “I have had a kottabos stand made, and practiced assiduously,” Johnson recalls in The Story of Wine. “From personal experience I can say it is not all easy … and it makes a terrible mess on the floor.”

    cc @tintin

    • Très intéressant !

      Et, en tirant les fils de la citation,

      Either way, the humour of the fragment depends on the audience’s ability to recognise the allusion to Euripides’ Stheneboea here see Stheneboea’s mournful longing for her lover become a typical comic woman’s desire for wine and sex.

      avec https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sthénébée
      et, as usual, WP[en]
      Stheneboea - Wikipedia
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stheneboea

      Stheneboea (Greek: Σθενέβοια; the “strong cow” or “strong through cattle”)
      […]
      Stheneboea, “cattle queen”
      Stheneboea is one of a number of female figures named for their role as “cattle queens”; they include Phereboia ("bringing in cattle"), and Polyboia ("worth much cattle"). In archaic Greece cattle were a source of wealth and a demonstration of social pre-eminence; they also signified the numinous presence of Hera. Cattle-queens, betokening the command of a large bride-price, are as familiar in Gaelic mythology as they are in Greek myth.

  • EU bank courts controversy with €1.5bn gas pipe investment
    https://euobserver.com/energy/140926

    he European Investment Bank (EIB) decided this week to invest €1.5bn in a natural gas pipeline connecting Italy, Greece, and Albania – despite MEPs having requested a vote on such preferential treatment given to fossil-fuel gas projects.

    The bank’s decision has been heavily criticised by environmental groups, who said it was “one of Europe’s largest ever loans to one of the EU’s largest fossil fuel projects”.

    Among the concerns is that the project will increase greenhouse gas emissions, and that the use of gas will be prolonged beyond what some scientists say is the final gas phase-out deadline if Europe is to keep up to its Paris treaty promises.

    The project is called the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and it is part of a larger concept, the Southern Gas Corridor.

    The latest would transport natural gas from Azerbaijan, through Turkey, to Europe. The TAP would be the last leg of the gas route.

    #énergi #gaz #balkans #adriatique #tube #guerre_des-tubes #russie #gazoducs

  • En 2017, un tiers des demandeurs d’asile placés sous procédure Dublin

    Les premières données statistiques sur la demande d’asile publiées le 16 janvier 2018, font apparaître plusieurs évolutions significatives. Il s’agit de données provisoires, les chiffres consolidés étant diffusés au printemps dans les rapports d’activité de l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA) et de la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA).

    Le ministère de l’Intérieur indique qu’un total de 100 412 demandes a été enregistré par l’OFPRA, soit une hausse de 17% par rapport à 2016. Les demandes de réexamens (7 582) sont relativement stables (+4%) tandis que les premières demandes (73 689) connaissent une hausse importante (+15%) tout comme le nombre de mineurs accompagnants (19 141 / +33%) rattachés aux dossiers de leurs parents. Le record de premières demandes établi en 2016 (63 935) est donc dépassé : jamais la France n’a enregistré autant de demandes d’asile.

    Les principaux pays d’origine des premières demandes enregistrées à l’OFPRA sont l’Albanie (7 630, +29%), l’Afghanistan (5 987, +6%), Haïti (4 934, stable), le Soudan (-24%) et la Guinée (+62%). La Côte d’Ivoire connait la hausse la plus significative parmi les principaux pays d’origine : le nombre de demandes, qui avait déjà fortement augmenté entre 2015 et 2016 (+48%), progresse de 111% (3 243).

    http://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/actualites/en-2017-un-tiers-des-demandeurs-d-asile-places-sous-procedure-dublin
    #statistiques #chiffres #Dublin #Règlement_dublin #asile #migrations #réfugiés #France #2017
    cc @isskein

    • Push for transfers at any cost – the Dublin system in 2017 : AIDA Comparative Report

      The 2017 Dublin Update, published by the Asylum Information Database, releases figures for 18 European countries revealing an increase in transfers in the aftermath of European Union and domestic political commitments for a stricter enforcement of the Dublin system.

      Germany continues to spearhead the Dublin system with a record-high 64,267 outgoing requests to other countries. France issued 41,500 requests, Austria 10,490 and Greece 9,784. With the exception of Greece, the majority of countries make marginal use of the family unity provisions (0.4% of requests in Slovenia, 1.5% in Switzerland, 4.1% in the United Kingdom) and the humanitarian clause of the Dublin Regulation (0% in Spain and the United Kingdom, 0.1% in Slovenia, 0.2% in Hungary and 0.9% in Romania). Most states overwhelmingly rely on the irregular entry criterion and applications previously made by asylum seekers in other countries.

      The number of transfers implemented in 2017 was 7,102 for Germany, 4,268 for Greece, 4,201 for Sweden and 3,760 for Austria. While the “transfer rate” of effective outgoing transfers to outgoing requests was 43.6% in Greece and 35.8% in Austria, Germany’s rate was only 11%, thereby indicating that the vast majority of Dublin procedures do not result in a transfer.

      The costs of this policy are palpable. Beyond pointing to an excessive and often unreasonable use of administrative and financial resources on the part of asylum authorities, the continued push for more Dublin transfers has translated into an expansion of abusive practices and deterioration of procedural safeguards in some countries. Asylum seekers are given transfer decisions before being able to lodge their asylum applications or to bring forward vulnerabilities or family links under a new procedure applied by Italy in its north-eastern region bordering Slovenia and Austria. In France, people are increasingly placed in detention during the weekend to be effectively deprived of the possibility to access legal assistance and challenge their transfer in France.

      Finally, the Dublin Update illustrates the widely disparate approaches taken by European states with regard to the safety of countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece.

      “The presumptions of mutual trust and equivalent standards have never held throughout the life of the Dublin system. Yet, to date, many governments continue to apply the Dublin Regulation even in the face of strong evidence of substandard asylum systems and reception conditions. These tactics at best subject asylum seekers to unduly long Dublin procedures never leading to a transfer; at worst, they send them to countries where their human rights are in jeopardy”, says Minos Mouzourakis, Senior AIDA Coordinator at ECRE.

      https://www.ecre.org/push-for-transfers-at-any-cost-the-dublin-system-in-2017

      Voici quelques données :


      –-> Bizarre ce tableau pour la #France... où il semblerait, en regardant ce tableau, qu’en 2017, aucun « outgoing transfert » ait été effectué...


      http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/aida_2017update_dublin.pdf
      #Europe #rapport

      In France, people are increasingly placed in detention during the weekend to be effectively deprived of the possibility to access legal assistance and challenge their transfer in France.

      #rétention #détention_administrative

      La #Suisse est en train de perdre son titre de #champion_des_renvois_Dublin (sic)
      #efficacité (sic)

    • On me répond que les statistiques de transferts Dublin pour la France ne sont pas disponibles... du coup, pourquoi ne pas le mentionner plus clairement sur le tableau au lieu de laisser croire que la France n’a transféré aucun dubliné ?

    • Petite précision d’une amie sur les dublinés à #Grenoble :

      Je dirais plutôt que la catégorie n’est pas renseignée comme s’ils n’avaient pas les chiffres.
      A Grenoble, on estime à 20% environ les transferts effectifs ; c’est à dire 20% de personnes en Dublin sont arrêtées, ensuite elles sont systématiquement transférées. Il n’y a plus de libération du CRA sans expulsion. Et ça tient au fait qu’ils entrent au CRA apres 18h et en sont embarqués vers 6h du matin.

    • How do Member States Return Unwanted Migrants? The Strategic (non‐)use of ‘Europe’ during the Migration Crisis

      This article analyzes how Member States have used the opportunities and avoided the constraints of the EU’s multilevel governance architecture to return unwanted migrants. Drawing on sociological approaches to the EU and a broad understanding of return policies, we investigate the ways in which the northern Member States, notably Germany and Austria, have increasingly relied upon the EU’s operational and financial resources to achieve their goal of pursuing a bold return policy. A key ‘usage’ of Europe has been the pooling of political and financial power to externalize and informalize its return policy. At the same time, the northern Member States’ deliberate – yet widely under‐researched – ‘non‐use’ of Europe, such as using and maximizing national leeway, has been an equally important strategy to reduce migratory pressure and achieve higher return rates.


      https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12621

  • SIREAS | Externalisation de la politique migratoire de l’UE : l’accord avec la Turquie
    https://asile.ch/2018/02/02/sireas-externalisation-de-politique-migratoire-de-lue-laccord-turquie

    À l’heure où les médias annoncent une rétrogradation des relations entre l’Union européenne et la Turquie, où des milliers de personnes sont en attente dans des conditions de vie très difficiles dans le camp de Moria en Grèce, l’article de Teresa Bevivino nous rappelle les enjeux importants de l’accord signé en mars 2016 entre l’Union […]

  • #Refugee_plus

    Refugees Plus is a digital media platform founded by a network of young refugee journalists who have first hand experience of what it means to be displaced. Refugees Plus aims to share the extraordinary success stories and challenges faced by refugees and displaced people.

    From Syria to South Sudan, the world has seen a record number of displaced people, with over 65 million people forced to flee their homes by conflict, persecution and natural disasters.

    This comes at a time of rising populism and xenophobia and rich countries closing their doors to those seeking safety. And the few who make it to destinations like Europe and America are portrayed as a security threat or economic burden by the media.

