• Dossier Libia. Abusi e violazioni sull’altra sponda del Mediterraneo

    Stiamo assistendo ormai da tempo ed impotenti da parte dell’Italia e dell’Unione Europea al tentativo di “sigillare” i confini e le frontiere dell’Europa, motivando queste azioni come necessarie al contrasto dell’immigrazione irregolare ma con lo scopo reale di impedire, scoraggiare, bloccare o diminuire i flussi migratori diretti in Europa.

    Tra giugno 2014 e giugno 2017 sono arrivate via mare in Italia 550 mila persone, la gran parte proveniente dall’Africa subsahariana – Nigeria ed Eritrea i paesi di origine più rappresentati – su imbarcazioni partite dalla Libia. Da luglio 2017 la frequenza degli arrivi è calata sensibilmente, come effetto degli accordi che Italia e Unione Europea hanno stretto con la Libia e con altri paesi di transito dei migranti, come il Niger.

    Nel 2018 il calo degli sbarchi e degli arrivi in Italia è dell’81% (111.478 al 31.10.2017 contro i 21.578 del 31.10.2018).

    Sul fronte della gestione dei flussi in partenza, il nuovo governo italiano non ha cambiato quasi nulla rispetto al precedente, scegliendo di proseguire con le politiche tracciate dall’ex ministro dell’Interno, Marco Minniti, che aveva notevolmente ridotto le partenze attraverso accordi con la Libia e altri paesi africani.

    L’attuale Governo ha introdotto però una nuova modalità di gestione delle imbarcazioni che partono dalla Libia, rafforzando la collaborazione con la guardia costiera libica allo scopo di aumentare i respingimenti e rendere sempre più complicato il salvataggio in mare. Anche la “strategia” della criminalizzazione dele associazioni e delle Ong impegnate nel Mediterraneo nelle operazioni di Sar hanno prodotto un progressivo e quasi totale “svuotamento” degli operatori civili.

    Grazie a programmi di distrazione dei fondi per la cooperazione e agli accordi economici con governi che di democratico hanno solo il nome (dalla Turchia di Erdogan alla Libia di Al Serraj), stiamo assistendo ad una impressionante crescita del business legato all’immigrazione ed al traffico di esseri umani. Come prima conseguenza, si è accresciuto il dramma di migliaia di donne, uomini e minori, profughi in viaggio, ricattati e detenuti in Libia dalle milizie “governative” o meno.

    Le violenze, gli stupri, le torture, i ricatti a carico dei migranti rinchiusi nei lager libici sono oramai un “fatto” documentato da moltissimi media e giornalisti internazionali.

    L’Italia e l’Europa si stanno macchiando di veri e propri crimini contro l’umanità.

    La “politica” di “scambio di denaro” contro quella di “scambio dei diritti” è semplicemente inaccettabile.

    Ognuno di noi ha il dovere e il diritto di denunciare tutto questo, di indicare i responsabili, i colpevoli ed i mandanti di queste politiche disumane.

    Nel dicembre del 2017, il Tribunale Permanente dei Popoli ha emesso una sentenza che rende evidenti le responsabilità delle politiche europee rispetto a quanto sta avvenendo in Libia, sancendo de facto la diretta corresponsabilità dell’Italia e dell’Unione Europea, definendo quando accade in Libia e “le oggettive conseguenze di morte, deportazione, sparizione delle persone, imprigionamento arbitrario, tortura, stupro, riduzione in schiavitù, e in generale persecuzione contro il popolo dei migranti, un crimine contro l’umanità”

    Il nostro progetto

    #DOSSIERLIBIA si propone come uno strumento di informazione, controinformazione e denuncia. Accorpare, aggregare, riunire in un unico strumento di comunicazione e di denuncia tutti gli atti, inchieste, articoli, le interviste, i video, le analisi che sono state raccolte e pubblicate dai media nazionali ed internazionali, compresi i rapporti delle Ong come Amnesty, Human Rights watch, Medu e altre.

    Ma pubblicheremo anche materiale inedito, come i video e le registrazioni che ci arrivano dai lager libici tramite le nostre reti di attivisti.

    #DOSSIERLIBIA sarà uno strumento di denuncia ma anche di #advocacy e pressione rivolto al Governo italiano e al Consiglio d’Europa, al Commissario europeo per la Giustizia, i diritti fondamentali e la cittadinanza, all’Alto rappresentante dell’Unione per gli Affari Esteri e la Sicurezza, Commissario per i Diritti Umani del Consiglio d’Europa, alla Cedu Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, all’Onu.

    Un’altra finalità del nostro progetto, attinente al lavoro di contenzioso strategico avviato da Asgi e da molti altri soggetti a livello nazionale e internazionale, è quella di dimostrare la responsabilità giuridica dell’EU e dei Paesi membri (in particolare dell’Italia) nelle operazioni di soccorso forzato operate dalla guardia costiera libica, in collaborazione, se non sotto la direzione, della Marina Italiana o delle agenzie UE.

    IL PORTALE WEB è lo strumento essenziale per dare corpo al nostro progetto. Lo abbiamo realizzato con le garanzie di massima sicurezza, sia per evitare attacchi informatici che per garantire la massima tutela delle fonti, come la protezione dell’anonimato delle denunce e delle persone con le quali siamo in contatto.

    Aggiorneremo di continuo tutte le notizie che giungono dalla Libia e abbiamo predisposto una sezione per ricevere segnalazioni, in maniera protetta, ed essere un possibile supporto ad azioni di difesa (cosa peraltro avvenuta recentemente grazie alla rete attiva con contatti locali in Libia ed in Europa).

    NOTA – Abbiamo già una mappatura/archivio di articoli stampa, nazionali ed internazionali, ma in particolare abbiamo attivi dei contatti che sono estremamente importanti per la ricezione di documentazione che ovviamente non possiamo più gestire con i mezzi classici (email, whats’app, sms). Tutte le realtà con le quali siamo in contatto in via formale ed informale ci hanno chiesto di avviare con estrema urgenza questo strumento di denuncia e di possibile azione concreta per sottrarre alle reti di trafficanti i migranti in transito in Libia.


    https://dossierlibia.lasciatecientrare.it
    #Libye #fermeture_des_frontières #externalisation #migrations #asile #réfugiés

  • L’UE compte sur la Serbie pour bloquer les réfugiés

    Des agents de la Frontex devraient bientôt être déployés en Serbie. L’objectif : sécuriser les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne contre de nouvelles arrivées de réfugiés. Mais Belgrade espère aussi marquer des points auprès de Bruxelles pour accélérer son intégration...

    En Serbie, on ne s’agite au sujet des migrations illégales qu’en cas d’incident, supposément provoqué par les réfugiés, ou à l’occasion d’un rapport sensationnaliste concernant leur « séjour prolongé » dans le pays. Mais l’annonce du déploiement prochain d’hommes de Frontex, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, à ses frontières a provoqué l’émoi de la population et des médias.

    Que signifierait donc un accord conclu entre Frontex et la Serbie ? Rien de spécial. La Serbie pourrait ainsi se rapprocher de l’Union européenne en termes de politiques de gestion des migrations. En pratique, cela signifierait seulement qu’aux passages frontaliers, les policiers serbes seraient épaulés par des membres des forces de l’ordre d’un État-membre de l’UE, missionnés par Frontex. Ces derniers seraient mobilisés aux frontières sud de la Serbie, mais aussi à celles de l’Albanie et de la Macédoine, pays des Balkans avec lesquels Frontex a signé un accord identique.

    « Protéger les frontières de l’UE »

    La réponse « rien de spécial » doit néanmoins être considérée moins d’un point de vue administratif que d’un point de vue colonial. Le développement de la coopération avec Frontex ne représente pas seulement la poursuite du dialogue avec l’UE, mais également une sorte de « délégation de sa souveraineté ». Cette délégation ne serait pas forcément inopportune dans une perspective d’intégration, mais le rapport de domination exercé par Bruxelles sur Belgrade laisse peu de marge de manœuvre à la Serbie.

    Les médias serbes ont expliqué que les représentants de Frontex « protégeraient les frontières de l’UE ». Certes, certains secteurs au sein de l’UE sont considérés comme « poreux », mais la vague de réfugiés de 2015 a complètement bousculé la perspective. Les frontières avaient alors été « ouvertes » sur la route des Balkans et le corridor contrôlé, assurant le transit des candidats à l’exil jusqu’à leur destination finale dans l’ouest et le nord de l’UE. La signature de l’accord entre Bruxelles et Ankara en mars 2016 en a marqué la fermeture définitive. Tout le monde pensait alors que le problème des migrations illégales massives serait résolu, mais la contrebande n’a fait que croître tandis que la sécurité des réfugiés et des migrants était davantage mise en danger.

    De nouvelles « zones de sécurité »

    Il y a quelques mois, l’accueil en logements collectifs pour des personnes débutées de leurs demande d’asile dans l’UE a également été évoqué. Les rumeurs selon lesquelles ces centres d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile seraient construits dans les pays des Balkans ont récemment été confirmées par les sommets des Etats autrichien et allemand. La mise en place de telles structures ne serait pas envisageable en Serbie, qui accueille déjà environ 4000 migrants qui souhaitent poursuivre leur route vers l’UE, soit les 2/3 de ses capacités totales d’accueil (6000 places). La tâche d’empêcher les migrants de pénétrer dans l’UE a été confiée à la Turquie où se trouvent actuellement plus de 3,5 millions de réfugiés syriens.

    Jusqu’à présent, la gestion des réfugiés en Serbie a été clairement définie par les politiques de l’UE relatives aux migrations illégales et en conformité avec l’agenda européen. Dans cette optique, le déploiement de la mission Frontex dans les pays non-européens serait de limiter le déplacement libre des migrants et des réfugiés, sous le prétexte de « lutter contre les migrations illégales ».

    Le temps dira si cet engagement s’inscrit dans la logique du renforcement des Balkans comme « zone de sécurité » entre l’UE et les pays tiers. Une situation similaire s’était produite en 2000. Les « politiques de développement » incitaient l’Albanie, la Macédoine, le Kosovo et la Serbie à « trier » les citoyens avant de les autoriser à voyager dans l’UE. En a résulté en l’adoption des accords de réadmission et de retour. L’action coordonnée entre ces États et l’UE a fait qu’aujourd’hui il n’y a de moins en moins de demandeurs d’asile en provenance de l’Europe du sud-est au sein de l’UE. Reste à savoir si les pays des Balkans sauront ainsi discipliner les personnes qui ne sont pas leurs citoyens, ou si Frontex s’en chargera.

    https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/serbie-ue-frontex-refugies

    #Frontex #asile #migrations #frontières #réfugiés #anti-chambre #fermeture_des_frontières #militarisation_des_frontières

  • #Calais police using #drones to arrest migrants before they cross Channel

    Police in Calais are using drones to locate migrants preparing to cross the Channel by boat, so that they can be arrested before they reach the water.

    In an escalation of security measures, the remotely controlled aerial vehicles have been seen flying low above the main Calais Migrant camp and sweeping across nearby beaches.

    Drones can cover much more ground in much less time than other vehicles, and are able to relay a live video camera feed.

    Ingrid Parrot, from the French Naval headquarters for the Channel and North Sea, said: “What we are trying to do with the police is exchange information and stop the migrants reaching the sea.

    “Our aim is to stop people on the beach reaching the water.

    “In the last three weeks, we have increased the number of ships and helicopters in the area to dissuade the migrants from attempting to go out to sea.

    “The police, I understand have also increased their numbers on the ground to stop people getting into boats.”

    Ms Parrot would not be drawn into giving specific figures because she did not want the smugglers to be alerted to the scale of the operation.

    “There are many people involved,” she added.

    The move has come after a recent spike in attempted crossings of the English Channel by predominantly Iranian migrants.

    On Tuesday, two men were picked up in St Margret’s bay, Kent at 3pm, having crossed the world’s busiest shipping lane in nothing more than a small dinghy in broad daylight.

    They presented themselves as Iranian, and were taken into custody by border force agents.

    On Wednesday, four men who said they were Iranian were picked up by the side of the road in Lincolnshire, having seemingly overshot the Kent coastline.

    Lincolnshire Police said: “The four men aged 30, 29, and two aged 31, were arrested by officers in the Roman Bank area of Mablethorpe at around 7.30pm on December 4. “It was reported these men had arrived by boat.”

    In France, there was activity too.

    Eight men in a pleasure craft were caught by police while trying to set sail across the channel from a beach just north of Boulogne-sur-Mer.

    A police spokesperson said that four of the migrants were Iranian and four were Iraqi. None were injured or taken to hospital, and all were taken into custody.

    In the strangest incident of the evening, a man radioed for help while struggling in a seven-metre pleasure cruiser in shallow waters near Equihen-Plage, just south of Boulogne-sur-Mer.

    He abandoned ship when it became clear that no boat was able to tug him away.

    It emerged that the craft had been bought the day before by a man who claimed to be British, and suspicions have been raised that he may have been trying to smuggle migrants across the channel.

    One coastguard insider said: “You don’t buy a boat like that at this time of year and take it out on the water at night. I think it’s quite clear what he was trying to do, and that was go round the corner and try and pick up a group of migrants.”

    The Telegraph visited the beach on Wednesday evening and saw the boat beached on the sand at low tide, with its propeller jammed into the sand and a life jacket left in the cabin.

    The man who abandoned ship had apparently not been back.

    https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/05/calais-police-using-drones-track-migrants-cross-channel
    #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #UK #France #Angleterre #mer #contrôles_frontaliers

    • #Coquelles : encore de nouveaux barbelés sur l’#A16 au-dessus du site de #Eurotunnel

      Depuis mardi, des ouvriers installent des barbelés « concertina » sur le pont de l’A16 qui surplombe les rails menant au Tunnel à Coquelles. C’est la raison pour laquelle une voie est neutralisée sur plusieurs centaines de mètres dans le sens Boulogne-sur-Mer – Calais.

      Des centaines d’usagers de l’autoroute A16 ont dû les apercevoir. Ce mercredi après-midi, sous la pluie, ils étaient encore à pied d’œuvre. Depuis mardi, des ouvriers installent des barbelés, dits « concertina », sur le pont de l’A16 qui surplombe les rails menant au Tunnel. Résultat, dans le sens Boulogne-sur-Mer – Calais, la voie de droite est neutralisée sur plusieurs centaines de mètres.

      Cette nouvelle installation est un moyen d’empêcher les migrants d’accéder aux voies ferrées, situées plusieurs mètres plus bas, et de rejoindre au péril de leur vie l’Angleterre. Elle fait suite à l’implantation de barbelés sur un autre pont, à quelques centaines de mètres de là, à hauteur de la tranchée de la Beussingues, à Peuplingues, en juillet.

      Cet été, la communication d’Eurotunnel avait parlé « d’une sécurisation accrue à la demande de la préfecture du Pas-de-Calais suite à une intrusion ». Des travaux sur l’A16 « dans un deuxième temps » avaient été annoncés. Nous y sommes. Les ouvriers devraient terminer cette partie du pont ce jeudi, selon la Direction interdépartementale des routes. Ils s’occuperont de l’autre côté du pont du 7 au 10 octobre. Là encore des perturbations de circulation sont à envisager. Pour rappel, en décembre, un migrant avait frôlé la mort. Il s’était jeté du pont avant d’atterrir sur une navette en marche et être électrocuté à plusieurs reprises.

      https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/642863/article/2019-09-26/coquelles-encore-de-nouveaux-barbeles-sur-l-a16-au-dessus-du-site-de-eu
      #militarisation_des_frontières #barbelé #fil_barbelé #barrières_frontalières

  • Dieser Zaun stoppt niemanden - weil keiner kommt

    In der Flüchtlingskrise baute Österreich eine Sperranlage an der Grenze zu Slowenien. Drei Jahre später laufen noch immer Soldaten Streife an diesem Zaun. Die Zahl der ertappten Migranten: überschaubar.

    Man könnte das Gras wachsen hören, in der Geister-Zeltstadt von #Spielfeld an Österreichs Südgrenze zu Slowenien. Totenstill ist es in den Riesenzelten für Tausende Menschen, die seit drei Jahren hier stehen, leerstehen.

    Grashalme sprießen durch die Ritzen im Asphalt unter einem Zeltdach. Die Holzplankenböden mit Hunderten Liegen wurden längst abgebaut. Wie auch die elektronischen Anzeigetafeln, die einst den Weg zum nächsten Dixi-Klo wiesen. In den blauen Containerbüros neben den Zelten und meterhohen Sperrgittern lagern kaum benutzte Computer und Fingerabdruckscanner. Denn der erwartete Ansturm der Migranten ist bisher ausgeblieben.

    Die sattgrünen Hänge hoch, am Graßnitzberg über Spielfeld, ragen rostende Pfosten aus der Erde. Hier auf Holger Hagens Weingut wollte der Staat Österreich ein Stück Grenzzaun befestigen. Der Winzer jedoch wollte das nicht. Und so kommen seither Abend für Abend junge Wehrpflichtige zur Lücke im Zaun, zur Nachtwache. Sie bauen olivgrüne Zelte auf und machen Feuer, tratschen und rauchen, frieren und wachen. Bloß Migranten tauchen keine auf. Nicht ein einziger.

    Das war einmal anders: Im Oktober 2015 stand das 1000-Einwohner-Örtchen Spielfeld im Zentrum der Flüchtlingskrise - als Durchgangsstation für Zehntausende Migranten auf ihrem Weg über die Balkanroute ins „Gelobte Land“: Merkels Bundesrepublik. Menschen aus dem Treck durchbrachen Absperrungen, passierten teils unregistriert die Grenze. Eisenbahnstrecken und Straßen mussten gesperrt werden, einige Migranten verließen das provisorische Flüchtlingslager, campierten im Freien und verbrannten Klamotten, weil ihnen so kalt war. Gerüchte über Plünderungen gingen um in Spielfeld; keines erwies sich als wahr.

    Man müsse nun „so rasch wie möglich an einer Festung Europa bauen“, forderte Österreichs damalige Innenministerin Johanna Mikl-Leitner von der konservativen ÖVP. Und die rot-schwarze Wiener Regierung rüstete auf. Sie ließ am Übergang Spielfeld eine zentrale Kontrollstelle errichten: das sogenannte Grenzmanagementsystem mit Gittern, Zelten, Containern, Scannern. Links und rechts neben der Station rammten Arbeiter und Soldaten Pfosten in die Erde. Und befestigten einen Grenzzaun aus Maschendraht: mindestens 2,50 Meter hoch, fast fünf Kilometer lang, quer über die Hügel und Weinberge.

    Der Zaun von Spielfeld sollte die Migranten kanalisieren. Verhindern, dass sie über die grüne Grenze kommen, sie zur Kontrollstelle zwingen. Er war ein Novum: die erste Sperranlage zwischen zwei EU-Staaten, die zum Schengenraum ohne Binnengrenzen gehören.

    „Der Zaun, der passt schon so“

    Aber als der Zaun Anfang Februar 2016 einsatzbereit war, da war er de facto schon wieder überflüssig. Denn es kamen kaum noch Flüchtlinge. Das Innenministerium in Wien räumte auf SPIEGEL-Anfrage ein: „Am Grenzzaun Spielfeld wurden keine illegal Einreisenden aufgegriffen.“

    Trotzdem sagt Reinhold Höflechner: „Der Zaun, der passt schon so“. Der Bürgermeister der Gemeinde Straß, zu der Spielfeld gehört, glaubt: „Er schreckt Schlepper ab.“ Und: „Gerade entwickelt sich eine neue Route über den Balkan. Da sind Tausende unterwegs, die könnten bei uns von der Tür stehen.“ Höflechner ist ÖVP-Mitglied, wie Mikl-Leitner und der jetzige Bundeskanzler Sebastian Kurz. Dessen Regierung hält fest an der Sperranlage: „Die Infrastruktur beim Grenzmanagement in Spielfeld wird aufgrund der aktuellen Lageentwicklungen entlang der Balkanrouten derzeit nicht abgebaut“, schreibt das Innenministerium. Geführt wird es von Herbert Kickl von der rechten FPÖ.

    Und so steht der Drahtzaun noch immer da. Er durchschneidet die Landschaft, trennt Nachbarn und zwei befreundete Staaten mitten in Europa voneinander. Vielen auf dem Graßnitzberg missfällt das. „A Bledsinn is’ des“, sagt eine ältere Weinbäuerin. „An Zaun hat’s net amal beim Tito ’gebn.“ Selbst in dunkelsten Phasen des Kalten Krieges verzichteten die Grenzwächter des sozialistischen Jugoslawien auf einen Eisernen Vorhang.

    2018 laufen hier österreichische Soldaten Streife. An diesem Morgen gehen ein älterer und ein junger Uniformierter den Grenzpanoramaweg ab, wo für Wanderer einige Tore im Zaun offen stehen. Migranten habe man keine gesehen, bloß Touristen, sagt der Ältere. Im Süden nichts Neues.

    Der kleine Grenzübergang an der Landstraße beim Graßnitzberg, den die beiden Soldaten hüten sollen, ist während der Patrouillengänge unbewacht. Dann können Autos völlig unkontrolliert hinein nach Österreich. Wie auch mittags, wenn die Wächter zum Essen fahren.

    „Die Politiker wollten diesen Zaun, damit sich bestimmte Wählergruppen sicher fühlen“, sagt Winzer Holger Hagen. „Aber was bringt eine Grenze, wenn halbmotivierte Soldaten im Wachhäuschen herumsitzen und sogar Lieferwägen mit verdunkelten Scheiben durchwinken, wenn die ein österreichisches Kennzeichen haben?“ Seine rumänischen Mitarbeiter oder andere Grenzgänger mit osteuropäischen Autonummern würden öfter gestoppt, erzählt Hagen. Wohl dem Schlepper, der das richtige Nummernschild hat.

    Der Zaun ist an mehreren Stellen nicht ganz dicht. Auch auf den Grundstücken des steirischen Naturschutzbundes sowie des Anwohners Helmut Strobl klaffen Lücken. „In einem Europa, das immer freizügiger wurde, nun wieder Grenzen zu schließen, ist traurig“, sagt Strobl, der einst selbst für die ÖVP Politik machte. „So entfremden wir uns von unseren slowenischen Nachbarn.“

    Teurer Spaß für die Steuerzahler

    „Diese Maßnahme ist nicht gerechtfertigt und unverhältnismäßig“, erklärt das slowenische Innenministerium. Es gebe heute kaum illegale Migration von Slowenien nach Österreich, und Österreichs innere Sicherheit sei erst recht nicht gefährdet.

    Rund 160 Kilometer grüne Grenze zu Slowenien werden bis heute vom österreichischen Militär überwacht: mit Fußstreifen, motorisierten Patrouillen und Wärmebildkameras. 160 bis 170 Soldaten sind laut FPÖ-Verteidigungsminister Mario Kunasek im sogenannten Assistenzeinsatz. Die Kosten für den Einsatz betragen rund 20 Millionen Euro pro Halbjahr, und in den ersten sechs Monaten 2018 wurden genau zehn illegale Einreisende aufgespürt. Macht zwei Millionen Euro pro Kopf.

    Spielfeld ist ein teurer Spaß für die Steuerzahler. Den Zaun mietete die Landespolizeidirektion zuerst für rund 331.000 Euro - um ihn dann dem Hersteller für 168.000 Euro abzukaufen. Rund 3 Millionen Euro verschlang laut Innenministerium der Aufbau des gesamten „Grenzmanagementsystems“. Laufende Kosten: etwa 1,7 Millionen pro Jahr.

    Im Juni war zumindest einen Tag lang mal richtig was los an der Kontrollstelle - wegen Kickl und Kunasek. Unter dem Motto „Pro Borders“ beorderten die FPÖ-Minister rund 500 Polizisten, 200 Soldaten und Männer der Spezialtruppe „Puma“ nach Spielfeld, um den Stopp von Migranten zu simulieren. Die Eindringlinge wurden von Polizeischülern dargestellt, die am Maschendraht rüttelten und so taten, als ob sie über die Grenze kommen wollten. Ein Panzer rollte an, Hubschrauber stiegen in die Luft, Hunde bellten. Und die Grenzschützer taten so, als würden sie die Migranten stoppen, registrieren und teils wieder nach Slowenien abschieben.

    Ehrengäste applaudierten, TV-Kameras filmten - und Kickl sprach in die Mikrofone: „Diese Übung soll ein ganz klares Signal in die Welt hinaus senden und zeigen, dass unsere Abwehr funktioniert.“ Später fanden Journalisten heraus: Das Manöver kostete über eine halbe Million Euro Steuergeld.

