en février 2013, les médias 14 Mars conspiraient contre l’armée libanaise en l’accusant…

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    Lebanon’s Inevitable Entanglement in Regional Conflict-Carnegie Middle East Center
    ▻http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/08/08/lebanon-s-inevitable-entanglement-in-regional-conflict/hk9x

    With Hezbollah clearly an enemy, ISIS moved its fighters into Qalamoun, an area on the Syrian-Lebanese border overlooking Syrian territories that is of strategic importance to Hezbollah. Arsal, at the foot of the Qalamoun mountain range, is key for both ISIS and Hezbollah. For ISIS, Arsal, a Sunni-majority town harboring sympathizers with the Syrian revolution and 100,000 Syrian refugees, is considered a base for fighters to regroup and go back to the conflict in Syria. For Hezbollah, Arsal is the last safe haven for Syrian rebels in Qalamoun; Hezbollah has secured all other access points to the mountain range where the rebels can take refuge. The Lebanese Armed Forces, unwilling to become entangled in a fight with the Syrian rebels and under continuous pressure from Hezbollah, had installed checkpoints around Arsal, preventing any armed groups from going outside the town and disregarding their flow back and forth across the border.

    assalam12
    • @nidal
      Nidal CC BY

      Il faut que le gars se mette à jour : ce sont les vieilles théories du complot du 14 Mars libanais :

      Initially, the Assad regime, and by extension Hezbollah, did not fight ISIS as the extremist group started to take over Syrian territory. It disregarded—even encouraged—the Islamic State’s expansion because the group was operating in areas controlled by the opposition. ISIS scattered the Syrian opposition; pushed back its most effective armed group, the Nusra Front; ousted a moderate Islamic armed group, Ahfad al-Rasoul, from the town of Raqqa; and crushed the Northern Storm brigade (in the town of Azaz). Syrian opposition groups, more poorly equipped and trained than the Islamic State, couldn’t match ISIS fighters. The rise of the Islamic State was also a golden opportunity for the Assad regime to justify its struggle against the Syrian opposition, as the regime presented ISIS to the international community as a proof that the regime is struggling with terrorists.

      et le plus beau :

      Hezbollah calculated that pushing ISIS fighters into Arsal would trap them in an open a clash with other Syrian rebel groups in the town—notably the Nusra Front and the remainder of an amalgam of fighters who had fled or lost battles in Syria (such as battles for the towns of Quseir, Yabroud, Raqqa, and Azaz). ISIS could potentially be hurt without the need for Hezbollah to engage with the group. Such a confrontation would naturally drag the Lebanese army into the fight because, taking place in Lebanon, the fight would present a direct threat to Lebanese stability.

      A Lebanese army takeover of Arsal would benefit Hezbollah, and the Assad regime as well, in its bid to control the Qalamoun area. From a military perspective, it would cut an essential supply line for any Syrian rebel group operating on the border. It would guarantee the safety of Hezbollah’s fighters by preventing Syrian rebels from accessing the border. And there is also the issue of a grant Saudi Arabia gave the Lebanese army in spring 2014 to purchase advanced weaponry—weapons that would help the army counter Hezbollah’s advanced arsenal. Engaged in the fight against the insurgents, the Lebanese army would use up that support without posing a potential serious threat to Hezbollah’s military supremacy in Lebanon.

      C’est un version un peu plus élaborée de la théorie du complot déjà servie l’année dernière au sujet d’Arsal :
      ▻http://seenthis.net/messages/284034
      Il faut admirer le fait que cette théorie est exprimée en deux paragraphes intégralement écrits au conditionnel (could, would, would, could…).

      Nidal CC BY
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