    International media attention on refuges stories and humanitarian crisis is increasingly becoming limited to geopolitical and strategic interest only instead of drawing attention to the plight of the women and children behind the headlines.

    As refugee journalists with industry standard experience, we come in to fill the gap and give voice to refugees and displaced people using the power of social media. We want to give a platform to the talented refugees contributing to their host countries including the entrepreneurs, the doctors, engineers, athletes and politicians. We also want to tell the stories of those trapped in camps, those making the treacherous sea and Sahara crossings as they flee persecution.

    We basically want to #TellOurOwnStories #WithRefugees


    http://refugeesplus.com

    #Refugeeplus #réfugiés #médias #journalisme #réfugiés_journalistes #journalistes_réfugiés #presse #raconter_sa_propre_histoire
    cc @isskein @reka

    • #ZINE

      ZINE is a platform for expression in the midst of uncertainty, an attempt to control one’s own narrative when circumstances and bureaucracy are wearing away at that right where the refugees of #Leros’ hotspot are concerned. Instead of an identity based in police paperwork, asylum applications, or case numbers, ZINE is composed of poetry, art, and personal narratives. It is that age-old rebel yell for humanity, this time coming from the hotspots of Greece. It is produced by Echo100Plus at The Hub – a community center on the island of Leros – where refugees who reside in RIC facilities (Reception and Identification Centers) are safe and welcome to attend classes and activities.

      https://issuu.com/echo100plus/docs/zine

  • Syrian Metal Is War - Full Documentary - YouTube

    Finalement le voilà le docu. J’avais complètement craqué sur ce merveilleux couple de musiciens syriens, leur voyage en forme d’épopée de Syrie aux Pays-Bas où ils se découvrent tout à coup... réfugiés !

    A ne rater sous aucun prétexte

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZP_HV-R-KGg&feature=youtu.be

    Thank you all for your unrelenting support since I started this project a little over four years ago. This film is intended to shed light and preserve the memories of metal artists and fans in war-torn Syria. It was filmed between mid-2013 and late 2014. The film is in no means extensive; it was filmed with a mobile phone and DSLR. Production, travelling, filming, and editing were minimal and utilized DIY methods. It was a personal endeavour and hence naturally limited to my own resources. The footage and project traveled with me across continents, starting in Syria and following through to Algeria, Turkey, Greece, and the Netherlands. I carried it with me while applying for asylum, and it kept me going despite being entirely depleted of both will and resources to continue. Sam Zamrik believed in the project since its conception and its possible effects in bringing exposure to this small, down-trodden Syrian community. He worked on the linguistic presentation of the film, including interviews, translations, and creative writing. Through crowd funding efforts, our friends in Switzerland managed to raise enough money for gear to edit and actually finish the film. Having finalized the film, my intent was to submit it to international festivals, since they would bring the most exposure to the artists. The intended runtime was two hours, but, having to accommodate festivals standards, I cut that to an hour and a half. Despite doing that, it wasn’t accepted. After several tries, I decided to bring the film to its audience; those who are truly interested, who have donated and supported us, and those in the film themselves. The film is now on YouTube. It is accessible to everyone for free. It now belongs to you and what you make of it. Having said that, we will be wholeheartedly accepting donations to the film, as opposed to ticket sales or any revenue. Lastly, we hope you all enjoy the film. Thank you all, Monzer Darwish. Syrian Metal Is War is a mosaic anthology of the different realities and personal experiences of metalheads in a war-torn Syria, the consequences they brought about, and the outpour of hope from destruction and chaos among peers who have only music and war in common.

  • Travelling Swallows

    who are we?
    we are afghan girls in the refugees’ camp in Greece. we are 4 girls from Afghanistan but from different cities
    Fateme is 16 years old .
    Atefe is 18 years old.
    Roya is 20 years old.
    Fahime is 23 years old.
    We are 4 best friends and created this blog ; beacuse ;we want to speak about a part of the hardship that we go through until we get to a safe place .
    Those immigrents have not come here for fun ,but have just traveld to Europe to have a safe place for themselves and their families and the future of their children...........
    And they have not made this easy.There are so many hardships that nobody can believe , but it’s true.
    It’s hard to walk for hours on the mountain and pass through sludge and stay a few nights in the gungle and the sea.It is not something that anyone can do easily with a women and child.........
    We ask you accompany us in this “journey”. Maybe through these stories you will feel a bit like the way we felt and understand us.

    We just write down a brief summary of these hardships.

    #blog #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_afghans #femmes #témoignage #Grèce #camp_de_réfugiés

    Reçu via mail par Laura Meli, avec ce commentaire :

    Oggi tocca a me. Da una settimana sono a Salonicco, con l’associazione QRT siamo attivi al campo di Diavata e Kavala, che accolgono rispettivamente 700 e 350 persone. Sono sollevata nel vedere che rispetto all’anno scorso le condizioni del campo sono migliorate, ma é triste ritrovare gli stessi visi. Oggi ho conosciuto una giovare ragazza afgana di 16 anni, partita due anni fa, ha trascorso 1 anno e mezzo al campo di Moria e ora con la sua famiglia hanno potuto raggiungere il campo sul continente. Questa ragazza ha creato un blog nel quale ha raccontato il suo viaggio, a partire dalla vita in Afganistan, il percorso fino a Moria e la vita al campo.

  • Revoliutsiia! Demonstratsiia! Soviet Art Put to the Test | The Art Institute of Chicago
    http://www.artic.edu/exhibition/revolutsiia-demonstratsiia-soviet-art-put-test

    Through January 15, 2018

    The October Revolution of 1917 changed the course of world history; it also turned Russia into a showcase filled with models. Every object and sphere of activity had to demonstrate how society could be remade according to revolutionary principles. It would take intensive experimentation and discussion to determine the shape of this unprecedented society. To be realized in any concrete way, communism had to be modeled and put on display.

    Soviet Art Put to the Test accordingly fills Regenstein Hall with ten model displays from the early Soviet era. Each of these sections, detailed below, holds rare works of art and features expert, life-size reconstructions of early Soviet display objects or spaces, commissioned especially for this exhibition.

    • Battleground: Posters from the Civil War years (1918–21) surround a “Lenin Wall” with three dozen works devoted to the first Soviet leader.
    • School: Rare works from Soviet art schools convey breakthroughs in abstraction. Many loans come from the storied Costakis art collection in Thessaloniki, Greece.
    • Theater: Model sets, props, and drawings bring to life classic Constructivist stagings that merged viewers and performers in a mass spectacle.
    • Press: A 14-foot multimedia kiosk built from a design by artist Gustav Klutsis and a suite of his original drawings anchor an extensive display of rare magazines and unique poster maquettes.
    • Factory: A 30-foot-long Workers’ Club designed by Aleksandr Rodchenko can be entered to see period books and magazines.
    • Exhibition: A reconstructed 1926 exhibition room by El Lissitzky features paintings by artists included in the original exhibition, among them Piet Mondrian, Francis Picabia, and Lissitzky himself.
    • Festival: A period model for Stalin’s Palace of the Soviets joins photographs of mass sports events and commemorative gatherings.
    • Cinema: A rotating program of Soviet cartoons and documentaries is shown in a space that evokes an agitprop train.
    • Storefront: Large picture windows showcase textiles, Constructivist advertisements, and Suprematist porcelain.
    • Home: Personal images of leading Soviet artists, porcelain figurines, and a painting by Socialist Realist Aleksandr Deineka populate a model interior also outfitted with furniture conceived for small or collective apartments.
    These ten displays—containing nearly 550 works—come together in the largest exhibition of Soviet art to take place in the United States in 25 years. Visitors have the opportunity to explore the trajectory of early Soviet art in all its forms and consider what it tells us about socially minded art now.

  • The Israeli Sports Minister Is Using the NBA to Further an Anti-Palestine PR Campaign

    The NBA in fact was shocked by Regev’s PR offensive. It may have been particularly disturbing for the league offices because Regev is best known for whipping up hatred against African migrants, calling them “a cancer” in 2012. She has also been accused of whipping up violence against these impoverished refugees. The NBA not only does a great deal of work in Africa, and it not only has several star players from the African continent, but their brightest young star is arguably Giannis Antetokounmpo, who was born to Nigerian migrants in Greece, where African immigrants have become the targets of Greek fascists exploiting the global refugee crisis—like Regev and Trump—to achieve political power.

    https://www.thenation.com/article/the-israeli-sports-minister-is-using-the-nba-to-further-an-anti-palestine

  • China’s Ambitious New ‘Port’: Landlocked #Kazakhstan

    China’s largest shipping company has poured billions of dollars into buying seaports in Greece and other maritime nations around the world. But the location of its latest big foreign investment has given a curious twist to the expanding ambitions of the #China_Ocean_Shipping_Company: The nearest ocean is more than 1,600 miles away.


    https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/asia/china-kazakhstan-silk-road.html
    #chine #port #transport_maritime #COSCO

  • Online property auctions attract interest from Russians, Chinese

    The low prices and the prospect of future capital gains, as well as the timing of Greece’s expected exit from the bailout program, have boosted the appeal of the local property market, not only in the eyes of foreign investment funds but also individual foreign investors from Russia and China.

    http://www.ekathimerini.com/224475/article/ekathimerini/business/online-property-auctions-attract-interest-from-russians-chinese

    #immobilier #grèce #spéculation #investissements_étrangers #investisseurs_étrangers #Chine #Russie

