Quand putin s’affiche avec une carte de la Rusie en format cinémascope
Et que notre ami Sacha Panin, prof de géographie et de cartographie à l’Université de Moscou remrque que sur la carte -> « no Dagestan, no Chechnya and no Ingushetia... ». Mais il y a bien la crimée.
Faut-il y voir un signe ?
Chechen demographic rise : reasons and concerns
Why are birth rates much higher than the Russian average in Chechnya and in other North Caucasus republics?
Paradox taking control of White Wolf after Vampire: The Masquerade LGBTQ+ controversy
▻https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2018-11-19-paradox-taking-control-of-white-wolf-after-vampire-the-mas
Tabletop dev will “no longer function as a separate entity” after “crude and disrespectful” use of Chechnya’s anti-gay purges
The Union of Concerned Mad Scientists — Plots Against Russia
▻http://plotsagainstrussia.org/eb7nyuedu/2016/7/6/the-union-of-concerned-mad-scientists
Il est difficile de ne pas devenir fou ou pour le moins désorienté quand on se penche trop sur les projets anticommunistes et anti-russes. Leurs auteurs défendent avec obstination des thèses aberrantes comme si c’étaient des résultats de la recherche scientifique partagés par a totalité du monde éduqué et sérieux. C’est le destin du défecteur soviétique Gregory Klimov qui a publié ses livres sur internet et autorisé leur re-publication gratuite. Cet article nous informe sur quelques détails de sa vie.
July 06, 2016
Klimov’s vision of an anti-Russian conspiracy itself resembles the monstrous progeny of Cold War mad science that was such efficient fodder for the pop cultural mill throughout the world. Like Godzilla and the plethora of giant, radioactive vermin that attacked the major metropolitan centers of the United States and Japan on the movie screens of the 1950s, or the dangerous biological, nuclear, and psychotropic weapons let loose from ex-KGB laboratories in post-Soviet Russian thrillers, Klimov’s “Harvard Project” is a freakish offshoot of Cold War propaganda battles that has far exceeded the intentions (not to mention the life-spans) of the actual researchers who inspired it.
FROM A VKONTAKTE GROUP FOR HARWARD PROJECT ENTHUSIASTS.
According to his now defunct official website, (▻http://klimov.bravehost.com), which had previously been maintained by the “Gregory Klimov Online Fan Club Moscow,” Grigory Petrovich Klimov was born Igor Borisovich Kalmykov, not far from Rostov-on-Don in 1918. In 1945, he was employed as an engineer in Soviet-occupied Berlin, defecting to the Allies’ zone in 1947. From 1949-1950 he claims to have worked for the CIA on a secret plan to destroy the Soviet Union, codenamed the “Harvard Project,” which was followed by the “Cornell Project” for psychological warfare in 1958-1959. As his website puts it, his participation in the Harvard Project “affected his entire life and work,” but, “[s]ince psychological warfare was literally a war of psychos, Grigory Petrovich, being a normal person, could not continue to participate in a performance whose script was written by sick people.”
Instead, he produced a cycle of novels and essays that purport to expose the evil machinations of the "Harvard Project’"s masterminds: The Prince of This World (Князь мира сего, 1970), My Name is Legion (Имя мое—легион, 1975), The Protocols of the Soviet Elders (Протоколы советский мудрецов, 1981), and Red Kabbalah (Красная каббала, 1987). Initially distributed among Soviet émigrés, copies of these books made their way into the Soviet Union before perestroika, after which they were eventually reprinted by right-wing Russian publishing houses (particularly, but not exclusively, "Sovetskaia Kuban’" in Krasnodar). In interviews (Mogutin) and elsewhere on his site, Klimov claims that the total print run of all his books is “more than 1,100,000 copies,” an assertion that is impossible to verify. [1] Moreover, Klimov repeatedly declared his willingness to have his books printed by anyone anywhere, foregoing copyright and royalties, and has made his texts freely available on the Internet. [2] For Klimov, the most important thing was to get his message out; thus, in 1997, he not only granted an interview to gay journalist Yaroslav Mogutin for Mitin zhurnal, but even agreed to have the text of the interview reprinted on his website, despite Mogutin’s thinly-veiled contempt for his subject and his insistence on faithfully transcribing all of Klimov’s grammatical mistakes and misplaced accents (▻http://klimov.bravehost.com/html/interview2.html). [3]
Klimov’s depiction of the Harvard Project does have a basis in the culture of military/industrial think tanks funded by the US government in the 1950s, but from a vantage point that simultaneously distorts the results of this research while highlighting the improbable oddities that actually characterized US anti-communist psychological warfare. When discussing the Harvard Project, Klimov often invokes the name of Nathan Leitis, a University of Chicago graduate who joined the Rand Corporation in 1949 after working as an adviser to the US government during World War II. Leitis first made his mark at Rand with the 1951 publication of The Operational Code of the Politburo, which Ron Robin describes as “the most conspicuous attempt to fuse psychoculture and elite studies during the early Cold War years”. Leitis treated Communism as a “secular religion” (Leitis, The Operational Code xiv), and assumed that its leaders and adherents followed Marxist-Leninist Holy Writ without fail. His “operational code” (a quasi-semiotic elaboration of the rules and motivations that guided Bolshevik leaders) was a marvel of exegesis, teasing out decision-making patterns from numerous volumes of Communist theory and official pronouncements.
Notes
[1] My copy of the 1997 Sovetskaia Kuban’ edition of My Name is Legion is part of a “supplementary printing” of 1000 copies.
[2] Klimov’s works could be found not only on his own site, but also on the largest Russian etext server, Maxim Moshkov’s library (www.lib.ru), as well as numerous sites offering e-books in formats more convenient for higher-end e-book reading software.
[3] Mogutin himself has been identified with xenophobic Russian nationalism in his writings about Zhirinovsky and the war in Chechnya (Essig 143-146; Gessen, Dead Again 185-198), but even for him, Klimov’s theories were too extreme to be taken seriously.
#anticommunisme #conspirationnisme #Russie #USA #guerre_froide
Do civilian casualties cause counterinsurgents to fail ?
▻https://warisboring.com/do-civilian-casualties-cause-counterinsurgents-to-fail #war #guerre #COIN #contre_insurrection #counterinsurgency
“All four studies that argue insurgent leaders make the decision on which side to support find that civilian killings had no substantial effect on outcomes.
However, the six studies that assume “civilian agency” in war produces mixed conclusions. Kocher and colleagues, Lyall and colleagues, and Condra and Shapiro find that civilian deaths are bad for counterinsurgents.
However, Lyall’s 2009 study of Russian artillery strikes in Chechnya finds that civilian deaths are actually helpful. However, his 2010 study of Russian/Chechen sweeping operations during the same war finds that intentional killings are only helpful for co-ethnic counterinsurgents and detrimental for foreign troops.
Finally, Kalyvas’ study on Germany’s recruitment efforts during the occupation of Greece finds that civilian killings had no real effect on outcomes.”
Her findings boil down to this. During civil wars with more than two armed groups — think Syria — insurgent leaders decide who to ally with based on two factors. The alliance should increase the likelihood of winning. However, the alliance must also allow for the insurgent leader to gain a significant amount of political power once the war ends. If it becomes clear during the course of the war that this will not happen, the insurgent leader will switch sides.
This phenomenon holds true even if it’s clear that the alliance is about to win the war. That is, unless it becomes clear that an insurgent group has become so dominant that no alliance formation could possibly challenge it. If this occurs, insurgent groups will bandwagon to the winning side.
