Article 29 Working Party plenary session – POLITICO

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  • Europe’s global plans all require money no one has
    https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-global-plans-money-green-economy

    Europe is about to face a sort of impossible triangle,” said Simone Tagliapietra, a senior fellow at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels who specializes in energy and climate policy. “On the one hand, we want to accelerate the green transition and be competitive while doing that, on the other hand, we want to ramp up defense spending. And on the other hand, we want to be fiscally conservative.

    National envoys to Brussels are already wondering how much they can rob from the Green Deal to build up the bloc’s military.

    In a way defense and green deal will be competing interests for public money,” said a diplomat from an EU country, who — like others in this article — was granted anonymity in order to discuss politically sensitive issues.

    A fund for “strategic technologies” — originally envisioned as a driver of clean tech innovation — was slashed from €10 billion to just €1.5 billion. And then EU leaders earmarked the remaining funds for defense spending anyway.

    [...]

    France believes it has the answer.

    Paris and other EU capitals are pushing to revive the so-called Capital Markets Union, a decade-old European Commission plan to use European’s savings to boost private investments across the bloc. The idea has struggled to gain acceptance, but keeps coming up.

    We will have a debate to have more public investment, but the idea is also to walk on two legs,” said an Elysée official, noting that private funding should increasingly be the secondary funding source for the EU’s green plans.

  • Russia is winning the global grain war – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-winning-global-grain-war-farmer-ukraine-putin-agriculture

    Farmers across Europe have taken to the streets this year, convinced that cheap Ukrainian produce spilling over the border is to blame for their woes.

    The mass protests have forced EU governments from Warsaw to Paris to make huge concessions to farmers, and have sent Kyiv’s political ties with its Western allies spiraling to their weakest since Russia’s full-scale invasion over two years ago.

    Newly reelected Russian President Vladimir Putin must be rubbing his hands with glee. 
    After all, he is the real mastermind behind the crisis.

    The main reason why EU farmers can’t sell their own goods this year has nothing to do with Ukraine and its huge agricultural sector.
    Instead, it is Russia, whose own record farm output — and world-beating exports — have driven crop prices down to the point where farmers everywhere are hurting.

    “It’s absolutely the case that Russia is using its food exports, particularly wheat exports, as a form of soft power,” said Caitlin Welsh, director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and co-author of a recent paper on Russia’s growing dominance of global agricultural markets at Ukraine’s expense.

    Aided by extremely favorable weather, Russia has grown unprecedented amounts of wheat over the past two years and sold it cheaply on the world market.

  • Israel must open border to life-saving aid for Palestinians, WFP chief says – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-block-aid-for-palestine-world-food-programme-cindy-mccain

    McCain said enough food to feed the entire #Gaza population for months was “ready to go in.” But access was not being granted.

    #génocide

  • Europe’s farmer protests have been fertile ground for Russian propaganda – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-farmer-protest-russia-war-propaganda

    While starting at the grassroots level, the protests have been keenly exploited by Russia to sow division and undermine popular support for Ukraine’s defense.

    La météo pourrie, célérusses. Le déficit public, célérusses. La rougeole, célérusses. Les punaises de lit, célérusses.

    #célérusses

  • Le gouvernement embarrassé par un “deepfake” visant Marine Le Pen
    https://www.politico.eu/article/france-gouvernement-deepfake-marine-le-pen

    Alors que le gouvernement français fait de la régulation des deepfakes l’un de ses combats dans le monde numérique, ces trucages destinés à tromper le public ont fait leur entrée dans la bataille politique par le biais d’un représentant du parti présidentiel lui-même.

    Loïc Signor, porte-parole de Renaissance, s’est attaqué à Marine Le Pen en la mettant en scène dans un montage généré par intelligence artificielle, publié sur la plateforme X. De quoi créer un précédent dans le débat français, à quelques mois des élections européennes.

    https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/1741512612028850177/vid/avc1/1280x720/a0l3yNErDff2P_PZ.mp4

    • Après, assimiler le simple fait de parler russe au fait d’être financé par un gouvernement autoritaire, ça n’a pas l’air de poser de problème. (Fais un montage de Macron qui se mettrait à parler en hébreux, tu vas voir du pays.)

    • déshumaniser / diaboliser l’ennemi…

      en même temps, la question est loin d’être simple : voir la place du russe et de la culture russe en Ukraine. Entre la culture comme soft power (pas forcément si soft d’ailleurs…) en soulignant le passé commun et l’éradication totale rejetant le passé commun (dominé…)

      connaître / comprendre, c’est déjà adhérer.

      On est loin du général de Gaulle dont on me disait quand j’étais petit qu’il avait choisi d’apprendre l’allemand, langue de l’ennemi…

    • J’ai pris allemand seconde langue en hommage à mon père qui avait « fait » la seconde guerre mondiale . Il en est ressorti militant pro Européen. L’allemand restait la langue de l’ennemi qu’il fallait connaitre...une peur restait...

  • Nepal arrests 10 on suspicion of recruiting locals for Russian army
    https://www.politico.eu/article/nepal-arrests-10-local-alleged-russia-army-recruiters-ukraine-war

    Police in Nepal have arrested 10 people for allegedly scamming unemployed young men into joining the Russian army.

    The suspects charged people up to $9,000 for “tourist visas” and sent them to Russia through third countries, mainly the United Arab Emirates, Kathmandu District Police chief Bhupendra Khatri told Reuters. They were then recruited to the Russian army, the official said, adding that it amounted to human trafficking.

    Nepalese authorities had earlier asked Russia not to recruit its citizens to fight in Ukraine, as at least six Nepalis have already been killed, Kathmandu Post reported this week.

    Deal ‘with the devil’: Meet the Cubans who’ve joined Russia’s war on Ukraine
    https://www.politico.eu/article/cuban-mercenaries-join-russian-army-ukraine-war

    The news of Cuban fighters in Ukraine splashed across global headlines earlier this month when Havana announced it had arrested 17 people for involvement in a human trafficking ring recruiting young men to fight for Russia.

    The news raised questions about the extent of cooperation between the two Cold War allies, and whether cracks were beginning to show in Havana’s support for Russia’s invasion.

    Conversations with Cubans in Cuba and Russia reveal a different side of the story: of desperate young men who see enlistment in the Russian army as their best shot at a better life — even if not all of them seem to know what they were getting themselves into.

    One recruit in his late 40s in the Russian city of Tula, whom we will call Pedro, said he was promised a job as a driver “for workers and construction material” but on arrival in Russia was being prepared for combat, weapon in hand.

    “We signed a contract with the devil,” he said, recalling the moment he enlisted. “And the devil does not hand out sweets.”

    #russie #ukraine #nepal #cuba

  • Germany aims for a ‘war-ready’ military

    It’s the most momentous shift in German defense priorities since 2011.

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is forcing Germany to turn its military into a powerful and well-financed fighting force focused on defending the country and NATO allies, Germany’s chancellor said on Friday.

    “Today, nobody can seriously doubt what we in Germany have been avoiding for a long time, namely that we need a powerful Bundeswehr,” Olaf Scholz said on the second day of a political-military conference presenting the deep change in Berlin’s strategic thinking.

    “Our peace order is in danger,” he warned, also mentioning the war between Hamas and Israel and adding that Germany needs “a long-term, permanent change of course.”

    But to defend Germany and its allies, the German military, or Bundeswehr, “needs to be upgraded for this. Only a Bundeswehr that is so strong … can ultimately prevent the worst from happening,” said Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. “We need a Bundeswehr that can defend itself and wage war in order to defend our security and our freedom.”

    Just how to get there is laid out in a 34-page military and strategic doctrine.

    The change in thinking is apparent from the first paragraph of the text: “War has returned to Europe. Germany and its allies once again have to deal with a military threat. The international order is under attack in Europe and around the globe. We are living in a turning point.”

    The enemy is also clear: “The Russian Federation will remain the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.” China also gets a nod for "increasingly aggressively claiming regional supremacy.”

    It’s the first new doctrine since 2011 — a time when Dmitri Medvedev was Russia’s president, Russia was seen as the source of cheap energy to fuel Germany’s economic miracle and Berlin’s defense spending had shrivelled.

    Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, killing thousands and wreaking destruction across the country, has ended any remaining illusion in Berlin that the Kremlin can be a partner and not a foe.

    “The first defense policy guidelines in over a decade are a response to this new reality,” Pistorius said.

    Since the end of the Cold War, Berlin has missed NATO’s current defense-spending target of 2 percent of GDP for over three decades.

    Germany will hit the goal this year — thanks in large part to the €100 billion special fund created in the wake of the Russian invasion. Scholz insisted that this isn’t a one-off. “We will guarantee this 2 percent in the long term, throughout the ’20s and ’30s.”

    It’s going to take more than just money to get the Bundeswehr back into fighting trim.

    The new doctrine says Germany will scale back foreign missions to focus on European and national defense to become “war-ready.”

    It also promises the “expansion of robust and secure defense industry capacities," as well as using civilians and not soldiers to do functions where military personnel are not needed, and to cut the red tape to speed up military procurement.

    “The central action that follows from the turning point is overcoming the organizational and bureaucratic sluggishness that has slowed down the troops for years,” Scholz said.

    Germany’s military has been hollowed out over recent years. At a military exercise last December to prepare a tank brigade for inclusion in NATO’s “high readiness” response force, all 18 of the modern German infantry fighting vehicles failed. There have also been problems with the readiness of other parts of the military.

    “We must be the backbone of deterrence and collective defense in Europe,” says the strategy. "Our population, but also our partners in Europe, North America and the world, expect us to face up to this responsibility. As a state and society, we have neglected the Bundeswehr for decades.”

    https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-war-military-bundeswehr-defense-nato
    #Allemagne #armée #paix #guerre #Bundeswehr #liberté #sécurité #ordre_international #Russie #Chine #war-ready #industrie_militaire #OTAN #NATO

  • Hélicoptères, jumelles thermiques et aspirateurs : comment la police française dépense l’argent britannique | Alexandre Léchenet et Esther Webber
    https://www.politico.eu/article/helicopteres-jumelles-thermiques-et-aspirateurs-comment-la-police-francaise

    L’argent britannique représente 10% du budget total de la France pour la protection de ses frontières, selon des documents budgétaires, et le Royaume-Uni prévoit de verser 540,3 millions d’euros à la France jusqu’en 2026 pour poursuivre la protection de la frontière. Source : Politico

  • The future of warfare : A $400 drone killing a $2M tank – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/future-warfare-400-army-strike-drone-unit-2m-tank

    Facing an enemy with superior numbers of troops and armor, the Ukrainian defenders are holding on with the help of tiny drones flown by operators like Firsov that, for a few hundred dollars, can deliver an explosive charge capable of destroying a Russian tank worth more than $2 million.

    On ne te dit pas que les chars européens et américains donnés aux ukrainiens ont été décimés tout au long de la contre-offensive estivale par le même type de drones russes, intervenant en essaims autonomes. On ne te le dit pas, parce qu’en fait, on ne sait pas encore le faire en Occident. Mais là, on a appris, et on te le dit, qu’on est héroïques et vraiment trop malins, et que demain on va gagner la guerre contre les horribles russes.

  • EU halts Palestinian funding following Hamas attack – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-funding-to-palestine-in-question-following-hamas-attack

    October 9, 2023 3:11 pm CET

    BRUSSELS — The EU has put funding for the Palestinian Authority on hold following this weekend’s terror attack by Hamas in Israel.

    (...)

    The move comes as Germany and Austria announced the suspension of aid to the Palestinian territories.

    (...)

    The EU has previously faced criticism from Israeli officials about its funding for Palestinian organizations.

    (...)

    Une petite punition collective histoire de montrer comment fonctionne le droit international, y-a pas à dire, les Européens sont un Grand Exemple pour la Communauté Internationale et même au delà, pour l’Univers tout entier.

    Certaines mauvaises langues pensaient qu’il n’était pas possible de faire pire que les US, et pourtant si.

    Un palestinien ne mérite son argent que tant qu’il ne rechigne pas à se laisser molester par des colons, à laisser les oliviers se faire arracher par les tractopelles, à laisser les bétonnières remplir les points d’eaux, et à accepter de vivre dans un territoire strictement sous embargo.

    • Israël a renforcé son blocus du territoire palestinien. « Nous imposons un siège complet à Gaza », a déclaré ce lundi le ministre de la Défense. « Pas d’électricité, pas d’eau , pas de gaz, tout est fermé », a-t-il précisé dans une vidéo. Un siège justifié à ses yeux même s’il plonge ce territoire de plus de 2 millions d’habitants dans une situation humanitaire très difficile. « Nous combattons des animaux et nous agissons en conséquence », a-t-il ajouté.

    • La déshumanisation, c’est la marque de la démocratie et de l’équilibre, assurément (non). Peut-on faire un procès en antisémitisme à ce ministre de la défense dont les propos pourraient potentiellement être interprétés fort négativement par l’opinion qui compte ? D’autant que ce monsieur à quelques pouvoirs, sans doute moins qu’un chansonnier populaire et basané, mais peut-être que tout de même serait-il possible d’être au moins un petit peu choqué ? (moi là, j’en reste sans voix, à quel point l’extrême droite ne déçoit jamais, finalement ; on nous disait qu’elle était devenue fréquentable, au XXIème siècle, mais en fait, peut-être que non ?)

    • Israël ordonne un « siège complet » de la bande de Gaza après l’attaque du Hamas
      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/moyen-orient/20231009-isra%C3%ABl-ordonne-un-si%C3%A8ge-complet-de-la-bande-de-gaza-apr%C3%A8

      Israël a renforcé son blocus du territoire palestinien. « Nous imposons un siège complet à Gaza », a déclaré ce lundi le ministre de la Défense. « Pas d’électricité, pas d’eau, pas de gaz, tout est fermé », a-t-il précisé dans une vidéo. Un siège justifié à ses yeux même s’il plonge ce territoire de plus de 2 millions d’habitants dans une situation humanitaire très difficile. « Nous combattons des animaux et nous agissons en conséquence », a-t-il ajouté.

      #vitrine_de_la_jungle

    • L’UE ne suspend plus son programme d’aide aux Palestiniens, et va seulement « revoir » le dispositif
      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2023/10/09/en-direct-guerre-israel-hamas-l-armee-israelienne-declare-avoir-frappe-plus-

      L’Union européenne (UE) va revoir son aide au développement en faveur des Palestiniens, a déclaré lundi soir la Commission européenne, sans faire mention d’une suspension de tous les paiements annoncée dans la journée par Oliver Varhelyi, commissaire hongrois chargé du voisinage et de l’élargissement.

      Cette annonce a surpris à Bruxelles et au-delà, d’autant qu’un porte-parole de la Commission venait à peine de préciser qu’une décision de réexamen de l’aide européenne aux Palestiniens serait précisément soumise mardi aux Etats membres de l’UE lors de cette réunion.

      Selon le ministère des affaires étrangères espagnol, le chef de la diplomatie espagnole a appelé le commissaire Varhelyi pour protester contre cette décision, jugeant qu’elle devait d’abord être discutée par les Vingt-Sept. Et si les capitales européennes ont condamné les « actes terroristes » du Hamas, plusieurs se sont élevées contre la décision annoncée par M. Varhelyi.

      Après les protestations, la Commission a annoncé « un réexamen urgent de l’assistance de l’Union européenne à la Palestine » en concertation avec les pays membres. L’UE, plus important soutien financier aux Palestiniens, a un budget de quelque 1,2 milliard d’euros entre 2021 et 2024 pour financer des projets, notamment dans l’éducation ou la santé.

      Le Royaume-Uni est en train de « revoir » l’aide au développement apportée aux Palestiniens

      Londres est en train de « revoir » son aide au développement en faveur des Palestiniens après l’attaque du Hamas contre Israël, a déclaré lundi le vice-premier ministre britannique, Oliver Dowden, sur la chaîne ITV. « Cependant, nous suivons déjà un processus très rigoureux pour le type d’aide que nous fournissons », a-t-il ajouté. « Il est également très important de comprendre que nous ne devrions pas mettre dans le même sac les terroristes du Hamas (…) et l’Autorité palestinienne et le peuple palestinien », a encore dit M. Dowden.

      ce serait hongrois, et plus sûrement encore débilissime pour l’Europe que de se priver de toute marge diplomatique en appliquant la politique d’Israël vis-à-vis des gazaouis

    • La Commission européenne maintient son aide humanitaire aux Palestiniens | 7sur7.be
      https://www.7sur7.be/monde/la-commission-europeenne-maintient-son-aide-humanitaire-aux-palestiniens~aaf0a

      L’Irlande a demandé des éclaircissements sur le gel des aides, alors que le gouvernement de gauche espagnol a exprimé lundi son “malaise” et son “désaccord” à la suite de la décision de la Commission européenne, de suspendre son aide aux Palestiniens après l’attaque du Hamas.

      Y en a encore qui connaissent ce que honte veut dire

    • « Revoir le dispositif » ?

      1) arrêter de fermer les yeux sur le détournement d’une grosse partie des aides par leur collabo préféré, l’ignoble Mahmoud Abbas
      https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/la-corruption-de-leurs-dirigeants-est-un-fleau-pour-les-palestiniens-201905

      2) demander à leur partageur de valeurs communes, l’état sioniste, de cesser de détruire les réalisations financées par le contribuable européen https://press.un.org/fr/2023/cs15390.doc.htm

    • Question bête, dsl : en droit international, ou même juste en « règles de la guerre », un blocus complet, sans eau ni nourriture, sur 2 millions de civils, ça passe ?

    • António Guterres, secrétaire général des Nations unies, s’est dit « profondément bouleversé » par l’annonce de ce siège décidé par Israël. « Je reconnais les griefs légitimes du peuple palestinien. Mais rien ne peut justifier ces actes de terreur et le meurtre, la mutilation et l’enlèvement de civils », a-t-il déclaré en ajoutant : « Tout en reconnaissant les préoccupations légitimes d’Israël en matière de sécurité, je lui rappelle que les opérations militaires doivent être menées dans le strict respect du droit humanitaire international. Les civils doivent être respectés et protégés à tout moment. Les infrastructures civiles ne doivent jamais être prises pour cible. »

      Human Rights Watch a qualifié ce blocus d’« odieux » et demandé à la Cour pénale internationale, dans un communiqué publié lundi, de prendre « note de cet appel à commettre un crime de guerre ». « Priver la population d’un territoire occupé de nourriture et d’électricité est une forme de punition collective, qui est un crime de guerre, tout comme le fait d’utiliser la famine comme arme de guerre », a déclaré Omar Shakir, directeur pour Israël et la Palestine de l’organisation de défense des droits de l’homme basée à New York. « De telles actions mettraient en péril la vie de plus de 2,2 millions de Palestiniens qui vivent depuis plus de 16 ans sous le blocus écrasant et illégal d’Israël », a-t-il ajouté.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/091023/l-armee-israelienne-pilonne-gaza-ou-l-etat-hebreu-impose-un-siege-complet

    • oui, de mémoire environ 4 jours, pour des gens en bonne santé au départ.

      Vous voyez cette scène dans Total Recall ou Cohaagen coupe l’air à Vénusville ?

    • Oui, cette scène est assez fondamentale pour moi.
      C’était l’illustration la plus implacable du despotisme hydraulique, concept exposé par Frank Herbert dans Dune.