  • Migreurop | City Plaza Hôtel : un exemple emblématique de la solidarité à Athènes
    https://asile.ch/2017/12/28/migreurop-city-plaza-hotel-exemple-emblematique-de-solidarite-a-athenes

    Dès la fermeture du « corridor migratoire » (printemps 2016), la capitale grecque a vu ses rues se peupler de plus de 25’000 de personnes sans abri. Les squats, ouverts par des collectifs militants locaux s’opposent à la « politique d’encampement » appliquée par le gouvernement grec. Ces modes d’accueil alternatifs font écho à d’autres mobilisations organisées par des […]

    • « City Plaza Hotel will become your home in Athens » / Entre lieu de vie et espace politique, les enjeux d’appropriation d’un squat athénien

      « Que vous soyez à Athènes pour affaires ou pour votre loisir, vous serez comme chez vous au City Plaza. »1 Cet extrait du site internet de l’hôtel City Plaza d’Athènes, non actualisé depuis sa fermeture en 2010, est une présentation à l’attention des touristes qui s’apprêtent à y séjourner quelques jours. Rénové grâce à des fonds de l’État octroyés à l’occasion des Jeux Olympiques de 2004 puis fermé après sa faillite sans indemnisation de ses employés, cet hôtel trois étoiles fait figure de symbole de la crise grecque. Huit ans plus tard, c’est un « chez-soi » (home) dénué de toute valeur marchande que le Refugee Accommodation and Solidarity Space City Plaza, propose à ses nouveaux habitants. Le 22 avril 2016, une centaine de militants grecs et un groupe de réfugiés2 squattent le bâtiment pour fournir sur sept étages un logement à environ 350 réfugiés. Leur objectif est de montrer par un exemple concret et de grande envergure qu’une politique d’accueil solidaire au centre d’Athènes est possible. Ils placent en effet au cœur de leurs actions la critique « en pratique » (expression d’un local) de la politique migratoire de l’Union Européenne et du gouvernement grec, des conditions de vie dans les camps et des hotspots3. Pour cela, ils proposent en miroir un modèle incarné par l’appropriation d’un lieu commun et autogéré.

      http://www.revue-urbanites.fr/city-plaza-athenes-squat

    • Greece’s Tower of Babel: An unusual place

      City Plaza functions collectively with refugees and activists cooking, cleaning, and making decisions together.

      From the outside, City Plaza Hotel might not look like much, just another shabby building in the Greek capital of Athens, neglected during the years of the economic crisis. Step inside its doors to find a unique space for hundreds of people from all over the world: refugees.

      Their plan was never to stay in Greece. They had hopes of reaching northern Europe. But, once the “Balkan Route” closed in March 2016, those who had made the dangerous trip in rubber dinghies from Turkey had nowhere else to go.

      That’s when activists in Athens intervened and occupied spaces such as City Plaza, a hotel that had been abandoned years earlier, to prevent the weary travellers from sleeping in overcrowded camps or, even worse, in the streets of Athens, as many who could not find shelter were forced to do.

      Since it was occupied, City Plaza has become home to some 400 refugees and migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere. Unlike most refugee accommodations in Europe, City Plaza affords its guests a level of dignity they wouldn’t find elsewhere.

      People have private rooms and their own bathrooms. It’s an unusual space - where most asylum centres are hierarchical and segregated based on nationality, City Plaza functions collectively, with refugees and activists cooking, cleaning, living and making decisions together.

      In such a diverse space, things can easily get lost in translation. But people find a way to communicate, and when they can’t there are people such as Rabea, himself a refugee from Damascus, to make sure that Greek and international activists can communicate with the refugees and migrants living in City Plaza.


      http://www.migreurop.org/article2852.html

    • City Plaza, la #fin...
      Message reçu le 12.07.2019 de Vicky Skoumbi via la mailing-list de Migreurop:

      Après 39 mois de fonctionnement l’occupation City Plaza, un hôtel athénien transformé en lieu de vie et d’hébergement pour réfugiés a fermé. City Plaza avait accueilli 2.500 réfugiés dans un espace exemplaire, géré collectivement par les solidaires et par les réfugiés eux-mêmes. L’évacuation a été programmée par le collectif Solidarity 2 refugees qui a été à l’origine de l’occupation. La décision de ne plus continuer l’occupation fut prise en mai 2018 et depuis juin de la même année City Plaza n’acceptait plus de nouveaux arrivants. D’après le communiqué mise en ligne sur FB, la décision fut prise pour trois raisons :

      A) le refus de normaliser/légaliser une occupation qui s’est voulue un acte militant tandis que deux ordres successives d’évacuation du procureur restaient en attente.

      B) Un manque grandissant des moyens et de forces vives ; il fallait que chaque nuit un service de sécurité de huit personnes soit de garde afin d’assurer la sécurité des réfugiés qui pouvaient à n’importe quel moment devenir la cible d’une attaque de l’Aube Dorée ou d’autres groupuscules d’extrême droite, la possibilité d’une intrusion de la propriétaire accompagnée de ses sbires étant toujours en ligne de mire.

      C) Les élections et la formation d’un gouvernent de droite qui a déjà annoncé son intention d’y envoyer les CRS pour évacuer de force l’hôtel et en finir avec la soi-disant « anomie » de l’occupation ; ont précipité l’évacuation : il fallait protéger les migrants sans-papiers d’une arrestation qui pourrait être suivi d’un internement et d’une expulsion

      Tous les résidents de City Plaza ont été relogés dans des bonnes conditions, soit à d’autres occupations, soit à des appartements.

      Le collectif remercie tous ceux et celles ont soutenu d’une façon ou d’une autre et leur donne rendez-vous pour des nouveaux combats en commun

      Voir leur communiqué en anglais
      https://www.facebook.com/sol2refugeesen/posts/2117692658523066?__tn__=K-R

      39 months City Plaza: the end of an era, the beginning of a new one. (here is the text in Greek https://urlzs.com/dtFsv)

      Yesterday, on 10th July 2019, the keys of squatted City Plaza were handed back to the former employees of the hotel, to whom the mobile equipment in the building belongs. All refugees living at City Plaza have been moved to safe housing within the city.

      On 22 April 2016, the Economic and Political Refugee Solidarity Initiative squatted the empty City Plaza building with a two-fold goal: to create, on the one hand, a space of safety and dignity in which to house refugees in the centre of the city and, on the other, to create a centre of struggle against racism, borders, and social exclusion. For the freedom of movement and for the right to stay.

      The decision to squat was taken at a critical political juncture. On 18th March 2016, one month before the squat opened, the EU-Turkey deal to restrict the movement of refugees to Europe was signed. It was the deal that marked the end of the “summer of migration” - the period which began in July 2015 when, under pressure from approximately one million people, the European borders “opened”. This was the deal that turned the islands of the Aegean into a sort of prison for migrants, and which turned mainland Greece into a trap for over 60,000 people. The SYRIZA-ANEL government, following its capitulation to the neoliberal management of the economic crisis, took on the the implementation of a policy of control, deterrence and discouragement of migration. With Frontex and NATO patrolling the Aegean, with detention centres such as Moria on the islands, with awful camps as the only policy for housing refugees on the mainland, by punishing solidarity and the struggle of refugees. During that time, the housing issue was very pressing. The refugees who had arrived in Athens were either homeless or were being housed in the awful camps of Elliniko, Malakasa, or the port of Piraeus, while hundreds of people slept in tents or cardboard boxes in city streets and squares.

      It was while these were happening that a discussion began within the Economic and Political Refugee Solidarity Initiative, which led to the decision to squat City Plaza, a hotel on Acharnon street which remained shut for seven years. The decision had certain features of voluntarism, and was not justified by the forces in our disposal, nor by the state of the anti-authoritarian movement at the time. Yet it was a move which addressed the political situation and the great struggle of the refugees who had, over the previous months, opened the borders of Fortress Europe and thus won their right to freedom of movement. It also matched the massive and spontaneous social solidarity movement which developed along the length of the migration route.

      City Plaza as an example of dignified housing, space for social solidarity and cooperation between locals and migrants.

      From its inception, City Plaza was organized around two key goals:
      – to create a space for safe and dignified housing for migrants in the centre of the city, a space of solidarity and cooperation between locals and migrants.
      – to function as a centre of struggle in which political and social demands by migrants and locals will interweave and complement each other.

      CP proved in practice that the state policy of “hospitality” towards refugees is a mixture of harshness, incompetence, and political expediency. Where the solidarity movement, without any funding from formal institutions, without any “experts” or employees, managed to create one of the best housing spaces in the centre of the city, the state continued to abide by the trapping of refugees in makeshift camps and tents in the mainland, and by imposing a regime of refuting the rights of refugees and detaining them in hot spots on the islands, at the threat of deportation.
      This contrast was the key element which led to mass support for CP at the beginning of its operation, by individual activists, organizations/collectives of the left, as well as by people who joined the movement for the first time there. Of course, because of the ownership status of the hotel, there were several attacks “from the left” which, fully aligned with the narrative of the owner and the petty bourgeois rhetoric on the “supreme human right to property”, attempt to belittle the effort, by spreading conspiracy theories (ranging from claims that we’re being funded by Soros, SYRIZA, the German State, to claims that we traffic drugs, firearms, children, and sex workers), slandering the collective and the activists who are part of it.

