organization:royal thai army

  • 1967 Opium War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_Opium_War
    La « guerre contre la drogue » n’est déclarée qu’après la fin du commerce de l’opium exécuté par les alliés asiatiques des #USA . La guerre de l’opium de 1967 coincide avec la la dernière phase de la french connection et l’avènement des circuits asiatiques. Plus tard d’autres alliés étatsuniens reprendront les affaires malgré les positions politique affichées publiquement par Washington.

    L’implication d’unités nationalistes chinoises en relation avec le gouvernement de Tapei dans un conflit au Laos est un indice pour l’interdépendance des conflits asiatiques.

    The CIA was the lead American agency in the American penetration of Laos that resulted in the Laotian Civil War. One of its agents, William Young, was a missionary’s son recruited for his cultural understanding of hill tribes in northwestern Laos. He founded a base for a guerrilla force at Nam Yu, Laos, near the triple border junction of China, Burma, and Laos.

    Marooned in the vicinity were the remnants of the Kuomintang that had been stranded there when the Chinese Civil War ended in a communist victory. Although Young recruited some of the Nationalist Chinese into the Royal Lao Armed Forces Batallon Especiale 101 (Special Battalion 101), many of the others became involved in the opium trade. Although they were funded by the Republic of China for intelligence activities and espionage, their money was cut off in 1961. When the KMT generals shifted to opium trading, they claimed it as a necessity to fund their armies. In short order, the KMT troops soon controlled 90 percent of the Burmese opium. Still maintaining their military capabilities, including a radio net for communications and weaponry that included crew-served weapons such as .50 caliber machine guns and 75mm recoilless rifles, the KMT would move caravans of 100 to 600 pack mules loaded with raw opium without interference. Their largest shipments contained nearly 20 tons of raw opium. They charged a “transit tax” on the opium they handled or protected.
    ...
    The resultant embarrassing bad publicity from the opium war brought on a Thai crackdown on all the Kuomintang remaining on their northern border. Prior to the 1967 Opium War, the Thais and KMT had preserved a fiction that the Chinese were civilian refugees seeking asylum. After the Chinese exposure caused by the battle at Ban Khwan, the Royal Thai Army began strictly supervising the Kuomintang units, insisting that their commanders be accountable for their troops. Eventually, the Thais would quietly legitimize the KMT as paramilitary units. The KMT’s revenue from the opium trade was much diminished; their 15-year control of the smuggling routes, collecting their “transit tax”, had ended with the fighting at Ban Khwan.

    #Laos #Guomindang #Chine

  • Military hardware rolls from parade in Kyiv to anti-terrorist operation area
    http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/military-hardware-rolls-from-parade-in-kyiv-to-anti-terrorist-operation-ar


    ©AFP

    The military hardware that was involved in the Aug. 24 parade on the 23rd anniversary of Ukraine’s independence in Kyiv has headed to the area of the anti-terrorist operation in the country’s east, the press service of the Ukrainian president says.

    Le matériel qui défile et va rejoindre l’Ukraine orientale est flambant neuf. Il semblerait qu’il s’agisse des BTR3E1 initialement destinés à la Thaïlande…


    Royal Thai Army’s BTR-3E1 APC during acceptance ceremony. (Photo : Army Technology)

    DELIVERY OF UKRAINIAN BTR-3E1 APC TO THAILAND SUSPENDED - Rentaka (17 juin 2014)
    http://rentaka.weebly.com/blog/delivery-of-ukrainian-btr-3e1-apc-to-thailand-suspended

    As reported by the chief editor of Ukrainian web-resource Tsenzor.Net Yuri Butusov, “for three weeks more than 30 new Ukrainian BTR-3E near Kiev are not in motion. These armored vehicles were built by order of Thailand, but due to the war, delivery was suspended.” 
    Based on available information, it is a part of 32 series machines BTR-3E1 for Thailand of SE “Kiev armored plant” has passed the preliminary acceptance of the spring of 2014. Reminding that the contracts in 2007 and 2011 to be delivered to Thailand total 233 BTR-3E1 and machines based on them, of which in 2010-2013 were shipped, according to different sources, from 142 to 153 units. (BMPD)

    • Pour le modèle plus récent (BTR4), les livraisons à la Garde nationale sont constituées des rejets des commandes à l’export… (article d’avril 2014)

      Ukraine National Guard to receive BTR-4s - IHS Jane’s 360
      http://www.janes.com/article/36447/ukraine-national-guard-to-receive-btr-4s

      The Ukraine National Guard will soon receive 74 new armoured personnel carriers, national defence industrial group Ukroboronprom announced on 2 April 2014.

      The National Guard was formed by Ukraine in early March in response to the Crimean crisis and subsequent stand-off with Russia. It is reported to have a target strength of 60,000, comprised in large part of reservists, and is backed by a USD700 million rise in the country’s defence budget.

      According to the Ukroboronprom announcement, the National Guard will imminently receive 74 of a planned 100 vehicles built by the Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building Design Bureau (KMDB).


      Ukraine’s new National Guard is set to receive BTR-4 armoured fighting vehicles Source : Ukroboronprom

      ANALYSIS
      Ukraine is keen to emphasise its efforts to create and bolster the National Guard with new equipment - which would otherwise effectively be a paper force.

      However, the quantity, designations, and availability of the vehicles points to them being vehicles rejected and returned by export customers. To date, Ukraine is only known to have ordered 10 BTR-4 vehicles, although the type’s only known export customer, Iraq, ordered 420 in 2009.

      Iraq has, however, complained about the quality of the BTR-4s it has received, with issues reported to have been found with the first batch of vehicles’ 30 mm ZTM-1 autocannons. These issues are understood to have eventually been resolved, with Iraq reportedly happy with the second batch of vehicles.

      However, the third batch of vehicles, understood to include around 40 vehicles, was returned to Ukraine after cracks were reportedly found in the vehicle’s hulls. Given the similarity in the number of BTR-4s in the returned Iraq shipment and the Ukraine delivery, it appears likely that the vehicles destined for the Ukraine National Guard come from this returned batch. The readiness of the vehicles for delivery also appears to confirm this, with it taking around two years to build an APC such as the BTR-4 from order to delivery. With the vehicle type only in mass production for Iraq it is highly likely that the vehicles either come from a future part of the Iraqi order, or - more likely - the returned shipment.

      Additionally, the designations of BTR-4 variants Ukroboronprom refers to match the variants of those ordered by Iraq. In particular the usage of the BTR-4E designation, understood to be reserved for the export version of the BTR-4, would appear to confirm that these vehicles were originally destined for export.