      C’est pour cela que j’ai bien ricané quand les milliardaire parlent d’installer des colonies sur Mars. Leurs colonies sur Mars.

      Israël peut effectivement couper l’eau à Gaza. Ce qui signifie que ce sont les dirigeants d’Israël qui ont réellement le pouvoir à Gaza.

      Et dans pas mal d’autres territoires.

    • Comme le rappelle Dominique Vidal, le ministre qui annonce « pas d’eau » pour ces « animaux », Yoav Gallant, était un des héros du mouvement de résistance contre la réforme judiciaire pour lequel des centaines de milliers de personnes ont manifesté.

      On 25 March 2023, Gallant spoke out against his own government in support of the protests against the government’s proposed judicial reforms. He asked for the government to delay the proposed legislation to allow for negotiations between the ruling coalition and the opposition, which resulted in National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir calling for Gallant’s dismissal.[28] Netanyahu announced on 26 March that he was dismissing Gallant, sparking massive protests that night in several major cities across Israel.[29] The following day, Gallant’s office stated that he would be continuing in his post, as he had not yet been given an official notice of his dismissal.[30] On 10 April, Netanyahu announced that he would not fire Gallant.[31]

      Le même jour, le ministre de la Défense, Yoav Galant, a demandé une pause dans la réforme judiciaire. Il a déclaré que « la fracture sociale croissante a fait son chemin jusqu’à l’armée et aux agences de sécurité. Il s’agit d’une menace claire, immédiate et tangible pour la sécurité d’Israël ». Gallant a appelé à une pause avant que les législateurs ne votent la semaine suivante sur une partie centrale des propositions du gouvernement54.

      Gallant a été démis de ses fonctions par Netanyahou le jour suivant55. En réponse à ce limogeage, des centaines de milliers de manifestants ont bloqué des routes à travers Israël, dans plus de 150 endroits55. Asaf Zamir, consul général d’Israël à New York, a démissionné de son poste à la suite du renvoi de Gallant afin de « défendre ce qui est juste et de lutter pour les valeurs démocratiques auxquelles je crois ». Les universités israéliennes (à l’exception de l’université d’Ariel, située en Cisjordanie) annoncent une grève illimitée, y compris l’arrêt de tous les cours et de la recherche, pour protester contre les actions du gouvernement. 23 dirigeants de conseils locaux ont annoncé leur intention d’entamer une grève de la faim devant le bureau du Premier ministre, exigeant l’arrêt de la réforme judiciaire55. Les manifestants ont intensifié leur mouvement et se sont dirigés vers la résidence de Netanyahou. Selon certaines informations, des barrières de sécurité auraient été brisées, mais ces informations ont été démenties par la police56,57.

  • France’s Niger debacle marks end of an era in Africa – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/france-niger-military-army-withdrawal-west-africa-sahel-colonies-burkina-fa

    Calls grow for Paris to rethink its relationship with African nations, including a military reduction in the restive region.

    Ce n’est pas un échec, c’est que ça n’a pas marché.
    Et puis d’ailleurs, qui aurait pu prédire ?

    (je précise qu’évidemment, àmha, la françafrique ne mérite pas de survivre dans sa dimension coloniale ; mais une françafrique de la bonne entente par contre, ça aurait pu être sympathique ; mais l’autre crétin ne gouvernant que par la force, il n’y aura ni l’un ni l’autre)

  • En #Tunisie, l’#UE refait la même erreur, toujours aussi dangereuse

    Alors que les représentant·e·s de la « Team Europe [2] » serraient la main du président tunisien Kaïs Saïed en juillet dernier, des centaines de réfugié·e·s et de migrant·e·s bloqués aux frontières terrestres désertiques du pays avec la Libye ont été rassemblés par ses forces de sécurité et abandonnés là, sans accès à de la nourriture ni à de l’eau, sans abri.

    Le président du Parti populaire européen (PPE) Manfred Weber a par la suite évoqué ces informations, y compris les multiples décès près de la frontière, en parlant de « vidéos prises dans le désert ou quelque chose comme ça [3] ».

    Les leaders européens se sont rendus en Tunisie pour signer un protocole d’accord visant à freiner l’immigration vers l’Europe. En échange, ils lui offrent environ 100 millions d’euros pour la « gestion des frontières » et près d’un milliard en prêts supplémentaires et soutien financier, dans le contexte de la crise économique sans précédent que traverse le pays.

    Cependant, pendant que la Tunisie et l’Union européenne débattent de la manière de mettre en place ce protocole d’accord, ses coûts humains sont déjà évidents. Tandis que l’Europe ferme les yeux sur la répression croissante des droits humains en Tunisie, la population, y compris les personnes demandeuses d’asile, réfugiées et migrantes, paient le prix fort.
    Les leaders de l’Europe et de l’Union européenne doivent tout de suite changer de cap.

    Tout d’abord, même une fois l’accord conclu, les autorités tunisiennes ont continué d’amener de force les migrant·e·s à la frontière libyenne, où beaucoup ont déjà besoin d’une aide humanitaire d’urgence, les médias internationaux [4] faisant état de nombreux morts. Fait choquant, les leaders de l’UE n’ont pas encore condamné publiquement ces violations.

    En revanche, la Commission européenne s’est engagée à coopérer avec les autorités tunisiennes pour empêcher les personnes demandeuses d’asile, réfugiées et migrantes d’atteindre l’Europe, sachant pertinemment que les mêmes violations se reproduiront – piégeant ces personnes dans des situations de violence et contribuant à l’hostilité qu’elles subissent en Tunisie.

    Plus inquiétant, cet accord a été signé sans aucune condition relative aux droits humains, sans évaluation ni suivi de son impact sur les droits, et en l’absence de mécanisme permettant de suspendre la coopération en cas d’abus. La médiatrice européenne a annoncé la semaine dernière [5] avoir demandé à la Commission européenne de clarifier [6] comment elle veillera à ce que la Tunisie respecte les droits humains.

    Il semble que personne n’ait tiré les leçons de la coopération de l’UE avec la Libye [7] : le soutien du bloc apporté aux forces de sécurité libyennes l’a rendu complice d’une infrastructure de violations infligées aux réfugié·e·s et migrant·e·s – actes de torture, viols, disparitions forcées, homicides illégaux et détentions arbitraires. Une récente enquête de l’ONU [8] a conclu que ces actes pouvaient s’apparenter à des crimes contre l’humanité.

    Les accords visant à contenir les personnes dans des pays ne faisant pas partie de l’UE ne sauvent pas des vies et ne les empêchent pas d’emprunter des itinéraires clandestins. Au contraire, les personnes en mouvement sont contraintes d’entreprendre des périples encore plus dangereux afin de ne pas se faire intercepter par les autorités, tandis que les passeurs en profitent puisqu’elles dépendent encore plus de leurs services. En outre, ces accords ne résolvent en rien les problèmes qui poussent les gens à émigrer en quête de sécurité, et qui vont de toute façon perdurer. Aussi est-il décevant que, dans son « Plan en 10 points pour Lampedusa [9] », la présidente Ursula Von der Leyen renforce l’accord avec la Tunisie.

    L’accord de l’UE avec la Tunisie risque aussi de légitimer l’attaque du président Kaïs Saïed contre l’état de droit et sa répression toujours plus forte de la dissidence. En amont de l’accord, le silence des leaders européens s’est épaissi tandis qu’il démantelait quasiment tous les contrôles institutionnels du pouvoir exécutif, publiait des décrets restreignant la liberté d’expression et s’octroyait des pouvoirs sur le système judiciaire. De très nombreux détracteurs, opposant·e·s, avocat·e·s, journalistes et juges ont fait l’objet de poursuites pénales arbitraires et de mesures restrictives, allant jusqu’à l’incarcération.

    La Tunisie a récemment refusé l’entrée à cinq députés européens qui devaient se rendre dans le pays dans le cadre d’une visite officielle. Parmi eux se trouvaient les eurodéputés Mounir Satouri et Michael Gahler qui avaient auparavant critiqué l’accord [10] en raison de la répression en Tunisie. Le refus de les laisser entrer sur le territoire a été largement perçu comme une mesure de représailles.

    Jadis saluée comme la réussite du mouvement du Printemps arabe et comme un refuge pour les défenseur·e·s des droits humains de toute l’Afrique du Nord, la Tunisie risque aujourd’hui d’emboîter le pas à l’Égypte, qui a vu son président Abdelfattah al Sissi transformer son pays en une prison à ciel ouvert, tout en supervisant l’appauvrissement de millions d’Égyptiens. Les leaders de l’UE ont majoritairement gardé le silence face à cette répression brutale, lorsqu’Abdelfattah al Sissi a bloqué les routes migratoires depuis l’Égypte vers l’Europe, forçant des milliers de personnes à emprunter l’itinéraire meurtrier via la Libye.

    Enfin, tout en sachant sans doute que l’accord augmenterait le risque de violations des droits humains à l’encontre des personnes migrantes et réfugiées, la Commission a choisi de négocier le protocole d’accord en secret. Les négociations se sont déroulées sans le regard aiguisé du Parlement européen et des Parlements nationaux, et loin de toute implication de la société civile.
    Ce manque de transparence sape la légitimité de la politique migratoire de l’UE.

    Pour éviter que l’UE ne se rende complice d’atteintes aux droits et de répression, son engagement avec des partenaires concernant la migration doit s’accompagner de conditions strictes, d’évaluations d’impact et de suivi en matière de droits humains. Nous avons besoin d’une approche équilibrée qui déploie un plus grand nombre d’itinéraires migratoires sûrs et s’attache à protéger plutôt que contenir.

    L’accord avec la Tunisie ne respecte aucune de ces conditions et doit donc être suspendu.
    L’UE doit promouvoir l’indépendance de la justice, la liberté de la presse et une société civile dynamique dans le pays.

    Notes

    [1] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-lawmakers-parliament-fumed-by-the-european-commission-tunisia-migration-

    [2] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-lawmakers-parliament-fumed-by-the-european-commission-tunisia-migration-

    [3] https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/weber-calls-on-tunisia-to-bring-down-migrant-numbers

    [4] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/20/world/africa/tunisia-african-migrants.html

    [5] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ethics-watchdog-ombudsman-question-commission-tunisia-migrant-deal

    [6] https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/opening-summary/en/175102

    [7] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/29/video-woman-dead-floor-migrant-detention-centre-libya

    [8] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/libya-urgent-action-needed-remedy-deteriorating-human-rights-situation-un

    [9] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_23_4503

    [10] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/12/tunisia-should-not-get-1bn-on-a-silver-plate-in-migration-deal-says-mep

    https://www.amnesty.be/infos/blogs/blog-paroles-chercheurs-defenseurs-victimes/article/tunisie-refait-erreur-dangereuse

    ping @_kg_

    #Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire

    • Immigrazione: gli effetti degli accordi con la Tunisia

      l’Italia e l’Ue, all’aumento degli arrivi via mare dalla Tunisia, hanno risposto chiedendo maggiori controlli e promuovendo l’accordo del 16 luglio scorso tra Tunisia e Ue. I risultati, finora, sono una serie di violenze generalizzate contro i sub-Sahariani in Tunisia e l’ulteriore aumento degli arrivi sulle coste italiane.

      Il 16 luglio scorso la Tunisia e l’Unione europea hanno firmato un memorandum d’intesa che riguarda la cooperazione su diversi fronti ma che è stato motivato in particolare dal desiderio dei governi europei di limitare i crescenti arrivi non autorizzati sulle coste italiane di persone imbarcatesi dal territorio tunisino: cittadini tunisini ma anche – e in misura crescente – cittadini di altri paesi (in particolare sub-Sahariani). A distanza di due mesi l’intesa non sembra avere avuto l’effetto sperato dai suoi principali promotori, i capi di governo dei Paesi bassi Rutte e dell’Italia Meloni, i quali hanno accompagnato la presidente della Commissione europea von der Leyen a Tunisi nella missione preparatoria di giugno e in quella finale della firma.
      Tunisia, paese di imbarco

      La Tunisia era stato il principale paese nordafricano di imbarco verso l’Italia fino al 2004. Quell’anno, in seguito al nuovo accordo tra Italia e Tunisia del dicembre 2003, il regime di Ben Alì aveva adottato una serie di misure volte a limitare le partenze, e la Tunisia era stata superata dalla Libia come principale paese di imbarco. Il primato libico non era più stato messo in discussione per molto tempo: gli stessi tunisini preferivano spesso spostarsi nel paese vicino per partire da lì anziché rischiare l’imbarco dalle proprie coste. Unica eccezione: i primi mesi del 2011, coincidenti con la rivoluzione, quando il vuoto di potere aveva fatto venire meno i controlli lungo le coste tunisine, consentendo la fuga verso l’Italia di oltre 25.000 persone. Poi l’accordo del 5 aprile 2011 tra i due governi aveva pressoché azzerato le partenze.

      Solo la crisi economica e politica degli ultimi anni ha fatto riprendere in modo sensibile gli imbarchi dalla Tunisia, dal 2017 e soprattutto dal 2020, nonostante la conclusione della Mobility Partnership tra Unione europea e Tunisia nel 2014 e ulteriori accordi tra Tunisia e Italia nel 2017 e nel 2020. Nel 2022, in un contesto di aumento generalizzato degli arrivi in Italia via mare, continua a crescere non solo il numero delle partenze dalla Tunisia ma anche la componente dei cittadini stranieri sul totale dei viaggiatori – anche questa una tendenza visibile già da un paio d’anni (Tabella 1).

      Il 18 gennaio 2023 i ministri italiani dell’interno, Piantedosi, e degli esteri, Tajani, si recano a Tunisi per chiedere maggiore impegno nei controlli e maggiore collaborazione nelle riammissioni ma il risultato non è quello sperato. Il 21 febbraio il presidente tunisino Saïed, che tra il 2021 e il 2022 ha svuotato di sostanza la giovane democrazia tunisina sospendendo il parlamento, cambiando la costituzione, arrestando gli oppositori, limitando la libertà di stampa e assicurandosi un potere quasi illimitato, trae ispirazione dalle richieste europee per dichiarare pubblicamente la propria ostilità nei confronti degli immigrati sub-Sahariani. Saïed li definisce ‘orde’ che mirano a cambiare la composizione demografica della Tunisia. Seguono non solo arresti e deportazioni di massa operati dalle autorità, ma anche aggressioni, licenziamenti e sfratti indiscriminati operati da privati cittadini contagiati dalla deriva razzista.

      Per sottrarsi alle violenze c’è chi torna nel proprio paese, ma tanti altri fuggono in Europa. E così, se fino al 19 febbraio, prima del discorso di Saïed, le persone arrivate in Italia dalla Tunisia erano 6.529, di cui un migliaio tunisini, il loro numero al 30 aprile del 2023 è già arrivato a 24.379, di cui meno di tremila tunisini. Molti tra coloro che partono sono sub-Sahariani che risiedevano da anni in Tunisia e non avrebbero lasciato il paese se non fossero stati costretti a farlo dalle violenze generalizzate.
      Il memorandum d’intesa UE-Tunisia

      L’Europa persegue allora la strada dell’accordo, che sarà siglato il 16 luglio 2023. La firma è preceduta da una nuova e cruenta ondata di deportazioni verso i confini desertici con Algeria e Libia, che provoca morte e sofferenza.

      L’intesa delude le aspettative europee. In primo luogo, essa non prevede la riammissione in Tunisia dei cittadini di paesi terzi giunti in Europa dal paese nordafricano, che era uno degli obiettivi principali. In secondo luogo, il numero degli arrivi dalla Tunisia non diminuisce ma aumenta (tabella 2).

      Se nelle sei settimane precedenti la firma dell’accordo tale numero è pari a 17.596, esso sale a 29.676 (+ 168,65%) nelle sei settimane successive. Alla fine del secondo quadrimestre del 2023 il numero delle persone arrivate dalla Tunisia risulta più che triplicato (73.827 al 27 agosto) rispetto alle 24.379 del primo quadrimestre. Nei soli primi otto mesi del 2023 sono arrivate più del doppio delle persone contate nell’intero anno precedente.

      Le politiche europee volte a esternalizzare verso i territori di paesi terzi i controlli delle frontiere raggiungono solo raramente – e mai definitivamente – l’obiettivo di ridurre l’immigrazione. Più spesso esse finiscono per sostenere regimi autoritari e alimentare nei paesi vicini sentimenti razzisti, politiche discriminatorie e pratiche violente e disumane. La Tunisia ne è l’ennesima dimostrazione.

      https://www.neodemos.info/2023/09/26/immigrazione-gli-effetti-degli-accordi-con-la-tunisia

  • EU judges slam France’s migrant pushbacks

    Ruling examines decision to shut French border to non-EU nationals.

    The EU’s top court ruled against France’s policy of turning away migrants at its borders.

    The European Court of Justice announced on Thursday (https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-09/cp230145en.pdf) that those actions breached the EU’s rules on migrant returns.

    The ruling comes as France closed its border to Italy amid a recent surge in migrant arrivals to the Italian island of Lampedusa.

    France’s center-right Home Affairs Minister Gerard Darmanin had on Monday vowed that “France will not take in a single migrant from Lampedusa” after meeting his Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi in Rome (https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/09/18/darmanin-la-francia-non-accogliera-migranti-da-lampedusa_2f53eae6-e8f7-4b82-9d7).

    But EU rules compel member countries to initiate a formal procedure when expelling an irregular migrant, and give that person sufficient time to leave the country.

    So-called pushbacks of migrants, or forcing a migrant directly back across a border, may only be carried out as a last resort, the judges in Luxembourg ruled.

    They also noted that non-EU citizens who lack permission to stay may not be turned away at internal EU borders.

    Commenting on the ruling, the European Commission’s Home Affairs spokesperson Anitta Hipper told a daily media briefing that “reintroducing [internal EU] border controls must remain an exceptional measure.” (https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-246319)

    She added that the EU executive is in consultations with countries that have sealed their borders.

    This ruling comes as the European Parliament’s home affairs committee on Wednesday backed legislation that allows EU countries to enact border controls only when faced with emergencies such as health or terrorism threats, and only for a limited time period.

    https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-judges-slam-france-migrant-pushback

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #Italie #France #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #fermeture_des_frontières #Alpes #justice #C-143/22 #Cour_de_justice_de_l'Union_européenne (#CJUE) #frontières_intérieures

    • JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Border control, asylum and immigration – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 – Article 32 – Temporary reintroduction of border control by a Member State at its internal borders – Article 14 – Refusal of entry – Equation of internal borders with external borders – Directive 2008/115/EC – Scope – Article 2(2)(a))

      In Case C‑143/22,

      REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France), made by decision of 24 February 2022, received at the Court on 1 March 2022, in the proceedings

      Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE),

      Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE),

      Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT),

      Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade),

      Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI),

      Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI),

      Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH),

      Le paria,

      Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF),

      SOS – Hépatites Fédération

      v

      Ministre de l’Intérieur,

      intervening party :

      Défenseur des droits,

      THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

      composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, L.S. Rossi, J.-C. Bonichot, S. Rodin and O. Spineanu-Matei, Judges,

      Advocate General : A. Rantos,

      Registrar : M. Krausenböck, Administrator,

      having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 19 January 2023,

      after considering the observations submitted on behalf of :

      – Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF) and SOS – Hépatites Fédération, by P. Spinosi, lawyer,

      – the Défenseur des droits, by C. Hédon, Défenseure des droits, M. Cauvin and A. Guitton, acting as advisers, and by I. Zribi, lawyer,

      – the French Government, by A.-L. Desjonquères and J. Illouz, acting as Agents,

      – the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, E. Borawska-Kędzierska and A. Siwek-Ślusarek, acting as Agents,

      – the European Commission, by A. Azéma, A. Katsimerou, T. Lilamand and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents,

      after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 30 March 2023,

      gives the following

      Judgment

      1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1, ‘the Schengen Borders Code’), and of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

      2 The request has been made in proceedings between Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le Paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF), SOS – Hépatites Fédération, and Ministre de l’Intérieur (Minister of the Interior, France) regarding the legality of the ordonnance no 2020-1733 du 16 décembre 2020 portant partie législative du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Order No 2020-1733 of 16 December 2020, laying down the legislative part of the Code on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum) (JORF of 30 December 2020, Text No 41).