      City Plaza proved in practice that refugees and locals can live together when, instead of isolation, punishment, and hatred, there is solidarity, struggle, and community. At the opposite pole from the camps, located outside the cities and in awful conditions, CP managed, in a difficult neighbourhood, until recently patrolled by neonazis, to brighten the formerly dark corner between Acharnon and Katrivanou, by giving it the character of security truly valued by those from below: the security of dignified housing, community, solidarity, and vitality of the people selflessly fighting for better lives.

      At the same time, dozens of people showed their solidarity around the world. Through their daily presence, their participation in shifts, positive attitude and a large-scale international campaign for the financial support of the project. Dozens of crates of food and other essentials were sent to Plaza, thousands of people and groups made donations to support the project, which relied solely on donations for its survival.

      City Plaza also served as a centre for struggle. Aiming to internationally denounce the anti-refugee policies of the SYRIZA-ANEL government and the EU, we brought to the fore topics such as criminal responsibility for shipwrecks and loss of human life, the delay or obstruction of sea rescue, the practice of illegal pushbacks in Evros and the Aegean, the conditions of imprisonment in hotspots. City Plaza hosted dozens of open discussions on the border regime, racism, the struggle for rights, often featuring contributions by well-known intellectuals from around the world, such as Judith Butler, Angela Davis, David Harvey, Alain Badiou, Sandro Mezzandra, among others. Yet the goal was not just to highlight issues relating to migrant struggles, but also to link them to the struggles of locals. In the rallies for International Worker’s Day, the Polytechnic Uprising, antifascist and feminist protests, the City Plaza block was present throughout the three years.

      The City Plaza community: Practices, Rights, Cooperation.

      The answer to the question of what City Plaza is is known to the thousands of people who passed through its doors: CP is a project for the realisation of a conception of everyday life which aims to empower those “from below”, in the constitution of a space of freedom, which practically realises an aspect of the society we envision.

      Its mode of operation expressed a politics of everyday life which is in opposition to the dominant model of managing migration, especially to its “NGOisation”. At the core of this voluntary contribution of time, effort, and emotion was not the “provision of services” to “the vulnerable” but the attempt to combat insecurity and fear, to empower and encourage confidence and trust in the collective. Help to refugees was re-politicised - and became solidarity and common struggle. Self-organisation, shared responsibility and decision making were central, as was a constant reflection on the inequalities permeating relations within the project: localisation, class, gender, language, education, etc.

      Despite the inherent contradictions and difficulties, the collective experience of organising everyday life was the foundation for building a strong community of solidarity. At the same time, in this context, and in contrast to dominant victimising narratives, refugees and migrants became dynamic subjects with an active role on social and political life.

      Daily life at CP was based on the principle of participatory organisation and collective decision making and operations, processes particularly complex in a community of 350 people speaking different languages, and with different ethnic, class, and social backgrounds, and different plans for the future. Regular coordination meetings became the space in which equal discussion took place on issues of operation and organisation, while House meetings were - especially in the beginning - a real lesson in how we can and should discuss, operate, and co-implement, as refugees and as locals. The organisation of residents and solidarians into working groups was a component of organising the project but also an essential basis for developing personal and political relationships amongst ourselves. The working groups were: Reception, Education, Children’s Activities, Health Centre, Kitchen, Security, Economics, Cleaning, Communications, as well as a self-organized Women’s Space.

      In its 36 months of operation, City Plaza hosted over 2,500 refugees from 13 different countries. About 100 of the 126 rooms of the hotel hosted 350 refugees at any one time, while the remaining 26 either served as communal spaces (classrooms, women’s space, storage space) or to host solidarians from around the world. It was, after all, City Plaza’s political choice to not serve as a housing space “for” refugees but as a space of cohabitation and shared everyday life.

      Yet we will not provide statistics referring to countries of origin, ages or ‘vulnerable” cases. In contrast, we will provide “statistics” on the enormous amount of resources that the movement was able to mobilise in order to keep City Plaza going:

      812,250 hot meals were prepared by the kitchen team

      74,500 work hours on security shifts

      28,630 hours of shifts at reception

      5,100 hours of language teaching and creative educational activities

      * 69,050 rolls of toilet paper

      However, the most important things cannot be counted. They have to do with human relationships, mutual respect and solidarity, emotions and experiences, optimism born out of common struggle.

      The end of an era, the beginning of a new one

      Such a project demands enormous resources. It is not a political squat which can stay closed for a couple of days in August without any problems. It is a space which demands a daily commitment, responsibility, and presence. Besides, the way we see it, self-organization is not automatic. To the contrary, it requires many hours of work, often endless processes of shared decision making, and interminable difficulties. In other words, self-organization and solidarity are not theory. They are action in the here and now. Action full of contradictions and life’s problems. In a society in which authoritarianism, war, capitalism, and competition between the subjugated is considered normal, while multiple divisions and hierarchies permeate us all, because of our origins, genders, and class backgrounds, self-organisation is not a slogan. It is a struggle.

      Unfortunately, as often happens in many self-organized projects, enthusiasm, commitment, and participation dwindle over time - especially when circumstances are so demanding. The fact that the overwhelming majority of City Plaza residents are in transit made it impossible to hand the operation of the squat completely over to the refugees as most of them, sooner or later, left for Europe. At the same time, the material resources required for a project of such size - for food, hygiene products, medications, building maintenance - became harder to come by, despite the fact that comrades throughout Europe have demonstrated extraordinary commitment.

      On the basis of all of the above, shortly before City Plaza celebrated its two-year anniversary, and following calls to collectives and spaces which supported the project from its inception, there opened a difficult and contradictory discussion on how long City Plaza can carry on, or whether and how it should adapt, given that we did not wish to see the project decline. There was a dilemma on whether we would move towards the direction of “normalising/ legalising” the squat or towards completing the project, while also looking for new ways to keep the community it created alive in a different context.
      The first option was found to be politically undesirable, as it clashes with City Plaza’s character as a political alternative to NGOisation, and leads to a disconnect between the issues of safe housing and collective struggle and rights demands more generally.

      We decided that, despite it being a difficult choice, City Plaza should rightly close the way it began and operated: as a political project, by protecting the central element which turned it into a example, that is organisation from below, safe and dignified living, community of struggle, and addressed to society as a whole.

      During the House meeting of 26th May 2018, we jointly decided on this direction - not without contradictions and disagreements - and there was an extensive discussion about how to implement such a decision. Beginning in June 2018, City Plaza did not accept new residents, while there was a collective commitment that the project would not wind down until every resident had found acceptable accommodation. This commitment was not at all simple to implement. The wider circumstances of dealing with the refugee question - both from the point of view of the SYRIZA-ANEL government and from the point of view of NGOs, did not provide an opportunity to provide institutionally guaranteed housing to residents, while other spaces and squats could not house such a large number of refugees, despite positive attempts to support this.

      One year on, and while the project was winding down, the expected change in the political landscape, with the imminent re-election of New Democracy, made it imperative to once more address the pace at which the project is progressing towards its close, taking into account the fact that, over the past several months, several refugees had gradually moved to safe housing. Plaza has two pending court orders for its evacuation, while high-ranking New Democracy members made daily references to the “destruction of private property” and the “lawlessness” at City Plaza. In this respect, evacuation could be used as a deterrent, while many refugees, especially those with no fixed legal status, could face disproportionate consequences (deportation, detention, etc.). Even though, for some, an evacuation by New Democracy could be seen as a “heroic exit”, for which few political explanations would need to be given, nevertheless most City Plaza residents would be put in danger, especially in view of their already vulnerable and unstable status.

      This reconfirmed the decision to bring City Plaza to a close, on a collective basis and in our own terms. All refugees found safe housing. In the almost eighteen months between the decision to shut down and its implementation, most refugees moved on towards Northern Europe. Out of those who remained at City Plaza, some had the opportunity to rent their own place, as they had since found employment, while others still resorted to collective solutions. Through shared spaces and other housing projects which we have already put in place, along with the impossibly persistent network of all the people who actively participated in the project (refugees and solidarians), the community will continue to exist long after the building has been abandoned.

      City Plaza’s closure is linked to the wider movement’s inability to develop effective forms of organization, mobilisation, and discourse on the refugee questions, which match the demands of the time. It is true that many parts of the wider social movement decided on different degrees of involvement, being unable to support the project and/or develop similar ones, which would galvanise our efforts through a new dynamic. This position is not apportioning blame, but highlights the project as part of a wider social and political process, reflecting the ideological-political and organisational crisis within the movement, with which we will have to deal in the next phase.

      City Plaza was an invaluable political experience for all who took part, but also a political event far greater than the sum of its parts. Without exaggeration, CP was the pan-European symbol which concentrated resistance to the racist and repressive migration regime of the EU, following the closure of the borders after the EU-Turkey deal was signed. Equally, it served as a strong counter-example at a time of pessimism and demobilisation for the left, and a time of resurgence for the far right.

      City Plaza was a great struggle which, like all great struggles, cannot be counted as a clear victory or a clear defeat. It is a chapter in antiracist and migration struggles and, at the same time, an experiment in social movements, an unexpected mix of different needs, sociopolitical, gendered, and class experiences. This meeting, like every mixture, needs some time for the multiple experiences to settle and leave their trace on our individual and collective consciousness.In this milieu, new forms of resistance, struggle, and relationships of cooperation and solidarity will form - in Athens as well as in the dozens of cities at which City Plaza residents will arrive, as well as in the daily struggles against the barbarism or racism and repressive policies. Σ

      The City Plaza collective was, from the beginning, aware of its contradictory makeup. The alternative it proposed could not but me incomplete, dependent on the circumstances in which it was born and the subjective capacities of the movement and its people, with their brains, hearts, and bodies. Yet it was also restricted, like every struggle for rights and equal participation, which impinges on the power of capitalist exploitation, the imposition and reproduction of nationalist, racist, and gendered hierarchies and divisions.