Insurgent leaders gauge the relative power in their coalition mainly based on battlefield performance, according to Christia. Ethnicity, religion, political goals and treatment of co-ethnic civilians, have no bearing on the decision to switch sides.
In fact, Christia shows that insurgent leaders “pick allies whose support will result in optimizing their wartime returns, and then look to their identity repertoires for characteristics shared with their allies while not shared with their foes.” This propaganda is unimportant to insurgent leaders, but “serve as important signals to the rank and file.”
Facebook blocks Chechnya activist page in latest case of wrongful censorship
▻https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/06/facebook-chechnya-political-activist-page-deleted
The barring of a non-terrorist group for ‘terrorist activity’ sparks debate – again – about how overloaded moderators can handle content fairly and accurately Facebook censored a group of supporters of Chechen independence for violating its community standards barring “organizations engaged in terrorist activity or organized criminal activity”, the latest example of the social network mistakenly censoring government dissidents. The Facebook group, Independence for Chechnya !, was “permanently (...)
Ca n’a rien à voir avec les modérateurs, facebook edite des listes de groupes terroristes, nom, drapeau et portrait des chefs. Si une page est labellisées terroriste elle part dans un service spécial qui valide ou non la üremière décision. Si le label est confirmé l’utilisateur va rejoindre une liste de personnes radicalisées et liste qui pourra etre transmise aux gouvernements. Le Hezbollah est pour fb comme pour le gvt américain, un groupe terroriste. Fb est plus que liée à la politique étrangère du gouvernement ricain mais il peut aussi passer des accords particuliers avec certains gouvernements.
Freestyle, le FLNC n’est plus concidéré par fb comme terroriste mais comme groupe de haine à l’instar par exemple du KKK. Accord avec le gouvernement francais ?
40 gay men saved from Chechnya’s ‘gay purge’ | Dazed
▻http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/35861/1/40-gay-men-saved-from-chechnya-s-gay-purge
At least four have reportedly died so far in Chechnya’s “gay purge”. Most recently, a teenage boy was pushed off of a 9th floor balcony to his death by his own uncle. Now, Russian LGBT Network has stepped in to evacuate gay people from the Russian Republic. So far, NPR reports, at least 40 men have been safely evacuated.
Speaking to NPR, the communications manager of the Russian LGBT Network – who remained anonymous for obvious reasons – said that a hotline has been set up that LGBT people can call in to in order to seek help. “Well, the first thing for us to do is, of course, to evacuate them from Chechnya, like, to other parts of Russia,” the woman said in the interview. “But we are also working to evacuate them, to relocate them to – out of Russia because for most of them it’s just deadly dangerous to stay in Russia because some of them are already hunted by their relatives outside of Chechnya.”
#russie #tchétchénie #homosexualité #droits_humains #discrimination
Russie : un militant homosexuel raconte les #violences_policières en Tchétchénie
Tabassage, humiliations et menaces de mort : un militant homosexuel russe a raconté lundi, une première à visage découvert, l’enfer des violences policières en Tchétchénie, république du Caucase russe très conservatrice.
Chechens alienated amidst gay persecutions
▻http://oc-media.org/chechens-alienated-amidst-gay-persecutions
News of this April’s mass detentions, arrests, and murders of Chechnya’s gay and bisexual population has spread around the globe. While Chechen and federal authorities categorically deny all reports of this persecution, the mass media is filled with stories of men who managed to flee Chechnya. These events have pushed the Chechen people to contemplate the unstable place of their nation in the world.
One gets the feeling that no moment in Chechnya’s history has been as roundly condemned by the world as this current human rights violation. The US State Department, the UN, and the majority of European governments have demanded an immediate cessation to the detention and execution of gay men. Chechens question both the scale of the repression and the very existence of queer people within the republic.
#russie #tchétchénie #homosexualité #droits_humains #discrimination
#Purges antigays en #Tchétchénie
Une centaine d’hommes auraient été arrêtés et détenus secrètement sur ordre de Kadyrov en raison de leur #orientation_sexuelle.
▻http://www.tdg.ch/monde/purges-antigays-tchetchenie/story/18822756
#homophobie #arrestations
Persécution d’homosexuels en Tchétchénie : plainte devant la #CPI
Trois associations LGBT françaises ont déposé plainte pour « génocide » mardi devant la Cour pénale internationale contre le président Ramzan Kadyrov pour des persécutions commises en Tchétchénie contre les homosexuels, a annoncé leur avocat à l’AFP.
▻http://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/persecution-dhomosexuels-en-tchetchenie-plainte-devant-la-cpi
Russie. Face à l’homophobie, le déni de la Tchétchénie
Un policier tchétchène demande, l’air imperturbable, “Quelle homophobie ?” Pourtant, près de lui, s’affiche une cible de tir aux couleurs arc-en-ciel, symbole de la communauté LGBT (lesbienne, gay, bisexuelle et transgenre). Le dessinateur néerlandais Tjeerd saisit ici très justement l’attitude des autorités tchétchènes, qui nient en bloc les accusations de persécutions à l’encontre des personnes homosexuelles en Tchétchénie, révélées par le journal d’investigation russe Novaïa gazeta, le 1er avril dernier.
Witnesses detail continuing anti-queer purge in Chechnya
The Russian LGBT Network has released witness testimonies from a number of queer people caught up in the systematic persecution of queer people in Chechnya
▻https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Chechnya/Witnesses-detail-continuing-anti-queer-purge-in-Chechnya-181867
Poland : Asylum Seekers Blocked at Border
(Budapest) – Polish authorities routinely deny asylum seekers at the Belarus-Poland border the right to apply for asylum and instead summarily return them to Belarus, Human Rights Watch said today. Since 2016, large numbers of asylum seekers, mostly from the Russian Republic of Chechnya, but also from Tajikistan and Georgia, have tried to apply for asylum in Poland at the border with Belarus.
–-> @reka : une autre frontière à épaissir sur les cartes...
Poland to follow Slovenia in closing borders for refugees
The President of Slovenia has signed into law legislative amendments to the Slovenian Aliens Act, entrusting the Parliament with the power to “close the borders” due to a serious threat to public order and security caused by migrations. In Poland draft amendments to the Polish law on the protection for foreigners resembling the Slovenian initiative have been introduced by Interior Minister Mariusz Błaszczak.
►http://www.ecre.org/poland-to-follow-slovenia-in-closing-borders-for-refugees
Poland: Draft amendment to the law on protection of foreigners – another step to seal Europe’s border, OP-ed by Polish Helsinki Committee
In January Polish Minister of Interior Mariusz Błaszczak presented draft amendment to the law on protection of foreigners on the territory of Poland. He claimed that there is a need to response to the growing migration flow in Poland and to ensure public security. However, he failed to explain what kind of danger to public security asylum seekers create amid lacking evidence that the number of crimes perpetrated by foreigners in Poland has increased. Moreover, official statistics show that, for the past years the number of asylum applications lodged in Poland has not exceed 15 000 yearly and neither has it increased recently. Taking this into consideration, it seems that the draft amendment reflects the national and regional trend of portraying foreigners as security threat and closing borders to persons seeking protection rather than the actual response to some changed situation.
▻http://www.ecre.org/poland-draft-amendment-to-the-law-on-protection-of-foreigners-another-step-to-
Poland Seals Europe’s Eastern Frontier as E.U. Turns a Blind Eye
For almost a year, the Polish Border Guard has been turning away most Chechens and other asylum seekers arriving on the border with Belarus. The E.U. has kept largely silent – and has its own interest in keeping the bloc’s eastern border shut.