      Legal context

      European Union law

      The Schengen Borders Code

      3 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code :

      ‘For the purposes of this Regulation the following definitions apply :

      1. “internal borders” means :

      (a) the common land borders, including river and lake borders, of the Member States ;

      (b) the airports of the Member States for internal flights ;

      (c) sea, river and lake ports of the Member States for regular internal ferry connections ;

      2. “external borders” means : the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders ;

      …’

      4 Title II of that code, which concerns ‘External Borders’, includes Articles 5 to 21.

      5 Article 14 of the code, entitled ‘Refusal of entry’, states :

      ‘1. A third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of long-stay visas.

      2. Entry may only be refused by a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal. The decision shall be taken by an authority empowered by national law. It shall take effect immediately.

      The substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal shall be given by means of a standard form, as set out in Annex V, Part B, filled in by the authority empowered by national law to refuse entry. The completed standard form shall be handed to the third-country national concerned, who shall acknowledge receipt of the decision to refuse entry by means of that form.

      Data on third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused shall be registered in the EES in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ 2017 L 327, p. 20)].

      3. Persons refused entry shall have the right to appeal. Appeals shall be conducted in accordance with national law. A written indication of contact points able to provide information on representatives competent to act on behalf of the third-country national in accordance with national law shall also be given to the third-country national.

      Lodging such an appeal shall not have suspensive effect on a decision to refuse entry.

      Without prejudice to any compensation granted in accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to the correction of the data entered in the EES or of the cancelled entry stamp, or both, and any other cancellations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry.

      4. The border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned.

      5. Member States shall collect statistics on the number of persons refused entry, the grounds for refusal, the nationality of the persons who were refused entry and the type of border (land, air or sea) at which they were refused entry and submit them yearly to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 23)].

      6. Detailed rules governing refusal of entry are given in Part A of Annex V.’

      6 Title III of the Schengen Borders Code, which concerns ‘Internal Borders’, includes Articles 22 to 35.

      7 Article 25 of that code, entitled ‘General framework for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where, in the area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State, that Member State may exceptionally reintroduce border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders for a limited period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days. The scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat.’

      8 Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, entitled ‘Provisions to be applied where border control is reintroduced at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of Title II shall apply mutatis mutandis.’

      9 Annex V, Part A, of the Schengen Borders Code provides :

      ‘1. When refusing entry, the competent border guard shall :

      (a) fill in the standard form for refusing entry, as shown in Part B. The third-country national concerned shall sign the form and shall be given a copy of the signed form. Where the third-country national refuses to sign, the border guard shall indicate this refusal in the form under the section “comments” ;

      (b) for third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused, register in the EES the data on refusal of entry in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 ;

      (c) annul or revoke the visas, as appropriate, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 34 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1)] ;

      (d) for third-country nationals whose refusals of entry are not to be registered into the EES, affix an entry stamp on the passport, cancelled by a cross in indelible black ink, and write opposite it on the right-hand side, also in indelible ink, the letter(s) corresponding to the reason(s) for refusing entry, the list of which is given on the standard form for refusing entry as shown in Part B of this Annex. In addition, for these categories of persons, the border guard shall record every refusal of entry in a register or on a list stating the identity and nationality of the third-country national concerned, the references of the document authorising the third-country national to cross the border and the reason for, and date of, refusal of entry.

      The practical arrangements for stamping are set out in Annex IV.

      2. If a third-country national who has been refused entry is brought to the border by a carrier, the authority responsible locally shall :

      (a) order the carrier to take charge of the third-country national and transport him or her without delay to the third country from which he or she was brought, to the third country which issued the document authorising him or her to cross the border, or to any other third country where he or she is guaranteed admittance, or to find means of onward transportation in accordance with Article 26 of the Schengen Convention and Council Directive 2001/51/EC [of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 45)] ;

      (b) pending onward transportation, take appropriate measures, in compliance with national law and having regard to local circumstances, to prevent third-country nationals who have been refused entry from entering illegally.

      …’

      10 Pursuant to Article 44 of that code, entitled ‘Repeal’ :

      ‘Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1)] is repealed.

      References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex X.’

      11 In accordance with that correlation table, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code corresponds to Article 13 of Regulation No 562/2006.

      Directive 2008/115

      12 Article 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115 states :

      ‘1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State.

      2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who :

      (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of [Regulation No 562/2006], or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State ;

      (b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.’

      13 Article 3 of that directive provides :

      ‘For the purpose of this Directive the following definitions shall apply :

      2. “illegal stay” means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of [Regulation No 562/2006] or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State ;

      3. “return” means the process of a third-country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced – to :

      – his or her country of origin, or

      – a country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or

      – another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted ;

      …’

      14 Article 4(4) of the directive provides :

      ‘With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the scope of this Directive in accordance with Article 2(2)(a), Member States shall :

      (a) ensure that their treatment and level of protection are no less favourable than as set out in Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 9(2)(a) (postponement of removal), Article 14(1)(b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into account needs of vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention conditions) and

      (b) respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      15 Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 provides :

      ‘When implementing this Directive, Member States shall take due account of :

      (a) the best interests of the child ;

      (b) family life ;

      (c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned,

      and respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      16 Article 6 of that directive provides :

      ‘1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.

      2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to the territory of that other Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance by the third-country national concerned with this requirement, or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security, paragraph 1 shall apply.

      3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1.

      …’

      17 The first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application.’

      18 Article 15(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when :

      (a) there is a risk of absconding or

      (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process.

      Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.’

      French law

      19 Article L. 213-3-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum), in the version resulting from the loi no 2018-778, du 10 septembre 2018, pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie (Law No 2018-778 of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration) (JORF of 11 September 2018, Text No 1) (‘the former Ceseda’), stated :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders provided for in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code], the decisions referred to in Article L. 213-2 may be taken in respect of foreign nationals who have arrived directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention signed on 19 June 1990, who have entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and were checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres behind it. The procedures for these checks are defined by decree in the Conseil d’État [(Council of State, France)].’

      20 Order No 2020-1733 recast the legislative part of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. Article L. 332-2 of that code, as amended (‘the amended Ceseda’) provides :

      ‘The decision refusing entry, which shall be in writing and substantiated, shall be taken by an officer belonging to a category prescribed by regulations.

      The notification of the decision refusing entry shall state that the foreign national has the right to inform, or cause to be informed, the person he or she has indicated that he or she intended to visit, his or her consulate or the adviser of his or her choice. It shall state that the foreign national has the right to refuse to be repatriated before one clear day has passed, under the conditions laid down in Article L. 333-2.

      The decision and the notification of rights which accompanies it shall be provided to him in a language he or she understands.

      Particular attention shall be paid to vulnerable persons, especially minors whether accompanied by an adult or not.’

      21 Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda provides :

      ‘The procedure laid down in Article L. 332-2 is applicable to the decision to refuse entry taken against the foreign national pursuant to Article 6 of the [Schengen Borders Code]. It shall also apply to checks carried out at an internal border in the event of the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code].’

      The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

      22 The associations referred to in paragraph 2 of the present judgment are challenging the validity of Order No 2020-1733 before the Conseil d’État (Council of State), in an action for annulment of that order, on the grounds, inter alia, that Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda resulting from it infringes Directive 2008/115 in that it allows decisions to refuse entry at internal borders where checks have been reintroduced.

      23 The referring court observes that the Court held, in its judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others (C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220), that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, does not apply to the situation of an illegally staying third-country national who was apprehended in the immediate vicinity of an internal border of a Member State, even where that Member State has reintroduced border control at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or to internal security in that Member State.

      24 The Conseil d’État (Council of State) points out that, in its Decision No 428175 of 27 November 2020, it held that the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda, which provided that in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, a foreign national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 and which entered into force on 26 March 1995 (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19, ‘the Schengen Convention’), could be refused entry under the terms of Article L. 213-2 of the former Ceseda if he or entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and was checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres inside that border, were contrary to Directive 2008/115.

      25 Admittedly, according to the Conseil d’État (Council of State), Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda does not repeat the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda. However, Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda again provides only for the adoption of a refusal of entry while carrying out border checks at internal borders in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the Schengen Borders Code.

      26 That court therefore considers it necessary to determine whether, in such a case, a third-country national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention who presents themselves at an authorised stationary or mobile border crossing point, without being in possession of documents justifying an authorisation to enter or right to stay in France, may be refused entry on the basis of Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, without Directive 2008/115 being applicable.

      27 In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of [the Schengen Borders Code], can foreign nationals arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention … be refused entry, when entry checks are carried out at that border, on the basis of Article 14 of that [code], without [Directive 2008/115] being applicable ?’

      Consideration of the question referred

      28 By its question referred for a preliminary ruling, the national court asks, in essence, whether the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out, a decision refusing entry, within the meaning of Article 14 of that code, without being subject to compliance with that directive.

      29 Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code allows, exceptionally and under certain conditions, a Member State to reintroduce temporarily border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in that Member State. Under Article 32 of the code, where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of the Title II of the code relating to external borders shall apply mutatis mutandis.

      30 That is the case with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, which provides that a third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States.

      31 However, it is important to remember that a third-country national who, after entering the territory of a Member State illegally is present on that territory without fulfilling the conditions for entry, stay or residence is, therefore, staying illegally, within the meaning of Directive 2008/115. Under Article 2(1) of that directive, and without prejudice to Article 2(2) of the directive, that third-country national falls within the scope of the directive, without his or her presence in the territory of the Member State concerned being subject to a condition as to minimum duration or intention to remain in that territory. He or she must therefore, in principle, be subject to the common standards and procedures laid down by the directive for the purpose of his or her removal, as long as his or her stay has not, as the case may be, been regularised (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

      32 This also applies where the third-country national has been apprehended at a border crossing point, provided that the border crossing point is on the territory of that Member State. In that respect, it should be noted that a person may have entered the territory of a Member State even before crossing a border crossing point (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 February 2020, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Signing-on of seamen in the port of Rotterdam), C‑341/18, EU:C:2020:76, paragraph 45).

      33 It should also be specified, by way of example, that when checks are carried out on board a train between the time when the train leaves the last station located on the territory of a Member State sharing an internal border with a Member State that has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, and the moment when that train enters the first station situated on the territory of the latter Member State, the check on board that same train must, unless otherwise agreed between those two Member States, be regarded as a check carried out at a border crossing point situated on the territory of the Member State which has reintroduced such checks. A third-country national who has been checked on board this train will necessarily remain on the territory of the latter Member State following the check, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/115.

      34 However, it should also be noted that Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States to exclude, exceptionally and under certain conditions, third-country nationals who are staying illegally on their territory from the scope of that directive.

      35 Thus, on the one hand, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States not to apply that directive, subject to the provisions of Article 4(4) thereof, in two specific situations, namely that of third-country nationals who are the subject to a refusal of entry at an external border of a Member State, in accordance with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, or that of third-country nationals who are apprehended or intercepted in connection with the irregular crossing of such an external border and who have not subsequently obtained authorisation or a right to reside in that Member State.

      36 However, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that those two situations relate exclusively to the crossing of an external border of a Member State, as defined in Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code, and do not therefore concern the crossing of a border common to Member States forming part of the Schengen area, even where checks have been reintroduced at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or the internal security of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 45 and 67).

      37 It follows, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 35 of his Opinion, that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 does not authorise a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders to derogate from the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive in order to remove a third-country national who has been intercepted, without a valid residence permit, at one of the border crossing points situated in the territory of that Member State where such checks are carried out.

      38 On the other hand, although Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2008/115 authorises Member States not to apply that directive to third-country nationals who are subject to a criminal penalty providing for or resulting in their return, in accordance with national law, or who are subject to extradition proceedings, it must be noted that such a case is not the one referred to by the provision at issue in the main proceedings.

      39 It follows from the foregoing, first, that a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders may apply, mutatis mutandis, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code and paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex V to that code in respect of a third-country national who is intercepted, without a legal residence permit, at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out.

      40 On the other hand, where the border crossing point is located on the territory of the Member State concerned, the latter must ensure that the consequences of such application, mutatis mutandis, of the provisions referred to in the previous point do not result in disregard of the common standards and procedures laid down in Directive 2008/115. The fact that this obligation on the Member State concerned is likely to render ineffective to a large extent any decision to refuse entry to a third-country national arriving at one of its internal borders is not such as to alter that finding.

      41 With regard to the relevant provisions of that directive, it should be recalled, in particular, that it follows from Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 that any third-country national staying illegally on the territory of a Member State must, without prejudice to the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of that article and in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 5 of that directive, be the subject of a return decision, which must identify, among the third countries referred to in Article 3(3) of that directive, the country to which he or she must return (judgment of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 53).

      42 In addition, a third-country national who is the subject of such a return decision must still, in principle, be given, under Article 7 of Directive 2008/115, a certain period of time in which to leave the territory of the Member State concerned voluntarily. Forced removal is to take place only as a last resort, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, and subject to Article 9 thereof, which requires Member States to postpone removal in the cases it sets out (judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection), C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 252).

      43 Furthermore, it follows from Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 that the detention of an illegally staying third-country national may only be imposed in certain specific cases. However, as the Advocate General pointed out, in essence, in point 46 of his Opinion, that article does not preclude a national from being detained, pending his or her removal, where he or she represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or domestic security, provided that such detention complies with the conditions set out in Articles 15 to 18 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, C‑18/19, EU:C:2020:511, paragraphs 41 to 48).

      44 Furthermore, Directive 2008/115 does not rule out the possibility for Member States to impose a prison sentence for offences other than those relating solely to illegal entry, including in situations where the return procedure established by that directive has not yet been completed. Consequently, that directive also does not preclude the arrest or placing in police custody of an illegally staying third-country national where such measures are adopted on the ground that that national is suspected of having committed an offence other than simply entering the national territory illegally, and in particular an offence likely to threaten public policy or the internal security of the Member State concerned (judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraph 66).

      45 It follows that, contrary to what the French Government maintains, the application, in a case such as that referred to in the reference for a preliminary ruling, of the common standards and procedures laid down by Directive 2008/115 is not such as to make it impossible to maintain public order and safeguard internal security within the meaning of Article 72 TFEU.

      46 In light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that code, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      Costs

      47 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

      On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules :

      Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals,

      must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that regulation, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down in that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0143

    • Contrôle des frontières : le gouvernement contraint de sortir de l’illégalité

      Communiqué commun signé par la LDH

      Après 8 ans de pratiques illégales du gouvernement français en matière de contrôle et d’enfermement des personnes en migration aux frontières intérieures, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) confirme, dans un arrêt du 21 septembre, qu’elles sont contraires au droit.

      La CJUE rappelle à la France qu’elle doit se conformer au droit de l’Union européenne, et il appartient au gouvernement français de prendre des mesures immédiates sans attendre que le Conseil d’État en tire toutes les conséquences.

      Associations signataires : Avocats pour la Défense des Droits des Etrangers (ADDE), Alliance-DEDF, Amnesty International France, Anafé (association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les personnes étrangères), Bizi migrant.es, Emmaüs Roya, Federation Etorkinekin Diakité, Gisti, La Cimade, LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme), Médecins du Monde, Roya citoyenne, Syndicat des avocats de France (Saf), Syndicat de la magistrature (SM), Tous Migrants, Tous Migrants 73, Utopia 56 (antenne Toulouse)

      Paris, le 21 septembre 2023

      https://www.ldh-france.org/controle-des-frontieres-le-gouvernement-contraint-de-sortir-de-lillegali

    • Corte di giustizia UE: vietato il respingimento sistematico alle frontiere interne

      La sentenza della Corte nella causa #C-143/22 promossa da diverse associazioni francesi

      Il 21 settembre 2023 una sentenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea (CGUE) ha dichiarato che, anche se un Paese UE ha introdotto controlli alle sue frontiere, non ha il diritto di effettuare respingimenti sistematici. Deve rispettare la direttiva europea «rimpatri» che prevede che a un cittadino extraeuropeo possa “essere concesso un certo periodo di tempo per lasciare volontariamente il territorio“.

      Tutto era partito dal ricorso di varie associazioni francesi 1 che hanno contestato dinanzi al Consiglio di Stato francese la legittimità di un’ordinanza che ha modificato il codice sull’ingresso e sul soggiorno degli stranieri e sul diritto d’asilo (Ceseda).

      Esse hanno sostenuto che, consentendo alle autorità francesi di rifiutare l’ingresso di cittadini di paesi terzi alle frontiere con altri Stati membri (ossia le «frontiere interne»), alle quali sia stato temporaneamente ripristinato un controllo di frontiera in forza del codice frontiere Schengen in ragione di una minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna della Francia, il Ceseda contravverrebbe alla direttiva «rimpatri». Secondo tale direttiva, qualsiasi cittadino di un paese terzo il cui soggiorno è irregolare deve, di norma, essere oggetto di una decisione di rimpatrio. Tuttavia, l’interessato deve, in linea di principio, beneficiare di un certo termine per lasciare volontariamente il territorio. L’allontanamento forzato avviene solo in ultima istanza.

      Il Consiglio di Stato ha quindi interrogato la CGUE sulla questione dichiarando che «in una situazione del genere, un provvedimento di respingimento può essere adottato sulla base del codice frontiere #Schengen ma che, ai fini dell’allontanamento dell’interessato, devono comunque essere rispettate le norme e le procedure comuni previste dalla direttiva “rimpatri” (https://openmigration.org/glossary-term/direttiva-rimpatri), il che può condurre a privare di una larga parte della sua utilità l’adozione di un siffatto provvedimento di respingimento».

      «La sentenza della CGUE impone la giurisprudenza a tutti gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, ma in particolare è rivolta alla Francia, che dal 2015 ha reintrodotto i controlli alle frontiere interne.»

      Negli ultimi otto anni, tutti i treni che passano per #Menton sono stati controllati, gli agenti di polizia hanno controllato i passaggi di frontiera e pattugliato i valichi alpini. Dal 1° giugno è ulteriormente stata dispiegata un militarizzazione delle frontiere con personale aggiuntivo, il supporto dell’esercito, droni con termocamere.