    Nicht ein einziger Migrant an der Sperranlage gefasst

    Sloweniens Regierung hat es vergrätzt. „Die Darstellung von Massenankünften illegaler Migranten von slowenischer auf die österreichische Seite wird unvermeidlich einen sehr negativen Effekt in Slowenien haben“, hatte sie schon zur Ankündigung erklärt. Die Übung helfe keinesfalls den Beziehungen der beiden Länder und der gemeinsamen Arbeit in der Flüchtlingspolitik. Und die minimale Zahl der Zurückweisungen von Österreich - 39 im gesamten Jahr 2017 - zeige: Slowenien hat seine Schengen-Außengrenze zu Kroatien im Griff.

    Nun ist es wieder einsam in Spielfelds Geister-Zeltstadt. Doch im Winter wird sich etwas rühren: die Motoren der hier aufgestellten Heizgeräte. Denn wenn es kalt ist, müssen die leeren Zelte beheizt werden, erzählt ein Polizeisprecher: „Weil sonst das Material kaputt gehen würde.“

    http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/oesterreich-grenzzaun-kostet-millionen-nur-fluechtlinge-kommen-nicht-a-12405

    Localisation de Spielfeld (#Autriche) :

    #efficacité #inutilité #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Autriche #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #Slovénie #frontière_sud-alpine (même si en réalité la Slovénie fait partie des Alpes... à voir comment penser ce territoire) #grillages #grillage #barrières_frontalières

    –--------

    Autour du #prix et du #coût :

    Spielfeld ist ein teurer Spaß für die Steuerzahler. Den Zaun mietete die Landespolizeidirektion zuerst für rund 331.000 Euro - um ihn dann dem Hersteller für 168.000 Euro abzukaufen. Rund 3 Millionen Euro verschlang laut Innenministerium der Aufbau des gesamten „Grenzmanagementsystems“. Laufende Kosten: etwa 1,7 Millionen pro Jahr.

    Petit résumé sur twitter par @twentyone_miles :

    It costs Austria over €3 million per month to police the border with Slovenia. In the first half of 2018, Austrian soldiers picked up 10 refugees at this border

    https://twitter.com/twentyone_miles/status/1069742294478270469

  • Ils ont osé...

    Today is International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women. How can border guards help protect women and girls? Frontex officers identify victims of trafficking in human beings, who often are women exposed to abuse, violence and sexual exploitation.

    https://twitter.com/Frontex/status/1066648189720248323
    #femmes #violence #exploitation #trafic_d'êtres_humains #victimes #Frontex #absudistan #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #exploitation_sexuelle #hypocrisie #propagande #twitter #tweet #genre
    –-> faudrait ajouter d’autres tag pour retrouver cette annonce de Frontex... si queluqu’un a des idées...

    Ma réponse :

    It’s a #joke, right? #LegalPaths and #OpenBorders is the answer to protect #women and #girls against #violence! This is actually the opposite of #Frontex mission!

    ping @isskein @reka @daphne @_kg_

  • La #fermeture_des_frontières empêche le #retour des migrants africains au pays

    En Europe, quand on parle de migrations africaines, on fait souvent référence aux arrivées de migrants, moins au fait qu’ils pourraient rentrer volontairement dans leur pays d’origine.

    Ces hommes et femmes sont la plupart du temps associés à des individus fuyant la misère et la guerre, recherchant des conditions de vie meilleures et n’ayant aucune intention de retourner d’où ils viennent. Quand les décideurs politiques européens parlent de « retour », ils font référence aux expulsions de migrants en situation irrégulière ou aux programmes incitant à un retour définitif, avec l’idée de décourager toute migration à venir.

    Tout cela laisse croire que la plupart des migrants africains voudraient s’établir définitivement en Europe et qu’aucun ne souhaiterait rentrer au pays, à moins d’y être contraint. Pourtant, l’éventualité d’un retour est toujours présente et fait partie de la #stratégie_de_mobilité de tout migrant. La migration est une #circulation et non un aller simple dans un sens ou dans l’autre. Le plus souvent, c’est le migrant qui décide de se mettre en mouvement.

    Des retours effectifs nombreux

    Les enquêtes « Migrations entre l’Afrique et l’Europe », menées à la fin des années 2000, ont montré que, à leur arrivée en Europe, de nombreux migrants envisageaient seulement une #migration_temporaire et avaient l’intention de #repartir. Ainsi, la moitié des migrants sénégalais et congolais arrivés en Europe entre 1960 et 2009 projetaient de rentrer dans leur pays d’origine.

    Les retours effectifs vers l’Afrique ont été nombreux. Après 10 ans, 20 % des Sénégalais et 40 % des Congolais qui avaient migré en Europe avaient effectué un retour au pays d’une durée d’un an ou plus, ou y étaient revenus temporairement avec l’intention de s’y installer.

    En fait, la grande majorité des retours sont décidés spontanément ou volontairement par les migrants eux-mêmes. Ils ne rentrent pas parce qu’ils y ont été forcés ou encouragés par les autorités du pays d’accueil. Seuls 11 % des Sénégalais et 3 % des Congolais ayant effectué un retour l’imputent à l’absence de titre de séjour régulier en Europe.

    Préparer soi-même son retour

    Les programmes d’#aide_au_retour « volontaire » (bien que ce choix résulte plutôt de contraintes) ne dissuadent pas de revenir en Europe. Les migrants circulent et les retours peuvent donner lieu à de nouvelles migrations si l’installation n’a été ni voulue ni préparée. C’est le cas, par exemple, de ceux dont le séjour en Europe a été trop court pour qu’ils puissent acquérir suffisamment de ressources pour réussir leur réinstallation réussie au pays d’origine. La part des Sénégalais de retour qui repartent en Europe est impressionnante : au bout de 10 ans, un peu moins de la moitié sont repartis pour l’Europe.

    Les migrants sont bien plus susceptibles de rentrer dans leur pays et d’y rester lorsqu’ils ont eux-mêmes préparé leur retour. Si on connaît mal la réalité statistique des retours décidés et mis en œuvre par les migrants dans le monde (rares sont les pays d’origine et de destination à enregistrer les migrations de retour), on cerne mieux les motivations de retour des migrants africains depuis les enquêtes biographiques MAFE. Particulièrement riches, ces enquêtes ont collecté des informations sur les parcours de vie des migrants, notamment sur leur trajectoire migratoire, leur vie familiale et professionnelle et leur expérience administrative en Europe et en Afrique.

    Les enquêtes MAFE montrent, enfin, que les politiques restreignant l’accès des migrants à l’Europe, même si elles sont accompagnées de programmes d’aide au retour « volontaire », ont un effet négatif sur les retours. Plus il est difficile de migrer vers l’Europe, moins les migrants retournent dans leur pays d’origine. Ils anticipent les difficultés de réinsertion dans un pays qu’ils ont parfois quitté depuis longtemps. Quand la situation du pays d’origine est instable et les conditions de vie difficiles, comme c’est le cas pour les Congolais partis après la crise de 1990, les migrants qui rentrent au pays le font le plus souvent à condition d’avoir l’assurance de pouvoir repartir.

    Les restrictions à l’immigration interrompent cette circulation et découragent les retours en poussant les migrants à s’installer définitivement en Europe. Un paradoxe sur lequel les décideurs pourraient méditer.

    https://theconversation.com/la-fermeture-des-frontieres-empeche-le-retour-des-migrants-africain
    #migration_circulaire #aller_et_venir #migrations #Afrique #Europe #retour_volontaire #mobilité #préjugés

  • Dimenticati ai confini d’Europa

    L’obiettivo della ricerca è dare voce alle esperienze dei migranti e dei rifugiati, per rendere chiaro il nesso tra quello che hanno vissuto e le politiche europee che i governi hanno adottato.
    Il report si basa su 117 interviste qualitative realizzate nell’enclave spagnola di Melilla, in Sicilia, a Malta, in Grecia, in Romania, in Croazia e in Serbia. Ciò che emerge chiaramente è che il momento dell’ingresso in Europa, sia che esso avvenga attraverso il mare o attraverso una foresta sul confine terrestre, non è che un frammento di un viaggio molto più lungo ed estremamente traumatico. Le rotte che dall’Africa occidentale e orientale portano fino alla Libia sono notoriamente pericolose, specialmente per le donne, spesso vittime di abusi sessuali o costrette a prostituirsi per pagare i trafficanti.

    Il report mostra che alle frontiere dell’Unione Europea, e talora anche a quelle interne, c’è una vera e propria emergenza dal punto di vista della tutela dei diritti umani. L’assenza di vie legali di accesso per le persone bisognose di protezione le costringe ad affidarsi ai trafficanti su rotte che si fanno sempre più lunghe e pericolose. I tentativi dell’UE e degli Stati Membri di chiudere le principali rotte non proteggono la vita delle persone, come a volte si sostiene, ma nella maggior parte dei casi riescono a far sì che la loro sofferenza abbia sempre meno testimoni.


    http://centroastalli.it/dimenticati-ai-confini-deuropa-2
    #Europe #frontières #asile #migrations #droits_humains #rapport #réfugiés #Sicile #Italie #Malte #Grèce #Roumanie #Croatie #Serbie #UE #EU #femmes #Libye #violence #violences_sexuelles #parcours_migratoires #abus_sexuels #viol #prostitution #voies_légales #invisibilisation #invisibilité #fermeture_des_frontières #refoulement #push-back #violent_borders #Dublin #règlement_dublin #accès_aux_droits #accueil #détention #mouvements_secondaires

    Pour télécharger le rapport :
    https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TT9vefCRv2SEqbfsaEyucSIle5U1dNxh/view

    ping @isskein

    • Migranti, il Centro Astalli: “È emergenza diritti umani alle frontiere d’Europa”

      Assenza di vie di accesso legale ai migranti forzati, respingimenti arbitrari, detenzioni, impossibilità di accedere al diritto d’asilo: è il quadro disegnato da una nuova ricerca della sede italiana del Servizio dei gesuiti per i rifugiati.

      S’intitola “Dimenticati ai confini d’Europa” il report messo a punto dal Centro Astalli, la sede italiana del Servizio dei gesuiti per i rifugiati, che descrive, attraverso le storie dei rifugiati, le sempre più numerose violazioni di diritti fondamentali che si susseguono lungo le frontiere di diversi Paesi europei. La ricerca, presentata oggi a Roma, si basa su 117 interviste qualitative realizzate nell’enclave spagnola di Melilla, in Sicilia, a Malta, in Grecia, in Romania, in Croazia e in Serbia.

      Il report, si spiega nella ricerca, «mostra che alle frontiere dell’Unione europea, e talora anche a quelle interne, c’è una vera e propria emergenza dal punto di vista della tutela dei diritti umani». Secondo padre Camillo Ripamonti, presidente del Centro Astalli, la ricerca mette bene in luce come l’incapacità di gestire il fenomeno migratorio solitamente attribuita all’Ue, nasca anche dalla «volontà di tanti singoli Stati che non vogliono assumersi le proprie responsabilità» di fronte all’arrivo di persone bisognose di protezione alle loro frontiere, al contrario è necessario che l’Europa torni ad essere «il continente dei diritti, non dobbiamo perdere il senso della nostra umanità». «Si tratta di una sfida importante - ha detto Ripamonti - anche in vista delle prossime elezioni europee».

      A sua volta, padre Jose Ignacio Garcia, direttore del Jesuit Refugee Service Europa, ha rilevato come «gli Stati membri dell’Ue continuano ad investire le loro energie e risorse nel cercare di impedire a migranti e rifugiati di raggiungere l’Europa o, nel migliore dei casi, vorrebbero confinarli in ‘centri controllati’ ai confini esterni». «La riforma della legislazione comune in materia d’asilo, molto probabilmente – ha aggiunto - non verrà realizzata prima delle prossime elezioni europee. I politici europei sembrano pensare che se impediamo ai rifugiati di raggiungere le nostre coste, non abbiamo bisogno di un sistema comune d’asilo in Europa».

      La fotografia delle frontiere europee che esce dalla ricerca è inquietante: violazioni di ogni sorta, violenze, detenzioni arbitrarie, respingimenti disumani, aggiramento delle leggi dei singoli Paesi e del diritto internazionale. Un quadro fosco che ha pesanti ricadute sulla vita dei rifugiati già provati da difficoltà a soprusi subiti nel lungo viaggio. «Il Greek Council for Refugees – spiega la ricerca - ha denunciato, nel febbraio del 2018, un numero rilevante di casi di respingimenti illegali dalla regione del fiume Evros, al confine terrestre con la Turchia. Secondo questa organizzazione, migranti vulnerabili come donne incinte, famiglie con bambini e vittime di tortura sono stati forzatamente rimandati in Turchia, stipati in sovraffollate barche attraverso il fiume Evros, dopo essere stati arbitrariamente detenuti in stazioni di polizia in condizioni igieniche precarie». Secondo le testimonianze raccolte in Croazia e Serbia, diversi sono stati gli episodi di violenze fisiche contro rifugiati e di respingimenti immediati da parte della polizia di frontiera.

      E in effetti nel nuovo rapporto del Centro Astalli, più dei soli dati numerici e dei carenti quadri normativi ben descritti, a colpire sono i racconti degli intervistati lungo le diverse frontiere d’Europa. Un ragazzo marocchino, in Sicilia, per esempio ha raccontato «di come i trafficanti gli abbiano rubato i soldi e il cellulare e lo abbiamo tenuto prigioniero in un edificio vuoto con altre centinaia di persone per mesi». «Durante il viaggio – è ancora la sua storia – i trafficanti corrompevano gli ufficiali di polizia e trattavano brutalmente i migranti». Nel corso di un tentativo di attraversamento del Mediterraneo ricorda poi di aver sentito un trafficante dire a un altro: «Qualsiasi cosa succeda non mi interessa, li puoi anche lasciar morire».

      Ancora, una ragazza somala di 19 anni, arrivata incinta in Libia, ha raccontato di come il trafficante la minacciasse di toglierle il bambino appena nato e venderlo perché non aveva la cifra richiesta per la traversata. Alla fine il trafficante ha costretto tutti i suoi compagni di viaggio a pagare per lei ma ci sono voluti comunque diversi mesi prima che riuscissero a mettere insieme la somma richiesta. Storie che sembrano provenire da un altro mondo e sono invece cronache quotidiane lungo i confini di diversi Paesi europei.

      Infine, padre Ripamonti, in merito allo sgombero del centro Baobab di Roma che ospitava diverse centinaia di migranti, ha osservato che «la politica degli sgomberi senza alternative è inaccettabile». Il Centro Astalli «esprime inoltre preoccupazione anche per le crescenti difficoltà di accesso alla protezione in Italia: in un momento in cui molti migranti restano intrappolati in Libia in condizioni disumane e il soccorso in mare è meno efficace rispetto al passato, il nostro Paese ha scelto di adottare nuove misure che rendono più difficile la presentazione della domanda di asilo in frontiera, introducono il trattenimento ai fini dell’identificazione, abbassano gli standard dei centri di prima accoglienza».

      https://www.lastampa.it/2018/11/13/vaticaninsider/immigrazione-il-centro-astalli-c-unemergenza-diritti-umani-alle-frontiere-deuropa-v3qbnNIYRSzCCQSfsPFBHM/pagina.html

  • PRE-ORDER: Build the Wall (#MAGA building blocks toy)

    We are pleased to announce the launch of a brand new line of toys: MAGA building blocks! This set comes with more than 100 pieces including President Trump in a MAGA hard hat!

    A mob of 10,000 Central American migrants is marching through Mexico and heading toward El Paso, Texas. Mexican border agents attempted to stop them at the Mexican border, but to no avail.

    We understand why they want to flee Honduras and live and work in America. After all, we are the greatest nation on earth.

    In the interest of national security, however, we cannot allow just anyone and everyone to cross our borders. While there are good people attempting to enter our nation, there are also gangs, criminals, and terrorists. Everyone who wants to enter our country must enter legally for the safety of all.

    The wall must be built. The wall will keep America safe and strong. Only then will we be able to help those in need.

    We are pleased to announce the launch of a brand new line of toys: MAGA building blocks! This toy makes a great Christmas gift for your kids and grandkids!

    101 Pieces
    Includes President Trump figurine w/ a MAGA hard hat!


    https://keepandbear.com/products/build-the-wall
    #légo #enfants #enfance #jeu #jeux #murs #frontières #barrières_frontalières #fermeture_des_frontières #jouet #jouets

    • Children were told to ‘build the wall’ at White House Halloween party

      A Halloween party on Oct. 25 at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building featured candy, paper airplanes and — concerning for some attendees — a station where children were encouraged to help “Build the Wall” with their own personalized bricks.

      Photos of the children’s mural with the paper wall were provided to Yahoo News.

      The party, which took place inside the office building used by White House staff, included the families of executive-branch employees and VIP guests inside and outside government. Even though many of the attendees were members of President Trump’s administration, not everyone thought the Halloween game was a treat.

      “Horrified. We were horrified,” said a person who was there and requested anonymity to avoid professional retaliation.

      The Eisenhower Executive Office Building stands across from the White House and houses a large portion of the West Wing support staff and is home to the vice president’s ceremonial office. The “Build the Wall” mural was on the first floor, outside the speechwriter’s office and next to the office of digital strategy and featured red paper bricks, each bearing the name of a child.

      Large letters on the display spelled out “Build the Wall.” Kids dressed as superheroes and ninjas were given brick-colored paper cards and told to write their name with a marker and tape them to the wall. Alongside the paper wall were signs including one that read “America First,” a slogan often used by President Trump that had been criticized because it was previously employed by the Ku Klux Klan.

      Earlier in the week offices inside the EEOB had been instructed to put together kid-friendly displays for trick-or-treaters. The displays were supposed to be interactive and inspiring, and all were supposed to address the party’s theme: “When I grow up I want to be…”

      Photos posted on social media show Vice President Mike Pence was present for the Halloween party at the EEOB. However, a spokesperson for the vice president said he did not go beyond his office, which is on the second floor.

      https://news.yahoo.com/children-were-told-to-build-the-wall-at-white-house-halloween-party-1530

  • 30 years on since first migrant death, still no end to tragedies at sea

    When the body of a Moroccan man washed up on a beach in #Tarifa in 1988, no one knew that it would be the first of more than 6,700 fatalities.

    The body lay face up in the sand with its arms in a cross. It was swollen but clothed. The small boat had run aground and swept up on the shores of a beach in Tarifa, a town in Spain’s southern province of Cádiz. Four survivors recounted in French the story of the shipwreck that “froze the heart.”

    It was November 1, 1988, a date that continues to haunt journalist Ildefonso Sena. He took 10 photos of the scene with his Nikon compact camera but only one was needed for the incident to send shock waves through Europe. Without intending to, he had immortalized the first migrant death in the Strait of Gibraltar.

    “I wasn’t aware of the number of deaths that would follow,” Sena told the local newspaper Diario de Cádiz. Two bodies were found the following day, another two on November 3 and one more in Ceuta, the Spanish exclave city in North Africa. A total of 11 people died and seven disappeared. It was the first time a migrant boat had shipwrecked off Spain’s southern border. Thirty years on, there is no sign of an end to the deaths. “There has not been one single year where there have not been deadly tragedies,” says Gabriel Delgado, who has been director of the Migration Office of the Cádiz and Ceuta Diocese since 1993.

    Since November 1, 1988, 6,714 migrants have died or gone missing in the Strait of Gibraltar, according to a report by the migrant support group Andalucía Acoge. As the sun sets one afternoon in late October, Antonio Ruiz and his son Francisco Ruiz visit the graves at Tarifa cemetery. Antonio was mayor for the Socialist Party (PSOE) when Tarifa was shocked by the first migrant death. Now his son is the mayor and the people of the town, home to 118,116 residents, jump into action to lend a hand and provide resources to hundreds of migrants when the system is unable to cope.

    In Tarifa, they now know that when the wind is calm or gently blowing from the west, boats will arrive to the shore. And, if there is a sudden easterly gust, that there will be more deaths at sea. “We have 30 years of experience. We have been living with this situation for many years and are used to it. You have to normalize providing shelter, but you must never normalize death,” says Francisco Ruiz.

    This is the unwritten wisdom of a town committed to solidarity at all costs – a hundred or so locals spent their summer helping migrants sheltered in the municipal pavilion – and one that is becoming increasingly more familiar with the arrival of bodies of North African and Sub-Saharan migrants to their shores.

    It was not like this in the 1980s, when the town had no idea about the scope of the problem. “We could not imagine that this was going to lead to what it has led to,” explains Antonio Ruiz. Sena agrees: “The migration phenomena was gradually revealed. Between 1982 and 1983, boats began to arrive and the Civil Guard thought at first they were bringing in drugs. Later it happened more frequently but nobody gave it any importance until November 1, 1988.” That was the day the journalist was told by a Civil Guard officer: “Go to Los Lances beach, a body has appeared.”

    Sena remembers the scene when he arrived: “There was an infernal wind. The dead young man was two meters from the bow of the boat. He was around 25 years old and covered with grime from the sea.”

    He squatted down to take the photos. An officer then approached him and asked if he could interpret from French for the four Moroccan survivors. “They told me that 23 of them had set sail at 12 from a beach in Tangier. Halfway into the trip, they were surprised by a very strong easterly wind. They got close to the coast but the ship capsized,” recalls the 67-year-old, who has now retired.

    The 11 migrants who were found dead in the following days had no name, affiliation or known family – a pattern that would become all too familiar. Their bodies were moved from the morgue to a common grave in Tarifa cemetery, which is marked by a simple tombstone: “In memory of the migrants who died in the Strait of Gibraltar.” Delgado placed the tombstone when he took office. Since then, he and his team have discovered that, unlike other dioceses, the brunt of their work is in assisting migrants, not emigrants.

    Delgado has 25 years of bittersweet experiences, of migrants who were able to move forward and others who became just another anonymous legal process of a tomb in the cemeteries of Tarifa, Barbate and Conil de la Frontera in Cádiz, and in Ceuta. In these years, Delgado has seen blood trails on beaches and dead children, like Samuel, who was found at the beginning of 2017 in Barbate. “Fatal tragedies hit me very hard. I cannot get used to it,” explains the priest, who has officiated dozens of migrant burials.

    Every second Wednesday of the month, Delgado organizes Circles of Silence meetings in cities in Ceuta and Cádiz. “We don’t want anyone to get used to tragedy. Now I fear that, what’s more, we have gone from the globalization of indifference to the globalization of rejection,” he says in a serious tone.

    Every date marks the death of a migrant at sea. But back on November 1, 1988, it was difficult to imagine the Strait of Gibraltar would become the mass grave it is today. That windy morning was just a day when Sena pressed the shutter on his camera, “without calibrating the importance the photo would have.”


    https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/11/01/inenglish/1541074865_689521.html?id_externo_rsoc=TW_CC
    #Etroit_de_Gibraltar #mourir_en_mer #30_ans triste (#anniversaire) #histoire #photographie #migrations #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #Espagne #Méditerranée #Forteresse_Europe #1988

    ping @reka

  • The U.S. Is Not Being Invaded: Fact-Checking the Common Immigration Myths

    Myth #1: Immigrants cost the U.S. “billions and billions” of dollars each year.

    Immigration puts much more money into U.S. public coffers via taxes than it takes out via benefits, as determined last year by a bipartisan blue-ribbon commission of leading immigration economists, across the political spectrum, convened by the National Academy of Sciences. It found that the average immigrant to the U.S., reflecting the country-and-skill composition of recent U.S. immigrants, makes a net positive fiscal contribution of $259,000 in net present value across all levels of government: federal, state, and local (see page 434 at the link).

    Myth #2: The U.S. is being “violently overrun” by immigrants.

    Immigrants to the United States, whether or not they have legal authorization, commit violent crimes at much lower rates than U.S. natives do. That is why violent crime is way down in the places where unauthorized immigrants go. For example, since 1990 the population of unauthorized immigrants in New York City has roughly tripled, from about 400,000 to 1.2 million, while during the same period the number of homicides in New York City collapsed from 2,262 (in 1990) to 292 (in 2017).
    Myth #3: The U.S. has the “most expansive immigration program anywhere on the planet.”

    In both Canada and Australia, some of the most prosperous and secure countries in the world and in all of history, immigrants are more than 20% of the population. That is far higher than the United States, where immigrants are 14% of the population.
    Myth #4: Immigrants are moving to the U.S. because it has the “hottest economy anywhere in the world.”

    Violence is a massive driver of undocumented immigration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Data provided to us by the Department of Homeland Security showed that from 2011 to 2016, unaccompanied child migrants apprehended at the U.S. border moved from Central America due to a roughly equal mix of economic conditions and violence in their communities. The violence is significant. Every 10 additional homicides in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras caused more than six additional unaccompanied child minor apprehensions.
    Myth #5: A “strong border” will cause immigrants to “turn away and they won’t bother” trying to migrate.