Poland trapping asylum seekers in unsafe Belarus
Looking through the windows at Terespol train station on Poland’s border with Belarus, I see a familiar sight. About 60 asylum seekers are waiting to be back on a return train ride to Brest, Belarus, 20 minutes away. Most appear to be family groups, many with small children, and I later learned, are from the northern Caucasus, largely from Chechnya and Tajikistan. Polish border guards have just denied them the right to seek asylum in .
▻https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/16/poland-trapping-asylum-seekers-unsafe-belarus
La Guardia de Fronteras polaca desobedece una sentencia del TEDH y devuelven a un solicitante de asilo a Bielorrusia
La decisión de los guardias de fronteras de devolver al ciudadano checheno por vigésima octava vez fue una violación directa del fallo del Tribunal de Estrasburgo sobre el caso del hombre
Poland: EU Should Tackle Unsafe Returns to Belarus
Poland blocks asylum seekers at border in defiance of European Court rulings
Human rights organisations: Poland violates international law by blocking entry of asylum seekers from Belarus
Despite rulings by the European Court of Human Rights in cases involving the push backs of Chechen nationals from Poland to Belarus, Polish border guards continue to block the entry of asylum seekers. In a joint statement Amnesty International, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch call the practice a breach of human rights law, refugee law and European Union law and urge the European Commission to act.
▻https://www.ecre.org/human-rights-organisations-poland-violates-international-law-by-blocking-entry
2021 :
Pologne : des arrivées de migrants records à la frontière biélorusse
►https://seenthis.net/messages/925941
Sale of the Century : Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism by Chrystia Freeland
▻http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1232497.Sale_of_the_Century
In the 1990s, all eyes turned to the momentous changes in Russia, as the world’s largest country was transformed into the world’s newest democracy. But the heroic images of Boris Yeltsin atop a tank in front of Moscow’s White House soon turned to grim new realities: a currency in freefall and a war in Chechnya; on the street, flashy new money and a vicious Russian mafia contrasted with doctors and teachers not receiving salaries for months at a time. If this was what capitalism brought, many Russians wondered if they weren’t better off under the communists.
This new society did not just appear ready-made: it was created by a handful of powerful men who came to be known as the oligarchs and the young reformers. The oligarchs were fast-talking businessmen who laid claim to Russia’s vast natural resources. The young reformers were an elite group of egghead economists who got to put their wild theories into action, with results that were sometimes inspiring, sometimes devastating. With unparalleled access and acute insight, Chrystia Freeland takes us behind the scenes and shows us how these two groups misused a historic opportunity to build a new Russia. Their achievements were considerable, but their mistakes will deform Russian society for generations to come.
Along with a gripping account of the incredible events in Russia’s corridors of power, Freeland gives us a vivid sense of the buzz and hustle of the new Russia, and inside stories of the businesses that have beaten the odds and become successful and profitable. She also exposes the conflicts and compromises that developed when red directors of old Soviet firms and factories yielded to — or fought — the radically new ways of doing business. She delves into the loophole economy, where anyone who knows how to manipulate the new rules can make a fast buck. Sale of the Century is a fascinating fly-on-the-wall economic thriller — an astonishing and essential account of who really controls Russia’s new frontier.
Avant elle était ...
Chrystia Freeland is the Global Editor-at-Large of Reuters news since March 1, 2010, having formerly been the United States managing editor at the Financial Times, based in New York City. Freeland received her undergraduate education from Harvard University, going onto St Antony’s at University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. She attended the United World College of the Adriatic, Italy, 1984-86.
The Other Side of the #COIN: The Russians in #Chechnya : ▻http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-other-side-of-the-coin-the-russians-in-chechnya #Russia #Russie #Tchétchénie
Overwhelming brutality with total disregard for civilian welfare... It works.
“Irrespective of their sympathies (and everything else being equal), most people prefer to collaborate with the political actor that best guarantees their survival” - Stathis Kalyvas in ‘The Logic of Violence in #Civil_War’ (2006, p. 12) #guerre_civile #contre_insurrection #counter_insurgency
.:Middle East Online:: :.
▻http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=78713
Pas beaucoup commenté mais important : une brèche dans le contrôle doctrinal de l’islam que l’Arabie saoudite cherche à construire depuis des années.
An old rift at the heart of Sunni Islam that once saw clerics brawl outside a mosque in medieval Baghdad has emerged again, only this time they are fighting it out on social media.
Clerics from around the world met in August in Grozny to define Sunnism and oppose extremism at a conference hosted by Chechnya’s eccentric strongman Ramzan Kadyrov.
The gathering excluded the Salafis, the official school of thought in Saudi Arabia, and was dominated by the Ashaaris — the main school of Sunni theologians elsewhere in the Middle East.
The clerics provoked outrage in Saudi Arabia when they issued a concluding statement defining Sunni theology as Ashaari and Maturidi — a similar school of thought — while not mentioning the Salafis.
The attendance of the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, the prestigious centre of Islamic learning in Egypt currently being renovated with Saudi funds, only fuelled the row.
Il me semblait bien que j’avais vu passer (par toi, d’ailleurs) l’information ici
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/523853
Un peu de mal à la retrouver car cette rencontre ne figurait pas dans les extraits.
Oui, j’ai limité les signalements car les commentaires sont vraiment très très nombreux. Je lui colle un beau tag.
Un maire se félicite de la chasse aux migrants
En Hongrie, Laszlo Toroczkai est fier des milices privées arrêtant les réfugiés qui traversent sa commune pour rejoindre l’ouest de l’Europe.
*Pig-head propaganda: Hungary’s war on refugees*
“What crime did we commit for 40 police officers to surround us? It’s like they think we are terrorists or criminals,” 48-year old Khatoon, a Yazidi woman from Iraq who had several family members who were murdered or taken hostage by the jihadist group Isis, told me.
▻https://euobserver.com/opinion/134762
#porc #cochon #islamophobie
En #Bulgarie, cette milice secrète à l’accent russe qui #traque les migrants
La région à cheval entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie est une pièce maîtresse dans le dispositif de sécurité européen. C’est aussi ici qu’opèrent ces milices de volontaires qui font la chasse aux migrants. Reportage au sein de la plus importante – et la plus secrète – d’entre elles.
Il a fallu montrer patte blanche, argumenter, négocier chaque détail. L’#Union_Vassil_Levski - #BNO_Shipka, organisation paramilitaire et patriotique, n’aime pas les curieux. « Nous sommes les seuls et véritables gardiens de la frontière de l’Europe face à la menace islamiste », nous avait annoncé #Vladimir_Roussev à Varna, principale ville au nord de la mer Noire, où se trouve son QG. Plus connu sous le nom de guerre de « Walter », ce petit homme râblé à la moustache fournie, dirige d’une main de fer l’organisation regroupant essentiellement d’anciens officiers des forces de sécurité du pays et qui affiche, selon lui, pas moins de 800 membres. Lui-même ex-colonel de l’armée de terre, Vladimir a du mal à se défaire du jargon militaire lorsqu’il nous expose ses activités : il y est question de « front » et de « base arrière », de « logistique » et de « chaîne de commandement ». Nous comprenons que la véritable action ne se passe pas à Varna, mais beaucoup plus au sud.
« #Patrouilleurs volontaires »
Cap donc sur Bourgas à l’autre bout de la côte, où après plusieurs jours d’attente nous allons enfin recevoir le feu vert de « Walter » pour rejoindre ses miliciens déployés à la frontière turque. Les instructions arrivent la veille, codées : il y est question d’une « randonnée dans la nature ». Le rendez-vous est fixé à Marinka, petit village à la lisière de la Strandja, cette montagne sauvage à cheval entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie. De nouveau l’attente, puis le doute.