      La Francia è stata accusata di respingere le persone migranti che cercano di entrare nel Paese, anche quelli che chiedono asilo e perfino i minorenni. Diversi rapporti di organizzazioni e collettivi hanno messo in luce queste pratiche violente e illegali, soprattutto nella zona di Ventimiglia. Secondo le testimonianze raccolte, si tratta di respingimenti “sistematici”.

      «In poche parole, questa decisione dice che la Francia sta perseguendo una politica illegale di chiusura delle frontiere», riassume Flor Tercero, dell’Association pour le Droit des Etrangers (ADDE) intervistato da Infomigrants. Questa decisione «è chiaramente una vittoria» e «significa che il governo non può ignorare il diritto dell’Unione europea».

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/09/corte-di-giustizia-ue-vietato-il-respingimento-sistematico-alle-frontier

      #frontières_intérieures #directive_retour #illégalité

    • European Court of Justice rules systematic pushbacks are illegal

      European countries do not have the right to refuse entry to irregular migrants even if they have border controls in place, the ECJ has ruled. Activists say the decision means that France has been violating EU law by pushing back migrants coming from Italy.

      When a member state decides to reintroduce checks at its internal borders, can it systematically refuse entry to all irregular foreign nationals? No, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ruled earlier this month. It must comply with the “Return Directive,” a law which says that a non-European national can “be granted a certain period of time to voluntarily leave the territory.”

      “A decision to refuse entry may be decided but, when seeking the removal of the person concerned, the common standards and procedures provided for by the Return Directive must still be respected,” the Luxembourg court stated.

      It also said that “excluding from the scope of this directive foreign nationals who are staying irregularly in the territory” can only be done “exceptionally.”

      The ruling on September 21 is at odds with the policy pursued by France, which re-established controls at its internal EU borders in 2015. For the past eight years, all trains passing through the French coastal city of Menton have been checked, and police have monitored border posts and patrolled the Alps.

      Activist groups say France has been taking advantage of the temporary border controls in order to turn back migrants who try to enter the territory — even those who come to ask for asylum. In an August report, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) teams in Ventimiglia documented practices of pushbacks at the border between Italy and France. “Systematic” pushbacks target unaccompanied minors, even sometimes separating families, according to the report.
      ’An illegal policy’

      “In a nutshell, this decision means that France is pursuing an illegal policy of closing borders,” Flor Tercero, of the Association for Foreigners’ Rights (ADDE), told InfoMigrants. ADDE is one of the associations involved in bringing the lawsuit to court.

      “Pushing back means, in a way, refusing these people the possibility of coming to France to apply for asylum or to cross France to go elsewhere in the EU. France for eight years has decided to carry out border checks. And as it re-established checks, it considered itself entitled to be able to push back migrants coming from Italy, in particular,” he added.

      “After eight years of illegal practices by the French government controlling and detaining migrants at internal borders, the CJEU confirms (...) that [these practices] are contrary to the law,” a joint press release of twenty organizations added.

      https://twitter.com/anafeasso/status/1704893792266969108

      For Flor Tercero, this decision is a clear victory. “This means that the government cannot forego European law,” he said.
      France ’will not welcome migrants’ from Lampedusa

      The court decision came at a time when attention was focused on the French-Italian border. Following the recent arrival of a very large number of people on the Italian island of Lampedusa, the French interior minister, Gérald Darmanin, announced that 200 additional police officers would be sent to the border between the two countries, in the expectation that the migrants would eventually make their way from Italy to France.

      France “will not welcome migrants” from the Italian island, the minister stated.

      Meanwhile the departmental director of the border police, Emmanuelle Joubert, announced that more than 3,000 migrants had been arrested in Menton within a fortnight. This brings to 32,000 the number of arrests since the start of the year along the Franco-Italian border. Of those, 24,000 were rejected and handed over to the Italian authorities

      Joubert said she had been informed about the judgment by the CJEU. “The State is carrying out an analysis, we will have instructions later,” she said, adding that migrants who had recently arrived in Lampedusa should not arrive at the French border for “several weeks.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/52117/european-court-of-justice-rules-systematic-pushbacks-are-illegal

  • Merci Bernard : non mais de quoi je me mêle ? | Politico | 24.08.23

    https://www.politico.eu/article/quand-bernard-arnault-poussait-pour-darmanin-a-matignon

    Bernard Arnault sort de son rendez-vous, non répertorié à l’agenda officiel ― et que l’Élysée a refusé de confirmer à POLITICO ― persuadé que Gérald Darmanin sera nommé à Matignon. Si bien qu’il en avise plusieurs de ses proches par téléphone.

    Perdu : dix jours plus tard, la Première ministre est confirmée dans son poste.

    Lors de cet entretien [début juillet] avec Emmanuel Macron, qu’il voit plusieurs fois par an, le patron de LVMH [avait] plaidé en faveur d’un départ d’Elisabeth Borne, trop à gauche à ses yeux.

  • Drowning in Lies. Greece tries to cover up its own role in the #Pylos shipwreck by tampering with evidence

    On the night of 13 June, a vessel carrying around 750 men, women and children mainly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria capsized in the Central Mediterranean, in Greek waters. The Greek authorities had been aware of the overloaded vessel the day before because Europe’s border agency Frontex and activists had warned them.

    Instead of rescuing the people, the Greek coast guard stayed close to the boat and observed it from the sky with a helicopter, ignoring Frontex’s offer for help. They sent commercial vessels to the area and later a coast guard boat.

    Shortly after the coast guard vessel arrived on the scene, the overloaded boat capsized. Only 104 men survived. All the others, including all the women and children on board, drowned.

    Survivors alleged that their vessel was towed by the Greek coast guard boat, causing the fatal wreck. The Greek coast guard and the government strongly denied these allegations and claimed the boat was never towed.

    We decided to collect as many survivor testimonies as possible and try to establish what really happened, and whether there had been efforts to cover up the truth.
    METHODS

    Finding visual evidence to determine the cause of the shipwreck was nearly impossible since it happened on the high seas and commercial vessels and surveillance planes were sent away by the Greek authorities. Videos survivors might have had on their phones were no longer accessible due to water damage or because they lost their phones.

    We decided to put a team together, including journalists from the same regions as the passengers, and carried out 17 interviews with survivors – the largest number collected in a single investigation into the wreck so far – to compare their accounts. We also spoke to sources inside the European border agency Frontex.

    We obtained crucial court documents containing two sets of testimonies given by the same nine survivors. They spoke first to the Greek coast guard and later to a local Greek court.
    STORYLINES

    Documents and witness testimony obtained by Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, Monitor, SIRAJ, El País, Reporters United and The Times show the Greek coast guard tampered with official statements to conceal their role in the wreck and pressured survivors into naming certain people as the smugglers.

    Nine survivors were asked by the coast guard to give witness statements just hours after the wreck. On analysing the documents, we discovered that critical parts of several testimonies contain identical phrases.

    The documents reveal that the translator used during one of the survivor’s interviews with the coast guard is a member of the coast guard himself. Other translators were local residents who spoke Arabic and other languages, who were sworn in on the day.

    In the documents, eight survivors are stated to have blamed the capsizing on factors unrelated to towing. Four of them are stated to have testified – in nearly identical wording – that the boat capsized because it was “old” and “there were no life jackets”. Their interviews were translated by three different interpreters.

    None of the survivors interrogated by the coast guard blamed the coast guard at all, according to the transcriptions. But in a later round of questioning by a Greek court of the same nine survivors, six of them are stated to have said the coast guard towed the boat shortly before it capsized.

    We spoke to two of the nine survivors who testified; they told us that the coast guard had omitted the parts of their testimony mentioning towing.

    “They asked me what happened to the boat and how it sank. I told them the Greek coast guard came and tied the rope to our boat and towed us and caused the capsizing of the boat,” said one survivor. “They didn’t type that in my testimony. When they presented it at the end I couldn’t find this part.”

    He added that the coast guard pressured him to single out certain people as the smugglers in charge of the operation. This claim is supported by our analysis of the documents: two answers to the coast guard’s questions about smugglers contain identical sentences.

    Another survivor who testified said he also blamed the shipwreck on towing when asked by the coast guard, but still signed the deposition at the end despite knowing it did not reflect what he said, because he felt “terrified”.

    Sixteen out of the seventeen survivors we spoke to said the coast guard attached a rope to the vessel and tried to tow it shortly before it capsized. Four also claimed that the coast guard was attempting to tow the boat to Italian waters, while four reported that the coast guard caused more deaths by circling around the boat after it capsized, making waves that caused the boat’s carcass to sink.

    While Europe and its border agency Frontex have largely backed Greece on its border practices and said following the shipwreck that they believed the coast guard did everything it could to save the people who drowned, Frontex is now doubting the official version

    The border agency has circulated an internal report on the incident based on survivor testimony, in which survivors state that the Greek coast guard was to blame for the drownings, according to sources.

    https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/drowning-in-lies
    #Grèce #naufrage #asile #migrations #décès #morts #tragédie #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #14_juin_2023 #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #13_juin_2023
    #Lighthouse_reports #enquête #contre-enquête

    Sur ce naufrage voir ce fil de discussion:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1006608

    • Survivors: ‘Greek coastguard was next to us when boat capsized’

      Two Syrian refugees recall their harrowing journey and pin blame on the coastguard for the devastating shipwreck.

      “The boat was too heavy,” he told Al Jazeera.

      “We were sitting next to each other, and there was a constant fear of sinking.”

      On the derelict blue ship that was soon to hit international headlines, he saw about 750 people crammed together, shoulder-to-shoulder, unable to move. They had all hoped to eventually reach Europe.

      In a few days, he would see hundreds of these people drown as a Greek coastguard ship floated nearby.

      Ahmed fled Syria with his friend Mohammed*, 23. They both asked to use pseudonyms because they fear the Greek government would punish them for speaking out about what they saw that night.

      They are two of the 104 survivors of the shipwreck off the coast of Pylos, Greece. Seventy-eight people have been confirmed dead.

      Like hundreds of other people on board, their third companion, Mohammed’s cousin, was never found.

      Their path to the central Mediterranean was taken in many steps. Ahmed and Mohammed said they left home hoping for a future without violence.

      Their journey took them to Lebanon, then Egypt and Libya.

      They spent about a month in Libya, where smugglers kept them closed up in an apartment with Egyptians, Pakistanis and other Syrians also making the journey.

      Mohammed said the smugglers beat the Egyptians and Pakistanis, constantly cursing and insulting them.

      Finally, in the first days of June, they were told, “You are leaving today.”

      They were put on the back of trucks that drove to the shore, were loaded onto small boats and were taken to a trawler, the Adriana, out in deeper waters.

      “They were beating people there,” Ahmed said.

      “They were beating them while taking them to the lower deck of the boat. … It was very bad down there. It smelled of diesel and fish. You couldn’t breathe.”

      Ahmed and his companions managed to pay a bribe of $200 to get themselves a spot on the upper deck.

      But wherever the passengers sat on the ship, they were wedged together.

      Women and children were kept below in the hold. From their cramped spot on the top deck, the young men could see the sea.
      ‘People were starting to lose consciousness’

      From the second day of the voyage, the boat’s engine started breaking down.

      “They would repair it, and after a while, it would break down again,” Mohammed said. “Every time they repaired it, it would stop again after two to three hours.”

      After the second day at sea, food and water ran out. Panic began to percolate across the ship.

      “At that time, people were starting to lose consciousness,” Ahmed said.

      “They were falling on the ground. They were fainting. Some were shaking. We were seeing tens, hundreds of people in this state.”

      They heard fights were breaking out all across the boat due to hunger, thirst and fear.

      “Me, Ahmed and my relative who is now missing were always trying to keep our spirits up,” Mohammed said. “When someone cried, we made jokes. ‘We will make it,’ we were saying to ourselves. But everyone was going crazy.”

      By the fourth day, they heard disturbing news from the hold.

      “Some people coming up from below said, ‘There are dead people down there,’” Ahmed said.

      “They said there were six dead bodies on the boat. Five bodies were down below, and we didn’t see them. One was on the upper deck. We saw him.”

      Ahmed and Mohammed said the passengers started telephoning the Italian authorities and the Greek coastguard to ask for help.

      “From the fourth day onwards, the Greek coastguard had been aware of us,” Mohammed said.

      By the fifth day, June 13, they said it looked like the Adriana had stopped moving completely.

      In the afternoon, a helicopter flew overhead.

      The passengers could not understand from the deck, but it was the Greek coastguard. In the afternoon, one and then another commercial ship passed by and tossed those on board water over the waves.

      “People were saying: ‘Take us with you.’ They were saying, ‘No.’” Mohammed said. “We asked for help, but they refused to help us.”

      A Greek coastguard vessel finally approached the fishing trawler around midnight in the first minutes of June 14, the friends said. “‘Follow us,’ they told us. We followed them,” Mohammed said.

      “Half an hour later, our boat stopped completely. It could not move. They came back and tied us to their boat.”

      Ahmed and Mohammed said the coastguard started to tow their stalled-out trawler, but it took a sharp turn, and the Adriana heaved precariously left, then right, then capsized.

      “They were right next to us when it capsized. In the moment it sank, they moved away from us. They deliberately made us sink,” Mohammed said. “We were standing on top of the boat, and we were able to see everything clearly.”

      Tossed into the dark Mediterranean Sea, hundreds of people tried to find something to cling onto, some way to survive. “People were holding onto me,” Ahmed said.

      “I was going under the water and getting away from people. Every time I got away, I would come across someone else, and they would hold onto me to save themselves. When someone grabbed onto me, we both went underwater together.”

      After an hour and a half, Ahmed said he spotted an inflatable coastguard boat and swam towards it.

      “They were 200 or 300 metres [220 to 330 yards] away from us,” he said. “I swam to them and got into the boat. They did not come close to us to save us. They were standing far away, and those who could swim were going towards them, like me.”

      As he made his way towards the inflatable boat, Ahmed had to push aside bodies floating in the water.

      Once taken to the larger coastguard boat, Ahmed was reunited with Mohammed. The two hugged each other, overwhelmed and elated to have found each other.

      They started asking about their third companion. He had not made it, and they realised how incomplete their relief was.

      The survivors of the shipwreck were taken ashore. Mohammed said that when they were first held in the Greek city of Kalamata, the authorities came to take his testimony of the tragedy three or four times.

      “When we told them that we had been towed with a rope, they stopped,” he said. “They were saying that the problem was our boat. They wrote our statements with their own words. They did not write down what we said. They made us say it and write it down.”

      Ahmed said no officials have ever taken his testimony.
      ‘Accountability vacuum’

      Both men are now in the Malakasa refugee camp, 40km (25 miles) north of Athens. They are awaiting their asylum claims to be processed. Mohammed is desperate for news of his cousin, even if that news is confirmation he is dead.

      Ahmed’s and Mohammed’s accounts contradict the account of the Greek coastguard, which has said the passengers of the Adriana refused aid, it was only immobile for about 20 minutes before it capsized and the coastguard had not towed the boat prior to it capsizing.

      Survivors’ accounts line up with other evidence.

      The Greek investigative website Solomon has published emails showing that the Greek authorities had been notified that the ship was in distress by 6pm (15:00 GMT) on June 13. And tracking data published and verified by the BBC and The New York Times show that the trawler was not moving for at least seven hours before it capsized.

      When asked to comment on allegations that the coastguard towed the boat and was involved in the shipwreck, the Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy told Al Jazeera: “The required information is part of the investigation procedure that is being conducted under strict confidentiality based on the instructions given by the prosecutor of the Supreme Court. Regarding the details of the operation plan of the Hellenic coastguard, no further comments can be made by our service.”

      Fingers have been pointed at the Greek coastguard for both the shipwreck and its large death toll.

      “It has been evidenced that the Hellenic coastguard uses a range of tactics to move boats they have intercepted at sea into different territorial areas to avoid responsibility for search and rescue and the lodging of their applications for international protection,” said Hope Barker, a policy analyst at the Border Violence Monitoring Network.

      “Whilst this usually includes towing boats back to Turkish territorial waters, it is equally likely that if the boat was closer to Italian territorial waters, they would try to transfer it there instead.”

      The organisation is calling for an independent investigation and for Frontex, the European Union’s border agency, to withdraw from Greece.

      “Violations of fundamental rights by the Hellenic coastguard are routine and systematised operations that have proven to be under-investigated by the Greek state. There is an accountability vacuum that allows these actions to continue unabated,” Barker said.

      In Malakasa, Mohammed said he cannot stop thinking about the moment the boat capsized and the screams of the people around him. He does not know how he survived in the water.

      “I shouted Ahmed’s and my cousin’s names for a while,” he said. “In that moment, I heard a voice screaming, ‘Mother! Mother!’ I asked that person for his name, and he said, ‘Fuat’.

      “He and I told each other our names, so that whichever of us survived would be able to bring the news to the other’s family.”

      https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/7/5/survivors-greek-coastguard-was-next-to-us-when-boat-capsized

    • Under the unwatchful eye of the authorities’ deactivated cameras: dying in the darkest depths of the Mediterranean

      A collaborative investigation by Solomon, Forensis, The Guardian and ARD presents the most complete tracing, to date, of the course that the fishing vessel Adriana took until it ultimately sank, causing over 600 people to drown − while under the supervision of Greek and European authorities. A document reveals that according to Frontex recommendations, the Coast Guard vessel was obligated to record the operation on video.

      In the early hours of June 14, the state-of-the-art cameras of the Coast Guard vessel ΠΠΛΣ-920 were off.

      The deadliest shipwreck within the Greek Search and Rescue Zone, one of the largest the Mediterranean has ever seen, was reportedly not visually detected.

      Only hours before, aerial photos of the overloaded fishing vessel were taken. Nearby tankers recorded videos before they were ordered to leave the scene. There were satellite images that captured its movement.

      But the exact circumstances in which the Adriana capsized off Pylos, killing more than 600 people, remain unclear three weeks on.

      In affidavits and interviews, some of the 104 survivors attributed the sinking of the fishing vessel to an attempt by the Hellenic Coast Guard to tow it to Italian waters.

      The Coast Guard emphasizes that it saved human lives, and maintains that the fishing vessel overturned due to a disturbance by the passengers.

      Solomon, in a joint investigation with the research group Forensis, The Guardian and German public broadcaster ARD reveals: the Coast Guard vessel ΠΠΛΣ-920, the only vessel present at the time the Adriana capsized, was obligated to “document its operation by video-recording” in accordance with a 2021 Frontex document which recommends that the Greek authorities record their operations continually.

      If this had been done, today there would be answers to the questions that the victims’ families are still asking.

      The ΠΠΛΣ-920 cameras were supposed to record

      By midday on June 13, the Greek and Italian authorities and Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), were aware of the overloaded fishing vessel, which had been sailing aimlessly for four days in the central Mediterranean – its only means of navigation was a compass and the position of the sun.

      The activist network Alarm Phone had also relayed to the authorities the desperate SOS of some 750 men, women, and children — mostly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria — who, lacking potable water, were using their shoelaces to lower containers into the sea: “They are urgently asking for help”.

      ΠΠΛΣ-920, the Coast Guard vessel which received the order to depart from the port of Souda, Crete to assist, has been the pride of the Coast Guard since 2021. European funding covered 90% of its cost, and it is one of the best-equipped vessels available in Greece.

      And it could not be in better hands: earlier this year, in March, its captain was awarded for “his valuable contribution to the protection of maritime borders and human life at sea.”

