Credibility Gap
United Kingdom civilian harm assessments for the
battles of Mosul and Raqqa.
PDF . ▻https://airwars.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Credibility-Gap-Airwars-submission-to-UK-Parlt-Defence-Select-Committee-Sep
The United Kingdom’s role in the battles of Mosul
and Raqqa represented some of the heaviest military
action by its forces in over a half century. The MoD
deployed a range of fighter and bomber aircraft
and armed Reaper RPAs, which launched significant
numbers of munitions at almost 1,000 targets.
Yet the patterns and indicators of civilian harm are also there:
Coalition and British strikes took place in large numbers in densely
populated areas. These strikes frequently hit buildings, the likely
location of ISIS fighters. Yet according to conservative estimates by
researchers at Airwars, at least 2,600 civilians and possibly many
more were killed by Coalition actions during the battles for both
cities – most reported killed when buildings collapsed around them.
After the US, the United Kingdom was the largest single international
contributor to the successful campaign to dislodge ISIS from
its strongholds. However, unlike the United States (as well as
Australia, which conducted markedly fewer strikes) British
authorities have not admitted to a single incident of civilian harm
in either city. All evidence nevertheless points to the inevitability
of such casualties in a hard-fought urban-focused war. The UK’s nonadmission
of harm therefore represents a shortfall in accountability.
As of this report, Airwars is not aware of any specific claims that
UK forces might have violated International Humanitarian Law.56
To date, the broader Coalition has admitted to 892 civilian deaths
in Iraq and Syria, including 367 fatalities at Mosul and Raqqa –
all without finding that its forces had violated international law.
The issue here however is also one of civilian harm mitigation.
Even accepting that civilians were not unlawfully killed by Coalition
actions, it is still incumbent upon all belligerents properly to
understand where, when and how such casualties might have
resulted from their own actions. Only then can lessons be learned,
and future conflict casualties reduced.
By claiming zero civilian casualties from its actions at Mosul and
Raqqa, the Ministry of Defence is demonstrably failing in this task.
This disparity additionally sets a poor example to others, providing
the UK with less leverage when criticizing belligerents such as
Russia or Syria, which take far fewer precautions or indeed may
deliberately target civilians or civilian infrastructure – while
insisting that their own actions too result in no civilian harm.
Part of the way forward lies in addressing systemic challenges in UK
civilian harm assessments from the air. At present there is a clear bias
towards acknowledging incidents that are observable, primarily using
ISR tools. This is a Coalition-wide problem – and one which the
United Kingdom government can help take the lead in addressing.