Ces redoutables « patrouilleurs volontaires » qui inondent la Toile de leurs exploits, existent-ils vraiment ? C’est alors que deux voitures, comme sorties de nulle part, nous prennent en sandwich. Un grand gaillard aux cheveux retenus par un catogan en surgit pour nous inviter à les suivre. Nous prenons la direction de Malko Tarnovo, le principal poste-frontière de la région, avant de bifurquer vers la mer, direction le village de Iasna Poliana, nommé d’après la dernière résidence du grand classique russe Tolstoï.
Le hameau, situé à quelque 30 km de la frontière, est connu pour servir de halte, ou de point de rassemblement, des migrants – ou du moins ceux qui ont réussi à échapper aux checkpoints mis en place par la police. La toponymie du lieu, renvoyant à l’auteur de Guerre et Paix, vient s’ajouter à un autre élément troublant : l’homme qui nous a adressé la parole avait indiscutablement l’accent russe, un accent reconnaissable parmi mille dans ce pays connu pour avoir été le plus fidèle allié de l’Union soviétique.
Equipement militaire
Nous quittons la route goudronnée pour nous engager sur une piste qui nous mène encore plus à l’intérieur des terres. Devant une cabane utilisée par les chasseurs, les deux véhicules déversent une demi-douzaine de jeunes avant de repartir. En quelques minutes, ces derniers tronquent leur jean, t-shirt et baskets contre un équipement militaire complet : treillis, bottes, gourde, sac à dos, radio. A cela s’ajoutent de longs couteaux accrochés à leur ceinture, une bombe lacrymogène et un pistolet à air comprimé. Et des cagoules, noires, qu’ils vont enfiler « pour des raisons de sécurité ».
« Nous ne portons rien d’illégal », précise l’homme à l’accent russe qui est à la fois leur instructeur et leur chef de groupe. Il nous présente les membres de la patrouille par leur nom de code : « Boxeur », « Coq », « Glissière de sécurité », « Ingénieur » et « Astika » (une marque de bière locale) pour la seule femme du groupe. Lui, c’est « Chamane ». Après avoir fait une série de pompes, les membres de la patrouille sont désormais prêts. Ils sont invités à ne pas se montrer « agressifs » envers les migrants mais sont autorisés à « agir selon les circonstances ». « Nous sommes en opération. Ceci n’est pas un entraînement », rappelle « Chamane ».
« Devenir quasi invisible »
Les cinq jeunes s’enfoncent dans la forêt, guidés par leur commandant. Ils longent des sentiers, grimpent des collines, enjambent des ravins sans quitter des yeux la forêt : des canettes de Red Bull, des boîtes de cigarettes, des conserves, des bouteilles d’eau ou encore un vêtement abandonné sont des indices qu’ils sont sur la bonne piste. Au passage, « Chamane » leur enseigne comment placer un poste d’observation, traverser à découvert, ramper et se fondre dans la nature. « Le but c’est de voir l’autre avant d’être vu. Devenir quasi invisible, pour avoir l’avantage sur l’ennemi », explique-t-il.
Vu l’absence de migrants à cette heure de la journée, le groupe va se faire la main sur des bergers, avant d’approcher au plus près une étable, toujours en « mode furtif ». Régulièrement, « Chamane » immobilise le groupe avant d’envoyer l’un de ses membres inspecter les environs pendant que les autres font le guet. « Je leur enseigne les techniques de base des Spetsnaz, les forces spéciales russes, en milieu hostile : renseignement, diversion, dissimulation », reconnaît-il.
En fait, dans cette patrouille tout est russe : la terminologie, les techniques utilisées et même les cartes – issues de l’état-major soviétique – parce que « celles de l’OTAN sont nulles », s’amuse le mystérieux commandant. Et lui, qui est-il ? D’une prudence de Sioux, le Russe livre très peu de détails sur lui-même : on comprendra qu’il est un vétéran du Caucase du Nord, qu’il a fait la deuxième guerre de Tchétchénie (1999-2000) et qu’il est bien officier, diplômé d’une école militaire. Il explique sa présence ici par ses origines bessarabes, cette ancienne région aujourd’hui partagée entre l’Ukraine et la Moldavie, foyer de nombreux bulgares ethniques qui ont bénéficié d’un « droit au retour » dans leur patrie historique. « La Russie n’a rien à voir dans cette histoire, pour le meilleur comme pour le pire d’ailleurs », tient-il à préciser. « C’est à nous, ici, de faire le boulot. Pratiquement à mains nues. »
« Effet de surprise »
On l’aura compris, pour « Chamane » et ses camarades l’ennemi ce sont bien les migrants. « Il s’agit à 90% des combattants étrangers, avec une hiérarchie et de réflexes de guerriers », croient-ils savoir en soulignant qu’ils ne croisent ici, dans cette région présentée comme une bifurcation de la fameuse « route balkanique », que des groupes de jeunes Afghans. Tous des hommes, avec dans leur sillage des Pakistanais, des Irakiens et, parfois, des Iraniens. Ils affirment en appréhender plusieurs par semaine, qu’ils remettent aux gardes-frontières. « On évalue d’abord la taille, puis la dangerosité du groupe avant de surgir du bois. Le plus souvent l’effet de surprise est tel que les intrus se laissent faire », poursuit « Chamane ».
« Nous ne sommes pas des chasseurs de migrants, mais des citoyens responsables ! », met en garde depuis Varna Vladimir Roussev. A Sofia, plusieurs voix se sont élevées contre les activités de son organisation, certains demandant au contre-espionnage bulgare d’enquêter sur la présence de ces instructeurs russes qu’ils ont comparé aux « petits hommes verts » de Vladimir Poutine, les commandos sans signes distinctifs envoyés en Ukraine. En juin dernier, le Comité Helsinki pour la défense des droits de l’homme a demandé au Parquet d’interdire les activités de l’organisation paramilitaire, jugées anticonstitutionnelles et dangereuses. « Ces idiots ne savent pas qu’ils sont, eux aussi, sur la liste des hommes à abattre des combattants de Daech [Etat islamique]. Juste après les notables juifs », dit encore « Walter » en insistant lourdement sur le dernier point. Là aussi, on l’aura compris.
▻https://www.letemps.ch/monde/bulgarie-cette-milice-secrete-laccent-russe-traque-migrants
#Bulgarie #milices #asile #migrations #réfugiés #anti-réfugiés #xénophobie #racisme
"Cacciatori di migranti" in Bulgaria, stasera il reportage del TG1 insieme all’Osservatorio
Ai confini esterni dell’Unione europea, alla frontiera tra Bulgaria e Turchia, gruppi di autoproclamanti “difensori dell’Europa” pattugliano i boschi alla ricerca di migranti che tentano di entrare nel paese, per poi proseguire lungo la “rotta balcanica” verso i paesi ricchi dell’UE.
▻http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Bulgaria/Cacciatori-di-migranti-in-Bulgaria-stasera-il-reportage-del-TG1-insi
Bulgaria, ronde anti-immigranti sul confine con la Turchia
Difendere Bulgaria ed UE dall’“invasione” dei migranti: in Bulgaria vari gruppi di auto-proclamati “patrioti” pattugliano il confine con la Turchia e il governo lascia fare
▻http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/Media/Multimedia/Bulgaria-ronde-anti-immigranti-sul-confine-con-la-Turchia
Existe aussi en anglais :
▻http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Media/Multimedia/Bulgaria-anti-immigrant-patrols-at-the-border-with-Turkey
Bulgarie : #Petar_Nizamov, le « chasseur de réfugiés », a été acquitté
Petar Nizamov, l’un des chefs des « milices anti-migrants », était assigné à résidence depuis la diffusion en avril 2016 d’une vidéo où on le voyait arrêter manu militari trois Afghans. La justice bulgare vient de le blanchir de toutes les accusations qui portaient contre lui.