      According to the Coast Guard, ΠΠΛΣ-920, like its three sister ships (ΠΠΛΣ-900, ΠΠΛΣ-910 and ΠΠΛΣ-930), has two state-of-the-art thermal camera systems. According to the Coast Guard, however, when the fishing vessel capsized, the cameras were not in operation because the crew’s attention was focused on the rescue efforts.

      “When we have an incident, we try to have the ability to operate seamlessly. Making some crew members ‘inactive’ so that they can record a video, you understand, is unethical,” Coast Guard spokesman Nikos Alexiou stated on June 15, justifying why the incident was not recorded on video.

      However, one of the three former and current Coast Guard officers who spoke to us during our investigation, said that these cameras do not require constant manual operation and they exist exactly for this reason – to record such incidents.

      But there is still a critical issue: a document reveals that, according to Frontex recommendations in March 2021, the Coast Guard vessel was obligated to record the operation.

      The document states that “if feasible, all actions taken by Frontex assets or Frontex co-financed assets… should be documented by video consistently.”

      The cost of the ΠΠΛΣ-290, one of four state-of-the-art vessels purchased for €55.5 million, has been 90% financed through Frontex. It is designated to be “available for four months a year, for Frontex missions outside of Greek waters.”

      Frontex had recommended the visual recording of operations, during a meeting where representatives from Greece were present as well as from other European countries, following complaints of human rights violations by the Coast Guard.

      The complaints that were assessed during the meeting referred to the exact same practice, attributed to ΠΠΛΣ-920: towing vessels of asylum seekers outside of Greek waters.
      We created a 3D model of the Adriana

      Solomon, Forensis, The Guardian and ARD worked together and after analyzing a wealth of evidence, we present the most complete picture to date, of the Adriana’s course up to the time of its sinking.

      We collected more than 20 survivor accounts and analyzed material derived from, among others, witness statements, official reports from the Coast Guard and Frontex, deck logs of the Coast Guard vessel and tankers in transit, aerial photographs and data on the position and movement of ships and aircraft. We also secured exclusive footage from the commercial vessels that were in the area and spoke to sources at Frontex, the Coast Guard, and rescuers.

      The analysis of this information resulted in a detailed chronology of the events that occurred on June 13 and 14, an interactive map showing Adriana‘s movement, as well as a 3D model of the fishing vessel.

      With the help of the 3D model, we were able to do what no official authority or journalistic investigation has done so far: to conduct in-person interviews with survivors of the wreck, using the visual impression of this body of data.

      Using the method of situated testimony, the survivors placed themselves in the 3D model of the ship, indicated their location on the deck, and recalled the events that unfolded before the sinking of the Adriana: from the alleged towing to its capsize.

      In this way, we were able to cross-reference accounts of what happened in the presence of the Coast Guard vessel, based on each person’s eyewitness account.
      Main conclusions

      Eleven critical findings emerge from the joint investigation:

      – Frontex offered to help three times. A Frontex source stated that the Coast Guard did not respond to any of the three requests for assistance.

      - The records of ΠΠΛΣ-920 are incoherent and raise questions. For example, while it is reported that immediately before the sinking, the fishing vessel was moving west, it actually appears to be moving for about an hour (00:44 – 01:40) in a southerly direction at a speed of only 0.6 knots. In addition: since, according to the Coast Guard, the fishing vessel’s engine had stopped working at 00:44, why was the preparation of life-saving equipment carried out an hour later, at 01:40?

      - While the fishing vessel’s engine was running but there was no navigation capability, according to testimonies, ΠΠΛΣ-920 approached the vessel and gave directions to Italy. A survivor stated: “[a crew member] told us that the Greek ship would go ahead of us and lead us to Italian waters. He told us that in two hours we would be in Italy.” ΠΠΛΣ-920 directed the fishing vessel from a distance, which followed until its engine broke down again.

      – According to Syrian survivors on deck, when the engine broke down, masked men from ΠΠΛΣ-920 boarded the fishing vessel and tied a blue rope to the stern. The above-mentioned testimonies are also consistent with an entry in the ΠΠΛΣ-920 deck logbook, which mentions the participation of a four-member team from the Special Missions Unit in the operation.

      - According to the same survivors, there were two brief attempts to tow the fishing vessel. The first time the rope broke. The second time the ΠΠΛΣ-920 increased its speed and the fishing vessel rocked to the right, then to the left, then to the right again and flipped onto its right side.

      – The Pakistani survivors were located in the interior of the ship, and could not see what was happening. They stated, however, that while the fishing vessel’s engine was not working, they felt a sharp forward thrust “like a rocket” — a sensation that corroborates the use of a rope for towing.

      – Testimonies in this investigation support testaments presented by other journalistic investigations, as well as survivor statements included in the official case file: this action appears to have led to the capsize and eventual sinking of the ship.

      - The fishing vessel capsized and survivors climbed on top of it. ΠΠΛΣ-920 left the scene, creating waves that made it more difficult for the survivors to stay afloat.

      – After withdrawing, ΠΠΛΣ-920 directed its floodlights on the shipwreck site. Survivors tried to swim to the Coast Guard vessel, but the distance was too great.

      – ΠΠΛΣ-920 began the rescue operation 30 minutes after the sinking, and only after the fishing vessel had completely disappeared from the water’s surface.

      - Survivors claim that their phones (which were protected in plastic cases) contain visual material from the incident. Immediately after the rescue, according to the same testimonies, Coast Guard officers confiscated their phones, which have not been returned to them.

      https://vimeo.com/843117800

      Survivor accounts of the towing

      In the deck log of ΠΠΛΣ-920, which we have seen, there is no mention of any towing attempt. The Coast Guard captain reports that they approached the fishing vessel to offer assistance, received no response, and followed it “from a discreet distance”.

      This is disputed by the accounts of the survivors, some of whom not only tell of a rope that was tied to the fishing vessel, but they all mention its color: blue.

      This investigation documents, for the first time, the blue cable that was used by ΠΠΛΣ-920, which can also be seen in earlier photos of the vessel.

      The estimation that the attempt to tow the fishing vessel by the ΠΠΛΣ-920 led to its sinking is underlined by the statements of survivors, that form part of the case file which is available to the journalists that participated in this investigation.

      “Then the Greek ship came and threw the rope which was tied to the front of our ship,” says a survivor who was on the deck.

      The Coast Guard started towing the fishing vessel, he adds, and “when it was going slowly the fishing vessel was fine, but instead of approaching the Greek ship we were moving away. When they hit the gas, I’m sorry to say, that’s when our ship sank.”

      The same survivor estimates that the fishing boat capsized due to the “pulling from the Greek ship, because then our ship began to lean to one side. And I, who was standing in a corner, slipped into the water with a relative of mine, who died.”

      Another survivor who was also on the deck, but at the stern and without full visibility, says in his testimony that “it was night, the guys in front told me that they tied the rope, but I could feel the motion too, because then we moved, but not for more than two minutes.”

      “Then we said stop-stop because our ship is leaning,” he says, adding, “I think we sank due to the fact that our boat was in bad condition and overloaded and that it shouldn’t have been towed.”

      In another testimony, the description of the towing attempt is concise: “On the last day the Greek ship threw us a rope and tied us to their ship. The Greek one turned right, then ours overturned and we fell into the water.”

      We contacted the Coast Guard, asking questions about the timeline of the shipwreck and asking them to comment on the findings of our investigation. At the time of publication, we have not received a response.
      Why didn’t Greece respond to Frontex?

      The picture of what actually happened would be more complete if the ΠΠΛΣ-920 was not the only vessel present during the incident.

      According to the captain of the merchant ship Faithful Warrior, at 00:18 the Coast Guard’s Search & Rescue Coordination Center gave him permission to depart the scene, thus removing the last witness present. The Faithful Warrior left at 00:30, about 15 minutes before the fishing vessel’s engine stopped working, according to Coast Guard records.

      Frontex, which operates in the central Mediterranean, had informed the Greek authorities about the fishing vessel early in the afternoon, and had offered to help.

      Specifically, at 19:35 (local Greek time) Frontex offered to assist with the Eagle I aircraft. Afterwards, the Greek side asked Frontex to assist in a search and rescue incident south of Crete, where 80 people were in danger. The vessel in question was spotted by the Frontex Heron drone at 22:50.

      At 00:34, Frontex again offered to provide assistance with the Eagle I and a few minutes later, at 00:52, it also offered the Heron. According to a Frontex source who spoke to our joint investigation, the Greek authorities did not respond to any request to send aerial assets to the overloaded fishing vessel.
      Fabricated testimonies?

      Concerns have also been raised about the possible alteration of survivors’ testimonies.

      Survivors gave two rounds of statements: first to the Coast Guard and then to an investigator. Both versions are available to Solomon and the international colleagues who participated in this investigation.

      While there are no references to the attempted towing of the fishing vessel in the survivor testimonies recorded by the Coast Guard, the same survivors spoke about it in the second interview with the investigator.

      Also, when describing the shipwreck, the testimonies that appear to have been given to the Coast Guard by two survivors of different nationalities, are the same, word for word: “There were too many people in the boat, which was old and rusty … that’s why it capsized and sank in the end.”
      Inside the hold

      The TikTok video shows his older brother hugging him tightly and kissing him, before he enters the airport, dragging along his suitcase.

      He had flown from Karachi to Dubai, and from Dubai to Alexandria, Egypt. From there he boarded another plane that took him to Benghazi, Libya, where he spent over ten days locked in a trafficker’s hideout, before he was taken to board the Adriana.

      When he saw the old fishing boat he couldn’t believe it — he thought the trip to Italy would also be by plane. He wanted to go back to Pakistan, but the traffickers wouldn’t let him.

      Inside the Adriana, Abdul traveled on the lowest of three levels, in suffocating conditions where he had to sit with his knees bent. “To get from one place to another, you had to step on people.”

      Conditions were similar on the middle level, where about 300 people were reportedly crammed in, with more than 200 people still on deck. The testimonies speak of another, separate space inside the fishing vessel, where women and children were located. No women were among the 104 people that were rescued.

      The Pakistani travelers had paid a total of €8,000-€10,000 each for the long journey to Europe – Abdul’s family of rice farmers had sold their land to finance his trip.

      Abdul had learned to swim in the canals around his family’s crops – when the Adriana sank, it was his ability to swim that allowed Abdul to reach the Coast Guard vessel and save himself.

      As he walks along in Athens, Abdul’s relatives call him, asking what’s the name of the city he’s in. He tells us about his family, but he also shows us photos of loved ones who perished: he was onboard the Adriana with 14 of his friends and his uncle. Only he survived.

      And of his 350 fellow Pakistanis who were also in the hold with him, only 12 were rescued. “Beautiful people were lost,” says Abdul.

      People who participated in the investigation: Christina Varvia, Lydia Emmanouilidou, Katy Fallon, Ebrahem Farooqui, Armin Ghassim, Sebastian Heidelberger, Stefanos Levidis, Andreas Makas, Stavros Malichudis, Iliana Papangeli, Corina Petridi, Timo Robben, Georgia Skartadou, Sulaiman Tadmory, George Christides.

      https://wearesolomon.com/mag/format/investigation/under-the-unwatchful-eye-of-the-authorities-deactivated-cameras-dying-

    • Greek shipwreck: hi-tech investigation suggests coastguard responsible for sinking

      Research into loss of trawler with hundreds of deaths strongly contradicts official accounts – while finding a failure to mobilise help and evidence that survivor statements were tampered with

      Attempts by the Greek coastguard to tow a fishing trawler carrying hundreds of migrants may have caused the vessel to sink, according to a new investigation by the Guardian and media partners that has raised further questions about the incident, which left an estimated 500 people missing

      The trawler carrying migrants from Libya to Italy sank off the coast of Greece on 14 June. There were 104 survivors.

      Reporters and researchers conducted more than 20 interviews with survivors and drew on court documents and coastguard sources to build a picture of missed rescue opportunities and offers of assistance that were ignored. Multiple survivors said that attempts by the Greek coastguard to tow the vessel had ultimately caused the sinking. The coastguard has strenuously denied that it attempted to tow the trawler.

      The night that the trawler capsized, 47 nautical miles off Pylos, in south-western Greece, was reconstructed using an interactive 3D model of the boat created by Forensis, a Berlin-based research agency founded by Forensic Architecture, which investigates human rights violations.

      The joint investigation by the Guardian, German public broadcaster ARD/NDR/Funk and Greek investigative outlet Solomon, in collaboration with Forensis, has given one of the fullest accounts to date of the trawler’s course up to its sinking. It unearthed new evidence such as a coastguard vessel moored at a closer port but never dispatched to the incident and how Greek authorities failed to respond not twice, as previously reported, but three times to offers of assistance by Frontex, the EU border and coastguard agency.

      Forensis mapped the final hours before the sinking, using data from the coastguard’s log and the testimony of the coast guard vessel’s captain, as well as flight paths, maritime traffic data, satellite imagery and information from videos taken by nearby commercial vessels and other sources. The ship’s last movements contradict the coastguard and reveal inconsistencies within the official account of events, including the trawler’s direction and speed.

      Crucially, the investigation showed the overcrowded trawler started moving westward on meeting the single Greek coastguard vessel sent to the scene. According to multiple survivor testimonies given to the Guardian and Greek prosecutors, the coastguard had told the migrants it would lead them to Italy – clashing with the official version that the trawler started moving west of its own accord. The investigation also showed the trawler had turned to the south and was almost stationary for at least an hour until, survivors said, a second and fatal towing attempt took place.
      Survivors use the 3D model of the boat to describe what happened on the night of the 14 June.

      Two survivors used the 3D model to describe the towing itself, while three others, who were sitting inside or on the vessel’s lower deck, described being propelled forward “like a rocket”, but with the engine not operating. That suggests a towing attempt.

      Another survivor separately said he heard people shouting about a rope being attached by the “Greek army” and described being towed for 10 minutes shortly before the trawler sank. “I feel that they have tried to push us out of Greek water so that their responsibility ends,” a survivor said after considering the map of events and reflecting on his memories of the night.

      Maria Papamina, a lawyer from the Greek Council for Refugees, one of two legal organisations representing between 40 and 50 survivors, said that there had been two towing attempts recounted to her team. Court documents also show that seven out of eight survivors gave accounts to the civil prosecutor of the presence of a rope, towing and a strong pull, in depositions conducted on 17 and 18 June.

      The exact circumstances of the sinking cannot be conclusively proved in the absence of visual evidence. Several survivors testified to having had their phones confiscated by the authorities and some mentioned having filmed videos moments before the sinking. Questions remain over why the newly acquired Greek coastguard vessel at the scene did not record the operation on its thermal cameras. The vessel, called the 920, was 90% financed by the EU to bolster the capabilities of Frontex in Greece and is part of the EU border agency’s joint operations in the country. Frontex recommends that “if feasible, all actions taken by … Frontex co-financed assets should be documented by video consistently”.

      In official statements the Greek coastguard said the operation was not recorded because the crew’s focus was on the rescue operation. But a source within the coastguard said cameras do not need constant manual operation and are there precisely to capture such incidents.

      The presence of masked men, described by two survivors as attaching a rope to the trawler, is also documented in the ship’s log, which includes an entry about a special ops team known as KEA joining the 920 that night.

      According to coastguard sources, it would not be unusual to deploy KEA – typically used in risky situations such as suspected arms or drug smuggling at sea – given the vessel’s unknown status, but one source said that their presence suggested the vessel should have been intercepted on security and maritime safety grounds alone.

      One source described the failure to mobilise help closer to the incident as “incomprehensible”. The 920 was deployed from Chania, in Crete, about 150 nautical miles from the site of the sinking. The source said the coastguard had somewhat smaller but still capable vessels, based in Patras, Kalamata, Neapoli Voion and even Pylos itself. The 920 was ordered by coastguard HQ to “locate” the trawler at about 3pm local time on 13 June. It finally made contact close to midnight. An eyewitness official confirmed another vessel was stationed in Kalamata on 14 June and could have reached the trawler within a couple of hours. “It should have been a ‘send everything you’ve got’ situation. The trawler was in clear need of assistance,” the source said.

      The Greek coastguard and Frontex were alerted to the trawler on the morning of 13 June. Both agencies had photographed it from the air but no search and rescue operation was conducted – according to the Greek side, because the boat had refused assistance. Authorities received an urgent SOS said to have been relayed to them at 5.53pm local time by the small boats emergency hotline Alarmphone, which was in contact with people on board.

      Two of the coastguard sources told the Guardian they believed towing was a likely reason for the boat capsizing. This would not be without precedent. In 2014, an attempt to tow a refugee boat off the coast of Farmakonisi cost 11 lives. Greek courts cleared the coastguard, but the European court of human rights passed a damning judgment in 2022.

      Allegations have also been made that survivors’ statements were tampered with. Two rounds of testimonies were given – first to the coastguard and then to a civil prosecutor – both seen by the Guardian. Testimonies to the coastguard by two separate survivors of different nationalities are word for word the same when describing the sinking: “We were too many people on the boat, which was old and rusty … this is why it capsized and sank in the end.”

      Under oath to the civil prosecutor, days later, the same survivors describe towing incidents and blame the Greek coastguard for the sinking. The same Syrian survivor who stated in his coastguard testimony that the trawler capsized due to its age and overcrowding would later testify: “When they stepped on it, and I am sorry to mention this, our boat sank. I believe the reason was the towing by the Greek boat.”

      Brussels has asked for a “transparent” investigation into the wreck, while there is frustration within Frontex, which repeatedly offered assets to Greek authorities – a plane twice and later a drone – but received no reply. Although Frontex is facing mounting calls to pull out of Greece, the Guardian understands it is considering less drastic measures such as discontinuing co-financing of Greek coastguard vessels.

      The Coast Guard said it “would not comment on operational issues or the ongoing investigation which is confidential according to a Supreme Court Order.”

      Nine Egyptians on the trawler have been arrested on charges including involuntary manslaughter, causing a shipwreck and migrant smuggling; they deny wrongdoing. According to Guardian information, the accused testified there were two towing attempts, the second resulting in the sinking of the boat. A brother of one of the accused said his sibling paid about £3,000 to be on the boat, amounting to proof, he said, that he was not a smuggler.

      In Greece and beyond, survivors and victims’ families are trying to understand what happened. Three Pakistani survivors said they flew from Pakistan through Dubai or Egypt to Libya. Two believed they would fly from Libya to Italy and were shocked on seeing the trawler. “I can’t sleep properly. When I sleep I feel as if I am sinking into the water and will die,” one said.

      Nearly half of the estimated 750 people on board are thought to have been Pakistani citizens taking an emerging people-smuggling route to Italy. Pakistani authorities estimate that 115 came from Gujranwala in the east of the country, a region known for its rice plantations and cotton fields but deeply mired in Pakistan’s economic crisis.

      Ahmed Farouq, who lives on the outskirts of the city of Gujranwala, lost his son in the Pylos shipwreck. Talking of the alleged towing, he saids: “They wanted it to sink. Why didn’t they save the people first? If they don’t want illegal migrants, let them deport us, but don’t let us drown.”

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/10/greek-shipwreck-hi-tech-investigation-suggests-coastguard-responsible-f

    • Greek coastguard ’pressured’ disaster survivors to blame Egyptian men

      New evidence found by BBC News casts further doubt on the Greek coastguard’s version of events surrounding last month’s deadly migrant boat sinking, in which up to 600 people died.