    Enforcement alone is not an effective migration deterrent. To be effective, it must be paired with enhanced legal pathways for migration. People will move if they have to and because of dire situations in their origin communities, they will be more willing to accept the risks of apprehension. There are interrelated migration pressures that drive people to move---including violence in the home country, economic conditions at home, and demographic realities. In Central America, these factors are interacting in complex ways and are driving much of the migration we see at the U.S. border. More protection at the border isn’t a deterrent without addressing the push factors that drive migration and providing sufficient legal channels for migration.

    https://www.cgdev.org/blog/us-not-being-invaded-fact-checking-immigration-myths
    #préjugés #mythe #invasion #coût #afflux #migrations #asile #réfugiés #USA #Etats-Unis #pull-factors #pull_factors #facteurs_push #push-pull_factors #facteurs_pull #fermeture_des_frontières #dissuasion

  • Le Maroc instaure une autorisation de voyage pour trois pays africains

    En effet, une correspondance entre le Responsable régional de la compagnie nationale Royal Air Maroc (RAM) pour le Gabon et un directeur d’agence de RAM dans le pays. Dans ce courrier, il est annoncé que

    « les autorités marocaines ont instauré à partir du 1er novembre 2018, une #autorisation_électronique_de_Voyage (AVEM) pour les ressortissants du #Mali, de la #Guinée et du #Congo_Brazaville désireux de se rendre au Maroc ».

    Ainsi, à partir de la date mentionnée, les personnes issues de ces pays qui veulent se rendre au Maroc doivent demander leur AVEM au minimum 96 heures avant leur date de départ vers le Maroc, via le portail http://www.acces-maroc.ma. Le site ne peut être consultable à partir du Maroc.

    https://224infos.org/societe-et-people/7852/le-maroc-instaure-une-autorisation-de-voyage-pour-trois-pays-africains.htm
    #Maroc #visas (ou similaires) #fermeture_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #autorisation_de_voyage #AVEM

    Commentaire de Elsa Tyszler via la mailing-list Migreurop :

    D’après cet article (et d’autres à peu près similaires trouvés sur le net), les ressortissant-e-s du Mali, de la Guinée (Conakry) et du Congo (Brazza) doivent désormais acquérir une « autorisation de voyage » pour entrer au Maroc.
    Pourquoi ces trois pays ? Des effets de l’externalisation des frontières européennes ? Une mesure qui intervient peu de temps avant la signature du Pacte Mondial des Migrations à Marrakech en décembre...

  • Barrières controversées aux #postes-frontières secondaires tessinois

    Des barrières sont en voie d’installation à plusieurs postes-frontières secondaires entre le Tessin et l’Italie. Fruits d’un compromis entre le canton et la Confédération, elles ne font pas l’unanimité.

    La pose de barrières à six de ces passages qui ne sont plus surveillés en permanence intervient après une période d’essai de six mois de #fermeture_nocturne, entre 23 heures et 5 heures du matin, qui avait été mise en place pour lutter contre les #braquages.

    Pour le Conseil fédéral, l’expérience menée en 2017 n’avait pas permis de conclure à une baisse de la criminalité. Il a cependant accepté que, selon les circonstances, ces petites frontières puissent être temporairement bouclées.

    Mais au sud des Alpes, certains ont le sentiment que Berne ménage davantage les susceptibilités italiennes que les intérêts du Tessin. C’est le cas de la conseillère nationale de la Lega et vice-syndique de Chiasso Roberta Pantani, qui avait demandé une fermeture nocturne durable.
    « Berne a peur des mesures de rétorsion de l’Italie »

    « Les problèmes majeurs ont surtout été posés par l’Italie qui disait que la fermeture était contraire à l’accord de Schengen », souligne-t-elle. « Mais pour nous, il s’agissait seulement de rétablir une certaine habitude de fermeture la nuit. C’est la première chose. Et la seconde, c’est que peut-être que le Conseil fédéral ne connaît pas très bien la situation du Tessin, où il a peur des mesures de rétorsion de l’Italie. »

    Mais de simples barrières, comme à l’entrée des parkings, suffiront-elles à repousser des malfaiteurs ? Pour Ornello Rusconi, patron d’une station d’essence à deux pas de la douane de San Pietro où sera installée une barrière, c’est toujours bon à prendre. Il a subi une quinzaine de braquages ces dernières années et l’entrée de son magasin est désormais verrouillée, sécurisée par des barreaux et une caméra de surveillance. Il est impossible d’entrer sans contrôle facial préalable.
    « Une mesure supplémentaire bienvenue »

    Pour lui, la décision constitue une bonne nouvelle : « En cas de besoin, le passage est bloqué et les autos ne peuvent plus passer », relève-t-il. « Si quelqu’un veut sortir, il doit s’arrêter ou trouver une alternative. Ou casser la barrière, mais l’infraction est grave. Si la route est barrée, il faut trouver une autre voie. C’est une mesure supplémentaire bienvenue », dit le commerçant.

    D’autres habitants de la région se montrent plutôt sceptiques. « Celui qui a envie d’entrer pour commettre un méfait ne va pas s’arrêter devant une barrière », juge un père de famille dont l’entourage a déjà subi des cambriolages à répétition. « Dans les faits divers, on lit que ce sont même des bandes professionnelles qui viennent ; ce n’est certainement pas une barrière qui va les arrêter. La frontière est vraiment ouverte ; il n’y a pas qu’un seul passage, la zone de frontière est partout. »
    L’objectif est de fermer rapidement ces frontières

    Reste à savoir quand la décision d’abaisser ces barrières - qui sont en cours d’installation - sera prise. Interpellée, la direction des gardes-frontière à Berne a répondu par un « no comment » à la RTS.

    Le département tessinois du Territoire, chargé de leur pose, fait savoir de son côté qu’un groupe de travail réunissant police et gardes-frontière planche actuellement sur les critères qui permettront « de boucler rapidement » ces frontières secondaires.

    https://www.rts.ch/info/regions/autres-cantons/9944416-barrieres-controversees-aux-postes-frontieres-secondaires-tessinois.html
    #frontières #rematérialisation_des_frontières #Schengen (fin de -) #criminalité #barrières_frontalières #Tessin #Suisse #Italie #fermeture_des_frontières #frontière_sud-alpine

    signalé par @bce_106_6, que je remercie

  • Scirocco : A Case Against Deportations

    EU governments are implementing security-oriented policies to govern migration. Higher walls, more controls, detention, expulsion. Deporting migrants to their country of origin will not tackle nor change people’s needs to migrate. Tunisians re-migrate to Italy short after being deported, as the uncertainty of travel is preferred to the certainty of unemployment and poverty.

    This animation tells the story of one to show the movement of many.
    Deportation is no deterrent to migration.

    https://vimeo.com/278007474


    #tunisie #migrations #vidéo #film #film_d'animation #remittances #fermeture_des_frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #smuggling #smugglers #mourir_en_mer #décès #morts #travail_au_noir #travail #économie #CIE #Italie #détention_administrative #renvois #expulsions #dissuasion #sans-papiers
    ping @_kg_

    • Deportation is no deterrent to migration - témoignage d’un migrant sfaxien rencontré à Briancon en janvier 2018 : « J’ai traversé la mer sept fois. Au début j’ai été renvoyé encore et encore. La septième fois le policier italien m’a dit ’Toi encore ? Vas-y ! On ne veut plus te voir ici’ et il m’a laissé rentrer en Italie »

  • Words matter. Is it @AP style to call migrants an “army”—above a photo of mothers tending to their infants and toddlers, no less? This is not only incorrect, but it enables a racist narrative sold by this @POTUS and his supporters. Armies invade. These people are running away.


    https://twitter.com/JamilSmith/status/1054163071785037824
    #armée #terminologie #préjugés #invasion #afflux #mots #vocabulaire #migrations #réfugiés #médias #journalisme #presse

    • #Polly_Pallister-Wilkins sur la marche de migrants qui a lieu en Amérique centrale...

      Dear media reporting on the Central American migrant caravan, can you please be attentive to how you talk about it? 1/n
      People are walking, walking not pouring, flowing, or streaming. Walking. They are walking along roads, they will be tired, hungry, their feet will hurt, they will have blisters and sore joints. They are not a natural liquid phenomenon governed by the force of gravity. 2/n
      Their walking is conditioned by the infrastructures they move along like roads, the physical geographies they traverse like hills and rivers and the human controls they encounter like border controls and police checkpoints. 3/n
      All of these things are risky, they make the walk, the journey more difficult and dangerous, esepcially the police checkpoints and the border controls. These risks are the reason they are travelling as a caravan, as a large group attempting to minimise the risks of controls 4/n
      And the risks from gangs and criminals that migrants on their journeys routinely face. Their journey is a deeply embodied one, and one that is deeply conditioned both by the violence they are leaving and the violence of the journey itself. 5/n
      So media please try and reflect this in your storytelling. These people are not a river obeying gravity. They have made an active yet conditioned choice to move. When they encounter a block in their path this can be deadly. It can detain, deport, injure, rape, or kill. 6/n
      And these blockages are not boulders in a riverbed around which the river flows. These blockages, these #checkpoints, border controls or police patrols are human blockages, they are not natural. So please try and reflect the political structures of this journey. Please. End/
      Addendum: there is a long history of caravans as a form political resistance in Central America.

      https://twitter.com/PollyWilkins/status/1054267257944227840
      #marche #migrations #Honduras #Amérique_centrale #mots #vocabulaire #terminologie #média #journalisme #presse #caravane #métaphores_liquides #risque #gravité #mouvement #contrôles_frontaliers #blocages #barrières #résistance #Mexique

    • Migrants travel in groups for a simple reason: safety

      A caravan of Central American migrants traveling to through Mexico to the United States to seek asylum is about halfway through its journey.

      The caravan began on Oct. 13 in Honduras with 200 people. As it has moved through Honduras, Guatemala and now Mexico, its ranks have grown to over 7,000, according to an estimate by the International Organization of Migration.

      The migrants have been joined by representatives from humanitarian organizations like the Mexican Red Cross providing medical assistance and human rights groups that monitor the situation.

      Journalists are there, too, and their reporting has caught the attention of President Donald Trump.

      He has claimed that the caravan’s ranks probably hide Middle Eastern terrorists. Trump later acknowledged there is no evidence of this, but conservative media outlets have nevertheless spread the message.

      It is reasonable for Americans to have security concerns about immigration. But as a scholar of forced migration, I believe it’s also important to consider why migrants travel in groups: their own safety.
      Safety in numbers

      The Central Americans in the caravan, like hundreds of thousands of people who flee the region each year, are escaping extreme violence, lack of economic opportunity and growing environmental problems, including drought and floods, back home.

      Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico have some of the world’s highest murder rates. According to Doctors Without Borders, which provides medical care in crisis zones, 68 percent of the migrants and refugees it surveyed in Mexico had experienced violence. Nearly one-third of women were sexually abused.

      Whether crossing Central America, the Sahara desert or the mountains of Afghanistan, migrants are regularly extorted by criminals, militias and corrupt immigration officials who know migrants make easy targets: They carry cash but not weapons.

      Large groups increase migrants’ chance of safe passage, and they provide some sense of community and solidarity on the journey, as migrants themselves report.
      Publicizing the dangers they flee

      Large groups of migrants also attract media coverage. As journalists write about why people are on the move, they shed light on Central America’s many troubles.

      Yet headlines about huge migrant caravans may misrepresent trends at the U.S.-Mexico border, where migration is actually decreasing.

      While the number of Central American families and children seeking asylum in the U.S. has increased in the past two years, Mexican economic migrants are crossing the border at historically low levels.

      And while most migrant caravan members hope to seek asylum in the U.S., recent history shows many will stay in Mexico.

      In response to Trump’s immigration crackdown, Mexican president-elect Andrés Manuel López Obrador has promised to welcome Central American refugees — and try to keep them safe.


      https://theconversation.com/migrants-travel-in-groups-for-a-simple-reason-safety-105621

      #sécurité

    • Trump’s Caravan Hysteria Led to This

      The president and his supporters insisted that several thousand Honduran migrants were a looming menace—and the Pittsburgh gunman took that seriously.

      On Tuesday, October 16, President Donald Trump started tweeting.

      “The United States has strongly informed the President of Honduras that if the large Caravan of people heading to the U.S. is not stopped and brought back to Honduras, no more money or aid will be given to Honduras, effective immediately!”

      “We have today informed the countries of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador that if they allow their citizens, or others, to journey through their borders and up to the United States, with the intention of entering our country illegally, all payments made to them will STOP (END)!”

      Vice President Mike Pence also tweeted:

      “Spoke to President Hernandez of Honduras about the migrant caravan heading to the U.S. Delivered strong message from @POTUS: no more aid if caravan is not stopped. Told him U.S. will not tolerate this blatant disregard for our border & sovereignty.”

      The apparent impetus for this outrage was a segment on Fox News that morning that detailed a migrant caravan thousands of miles away in Honduras. The caravan, which began sometime in mid-October, is made up of refugees fleeing violence in their home country. Over the next few weeks, Trump did his best to turn the caravan into a national emergency. Trump falsely told his supporters that there were “criminals and unknown Middle Easterners” in the caravan, a claim that had no basis in fact and that was meant to imply that terrorists were hiding in the caravan—one falsehood placed on another. Defense Secretary James Mattis ordered more troops to the border. A Fox News host took it upon herself to ask Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen whether there was “any scenario under which if people force their way across the border they could be shot at,” to which Nielsen responded, “We do not have any intention right now to shoot at people.”

      Pence told Fox News on Friday, “What the president of Honduras told me is that the caravan was organized by leftist organizations, political activists within Honduras, and he said it was being funded by outside groups, and even from Venezuela … So the American people, I think, see through this—they understand this is not a spontaneous caravan of vulnerable people.”

      The Department of Homeland Security’s Twitter account “confirmed” that within the caravan are people who are “gang members or have significant criminal histories,” without offering evidence of any such ties. Trump sought to blame the opposition party for the caravan’s existence. “Every time you see a Caravan, or people illegally coming, or attempting to come, into our Country illegally, think of and blame the Democrats for not giving us the votes to change our pathetic Immigration Laws!” Trump tweeted on October 22. “Remember the Midterms! So unfair to those who come in legally.”

      In the right-wing fever swamps, where the president’s every word is worshipped, commenters began amplifying Trump’s exhortations with new details. Representative Matt Gaetz of Florida wondered whether George Soros—the wealthy Jewish philanthropist whom Trump and several members of the U.S. Senate blamed for the protests against Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and who was recently targeted with a bomb—was behind the migrant caravan. NRATV, the propaganda organ of the National Rifle Association, linked two Republican obsessions, voter fraud and immigration. Chuck Holton told NRATV’s viewers that Soros was sending the caravan to the United States so the migrants could vote: “It’s telling that a bevy of left-wing groups are partnering with a Hungarian-born billionaire and the Venezuelan government to try to influence the 2018 midterms by sending Honduran migrants north in the thousands.” On CNN, the conservative commentator Matt Schlapp pointedly asked the anchor Alisyn Camerota, “Who’s paying for the caravan? Alisyn, who’s paying for the caravan?,” before later answering his own question: “Because of the liberal judges and other people that intercede, including George Soros, we have too much chaos at our southern border.” On Laura Ingraham’s Fox News show, one guest said, “These individuals are not immigrants—these are people that are invading our country,” as another guest asserted they were seeking “the destruction of American society and culture.”

      Peter Beinart: Trump shut programs to counter violent extremists

      In the meantime, much of the mainstream press abetted Trump’s effort to make the midterm election a referendum on the caravan. Popular news podcasts devoted entire episodes to the caravan. It remained on the front pages of major media websites. It was an overwhelming topic of conversation on cable news, where Trumpists freely spread disinformation about the threat the migrants posed, while news anchors displayed exasperation over their false claims, only to invite them back on the next day’s newscast to do it all over again.

      In reality, the caravan was thousands of miles and weeks away from the U.S. border, shrinking in size, and unlikely to reach the U.S. before the election. If the migrants reach the U.S., they have the right under U.S. law to apply for asylum at a port of entry. If their claims are not accepted, they will be turned away. There is no national emergency; there is no ominous threat. There is only a group of desperate people looking for a better life, who have a right to request asylum in the United States and have no right to stay if their claims are rejected. Trump is reportedly aware that his claims about the caravan are false. An administration official told the Daily Beast simply, “It doesn’t matter if it’s 100 percent accurate … this is the play.” The “play” was to demonize vulnerable people with falsehoods in order to frighten Trump’s base to the polls.

      Nevertheless, some took the claims of the president and his allies seriously. On Saturday morning, Shabbat morning, a gunman walked into the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh and killed 11 people. The massacre capped off a week of terrorism, in which one man mailed bombs to nearly a dozen Trump critics and another killed two black people in a grocery store after failing to force his way into a black church.

      Before committing the Tree of Life massacre, the shooter, who blamed Jews for the caravan of “invaders” and who raged about it on social media, made it clear that he was furious at HIAS, founded as the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, a Jewish group that helps resettle refugees in the United States. He shared posts on Gab, a social-media site popular with the alt-right, expressing alarm at the sight of “massive human caravans of young men from Honduras and El Salvador invading America thru our unsecured southern border.” And then he wrote, “HIAS likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.”

      The people killed on Saturday were killed for trying to make the world a better place, as their faith exhorts them to do. The history of the Jewish people is one of displacement, statelessness, and persecution. What groups like HIAS do in helping refugees, they do with the knowledge that comes from a history of being the targets of demagogues who persecute minorities in pursuit of power.

      Ordinarily, a politician cannot be held responsible for the actions of a deranged follower. But ordinarily, politicians don’t praise supporters who have mercilessly beaten a Latino man as “very passionate.” Ordinarily, they don’t offer to pay supporters’ legal bills if they assault protesters on the other side. They don’t praise acts of violence against the media. They don’t defend neo-Nazi rioters as “fine people.” They don’t justify sending bombs to their critics by blaming the media for airing criticism. Ordinarily, there is no historic surge in anti-Semitism, much of it targeted at Jewish critics, coinciding with a politician’s rise. And ordinarily, presidents do not blatantly exploit their authority in an effort to terrify white Americans into voting for their party. For the past few decades, most American politicians, Republican and Democrat alike, have been careful not to urge their supporters to take matters into their own hands. Trump did everything he could to fan the flames, and nothing to restrain those who might take him at his word.

      Many of Trump’s defenders argue that his rhetoric is mere shtick—that his attacks, however cruel, aren’t taken 100 percent seriously by his supporters. But to make this argument is to concede that following Trump’s statements to their logical conclusion could lead to violence against his targets, and it is only because most do not take it that way that the political violence committed on Trump’s behalf is as limited as it currently is.

      The Tree of Life shooter criticized Trump for not being racist or anti-Semitic enough. But with respect to the caravan, the shooter merely followed the logic of the president and his allies: He was willing to do whatever was necessary to prevent an “invasion” of Latinos planned by perfidious Jews, a treasonous attempt to seek “the destruction of American society and culture.”

      The apparent spark for the worst anti-Semitic massacre in American history was a racist hoax inflamed by a U.S. president seeking to help his party win a midterm election. There is no political gesture, no public statement, and no alteration in rhetoric or behavior that will change this fact. The shooter might have found a different reason to act on a different day. But he chose to act on Saturday, and he apparently chose to act in response to a political fiction that the president himself chose to spread and that his followers chose to amplify.

      As for those who aided the president in his propaganda campaign, who enabled him to prey on racist fears to fabricate a national emergency, who said to themselves, “This is the play”? Every single one of them bears some responsibility for what followed. Their condemnations of anti-Semitism are meaningless. Their thoughts and prayers are worthless. Their condolences are irrelevant. They can never undo what they have done, and what they have done will never be forgotten.

      https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/caravan-lie-sparked-massacre-american-jews/574213

    • Latin American asylum seekers hit US policy “wall”

      Trump’s new restrictions mean long waits simply to register claims.

      The movement of thousands of Central American asylum seekers and migrants north from Honduras towards the southern border of the United States has precipitated threats from US President Donald Trump – ahead of next week’s midterm elections – to block the group’s entry by deploying troops to the US-Mexican border.

      Under international law the United States is obligated to allow asylum seekers to enter and file claims. However, immigration officials at the country’s southern border have for months been shifting toward legally dubious practices that restrict people’s ability to file asylum claims.

      “Make no mistake, the administration is building a wall – one made of restrictionist policy rather than brick and mortar,” said Jason Boyd, policy counsel at the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA).

      As a result, hundreds, possibly thousands, of asylum seekers have been left waiting for extended periods of time on the Mexican side of the border in need of shelter and basic services. Firm numbers for those affected are difficult to come by because no one is counting.

      Some of those turned away explore potentially dangerous alternatives. Aid and advocacy groups as well as the Department of Homeland Security say the wait has likely pushed some to attempt to enter the United States illegally, either with smugglers or on their own via perilous desert routes.

      While some of those in the so-called “migrant caravan” are searching for economic opportunity, others are fleeing gang violence, gender-based violence, political repression or unrest – all increasingly common factors in Central America and Mexico that push people to leave their homes.
      Menacing phone calls

      When people from the migrant caravan reach the southern border of the United States, they may find themselves in a similar position to Dolores Alzuri, 47, from Michoacan, a state in central Mexico.

      In late September, she was camped out with her husband, daughter, granddaughter, and aunt on the Mexican side of the DeConcini port of entry separating the twin cities of Nogales – one in the Mexican state of Sonora, the other in the US state of Arizona.

      Alzuri and her family were waiting for their turn to claim asylum in the United States, with only a police report in hand as proof of the threats they faced back home. Camping beside them on the pedestrian walkway just outside the grated metal door leading to the United States, nine other families waited to do the same.

      Over the preceding month Alzuri had received several menacing phone calls from strangers demanding money. In Michoacan, and many other parts of Mexico where criminal gangs have a strong presence, almost anybody can receive calls like these. You don’t know who’s on the other end of the line, Alzuri explained, but you do know the consequences of not following their orders.

      “If you do not give [money] to them, they kidnap you or they kidnap your family,” Alzuri said. “They destroy you. They kill you. That is why it is so scary to be in this country.”

      Other people she knew had received similar calls. She also knew that those who didn’t pay ended up dead – pictures of their bodies posted on Facebook as a macabre warning of what happens to those who resist.

      Fearing a similar fate, Alzuri packed her bags and her family and travelled north to ask for asylum in the United States. A friend had been granted asylum about nine months ago, and she had seen on television that other people were going, too. It seemed like the only way out.

      “I had a problem,” she said, referring to the phone calls. “They asked us for money, and since we did not give them money, they threatened us.”

      Before leaving her home, Alzuri said she filed a police report. But the authorities didn’t care enough to act on it, she said. “They are not going to risk their life for mine.”
      No way out

      Despite the danger at home, Alzuri and others in similar situations face an increasingly difficult time applying for asylum in the United States. At the Nogales crossing, asylum seekers must now wait up to a month simply to be allowed to set foot inside a border office where they can register their claims, aid workers there say.

      Those waiting are stuck in territory on the Mexican side that is controlled by gangs similar to the ones many are fleeing, though local aid groups have scrambled to find space in shelters, especially for women and children, so people will be safer while they wait.

      The situation hasn’t always been like this.

      In the past, asylum seekers were almost always admitted to register their claims the same day they arrived at the border. Since May, however, there has been a marked slowdown in registration.

      US Custom and Border Protection (CBP), the federal law enforcement agency responsible for screening people as they enter the country, says delays are due to a lack of capacity and space. But asylum advocates say similar numbers have arrived in previous years without causing a delay and the real reason for the slowdown is that CBP has shifted resources away from processing asylum seekers – not just in Nogales but across the southern US border – resulting in people being forced to wait for long periods or turned away altogether.

      This is happening despite the insistence of high-ranking Trump administration officials that asylum seekers present themselves at ports of entry or face criminal prosecution for crossing the border irregularly. Such contradictory policies, asylum advocates argue, are part of a broad-based effort by the Trump administration to dramatically reduce the number of people able to seek protection in the United States.

      “Our legal understanding is that they have the legal obligation to process asylum seekers as they arrive,” said Joanna Williams, director of education and advocacy at the Kino Border Initiative (KBI), a Nogales-based NGO. “There’s no room in the law for what they are doing right now.”
      A system in crisis

      In the past decade, migration across the southern border of the United States has undergone a dramatic change. Every year since the late 1970s US Border Patrol agents apprehended close to a million or more undocumented migrants entering the country. In 2007, that number began to fall, and last year there were just over 310,000 apprehensions – the lowest number since 1971.

      At the same time, the proportion of people entering the United States from the southern border to claim asylum has increased. Ten years ago, one out of every 100 people crossing the border was seeking humanitarian protection, according to a recent report published by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), a non-partisan think tank in Washington DC. Today that number is about one in three.

      According to Boyd of AILA, the increase is being driven by ongoing humanitarian emergencies in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, an area of Central America known as the Northern Triangle. These countries have some of the highest homicide rates in the world and are wracked by gang violence, gender-based violence, extortion, and extra-judicial killings. “Many of the individuals and families arriving at the US southern border are literally fleeing for their lives,” said Boyd.