Bulgarian Vigilantes Patrol Turkey Border to Keep Migrants Out
Figures in camouflage and ski masks gather at a fishing lodge. Many are armed with long knives, bayonets and hatchets.
The 35 men and women are on the hunt in Strandzha Massif, a forested mountain range on Bulgaria’s border with Turkey. Migrants trying to cross into Europe are their prey.
▻http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/bulgarian-vigilantes-patrol-turkey-border-keep-migrants-out-n723481
Ceux qui disent « halte » aux migrants
La frontière turco-bulgare, aux marches de l’Europe, est la nouvelle route utilisée par les passeurs de migrants. En Bulgarie, pour stopper cet afflux de clandestins, une unité de volontaires, encadrée par des vétérans de l’armée, s’organise pour faire le travail de la police.
Sofia est dépassé par l’ardeur des « chasseurs de migrants »
Après avoir encouragé à demi-mot l’aide fournie par des volontaires à la frontière turque, les autorités bulgares semblent vouloir sévir contre ces initiatives qui risquent de dégénérer
▻https://www.letemps.ch/monde/2016/04/14/sofia-depasse-ardeur-chasseurs-migrants
Des migrants ligotés et arrêtés par des habitants
Des civils ont arrêté des réfugiés dans une forêt à la frontière bulgaro-turque. Une action « illégale » rappellent les autorités.
▻http://www.lematin.ch/monde/Des-migrants-ligotes-et-arretes-par-des-habitants-/story/25672749
Bulgaria tries to restrain its vigilante “migrant hunters”
Rights groups demand that Bulgaria’s government bring illegal border-policing groups under control
Dutch #Pegida leader and expelled German deputy hunt migrants on Bulgaria border
The former frontwoman of Germany’s Pegida anti-Muslim movement and a leader of its Dutch offshoot have travelled to Bulgaria to hunt down migrants attempting to cross the border from Turkey, it has emerged.
Human rights experts: Unchecked atmosphere of anti-migrant discourse results in abuses
They call them “migrant hunters” or “citizen protection” organizations. They are volunteers, whose self-appointed job is to patrol Bulgaria’s border with Turkey, seeking out people trying to cross. - See more at: ►http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/MigrationXenophobiaRacisminBulgaria.aspx?platform=hootsuite#sthash.8B8AouOl.d
►http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/MigrationXenophobiaRacisminBulgaria.aspx?platform=hootsuite
#hongrie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #xénophobie
Al confine bulgaro-turco parte la caccia al migrante: “Qui non entra nessuno”
Gruppi autorganizzati si muovono nei boschi. Le tv li seguono e li esaltano come eroi
Bulgarian Vigilantes Patrol Turkey Border to Keep Migrants Out
Figures in camouflage and ski masks gather at a fishing lodge. Many are armed with long knives, bayonets and hatchets.
The 35 men and women are on the hunt in Strandzha Massif, a forested mountain range on Bulgaria’s border with Turkey. Migrants trying to cross into Europe are their prey.
Patches on their irregular uniforms — a coat of arms bearing a snarling wolf’s head framed by Cyrillic text — proclaim them to be members of the Bulgarian National Movement Shipka, abbreviated in Bulgarian as “BNO Shipka.”
Members of the paramilitary organization form into ranks as their leader, Vladimir Rusev, speaks. A former colonel who says he fought in Chechnya as a volunteer alongside Russians, Rusev declares his support for a man they admire: President Donald Trump.
“The CIA is trying to undermine Trump,” said Rusev, a compact 58-year-old with a neat mustache and short-cropped hair. “They want to destroy him. We offer our support to him.”
Trump’s hard-line stance on immigration and vocal criticism of Islam finds an appreciative audience here.
Most BNO Shipka members are friendly, courteous and open. The organization’s website projects a different message: slick videos replete with firearms and military training, and declarations that Europe must be defended against Islam.
Rusev claims they have as many as 50,000 members, although NBC News was unable to verify this number.
“I’m not nationalistic or anything like that. I’m just a patriot,” said Nikolai Ivanov, a 34-year-old who was one of the group’s founding members in 2014.
“Many of these immigrants are not just some guys who are trying to run away from war. They are from age 17 to 35, with good physiques and training,” Ivanov added. “It’s not a problem that they are Muslims. The problem is it’s a different civilization. They don’t think like us, they have a totally different view about life, about everything.”
While the group has been criticized by human rights advocates, it isn’t hard to find people who agree with Ivanov’s views in Bulgaria. The head of the country’s border police praised a nationalist volunteer group for intercepting migrants in April.
Rust Belt of the Balkans
Bulgaria occupies a place at the seams. Looking east, this Eastern Orthodox crossroads shares a traditional alliance with Russia. To the south is Turkey, once home to a Muslim empire that for centuries dominated the region. The European Union, with liberal values and a promise of wealth, lies to the west.
Since the end of the Cold War, Bulgaria has firmly embraced the West — joining NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007. But the rapid rise in living standards for its seven million citizens stalled during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Now, average annual income remains the lowest in the EU, even when measured by purchasing power.
In the Soviet era, heavy industry and chemical production dominated the economy. Now, abandoned factories litter a landscape replete with decaying smokestacks and depopulated villages.
On top of this, Bulgaria has become a major overland route as Europe grapples with a migration crisis due to its borders with Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Romania.
According to Eurostat, 20,165 people applied for asylum in Bulgaria in 2015, the most recent year for which firm numbers were available. This was a fraction of the around 1.2 million who claimed asylum in the EU that year, more than three quarters of whom were from majority Muslim countries.
Although only a handful of Europe-bound migrants have settled in Bulgaria, concern about the newcomers resonates in a country that was dominated for centuries by the Ottoman Turks.
Ivanov believes the refugee crisis was part of a plan in which ISIS militants would slip into the country and attack. Then, neighboring Turkey would deploy troops to Bulgaria under the auspices of the NATO alliance, he said, effectively reclaiming a portion of the lost Ottoman Empire.
Conspiracy theories like this abound among BNO Shipka members, some of whom make a point of speaking Russian. Their affinity for Moscow is perhaps understandable in the context of Bulgaria’s unhappy history with its Muslim-majority neighbor. Shipka, after all, refers to a battle in which a Russo-Bulgarian force defeated the Ottoman Turks in 1877.
Bulgaria’s weak economy and status outside the borderless Schengen area means most migrants aim for Greece as a gateway to more prosperous countries further west.
So the “refugee situation here is not that serious,” said Krassimir Kanev, a founder of the human rights group Bulgarian Helsinki Committee. "Bulgaria is a transit country, the refugees want to move to [other] EU countries.”
However, Bulgaria “registered 31,281 new arrivals in 2015, which represents 89.3 percent of all land arrivals in the EU for the same year,” according to a report by Radoslav Stamenkov, the head of the Bulgaria office at the International Organization for Migration. The “migration shock” that began in 2013 created social tensions “in a country that had a very limited experience of receiving migrants,” Stamenkov wrote.
Kanev sees BNO Shipka and similar groups as xenophobic nationalists at best, or at worst, violent and racist extremists. In October 2015, an Afghan migrant was shot and killed when he tried to cross into Bulgaria. In November, protests by locals over rumors of disease forced the temporary closure of the country’s largest refugee camp and led to riots.