      City Plaza is a link in a chain of struggles for social emancipation. A peculiar struggle, as it began from the small and the everyday, from how to cook the food and how to clean the building, and extended to resistance to the border regime and to multiple levels of discrimination. For those of us who took part in it, CP was an opportunity to redefine and to reflect on political thought and practice, relations of power, everyday life, cohabitation and its terms, self-organisation and its contradictions. We say goodbye to S(p)iti Plaza with one promise: to transfer this rich experience, to continue to enrich and broaden the ways and the places of common struggle.

      Solidarity will win!

  • Slavoj Žižek · The Non-Existence of Norway · LRB 9 September 2015

    https://www.lrb.co.uk/2015/09/09/slavoj-zizek/the-non-existence-of-norway

    The Non-Existence of Norway

    Slavoj Žižek on the refugee crisis

    The flow of refugees from Africa and the Middle East into Western Europe has provoked a set of reactions strikingly similar to those we display on learning we have a terminal illness, according to the schema described by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross in her classic study On Death and Dying. First there is denial: ‘It’s not so serious, let’s just ignore it’ (we don’t hear much of this any longer). Then there is anger – how can this happen to me? – which explodes when denial is no longer plausible: ‘Refugees are a threat to our way of life; Muslim fundamentalists are hiding among them; they have to be stopped!’ There is bargaining: ‘OK, let’s decide on quotas; let them have refugee camps in their own countries.’ There is depression: ‘We are lost, Europe is turning into Europastan!’ What we haven’t yet seen is Kübler-Ross’s fifth stage, acceptance, which in this case would involve the drawing up of an all-European plan to deal with the refugees.

    What should be done? Public opinion is sharply divided. Left liberals express their outrage that Europe is allowing thousands to drown in the Mediterranean: Europe, they say, should show solidarity and throw open its doors. Anti-immigrant populists say we need to protect our way of life: foreigners should solve their own problems. Both solutions sound bad, but which is worse? To paraphrase Stalin, they are both worse. The greatest hypocrites are those who call for open borders. They know very well this will never happen: it would instantly trigger a populist revolt in Europe. They play the beautiful soul, superior to the corrupted world while continuing to get along in it. The anti-immigrant populist also knows very well that, left to themselves, people in Africa and the Middle East will not succeed in solving their own problems and changing their societies. Why not? Because we in Western Europe are preventing them from doing so. It was Western intervention in Libya that threw the country into chaos. It was the US attack on Iraq that created the conditions for the rise of Islamic State. The ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic between the Christian south and the Muslim north is not just an explosion of ethnic hatred, it was triggered by the discovery of oil in the north: France and China are fighting for the control of resources through their proxies. It was a global hunger for minerals, including coltan, cobalt, diamonds and copper, that abetted the ‘warlordism’ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s and early 2000s.

    If we really want to stem the flow of refugees, then, it is crucial to recognise that most of them come from ‘failed states’, where public authority is more or less inoperative: Syria, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, DRC and so on. This disintegration of state power is not a local phenomenon but a result of international politics and the global economic system, in some cases – like Libya and Iraq – a direct outcome of Western intervention. (One should also note that the ‘failed states’ of the Middle East were condemned to failure by the boundaries drawn up during the First World War by Britain and France.)

    It has not escaped notice that the wealthiest countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar) have been much less open to refugees than the not so rich (Turkey, Egypt, Iran etc). Saudi Arabia has even returned ‘Muslim’ refugees to Somalia. Is this because Saudi Arabia is a fundamentalist theocracy which cannot tolerate foreign intruders? Yes, but Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil revenues makes it a fully integrated economic partner of the West. There should be serious international pressure on Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait and Qatar and the Emirates) to accept a large contingent of the refugees, especially since, by supporting the anti-Assad rebels, the Saudis bear a measure of responsibility for the current situation in Syria.

    New forms of slavery are the hallmark of these wealthy countries: millions of immigrant workers on the Arabian peninsula are deprived of elementary civil rights and freedoms; in Asia, millions of workers live in sweatshops organised like concentration camps. But there are examples closer to home. On 1 December 2013 a Chinese-owned clothing factory in Prato, near Florence, burned down, killing seven workers trapped in an improvised cardboard dormitory. ‘No one can say they are surprised at this,’ Roberto Pistonina, a local trade unionist, remarked, ‘because everyone has known for years that, in the area between Florence and Prato, hundreds if not thousands of people are living and working in conditions of near slavery.’ There are more than four thousand Chinese-owned businesses in Prato, and thousands of Chinese immigrants are believed to be living in the city illegally, working as many as 16 hours a day for a network of workshops and wholesalers.

    The new slavery is not confined to the suburbs of Shanghai, or Dubai, or Qatar. It is in our midst; we just don’t see it, or pretend not to see it. Sweated labour is a structural necessity of today’s global capitalism. Many of the refugees entering Europe will become part of its growing precarious workforce, in many cases at the expense of local workers, who react to the threat by joining the latest wave of anti-immigrant populism.

    In escaping their war-torn homelands, the refugees are possessed by a dream. Refugees arriving in southern Italy do not want to stay there: many of them are trying to get to Scandinavia. The thousands of migrants in Calais are not satisfied with France: they are ready to risk their lives to enter the UK. Tens of thousands of refugees in Balkan countries are desperate to get to Germany. They assert their dreams as their unconditional right, and demand from the European authorities not only proper food and medical care but also transportation to the destination of their choice. There is something enigmatically utopian in this demand: as if it were the duty of Europe to realise their dreams – dreams which, incidentally, are out of reach of most Europeans (surely a good number of Southern and Eastern Europeans would prefer to live in Norway too?). It is precisely when people find themselves in poverty, distress and danger – when we’d expect them to settle for a minimum of safety and wellbeing – that their utopianism becomes most intransigent. But the hard truth to be faced by the refugees is that ‘there is no Norway,’ even in Norway.

    We must abandon the notion that it is inherently racist or proto-fascist for host populations to talk of protecting their ‘way of life’. If we don’t, the way will be clear for the forward march of anti-immigration sentiment in Europe whose latest manifestation is in Sweden, where according to the latest polling the anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats have overtaken the Social Democrats as the country’s most popular party. The standard left-liberal line on this is an arrogant moralism: the moment we give any credence to the idea of ‘protecting our way of life’, we compromise our position, since we’re merely proposing a more modest version of what anti-immigrant populists openly advocate. And this is indeed the cautious approach that centrist parties have adopted in recent years. They reject the open racism of anti-immigrant populists, but at the same time profess that they ‘understand the concerns’ of ordinary people, and so enact a more ‘rational’ anti-immigration policy.

    We should nevertheless reject the left-liberal attitude. The complaints that moralise the situation – ‘Europe is indifferent to the suffering of others’ etc – are merely the obverse of anti-immigrant brutality. They share the presupposition, which is in no way self-evident, that the defence of one’s own way of life is incompatible with ethical universalism. We should avoid getting trapped in the liberal self-interrogation, ‘How much tolerance can we afford?’ Should we tolerate migrants who prevent their children going to state schools; who force their women to dress and behave in a certain way; who arrange their children’s marriages; who discriminate against homosexuals? We can never be tolerant enough, or we are always already too tolerant. The only way to break this deadlock is to move beyond mere tolerance: we should offer others not just our respect, but the prospect of joining them in a common struggle, since our problems today are problems we share.

    Refugees are the price we pay for a globalised economy in which commodities – but not people – are permitted to circulate freely. The idea of porous borders, of being inundated by foreigners, is immanent to global capitalism. The migrations in Europe are not unique. In South Africa, more than a million refugees from neighbouring states came under attack in April from the local poor for stealing their jobs. There will be more of these stories, caused not only by armed conflict but also by economic crises, natural disasters, climate change and so on. There was a moment, in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, when the Japanese authorities were preparing to evacuate the entire Tokyo area – more than twenty million people. If that had happened, where would they have gone? Should they have been given a piece of land to develop in Japan, or been dispersed around the world? What if climate change makes northern Siberia more habitable and appropriate for agriculture, while large parts of sub-Saharan Africa become too dry to support a large population? How will the redistribution of people be organised? When events of this kind happened in the past, the social transformations were wild and spontaneous, accompanied by violence and destruction.

    Humankind should get ready to live in a more ‘plastic’ and nomadic way. One thing is clear: national sovereignty will have to be radically redefined and new methods of global co-operation and decision-making devised. First, in the present moment, Europe must reassert its commitment to provide for the dignified treatment of the refugees. There should be no compromise here: large migrations are our future, and the only alternative to such a commitment is renewed barbarism (what some call a ‘clash of civilisations’).