      Two survivors have described how the coastguard pressed them to identify nine Egyptians on board as traffickers.

      A new video of the overcrowded boat foundering at sea also challenges the Greek coastguard’s account.

      It was taken when the boat was said to be on a “steady course”.

      BBC Verify has confirmed the footage was filmed when the coastguard claimed the boat was not in need of rescue - and was in fact filmed by the coastguard itself.

      We have also confirmed that the larger vessel in the background is the oil tanker Faithful Warrior, which had been asked to give supplies to the migrant boat.

      The official Greek coastguard account had already been challenged in a BBC Verify report - but now we have seen court documents which show serious discrepancies between survivors’ witness statements taken by the coastguards, and the in-person evidence later presented to a judge.

      A translator has also come forward with his account of a people-smuggling investigation last year, after another group of migrants were rescued by the coastguard. He describes how witnesses from that incident were intimidated by the coastguard. The legal case collapsed before it could reach trial.

      The revelations raise fresh questions about how the Greek authorities handle such disasters.

      Both the Greek coastguard and Greek government did not comment and declined our requests for interview.
      A map of a section of the Mediterranean Sea showing the possible route taken by the migrant boat off the coast of Libya, near the city of Tobruk. The possible route shows the last approximate location of the boat before it sunk and the path taken by the Faithful Warrior, which had made contact with the boat. Also shown is the Greek port city of Pylos.

      Survivors ’silenced and intimidated’

      Soon after the 14 June sinking, nine Egyptian men were detained and charged with manslaughter and people-smuggling.

      But two survivors of the disaster say migrants were silenced and intimidated by Greek authorities, after suggesting the coastguards may have been to blame for the tragedy.

      For the past month, allegations have been made that the coastguard used a rope to tow the fishing vessel, causing it to sink.

      The two survivors we spoke to in Athens - who we are calling Ahmad and Musaab to protect their identities - say that is what happened.

      “They attached a rope from the left. Everyone moved to the right side of our boat to balance it,” says Musaab. “The Greek vessel moved off quickly causing our boat to flip. They kept dragging it for quite a distance.”

      The men described how they spent two hours in the water before being picked up by the coastguard.

      When I ask how they knew it was that amount of time, Musaab says his watch was still working so he could tell.

      Once on land, in Kalamata, they claim the coastguard told survivors to “shut up” when they started to talk about how the Greek authorities had caused the disaster.

      “When people replied by saying the Greek coastguard was the cause, the official in charge of the questioning asked the interpreter to tell the interviewee to stop talking,” says Ahmad.

      Ahmad says those rescued were told to be grateful they hadn’t died.

      He says there were shouts of: “You have survived death! Stop talking about the incident! Don’t ask more questions about it!”

      he men say they are scared to speak out publicly because they fear they too will be accused like the Egyptians.

      “If there was a fair system in place, we would contribute to this case,” says Ahmad.

      The men told us they had both paid $4,500 (£3,480) for a spot on the boat. Ahmad’s younger brother was also on board. He is still missing.
      Collapsing court cases

      As well as this testimony given to us by survivors, we have seen court documents which raise questions about the way evidence is being gathered to be presented in court.

      In initial statements from five survivors, none mentioned the coastguard trying to tow the migrant vessel with a rope. But days later, in front of a judge, all explained that there had been a failed attempt to tow it.

      One initial statement reads:

      But the same witness later told a judge:

      BBC Verify has not spoken to these witnesses and so we can’t say why their accounts changed.

      The Greek coastguard initially denied using a rope - but later backtracked, admitting one had been used. But it said it was only to try to board the vessel and assess the situation. It said this was at least two hours before the fishing vessel capsized.

      Eighty-two people are confirmed dead in the sinking, but the United Nations estimates as many as 500 more lost their lives.

      The Greek authorities say the charged Egyptian men are part of a smuggling ring and were identified by fellow passengers. They face up to life imprisonment if found guilty.

      Some survivors allege some of the nine suspects mistreated those on board - while other testimony says some were actually trying to help.

      But Ahmad and Musaab told us the coastguard had instructed all of the survivors to say that the nine Egyptian men were to blame for trafficking them.

      “They were imprisoned and were wrongly accused by the Greek authorities as an attempt to cover their crime,” says Musaab.

      A Greek Supreme Criminal Court deputy prosecutor is carrying out an investigation, but calls - including from the UN - for an international, independent inquiry have so far been ignored. The European Commission has indicated it has faith in the Greek investigation.

      But Ahmad and Musaab are not alone in their concerns about the Greek coastguard.
      Interpreter comes forward to BBC

      When the nine Egyptian men were arrested in the hours after the shipwreck, it was widely reported as an example of efficient detective work by the Greek authorities.

      But for Farzin Khavand it rang alarm bells. He feared history was repeating itself.

      He says he witnessed Greek coastguards put two innocent Iranian men in the frame for people-smuggling last year, following the rescue of 32 migrants whose boat had got into trouble crossing from Turkey.

      Mr Khavand, a UK citizen who speaks Farsi and has lived in the Kalamata area for 20 years, acted as a translator during the coastguard’s investigation into what happened then.

      He says the migrants - 28 from Afghanistan and four from Iran - explained that they had set off from Turkey and been at sea for eight days before being rescued.

      During this time, the Greek coastguard had approached the boat, before leaving, he was told.

      Two Arabic-speaking men had abandoned the boat after the engine blew up, Mr Khavand was told by the Afghan migrants. They said that most people on board had taken turns to try to steer the stricken boat to safety - including the two accused Iranians, who had paid to be on board like everyone else.

      “They [the Iranian men] were highly traumatised,” Mr Khavand said.

      “They were repeating to me that they’d never even seen an ocean before they set off in Turkey. And they kept being told they were the captain and they said: ’We know nothing about the boat. We can’t even swim.’”

      One of the two accused - a man called Sayeed who was facing a long prison sentence - had been rescued with his young son, explained Mr Khavand.

      “I asked him ’Why did you take a six-year-old child on a boat?’ And he said the smugglers told us it’s only two hours’ journey.”

      Mr Khavand relayed their accounts to the coastguard, exactly as it had been told to him - but he says when he saw the transcripts, the Afghans’ testimony had changed. He fears they altered their stories after pressure from the Greek authorities.

      He says the Iranians told him that some of their fellow Afghan passengers had been leaned on by the coastguard to name them as the people-smugglers - to avoid being “treated unpleasantly”, threatened with prison, and being “returned to the Taliban”.

      The case eventually collapsed. Mr Khavand says he was not willing to assist the Greek coastguard again. He says when Sayeed and his son were released from custody the €1,500 (£1,278) that had been confiscated from them was not returned.

      “The scene ended with me thinking I don’t want to do this again because they were not trying to get to the bottom of the truth. They were trying to pick a couple of guys and accuse them of being people smugglers.”

      All of these accusations were put to the Greek authorities by the BBC - but we have received no response. Our request for an interview with Greece’s minister of maritime affairs - who oversees the coastguard - was also rejected.
      Greece previously accused of human rights violations

      Kalamata lawyer Chrysanthi Kaouni says she has seen other criminal cases brought against alleged people smugglers which have troubled her.

      She has been involved in more than 10 such cases, she tells us.

      “My concerns are around the translations, the way evidence is gathered and - later on - the ability of the defendants to challenge this evidence,” she said.

      “Because of these three points, I don’t think there are enough safeguards according to the international law, and in the end I don’t believe justice is done.”

      A new study has found that the average trial in Greece for migrants accused of people smuggling lasted just 37 minutes and the average prison sentence given was 46 years.

      The study, commissioned by The Greens/European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament, looked at 81 trials involving 95 people - all of whom were tried for smuggling in eight different areas of Greece between February 2020 and March 2023.

      The study claims verdicts were reached often on the testimony of a single police or coastguard officer and, in more than three-quarters of the cases, they didn’t appear in court for their evidence to be cross-examined.

      Ahmad says he and the other survivors now want authorities to recover the shipwreck and the people that went down with it, but they have been told it’s too difficult and the water is too deep.

      He compares this to the vast amounts of money and resources spent on searching for five people on the Titan submersible in the North Atlantic in June.

      “But we were hundreds,” he says. “It’s not just a ship. It’s our friends and family.”

      https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66154654

    • Italy warned of dead children on migrant ship hours before it capsized

      The findings of an investigation by Welt am Sonntag and

      POLITICO raise questions about whether the authorities knew the boat was in distress earlier than they admitted.

      Early on the morning of the Adriana’s final day at sea, the Italian authorities sent a troubling warning to their EU and Greek colleagues: Two children had died aboard the overloaded migrant boat.

      The alert was sent at 8:01 a.m. UTC, just over an hour after the Italians initially spotted the vessel at 6:51 a.m., an investigation by Welt am Sonntag and POLITICO found. The ship would later stall out in the ocean and capsize that night, killing hundreds of migrants on board.

      The new details are revealed in an internal document at the EU border agency Frontex and seen by Welt, part of a “serious incident report” Frontex is compiling on the tragedy.

      The findings raise questions about whether the authorities knew of serious distress on the boat much earlier than they have admitted. The document further complicates the timeline European authorities have given about the boat — Frontex has said its own plane was the first to discover the Adriana at 9:47 a.m., while the Greek government has said it was alerted around 8 a.m.

      According to the internal document, Rome’s warning went to both Frontex and the Greek coast guard’s central office for rescue operations in Piraeus, which sits on the coast near Athens. Yet despite the alert, the Greek authorities did not send a coast guard vessel to the boat until 7:40 p.m., nearly 12 hours later. The boat then capsized around 11 p.m., roughly 15 hours after Rome’s notice first came through, leaving approximately 600 people dead.

      Survivors have said the Greek coast guard’s attempts to attach ropes to the ship caused it to capsize — accounts Greek officials say are not definitive. Only 104 people were brought to shore alive.

      Frontex declined to comment on the internal document showing the Italian warning, citing the “ongoing investigations” and referring to a June 16 statement. That statement lists a chronology of events starting at 9:47 a.m. with the Frontex plane spotting the boat.

      Dimitris Kairidis, Greece’s newly appointed migration minister, told POLITICO in Brussels that he had not seen the Frontex note, and he neither confirmed nor denied that Athens had received the Rome alert mentioning dead children.

      There is, he said, an “independent judicial investigation,” and if anyone is found responsible, “there will definitely be consequences.”

      “But until then,” he added, “we should not rush to conclusions and bow to political pressure.”

      Asked for comment, the Greek government referred to a statement on its coast guard website from June 14, which mentions information coming from Rome around 8 a.m. It doesn’t say whether that information included a warning about dead children on board.

      The Italian government did not respond to a request for comment.

      Greece has faced mounting political pressure over the tragedy.

      German lawmaker Clara Bünger, a member of The Left, is pushing for a review of the drama that unfolded off the shore of Pylos.

      She told Welt that “upon sighting such an overcrowded boat, Frontex should have immediately issued a mayday distress signal; even more so if Frontex knew that there were already Tuesday morning about two dead children on board.”

      That this didn’t happen, she added, is “outrageous and unforgivable.”

      Frontex has been trying to rehab its reputation under new Director Hans Leijtens, but Bünger argued he is on a doomed mission. Frontex, she argued, should just be dissolved.

      “This project has failed miserably,” she said.

      Erik Marquardt, a German European Parliament member from the Greens, pointed out that Germany chairs the Frontex Management Board.

      “I expect the German government to enforce full transparency here,” he said.

      The European Commission, the EU’s executive, said it does not comment on “ongoing investigations” or “leaks.”

      But the Commission stressed: “The facts about the tragic incident off the coast of Pylos must be clarified. That is the priority now.”

      https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-warned-greece-of-dead-children-on-migrant-ship-hour-before-it-capsize

    • Frontex und Athen wussten 15 Stunden vor Bootsdrama von toten Kindern an Bord

      Mitte Juni starben vor der griechischen Küste 600 Migranten, als ihr Boot kenterte. Über die Verantwortung für die schlimmste Katastrophe seit Jahren im Mittelmeer wird seitdem gestritten. Nun kommt heraus: Eine wichtige Information zu den wahren Abläufen wird nach Informationen von WELT AM SONNTAG bewusst zurückgehalten.

      Die EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex sowie die griechische Regierung verschweigen die wahren Abläufe eines Bootsdramas im Juni mit rund 600 Toten. Wie WELT AM SONNTAG und das ebenfalls zum Axel-Springer-Verlag gehörende Nachrichtenunternehmen „Politico“ erfuhren, muss die hochdramatische Situation vor der griechischen Küste Athen und den Grenzschützern viel früher bewusst gewesen sein als bislang bekannt.

      Frontex hatte in einer Stellungnahme mitgeteilt, als Erstes habe ein agentureigenes Flugzeug das völlig überladene Boot um 9.47 Uhr (UTC) entdeckt. Allerdings soll das Boot – so geht es aus einem internen Frontex-Dokument hervor – bereits um 6.51 Uhr erstmals gesichtet worden sein – und zwar durch italienische Behörden.

      Um 8.01 Uhr alarmierte die Seenotrettungstelle Rom demnach sowohl Frontex als auch die Leitstelle in Piräus, von wo aus Rettungseinsätze der griechischen Küstenwache gesteuert werden. Noch brisanter: Bestandteil dieses Alarms war die Information, dass an Bord des Bootes bereits zwei Kinder verstorben seien. Wie Italien an seine Informationen zu der Existenz des Bootes und den toten Kindern gelangte, ist unklar.

      Der Alarm ist nach Informationen von WELT AM SONNTAG Teil der Notizen des noch in Arbeit befindlichen „Serious Incident Report“, der das Aktenzeichen 12595/2023 trägt. Trotz des Alarms aus Roms unternahmen die griechischen Behörden lange nichts. Erst gegen 19.40 Uhr traf ein Schiff der Küstenwache in der Nähe der Migranten ein.

      Das Boot kenterte schließlich gegen 23 Uhr, 15 Stunden nach dem Alarm aus Rom. Unmittelbar davor hatten griechische Küstenwächter Seile an das Boot angebracht, was – so berichteten Überlebende – zum Kentern geführt habe. Nur 104 Menschen wurden lebend an Land gebracht.

      WELT AM SONNTAG konfrontierte Frontex mit den Informationen zu dem Alarm aus Rom. Wann ging dieser ein? Was war die Reaktion der Agentur? In einer schriftlichen Antwort hieß es, man könne „aufgrund von laufenden Ermittlungen“ kein Statement abgeben, das über jenes vom 16. Juni hinausgeht. Darin wird die Chronologie der Ereignisse geschildert – mit 9.47 Uhr als Startpunkt, der Sichtung des Bootes durch ein Frontex-Flugzeug.

      Der neu ernannte griechische Migrationsminister Dimitris Kairidis sagte in Brüssel, er habe die Frontex-Notiz nicht gesehen; weder bestätigte noch dementierte er, dass Athen diese Information aus Rom erhalten hat. Er erklärte, dass „eine unabhängige gerichtliche Untersuchung“ stattfinde. Sofern jemand für schuldig befunden werde, „wird es definitiv Konsequenzen geben.

      Bis dahin solle man „keine voreiligen Schlüsse ziehen und sich dem politischen Druck beugen“. Am Freitag verwies Athen auf ein Statement auf der Küstenwache-Webseite vom 14. Juni, in dem eine Info zu dem Boot aus Rom gegen acht Uhr erwähnt wird. Von toten Kindern kein Wort. Die italienische Regierung beantwortete eine Anfrage zu dem Sachverhalt nicht.

      Der Druck aus der Politik auf die Behörde und Athen wächst derweil. Die Linken-Bundestagsabgeordnete Clara Bünger, die auf eine Aufarbeitung des Pylos-Dramas drängt, sagte WELT AM SONNTAG: „Beim Sichten eines derart überfüllten Bootes hätte Frontex sofort einen Mayday-Notruf machen müssen. Das gilt umso mehr, wenn Frontex wusste, dass es am Dienstagmorgen bereits zwei tote Kinder an Bord gab.“ Dass das nicht geschehen ist, sei „ungeheuerlich und unverzeihbar“. Frontex-Direktor Hans Leijtens hätte angekündigt, er wolle Vertrauen wiederherstellen und Menschenrechte achten: „Dieses Vorhaben ist krachend gescheitert.“ Bünger sagte, Frontex sei nicht reformierbar – und forderte die Auflösung.

      Der EU-Parlamentarier Erik Marquardt (Grüne) verwies darauf, dass Deutschland den Vorsitz im Frontex-Verwaltungsrat hat: „Ich erwarte von der Bundesregierung, dass sie hier vollständige Transparenz durchsetzt.“ Derartige Versprechen seitens Leijtens würden bislang nicht eingehalten.

      Die EU-Kommission ließ verlauten, man äußere sich „weder zu laufenden Untersuchungen noch zu Leaks“, machte aber klar: „Die Fakten über den tragischen Vorfall vor der Küste von Pylos müssen geklärt werden. Das ist jetzt die Priorität.“

      https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article246382076/Migration-Frontex-und-Athen-wussten-15-Stunden-vor-Bootsdrama-von-toten-Kindern

    • Pylos shipwreck: the Greek authorities must ensure that effective investigations are conducted

      In a letter to the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, published today, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, stresses that Greece has the legal obligation to conduct effective investigations into the Pylos shipwreck, which resulted in the death of more than 80 persons with many hundreds still missing, to establish the facts and, where appropriate, to lead to the punishment of those responsible.

      The Commissioner expresses concern about reports of pressure having been exercised on survivors and about allegations of irregularities in the collection of evidence and testimonies, which may have led to a minimisation of the focus on certain actors in this tragedy, including the Greek Coast Guard. In the case of Safi and Others v. Greece, the European Court of Human Rights spelled out the parameters of an effective investigation into a similar event. Among those parameters, the Commissioner notes that independence is critical to securing the trust of the victims’ relatives, the survivors, the public and Greece’s international partners. While stressing that investigations cannot be limited to the role of alleged smugglers, she requests clarifications on the scope of the investigations initiated after the shipwreck.

      Referring to the right of missing persons’ families to know the truth, the Commissioner seeks information on the efforts made to ensure that the remains of deceased migrants are located, respected, identified, and buried.

      Expressing concerns at restrictions on survivors’ freedom of movement and the way asylum interviews have been conducted, she requests information on the concrete measures that Greece has taken to abide by its human rights obligations regarding reception conditions and access to the asylum procedure.

      "In my view, the shipwreck of 14 June is unfortunately not an isolated incident”, writes the Commissioner. This should prompt a reconsideration of the approach to refugees and migrants arriving by sea at the political, policy and practical level. In this context, the Commissioner urges the Prime Minister to ensure that Greece abides by its international obligations regarding search and rescue, both under maritime law and human rights law.