“There are ongoing criminal proceedings against a number of these groups,” Kanev said. Bulgarian vigilantes have detained migrants and tied them up, sometimes beating and humiliating them before forcing them back across the border, he added.
Asked for its position on vigilante groups, Bulgaria’s Interior Ministry did not respond.
Jokes and Cigarettes
Back in the forests of the Strandzha Massif, BNO Shipka is going out on patrol. In bitter cold and with snow on the ground, this isn’t the high season for refugees crossing from Turkey. Some still try.
After a series of short speeches by leaders, members gear up and head toward the border. But the presence of a large group of people in ski masks and military regalia dashing from cover to cover in view of the highway attracts the attention of local authorities.
Two border police officers, accompanied by several soldiers armed with assault rifles, drive up in four-by-fours and ask for an explanation. They seem less concerned than confused. Most BNO Shipka members wear Bulgarian military fatigues from their own service so the groups merge, trading jokes and cigarettes. Only the slung rifles indicate who is an active soldier and who is a vigilante.
The authorities seem unsure what to do, particularly with members of the media present.
A BNO Shipka squad leader informs journalists that police are letting them continue, but the training mission has been completed and the team will return to the fishing lodge. As the group marches back, police follow them having called in reinforcements.
No one is detained or questioned further, but police return the following day.
Undeterred, BNO Shipka members record a video message to Trump. They put on snow camouflage oversuits and sneak around police stationed at the road leading to the lodge.
Asked if he is afraid Bulgaria is losing its identity, founding member Ivanov nods. "If we don’t do something soon,” he said. “It’s not just Bulgaria, but all of Europe.”
BNO Shipka didn’t catch any migrants this time. Still, they intend to keep looking.
Defending human rights in Chechnya
Defending human rights in Russian republic Chechnya is not without its risks. Local IRCT member the Committee to Prevent Torture has been the target of endless acts of violence, discrimination and harassment because of its anti-torture work. Just last month, a group of journalists and a couple of the Committee’s staff were beaten up by masked men and the organisation’s offices were broken into. Despite international human rights organisations calling for a proper investigation, the perpetrators are yet to be brought to justice.
▻https://worldwithouttorture.org/2016/04/14/defending-human-rights-in-chechnya
#Tchétchénie #droits_humains
Sinai plane crash may show price of Putin’s military adventurism in Syria | World news | The Guardian
▻http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/05/sinai-plane-crash-putin-military-adventurism-syria-analysis
With many US and European security officials now appearing to agree that a bomb on board the plane is the most likely cause of the disaster, questions will be asked about why a Russian airline, rather than any other airline, was attacked – and why Putin was so keen to discount the possibility that terrorism was responsible.
The most likely answer to both questions is Putin’s Syria adventure. To be fair to the Russian leader, he has long identified spreading Islamist terrorism as a threat to Russia and its central Asian allies, as well as to Arab and western countries. Islamist separatists in Russia’s Muslim Caucasus region, particularly in Chechnya, have a recent history of terror attacks on Russian soil. And many Chechen fighters have reportedly joined Isis ranks.
But by making an enemy of Isis, Putin has put Russia directly in the firing line. This will not go down well with the Russian public, which showed little support for another recent Russian interventions, in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Body bags, military and civilian, bring back bad memories for Russians of the disastrous war in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
For a man who is notoriously touchy about Moscow’s reputation and standing, the fact that the Obama administration and British ministers publicly predicted that Putin’s intervention would make Russia a terrorist target is galling.
Donc, si on comprend bien la logique : voilà ce qui se passe quand on attaque vraiment l’EI ; c’est bien fait pour lui, fallait pas qu’il y aille !
OSCE observer in Luhansk region found to be Russian intelligence officer - media
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/osce-observer-in-luhansk-region-found-to-be-russian-intelligence-officer-m
An observer of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the OSCE in Luhansk region, Maxim Udovichenko, has been revealed to be an employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Federation, the TSN news service of the “1+1” TV channel has reported.
(intégralité de la brève)
Ça ne va pas arranger les membres de la mission qui sont — déjà — soupçonnés par les deux côtés…
OSCE’s impartiality questioned as monitor turns out to be ex-Russian intelligence officer
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/osces-impartiality-questioned-as-monitor-turns-out-to-be-ex-russian-intell
A scandal over the work in Ukraine of Russian monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has erupted after one of them was videoed saying he had recently served in Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
The Russian was also videoed using insulting and derogatory language regarding Ukraine.
The OSCE said on Oct. 27 that it had expelled the monitor from its mission in Ukraine, attributing the move to the monitor’s “unprofessional conduct, (and) violations of (the OSCE) code and the principle of impartiality.” The OSCE said the observer had been “apparently inebriated.”
The scandal underscores long-running concerns in Ukraine over the presence of Russian monitors on the OSCE mission in the country.
Critics say that allowing representatives of an aggressor country to monitor the war zone in eastern Ukraine is an absurdity. They also suspect that some of them could be spying for Russia.
However, the OSCE has been reluctant to recognize Russia as a party to the war in eastern Ukraine, despite there being an immense pool of evidence of the presence of Russian weapons, mercenaries and regular troops in the country.
The monitor who triggered the scandal, Maxim Udovichenko, told Ukrainian channel 1+1 in the city of Severodonetsk in Luhansk Oblast that he had served in the 24th special forces brigade of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), according to footage of the 1+1 television network posted on the Ukraine Today channel’s site on Oct. 27.
“Yes, I served in Russian armed forces…” Udovichenko said in the video footage. “I served in the 24th brigade of special forces. I retired in 2010.”
1+1 also sent the Kyiv Post footage in which Udovichenko explicitly calls himself a “GRU officer” and appears to threaten a 1+1 journalist.
“I served in the Main Intelligence Directorate,” he told the journalist. “Are you out of your mind? You’re messing with the wrong guy.”
Udovichenko said he had retired as a lieutenant colonel, and added he had served during the war in Chechnya in 1994. He also lambasted Ukraine.
“Ukraine is a piece of shit,” he told a local resident in the 1+1 footage. “There is great Russia. It’s right nearby.”
1+1 also cited Udovichenko as saying that Russian troops would return to Ukraine.
“The entire armada has gone away to Syria, now you sort it out yourselves,” Udovichenko said in the 1+1 video, apparently referring to Russian regular troops being redeployed from Ukraine to Syria.
Michael Bociurkiw, a spokesman for the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine, described the incident as a “very unfortunate and very rare occasion.”
“Whatever his personal views, we’re not going to comment on them,” he told the Kyiv Post.
Inside the world’s only sanctuary for exiled journalists - Quartz
▻http://qz.com/495602/inside-the-worlds-only-sanctuary-for-exiled-journalists
The Maison was the dream of a French journalist named Danièle Ohayon, after she was tempted into a conversation with a homeless person—who also turned out to have been a journalist, from Chechnya.
(...) “More journalists are being killed, exiled and imprisoned and in this sense, the Maison is a sort of barometer of the situation of liberty of the press in the world,” Darline Cothière says.
#maison des #journalistes #exil
Bah. Des journalistes francophones exilés, il y en a plein. J’en connais deux qui sont gardiens de la paix à #Bruxelles. Deux autres qui sont #médiateurs de quartier (whatever that means) à Metz et à #Bruxelles et quatre au #chômage à #Bruxelles. Et j’en ai croisé d’autres à #Paris. Sans me forcer.