    Second, as a necessary consequence of this commitment, Europe should impose clear rules and regulations. Control of the stream of refugees should be enforced through an administrative network encompassing all of the members of the European Union (to prevent local barbarisms like those of the authorities in Hungary or Slovakia). Refugees should be assured of their safety, but it should also be made clear to them that they must accept the destination allocated to them by European authorities, and that they will have to respect the laws and social norms of European states: no tolerance of religious, sexist or ethnic violence; no right to impose on others one’s own religion or way of life; respect for every individual’s freedom to abandon his or her communal customs, etc. If a woman chooses to cover her face, her choice must be respected; if she chooses not to cover her face, her freedom not to do so must be guaranteed. Such rules privilege the Western European way of life, but that is the price to be paid for European hospitality. These rules should be clearly stated and enforced, by repressive measures – against foreign fundamentalists as well as against our own racists – where necessary.

    Third, a new kind of international military and economic intervention will have to be invented – a kind of intervention that avoids the neocolonial traps of the recent past. The cases of Iraq, Syria and Libya demonstrate how the wrong sort of intervention (in Iraq and Libya) as well as non-intervention (in Syria, where, beneath the appearance of non-intervention, external powers such as Russia and Saudi Arabia are deeply involved) end up in the same deadlock.

    Fourth, most important and most difficult of all, there is a need for radical economic change which would abolish the conditions that create refugees. Without a transformation in the workings of global capitalism, non-European refugees will soon be joined by migrants from Greece and other countries within the Union. When I was young, such an organised attempt at regulation was called communism. Maybe we should reinvent it. Maybe this is, in the long term, the only solution.

    #norvège #réfugiés #asile

  • MIGRATORY FLOWS IN NOVEMBER : ARRIVALS DOWN IN ITALY AND GREECE, RISE IN SPAIN
    http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/news/migratory-flows-in-november-arrivals-down-in-italy-and-greece-rise-in

    http://frontex.europa.eu/thumb/Images_News/2017/B33I4720.prop_300x.fe14a18856.JPG

    In November, 13 500 irregular border crossings were detected on the four main migratory routes into the EU, 27% fewer than a year ago.

    The total number of migrants detected on these routes in the first eleven months of this year fell by 62% to around 186 500 from the same period in 2016.

    Central Mediterranean

    The number of migrants arriving in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route in November fell by a tenth from the previous month to 5 300 due to worse weather conditions, following a usual seasonal pattern.

    The total number of arrivals for the first 11 months of 2017 dropped by a third to around 116 400 compared to the same period of last year. Nigerians made up the largest number of irregular migrants coming to Italy so far this year, accounting for one of every seven arrivals. They were followed by nationals of Guinea, Ivory Coast and Bangladesh.

    Western Mediterranean

    Spain continued to see a high number of irregular migrants, with 3 900 arriving in November, more than three times the figure from a year ago. This was also the highest monthly number of migrants detected on this route since Frontex began collecting data in 2009.

    More than half of the migrants were nationals of Algeria and Morocco, whose numbers have been on the rise since the middle of this year. Most of the remaining migrants on this route come from Western Africa.

    Between January and November, there were more than 21 100 detections of irregular border crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, up 140% from the same period of last year.

  • Readmission of asylum seekers to Turkey: What that means for human rights and integration possibilities?

    Recent research into the readmission of asylum seekers to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement has shed light on key concerns, such as discrimination on the grounds of nationality and barriers to effective human rights monitoring. Likewise, implementation of the Statement was found to prioritise returns, rather than people’s access to asylum.

    This Statement which came into force in March 2016 was put forward as a solution to the refugee crisis as it aimed “to end the flow of irregular migration from Turkey to the EU and replace it with organised, safe and legal channels to Europe.” It further aimed to fast-track asylum procedures and, in the case of negative decisions, facilitated returns to Turkey. In exchange, EU member states agreed to take one Syrian refugee from Turkey for every Syrian readmitted from Greece to Turkey.

    http://www.migrationnewssheet.eu/features/readmission-of-asylum-seekers-to-turkey-what-that-means-for-human
    #accord_ue-turquie #chiffres #statistiques #Turquie #Grèce #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réadmissions
    cc @i_s_

  • Greece to speed up migrant transfer after Turkey deal

    Greece will speed up the relocation of thousands of migrants from its overcrowded islands to the mainland before the onset of winter after reaching a deal with Turkey, a key ally in helping to tackle Europe’s migration crisis, government sources said yesterday (11 December).

    Athens persuaded Ankara last week to accept migrant returns, including Syrian refugees, from the mainland and not just from the Aegean islands as previously agreed under a 2016 EU-Turkey pact, a government source told AFP.

    http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/greece-to-speed-up-migrant-transfer-after-turkey-deal
    #new_deal #accord #Grèce #Turquie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #îles #mer_Egée #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés_syriens #accord_UE-Turquie
    cc @isskein @i_s_

  • Migrants in Libya : Pushed away, pulled back

    As EU policies drive migrants away, Libyan authorities push them into dire detention centres. For some who reach Europe, it is worth the risk

    http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/migrants-libya-pushed-back-pulled-back-409483752
    #pull-back #push-back #Libye #externalisation
    #renvois #expulsions #retour_au_pays #prostitution #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nigeria #trafic_d'êtres_humains :

    Eight years ago, Joy was a teenager when she was offered a job as a nanny in London. In the event, she was flown by plane to Milan, and ordered to work off a nearly $60,000 debt as a sex worker.

    When Joy fled to what she thought was the safety of her home in southern Nigeria’s Edo State however, it turned out to be “hell”.

    “Returning was one of the worst things I could have done,” she said.
    Her local recruiters repeatedly threatened the lives of her family for cash. Joy’s uncle beat her, and sold her off to be married twice.

    Et qu’est-ce qu’elle fait Joy quelques années après ?

    Years later, she resolved to return to Italy for a better life, by land through Libya, with her eyes open. “Everyone knows the story about Libya,” she said. “We all know it is dangerous.”

    • Dopo la Libia, l’inferno è in Italia: le donne nigeriane di #Castel_Volturno

      A Castel Volturno le donne nigeriane arrivano dopo essere passate dalla Libia. Qui le aspetta la paura del «juju», la prostituzione nelle case chiuse, lo sfruttamento. Finché non finiscono di pagare il debito che hanno contratto per arrivare in Italia. Sara Manisera e Federica Mameli sono state a parlare con loro nelle «connection house» di Castel Volturno.

      http://openmigration.org/analisi/dopo-la-libia-linferno-e-in-italia-le-donne-nigeriane-di-castel-voltu

    • UNHCR expresses concern over lack of rescue capability in Mediterranean, but condones Libyan coast guard pull back operations

      While UNHCR rightly calls for a change in EU practices, it fails to acknowledge or address the serious problems with the Libyan coast guard’s pull back practices in Libyan territorial waters – practices enabled and funded by the EU. UNHCR’s latest statement on this subject condones EU-funded Libyan coast guard pull back practices.

      From Jeff Crisp (@JFCrisp): “A simple question for UNHCR and IOM: Should asylum seekers who leave Libya by boat have an opportunity to submit an application for refugee status elsewhere, rather than being summarily intercepted and forcibly returned to and detained in the country of departure? Because UNHCR’s global policy says: ‘persons rescued or intercepted at sea cannot be summarily turned back or otherwise returned to the country of departure, including in particular where to do so would deny them a fair opportunity to seek asylum.’”

      UNHCR’s statement: “UNHCR continues to be very concerned about the legal and logistical restrictions that have been placed on a number of NGOs wishing to conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations, including the Aquarius. These have had the cumulative effect of the Central Mediterranean currently having no NGO vessels conducting SAR. Should NGO rescue operations on the Mediterranean cease entirely we risk returning to the same dangerous context we saw after Italy’s Mare Nostrum naval operation ended in 2015 and hundreds of people died in an incident on the central Mediterranean Sea. UNHCR welcomes the rescue efforts of the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), as without them more lives would have been lost. Nonetheless, with the LCG now having assumed primary responsibility for search and rescue coordination in an area that extends to around 100 miles, the LCG needs further support. Any vessel with the capability to assist search and rescue operations should be allowed to come to the aid of those in need. UNHCR reiterates that people rescued in international waters (i.e. beyond the 12 nautical miles of the territorial waters of Libya) should not be brought back to Libya where conditions are not safe. The largest proportion of deaths have been reported in crossings to Italy, which account for more than half of all deaths reported this year so far, despite Spain having become the primary destination of those newly arrived. More than 48, 000 people have arrived there by sea, compared to around 22,000 in Italy and 27,000 in Greece. There is an urgent need to break away from the current impasses and ad-hoc boat-by-boat approaches on where to dock rescued passengers. UNHCR reiterates that in recent months, together with IOM, we have offered a regional solution that would provide clarity and predictability on search and rescue operations.”

      https://migrantsatsea.org/2018/11/12/week-in-review-11-november-2018

  • German Foreign Ministry rejects additional winter aid for refugees on Greek islands
    http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2017/12/11/greece-turkey-germany-refugees-migrants

    The German Foreign Ministry has made it clear that it will not provide additional winter assistance to refugees on the Aegean islands. In a related question from German newspapers, the foreign ministry replied that “responsibility for accommodating and feeding refugees falls under the jurisdiction of each country.”

    According to dpa, the Foreign Ministry recalled that Berlin recently funded the installation of 135 heated containers for a total of 800 people in two camps in the Thessaloniki region and that the EU has allocated up to now 1.4 billion euros to tackle the refugee crisis in Greece.