      But the system that is supposed to provide them protection is in crisis. Beginning in 2010 the number of asylum requests lodged in the United States started to balloon, mirroring an upward trend in global displacement. Last year, 79,000 people approached the US border saying they had a credible fear of returning to their home country, compared to 9,000 at the beginning of the decade.

      The increase in credible-fear claims, as well as asylum requests made by people already in the United States, has strained the system to a “crisis point”, according to the MPI report. This has led to a backlog of around 320,000 cases in US immigration courts and people having to wait many months, if not years, to receive a hearing and a decision.
      Crackdown

      Senior officials in the Trump administration, including the president, have consistently lumped asylum seekers and economic migrants together, positing that the United States is being “invaded” by a “massive influx of illegal aliens” across the southern border, and that the asylum system is subject to “systematic abuse” by people looking to gain easy entry to the country.

      People working on the ground with asylum seekers refute this. Eduardo Garcia is a communication coordinator at SOA Watch, an organisation that monitors the humanitarian impact of US policy in Latin America. He has spent time in Nogales speaking with people waiting to claim asylum.

      “The stories of many of the people we have talked to… are stories of people fleeing gang violence, are stories of people fleeing because one of their sons was killed, because one of their sons was threatened, because one of their family members [was] raped,” he said. “They have said they cannot go back to their countries. If they are sent back they are going to be killed.”

      Still, the Trump administration’s zero-tolerance policy on immigration – responsible for the recent child-separation crisis – has also included measures that have restricted access to asylum in the United States.

      In May, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that the Justice Department would begin criminally prosecuting everyone who irregularly crossed the US southern border, including asylum seekers. In June, that policy was followed by a decision that the United States would no longer consider gang and sexual violence – precisely the reasons so many people flee the Northern Triangle – as legitimate grounds for asylum. Around the same time, CBP appears to have deprioritised the processing of asylum seekers at ports of entry in favour of other responsibilities, leading to the long waits and people being turned away, according to humanitarian workers and a recent report by the DHS’s Office of Inspector General.

      And even as these restrictive policies were being put in place, Trump administration officials have been encouraging asylum seekers to try. “If you’re seeking asylum, go to a port of entry,” Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen said in an 18 June press conference. “You do not need to break the law of the United States to seek asylum.”

      Nogales, Mexico

      “I came here with the hope that if I asked for asylum I could be in the United States,” said Modesto, a 54-year-old from Chimaltenango, Guatemala. In mid-September he was sitting in a mess hall run a couple hundred meters from the US border run by KBI, which provides humanitarian assistance to migrants and asylum seekers.

      Modesto had already been in Nogales, Sonora for several months. Like Dolores Alzuri, he fled his home because criminal gangs had tried to extort money from him. “I worked a lot and was making a living in my country,” Modesto explained. “The problem in particular with the gangs is that they don’t let you work… If you have money they extort you. If you don’t have money they want to recruit you.” And people who don’t cooperate: “They’re dead,” he added.

      The situation Modesto found when he arrived in Nogales, Sonora was far from what he expected. For starters, there was the long wait at the border. But he also discovered that – as an adult travelling with his 18-year-old son – even once he entered the United States he would likely end up in a detention centre while his case slowly made its way through the overburdened immigration courts – a practice that has also increased under the Trump administration. “I don’t want to cross… and spend a year in prison when my family needs my help,” he said.

      Modesto is in some ways an exception, according to Williams of KBI. Many of the people arriving in Nogales, Sonora are families with children. Once in the United States they will likely be released from immigration detention with ankle monitoring bracelets to track their movements. These people often choose to wait and to claim asylum at the port of entry when there is space.

      After more than 100 people piled up to wait at the border in May, local humanitarian groups set up a system to organise and keep track of whose turn it was to submit an asylum claim to US immigration officials. They also scrambled to find spaces in shelters so people were not sleeping on the walkway over the weeks they needed to wait.

      Now, only people who are likely to enter soon are camped on the walkway. When IRIN visited, about 40 asylum seekers – mostly women and children – sat on one side of the walkway as a steady stream of people heading to the United States filtered by on the other. Some of the asylum seekers were new arrivals waiting to be taken to a shelter, while others had been sleeping there for days on thin mats waiting for their turn. Volunteers handed out clean clothing and served pasta, as a CBP agent opened and closed the metal gate leading to the United States, just a few tantalisingly short feet away.

      The slowdown of processing “leaves people stranded – in really dangerous situations sometimes – on the other side of the border, and completely violates our obligations under both domestic and international law,” said Katharina Obser, a senior policy adviser at the Women’s Refugee Commission, an NGO that advocates for women, children, and youth displaced by conflict and crisis.

      As a result, some people arrive, find out about the wait, and leave. “We’re fairly certain that those are individuals who then end up crossing the border through other means,” Williams said.

      The DHS Office of the Inspector General came to a similar conclusion, finding that the contradiction between Trump administration rhetoric and policy “may have led asylum seekers at ports of entry to attempt illegal border crossings.”
      Border-wide

      The situation in Nogales, Sonora is far from isolated, according to Boyd of the AILA. “Recent turnbacks of vulnerable asylum seekers have been documented throughout the US southern border,” he said, including at many ports of entry in Texas and California. In those states, asylum seekers have reported being stopped as they approach the border and told they cannot enter because immigration officials don’t have the capacity to process their claims.

      “Turnbacks form part of a comprehensive set of practices and policies advanced under this administration that appears aimed at shutting out asylum seekers from the United States,” Boyd continued.

      Meanwhile, people like Dolores Alzuri – and most likely some of the thousands of Central Americans who are travelling north from Honduras in the hope of claiming asylum – are left with little choice but to wait. Moving somewhere else in Mexico or returning home is not an option, said Alzuri. “The violence is the same in every state,” she said. And crossing the desert, “that’s a big danger.”

      She and her family don’t have a back-up plan. “Let’s hope that I do get [asylum], because I really do need it,” she said. “You don’t live comfortably in your own country anymore. You live in fear that something will happen to you. You can’t walk around on the streets because you feel that you’re being followed.”

      https://www.irinnews.org/news-feature/2018/10/29/latin-american-asylum-seekers-hit-us-policy-wall
      #USA #Etats-Unis #fermeture_des_frontières #Mexique

      Commentaire Emmanuel Blanchar via la mailing-list Migreurop:

      Un article intéressant car il rappelle opportunément que la « caravane des migrants » en route vers les Etats-Unis est également composée de nombreuses personnes qui souhaiteraient pouvoir déposer des demandes d’asile. Or, si la frontières Mexique-USA est loin d’être encore mûrées, un mur administratif empêche déjà que les demandes d’asile puisse être déposées et traitées dans le respect des droits des requérant.e.s.

      #mur_administratif #asile

    • No es una caravana, es un dolor que camina

      La caravana de migrantes es sólo la primera manifestación pública y masiva de la crisis humanitaria en la que vive la mayoría de la población; negada por el gobierno, por la oligarquía, embajadas, organizaciones de la sociedad civil y por algunas agencias de cooperación que le hacen comparsa a la dictadura.

      Esta crisis humanitaria es provocada por el modelo económico neoliberal impuesto a sangre y fuego, que sólo pobreza y violencia ha llevado a las comunidades, que ante la ausencia de oportunidades y ante el acoso de los grupos criminales no tienen otra alternativa que la peligrosa e incierta ruta migratoria; prefieren morir en el camino que en sus barrios y colonias.

      El infierno en que se ha convertido Honduras tiene varios responsables. En primer el lugar el imperialismo, que a través de su embajada promueve la inestabilidad política en el país con el apoyo directo al dictador, que para granjearse ese apoyo les ha entregado el país, hasta el grado del despojo y de la ignominia, como puede observarse en los foros internacionales.

      Otro responsable es el dictador, que además de la incertidumbre que genera en lo económico, en lo político y en lo social, ha profundizado y llevado al extremo las políticas neoliberales, despojando de sus recursos a comunidades enteras, para dárselas a las transnacionales, principalmente norteamericanas y canadienses.

      La oligarquía corrupta, mediocre, salvaje, inepta y rapaz también es responsable de esta crisis humanitaria, quien se ha acostumbrado a vivir del presupuesto nacional a tal grado de convertir al Estado en su patrimonio, por medio de un ejército de ocupación, de diputados y presidentes serviles y títeres, que toman las decisiones no para el pueblo, sino que para sus insaciables intereses.

      Hay otro actor importante en esta crisis y es el Ejército Nacional, fiel sirviente de los intereses imperiales y de la oligarquía, que sólo sirve para consumir una gran tajada del presupuesto nacional y más que un ejército defensor y garante de la soberanía nacional es una fuerza de ocupación; listo para asesinar, torturar y matar aquellos que se oponen al dictador, al imperio y la oligarquía.

      Desgraciadamente esta caravana la conforman los miserables, los desheredados de la tierra, los parias: “los que crían querubes para el presidio y serafines para el burdel” como dijo en su poema, Los Parias, el poeta mexicano Salvador Díaz Mirón.

      Estos miserables y desheredados no huyen de la patria, la aman, la adoran y la llevan convertida en un dolor sobre sus hombros, huyen de los verdugos y carniceros que nos gobiernan y de los otros responsables de esta crisis humanitaria. Los que huyen aman a esta tierra más que los que nos quedamos.

      https://criterio.hn/2018/10/29/no-es-una-caravana-es-un-dolor-que-camina
      #douleur

    • WALKING, NOT FLOWING : THE MIGRANT CARAVAN AND THE GEOINFRASTRUCTURING OF UNEQUAL MOBILITY

      In 2015 our TV screens, newspapers and social media were full of stories about ‘flows’ of migrants ‘pouring’ into Europe, set alongside photos and videos of people packed into boats at sea or meandering in long lines across fields. This vocabulary, and the images that accompanied it, suggested that migration was a natural force: like a flow of water that cannot be stopped, governed only by the forces of gravity. Now, this same language is being used to describe the ‘migrant caravan’ of the thousands of Hondurans leaving the violence of their home country and attempting to journey to the US.

      This essay began life as an angry Twitter thread, hastily tapped out with my morning coffee. I argued that people were not flowing, but rather walking. In this Twitter thread, I tried to forge a connection between the how of the journey—noting both the material and geographical aspects impacting and structuring how people move—and the physical impacts of that journey on the bodies of those on the move. I called attention to the travelers’ tired, blistered feet in an attempt to weave a thread between the material (and political) geographies of the journey and the embodied experiences of those making it. The Twitter thread drew some attention and solicited an invitation to write a short intervention for the small Dutch critical-journalism platform De Nieuwe Reporterwhere it appeared in Dutch with the title: “Dit is waarom media niet moeten schrijven over ‘migrantenstromen’” (“This is why the media should not write about ‘migrant flows’”).

      Time has passed since I wrote the intervention. Since then, the caravan has journeyed to the US-Mexico border. US and Mexican authorities have responded with tear gas and closures, highlighting in clear terms the violence of the border and corresponding mobility governance. This violence is too often obscured by talk of flows: in the intervention, I worked hard to make visible what watery metaphors of ‘flow’ do to shape how we think about migrant mobilities and what is lost in their usage. I attempted to highlight the uneven politics of mobility that is shaped by and made visible through a consideration of what I want to call geoinfrastructuring, alongside the embodied effects of this uneven mobility. Here, in contrast to modernity’s quest for faster, more convenient, more efficient modes of travel to overcome the limits of the body as it encounters and moves through space, the migrant caravan’s mode(s) of travel—walking, stopping, starting, bus hopping, sitting, waiting, sleeping—bring into sharp relief the ways that for those excluded from privileged mobility regimes, the body is in intimate concert with the material world it encounters.

      The remainder of this essay will first reproduce the short intervention I wrote for De Nieuwe Reporter before thinking through more conceptually how this opinion piece relates to scholarly work on mobility and infrastructures.

      What we call things matters (while often invisibilizing how they matter). A Reuters report on the status of the migrant caravan in English from October 21st had the headline “Thousands in U.S.-bound migrant caravan pour into Mexican city”, while two days earlier a report by Reuters had talked about a “bedraggled” migrant “surge” attempting to “breach” the Mexican border. Meanwhile in other news outlets, the watery theme continued with a migrant “storm” in the UK’s Daily Mail, and a “wave” in USA Today. And lest we think this was a something restricted to reporting in the Global North, the Latin American press has not been immune, with Venezuela’s Telesur talking of a “second wave of migration.” Meanwhile in the Dutch language media, De Telegraafwrote of “Grote migrantenstromen trekken naar VS”, the headline handily highlighted in red in case the emergency nature of these “migrantenstromen” was not clear.

      A counterpoint was offered by oneworld.nl, who talked of the dehumanizing effects of such language use. Indeed, what we call things matters, because politicians also echo the language of the media creating a self-re-enforcing migration language. Unsurprisingly Trump has talked of flows in his condemnation of the Honduran migrant caravan, while Mark Rutte earlier this year talked about Europe not being ready for a new “migrantenstroom” (“migrant flow”). However, what we call things also matters as much for what it reveals as what it conceals. The widespread use of watery and other natural metaphors when talking about migration journeys hides both the realities of and the reasons for the people’s journeys. To talk of rivers, streams, floods, and flows masks the experiences of the thousands of people who are walking thousands of kilometers. They are walking along roads, up hills and across borders; they are tired and hungry, and their feet hurt. Many are travelling with children as people are leaving lives of poverty and deadly gang violence and looking for a safe future in the United States. Just as the British-Somali refugee poet Warshan Shire urges us to consider that “No one would put their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the land”, in the case of the Honduran migrant caravan it’s very unlikely that anyone would walk thousands of kilometers unless the road was safer than their homes.

      One of those travelling is Orellana, an unemployed domestic worker travelling with her two five-year-old grandsons. She declared she had no choice after the boys’ father was murdered and she “[Could not] feed them anymore”, and she is too old to get a job herself. Orellana has decided to try and get to Texas where her daughter, who migrated three years before, now lives.

      What the watery metaphors also hide is the agency of Hondurans like Orellana in attempting the journey and what the decision to travel in such a large group tells us about the realities of the journey itself. While the migrant caravan is walking to ostensible safety, the northbound journeys of Central American migrants through Mexico to the US are not safe. Many thousands attempt this journey every year, encountering detention and extortion by the police and drug cartels, physical violence, rape, and death. The policing of Mexico’s southern border, undertaken with the support of the US, does not only capture migrants in its net. Mexicans of indigenous appearance, suspected of being from Guatemala, Honduras or El Salvador because of crude processes of racial profiling, are routinely caught up in and detained in police patrols and at police checkpoints. In all this, women and teenagers are at particular risk. The risks of the journey are the reasons underpinning the choice of the Hondurans to travel in a caravan—the idea being that the greater the number of people, the lower the risk of capture and deportation, of physical harm from police, cartels and criminals along the route, and of being stopped by border controls. Moving in a caravan also removes the need to employ the services of smugglers who are often linked to cartels and are a source of the violence migrants face. In other words, people are reclaiming the right to move without paying large sums of money.

      Talk of “flows” also hides the way the journeys of migrants are shaped by the infrastructures of their travel. Roads direct migrants in particular directions and border controls interrupt their movement and divert them into using different paths. Unlike a river, they are not a force of nature that can make their way to their metaphorical sea by the quickest and most efficient route possible. The obstacles migrants encounter on their journey are not only natural obstacles like rivers, deserts, or mountains, but also human-made obstacles like police roadblocks, border control points and migrant prisons.

      And yet in the face of all this, they still walk. Faced with the difficulties of the journey and the promise of repatriation, some have already returned to Honduras. But many in the caravan have now crossed two national borders, with Guatemala and Mexico. Their numbers are growing as many people see the strength in numbers and the difficulty, both practically and politically, of preventing passage. Many others still are left sleeping on bridges, hungry and thirsty with little access to sanitation or shelter as they wait to enter Mexico. And yet they walk, they wait, and more join because “It’s even worse in Honduras.”

      In my work on humanitarian borderwork I have begun to argue for a deeper focus on the ways infrastructures and geographies intimately shape not only the risks faced by those excluded from safe and legal travel but also how the excluded move (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018, 2019). This builds on William Walter’s earlier demand that studies of migration take the journey seriously:

      The vehicle, its road, its route—these particular materialities are not entirely missing from scholarship on migration politics. But… they rarely feature as a central focus in theorisation and investigation of migration worlds. This is surely a paradox. All migrations involve journeys and those journeys are more often than not mediated by complex transport infrastructures, authorities and norms of transportation. Granted, in many instances those journeys may be rather uneventful and not in the least bit life-changing or politically salient… Nevertheless, in many other instances, the journey is politically salient, perhaps even a life-or-death experience. (2015: 270)

      Alongside taking the journey seriously, Mimi Sheller’s important work has shone a light on systems of ‘motility’, differential mobility capability, and mobility justice (2018) and Vicki Squire has drawn our attention to the biophysical role of deserts and seas in governing mobility (2016). Therefore, a focus on the journey and differential mobility capabilities challenges the watery metaphor of ‘flow,’ compelling us instead to understand how infrastructures and geographies—roads, bridges, deserts, mountains, border controls, police patrols, walls and fences, time and speed — make possible and condition particular types of mobility with embodied effects.

      Infrastructures here, following Lauren Berlant (2016), are defined by use (and movement) coming to pattern social life. They are what organizes life. As such they are agents in the (re)production of social inequalities (Donovan, 2015) and uneven geographies (Chua et. al, 2018). Alongside the way infrastructures pattern social life, consideration of infrastructuring offers a dynamic way of understanding the how of unequal mobility beyond the crafting of policy, enabling a greater consideration of infrastructure as something dynamic and mutable in the context of use. Infrastructures are not all encountered or utilized equally. A road driven is not the same as a road walked. Moreover, in thinking about context and use, Deborah Cowen (2014) has drawn our attention to the ways infrastructure, such as complex systems of just-in-time logistics, not only works to overcome the limits of space and time, but also offers opportunities for disruption and resistance. The essays in the “Investigating Infrastructures” Forum on this site show the role of infrastructures in crafting and reinforcing uneven geographies.

      With this in mind, I also want to consider the role of physical geography as an active agent working along with border, policing, and transport infrastructures in conditioning the how of unequal mobility as well as the embodied risks migrants face. The exclusive and privileged nature of various (safer) transport infrastructures and the growth of differential mobility regimes results in physical geographies and their attendant risks coming to matter to what Karen Barad would call matter (2003), in this instance to human life and well-being. In these instances, physical geographies have been politically made to matter through various policies underpinning mobility access and they come to matter at the level of the individual migrant bodies that encounter them.

      Infrastructural projects—roads, railways, and shipping routes—are all attempts to overcome the limits of physical geography. Planes and their attendant infrastructures of airports, airlines, runways and air traffic control make the traversal of great distance and the geographies of seas, mountains, and deserts possible and less risky. By making air travel exclusive, not through cost alone but through border regimes that deny access to those without the correct documentation, physical geography comes to matter more. Those seeking life through movement are increasingly prevented from accessing such transport. Thus, at the level of individual bodies and the journeys they make, the physical geography of the route comes to play a greater constitutive role. As Mimi Sheller makes clear, “There is a relation between personal bodily vulnerabilities, the struggle for shelter, the splintering of infrastructural systems, and the management of citizenship regimes and borders” (2018: xiv).

      Infrastructural projects such as roads, railways, and runways suggest attempts to overcome the limits of physical geography and yet are also intimately shaped by them. Mountain roads, for example, contain hairpin bends necessitated by the gradient of the slopes they cross. Bridges span rivers where such engineering can practically and safely take place. Meanwhile, a lack of roads or bridges impedes mobility, encouraging migrants to use boats, to swim, or like the Rohingya’s journeys from Rakhine into Bangladesh, to use the small narrow dykes that have shaped the environment of the wetlands of the Naf River delta.

      As John Law noted in his study of the possibilities that the Portuguese ship created for long distance control and an apparent human-technological triumph over space, the physical geographies of the ocean—“the winds and currents”—are an ever-present actor working in concert with infrastructure networks (1986). According to Law, it is not possible to think about these infrastructural networks and the social, political, and economic forces they represent and bring into being without a consideration of what he calls the natural, or what I am calling physical geography. The nature of concern to Law is very different from the natural world evoked by discussion of migrant flows and the wide variety of attendant watery metaphors. In these discussions, flow is a description. For Law, flow would have and perform a relational role. This relational ontology becomes even more politically pressing when the natural has embodied effects on the lives of migrants bound up in such a relational system. Put simply, the physical geography alongside infrastructures affects how people move and the risks they encounter on their journeys.

      Therefore, geoinfrastructuring, I argue, is important in considering how people exercise mobility. Geoinfrastructuring both conditions the journey of the migrant caravan and creates particular embodied effects, such as sore feet, blisters, joint pain, sprained muscles, and dehydration. Moments of enforced waiting on the journey, such as at border crossing points, generate their own embodied risks due to poor sanitation, lack of access to clean drinking water, and exposure to extreme weather, which in turn creates the need for as well as the time and space for limited humanitarian relief (see Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). However, as the migrant caravan attests, geoinfrastructure also creates the possibility for a (conditioned) resistance to exclusionary political-material mobility regimes. Infrastructural spaces and systems—roads, transit areas, buses and pick-up trucks—are being claimed and used by Honduran migrants in their journeys to the United States. In Europe and in the context of my own research, one of the key architects of Médecins Sans Frontiéres’ Search and Rescue operations has impressed upon me the important interrelation of the sea, infrastructures of surveillance and visibility, and the boat in making possible humanitarian efforts not only at saving lives but in addition the “activist” element of such search and rescue. Here, the dynamics of the sea, in concert with European border surveillance systems such as EUROSUR and the boat, make possible certain political interventions and disruptions that, it is argued, are not possible in other environments such as the Sahara and speak to Law’s idea of a relational ontology.[1]

      Away from the migrant caravan and my own research on search and rescue in the Mediterranean, I have become interested in exploring the relationship between physical, infrastructural and border geographies in how migrants choose to cross the Alps from Italy into France. These crossings occur at only a few points along the border, at crossing points that are manageable to migrants with differential mobility capabilities. Importantly, they are less risky than other crossing points due to lower altitude, better transport connections and a reduced police presence, such as at the Col de l’Échelle between the Italian town of Bardonecchia and the French city of Briançon. People do not cross through these places for lack of other routes. The town of Bardonecchia, for example, is located at the Italian entrance of both the Fréjus tunnel linking France and Italy, carrying motor vehicles under the Alps, and the older Mont Cenis tunnel linking France and Italy by rail. The entry point to the Fréjus and the trains using the Mont Cenis are heavily policed. The policing of the Fréjus tunnel is further made easier by traffic having to stop and pass through toll booths. And yet, the presence of the railway and its attendant station in Bardonecchia means that it is relatively accessible for migrants travelling from the rest of Italy. Its proximity to the French border, only 7km and a relatively gentle walk away, means that this particular border region has become a particularly popular passage point for migrants wanting to leave Italy for France.

      I have come to know this region well through its additional and complimentary infrastructures of tourism. The cross-border region is a popular holiday destination for people like me who are drawn there by the geoinfrastructure that makes for excellent cycling terrain. This tourism infrastructure for both summer and winter Alpine sports and outdoor activities means that the area is comparatively heavily populated for the Hautes-Alpes. This has resulted in services capable and willing to assist migrants with their journeys, from dedicated and well-equipped teams of mountain rescuers, to a large hospital specializing in mountain injuries, and solidarity activists offering food and shelter. In this region of the Hautes-Alpes, geoinfrastructuring, like with the migrant caravan, shapes not only how and why migrants make their journeys in particular ways: it also facilitates the exercising of political resistance to exclusionary border regimes by both migrants themselves and those who stand in solidarity with them.

      With this short essay I have attempted to challenge the language of flows and in so doing drawn attention to the constitutive role of infrastructures and their embodied effects in how migrants, excluded from safe and legal forms of transportation, exercise mobility. I have argued that as political geographers we should also consider the role of physical geography in making a difference in these journeys that occur in concert with roads, rivers, mountains, deserts, tunnels, bridges and vehicles. These physical geographies, as Vicki Squire argues, have biophysical effects. This is not to normalize the very real bodily dangers faced by migrants in their journeys by seeking to lay blame at the foot of the mountain, so to speak. Instead, it is to suggest that these physical geographies come to matter and have very real effects because of the political role ascribed to them by human decision-making concerned with (re)producing unequal mobility. It is to make the case for what I have termed here geoinfrastructuring—the assemblage of physical, material and political geographies—that shape how migrants move and the risks they face.

      http://societyandspace.org/2019/02/21/walking-not-flowing-the-migrant-caravan-and-the-geoinfrastructuring

    • Quand les caravanes passent…

      Depuis l’intégration du Mexique à l’Espace de libre-échange nord- américain, la question migratoire est devenue centrale dans ses relations avec les États-Unis, dans une perspective de plus en plus sécuritaire. Sa frontière méridionale constitue le point de convergence des migrations des pays du sud vers les pays nord-américains. Les caravanes de migrants, qui traversent son territoire depuis la fin 2018, traduisent une façon de rompre avec la clandestinité autant qu’une protection contre les périls de la traversée ; elles sont aussi l’expression d’une geste politique.