      Finally, the Commissioner reiterates her call for the Greek government to actively create and maintain an enabling legal framework and a political and public environment which is conducive to the existence and functioning of civil society organisations and to the work of human rights defenders and investigative journalists, and to stop their criminalisation and other forms of harassment.

      https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/pylos-shipwreck-the-greek-authorities-must-ensure-that-effective-investigations

      Pour télécharger la lettre:
      https://rm.coe.int/letter-addressed-to-the-prime-minister-of-greece-by-dunja-mijatovic-co/1680ac03ce

      #conseil_de_l'Europe

    • Après le naufrage d’un bateau avec 750 personnes à bord au large de la Grèce, une enquête de la médiatrice européenne sur le rôle de Frontex

      #Emily_O’Reilly, dont le rôle est de demander des comptes aux institutions et aux agences de l’Union européenne, a annoncé avoir ouvert cette procédure à la suite du naufrage survenu en juin, le pire en Méditerranée depuis 2016.

      Un peu plus d’un mois après le pire naufrage d’un bateau de migrants depuis 2016 en Méditerrannée, survenu mi-juin au large de la Grèce et qui a fait des centaines de morts, la médiatrice européenne a annoncé, mercredi 26 juillet, avoir ouvert une enquête afin de « clarifier le rôle » de Frontex, l’agence de l’Union européenne (UE) chargée des frontières, dans les opérations de sauvetage.

      « Alors que le rôle des autorités grecques fait l’objet d’une enquête au niveau national, celui de Frontex dans les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage doit également être clarifié », a souligné dans un communiqué Emily O’Reilly. Le rôle de la médiatrice est de demander des comptes aux institutions et aux agences de l’UE.

      « Il a été signalé que Frontex avait bien alerté les autorités grecques de la présence du navire et proposé son assistance ; mais, ce qui n’est pas clair, c’est ce qu’elle aurait pu ou aurait dû faire d’autre », a-t-elle ajouté.

      Le patron de Frontex, Hans Leijtens, a salué l’ouverture de cette enquête, assurant être prêt à coopérer « en toute transparence » pour expliquer le rôle de son agence. « Si nous ne coordonnons pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, sauver des vies en mer est essentiel. Nous apportons une aide aux autorités nationales lorsque cela est nécessaire », a-t-il ajouté dans un message sur X (ex-Twitter).

      Partage d’informations entre Frontex et les autorités nationales

      Le chalutier vétuste et surchargé, qui était parti de Libye, a fait naufrage au large du sud de Grèce dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin. Il transportait environ 750 personnes à son bord, mais seule une centaine de migrants ont survécu.

      Depuis le naufrage, les interrogations sont tournées autour de la lenteur de l’intervention des gardes-côtes grecs et sur les causes du chavirement de l’embarcation.

      Par cette enquête sur le rôle de Frontex, Mme O’Reilly veut en particulier se pencher sur le partage d’informations entre l’agence européenne et les autorités nationales en matière d’opérations de recherche et de sauvetage.

      Elle la coordonnera aux côtés du médiateur grec, Andreas Pottakis, qui a « la compétence d’examiner » la façon dont les autorités grecques se sont occupées du bateau Adriana.

      Mi-juillet, les eurodéputés ont réclamé l’élaboration d’une « stratégie de recherche et de sauvetage fiable et permanente » des migrants en Méditerranée. Dans une résolution transpartisane, dépourvue de caractère contraignant, ils ont appelé Bruxelles à apporter aux Etats membres de l’UE un « soutien matériel, financier et opérationnel » pour renforcer leurs capacités de sauvetage en mer.

      Les élus du Parlement européen citaient les chiffres de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), selon laquelle plus de 27 600 personnes ont disparu en Méditerranée depuis 2014.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/07/26/naufrage-d-un-bateau-de-migrants-au-large-de-la-grece-la-mediatrice-europeen

    • Smuggler, Warlord, EU ally

      The lead smugglers behind the Pylos shipwreck are closely linked to General Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan warlord who EU leaders are partnering with to curb migration

      On the night of 13 June, a vessel carrying around 750 men, women and children mainly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria capsized in Greek waters. Only 104 men survived. All women and children died.

      In an earlier investigation we revealed Greek coastguard efforts to cover up their role in the fatal shipwreck. The country’s naval court has since launched a preliminary investigation into the coastguard’s response to the sinking, with no arrests or suspensions of officers so far.

      The only arrests made were those of nine Egyptians, accused in a separate inquiry of being part of the smuggling network behind the deadly voyage. They were charged with six counts including illegal trafficking of foreigners, organisation crime and manslaughter by negligence.

      Using the contacts and documents already available to us, we pursued a follow-up investigation to establish the truth about any smugglers behind the fatal sea crossing, with the aim of identifying the key players and establishing the extent to which the nine Egyptians in prison in Greece are actually responsible.
      METHODS

      Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, SIRAJ, El País and Reporters United used the previously established relationships with survivors and their families, as well as a network of sources in Libya, to investigate the smuggling network behind the Pylos wreck.

      We also looked into the ongoing court case against nine alleged smugglers, analysing confidential court documents and speaking to five of the families of those arrested.
      STORYLINES

      While investigating the circumstances that led to the shipwreck and Greece’s responsibility in it, we spoke to 17 survivors.

      Many named the key smugglers involved in organising the trip during our interviews with them – none of them were people on board the ship.

      Some were Eastern Libyan nationals with ties to the region’s powerful ruler, Khalifa Haftar.

      One name stood out: Muhammad Saad Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi. Three sources identified him as a key player in the smuggling operation: a survivor, a lower level smuggler and a Libyan insider all gave his name.

      Al-Kahshi works for a special forces navy unit called the “frogmen”, run by a family member of his, Bahar Al-Tawati Al-Mnfi. Al-Tawati Al-Mnfi works under the direct orders of Khalifa Haftar.

      One survivor explained that Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi used his position to issue the licence that allowed the boat (which came from Egypt) to navigate in Libyan waters and made sure the Libyan coast guards were paid to shut off the marine radar devices that detect ship movements to allow the departure.

      We found that the network goes far beyond Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi.

      Survivors, insiders and analysts explained that the trip was organised with wide ranging support from powerful people reporting to Haftar.

      Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui said the “migrant business” had been flourishing in Eastern Libya in the last 18 months. “Haftar cannot say that he’s not aware,” he added. “He can’t say that he’s not involved.”

      “All trips are overseen by his son, Saddam Haftar” said one survivor. “Saddam leads the cooperation himself or assigns one of the frogmen battalions [this may have been the case for the Pylos trip] or the 2020 battalion, depending on who has more migrants to pay the fees.”

      Five survivors who flew from Syria to Libya describe how immigration officials facilitated their arrival at Benghazi’s military airport. One said: “At the airport, a person took my passport, went to immigration office, put a stamp and took us outside”.

      There was a curfew in Eastern Libya on the night of departure (حظر التجول ليلاً في طبرق الليبية), yet the survivors we interviewed said that it was at night that they, along with hundreds of passengers, were taken to a small bay near Wadi Arzouka, east of Tobruk, and boarded onto the vessel.

      Militias supported by Khalifa Haftar are not only involved in smuggling, they are also active in illegal “pullbacks” of migrants in EU waters.

      At least two pullbacks (in May and July this year) were carried out by a militia (Tariq Bin Ziyad) controlled by Haftar’s son, including one in Maltese waters.

      At least four of the people who died in the Pylos shipwreck were on the boat that was pulled back by the Tariq Bin Ziyad militia on 25 May, according to family members.

      These findings raise serious questions about EU member states’ migration prevention policies.

      It is known by EU authorities that Eastern Libyan militias answering to Haftar carry out both pullback and smuggling operations. The IOM and the UNHCR briefed EU officials on an increase in departures from eastern Libya , describing them as a “lucrative source of income for the eastern Libyan rulers involved”.

      In spite of this, Italy and Malta are making deals with Haftar to prevent migration.

      In May, Haftar met with Italian PM Meloni to discuss migration related issues and in June Italy’s interior minister said they would ask Haftar to collaborate in stopping departures.

      The same month, for the first time, a Maltese delegation met Haftar in Benghazi to discuss security challenges in the region, with particular emphasis on irregular migration.

      Internal EU documents show the commission is looking for ways to curb arrivals from Benghazi’s airport with the collaboration of local operators.

      Harchaoui described Italian efforts to encourage Khalifa Haftar to stop departures as “bribery” and pointed to “a very clear admission of how Italy intends to work and what it promised to Haftar: if you reduce the human smuggling volumes, we will inject capital”.

      Meanwhile, there’s growing evidence that nine Egyptians imprisoned for trafficking in Greece are being scapegoated.

      We spoke to the families of five of the nine Egyptians under arrest – all of them say that they were passengers, not smugglers.

      Three of them provided evidence that their relatives paid for their trip, indicating that it’s highly unlikely that they were involved in organising the smuggling operation.

      We were able to verify the identity of a smuggler who asked one of the accused men for money ahead of the trip.

      We previously found that witness testimony provided to the coast guard had been tampered with, including survivors’ answers to questions about smugglers.

      In the documents, two answers to questions about smugglers contain identical sentences.

      Those who were interrogated by the coast guard mentioned being pressured to place the blame on the nine Egyptians later indicted.

      https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/smuggler-warlord-eu-ally

    • Naufrage au large de la Grèce : deux ONG pointent les défaillances des autorités grecques

      Dans un rapport publié le 3 août, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch reviennent sur les circonstances troubles du drame survenu aux portes de l’Europe dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin, qui a coûté la vie à au moins six cents personnes. Les associations réclament une enquête « efficace, indépendante et impartiale ».

      C’est un naufrage qui a d’abord marqué les esprits de par son ampleur : pas moins de 750 personnes se trouvaient à bord d’un bateau de pêche en bois, L’Adriana, au moment où il a chaviré, dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin, au large de Pýlos en Grèce. Partie de Tobrouk en Libye pour rejoindre l’Italie, l’embarcation surchargée transportait des ressortissants syriens, égyptiens, palestiniens ou pakistanais, dont de nombreuses femmes et enfants placés dans la cale pour être « à l’abri » des éventuelles intempéries ou du soleil.

      Mais on retient aussi les circonstances troubles dans lequel il s’est produit. Très vite après le naufrage, des premières voix parmi la centaine de rescapés se sont élevées pour pointer le rôle potentiel des gardes-côtes grecs dans ce drame.

      Mediapart a documenté, dès le 17 juin, cette version différente de celle avancée par les autorités du pays. Une enquête de la BBC est venue l’appuyer, puis le New York Times a suivi : des témoignages de survivant·es attestent que les gardes-côtes ont non seulement tardé à organiser un sauvetage, mais ont aussi tenté de tirer le bateau à l’aide d’une corde, pouvant ainsi avoir contribué à le faire chavirer.

      Après un déplacement de neuf jours en Grèce et une vingtaine d’entretiens réalisés avec des exilé·es sur place, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch ont relevé également les « disparités extrêmement préoccupantes » entre les récits des survivant·es du Pýlos et la version des événements livrée par les autorités.

      Les survivant·es interrogé·es par les deux ONG « ont systématiquement déclaré que le navire des gardes-côtes grecs envoyé sur les lieux avait attaché une corde à L’Adriana et l’avait remorqué, le faisant tanguer, puis chavirer », peut-on lire dans le rapport d’enquête publié conjointement ce jeudi 3 août.

      Aux ONG, les responsables des gardes-côtes ont de leur côté affirmé que leurs équipes s’étaient approchées du bateau, reconnaissant avoir utilisé une corde, mais qu’après de « premières négociations », les passagers avaient repoussé la corde pour poursuivre leur trajet.
      Le rôle des gardes-côtes grecs et de Frontex interrogé

      Une version contredite par le témoignage des survivant·es interrogé·es : « Peu importe leur position sur le bateau, les survivants disent tous avoir ressenti le mouvement du bateau une fois tracté, qui avançait alors très vite alors que le moteur ne fonctionnait plus, précise Alice Autin, chercheuse pour la division Europe et Asie centrale à Human Rights Watch. Tous sont d’accord pour dire que c’est cela qui a fait vaciller le bateau, avant de le faire chavirer. »

      Frontex a par ailleurs déclaré avoir repéré l’embarcation dès la veille du naufrage, ce qui a poussé certains acteurs à s’interroger sur le rôle de l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières. Pourquoi n’est-elle pas intervenue pour venir en aide aux passagers ? A-t-elle bien alerté les autorités grecques pour qu’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage soit menée en urgence ?

      Dans un communiqué, Frontex a précisé que l’un de ses avions de surveillance « avait immédiatement informé les autorités compétentes », sans toutefois intervenir, au prétexte que les exilé·es avaient refusé « toute aide ». Le lendemain du drame, le patron de l’agence Hans Leijtens était en déplacement en Grèce pour « mieux comprendre ce qu’il s’était passé », et voir comment ses équipes pouvaient aider les autorités grecques, précisant que le fait de « sauver des vies était leur priorité ».

      Une version qui ne semble pas avoir convaincu la médiatrice européenne, qui a décidé, le 24 juillet dernier, d’ouvrir une enquête de sa propre initiative pour interroger le rôle de Frontex dans les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage à la suite du naufrage survenu en Grèce.

      « Il est clair que Frontex a joué un rôle important dans la mission de recherche et de sauvetage du point de vue de la coordination. À ce titre, je pense qu’il est possible de clarifier davantage son rôle dans de telles opérations », a déclaré dans une lettre ouverte Emily O’Reilly, qui occupe le poste de Médiateur européen.

      « Il a été signalé que Frontex avait bien alerté les autorités grecques de la présence du navire et proposé son assistance ; mais ce qui n’est pas clair, c’est ce qu’elle aurait pu ou aurait dû faire d’autre », a-t-elle souligné. Frontex s’est dite prête à coopérer « en toute transparence ».

      « Cela posera des questions importantes sur le rôle, les pratiques et les protocoles de l’agence dans le contexte des opérations [en mer] et sur les mesures qu’elle a prises pour se conformer à ses obligations en matière de droits fondamentaux et aux lois de l’UE », estiment Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch.
      Des appels à l’aide ignorés

      Les deux ONG s’interrogent aussi sur l’aide que les gardes-côtes grecs auraient pu apporter aux migrant·es dans les heures ayant précédé le naufrage. De hauts responsables des gardes-côtes leur auraient affirmé que « les personnes à bord du bateau limitaient leur demande d’aide à de l’eau et de la nourriture » et avaient exprimé leur volonté de poursuivre leur route vers l’Italie.

      Mais les survivant·es interrogé·es par Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch ont « déclaré que les passagers avaient demandé à être secourus » et qu’ils avaient entendu d’autres personnes à bord de l’embarcation appeler à l’aide lors d’un échange avec un téléphone satellite, plusieurs heures avant le naufrage. Certains auraient enlevé leur T-shirt pour le secouer en l’air et appeler à l’aide, d’autres auraient hurlé à l’attention des deux navires marchands croisés avant le drame.

      « Des récits concordent pour dire que des personnes ont perdu la vie à bord du bateau avant le naufrage et que l’un des corps a été placé sur le pont supérieur au-dessus de la cabine pour signifier l’urgence de la situation », poursuit Alice Autin d’Human rights watch. Et d’ajouter : « Les gardes-côtes grecs avaient la responsabilité de venir en aide aux passagers du bateau et il apparaît au vu des résultats de notre enquête qu’il y a des doutes sur la manière dont cela s’est déroulé. »

      Plusieurs survivants ont enfin déclaré que les autorités leur auraient confisqué leur téléphone après le naufrage, poursuivent les ONG. Or, certaines personnes auraient « tout filmé ». Ces téléphones pourraient, s’ils réapparaissaient, servir dans le cadre de l’enquête ouverte par la justice grecque.

      « Il est essentiel d’analyser ce qu’ils contiennent pour faire toute la lumière sur le déroulement des faits », conclut Alice Autin. Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch réclament une enquête « efficace, indépendante et impartiale ».

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030823/naufrage-au-large-de-la-grece-deux-ong-pointent-les-defaillances-des-autor

    • Greece: Disparities in accounts of Pylos shipwreck underscore the need for human rights compliant inquiry

      Starkly divergent accounts from survivors and Greek authorities around the circumstances of the deadly Pylos shipwreck, underscore the urgent need for an effective, independent, and impartial investigation, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said today. 

      The disparities between survivors’ accounts of the Pylos shipwreck and the authorities’ version of the events are extremely concerning

      The fishing vessel, Adriana, was carrying an estimated 750 people when it sank on 14 June off the coast of Pylos. In the aftermath, accounts from several of the 104 survivors suggest that the vessel was towed by a Greek coast guard boat, causing the fatal wreck.  The Greek authorities have strongly denied these claims.

      “The disparities between survivors’ accounts of the Pylos shipwreck and the authorities’ version of the events are extremely concerning” said Judith Sunderland, Associate Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights Watch.

      “The Greek authorities, with support and scrutiny from the international community, should ensure that there is a transparent investigation to provide truth and justice for survivors and families of the victims, and hold those responsible to account.”  

      A delegation from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch visited Greece between 4 and 13 July 2023 as part of ongoing research into the circumstances of the shipwreck and steps toward accountability. They interviewed 19 survivors of the shipwreck, 4 relatives of the missing, and nongovernmental organizations, UN and international agencies and organizations, and representatives of the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Greek Police.

      The organizations’ initial observations confirm the concerns reported by several other reputable sources as to the dynamics of the shipwreck. Survivors interviewed by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch consistently stated that the Hellenic Coast Guard vessel dispatched to the scene attached a rope to the Adriana and started towing, causing it to sway and then capsize. The survivors also consistently said that passengers asked to be rescued, and that they witnessed others on the boat plead for a rescue by satellite phone in the hours before their boat capsized.  

      In a meeting with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, senior officials of the Hellenic Coast Guard said individuals on the boat limited their request for assistance to food and water and expressed their intention to proceed to Italy. They said the crew of the Coast Guard vessel came close to the Adriana and used a rope to approach the boat to assess whether passengers wanted help, but that after the first “negotiations”, passengers threw the rope back and the boat continued its journey.

      This preventable tragedy demonstrates the bankruptcy of EU migration policies predicated on the racialized exclusion of people on the move and deadly deterrence

      Greek authorities have opened two criminal investigations, one targeted at the alleged smugglers, and another into the actions of the coast guard. It is vital for these investigations to comply with international human rights standards of impartiality, independence, and effectiveness. 

      To enhance the credibility of judicial investigations both in practice and perception, they should be under the supervision of the Supreme Court Prosecutor’s Office. Further, Greek authorities should ensure that the Greek Ombudsman’s office is promptly provided with information and resources necessary to carry out its functions as the National Mechanism for Investigating Incidents of Arbitrariness, in relation to any disciplinary investigation.   

      Several survivors said that the authorities confiscated their phones following the shipwreck but did not give them any related documentation or tell them how to retrieve their property. Nabil, a survivor of Syrian origin, told the organisations, “It’s not only the evidence of the wreck that has been taken from me, it is my memories of my friends who were lost, my life has been taken from me”. 

      The Greek authorities’ longstanding failure to ensure accountability for violent and unlawful pushbacks at the country’s borders raises concerns over their ability and willingness to carry out effective and independent investigations.

      Lessons should be learned from the European Court of Human Rights 2022 decision about the 2014 “Farmakonisi” shipwreck, in which survivors argued that their boat had capsized because the Hellenic Coast Guard used dangerous maneuvers to tow them towards Turkish waters. The Court condemned Greece for the authorities’ failures in handling rescue operations and for shortcomings in the subsequent investigation of the incident, including how victims’ testimony was handled.  