    Meanwhile, there is media report that Greece has persuaded Turkey to accept migrant returns from the mainland in order to reduce critical overcrowding in its refugee camps.

    The Kathimerini daily said the agreement came during a strained two-day state visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan this week, during which he angered his hosts with talk of revising borders and complaints about Greece’s treatment of its Muslim minority.

    The deal is in addition to Turkey’s existing agreement to take back migrants from Aegean island camps, under the terms of an EU-Turkey pact.

    • #Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations

      Frontex, the EU’s border agency, has been heavily criticised for failing to provide adequate staff and resources to its own Fundamental Rights Office, a problem that “seriously hinders the Agency’s ability to deliver on its fundamental rights obligations.”

      The criticisms come in a report from the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, an independent advisory body made up of experts from other EU agencies, international organisations and NGOs.

      As well as noting an ongoing “reluctance” to provide the Fundamental Rights Office with “sufficiently qualified staff,” the Consultative Forum report raises concerns over Frontex’s role at the Serbian-Hungarian border, a failure to update and effectively implement codes of conduct and a complaints mechanism, and the lack of independent monitoring of forced return operations coordinated by the agency.

      See: Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights - Fifth Annual Report (pdf): http://statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-on-fundamental-rights-report-2017.pdf

      Fundamental rights sidelined

      While the Consultative Forum exists to provide “independent advice” to Frontex’s executive director and management board and is staffed voluntarily, the Fundamental Rights Officer is a Frontex official tasked with “contributing to the Agency’s fundamental rights strategy… monitoring its compliance with fundamental rights and… promoting its respect of fundamental rights.”

      The Officer has to oversee a large organisation - Frontex foresaw (pdf: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Programming_Document/2018/Programming_Document_2018-2020.pdf) having 352 staff at the end of 2017, and 418 by the end of this year - yet “lacks the minimum capacity to carry outs its role,” according to the Consultative Forum, with just four staff working alongside the officer and one member of secretarial staff.

      The report states that “the lack of adequate staffing seriously hinders the Agency’s ability to deliver on its fundamental rights obligations including on key areas such as Frontex operational activities, the newly established complaints mechanism or the protection of children.”

      The Consultative Forum has come up against its own problems in attempting to carry out its tasks. According to Article 70(5) of the Frontex Regulation adopted in 2016, “the consultative forum shall have effective access to all information concerning the respect for fundamental rights.”

      Yet the report complains that the Forum “continues to face serious and further limitations” on access to information, “particularly in relation to relevant operational reference and guiding documents.” Despite “repeatedly raising this concern with Frontex management,” it is yet to receive a “final response or constructive proposal.”

      Given that Frontex operational documents have included (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm) instructions for border guards to target “migrants from minority ethnic groups, and individuals who may have been isolated or mistreated during their journey,” the need for access to such information by fundamental rights monitoring bodies is clear.

      In this regard, the Consultative Forum highlights that “external oversight” - for example by the European and national parliaments and civil society groups - “remains of particular importance”.

      The Hungarian-Serbian border

      In November 2016 the Consultative Forum recommended that Frontex teams be withdrawn from the Hungarian-Serbian border due to fundamental rights concerns, but the Executive Director rebuffed the proposal, arguing that Frontex’s presence can “minimise potential risks related to the use of force” and can assist in documenting “circumstances on the ground.”

      Indeed, the positive effect of Frontex presence on national border guards has been noted elsewhere - following a trip to the Bulgarian-Turkish border, French MEP Marie-Christine Vergiat reported NGOs as saying that “whenever a Frontex officer was involved in a [Bulgarian border guard] patrolling group, there were no abuses.” (http://bulgarianpresidency.eu/marie-christine-vergiat-teaming-bulgarian-turkish-border-guards-)

      However, given the European Commission’s decision to launch an infringement procedure against Hungary for new asylum legislation that includes automatic detention, limitations on legal assistance and measures for automatic expulsion, the Forum reasserted its recommendation.

      The agency has apparently “significantly reduced the number of deployed officers and assets in Hungary,” according to the report, but a number remain in place and the Consultative Forum warns that the developments in Hungarian law and practice “have further exacerbated the risks of Frontex being involved in serious fundamental rights violations.”

      Complaints mechanism and codes of conduct

      The need for Frontex to establish a complaints mechanism so that individuals can seek redress for potential fundamental rights violations that they may have suffered during operations coordinated by the agency is a long-standing issue (https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/speech.faces/en/73745/html.bookmark), and the 2016 Regulation (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1624) introduced such a mechanism (in Article 72), to be overseen by the agency in cooperation with the Fundamental Rights Officer.

      There is now, however, a need to implement this mechanism and the Consultative Forum’s report notes that:

      “The rules should, among other points, provide further details on the respective roles of the different actors involved in the procedure, specify the timeframe for the processing of complaints, and provide for the possibility of anonymous complaints. In this context the Consultative Forum reiterates its calls for the allocation of more technical staff and means to the Fundamental Rights Officer.”

      The Forum also highlights the agency’s decision to discard its recommendations on the ’Code of Conduct for all persons participating in Frontex activities’, which would have seen the inclusion of “specific references to omissions or failures to act or to the prohibition to obey or obligation not to comply with and report instructions that are illicit or against international, EU or national legislation, the Code of Conduct or the legal framework of the activity.”

      The agency is also redrafting its ’Code of Conduct for Return Operations and Return Interventions’, which is expected to be adopted this year. The Forum notes that it is “essential to strengthen the wording relating to the legal framework and, in particular, fundamental rights obligations such as the right to an effective remedy,” and makes a number of specific proposals.

      Monitoring of forced return operations

      In 2017 the agency coordinated and/or co-financed 341 forced return operations - 150 national return operations (involving just one Member State), 153 joint return operations (involving one or more Member State) and 38 collecting return operations, in which the authorities of non-EU states are involved in the “collection” of their own nationals.

      Of these 341 operations, a human rights monitor accompanied 188 of them, just 41% of the total, but nevertheless an increase on the previous year. However, the report indicates that a particularly low number of national return operations - 20 of 150 - were monitored.

      The report also notes 50 “readmission” operations from Greece to Turkey conducted by Frontex, in the framework of the EU-Turkey deal. Only 22 of these were monitored. The Forum recommends treating readmission operations in the same way as return operations, “in order to make use of the already existing standards for return operations (code, monitoring, escorts training, etc.).”

      The list goes on

      Other problems for the Consultative Forum in 2017 include a failure to prioritise the revision of Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy (now foreseen for adoption sometime this year), the need to “mainstream” gender perspectives and issues into Frontex activities, and some issues with the terminology deployed in the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community reports, such as references to “illegal” migrants and referring to operations by the Libyan Coast Guard as “rescues”.

      Elsewhere, the Consultative Forum notes good progress made on updating measures to try to ensure the protection of children and migration and the identification of minors at risk of abuse. Nevertheless, for an agency whose “mission” is “to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter,” it seems that the former is being given priority over the latter.

      http://statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #condamnation #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • AIDA Country Report : #Portugal

    The new Country Report on Portugal, the 21st country covered by the Asylum Information Database, provides a detailed account of the country’s legal framework, policy and practice relating to the asylum procedure, reception conditions, detention of asylum seekers and content of international protection.

    Portugal has been at the centre of the implementation of the relocation programme from Italy and Greece, with a total 1,507 asylum seekers relocated so far. Asylum seekers arriving in the country through relocation had initially had their cases fast-tracked, though this trend seems to have subsided due to the increasing number of cases before the Aliens and Borders Service (SEF), the authority responsible for examining asylum claims.

    Portugal has also set up a special coordination framework bringing together different reception providers in the context of relocation. Relocated asylum seekers benefit from an 18 to 24-month support programme by service providers such as the Platform for Reception of Refugees (PAR), followed by the Portuguese Refugee Council (CPR), the Municipality of Lisbon, União de Misericórdias, the Portuguese Red Cross, and other municipalities. Provisional figures suggest that one third of relocated asylum seekers in working age who are now coming to the end of the 18-month integration programme have secured employment in Portugal.

    Reception arrangements for relocation run parallel to the reception system already established for spontaneously arriving asylum seekers, whereby reception responsibility is allocated to different actors depending on the type and stage of procedure an applicant is in. Asylum seekers in the regular procedure receive reception conditions from the Institute of Social Security (ISS), in admissibility and accelerated procedures by CPR, in appeal procedures by Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa (SCML), and in the border procedure by the SEF.

    The border procedure remains a crucial feature of the Portuguese asylum system, as it foresees systematic detention of asylum seekers pending the examination of inadmissibility and accelerated procedure grounds at the border, which lasts 7 days. A total 260 applicants had their claims processed in detention at borders and transit zones in 2016, the vast majority in Lisbon airport. The border procedure is applied to asylum seekers, with the exception of certain categories of vulnerable groups. Whereas unaccompanied children and families were previously exempted from detention at the border, a change in practice has been witnessed in 2016, whereby these persons are only released from detention and allowed into the territory after a couple of weeks.