      Le Mexique occupe dans la stratégie de sécurisation des frontières américaines un rôle pivot, à la fois un État tampon et un relais du processus d’externalisation du contrôle des frontières dans l’espace méso-américain. Si l’attention médiatique tend à se focaliser sur les 3 000 kilomètres de frontières qu’il partage avec son voisin du nord, sa frontière sud catalyse les enjeux géopolitiques du contrôle des flux dans la région.

      Depuis son intégration à l’espace de libre-échange nord-américain au cours des années 1990, le Mexique a vu s’imposer la question migratoire dans ses relations diplomatiques avec les États-Unis. L’objectif d’une régulation du passage des frontières par le blocage des flux illicites, de biens ou de personnes, est devenu un élément central de la coopération bilatérale, a fortiori après le 11 septembre 2001. La frontière sud, longue de près de 1 000 kilomètres, circonscrit l’espace de libre circulation formé en 2006 par le Nicaragua, le Honduras, le Salvador et le Guatemala. Elle constitue le point de convergence des migrations en direction des pays nord-américains.
      Faire frontière

      Dans les années 2000, les autorités mexicaines ont donc élaboré une stratégie de surveillance fondée sur la mise en place de cordons sécuritaires [1], depuis l’isthme de Tehuantepec jusqu’à la frontière sud, bordée par une zone forestière difficilement contrôlable. Responsable de l’examen du droit au séjour, l’Institut national de migration (INM) est devenu en 2005 une « agence de sécurité nationale » : la question migratoire est depuis lors envisagée dans cette optique sécuritaire. Des « centres de gestion globale du transit frontalier » [centro de atención integral al tránsito fronterizo] ont été construits à une cinquantaine de kilomètres de la frontière sud. Chargées de filtrer les marchandises comme les individus, ces mégastructures regroupent des agents de l’armée, de la marine, de la police fédérale, de la migration et du bureau fédéral du Procureur général. En 2014, la surveillance des déplacements a été confortée par l’adoption du « Programme Frontière sud », à l’issue d’une rencontre entre le président Peña Nieto et son homologue américain, mécontent de l’inaction du Mexique face à l’afflux de mineurs à leur frontière commune. Derrière le vernis humanitaire de la protection des personnes, la détention et l’expulsion sont érigées en objectifs politiques. Fin 2016, les placements en rétention avaient augmenté de 85 %, les expulsions doublé. Proche de la frontière guatémaltèque, le centre de rétention de Tapachula, décrit comme le plus moderne et le plus grand d’Amérique centrale [2], concentre près de la moitié des expulsions organisées par le Mexique. Avec ceux des États de Tabasco et de Veracruz, ce sont plus de 70 % des renvois qui sont mis en œuvre depuis cette région. De multiples rapports associatifs font état de l’augmentation des drames humains liés à ces dispositifs qui aboutissent, de fait, à une clandestinisation de la migration et rendent les routes migratoires plus dangereuses.

      La migration a également été incorporée aux multiples programmes américains de coopération visant à lutter contre les trafics illicites, la criminalité transfrontalière et le terrorisme. Ces programmes n’ont eu d’autre effet que de faire des personnes en route vers le nord une nouvelle manne financière pour les organisations criminelles qui contrôlent ces espaces de circulation transnationale. La traversée de la frontière américaine guidée par un passeur coûterait 3 500 dollars, les prix variant en fonction de la « méthode ». Le passage par la « grande porte », à l’un des points officiels d’entrée sur le territoire américain, s’achèterait 18 000 dollars. Mais les cartels recrutent aussi des migrant·es pour convoyer plusieurs dizaines de kilos de drogue sur le territoire américain, des « mules » payées 2 000 dollars si elles y parviennent. L’extorsion, la prise d’otages et le travail forcé des migrant·es en transit vers les États-Unis figurent parmi les pratiques des cartels, avec parfois la complicité des agents de l’État. En 2011, des personnes en instance d’expulsion ont ainsi été vendues par des fonctionnaires de l’INM au cartel des Zetas contre 400 dollars par personne.

      Se donnant entre autres objectifs de « construire la frontière du xxiesiècle », l’Initiative Mérida a investi plus de 2,8 milliards de dollars depuis 2007 dans le renforcement d’infrastructures, la technologie du contrôle – dont l’échange avec la partie nord-américaine des données biométriques des personnes placées en rétention – et l’organisation d’opérations policières à la frontière avec le Guatemala. Ce programme finance aussi l’expulsion de ressortissants centraméricains ou extracontinentaux par le Mexique (20 millions de dollars en 2018).

      Dans une certaine mesure, ces dispositifs font système, au point que certains chercheurs [3] parlent du corridor migratoire mexicain comme d’une « frontière verticale ».
      Des caravanes pas comme les autres

      Du premier groupe constitué d’une centaine de personnes parties du Honduras en octobre 2018 aux divers collectifs formés en cours de route vers la frontière nord-américaine par des milliers d’individus venant d’Amérique centrale, de la Caraïbe et, dans une moindre mesure, des continents africain et asiatique, ce qu’il est désormais convenu d’appeler des « caravanes de migrants » constitue un phénomène inédit.

      Dans l’histoire centraméricaine, la notion renvoie à une pluralité de mobilisations, telle celle des mères de migrant·es disparu·es au cours de la traversée du Mexique, qui chaque année parcourent cette route à la recherche de leurs fils ou filles. Le Viacrucis migrante, « chemin de croix du migrant », réunit annuellement des sans-papiers centraméricain·es et des organisations de droits de l’Homme afin de réclamer la poursuite des auteur·es de violations des droits des migrant·es en transit au Mexique, séquestrations, racket, assassinats, viols, féminicides, exploitation ou tous autres abus.

      La première caravane de migrants du Honduras et celles qui lui ont succédé s’inscrivent dans une autre démarche. Elles traduisent une façon de rompre avec la clandestinité imposée par les politiques autant qu’une forme de protection contre les périls de la traversée. Le nombre des marcheurs a créé un nouveau rapport de force dans la remise en cause des frontières. Entre octobre 2018 et février 2019, plus de 30 000 personnes réunies en caravanes ont été enregistrées à la frontière sud du Mexique mais, chaque jour, elles sont des milliers à entrer clandestinement. Entre janvier et mars 2019, les États-Unis ont recensé plus de 234 000 entrées sur leur territoire, le plus souvent hors des points d’entrée officiels.

      Ces caravanes ont aussi révélé un phénomène jusqu’alors peu visible : l’exode centraméricain. Depuis les années 2000, près de 400 000 personnes par an, originaires du Honduras, du Salvador, du Guatemala, migrent aux États- Unis. Fuyant des États corrompus et autoritaires, une violence endé- mique et multiforme, dont celle des maras (gangs) et des cartels, ainsi que les effets délétères du modèle extractiviste néolibéral, elles quittent des pays qui, selon elles, n’ont rien à leur offrir.

      Ces migrations ne doivent pas être appréhendées de façon monolithique : les caravanes constituent une juxtaposition de situations diverses ; les groupes se font et se transforment au cours de la route, au gré des attentes de chacun. Certains ont préféré régulariser leur situation dès l’entrée sur le territoire mexicain quand d’autres ont choisi de pousser jusqu’à la frontière nord, d’où ils ont engagé des démarches auprès des autorités mexicaines et américaines.
      Du Nord au Sud, la fabrique d’une « crise migratoire »

      En réaction à ces différentes mobilités, le Mexique et les États-Unis ont déployé leurs armées, le premier oscillant entre un accueil humanitaire ad hoc, des pratiques de contention et l’expulsion, ou la facilitation des traversées en direction des États-Unis. Les mesures adoptées tant par les États-Unis que par le Mexique ont participé à l’engorgement des frontières, du sud au nord, créant ainsi la situation de « crise migratoire » qu’ils prétendaient prévenir.

      Sollicité par le gouvernement mexicain avant même l’arrivée de la première caravane sur le territoire des États-Unis, le Haut-Commissariat pour les réfugiés (HCR) a obtenu des fonds de ces derniers pour faciliter l’accès à la procédure d’asile mexicaine. Les États-Unis ont également mobilisé l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) pour qu’elle mette en place des campagnes de sensibilisation sur les risques de la traversée, et d’encouragement au retour. Écartant d’emblée la revendication des marcheurs de pouvoir solliciter collectivement l’asile à la frontière américaine, les agents du HCR ont insisté sur la complexité des procédures et la faible probabilité d’obtenir l’asile aux États-Unis, confortant le discours porté par l’OIM. Les organisations mexi- caines de défense des droits des étrangers ne se sont pas saisies du droit comme d’une arme politique de soutien à l’appel des marcheurs à une libre circulation au Mexique et au refuge pour tous aux États-Unis. L’ensemble des discours en direction des caravanes ont convergé en faveur de la promotion de l’installation au Mexique. « À chaque fois, on nous parle de la détention, de l’expulsion… Mais nous, on est là et on va continuer d’avancer ! » a observé l’un des marcheurs.

      Depuis plusieurs années, les obstacles à la traversée clandestine du Mexique ont contribué à l’accroissement des demandes d’asile qui sont, avec la carte de visiteur pour raison humanitaire délivrée par l’INM, l’unique option de régularisation. Entre 2013 et 2018, le nombre de requêtes a augmenté de 2 332 %, passant de 1 269 à 29 600. Cette tendance se poursuit. Au premier semestre 2019, la Commission mexicaine d’aide aux réfugiés (Comar) – équivalent de l’Ofpra français – enregistrait une hausse de 182 % par rapport à la même période en 2018, sans que n’augmentent ses moyens. Elle ne disposait en 2017 que de 28 officiers de protection chargés d’instruire les dossiers. L’année suivante, le HCR a soutenu le recrutement de 29 autres officiers tandis que le gouvernement votait une diminution du budget alloué à la Comar. En février 2018, la Commission nationale des droits de l’Homme révélait que des demandes d’asile déposées en 2016 n’avaient toujours pas été examinées, de même que près de 60 % des requêtes formées en 2017. Aux 33 650 dossiers en attente de traitement, se sont ajoutées plus de 12 700 demandes depuis le début 2019.

      Pour éviter d’être expulsées, les personnes n’ont d’autre choix que de « faire avec » ce système en pleine déliquescence. En décembre 2018, il fallait compter jusqu’à six semaines avant de pouvoir déposer une requête à la Comar de Tapachula, et six mois à l’issue de l’audition pour obtenir une réponse. En attendant, les postulant·es doivent, chaque semaine, attester du maintien de leur demande et, pour survivre, s’en remettre à l’assistance humanitaire offerte dans les lieux d’hébergement tenus par des ecclésiastiques. Conséquence de cette précarisation croissante, le taux d’abandon des demandes d’asile déposées à la Comar dans l’État du Chiapas atteignait 43% en 2017. Nombreux sont ceux et celles qui sollicitent l’asile et le visa humanitaire dans le même temps et, une fois le second obtenu, partent chercher un travail au nord du pays. Afin de réduire l’abandon des demandes d’asile, le HCR verse un pécule durant quatre mois aux personnes jugées « vulnérables », une appréciation subordonnée à son budget. En plus des pointages hebdomadaires auprès des administrations, les bénéficiaires doivent chaque mois attester de leur présence au bureau du HCR pour recevoir ce pécule. Dans cette configuration, la distinction entre les logiques sécuritaire et humanitaire se brouille. Parmi les personnes rencontrées à Tapachula, nombreuses sont celles qui ont souligné l’artifice d’une politique d’assistance qui n’en porte que le nom, à l’exemple de Guillermo, originaire du Salvador : « Pour demander des papiers aujourd’hui, il faut passer d’abord par la mafia des organisations. Tout le monde te parle, chacun te propose son petit discours. Cela me fait penser aux prestidigitateurs au cirque, c’est une illusion.[...] Le HCR dit que la procédure d’asile est longue et qu’on peut en profiter pour faire des formations pour apprendre un nouveau métier [...]. Mais déjà, la plupart ici n’a pas l’argent pour ça et se bat pour vivre et trouver un logement ! Ensuite moi, je dois aller signer chaque mardi à la Comar et chaque vendredi à l’INM, le HCR me propose deux jours de cours de langue par semaine pour apprendre l’anglais, mais ça veut dire quoi ? Cela veut dire qu’on peut juste aller travailler un jour par semaine ?! [...] Ils te font miroiter des choses, ils t’illusionnent ! [...] Le HCR te dit : "Tu ne peux pas sortir du Chiapas." La Comar te dit : "Tu ne peux pas sortir de Tapachula." L’INM te dit : "Si on te chope, on t’expulse." »

      La formation d’un espace de contention au bord de l’implosion au sud du Mexique fait écho à la situation de blocage à la frontière nord du pays, renforcée en novembre 2018 par le plan « Reste au Mexique », mal renommé depuis « Protocole de protection de la migration ». Les États-Unis, qui obligeaient déjà les demandeurs d’asile à s’enregistrer et attendre à la frontière, ont unilatéralement décidé de contraindre les non-Mexicains à retourner au Mexique durant le traitement de leur demande d’asile, à moins qu’ils ne démontrent les risques qu’ils y encourraient.
      Frontières et corruption : une rébellion globale

      Ces derniers mois, les entraves et dénis des droits ont engendré de nouvelles formes de mobilisation des migrant·es originaires de la Caraïbe, d’Afrique et d’Asie, jusqu’alors peu visibles. Les personnes en quête de régularisation se heurtent à la corruption qui gangrène les arcanes de l’État : toute démarche, du franchissement de la frontière en passant par la possibilité d’entrer dans les locaux de l’INM jusqu’à l’obtention d’un formulaire, est sujette à extorsion. La délivrance de l’oficio de salida, permettant à certain·es [4] de traverser le pays en direction des États-Unis, est devenue l’objet d’un racket en 2018. Les agents de l’INM disposent d’intermédiaires chargés de récolter l’argent auprès des migrant·es pour la délivrance de ce sauf-conduit, qui donne une vingtaine de jours pour parvenir à la frontière nord. Les montants varient en fonction des nationalités : un Cubain devra payer 400 dollars, un Pakistanais 200 quand un jeune Congolais parviendra à négocier 70 dollars, 100 étant demandés aux autres Africains. Pour tenter de contourner ce système, des personnes sont restées des journées entières devant l’entrée du centre de rétention, dans l’espoir d’y accéder : le plus souvent, seules les familles finissaient par entrer. En mars 2019, des Cubains, exaspérés d’attendre depuis plusieurs mois, ont tenté d’entrer en force à la délégation de l’INM. Rejoints par des personnes originaires de Haïti, d’Amérique centrale, d’Afrique et d’Asie, ils ont été plus de 2 000 à faire le siège des locaux de l’INM, avant de décider, après plusieurs semaines d’attente vaine, de former la caravane centraméricaine et de la Caraïbe vers la frontière nord.

      Aujourd’hui, l’élan de solidarité qui avait accueilli la première caravane de Honduriens est retombé. Celles et ceux qui continuent leur route en direction du Mexique et des États-Unis ne bénéficient ni de la même couverture médiatique ni du même traitement politique. Les promesses gouvernementales d’accueil sont restées lettre morte. En janvier 2019, l’INM annonçait avoir délivré 11 823 cartes de visiteurs pour raisons humanitaires au cours du mois. En mars, on n’en comptait plus que 1 024. Outre une recrudescence des expulsions, un nouveau « plan de contention » prévoit le renforcement de la présence policière dans l’isthme de Tehuantepec. Cette stratégie se déploie aussi par-delà le territoire puisque les demandes de visa humanitaire devraient désormais se faire depuis le Honduras, le Salvador et le Guatemala.

      Si certains voient dans les caravanes un nouveau paradigme migratoire, une chose est sûre : la contestation des frontières et la défiance envers les États portées par ces mouvements sont l’expression d’une geste politique longtemps déniée à une migration jusqu’alors confinée au silence.

      https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article6226

    • Primer vuelo “exprés” con 129 hondureños retornados de México

      Tras meses de espera en la frontera norte de México, los hondureños solicitantes de asilo en Estados Unidos comienzan a desesperarse y están pidiendo retornar de forma voluntaria al país, tal y como lo hicieron 129 compatriotas que llegaron hoy por vía aérea a #San_Pedro_Sula.

      El vuelo, organizado por la embajada de Honduras en México y financiado por la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (#OIM), salió de la ciudad de #Matamoros (Tamaulipas), donde los hondureños llevaban varios meses de espera.

      El embajador de Honduras en México, Alden Rivera Montes, informó que los retornados venían en 55 grupos familiares, constituidos por 32 hombres, 30 mujeres y 65 menores acompañados de sus padres; además, retornaron dos adultos solos.

      Rivera Montes detalló que el nuevo Consulado Móvil de Honduras en Matamoros expidió los salvoconductos para que los compatriotas pudieran salir de México mediante la modalidad de Retorno Voluntario Asistido (AVR) a través de la OIM.

      Aseguró que debido a los altos índices de violencia de esa ciudad mexicana se están haciendo las gestiones para que los hondureños que son devueltos por las autoridades estadounidenses a México, sean trasladados a puntos fronterizos menos vulnerables.

      De la misma manera las autoridades de la embajada de Honduras en México anunciaron que los procesos de atención a los migrantes en situación de espera que deseen regresar voluntariamente a Honduras seguirán abiertos durante los próximos meses y que pronto se habilitará esta misma opción de retorno voluntario desde Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juárez y Tijuana.

      ATENCIÓN DIGNA

      El vuelo llegó al aeropuerto sampedrano a las 3:00 de la tarde y posteriormente los compatriotas fueron trasladados Centro de Atención para la Niñez y Familias Migrantes Belén, ubicado en San Pedro Sula.

      En Belén los compatriotas fueron recibidos con un plato de sopa caliente; posteriormente hicieron el Control Biométrico con personal del Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) y llenaron una ficha socioeconómica para optar a los diferentes programas de reinserción social y de oportunidades que ofrece el gobierno.

      Los menores retornados también reciben atención médica y psicológica; posteriormente, si son menores no acompañados, un grupo de especialistas de la Dirección de Niñez, Adolescencia y Familia (Dinaf) les brinda seguimiento para garantizar que se cumplan sus derechos.

      Asimismo, con el apoyo de la Cruz Roja Hondureña se les brinda una llamada para que puedan comunicarse con sus familiares acá en Honduras, se les proporciona un ticket para que puedan trasladarse a sus lugares de origen y si lo requieren se les brinda un albergue temporal.

      https://www.latribuna.hn/2019/10/09/primer-vuelo-expres-con-129-hondurenos-retornados-de-mexico
      #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés_honduriens #IOM #retour_volontaire

    • Honduran Migrants Return from Mexico with IOM support

      The International Organization for Migration (IOM) organized a charter flight for 126 migrants who expressed their decision to return voluntarily to their country of origin. Fifty-three family groups comprising 33 men, 29 women and 64 children flew on Wednesday (09/10) from the city of Matamoros (Tamaulipas, Mexico) to San Pedro Sula (Honduras).

      IOM deployed all efforts and collaborated closely with the Honduran Embassy in Mexico and with the National Migration Institute of Mexico to arrange for this first charter flight in its Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programme.

      In the days preceding departure, with the support of its Shelter Support programme and local partners, IOM provided migrants with accommodation and food. According to its internal protocols, IOM ensured that all migrants were made aware of all processes so that all decisions could be taken based on complete information. Further, IOM verifies that persons who express a desire to return do not face any immediate risks upon arrival.

      “I made the decision to return to my country because of the situation I faced with my son; because promises made to us by the ‘coyotes’ are not fulfilled, and we risk our lives along the way,” said a young mother on board the flight. “When we finally crossed the border into the USA, they took us back to Matamoros in Mexico, where I spent eight days in a shelter. There, we saw IOM and we learned about different options. But I want to see my other daughter now, so I decided to return home.”

      “Something I want to say is that if I ever migrate again, I will look for information before leaving, because many people simply give money which we do not really have to ‘coyotes’ or guides, who takes advantage of us,” said another Honduran migrant who decided to return due to the difficult conditions in the Mexican border city. “After considering our options, we found the shelter supported by IOM who helped us out by giving us food and a place to stay, and the possibility of return.”

      “IOM has been providing support to shelters to increase their capacity along with the option of assisted voluntary returns by bus and commercial flights over the last months,” explained Christopher Gascon, IOM Chief of Mission in Mexico. “This is the first return by charter flight, which offers a better service to migrants who want to return home. We hope to provide many more charter flights in the weeks to come.”

      The IOM Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programme offers an alternative for an orderly, safe and dignified voluntary return for migrants. IOM offers humanitarian assistance to those who cannot or do not wish to remain in Mexico. Voluntariness is a key principle of IOM #AVR programmes worldwide.


      https://www.iom.int/news/honduran-migrants-return-mexico-iom-support

  • UN experts: concern over EU’s attempts to seal borders, close protection space and disregard human rights and humanitarianism

    In September eight UN working groups, independent experts and special rapporteurs issued a statement highlighting serious concerns over the ongoing attempts to reform the EU’s migration and asylum systems. Their paper was addressed to the informal summit of EU heads of state and government in Salzburg in September, but remains relevant given the ongoing discussions in the EU on the Common European Asylum System and revamping of EU agencies such as Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

    The document was signed by the UN’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity; Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children.

    See: Joint communication of Special Procedures ahead of the informal summit of EU heads of state or government in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018 (OL OTH 64/2018, 18 September 2018, pdf): http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/oct/un-joint-communication-eu-migration-asylum-proposals-18-9-18.pdf

    Selected quotes:

    "We would like to comment on three particular proposals elaborated by the European Commission based on the European Council’s conclusions, which are of utmost concern from a human rights perspective, namely: the creation of #regional_disembarkation_platforms, the establishment of controlled centres, and the strengthening of the border police and coast guard.

    ...Outsourcing responsibility of disembarkation to third countries, in particular those with weak protection systems, only increases the risk of #refoulement and other human rights violations. As similar models have shown elsewhere, external disembarkation and processing centres do not provide durable solutions and result in numerous grave human rights violations, including breaches of the non-refoulement obligation, torture and ill-treatment, confinement amounting to arbitrary or indefinite detention, and violations of the right to life. Furthermore, processes should be established to ensure that relevant actors be held to account if they fail to meet international standards.”

    -----

    “We are deeply concerned that in truth, the above-mentioned three proposals which are being discussed in the context of the reform of the common migration and asylum system are aimed at sealing borders, closing the protection space in Europe, and disregarding human rights principles and humanitarian concerns as central aspects at stake. Moreover, we are concerned that these measures are being proposed as a means to leverage political gain in response to the worrying rise of anti-migration and xenophobic hate speeches and stances, as reflected by increased acts and discourses of #violence and racism against migrants in various member States. In this respect, we urge the European Commission to lead efforts to counter negative anti-immigration discourses both at the political and social level in order to facilitate and improve the reception and integration of migrants in Europe.”

    -----

    “The EU and its member States should adopt a more thoughtful approach, and seek constructive, long-term, sustainable solutions, instead of adopting counterproductive and ineffective security policies which result in the criminalization and stigmatization of migrants.”

    -----

    “It is high time for the EU to accept the impossibility of sealing borders and the perverse incentives and paradoxes created by the current system, as well as the inevitability and added benefits of mobility. The EU must invest in the overall development of a coherent and robust migration policy that fully integrates the human rights of migrants as enshrined in both international and regional law. Measures intended to prevent migration, accelerate returns, and seal borders are not the solution, and only respond to misguided security concerns over the protection of migrants.”

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/oct/un-sr-eu-migration.htm
    #ONU #fermeture_des_frontières #EU #UE #droits_humains #humanitarisme #Europe #réfugiés #asile #migrations #plateformes_de_désembarquement #contrôles_frontaliers #externalisation #push-back #droit_à_la_vie #hate_speech #xénophobie #racisme #mobilité #politique_migratoire
    ping @reka

  • #Stefano_Allievi: I confini non sono muri ma luoghi di passaggio

    «Potersi muovere è un fattore imprescindibile dello sviluppo economico e culturale. Si muovono le idee, il denaro, le merci. Gli uomini e le donne quando si muovono imparano delle cose, quando si separano dai loro luoghi d’origine vivono nuove esperienze. E spesso possono anche decidere di riportarle al loro Paese se torneranno». Incontriamo Stefano Allievi, sociologo dell’Università di Padova, all’indomani dell’uscita di 5 cose che tutti dovremmo sapere sull’immigrazione (e una da fare). Un libricino di 64 pagine edito da Laterza, dal costo di soli 3 euro, che risponde con parole semplici ed esempi chiari alle domande e ai dubbi più frequenti sul tema del secolo, che la politica, a livello nazionale ed europeo, non riesce a (o non vuole) risolvere.