      In view of the seriousness and international significance of the Pylos tragedy, Greek authorities should seek out and welcome international and/or European assistance and cooperation in the conduct of national investigations as an additional guarantee of independence, effectiveness and transparency.  

      A full and credible investigation into the shipwreck should seek to clarify any responsibility for both the sinking of the ship and delays or shortcomings in the rescue efforts that may have contributed to the appalling loss of life. The investigation should involve taking the testimonies of all survivors, under conditions that guarantee their trust and safety.

      All forensic evidence, such as traces of communications, videos, and photographs, should be collected, assessed and safeguarded to facilitate accountability processes. Any property, such as cell phones, taken from survivors for investigative purposes should be appropriately logged and returned within a reasonable amount of time.  

      All of those involved in or with knowledge of the incident, including the Hellenic Coast Guard, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the captains and crews of the two merchant vessels, and others who took part in the rescue operation after the shipwreck should be invited or required to testify, as appropriate, and should cooperate fully and promptly with the investigations.

      To ensure this is the last, and not the latest, in an unconscionably long list of tragedies in the Mediterranean, the EU should reorient its border policies towards rescue at sea and safe and legal routes

      In parallel to the national investigation, the EU Ombudsman has announced that it will open an inquiry into the role of Frontex in search and rescue (SAR) activities in the Mediterranean, including in the Adriana shipwreck. This will pose important questions about the agency’s role, practices and protocols in the context of SAR operations and on what actions it has taken to comply with its fundamental rights obligations and EU laws during this and other shipwrecks.

      Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are continuing to investigate the Pylos shipwreck and demand justice for all those harmed.

      “This preventable tragedy demonstrates the bankruptcy of EU migration policies predicated on the racialized exclusion of people on the move and deadly deterrence,” said Esther Major, Amnesty International’s Senior Research Adviser for Europe.

      “To ensure this is the last, and not the latest, in an unconscionably long list of tragedies in the Mediterranean, the EU should reorient its border policies towards rescue at sea and safe and legal routes for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants.”  

      Background 

      As part of their ongoing investigation, the organizations have sent letters requesting information to several key entities, including the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, the Prosecutors of the Supreme Court and of the Piraeus Naval Court and Frontex.

      On 13 June 2023, Frontex said its surveillance plane spotted the Adriana at 09:47 UTC (12:47 EEST/in Athens) and alerted authorities in Greece and Italy. In the following hours, two merchant vessels and later a Hellenic Coast Guard vessel interacted with the Adriana. After the boat capsized at around 2 a.m. EEST on 14 June, only 104 survivors, including several children, were rescued.

      The Prosecutor of Kalamata ordered the arrest of nine Egyptian nationals who survived the shipwreck on charges of smuggling, membership in an organized criminal network, manslaughter, and other serious crimes.

      Following an order by the Head of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Piraeus Naval Court, a prosecutor is currently conducting a preliminary investigation into the conditions of the shipwreck and the potential punishable offences by members of the Hellenic Coast Guard. The organizations have sought information with the Greek Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy about any disciplinary investigation opened into the actions of members of the Hellenic Coast Guard.

      https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/08/greece-disparities-in-accounts-of-pylos-shipwreck-underscore-the-need-for-h

  • Ukraine is the blind spot in Macron’s military splurge – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-emmanuel-macron-military-defense-tank-jet-delay

    French President Emmanuel Macron wants to ramp up military expenditure to €413 billion over the next seven years, but critics say the 30 percent spending boost isn’t taking into account what’s happening on the ground in Ukraine.

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been marked by a voracious use of artillery and rockets — a return to a more traditional type of warfare that post-Cold War planners had eschewed in favor of smaller, high-tech and highly trained forces able to deploy far from home.

    The French military budget — which the National Assembly will begin voting on this week — still sticks to that pre-Ukraine war model by cutting back on heavy weapons like tanks and armored personnel carriers while boosting spending on France’s nuclear deterrent and investing in fighting new threats in areas such as space, cyber and the deep seas.

    A final vote is expected before July 14, France’s national day.

    • The budget plans reflect a real strategic vision, not short term, but long term. We are thinking about the Indo-Pacific region, about the deep seas,” said Philippe Maze-Sencier, a geopolitics analyst with Hill+Knowlton Strategies. “Who in Europe thinks about that? We’ve got a rare materials problem and we know that the ocean depths have mining resources.

      In the next seven years, France will spend €5 billion to build a new aircraft carrier to replace the Charles de Gaulle.

      The multi-annual plan also seeks to tackle what Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu called “new areas of conflict and militarization” — namely space, the deep seas and cyber. By 2030, Paris wants to invest €6 billion in space, €4 billion in cyber — representing a 300 percent increase — and €5 billion in intelligence services.

      Ok le budget des armées c’est pour aller extraire des terres rares au fond des mers dans l’indo-pacifique ??

      C’est un truc complètement déprimant : loin de faire scandale, les +100 milliards pour les armées sont au contraire vus comme nettement insuffisants pour provoquer le « saut capacitaire » présenté comme nécessaire avec l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Et le pire c’est que ça se tient vu (i) qu’une leçon de cette guerre semble être que le qualitatif ne doit pas se faire au détriment du quantitatif, (ii) le coût astronomique de ces engins de guerre (c’est un puits sans fond) et (iii) qu’on s’est mis en tête de militariser toute la colonne du fond des mers jusqu’à l’espace et que l’#indo-pacifique is a thing.

      Apparemment 160 chars Leclerc et 137 rafales d’ici 2030 c’est pas assez, on avait prévu plus, c’est la grosse déception. Mais c’est pas assez pour quoi faire ? Ce que je comprends c’est que ce n’est pas assez pour faire la guerre tout seuls à une grande puissance, mais bon, est-ce que c’est grave ?

      Dans le même genre militariste mais en relativement moins énervant :
      Why the French Army Will Continue to Prioritize Quality Over Mass
      https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/why-the-french-army-will-continue-to-prioritize-quality-over-mass

      The French approach to high-intensity warfare since the calamity of 1940 has been to privilege maneuver, speed, and “audacity” at the expense of mass and firepower. This was a reaction to the stolid doctrines that emerged in World War I — often associated with Gen. Philippe Pétain — that contributed to the construction of a force that in 1940 was vast in size and firepower but unwieldy and inflexible when attacked by the rapid-moving and far nimbler Wehrmacht. The newer maneuver-centric approach found reinforcement in the French army’s colonial experience and its expeditionary doctrines, which likewise promoted audacity and improvisation in the absence of numbers and resources. That colonial culture has had a profound influence on the French military up to the present day because of a variety of institutional factors and the reality that, as one Foreign Legion officer has frequently told me, an “army is what it does.” The French army most of the time in recent decades has been busy with small wars in Africa.

    • Ces articles ne sont pas stratégiques, ils sont économiques. Il faut acheter de la quincaillerie, parce que ça fait marcher l’économie. Il faut atteindre le 2%+ du PIB en achats militaires, parce que le CMI occidental en a besoin, le réclame, l’impose. Ce n’est même pas du complotisme, comme on a tous envie de le voir, parce que bon, quoi, le CMI, ça n’existe pas, ce sont des trucs qu’Eisenhower - que plus personne ne connait - imaginait à la fin de sa vie. Et le TCE, en 2005, ne l’évoquait pas du tout, ce niveau de dépenses militaires, ce sont de purs mensonges lancés par les pires eurosceptiques à qui on a filé la plupart des présidences des commissions de l’Assemblée Nationale tellement ils sont peu fréquentables.

      J’ignore ce qu’ils ont prévu précisément de faire pour l’amélioration des capacités de destructions mutuelles (nucléaires, donc), mais oui, c’est de ce côté là qu’il y a un apprentissage sur le fond de la guerre en Ukraine. Mais on n’en parle pas à la télé. Personne ne comprendrait. On te répète quotidiennement que la Russie mène une guerre d’invasion, et que son objectif est d’envahir les Etats-Unis, après l’Europe. Excusez moi, mais les complotistes mous du bulbe, là, ils sont à la télé et ils parlent dans le poste avec la morgue des prédicateurs.

      Les Russes ont démontré qu’ils avaient une force de première frappe, une capacité de décapitation des centres de commandement. Mais on feint de faire comme si quelques chars d’assaut de plus pouvaient changer la donne.

      L’obtention de la capacité de première frappe, c’est ce que les US tentent et prétendent d’obtenir depuis 20 ans, en faisant avancer l’OTAN en Europe de l’Est et en installant le bouclier anti-missile en Pologne et en Roumanie. C’est ce qui a fait dire à la Russie en 2008 qu’ils allaient mettre en œuvre une modernisation de leur arsenal, et qui a aboutit à ce qu’on voit mis en œuvre désormais en Ukraine. La destruction des batteries de Patriot à Kiev par exemple, pour la partie la plus visible (fèqueniouzes !, comme ils diraient dans les services de vérification de l’information, à la façon du premier trump venu).

    • Ca a du le faire chier qu’un chef étranger occupe le devant de la scène.
      « - Mirroir, mirroir, qui est le plus cool des présidents ? »
      " - Il y a un élu, dans une vallée voisine qui attire les projecteurs"
      « - Rhaaaa, vite habillons nous comme lui pour quelques photos »

  • How Russians end up in a far-right militia fighting in Ukraine
    https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-russians-end-up-far-right-militia-fighting-ukraine-2023-05-11

    the #Russian_Volunteer_Corps (RVC), a unit made up of Russians fighting against their own country alongside Ukrainian forces.

    The RVC was founded by Moscow-born Denis Kapustin, also known as Denis Nikitin or by the nom de guerre White Rex. The Antifascist Europe monitoring project says he is a neo-Nazi and white supremacist.

    Nikitin, who declined to be interviewed for this article, has frequently described himself as a nationalist fighting for a Russia that belongs to ethnic Russians though has rejected the neo-Nazi and white supremacist characterisations.

    [...] The presence of Russian far-right groups on both sides of the conflict is also a sign of an ideological fracturing of Russia’s ultranationalist movement, said political scientist Mark Galeotti, head of London-based Mayak Intelligence consultancy and author of several books on the Russian military.

    Groups seeking a restoration of Russia’s historic power are facing other outfits, like the RVC, that oppose Putin’s invasion and want to see a smaller, ethnic Russian state, he added.

    “Some think that Ukraine’s struggle against the evil Russian empire is their cause. And there are some who think that fighting for the motherland is their cause,” said Galeotti, naming the #Rusich_Group and #ENOT_Corp among far-right paramilitary units fighting on Russia’s side.

    [...] The RVC hit the headlines in March when it claimed responsibility for a cross-border raid into Russian territory, which Putin denounced as a terrorist attack and said the fighters involved had opened fire on civilians in a car, including children. The governor of the border region said the attack had killed two people and wounded a boy of 11.

    A senior member of the RVC called Vladimir, with the nom de guerre Cardinal, told Reuters via Signal call in February that the unit numbered up to 200 fighters, though Reuters was unable to independently verify that figure.

    #Ukraine #Russie #extrême_droite

    • Russia says cross-border attack from Ukraine has been crushed, one civilian killed
      https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/counter-terrorism-operation-russias-belgorod-region-continues-governor-2023

      The Russian military said on Tuesday it had routed militants who had attacked a Russian border region with armoured vehicles the previous day, killing more than 70 “Ukrainian nationalists” and pushing the remainder back into Ukraine.

      In what appeared to be one of the biggest incursions from Ukraine since the war began 15 months ago, two purported anti-Kremlin armed groups employing Russians based abroad said they were responsible for the attack in Russia’s Belgorod region.

      [...] One of the two fighting groups - the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) - said on social media: “One day we’ll come to stay.”

      Ukraine’s government had said it was watching the situation but had “nothing to do with it”. It said the same in March when one of the groups - which Moscow said consisted of far-right Russian extremists managed by Ukrainian intelligence - mounted an incursion into another border region.

      [...] The two groups that claimed responsibility for the incursion are the RVC and the #Freedom_of_Russia_Legion - a Ukraine-based Russian militia led by Russian opposition figure Ilya Ponomaryov that says it is working inside Russia to overthrow President Vladimir Putin.

      Ponomaryov is wanted in Russia, where the authorities have accused him of spreading false information about the army and designated him a terrorist.

  • Ce scandale qu’ursula von der leyen pensait laisser derrière elle à Berlin France Culture

    L’opposition allemande publie un rapport d’enquête accablant sur la responsabilité d’ursula von der leyen dans un scandale qui a coûté des dizaines de millions d’euros au ministère qu’elle dirigeait avant de partir pour Bruxelles.

    Il est beaucoup question de la présidente de la Commission européenne ursula von der leyen dans la presse allemande ce mercredi.

    Oui car avant de quitter Berlin pour Bruxelles l’année dernière, ursula von der leyen était la ministre de la Défense d’Angela Merkel, et son départ avait été jugé aussi inattendu que précipité. aujourd’hui, un an plus tard, voilà que ressurgit un vieux dossier de l’époque qui n’a pas fini de la poursuivre... jusque dans son exil européen.

    https://media.radiofrance-podcast.net/podcast09/10901-24.06.2020-ITEMA_22368464-2020C22811S0176-177945590

    Car pendant ces années où Mme von der leyen a dirigé le ministère allemand de la Défense, celui-ci a accumulé les problèmes de gestion, les dizaines de millions d’euros dilapidés sans contrôle pour payer des consultants, conseillers et autre sous-traitants privés. "Il y en a pour près de 100 millions" , affirme ce matin l’hebdomadaire Focus https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/berater-affaere-im-verteidigungsministerium-faktisches-komplettversagen-neuer- en se basant sur un rapport d’enquête qui vient d’être rendu public et qui s’avère "dévastateur" pour l’ex-ministre.

    Ce rapport, il faut le préciser, a été rédigé par les députés issus de l’opposition qui ont participé à la commission d’enquête parlementaire sur cette affaire. Un an de travail, et ces conclusions des députés Verts, libéraux-démocrates et du Parti de Gauche qui sont accablantes, reprises également par Der Spiegel https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ursula-von-der-leyen-und-die-berateraffaere-faktisches-komplettversagen-a-55 : sous ursula von der leyen, la gestion du ministère était "un échec complet_", dixit le rapport, avec des procédures de contrôle des contrats de consulting qui n’étaient pas respectées, et cachaient souvent des liens de copinage, de connivence entre hauts fonctionnaires et lobbyistes privés. 

    La désormais présidente de la Commission européenne s’en est toujours sorti, jusque là, en disant que les décisions n’étaient pas prises à son niveau, qu’elle n’en avait pas connaissance et donc qu’elle ne pouvait en être tenue responsable. Ce n’est pas ce que conclut le rapport d’enquête de l’opposition, martèle Der Spiegel https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ursula-von-der-leyen-und-die-berateraffaere-faktisches-komplettversagen-a-55 . Il met en avant la responsabilité inévitable de l’ex-ministre, qui était tenue au courant des problèmes rencontrés à cause de tous ces contrats, mais n’a jamais fait mine de mettre fin aux mauvaises pratiques. 

    Pire encore, rappelle Politico https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-german-governing-parties-contracting-scandal , Urusula von der leyen a semblé tenter de faire obstruction à l’enquête parlementaire, quand on s’est rendu compte que ses deux téléphones portables professionnels saisis pour les besoins de l’enquête avaient été consciencieusement expurgés de tout message avant d’être livrés à la commission.

    A présent "il n’y a plus guère de doute sur la raison véritable qui a poussé ursula von der leyen à fuir à Bruxelles" résume le chef du service investigation de Die Welt Wolfgang Büscher pour qui l’ex-cheffe de la Bundeswehr est bien coupable, je cite, d’avoir laissé ces "oiseaux parasites que sont les consultants privés faire leur nid au ministère de la Défense" , d’avoir donné les clés de la Défense nationale, à travers ces lobbyistes, aux intérêts des grandes compagnies du secteur de l’armement en particulier.

    Faut-il en conclure pour autant que la nomination d’ursula von der leyen n’aura été comme le sous-entend Wolfgang Büscher, qu’une « exfiltration en urgence pour masquer le chaos qu’elle laissait derrière elle » ? _ 

    On n’en est pas là... Il faut enfin rappeler, avec la Süddeutsche Zeitung https://www.sueddeutsche.de , que les conclusions définitives de la commission d’enquête parlementaire dans son ensemble (opposition+majorité) ne devraient être rendues que la semaine prochaine. D’ores et déjà, les partis de la grande coalition merkelienne font bloc autour d’ursula von der leyen, ils rejettent toutes ces accusations et plaident l’ignorance de l’ancienne ministre. A Berlin comme à Bruxelles, on se demande bien comment ceux qui accablent la présidente de la Commission européenne et ceux qui l’absolvent vont arriver à accorder leurs violons.

    Source : https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/revue-de-presse-internationale/ce-scandale-qu-ursula-von-der-leyen-pensait-laisser-derriere-elle-a-berl

    #mckinsey #mac_kinsey #mckinseygate #corruption #incompétence #privatisation #cabinets_de_conseil #consulting #en_vedette #allemagne #covid-19 #politique #femme #ue #union_européenne #ursula_von_der_leyen

    • A Liège, une plainte pénale contre Ursula von der Leyen Le Vif

      Le juge d’instruction liégeois Frédéric Frenay vient d’être saisi afin d’instruire une plainte pénale contre Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission européenne. Une plainte pour « usurpation de fonctions et de titre », « destruction de documents publics » et « prise illégale d’intérêts et corruption ».

      En clair, il est reproché à la présidente de la Commission de s’être substituée « sans aucun mandat » aux Etats membres de l’UE – dont le gouvernement belge – en négociant de façon « directe et secrète », par SMS notamment, des contrats d’achat de vaccins avec le CEO de Pfizer, Albert Bourla, durant la pandémie de Covid-19. Il lui est aussi reproché d’avoir supprimé ces textos, une affaire connue sous le nom du « Deletegate ». Le plaignant, Frédéric Baldan, 35 ans, estime que le comportement d’Ursula von der Leyen porte atteinte « aux finances publiques de la Belgique » et « à la confiance publique ». Il s’est constitué partie civile et réclame 50 000 euros pour son préjudice moral. Cette affaire a déjà fait l’objet de plaintes contre la Commission auprès de l’ombudsman européen (saisi par un journaliste allemand) et de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (saisie par The New York Times). Avec cette nouvelle plainte, le Deletegate prend une tournure pénale : ce n’est plus la Commission qui est ciblée pour manque de transparence, c’est sa présidente, à titre personnel.

      Source : https://www.levif.be/magazine/a-liege-une-plainte-penale-contre-ursula-von-der-leyen

      #Deletegate

  • Macron heckled by protesters during speech in the Netherlands – POLITICO
    https://www.politico.eu/article/heckling-protesters-interrupt-macrons-speech-in-the-netherlands-democracy-f


    Jusqu’au fond des chiottes, faut le faire chier.

    A speech by French President Emmanuel Macron was interrupted Tuesday in the Netherlands by protesters attacking him on the state of democracy in France.

    “I think we lost something; where is French democracy?” shouted one male protester at the beginning of a speech by the French president on European sovereignty at the Nexus Institute in The Hague. Another yelled, “Why did you bypass [the] French parliament?” in reference to the political crisis that has emerged over the president’s flagship pensions reform in France.