Et qui donc officient bénévolement sur les radios libres locales ou dans des journaux alternatifs papier ou web. Et sans me forcer. Tu parles d’une #solidarité, ils ont tous les même histoires à raconter de #racisme et de #condescendance de la part des services RH de titres de #presse ou même de sois-disant pairs journalistes.
Ce milieu joue tellement des coudes qu’il n’y a pas de place pour eux, quelque soit leur expérience passée et le sens très concret qu’a pour eux liberté de la presse.
Moscow Accuses Ukrainian PM Of ’Torturing’ Russians In Chechen War
▻http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-moscow-accuses-yatsenyuk/27233898.html
Bastrykin [, the powerful head of Russia’s Investigative Committee,] claimed in the interview that Yatsenyuk “participated in at least two armed conflicts” in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, in late 1994 and early 1995, “as well as in torture and executions of Russian army servicemen” in January 1995.
He also claimed that the late Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, who declared Chechen independence from Russia in 1991 and led separatists in the first Chechen war until his death in a Russian missile strike in 1996, awarded Yatsenyuk and other alleged Ukrainian volunteers medals for “killing Russian servicemen.”
[…]
Yatsenyuk’s spokeswoman, Olha Lappo, responded to the allegation on social media by “encourag[ing] the Russian regime to undergo psychiatric evaluation.”
During the time period indicated in Bastrykin’s allegations, Yatsenyuk was studying in the western Ukrainian city of Chernivtsi, near the Romanian border, according to the Ukrainian premier’s official biography.
Chechen Jihadis Leave Syria, Join the Fight in Ukraine - The Daily Beast
►http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/04/chechen-jihadists-leave-syria-join-the-fight-in-urkaine.html
MARIUPOL, Ukraine — Just an hour’s drive from this city under siege, at an old resort on the Azov Sea that’s now a military base, militants from Chechnya—veterans of the jihad in their own lands and, more recently, in Syria—now serve in what’s called the Sheikh Mansur Battalion. Some of them say they have trained, at least, in the Middle East with fighters for the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS.
Among the irregular forces who’ve enlisted in the fight against the Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, few are more controversial or more dangerous to the credibility of the cause they say they want to serve. Russian President Vladimir Putin would love to portray the fighters he supports as crusaders against wild-eyed jihadists rather than the government in Ukraine that wants to integrate the country more closely with Western Europe.
Yet many Ukrainian patriots, desperate to gain an edge in the fight against the Russian-backed forces, are willing to accept the Chechen militants on their side.
Over the past year, dozens of Chechen fighters have come across Ukraine’s border, some legally, some illegally, and connected in Donbas with the Right Sector, a far-right-wing militia. The two groups, with two battalions, have little in common, but they share an enemy and they share this base.
Doublon, mais moi, j’ai mis l’illustration…
▻http://seenthis.net/messages/405483
Raised by ISIS, Returned to Chechnya: ‘These Children Saw Terrible Things’
Every day, Belant Zulgayeva gets a knot in her throat watching her grandchildren play their violent games, what she calls their “little war.” They talk very little, but they run around, hide and, occasionally, slam one another to the ground with a disturbing ferocity.
Ms. Zulgayeva is on the front line of a different kind of struggle: an effort by the Russian government to bring home and care for Russian children like her three grandchildren, who were raised by Islamist militants in the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
As the American-led coalition and Syrian government forces captured cities that had been held by the Islamic State, they found among the ruins a grim human wreckage of the organization’s once successful recruitment drive: hundreds and perhaps thousands of children born to or brought with the men and women who had flocked to Syria in support of the Islamic State.
While Russia, which has so far returned 71 children and 26 women since August, may seem surprisingly lenient in its policy, its actions reflect a hardheaded security calculus: better to bring children back to their grandparents now than have them grow up in camps and possibly return as radicalized adults.
“What should we do, leave them there so somebody will recruit them?” said Ziyad Sabsabi, the Russian senator who runs the government-backed program. “Yes, these children saw terrible things, but when we put them in a different environment, with their grandparents, they change quickly.”
European governments have shown little sympathy toward adult males who volunteered to join the militant group. Rory Stewart, the British international development minister, for example, told the BBC that “the only way of dealing with them will be, in almost every case, to kill them.”
But most European countries, including Britain, have taken a softer approach to repatriating most of the women and the estimated 1,000 children of militants from the European Union who fought in Syria. France has placed most of the 66 minors who have returned so far from the Islamic State in foster or adoptive homes. Some have joined relatives. A few older ones, who were combatants, have been incarcerated.
Analysts estimate that as many as 5,000 family members of foreign terrorist recruits are now marooned in camps and orphanages in Iraq and Syria. Russia and Georgia are in the forefront of countries helping family members to return, said Liesbeth van der Heide, the co-author of “Children of the Caliphate,” a study published last summer by the International Center for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague.
As Mr. Sabsabi acknowledged, many, if not most, of the returning children were exposed to unspeakable acts of macabre violence, including roles in execution videos. Many children were desensitized to violence through ceaseless indoctrination, paramilitary training and participation in various other crimes.
Germany’s domestic intelligence chief, Hans-Georg Maassen, told Reuters the children of the Islamic State were “brainwashed,” and that “we have to consider that these children could be living time bombs.”
That is not an easy view to take of Bilal, 4, a little Russian boy with a mop of sandy blond hair and spindly arms who last summer became the first child returned to Russia from Islamic-State controlled territory.
He makes car noises and pushes a toy around the kitchen table in his grandmother’s apartment in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. He says little about his time in Iraq, says his grandmother, Rosa Murtazayeva, but it is obvious he remains touchingly attached to his father, Hasan.
With American-backed forces closing in, father and son survived like hunted animals in basements in Mosul, which the Islamic State controlled for three years. Bilal recalls little but the boiled potatoes they survived on. “I was with papa,” Bilal said. “There were no other boys.”
After they were captured, his father vanished into Iraqi prisons. Emaciated and filthy when he was found, Bilal is now outwardly fine. Ms. Murtazayeva said he is sociable at kindergarten and has many friends.
That is not always the case. Even months after returning, some children remain grimly silent, despite various therapies and pampering from their grandparents.
When the Islamic State tide went out, Hadizha, 8, was found like flotsam in a Mosul street. Her grandmother identified her from a photograph posted by an aid group. She was lying in a gutter, her arm and chin bandaged from burns.
What became of her mother, two brothers and a sister is unclear, said the grandmother, Zura, identified only by her first name to protect the child’s privacy. She cares for Hadizha in a small village in Chechnya.
“I gently asked her, ‘What happened?’ but she doesn’t want to say anything,” Zura said. “I want to hope they are alive, to latch onto something. But she is certain. She says they were shot, but that she waved her hands and said in Arabic, ‘Don’t shoot,’ and saved herself in that way.”
While clearly troubled, Hadizha hardly seems to pose any risks. She spends her days curled up on a couch, her eyes distant and angry, watching cartoons on a big-screen television. “She doesn’t need anything else,” her grandmother said. “She is silent.”
Others have fared better. Adlan, 9, left for Syria with his mother and father and two siblings but returned alone, delivered by Russians working with the repatriation program.
Photo
In the Islamic State, he said, he attended school, rode bikes and played tag with other Russian-speaking children. During the battle for Mosul, something exploded in his house, he said. He survived but the rest of the family was killed. “He said he saw his mother and brother and sisters, and they were sleeping,” said his Chechen grandfather, Eli, identified only by his first name to protect the child’s privacy.
Asked by a child psychologist to draw a picture with crayons, Adlan drew a house and flowers, deemed to be a good sign. “I think it will pass. He is still young and has a child’s memory,” Eli said.