    Da dove bisogna partire per parlare di immigrazione senza tare ideologiche o di altro tipo?
    Ci sono ambiti legati al tema dei migranti su cui non si riflette mai abbastanza. Quando parliamo di demografia si tende a enfatizzare soprattutto quella dell’Africa. “Fanno tanti figli, la loro popolazione si raddoppierà, la Nigeria sostituirà gli Usa come terzo Paese più popoloso al mondo”, e questo suscita terrore: “Non possiamo accogliere tutti”. E si perde di vista quello che comporta il calo demografico in atto in Europa. Dove per la prima volta nella storia si è invertita la piramide demografica per cause naturali, cioè non per effetto di una guerra, e i giovani sono molto meno degli anziani. Nelle regioni del nord per ogni under 15 ci sono due over 65. Già oggi, non in futuro. In Africa, invece, metà della popolazione ha meno di 15 anni.

    https://left.it/2018/10/12/stefano-allievi-i-confini-non-sono-muri-ma-luoghi-di-passaggio
    #frontières #passage #murs

    • Stefano Allievi, 5 cose che tutti dovremmo sapere sull’immigrazione (e una cosa da fare)

      Per ragionare sulle cause delle migrazioni potremmo limitarci a citare, in ordine sparso, alcune parole: guerre, fame, dittature, persecuzioni (per motivi etnici, religiosi, razziali, politici), ingiustizie subìte, diseguaglianze, calamità naturali (incluse quelle dovute al cambiamento climatico), crescita demografica non accompagnata da crescita economica. A cui va aggiunto il puro e semplice sfruttamento delle risorse (alimentari, minerarie, ecc.), fatto quasi sempre per conto terzi: anche quando gli sfruttatori sono i governi – spesso militari – dei rispettivi paesi, i terzi sono, di solito, aziende dei paesi sviluppati; e come dice un saggio proverbio africano, “se uno percuote un alveare per portare via il miele, le api lo inseguono”. Quella che precede è la lista, per difetto, dei cosiddetti push factors, o fattori di spinta. Ci accontenteremo di fare un cenno solo alle diseguaglianze di reddito e alla demografia.

      Le differenze di reddito non spiegano tutto, delle migrazioni. Esistono da sempre. E nonostante questo la maggior parte delle persone preferisce rimanere vicino alla sua famiglia, tra la sua gente, la sua cultura, con chi parla la sua lingua. Ma pesano. Il PIL pro capite (il prodotto interno lordo – ovvero la ricchezza del paese – suddiviso per il numero degli abitanti), è in Italia di 30.507 dollari l’anno.

      Quello medio dell’Unione Europea è di 39.317 dollari, quello dell’Africa subsahariana è di 3.837 dollari, e in alcuni dei paesi da cui provengono coloro che tentano di sbarcare in Italia viaggia al di sotto dei mille dollari l’anno (411 in Niger, 469 in Gambia, 795 in Etiopia, 830 in Mali, 852 in Ciad). Ora, se le diseguaglianze di reddito bastassero a spiegare le migrazioni, l’Africa sarebbe già da decenni in Europa, l’Europa negli Stati Uniti (dove il PIL pro capite è di oltre 57.000 dollari, quasi 20.000 in più che in Europa), e gli Stati Uniti a loro volta in Lussemburgo (dove è di 103.000, il più alto del mondo). E non bastano le barriere alle immigrazioni per spiegare perché non sia così: in Europa c’è la libera circolazione della manodopera, e il reddito della Germania è oltre il doppio di quello della Grecia (e i servizi e il welfare molto migliori), eppure i greci – nonostante la drammatica crisi che hanno vissuto in questi anni – in maggioranza non sono andati in Germania, e sono rimasti a casa loro (né gli altri europei sono finiti tutti in Lussemburgo, peraltro). Ma serve a spiegare perché le migrazioni siano in aumento. Del resto, chiedetevelo da soli: quanti di voi sarebbero disposti ad emigrare sapendo che, a parità di lavoro, il vostro reddito potenziale potrebbe essere di dieci o addirittura cinquanta volte tanto? In molti non stareste neanche lì a chiedervi se il costo della vita altrove è più alto... Eppure oggi – grazie ai media globali e alla rete – la ricchezza degli altri la possiamo letteralmente “vedere”, più di quanto capitasse ai nostri nonni.

      Poi c’è la demografia. La popolazione del mondo cresce: molto, e in maniera squilibrata.

      In Europa, ad esempio (Italia inclusa), diminuisce, e stiamo ogni giorno più larghi. In Africa invece cresce tumultuosamente: entro il 2050 sarà il doppio di oggi. La Nigeria, per dire, oggi settimo paese del mondo per popolazione, prima del 2050 scalzerà gli Stati Uniti dal loro tradizionale terzo posto: e già oggi i 10 Stati più giovani del mondo, con un’età media intorno ai vent’anni, sono tutti africani. La sproporzione si vede bene sul piano storico: all’inizio del

      Novecento era europeo un abitante del mondo su quattro; nel 2050 lo sarà uno su quattordici.

      Facciamo meno figli, e viviamo più a lungo, di conseguenza la popolazione invecchia, e gli anziani sono più dei giovani – i demografi la chiamano inversione della piramide della popolazione, è la prima volta che accade nella storia per motivi naturali, e ha effetti drammatici.

      Non è solo questione di risorse, di chi pagherà le pensioni e le cure mediche, sempre più care man mano che cresce l’età della popolazione – uno squilibrio che mette sulle spalle delle giovani generazioni un fardello enorme. È anche questione del tipo di paese che si va configurando: non è dagli anziani che ci aspettiamo – e che storicamente proviene – la creatività, l’innovazione, l’apertura mentale, il desiderio di scoprire nuovi orizzonti... E nemmeno il mettersi in gioco economicamente con l’invenzione di imprese, il lancio di start up, l’assunzione di manodopera. Dunque una società più anziana è anche una società depressiva e recessiva – consuma più di quello che produce, oltre che essere più triste e passiva: diciamolo, è più vicina alla morte, e vive nella sua ombra. Per invertire lo scenario occorre avere, come sempre nella storia dell’umanità, più popolazione giovane.

      Certo, potrebbe essere popolazione autoctona. Ma, semplicemente, non c’è. Per motivi legati agli stili di vita e alle trasformazioni culturali – e, per i ceti meno abbienti, anche ai costi – l’aumento del benessere ha finora portato con sé la riduzione della natalità. A spingere le migrazioni ci sono anche, oltre ai fattori di espulsione, i fattori di attrazione, i pull factors: il differenziale economico e salariale l’abbiamo già citato. Ma conta anche l’immaginario che abbiamo sugli altri paesi, che crediamo più liberi, e più ricchi di opportunità, non solo di denaro. Libertà di muoversi, di sfuggire al controllo sociale della famiglia e della comunità, di studiare quello che si vuole (e di poterlo fare perché aiutati dallo Stato, anche se si è poveri), di fare esperienze (tutte quelle legate alla condizione giovanile, incluse quelle sessuali, in società più aperte da questo punto di vista), di viaggiare, di trovare più opportunità di lavoro (per il semplice fatto che la società è più complessa e il mercato del lavoro più ampio e articolato: non ci sono solo quei tre o quattro mestieri a cui si è inevitabilmente destinati...), di essere valutati rispetto al proprio merito e non alla propria origine, di sfuggire alla corruzione dei governi e delle burocrazie, che può essere oppressiva e soffocante, fino al semplice desiderio di sposare chi si vuole, e di sperimentare le proprie capacità cercando nuove occasioni, diversificate quanto lo sono le forme del desiderio. E poi, magari – li sottovalutiamo, questi fattori, noi che li diamo per scontati –, di avere scuole e ospedali migliori e quasi gratuiti, l’acqua corrente in casa, gli elettrodomestici, i videogiochi, quattro soldi in tasca, negozi pieni di merci, le vacanze... L’Europa non se ne è accorta, ma è diventata l’America dell’Africa (e di altre aree del mondo): o per lo meno, un’America più vicina e meno irraggiungibile dell’altra, che resta ancora la più ambita. Per molti, nel mondo, la nostra è una terra dei sogni. Il fatto che non ce ne accorgiamo ci dà la misura di quanto l’Europa non sia all’altezza del proprio ruolo.

      Ecco perché non sarà facile fermare le migrazioni. Ammesso che sia auspicabile. E, a proposito: sareste d’accordo a fermare anche quelle in uscita? Perché è giusto capire in quale direzione stiamo contribuendo a far andare il mondo: è probabile infatti che saremo ripagati con la stessa moneta, se le frontiere, anziché luoghi di attraversamento, diventano muri. Ce ne stiamo già accorgendo.
      Ecco perché, anche, è necessario lavorare sulle cause delle migrazioni, sugli equilibri e gli squilibri globali, sulle ingiustizie planetarie. In una logica di scambio.


      https://www.laterza.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2154:stefano-allievi-5-cose&cat
      #livre #préjugés #migrations #asile #réfugiés

  • 2.3 million Venezuelans now live abroad

    More than 7% of Venezuela’s population has fled the country since 2014, according to the UN. That is the equivalent of the US losing the whole population of Florida in four years (plus another 100,000 people, give or take).

    The departing 2.3 million Venezuelans have mainly gone to neighboring Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru, putting tremendous pressure on those countries. “This is building to a crisis moment that we’ve seen in other parts of the world, particularly in the Mediterranean,” a spokesman for the UN’s International Organization for Migration said recently.

    This week, Peru made it a bit harder for Venezuelans to get in. The small town of Aguas Verdes has seen as many as 3,000 people a day cross the border; most of the 400,000 Venezuelans in Peru arrived in the last year. So Peru now requires a valid passport. Until now, ID cards were all that was needed.

    Ecuador tried to do the same thing but a judge said that such a move violated freedom-of-movement rules agreed to when Ecuador joined the Andean Community. Ecuador says 4,000 people a day have been crossing the border, a total of 500,000 so far. It has now created what it calls a “humanitarian corridor” by laying on buses to take Venezuelans across Ecuador, from the Colombian border to the Peruvian border.

    Brazil’s Amazon border crossing in the state of Roraima with Venezuela gets 500 people a day. It was briefly shut down earlier this month—but that, too, was overturned by a court order.

    Venezuela is suffering from severe food shortages—the UN said more than 1 million of those who had fled since 2014 are malnourished—and hyperinflation. Things could still get worse, which is really saying something for a place where prices are doubling every 26 days. The UN estimated earlier this year that 5,000 were leaving Venezuela every day; at that rate, a further 800,000 people could leave before the end of the year (paywall).

    A Gallup survey from March showed that 53% of young Venezuelans want to move abroad permanently. And all this was before an alleged drone attack on president Nicolas Maduro earlier this month made the political situation even more tense, the country’s opposition-led National Assembly said that the annual inflation rate reached 83,000% in July, and the chaotic introduction of a new currency.

    https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/venezuela-has-lost-2-3-million-people-and-it-could-get-even-worse
    #Venezuela #asile #migrations #réfugiés #cartographie #visualisation #réfugiés_vénézuéliens

    Sur ce sujet, voir aussi cette longue compilation initiée en juin 2017 :
    http://seen.li/d26k

    • Venezuela. L’Amérique latine cherche une solution à sa plus grande #crise_migratoire

      Les réunions de crise sur l’immigration ne sont pas l’apanage de l’Europe : treize pays latino-américains sont réunis depuis lundi à Quito pour tenter de trouver des solutions communes au casse-tête migratoire provoqué par l’#exode_massif des Vénézuéliens.


      https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/venezuela-lamerique-latine-cherche-une-solution-sa-plus-grand

    • Bataille de #chiffres et guerre d’images autour de la « #crise migratoire » vénézuélienne

      L’émigration massive qui touche actuellement le Venezuela est une réalité. Mais il ne faut pas confondre cette réalité et les défis humanitaires qu’elle pose avec son instrumentalisation, tant par le pouvoir vénézuélien pour se faire passer pour la victime d’un machination que par ses « ennemis » qui entendent se débarrasser d’un gouvernement qu’ils considèrent comme autoritaire et source d’instabilité dans la région. Etat des lieux d’une crise très polarisée.

      C’est un véritable scoop que nous a offert le président vénézuélien le 3 septembre dernier. Alors que son gouvernement est avare en données sur les sujets sensibles, Nicolas Maduro a chiffré pour la première fois le nombre de Vénézuéliens ayant émigré depuis deux ans à 600 000. Un chiffre vérifiable, a-t-il assuré, sans toutefois donner plus de détails.

      Ce chiffre, le premier plus ou moins officiel dans un pays où il n’y a plus de statistiques migratoires, contraste avec celui délivré par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) et le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés (HCR). Selon ces deux organisations, 2,3 millions de Vénézuéliens vivraient à l’étranger, soit 7,2% des habitants sur un total de 31,8 millions. Pas de quoi tomber de sa chaise ! D’autres diasporas sont relativement bien plus nombreuses. Ce qui impressionne, c’est la croissance exponentielle de cette émigration sur un très court laps de temps : 1,6 million auraient quitté le pays depuis 2015 seulement. Une vague de départs qui s’est accélérée ces derniers mois et affectent inégalement de nombreux pays de la région.
      Le pouvoir vénézuélien, par la voix de sa vice-présidente, a accusé des fonctionnaires de l’ONU de gonfler les chiffres d’un « flux migratoire normal » (sic) pour justifier une « intervention humanitaire », synonyme de déstabilisation. D’autres sources estiment quant à elles qu’ils pourraient être près de quatre millions à avoir fui le pays.

      https://www.cncd.be/Bataille-de-chiffres-et-guerre-d
      #statistiques #guerre_des_chiffres

    • La formulation est tout de même étrange pour une ONG… : pas de quoi tomber de sa chaise, de même l’utilisation du mot ennemis avec guillemets. Au passage, le même pourcentage – pas si énorme …– appliqué à la population française donnerait 4,5 millions de personnes quittant la France, dont les deux tiers, soit 3 millions de personnes, au cours des deux dernières années.

      Ceci dit, pour ne pas qu’ils tombent… d’inanition, le Programme alimentaire mondial (agence de l’ONU) a besoin de sous pour nourrir les vénézuéliens qui entrent en Colombie.

      ONU necesita fondos para seguir atendiendo a emigrantes venezolanos
      http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/mundo/onu-necesita-fondos-para-seguir-atendiendo-emigrantes-venezolanos_25311

      El Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA), el principal brazo humanitario de Naciones Unidas, informó que necesita 22 millones de dólares suplementarios para atender a los venezolanos que entran a Colombia.

      «Cuando las familias inmigrantes llegan a los centros de recepción reciben alimentos calientes y pueden quedarse de tres a cinco días, pero luego tienen que irse para que otros recién llegados puedan ser atendidos», dijo el portavoz del PMA, Herve Verhoosel.
      […]
      La falta de alimentos se convierte en el principal problema para quienes atraviesan a diario la frontera entre Venezuela y Colombia, que cuenta con siete puntos de pasaje oficiales y más de un centenar informales, con más de 50% de inmigrantes que entran a Colombia por estos últimos.

      El PMA ha proporcionado ayuda alimentaria de emergencia a más de 60.000 venezolanos en los departamentos fronterizos de Arauca, La Guajira y el Norte de Santander, en Colombia, y más recientemente ha empezado también a operar en el departamento de Nariño, que tiene frontera con Ecuador.
      […]
      De acuerdo con evaluaciones recientes efectuadas por el PMA entre inmigrantes en Colombia, 80% de ellos sufren de inseguridad alimentaria.

    • Migrants du Venezuela vers la Colombie : « ni xénophobie, ni fermeture des frontières », assure le nouveau président colombien

      Le nouveau président colombien, entré en fonction depuis hier (lundi 8 octobre 2018), ne veut pas céder à la tentation d’une fermeture de la frontière avec le Venezuela.


      https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/martinique/migrants-du-venezuela-colombie-xenophobie-fermeture-frontieres-a
      #fermeture_des_frontières #ouverture_des_frontières

    • Fleeing hardship at home, Venezuelan migrants struggle abroad, too

      Every few minutes, the reeds along the #Tachira_River rustle.

      Smugglers, in ever growing numbers, emerge with a ragtag group of Venezuelan migrants – men struggling under tattered suitcases, women hugging bundles in blankets and schoolchildren carrying backpacks. They step across rocks, wade into the muddy stream and cross illegally into Colombia.

      This is the new migration from Venezuela.

      For years, as conditions worsened in the Andean nation’s ongoing economic meltdown, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans – those who could afford to – fled by airplane and bus to other countries far and near, remaking their lives as legal immigrants.

      Now, hyperinflation, daily power cuts and worsening food shortages are prompting those with far fewer resources to flee, braving harsh geography, criminal handlers and increasingly restrictive immigration laws to try their luck just about anywhere.

      In recent weeks, Reuters spoke with dozens of Venezuelan migrants traversing their country’s Western border to seek a better life in Colombia and beyond. Few had more than the equivalent of a handful of dollars with them.

      “It was terrible, but I needed to cross,” said Dario Leal, 30, recounting his journey from the coastal state of Sucre, where he worked in a bakery that paid about $2 per month.

      At the border, he paid smugglers nearly three times that to get across and then prepared, with about $3 left, to walk the 500 km (311 miles) to Bogota, Colombia’s capital. The smugglers, in turn, paid a fee to Colombian crime gangs who allow them to operate, according to police, locals and smugglers themselves.

      As many as 1.9 million Venezuelans have emigrated since 2015, according to the United Nations. Combined with those who preceded them, a total of 2.6 million are believed to have left the oil-rich country. Ninety percent of recent departures, the U.N. says, remain in South America.

      The exodus, one of the biggest mass migrations ever on the continent, is weighing on neighbors. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, which once welcomed Venezuelan migrants, recently tightened entry requirements. Police now conduct raids to detain the undocumented.

      In early October, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, Colombia’s foreign minister, said as many as four million Venezuelans could be in the country by 2021, costing national coffers as much as $9 billion. “The magnitude of this challenge,” he said, “our country has never seen.”

      In Brazil, which also borders Venezuela, the government deployed troops and financing to manage the crush and treat sick, hungry and pregnant migrants. In Ecuador and Peru, workers say that Venezuelan labor lowers wages and that criminals are hiding among honest migrants.

      “There are too many of them,” said Antonio Mamani, a clothing vendor in Peru, who recently watched police fill a bus with undocumented Venezuelans near Lima.
      “WE NEED TO GO”

      By migrating illegally, migrants expose themselves to criminal networks who control prostitution, drug trafficking and other rackets. In August, Colombian investigators discovered 23 undocumented Venezuelans forced into prostitution and living in basements in the colonial city of Cartagena.

      While most migrants are avoiding such straits, no shortage of other hardship awaits – from homelessness, to unemployment, to the cold reception many get as they sleep in public squares, peddle sweets and throng already overburdened hospitals.

      Still, most press on, many on foot.

      Some join compatriots in Brazil and Colombia. Others, having spent what money they had, are walking vast regions, like Colombia’s cold Andean passes and sweltering tropical lowlands, in treks toward distant capitals, like Quito or Lima.

      Johana Narvaez, a 36-year-old mother of four, told Reuters her family left after business stalled at their small car repair shop in the rural state of Trujillo. Extra income she made selling food on the street withered because cash is scarce in a country where annual inflation, according to the opposition-led Congress, recently reached nearly 500,000 percent.

      “We can’t stay here,” she told her husband, Jairo Sulbaran, in August, after they ran out of food and survived on corn patties provided by friends. “Even on foot, we must go.” Sulbaran begged and sold old tires until they could afford bus tickets to the border.

      Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has chided migrants, warning of the hazards of migration and that emigres will end up “cleaning toilets.” He has even offered free flights back to some in a program called “Return to the Homeland,” which state television covers daily.

      Most migration, however, remains in the other direction.

      Until recently, Venezuelans could enter many South American countries with just their national identity cards. But some are toughening rules, requiring a passport or additional documentation.

      Even a passport is elusive in Venezuela.

      Paper shortages and a dysfunctional bureaucracy make the document nearly impossible to obtain, many migrants argue. Several told Reuters they waited two years in vain after applying, while a half-dozen others said they were asked for as much as $2000 in bribes by corrupt clerks to secure one.

      Maduro’s government in July said it would restructure Venezuela’s passport agency to root out “bureaucracy and corruption.” The Information Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
      “VENEZUELA WILL END UP EMPTY”

      Many of those crossing into Colombia pay “arrastradores,” or “draggers,” to smuggle them along hundreds of trails. Five of the smugglers, all young men, told Reuters business is booming.

      “Venezuela will end up empty,” said Maikel, a 17-year-old Venezuelan smuggler, scratches across his face from traversing the bushy trails. Maikel, who declined to give his surname, said he lost count of how many migrants he has helped cross.

      Colombia, too, struggles to count illegal entries. Before the government tightened restrictions earlier this year, Colombia issued “border cards” that let holders crisscross at will. Now, Colombia says it detects about 3,000 false border cards at entry points daily.

      Despite tougher patrols along the porous, 2,200-km border, officials say it is impossible to secure outright. “It’s like trying to empty the ocean with a bucket,” said Mauricio Franco, a municipal official in charge of security in Cucuta, a nearby city.

      And it’s not just a matter of rounding up undocumented travelers.

      Powerful criminal groups, long in control of contraband commerce across the border, are now getting their cut of human traffic. Javier Barrera, a colonel in charge of police in Cucuta, said the Gulf Clan and Los Rastrojos, notorious syndicates that operate nationwide, are both involved.

      During a recent Reuters visit to several illegal crossings, Venezuelans carried cardboard, limes and car batteries as barter instead of using the bolivar, their near-worthless currency.

      Migrants pay as much as about $16 for the passage. Maikel, the arrastrador, said smugglers then pay gang operatives about $3 per migrant.

      For his crossing, Leal, the baker, carried a torn backpack and small duffel bag. His 2015 Venezuelan ID shows a healthier and happier man – before Leal began skimping on breakfast and dinner because he couldn’t afford them.

      He rested under a tree, but fretted about Colombian police. “I’m scared because the “migra” comes around,” he said, using the same term Mexican and Central American migrants use for border police in the United States.

      It doesn’t get easier as migrants move on.

      Even if relatives wired money, transfer agencies require a legally stamped passport to collect it. Bus companies are rejecting undocumented passengers to avoid fines for carrying them. A few companies risk it, but charge a premium of as much as 20 percent, according to several bus clerks near the border.

      The Sulbaran family walked and hitched some 1200 km to the Andean town of Santiago, where they have relatives. The father toured garages, but found no work.

      “People said no, others were scared,” said Narvaez, the mother. “Some Venezuelans come to Colombia to do bad things. They think we’re all like that.”

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-insight/fleeing-hardship-at-home-venezuelan-migrants-struggle-abroad-too-idUSKCN1MP

      Avec ce commentaire de #Reece_Jones:

      People continue to flee Venezuela, now often resorting to #smugglers as immigration restrictions have increased

      #passeurs #fermeture_des_frontières

    • ’No more camps,’ Colombia tells Venezuelans not to settle in tent city

      Francis Montano sits on a cold pavement with her three children, all their worldly possessions stuffed into plastic bags, as she pleads to be let into a new camp for Venezuelan migrants in the Colombian capital, Bogota.

      Behind Montano, smoke snakes from woodfires set amid the bright yellow tents which are now home to hundreds of Venezuelans, erected on a former soccer pitch in a middle-class residential area in the west of the city.

      The penniless migrants, some of the millions who have fled Venezuela’s economic and social crisis, have been here more than a week, forced by city authorities to vacate a makeshift slum of plastic tarps a few miles away.

      The tent city is the first of its kind in Bogota. While authorities have established camps at the Venezuelan border, they have resisted doing so in Colombia’s interior, wary of encouraging migrants to settle instead of moving to neighboring countries or returning home.

      Its gates are guarded by police and officials from the mayor’s office and only those registered from the old slum are allowed access.

      “We’ll have to sleep on the street again, under a bridge,” said Montano, 22, whose children are all under seven years old. “I just want a roof for my kids at night.”

      According to the United Nations, an estimated 3 million Venezuelans have fled as their oil-rich country has sunk into crisis under President Nicolas Maduro. Critics accuse the Socialist leader of ravaging the economy through state interventions while clamping down on political opponents.

      The exodus - driven by violence, hyperinflation and shortages of food and medicines - amounts to one in 12 of the population, placing strain on neighboring countries, already struggling with poverty.

      Colombia, which has borne the brunt of the migration crisis, estimates it is sheltering 1 million Venezuelans, with some 3,000 arriving daily. The government says their total numbers could swell to 4 million by 2021, costing it nearly $9 billion a year.

      Municipal authorities in Bogota say the camp will provide shelter for 422 migrants through Christmas. Then in mid January, it will be dismantled in the hope jobs and new lodgings have been found.