    In 2016, Portugal registered 1,469 asylum applications, predominantly from Syria, Eritrea, Ukraine and Iraq. All four nationalities were granted protection at a nearly 100% rate by the SEF. Nationals of Ukraine and Iraq, as well as some Syrian nationals, are only granted subsidiary protection, meaning that they are entitled to shorter residence permits and more stringent rules on travel documents and naturalisation than refugee status holders.

    https://www.ecre.org/aida-country-report-portugal
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #statistiques #chiffres #accueil #logement #hébergement #procédure_d'asile #détention_administrative #rétention #relocalisation #vulnérabilité #travail #santé #éducation

    Lien vers le #rapport :
    http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_pt.pdf

  • Human rights violations by design : EU-Turkey statement prioritises returns from Greece over access to asylum

    The EU-Turkey-Statement proposes to reduce arrival rates and deaths in the sea by subjecting individuals who arrive on Greek islands after 20 March 2016 to fast-track asylum procedures and, in the case of negative decisions, to returns to Turkey. In exchange, EU member states have agreed to take one Syrian refugee from Turkey for every Syrian readmitted from Greece to Turkey. The Statement builds on the deterrent effect of returns and turns high return rates into an indicator for a successful border policy. This policy brief examines the impact of the Statement’s focus on returns for people seeking asylum in Greece. The analysis draws on interviews with asylum seekers and practitioners, phone interviews with people who were returned from the Greek islands following the EU-Turkey Statement, as well as on participant observations at refugee camps and inter-agency meetings on Lesbos and Chios in July and August 2017.

    http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/48904
    #accord_ue-turquie #Turquie #Grèce #réfugiés #asile #migrations #réfugiés #droits_humains #protection

    • Post-deportation risks under the EU-Turkey statement : what happens afThis policy brief examines whether asylum seekers readmitted from Greece to Turkey after the EU-Turkey Statement as of April 2016 were able to access effective protection in Turkey thereafter (see graph, return trend, p. 2). The EU has long collaborated with countries of origin and transit in the form of migration compacts, readmission agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. The EU-Turkey Statement is different from prior forms of agreements because of the use of the safe-third-country concept. As a result, Greece can reject asylum applications of people who passed through Turkey as being inadmissible and shift the responsibility of merit assessments to Turkey.ter readmission to Turkey?

      http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/49005

    • EU Policies Put Refugees At Risk

      A lack of leadership, vision, and solidarity based on human rights principles are at the core of the European Union’s dismal response to refugee and migration challenges. The mismanagement and politicization of a surge in boat migration in 2015, when over one million migrants and asylum seekers traveled to the EU by sea, has led to a humanitarian and political crisis largely of the EU’s own making that needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency.

      If chaos characterized the response of the EU and its member states in 2015, wrong-headed and rights-abusing policies have defined 2016. Instead of providing for safe and orderly channels into the EU for asylum seekers and refugees and sharing responsibility for them equitably, the EU and its member states have endorsed policies designed to limit arrivals and to outsource responsibility to regions and countries outside of the EU. The deeply flawed deal with Turkey and problematic cooperation with the Libyan authorities reflect this approach.

      Individual member states have rolled back asylum rights at a national level and the European Commission has proposed an overhaul of the common European asylum system that is more informed by a logic of deterrence than a commitment to basic human rights. Far from ensuring the right to family reunification, over the past year numerous EU countries have restricted the right to bring family members to safety, and there is a discernible trend towards granting subsidiary—temporary—protection over refugee status. Proposed changes to the EU directives governing procedures, qualification for asylum, and reception conditions include some positive measures but also measures to punish asylum seekers for moving from one EU country to another, obligatory use of “safe country” and “internal flight alternative” concepts to deny protection, and compulsory reviews to enable revoking refugee status and subsidiary protection.

      The European Commission has also advocated changes to EU aid and foreign policy that would direct them towards migration control objectives rather than improving respect for human rights. The Partnership Framework for relations with third countries represents a clear articulation of the EU’s goal, significantly re-energized over the past 18 months, to intensify migration cooperation with countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia with the objectives of preventing irregular migratory flows to Europe and facilitating the removal of rejected asylum seekers and other irregular migrants from EU territory.

      In the same period EU member states have largely failed to implement the September 2015 emergency relocation mechanism scheme, which in spite of its limited scope stands as the only effort to date to more equitably share responsibility for the recent arrivals to Greece and Italy. As of mid-November, only 7,224 asylum seekers had been relocated.

      To date in 2016, over 343,000 have managed to reach European shores by sea, while at least 4,646 have died or gone missing at sea. A substantial proportion of those arriving come from refugee producing countries such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Such people are fleeing generalized violence, war, and serious human rights abuses. Many others are seeking to escape economic deprivation and may not qualify for asylum.

      The numbers of arrivals are down from 2015, when over one million migrants and asylum seekers survived the dangerous journey to the EU. But 2016 is proving even deadlier than 2015, when at least 3,671 died or went missing in the attempt. Border closures and a deeply flawed deal with Turkey contributed to reducing the numbers of those crossing from Turkey to Greece, while crossings from North Africa, particularly Libya, have kept pace with previous years.

      In November 2015, Human Rights Watch urged the EU and its member states to take concrete actions to reduce the need for dangerous journeys, address the crisis at Europe’s borders, fix the EU’s broken asylum system, and ensure that EU cooperation with other countries improves refugee protection and respect for human rights. This document, one year later, shows that the EU has gone in the opposite direction.

      Throughout this document, we use the terms migrant, asylum seeker, and refugee within the meaning of existing international law. The term migrant describes the wide range of people on the move; it is intended as an inclusive rather than an exclusive term. A migrant may also be an asylum seeker or refugee. An asylum seeker is someone who has or intends to apply for international protection in a country other than her own. A refugee is a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution in her country of origin. A migrant who has crossed international borders without a need for international protection may, following a fair procedure in which their individual circumstances have been assessed and their rights have been guaranteed, be returned involuntarily to their country of origin if this return can be done in a safe and dignified manner. All persons, regardless of status, have inalienable human rights.

      https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/eu-policies-put-refugees-risk

      –-> Dans ce rapport, pas mal d’info sur Dublin...

  • Ai Weiwei’s Human Flow is a major work, but what does the defense of immigrants entail? - World Socialist Web Site
    https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2017/11/15/flow-n15.html

    Ai Weiwei’s Human Flow is a major work, but what does the defense of immigrants entail?
    By Eric London
    15 November 2017

    In Human Flow, Ai Weiwei’s remarkable documentary on mass immigration, the Chinese expatriate artist and director includes a clip from an interview with Greek Migration Minister Yiannis Mouzalas, a member of that country’s ruling Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA).

    –----

    Human Flow review – Ai Weiwei’s urgent look at the scale of the refugee crisis | Film | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/aug/31/human-flow-review-ai-weiwei-refugee-crisis

    The international co-productions of the mid-20th century often boasted myriad shooting locations in far-flung places. Who would have guessed the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei would pick up where moguls such as Sam Spiegel left off.

    Ai’s new film, Human Flow, while certainly epic in scope, is not exactly meant as entertainment. This is an urgent, deep soak in the current refugee crisis. There has been no dearth of documentaries about this topic, but this one comes closest to understanding the totality of the issue.

    –----

    Review: Ai Weiwei’s ‘Human Flow’ Tracks the Global Migrant Crisis - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/movies/human-flow-review-ai-weiwei.html

    There are moments in “Human Flow,” a bracing, often strangely beautiful movie by the artist Ai Weiwei, when it can be hard to see the individuals who make up the roiling, surging rivers onscreen. This difficulty in isolating specific people — really seeing them as sovereign beings rather than as an undifferentiated mass — is crucial to the meaning of the documentary, which charts the global refugee and migrant crisis. Shot over the course of one year in 23 countries, the movie tracks the here and there of people whose relentless ebbing and flowing make startlingly visible what news headlines repeatedly suggest: that ours is an age of ceaseless churn with no calm in sight.

    #art #réfugiés #migrations #Ai_Weiwei

    • Between Ai Weiwei and Bashar al-Assad, we wonder

      On a fine early afternoon in late March a young German-Iranian friend and I walked into the Garage Gallery at the Fire Station in Doha, Qatar - and we wondered.

      We were there to see the famous Chinese artist Ai Weiwei’s “Laundromat”: “A traveling installation”, as the official description of the exhibition says, “that brings the current European migrant crisis into sharp focus.” We had read before that “the work is centered around a vast makeshift camp near the village of Idomeni, on the border with the Republic of Macedonia. As part of his recently released documentary #Human_Flow, Ai Weiwei has borne witness to the brutal plight of refugees worldwide.”

      Borne witness? Does the brutal plight of refugees worldwide - those from Syria in particular - need a witness? Surely. But how - we wondered. How can an artist, a work of art, transcend the mundane materiality of human wherewithal (a brush, a camera, a pen, a pair of washed and ironed pants) to reach for the quintessence of a man-made calamity? If the principle (but by no means the only) culprit of the Syrian catastrophe is Bashar al-Assad, what can Ai Weiwei teach us to better bear witness to the crooked timber of our time?


      https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ai-weiwei-bashar-al-assad-180426071333625.html
      #Laundromat

  • The Right to the City in an Age of Austerity

    In Greece, resistance to austerity comprises a mosaic of struggles for a right to the city, conceived as the collective self-determination of everyday life.

    When talking about Greece and “the crisis,” it is easy to fall in the trap of “Greek exceptionalism.” After all, it is through essentializing orientalist narratives that austerity and structural adjustment have been justified: the Greeks are corrupt, lazy and crisis-prone, and they should be adapted and civilized for their own good.

    https://roarmag.org/magazine/right-city-age-austerity

    #Grèce #austérité #orientalisme #crise