      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-colombia/no-more-camps-colombia-tells-venezuelans-not-to-settle-in-tent-city-idUSKCN

      #camps #camps_de_réfugiés #tentes #Bogotá #Bogotà

    • Creativity amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in Latin America

      As more than 3 million Venezuelans have fled a rapidly collapsing economy, severe food and medical shortages, and political strife, neighboring countries—the primary recipients of these migrants—have responded with creativity and pragmatism. This policy brief explores how governments in South America, Central America, and Mexico have navigated decisions about whether and how to facilitate their entry and residence. It also examines challenges on the horizon as few Venezuelans will be able to return home any time soon.

      Across Latin America, national legal frameworks are generally open to migration, but few immigration systems have been built to manage movement on this scale and at this pace. For example, while many countries in the region have a broad definition of who is a refugee—criteria many Venezuelans fit—only Mexico has applied it in considering Venezuelans’ asylum cases. Most other Latin American countries have instead opted to use existing visa categories or migration agreements to ensure that many Venezuelans are able to enter legally, and some have run temporary programs to regularize the status of those already in the country.

      Looking to the long term, there is a need to decide what will happen when temporary statuses begin to expire. And with the crisis in Venezuela and the emigration it has spurred ongoing, there are projections that as many as 5.4 million Venezuelans may be abroad by the end of 2019. Some governments have taken steps to limit future Venezuelan arrivals, and some receiving communities have expressed frustration at the strain put on local service providers and resources. To avoid widespread backlash and to facilitate the smooth integration of Venezuelans into local communities, policymakers must tackle questions ranging from the provision of permanent status to access to public services and labor markets. Done well, this could be an opportunity to update government processes and strengthen public services in ways that benefit both newcomers and long-term residents.

      https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/legal-pathways-venezuelan-migrants-latin-america

    • Venezuela: Millions at risk, at home and abroad

      Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world and is not engulfed in war. Yet its people have been fleeing on a scale and at a rate comparable in recent memory only to Syrians at the height of the civil war and the Rohingya from Myanmar.

      As chronicled by much of our reporting collected below, some three to four million people have escaped the economic meltdown since 2015 and tried to start afresh in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. This exodus has placed enormous pressure on the region; several governments have started making it tougher for migrants to enter and find jobs.

      The many millions more who have stayed in Venezuela face an acute humanitarian crisis denied by their own government: pervasive hunger, the resurgence of disease, an absence of basic medicines, and renewed political uncertainty.

      President Nicolás Maduro has cast aside outside offers of aid, framing them as preludes to a foreign invasion and presenting accusations that the United States is once again interfering in Latin America.

      Meanwhile, the opposition, led by Juan Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly, has invited in assistance from the US and elsewhere.

      As aid becomes increasingly politicised, some international aid agencies have chosen to sit on the sidelines rather than risk their neutrality. Others run secretive and limited operations inside Venezuela that fly under the media radar.

      Local aid agencies, and others, have had to learn to adapt fast and fill the gaps as the Venezuelan people grow hungrier and sicker.

      https://www.irinnews.org/special-report/2019/02/21/venezuela-millions-risk-home-and-abroad
      #cartographie #visualisation

    • Leaving Home Through a Darkened Border

      I’m sitting on the edge of a boat on the shore of the Grita river, a few kilometers from the Unión bridge. The border between San Antonio del Tachira (Venezuela) and Cucuta (Colombia), one of the most active in Latin America, is tense, dark and uneasy. I got there on a bus from Merida, at around 4:00 a.m., and people were commenting, between WhatsApp messages and audios, that Maduro had opened the border, closed precisely the last time I went through in a violent haze.

      Minutes after I got off the bus, I could see hundreds standing in an impossible queue for the Venezuelan immigration office, at Boca de Grita. Coyotes waited on motorbikes, telling people how much cheaper and faster it’d be if they paid to cross through the side trail. I approached the first motorbike I saw, paid 7,000 Colombian pesos (a little over $2) and sleepily made my way through the wet, muddy paths down to the river.
      Challenge 1: From Merida to the border

      Fuel shortages multiplied the bus fares to the border in less than a month; the few buses that can still make the trip are already malfunctioning. The lonely, dark roads are hunting grounds for pirates, who throw rocks at car windows or set up spikes on the pavement to blow tires. Kidnapping or robberies follow.

      The bus I was in stopped several times when the driver saw a particularly dark path ahead. He waited for the remaining drivers traveling that night to join him and create a small fleet, more difficult to attack. The criminals are after what travelers carry: U.S. dollars, Colombian pesos, Peruvian soles, gold, jewelry (which Venezuelans trade at the border for food or medicine, or a ride to Peru or Chile). “It’s a bad sign to find a checkpoint without soldiers,” the co-driver said, as he got off to stretch his legs. “We’ll stop here because it’s safe; we’ll get robbed up ahead.” Beyond the headlights, the road was lost in dusk. This trip usually takes five hours, but this time it took seven, with all the stops and checkpoints along the way.
      Challenge 2: Across the river from Venezuela to Colombia

      Reaching the river, I noticed how things had changed since the last time I visited. There was no trace of the bottles with smuggled fuel, barrels, guards or even containers over the boats. In fact, there weren’t even that many boats, just the one, small and light, pushed by a man with a wooden stick through muddy waters. I was the only passenger.

      The paracos (Colombian paramilitaries) were in a good mood. Their logic is simple: if Maduro opened the border, lots of people would try to cross, but since many couldn’t go through the bridge due to the expensive bribes demanded by the Venezuelan National Guard and immigration agents, this would be a good day for trafficking.

      The shortage of fuel in states like Tachira, Merida and Zulia destroyed their smuggling of incredibly cheap Venezuelan fuel to Colombia, and controlling the irregular crossings is now the most lucrative business. Guerrillas and paracos have been at it for a while, but now Venezuelan pro-Maduro colectivos, deployed in Tachira in February to repress protests, took over the human trafficking with gunfire, imposing a new criminal dynamic where, unlike Colombian paramilitaries, they assault and rob Venezuelan migrants.

      A woman arrives on a motorbike almost half an hour after me, and comes aboard. “Up there, they’re charging people with large suitcases between 15,000 and 20,000 pesos. It’s going to be really hard to cross today. People will grow tired, and eventually they’ll come here. They’re scared because they’ve heard stories, but everything’s faster here.”

      Her reasoning is that of someone who has grown accustomed to human trafficking, who uses these crossings every day. Perhaps she’s missing the fact that, in such a critical situation as Venezuela’s in 2019, most people can no longer pay to cross illegally and, if they have some money, they’d rather use it to bribe their way through the bridge. The binational Unión bridge, 60 km from Cucuta, isn’t that violent, making it the preferred road for families, pregnant women and the elderly.

      Coyotes get three more people on the boat, the boatman sails into the river, turns on the rudimentary diesel engine and, in a few minutes, we’re on the other side. It’s not dawn yet and I’m certain this is going to be a very long day.

      “I hope they remove those containers from the border,” an old man coming from Trujillo with a prescription for insulin tells me. “I’m sure they’ve started already.” After the failed attempt to deliver humanitarian aid in February, the crossing through the bridges was restricted to all pedestrians and only in a few exceptions a medical patient could be let through (after paying the bribe). The rest still languishes on the Colombian side.
      Challenge 3: Joining the Cucuta crowd

      I finally reach Cucuta and six hours later, mid-afternoon, I meet with American journalist Joshua Collins at the Simón Bolívar bridge. According to local news, about 70,000 people are crossing it this Saturday alone.

      The difference with what I saw last time, reporting the Venezuela Live Aid concert, is astounding: the mass of Venezuelans lifts a cloud that covers everything with a yellowish, dirty and pale nimbus. The scorching desert sunlight makes everyone bow their heads while they push each other, crossing from one side to the other. There’s a stagnant, bitter smell in the air, a kind of musk made of filth, moisture and sweat.

      Joshua points to 20 children running barefoot and shirtless after cabs and vehicles. “Those kids wait here every day for people who want to cross in or out with packs of food and merchandise. They load it all on their shoulders with straps on around their heads.” These children, who should be in school or playing with their friends, are the most active carriers nowadays, working for paramilitaries and colectivos.

      The market (where you can buy and sell whatever you can think of) seems relegated to the background: what most people want right now is to cross, buy food and return before nightfall. The crowd writhes and merges. People shout and fight, frustrated, angry and ashamed. The Colombian police tries to help, but people move how they can, where they can. It’s unstoppable.

      The deepening of the complex humanitarian crisis in the west, plus the permanent shortage of gasoline, have impoverished migrants to a dangerous degree of vulnerability. Those who simply want to reach the border face obstacles like the absence of safe transportation and well-defined enemies, such as the human trafficking networks or the pro-Maduro criminal gangs controlling the roads now. The fear of armed violence in irregular crossings and the oppressive tendencies of the people controlling them, as well as the growing xenophobia of neighboring countries towards refugees, should be making many migrants wonder whether traveling on foot is a good idea at all.

      Although the border’s now open, the regime’s walls grow thicker for the poor. This might translate into new internal migrations within Venezuela toward areas less affected by the collapse of services, such as Caracas or the eastern part of the country, and perhaps the emergence of poor and illegal settlements in those forgotten lands where neither Maduro’s regime, nor Iván Duque’s government hold any jurisdiction.

      For now, who knows what’s going to happen? The sun sets over the border and a dense cloud of dust covers all of us.

      https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/06/11/leaving-home-through-a-darkened-border

  • À #Calais, un #état_d’urgence opportun

    Depuis plus de 20 ans, la préfecture du Pas-de-Calais et la mairie de Calais utilisent tous les moyens pour empêcher les exilé·e·s, en route pour la Grande-Bretagne ou en attente de l’examen de leur demande d’asile en France, d’installer des lieux de vie, et pour empêcher les habitant·e·s et associations de leur venir en aide. Bien que la menace terroriste soit nulle dans le Calaisis, l’adoption de l’état d’urgence a donné les coudées franches aux autorités.

    La déclaration de l’état d’urgence, à la suite des attentats du 13 novembre 2015 à Paris et à Saint-Denis, a fourni l’occasion à la préfecture du Pas-de-Calais d’utiliser les pouvoirs dérogatoires prévus par la loi du 3 avril 1955 sur l’état d’urgence. Le président de la République avait en effet considéré, par son décret du 14 novembre 2015, que le péril combattu devait l’être sur l’ensemble du territoire métropolitain. Sauf qu’à Calais, il n’a pas été question un seul instant de combattre le terrorisme. À notre connaissance, le territoire calaisien n’a d’ailleurs jamais constitué un enjeu dans la lutte contre Daesh.

    L’objectif était donc ailleurs : depuis plus de 20 ans, pour empêcher l’apparition de lieux de vie d’exilés à Calais, le préfet a pris l’habitude d’utiliser tous les moyens à sa disposition. Très vite, les forces de l’ordre calaisiennes ont considéré qu’elles ne pouvaient se passer des pouvoirs extraordinaires posés par la loi du 3 avril 1955. Extra-ordinaires, car, pour la plupart, ces pouvoirs sont complètement étrangers au droit commun et permettent de porter des graves atteintes à la liberté d’aller et de venir des personnes.

    L’application de l’état d’urgence à Calais, qui n’aurait jamais dû avoir lieu, intervient dans un contexte particulier. En novembre 2015, environ 6 000 exilés vivent à Calais. Certains sont demandeurs d’asile en France, quelques-uns sont en errance, tandis que d’autres cherchent à rejoindre le Royaume-Uni par des moyens irréguliers rendus nécessaires par l’insuffisance des procédures légales, en particulier en matière de réunification familiale [1].

    À cette époque, la maire de la commune de Calais et la préfète du Pas-de-Calais se félicitent d’avoir finalement obtenu la disparition de l’ensemble des squats et lieux de vie d’exilés implantés en centre-ville, en les repoussant sur le bidonville de la Lande, zone marécageuse située aux abords de la rocade portuaire. Cet « encampement » en marge de la ville expose les exilés à des conditions de vie particulièrement indignes [2]. Les personnes « relocalisées » doivent s’y installer dans des abris de fortune, à proximité du centre Jules Ferry où sont distribués, en quantité insuffisante, des repas et où est proposé un service de douches, volontairement sous-dimensionné, pour vraisemblablement éviter de rendre le lieu trop attractif. Parmi les exilés, figurent de très nombreux mineurs isolés, parfois très jeunes. Plusieurs associations françaises et britanniques se mobilisent alors pour apporter aux exilés l’assistance que les pouvoirs publics refusent d’accorder.

    Mais, pour sa part, l’autorité préfectorale travaille essentiellement à mettre à l’écart cette population et à empêcher les tentatives de passage. Et, à la fin de l’année 2015, c’est un État, probablement à court d’idées pour freiner l’essor de ces tentatives et maîtriser le nombre d’exilés présents, qui va profiter de la déclaration de l’état d’urgence.

    Dissuader les tentatives de passages

    L’état d’urgence va d’abord être utilisé pour sécuriser la frontière. Pour empêcher les tentatives de franchissement de la frontière, les dispositifs de protection ont été renforcés en 2015. À la suite d’un accord passé entre le ministre de l’intérieur français et le ministre du Home Office britannique en septembre 2014, la zone portuaire [3] est littéralement fortifiée par l’érection d’une double clôture de deux et quatre mètres de haut, et qui s’étend sur près de trois kilomètres le long de la rocade menant aux embarcadères du port de Calais.

    Évidemment, cela ne suffit pas à ralentir le nombre important de tentatives de passage, cela ne fait qu’en déplacer le lieu de la mise en œuvre. L’on tente toujours de franchir la frontière aux abords de l’Eurotunnel ; en juin 2015, Theresa May, ministre du Home Office affirme devant la Chambre des communes qu’au total 30 000 tentatives de passages ont été constatées sur les dix derniers mois [4].

    Les ministres de l’intérieur français et britannique vont donc, par un nouvel accord, le 20 août 2015 [5], allouer des moyens supplémentaires à la sécurisation du périmètre de l’entrée du tunnel, par un dispositif de clôtures, de vidéosurveillance, de technologie de détection infrarouge et de projecteurs lumineux. Ce renforcement drastique de la surveillance et de la protection de plusieurs points de passage ne décourage pourtant pas les exilés. Il les contraint cependant à prendre de plus en plus de risques. À tel point qu’en 2014 et 2015, on compte 46 décès à la frontière (sans citer les blessés).

    Pour enrayer les tentatives de passage que le dispositif ne ralentit pas, l’État va sortir la carte de l’état d’urgence. L’une des prérogatives prévues par l’article 5 de la loi du 3 avril 1955 permet au préfet de département d’« instituer, par arrêté, des zones de protection ou de sécurité où le séjour des personnes est réglementé ». L’institution d’une zone de protection ou de sécurité est une mesure de police administrative attrape-tout, qui a pu, au début de la guerre d’Algérie, justifier d’importants déplacements de populations, des restrictions de circulation et même des assignations à résidence collectives, étant précisé que le non-respect de l’obligation imposée par l’autorité qui a institué la zone pouvait aboutir, comme le précise l’article 13 de la loi, à des peines d’emprisonnement. Alors que cette disposition devrait être maniée avec précaution, la préfète du Pas-de-Calais choisit de l’appliquer quelques jours après la déclaration de l’état d’urgence, le 1er décembre 2015, pour interdire la présence de piétons sur la rocade portuaire.

    Pourquoi une telle mesure ? L’article L. 2231-1 du code général des collectivités territoriales permet déjà à l’autorité de police (le maire ou le préfet) de réglementer, dans le cadre de ses pouvoirs ordinaires, les conditions de circulation sur les routes nationales. Mais surtout, une telle préférence donnée à la loi du 3 avril 1955 n’est pas compréhensible dès lors qu’aucun motif en lien avec l’état d’urgence n’est ici en cause, comme les commentateurs le soulignent [6]. Avec cet arrêté, ce n’est pas tant les aspects opérationnels de la zone de protection qui semblent intéresser la préfète du Pas-de-Calais, mais plutôt le label « état d’urgence », dont l’administration espère sûrement qu’il exercera un effet dissuasif sur les exilés tentés de passer. Mais, l’épouvantail ainsi créé n’a été d’aucun effet.

    L’obligation portée par cet arrêté a été massivement méconnue, pendant toute sa durée (la préfète du Pas-de-Calais ne parlait-elle pas, en octobre 2016, de plus de 30 000 intrusions piétonnes sur la rocade, chaque mois ?), sans qu’elle ne donne lieu, à notre connaissance, à des condamnations.
    Contrer le droit de manifester

    L’état d’urgence a également servi à restreindre le droit de manifester [7]. Là encore, ces limitations ont été régulièrement prononcées pour des motifs sans lien avec le risque d’attentats terroristes, au fondement de la déclaration de l’état d’urgence. Il a été instrumentalisé par le gouvernement pour assouvir des mobiles politiques et, tout particulièrement, pour contrer des manifestations hostiles à ses décisions. On connaît les assignations à résidence prises sur le fondement de l’article 6 de la loi du 3 avril 1955 contre des militants écologistes qui risquaient d’organiser des actions et des mobilisations au cours de la COP 21 (conférence internationale sur le climat qui s’est tenue au Bourget) ou encore les interdictions de séjour prononcées en application du 3° de l’article 5 de la loi du 3 avril 1955, contre des militants pour les empêcher de se rendre dans les secteurs où étaient organisées des manifestations contre la « loi travail ».

    À Calais, l’état d’urgence va permettre le gel du droit de manifester en soutien aux exilés. Lorsque, à la fin de l’année 2016, le démantèlement de la Lande de Calais est projeté, il est présenté par le gouvernement comme une grande opération humanitaire destinée à « sortir de la boue » les exilés qui y vivent et à leur permettre, par une (nouvelle) relocalisation – cette fois-ci vers des centres d’accueil et d’orientation – d’intégrer le dispositif d’asile de droit commun [8]. Les critiques de plusieurs associations – lesquelles n’y voient qu’une énième opération de déguerpissement sans solution pérenne pour les exilés arrivant à Calais – sont toutefois vives et risquent de brouiller le message du gouvernement [9]. De manière assez problématique, l’état d’urgence va de nouveau être mobilisé à Calais pour « invisibiliser » cette opposition.

    Ainsi, peu avant la destruction du bidonville de la Lande de Calais, deux manifestations de soutien aux exilés du bidonville sont organisées par la Coalition internationale des sans-papiers et migrants (CISPM), les 1er et 11 octobre 2016. Alors qu’elles n’ont aucun lien avec la lutte contre la menace terroriste, elles sont interdites par l’autorité préfectorale qui se fonde, sur l’article 8 de la loi du 3 avril 1955, qui prévoit que « les […] rassemblements de personnes sur la voie publique peuvent être interdits dès lors que l’autorité administrative justifie ne pas être en mesure d’en assurer la sécurité compte tenu des moyens dont elle dispose ». C’est en se prévalant de l’insuffisance des unités de police pour encadrer ces rassemblements que la préfète du Pas-de-Calais interdit ces manifestations dont l’une, pourtant, ne devait pas regrouper plus de 200 participants [10]. À ces deux dates, les forces de l’ordre étaient, comme on le sait, très nombreuses à Calais pour préparer l’opération d’évacuation du bidonville, qui allait intervenir quelques jours après. On peut dès lors s’interroger sur la sincérité de la justification avancée.

    Pouvait-elle, en outre, suffire à justifier qu’aucune manifestation ne se tienne (même organisée différemment et selon un autre trajet), alors que, à cette époque, il existait dans le débat public un important courant opposé au plan d’évacuation du bidonville, tel qu’il était projeté, et qui aurait mérité de pouvoir s’exprimer ? Le tribunal administratif de Lille, saisi de deux référés-liberté, a malheureusement rejeté le recours des organisateurs en arguant que des groupes d’ultra-gauche et d’ultra-droite pourraient s’y rencontrer pour s’y affronter et que les forces de l’ordre ne pouvaient en assurer le contrôle [11].

    Et c’est ainsi que, au cours du mois d’octobre 2016, l’expulsion de la Lande de Calais a été mise en œuvre sans qu’aucune manifestation publique ait pu avoir lieu.
    Démanteler le bidonville

    Les opérations de l’expulsion du bidonville de la Lande de Calais se sont déroulées en plusieurs étapes : d’abord, avec l’adoption des arrêtés du 19 janvier et du 19 février 2016 pour l’expulsion de la zone sud du bidonville : ensuite avec l’arrêté du 21 octobre 2016 pour l’évacuation de la zone nord. Là encore, l’état d’urgence a constamment été mobilisé.

    D’abord, il a joué le rôle d’alibi et de justification des mesures d’expulsion. Chaque arrêté a, en effet, été pris au visa de la loi du 3 avril 1955 sur l’état d’urgence, et retient, parmi ses motifs, que, « compte tenu de la prégnance, à un niveau très élevé, de la menace terroriste ayant justifié l’état d’urgence, les forces de sécurité doivent prioritairement être engagées dans la prévention de cette menace et ne peuvent être distraites et mobilisées, en nombre très important, pour lutter contre des troubles à l’ordre public récurrents liés à l’occupation de ce campement ». Autrement dit, par contamination, le régime d’état d’urgence a permis de légitimer des décisions qui, en temps ordinaire, auraient pu sembler trop sévères ou inadaptées. Le pire est sûrement qu’une telle acception était recevable pour le juge administratif comme l’atteste la jurisprudence trop peu exigeante du Conseil d’État qui retient que, pour le prononcé d’une mesure relevant du régime de l’état d’urgence [12] ou d’une mesure de droit commun [13], l’autorité de police peut, notamment, s’appuyer sur le fait que les forces de police ne doivent pas être distraites de leur rôle de lutte contre le terrorisme.

    Ensuite, l’état d’urgence a été utilisé à des fins opérationnelles, dans le cadre de ces expulsions. Ainsi, le 23 octobre 2016, la préfète du Pas-de-Calais crée une zone de protection sur l’ensemble du secteur de la Lande, dans laquelle le séjour, la circulation et le stationnement des personnes sont réglementés, du 24 octobre au 6 novembre 2016. Cette décision a pour principale implication de subordonner l’entrée sur la Lande à l’obtention d’une accréditation délivrée par la préfète.

    Une opération "humanitaire" attentatoire aux droits de l’Homme

    Ce dispositif parachève, en quelque sorte, ce qui avait déjà été entrepris avec les interdictions de manifestations : il vise à empêcher tout risque d’opposition. Le texte indique chercher à éloigner du bidonville les militants No Border jugés susceptibles de s’opposer physiquement au démantèlement. L’on découvre toutefois qu’aucune action de ce type n’a jamais été projetée. En outre, le dispositif cible large et éloigne les avocats de la zone de protection. Plusieurs d’entre eux, qui intervenaient sur le #bidonville, ne pourront pas retrouver leurs clients avant qu’ils soient dispersés dans des centres d’accueil et d’orientation, sur tout le territoire national, à l’issue de l’opération d’expulsion.

    Alors que des centaines de journalistes ont bénéficié d’accréditations pour assister à l’expulsion, plusieurs associations de soutien des exilés, présentes sur le bidonville, ont été tenues à l’écart. Certaines, qui y intervenaient avec le concours de l’État sur des questions de santé et de sensibilisation aux violences sexuelles, se sont vu refuser l’accréditation alors qu’elles y suivaient des exilés. Il en est allé de même pour l’association la Cabane juridique/Legal Shelter, qui avait pu, quelques mois auparavant, organiser la saisine du juge des enfants pour obtenir le placement provisoire de mineurs isolés étrangers du bidonville, et qui accompagnait encore près de 200 exilés victimes de violences policières ou engagés dans des démarches de demande d’asile et de réunification familiale.

    Quelques heures après l’adoption de cet arrêté, le Gisti, l’association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), l’association calaisienne le Réveil voyageur et la Ligue des droits de l’Homme l’ont dénoncé dans le cadre d’un référé-liberté. Trop tard. La préfète du Pas-de-Calais l’abrogera quelques heures avant l’audience, en indiquant que l’opération d’#expulsion étant achevée, l’arrêté instituant la zone de protection n’avait plus d’utilité.

    Outre l’institution de cette zone de protection, la préfète du Pas-de-Calais a prononcé, en octobre 2016, quatre interdictions de séjour à l’encontre de militants. Un rapport parlementaire le note : ces dernières mesures n’étaient pas fondées sur le fait que la présence de ces derniers constituerait un risque d’attentat terroriste, ni même sur une dangerosité révélée par des #violences commises dans le passé, mais sur le simple fait que ces personnes auraient été vues aux abords de la première zone de protection créée le 1er décembre 2015 [14]. Parmi ces interdits de séjour figure un journaliste, auteur d’articles et de reportages témoignant de la dureté des #violences_policières à Calais.

    Jamais une opération « humanitaire » n’a mobilisé autant de prérogatives attentatoires aux libertés. Qu’importe. L’essentiel est, pour le gouvernement, que ce recours aux outils de l’état d’urgence ait permis d’atteindre l’objectif d’une expulsion éclair en trois jours.

    https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article5963
    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #fermeture_des_frontières #dissuasion #terrorisme #camps #campement #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux

  • ONU | Un expert onusien conclut à l’absence de lien entre migration et terrorisme

    Le Rapporteur spécial du Conseil des droits de l’homme sur la promotion et la protection des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales dans la lutte antiterroriste, #Ben_Emmerson, a publié un rapport sur l’impact des mesures anti-terroristes sur les personnes migrantes et réfugiées. Outre l’absence de lien entre la migration et la recrudescence d’actes terroristes, le rapport insiste sur le fait que des politiques migratoires restrictives créent les conditions propices à la propagation du terrorisme.

    La présence, dans une région, de groupes terroristes actifs ou parties à un conflit armé est un facteur d’incitation à la migration pour les victimes du terrorisme en quête de sécurité et un facteur d’attraction pour les combattants terroristes étrangers. Or le discours actuel met en évidence la migration en tant que moteur du terrorisme, ce qui a conduit à considérer les politiques migratoires avant tout sous l’angle de la sécurité.

    L’obligation des États de protéger leur population contre les actes de terrorisme passe par l’adoption d’un certain nombre de mesures liées à la gestion des frontières et à l’immigration et destinées à permettre le repérage des individus qui ont commis ou s’apprêtent à commettre des infractions terroristes. Pourtant, l’adoption, en matière de migration et d’asile, de politiques restrictives ou portant atteinte aux droits de l’homme peut venir saper les efforts déployés par les États dans la lutte antiterroriste en ce qu’elle favorise la migration irrégulière et la violation des droits fondamentaux des migrants et des réfugiés, en marginalisant telle ou telle communauté et en réduisant les possibilités pour les migrants, ce qui peut s’avérer propice au terrorisme. Le Rapporteur spécial rappelle en particulier que l’Assemblée générale, dans la Stratégie antiterroriste mondiale des Nations Unies, a reconnu unanimement que la déshumanisation des victimes du terrorisme était une condition favorable à la propagation de celui-ci. Il se pourrait également que l’ostracisme dont est frappée une communauté corresponde précisément à l’objectif recherché par les groupes terroristes, ce qui renforcerait le soutien qu’ils reçoivent des communautés de migrants.

    Pour qu’une politique antiterroriste soit efficace, elle doit être associée à une politique migratoire d’ensemble qui soit empreinte de respect pour les droits de l’homme, la justice, la responsabilité, la dignité humaine, l’égalité et la non-discrimination, et qui fournisse aux victimes du terrorisme la protection à laquelle elles ont droit. La sécurité et la protection des droits des migrants ne sont pas des objectifs antagoniques : ils sont indissociables et se renforcent mutuellement.

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :
    https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1628562.pdf

    https://asile.ch/2016/10/31/un-expert-onusien-conclut-a-labsence-de-lien-entre-migration-et-terrorisme
    #migrations #terrorisme #lien #asile #réfugiés #anti-terrorisme #fermeture_des_frontières

    Pas nouveau, mais je mets ici pour archivage, car bizarrement, il n’y était pas...

  • This European Border Is Still Open. But for How Long?

    The border between Austria and Slovenia runs through Armin Tement’s backyard. Literally.

    Not that you would know it. Neat rows of vines march up and down the valley like military columns with no regard for a frontier laid down by man, why here, no one can quite remember. The Slovene wine workers speak German. The Austrians speak Slovenian, or at least try.

    As for the wine, well, says Mr. Tement, 32, “it tastes exactly the same on both sides.”

    When Mr. Tement’s family started making wine back in the 19th century, there was no border here. The region of Styria, straddling what is now southeastern Austria and northeastern Slovenia, was part of the Hapsburg Empire.

    When the empire was broken up after World War I, Upper Styria became Austrian and Lower Styria became part of Yugoslavia — until the 1990s, when that country, too, was broken up and Slovenia gained its independence.

    The border, a hundred years old this year, was briefly eliminated by advancing Nazi armies, then heavily policed during the Cold War, before vanishing in all but name when Slovenia joined the European Union’s passport-free travel zone in 2007.

    “It was a great moment,” recalled Janez Valdhuber, 53, a winemaker on the Slovenian side. To celebrate, he grabbed his young children, climbed the steep vineyard opposite his house to the top where the border runs, and unfurled a European flag.

    The interrogations at the border stopped, and Mr. Valdhuber’s car trunk was no longer searched when entering Austria.

    But some worry Europe’s open borders might slowly be closing again, one checkpoint at a time.

    This month, Germany announced that at its Bavarian border, it would turn back asylum seekers registered in other European Union countries, a move reintroducing a hard border of sorts with Austria.

    Austria, now run by a conservative government in coalition with the far right, threatened to do the same on its southern border with Italy, Europe’s busiest north-south trade route. And as if to demonstrate its resolve, Austria briefly resurrected checkpoints at the Brenner Pass this month.

    The border at Spielfeld, an Austrian town with barely 1,000 inhabitants, became a stop on the migrant route in 2015, and for a few traumatic weeks that year, tens of thousands of refugees came through.

    Since then, Austrian soldiers have returned.

    They ride in military jeeps along the “Wine Route,” a winding country road that zigzags back and forth across the border. They have built a fence along a small border stretch near Spielfeld and set up makeshift checkpoints in the hills — only sporadically manned, but there — on otherwise deserted lanes.

    No one here reports having seen any refugees in more than two years, and so far the border checks are relatively rare.

    But this month, the Austrian military and police staged a high-profile military exercise, simulating another mass arrival of migrants.

    A platform was set up for the photographers. Two Black Hawk helicopters circled overhead. Two hundred students from the police academy were enlisted as “refugees.” Later, the defense ministry released a video.

    “It feels a bit like we’re backsliding into the old days,” said Marko Oraze, a member of Austria’s Slovene-speaking minority who runs the Council of Carinthian Slovenes.

    Mr. Oraze lives in Austria but gets his car fixed in Slovenia. Many of his friends commute across the border every day.

    “More and more of them are stopped at the border on their way to work,” he said.

    Some in Spielfeld applaud the tougher stance taken by Austria.

    “It’s about time,” said Walpurga Sternad, who runs a restaurant with her husband near the highway connecting Austria and Slovenia. “They should just close all the borders in Europe, go back to what we used to have,” she said, as a group of friends nodded in approval.

    Ms. Sternad remembers the day in October 2015, when some 6,000 migrants poured over the border in Spielfeld, filling the motorway and spilling into her own front yard. “It was scary,” she said. “So many people. They kept coming.”


    https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/world/europe/austria-slovenia-border-migrants-spielfeld-schengen.html#click=https://t.co/YWlazq9xGU
    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Autriche #Slovénie #fermeture_des_frontières #Schengen (fin de -) #militarisation_des_frontières #armée #frontière_sud-alpine

    • Anti-immigration mood drives fear of racist profiling on EU borders

      Europe’s passport-free area under pressure as calls grow for tougher migrant controls.

      Police spot checks have become a part of Fahad’s annual summer holiday when driving through the snow-topped mountains of southern Bavaria.

      “This usually happens,” said the Kuwaiti father of three, when his silver people-carrier with his wife and children was stopped by German border officers in the idyllic Alpine town of #Kiefersfelden.

      Fahad and his family had to wait for more than half an hour at the border post, until they were given a pass to drive from Austria into Germany. During the FT’s three-hour stay at the checkpoint, non-white drivers made up about 70 per cent of cars selected for further checks. Fahad was one of a few drivers with beards, while others included women wearing headscarves and motorists who at first sight did not look like white Europeans. All were waved through once their IDs were checked, vehicle boots searched and luggage examined.

      Racial profiling at Europe’s internal borders is forbidden under EU law. But with a fresh wave of anti-immigrant governments calling for tougher controls on migrant movements, there are concerns that non-white people will come under increasing suspicion when travelling in the continent.

      Europe’s passport-free Schengen zone — an area made up of 26 European states that abolished passport control at their mutual borders — has buckled under twin pressures: Europe’s biggest influx of refugees since the second world war, and a growing number of anti-immigrant governments pushing to crack down on irregular migration flows. “There is such a fear that Schengen won’t survive that countries are being given the discretion to do whatever they can to keep it alive,” said Elizabeth Collett, director of the Migration Policy Institute Europe think-tank.

      Although the number of migrants entering the EU has dropped dramatically since the height of the migration crisis in 2015, emergency powers still allow border controls across 20,000km inside the Schengen zone. Kiefersfelden, a popular skiing destination, has become one of Schengen’s pinch points: it is home to one of three emergency police controls along Germany’s 820km border with Austria.

      Every car travelling on the A12 autobahn through Kiefersfelden must pass a police border stop where officers select vehicles for extra spot checks. The cars that are picked are sent to a tented zone, where drivers and passengers must show valid ID documents.

      Border police said they are told to look for signs of undocumented migrants and people smugglers crossing into Germany from Austria. So far this year, an average of 900 illegal migrants per month have been detained on the Austro-German border, down from 1,120 per month in 2017.

      As racial profiling is outlawed, it is the responsibility of European governments to ensure their police forces carry out checks at random. Rainer Schafer, spokesman for the federal police overseeing the Kiefersfelden controls, said race and ethnicity “can be among the indicators” officers look for when deciding to pull over a vehicle for extra checks.

      “But there are no rules that we just pick out the people who look like they are coming from Africa,” he said. Other factors include registration plates (Italian or eastern European plates draw officers’ attention), blacked-out windows, and the number of passengers, he said.

      Police checks in Bavaria are expected to intensify after the region’s conservative local government last month requested tougher migration controls.

      Horst Seehofer, Germany’s interior minister, has also called on the government to break two decades of EU-wide co-operation on migration and unilaterally send people away at Germany’s internal borders. Observers fear that other Schengen countries, like Austria, could in turn erect their own emergency border controls — and that the EU’s principle of free movement of people is at risk of becoming a privilege enjoyed only by white Europeans.

      A report from La Cimade, a French non-governmental organisation, found French border police “systematically check the identity documents of people who do not have the right skin colour” on inbound trains from Italy.

      Inga Schwarz, a researcher at the University of Freiburg, said Europe’s internal border crossings are becoming “increasingly racialised spaces, constructed not only by border guards profiling according to race, but also by European citizens who witness these racialised control practices”.

      In Kiefersfelden, the majority of the non-white drivers selected for checks were tourists in people-carriers and expensive cars — mostly from the Gulf — and were waved through in less than 15 minutes. Uruj, a 27-year-old teacher from Kuwait, her husband and young daughter waited for nearly an hour in their white Mercedes.

      Although they had valid visa documents, police took away their passports and only permitted the family to continue to their holiday destination in Austria once they had obtained a car seat for their three-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Wafah. Uruj, who was wearing a pink headscarf, said, “I don’t think they liked the look of us.”


      https://www.ft.com/content/fac891a6-93f9-11e8-b67b-b8205561c3fe?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754
      #contrôles_frontaliers #profiling #Allemagne #Autriche #contrôle_au_faciès

    • Réfugiés : la #Slovénie veut toujours plus de #barbelés sur sa frontière avec la #Croatie

      Les autorités slovènes se veulent rassurantes : la sécurité des frontières est assurée et personne n’a d’information sur l’éventuelle réouverture massive de la « #route_des_Balkans ». Pourtant le nouveau gouvernement ne semble pas avoir l’intention d’infléchir la politique migratoire de son prédécesseur et songerait même à étendre les barbelés qui coupent la Slovénie de son voisin croate.

      Par Charles Nonne

      La question des réfugiés semble ces dernières semaines avoir déserté le débat public en Slovénie. Le contrat de coalition signé le 28 août 2018, lapidaire, dédramatise : « Nous élaborerons une stratégie migratoire exhaustive, basée sur la coopération intergouvernementale. Nous protègerons les frontières de l’espace Schengen avec davantage d’efficacité et nous démonterons les obstacles techniques [barrières et panneaux] dès que les circonstances le permettront. »

      Pourtant, les passages de la frontière se poursuivent, notamment dans la région de la Bela Krajina, au sud-est du pays, où la rivière Kolpa sépare Slovénie et Croatie. Selon la police de Novo Mesto, entre le 1er janvier et le 31 septembre 2018, plus de 2400 ressortissants étrangers auraient illégalement franchi la Kolpa, soit douze fois plus qu’en 2017.

      Fin septembre, en marge d’un déplacement dans le centre régional de Črnomelj, le nouveau ministre de l’Intérieur, Boris Poklukar, avait affirmé vouloir maintenir les barrières en l’état, tout en garantissant que la police était préparée à une augmentation des passages frontaliers. Pour la maire de Črnomelj, Mojca Čemas Stjepanovič, « pour le moment, la sécurité est garantie et nous n’avons aucune raison de nous inquiéter. » Dans les communes les plus exposées, le gouvernement a promis l’érection de nouveaux « obstacles techniques » : sur les 670 kilomètres de frontière slovéno-croate, plus de 160 sont parcourus par des barbelés et 56 par de véritables barrières.

      En Slovénie, c’est notamment les tensions à la frontière entre la Bosnie-Herzégovine et la Croatie qui préoccupent. Si le gouvernement se prépare à plusieurs scénarios, il affirme n’avoir « aucune information laissant penser à une augmentation prochaine des flux », indique le ministre Boris Poklukar. Au nord, l’Autriche a d’ores et déjà annoncé qu’elle ne diminuerait pas la surveillance de sa frontière lors des six prochains mois.

      Au-delà du strict contrôle frontalier, d’autres questions divisent : des inquiétudes pèsent notamment sur la possible installation de centres d’accueil, comme à Debeli Rtič, sur la côte slovène, et à Brežice, à 40 kilomètres de Zagreb. La directrice du bureau gouvernemental pour la prise en charge de l’intégration des migrants, Mojca Špec Potočar, a tenu à indiquer qu’« il n’y [aurait] aucune installation permanente de réfugiés. »

      La question secoue également les rangs de la coalition : l’ancienne ministre de l’Intérieur, Vesna Györkös Žnidar, « faucon » régulièrement critiqué par les défenseurs des droits de l’homme, vient de claquer la porte de son parti, le Parti du centre moderne (SMC) de l’ancien Premier ministre Miro Cerar, en raison de désaccords profonds sur les questions migratoires.

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Slovenie-le-gouvernement-poursuit-lentement-le-renforcement-de-sa
      #fermeture_des_frontières #murs #barrières_frontalières

  • Migranti, l’Austria: «Dovremo proteggere il confine con l’Italia»

    Scatta quella chiusura delle frontiere nel cuore dell’Europa che potrebbe tagliare fuori l’Italia dal resto del continente e provocare un effetto domino capace di far vacillare Schengen e la stessa Unione. Dopo l’accordo tra la Cdu di Angela Merkel e la bavarese Csu del ministro degli Interni Horst Seehofer, è l’Austria (in accordo con Berlino) ad annunciare che «proteggerà i confini meridionali». Decisione presa dal Cancelliere Sebastian Kurz e dal suo vice, il leader dell’ultradestra dell’Fpoe Christian Strache. Di fatto i migranti registrati in Italia e lasciati fuggire a Nord non saranno più accettati dalla Germania. L’Austria sposa la politica di Merkel e annuncia che nemmeno lei li farà passare, scaricando la pressione (politica, i numeri reali sono irrisori) sul Brennero. E con Salvini lesto a rilanciare: «L’Austria chiude i confini? Sono pronto da domani a ripristinare i controlli al Brennero perché l’Italia ha solo da guadagnarci, sono più i migranti che tornano da noi di quelli che vanno da loro».

    Ecco la temuta crisi di Schengen, annunciata da settimane e puntualmente in arrivo. «Un capolavoro di Salvini», incalza il Pd con Filippo Sensi. In effetti l’Italia dalla nascita del governo giallo-verde ha provocato i partner con una strategia di insulti firmata Salvini-Di Maio e con il ricatto sulle navi cariche di migranti (Aquarius e Lifeline), si è detta pronta a stringere alleanze con xenofobi ed estrema destra (tra cui gli stessi austriaci e Seehofer) dagli interessi contrari con quelli della penisola e la scorsa settimana non ha portato a casa nulla al Consiglio europeo di Bruxelles, preparato in modo estemporaneo, senza tessere alleanze reali e con richieste (per quanto legittime) gettate sul tavolo solo a fini di consenso interno.
    Alla vigilia di quel summit Conte aveva annunciato che in caso di successo a Bruxelles avrebbe accettato una soluzione sui migranti secondari, ovvero i richiedenti asilo registrati da noi e lasciati scappare in Germania. Ma pur rivendicando un successo al vertice Ue (non suffragato dai fatti), si è rifiutato di negoziare quel trattato bilaterale capace di salvare Merkel dalle bordate di Seehofer. E in giro per l’Europa diversi osservatori si chiedono se il fine ultimo di Salvini e Di Maio non sia quello di far cadere la Cancelliera, se non di provocare una crisi europea capace di ridimensionare l’Unione nel nome di un’ideologia sovranista che coincide con quella di Vladimir Putin e di chi dall’esterno (lo stesso Trump) vorrebbe dare un colpo alla Ue per poi dettare legge ai singoli stati nazionali.

    Ad ogni modo, Merkel ha salvato il governo accordandosi su Seehofer sui respingimenti, innescando l’annunciato effetto domino su Schengen, evitabile solo con un accordo a tre tra Roma, Vienna e Berlino (non a caso Seehofer spiegava che «parleremo anche con l’Italia»). In mattinata lo stesso Kurz, da due giorni presidente di turno dell’Unione, di fronte alla plenaria dell’Europarlamento a Strasburgo ha ribadito che Schengen sarà salva solo se si bloccheranno gli sbarchi: «Un’Europa senza confini interni funzionerà solo se saranno protetti i confini esterni». Dall’alleato di Salvini non una parola sulla solidarietà, sulla riforma di Dublino che porterebbe alla ripartizione tra partner dei richiedenti asilo. Quanto alla chiusura dei confini esterni, proprio oggi l’Unione africana ha condannato l’idea europea di istituire campi per migranti ("piattaforme") nel Sahel.

    Il dibattito a Strasburgo è stato duro. Il presidente dell’Europarlamento, Antonio Tajani, ha ricordato a Kurz la necessità di approvare la riforma di Dublino (tra l’altro il testo approvato a gennaio da Strasburgo garantirebbe l’Italia e permetterebbe ai Visegrad di restare fuori dalla ripartizione per un decennio). Ma è il clima politico che dovrebbe far riflettere. Il capogruppo dei liberali, Guy Verhofstadt, ha ricordato che i numeri dimostrano che «non c’è nessun crisi migratoria, c’è una crisi politica sulle spalle dei migranti creata da Salvini e dai suoi amici, come Orban, che però sono solo d’accordo solo nel dire che non vogliono i migranti a casa loro». Il presidente dei deputati socialisti e democratici, Udo Bullmann, ha ammonito: «Dovete smilitarizzare le frontiere, state distruggendo Schengen». Il leader dei Verdi, Philippe Lamberts, ha concluso: «Non ho mai avuto paura dell’estrema destra, ma siamo tutti in pericolo quando le sue idee contaminano i partiti che erano al cuore dell’Europa e della democrazia». Riferimento ai popolari di Kurz. In effetti i toni dei sostenitori di Kurz sono preoccupanti, riportano il pensiero al passato: le voci del populismo e della destra estrema stanno montando all’interno dei governi di mezza Europa e dopo le europee del 2019 anche a Strasburgo - cuore della democrazia europea - potrebbero non essere più una trascurabile minoranza.

    http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2018/07/03/news/migranti_austria_frontiere-200704252/?ref=search
    #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Autriche #Allemagne #Italie #frontières_sud-alpine #Schengen (fin de-)

  • Conclusions du #Conseil_européen du #28_juin_2018 sur les migrations

    La prophétie s’auto-réalise. A force de parler de crise des migrations et réfugiés, les gouvernants européens et la technocratie de l’Union ont bien produit une crise de l’Europe (voir L’espace Schengen : crise et méta-crise et Quelle crise des réfugiés ?) à l’égard des migrants dont il est reconnu pourtant dès le § 1 des conclusions que l’arrivée a baissé de 95 % par rapport à 2015.

    Le mot d’ordre des conclusions – qui parlent abusivement d’une « #politique_migratoire_européenne » alors que tout repose sur une série d’actions volontaires des Etats qui, précisément, ne veulent pas se charger de la question, préférant l’approfondir – est clair. Il s’agit de poursuivre et renforcer la #fermeture_des_frontières en limitant les entrées et en favorisant les #retours. Pour cela, l’« approche globale » annoncée est en réalité un patchwork de petites solutions pour la plupart déjà existantes ou sinon irréalisables.

    Ainsi en appelle-t-on comme par rituel magique à l’application de solutions et instruments qui existent déjà et ne fonctionnent pas (comme les accords de réadmission ou la déclaration UE-Turquie) ou à la réalisation de projets que les Etats n’ont jamais vraiment voulus (#solidarité avec les Etats européens d’entrée) ou très mal conçus (partenariats avec les Etats d’origine ou de transit des migrants ; destruction du modèle économique des #passeurs, distinction des « migrants » et des « réfugiés », rôle de #Frontex). Et que dire du « #partenariat_avec_l’Afrique » pendant que l’Europe négocie de nouveaux accords commerciaux avec les Etats africains dont la logique est orthogonale à toute idée de partenariat et de coopération et ne peut qu’alimenter les migrations dites économiques ? En attendant les « réformes » prévues dont tout le monde sait l’échec programmé, il convient donc de verser de l’argent à divers budgets non coordonnés.

    Parmi les nouvelles solutions irréalisables, on songe bien sûr à l’appel très médiatisé pour des centres établis volontairement par les Etats membres alors que tout le monde sait pertinemment qu’aucun ne veut instituer de tels centres sur son territoire ainsi qu’aux « #plateformes_régionales_de_débarquement » qui, outre qu’elles seraient illégales, sont d’ores et déjà rejetées par les voisins de l’Europe.

    On ne peut être qu’être marqué, non pas étonné, par la généralité et donc la vacuité du contenu de l’accord. Rien de précis n’est annoncé au profit d’une accumulation de slogans répétés à l’envi depuis des années, tels des mantras dont on devine qu’ils s’adressent à certains électorats internes et ont pour objet d’entretenir une peur obsessionnelle qui constitue la seule crise empiriquement observable (car on a peine à imputer à l’immigration actuelle une quelconque trace d’invasion, d’insécurisation, de destruction de l’économie ou de fin de civilisation).

    L’Europe s’abîme à tel point qu’il faut d’urgence décentrer le regard sur les questions migratoires et, tout en continuant à s’intéresser aux politiques d’immigration, se concentrer sur les politiques d’émigration des Etats d’origine dont la vacuité n’a rien à envier aux premières et surtout aux causes profondes des migrations et à une appréciation plus fine de leur caractère positif ou négatif tant pour les Etats d’origine, de transit et de destination que pour les individus.

    https://migrationsansfrontieres.com/2018/07/01/conclusions-du-conseil-europeen-du-28-juin-2018-sur-les-mig
    #migrations #politique_migratoire #migrations #asile #réfugiés #UE #EU #renvois #expulsions #tri #catégorisation #externalisation #business_as_usual

    Commentaire de @jean, que je remercie.

    Plus sur les #disembarkation_platforms :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/703288

  • Unless The Water Is Safer Than The Land

    Over the course of four weeks, twenty MA students conducted in-depth research into Australia’s immigration policies and practices at sea, producing spatial and visual analysis that reveals a striking pattern of human rights violations taking place against asylum seekers. The students specifically looked into a series of cases of maritime interception, on-sea detention, and pushback operations that took place under the ongoing, military-led border security initiative Operation Sovereign Borders. In investigating and reconstructing these events, students developed creative forensic methodologies in an attempt to overcome the Australian government’s policy of ‘on-sea’ secrecy. The materials produced offer a strong indictment of the policies and practices put in place to deter people from arriving in Australia by boat and reveal how the latter sit in continuity with the longer histories of settler-colonial violence. Students of the Research Architecture MA studies from Goldsmiths will share their research in this panel, moderated by Lorenzo Pezzani. With Research Architecture MA students (Goldsmiths, University of London), 2017–18: Esra Abdelrahman, Riccardo Badano, Nelson Beer, Guillaume De Vore, Anne-Sofie Hansen, Halima Haruna, Patrick Harvey, Faiza Khan, Naiza Khan, Robert Krawczyk, Enrico Murtula, Imani Robinson, Hanna Rullmann, Erin Schneider, Ariadna Serrahima, Elena Solis, Ido Tsarfati, Clive Vella, Sarah Vowden, and Liza Walling.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6N3L_Z2ucrA

    #Australie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #architecture_forensique #mer #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #operatio_sovereign_borders #chronologie #fermeture_des_frontières #push-back #refoulement #Lorenzo_Pezzani

    v. aussi le #rapport :
    https://www.gold.ac.uk/media/images-by-section/departments/research-centres-and-units/research-centres/centre-for-research-architecture/Live-Project_CRA_2017.pdf