Women from Muslim areas of Russia sometimes traveled to Syria or Iraq with their husbands, and sometimes in search of a husband, said Ekaterina L. Sokiryanskaya, director of the Conflict Analysis and Prevention Center, adding that they present a different set of resettlement issues.
“Women were not in the battlefield, but that does not mean that they were not radicalized, that they were not supporters of this terrorist organization and its very ugly ideology,” Ms. Sokiryanskaya said. “There were many very radical women joining.”
Hava Beitermurzayeva, now 22, slipped away in 2015 from her parents’ home in the village of Gekhi in Chechnya to marry an Islamic State soldier she had met online, and she wound up living in Raqqa, the capital of the militant group’s so-called caliphate in Syria.
She said in an interview that she spent most of her time cloistered at home, with a new son. The Islamic State militants, she added, enforced religious rules and staged public executions, by beheading or stoning, for crimes like adultery.
“The passers-by could stop and watch,” Ms. Beitermurzayeva said, though she says she never did herself.
Back at home now, she seems remarkably untroubled by her experiences and still enthusiastic about the caliphate, though, as she says, it was not God’s will to work out this time. “Everything that happened to me was determined by God,” she said. “If I were to regret it, I would be unhappy with the fate that God gave me.”
At first, Hamzat, 6, and his younger brothers, the boys who battle each other in their grandmother’s living room, talked very little when they moved in with her in Dachu-Borzoi, a village in the Caucasus Mountains in Chechnya. They just played their war games. But with time, they mellowed, Ms. Zulgayeva said.
They had been living in Tal Afar, Iraq, when American-backed Iraqi forces surrounded the city. Their father died in the fighting. After a bomb flattened a neighboring house, their mother, Fatima, decided to get out with the three boys and their baby sister.
But Hamzat and his brothers, Malik, 4, and Abdullah, 5, became separated from her at a checkpoint. She remains detained in Iraq, while the Russian government returned the boys and their baby sister, Halima, who turned 1 this month.
“It’s a miracle they all made it back alive,” Ms. Zulgayeva said.
Swiss diplomat Tagliavini to give up Ukraine OSCE role - StarTribune.com
▻http://www.startribune.com/swiss-diplomat-tagliavini-to-give-up-ukraine-osce-role/306367271
The Swiss government says diplomat Heidi Tagliavini plans to step down as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s representative in talks between Moscow, Kiev and pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine.
Tagliavini, who previously worked on crises in places including Chechnya and Georgia, has played a low-key but well-regarded role for the past year in efforts to cool the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
The Swiss Foreign Ministry said Saturday that Tagliavini wants to give up her mandate soon. It gave no reason or exact timing for her departure.
The announcement comes four days after the latest talks ended with no visible results. The OSCE’s deputy chief monitor in Ukraine has called for an urgent resumption of negotiations amid the worst fighting since a cease-fire began to take hold in March.
Brève du Kyiv Post à propos de cette démission (certainement pas une bonne nouvelle en ce qu’elle révèle sûrement le constat d’une absence de volonté d’aboutir à un accord).
Tagliavini resignation could have been prompted by disruption of Contact Group meeting on June 2
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/tagliavini-resignation-could-have-been-prompted-by-disruption-of-contact-g
Heidi Tagliavini’s resignation as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) envoy for Ukraine could have been prompted by the disruption of the Trilateral Contact Group meeting on June 2, a source with the group organizing the Contact Group’s meetings in Minsk said.
Suspicions abound as Chechen fighters make mysterious exit from Donbas battlefield
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/suspicions-abound-as-chechen-fighters-make-mysterious-exit-from-donbas-bat
Amid growing signs of a standoff between the Kremlin and Chechnya’s strongman leader Ramzan Kadyrov – and persistent rumors of infighting among Russian-backed separatists who control parts of the Donbas – Chechen fighters have left the battlefield in eastern Ukraine.
Some say they were forced out.
Journalists working in Donetsk said they had in past weeks noticed a major exodus of previously pro-Kremlin Chechen fighters, with no reason provided from separatist leadership as to why they departed. The exit of the Chechen fighters, who played a prominent role when Russia instigated the war a year ago, has triggered speculation.
Fire Engulfs Mosque in Russia’s Dagestan, No One Hurt - NYTimes.com
▻http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/04/10/world/europe/ap-eu-russia-mosque-fire.html
Fire has engulfed the main mosque in a town in the southern Russian republic of Dagestan.
Police spokeswoman Fatina Ubaidatova says no one was hurt when the fire swept through the mosque in Kizlyar, located near the border with Chechnya.
Fire investigators were still trying to determine the cause of Friday’s blaze, which broke out after morning prayers.
There were no indications that the fire was connected to the Islamic insurgency that spread through Russia’s predominantly Muslim North Caucasus region after two separatist wars in Chechnya.
A number of moderate Muslim clerics who oppose a more fundamentalist form of Islam have been attacked or killed in Dagestan in recent years.
Russia’s war against Ukraine renews Chechen animosities
▻http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/russias-war-against-ukraine-renews-chechen-animosities-384581.html
Chechens, like many other ethnicities, have been divided by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
One group, led by pro-Kremlin Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, has joined Russia’s cause.
Another group, part of the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion, is fighting for Ukraine.
The battalion, set up last March and named after Chechnya’s first president and insurgent leader, views the war as part of a broader struggle against Russian imperialism and the Kadyrov regime, the Kremlin’s main bulwark in the Caucasus.
(…)
[Amina] Okuyeva [, the battalion’s spokeswoman,] clad in camouflage and a Muslim headscarf, could not specify a more specific location and the current number of fighters for security reasons. She also said that the battalion used trophy weapons and got its food and clothing supplies from volunteers.
Though the unit has been called a “Chechen battalion,” ethnic Chechens account for only about 17 percent, while about 70 percent are ethnic Ukrainians. Most of the Chechens are from European countries, including Denmark and Scandinavian nations, but there are also those who come from Chechnya and fought in the First Chechen War (1994-1996) and Second Chechen War (1999-2000).
The battalion also includes other Muslims like Azeris, Ingush and Tatars, as well as Georgians.
The unit’s fighters have different views ranging from secular to religious ones, Okuyeva said.
Ça se complique (avant, c’était simple ;-)
Des Tchétchènes scandinaves laïques représentés par une vraie tchétchène en voile islamique camouflé se battent en Ukraine pour l’indépendance tchétchène et la défense de l’Occident contre l’envahisseur russe …
Syria Calling : Radicalisation in Central Asia - International Crisis Group
►http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/b072-syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.aspx
Growing numbers of Central Asian citizens, male and female, are travelling to the Middle East to fight or otherwise support the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIL or ISIS). Prompted in part by political marginalisation and bleak economic prospects that characterise their post-Soviet region, 2,000-4,000 have in the past three years turned their back on their secular states to seek a radical alternative. IS beckons not only to those who seek combat experience, but also to those who envision a more devout, purposeful, fundamentalist religious life. This presents a complex problem to the governments of Central Asia. They are tempted to exploit the phenomenon to crack down on dissent. The more promising solution, however, requires addressing multiple political and administrative failures, revising discriminatory laws and policies, implementing outreach programs for both men and women and creating jobs at home for disadvantaged youths, as well as ensuring better coordination between security services.
Intéressant, mais toujours le même problème : il nous faudrait admettre que cette forme très spécifique d’islamisme radical naîtrait spontanément de la pauvreté, des discriminations et de la répression.
Or, voici ce que Labévière écrivait déjà en octobre 1999 (il y a quinze ans !), dans son prologue pour l’édition américaine de « Dollars for Terror » :
Parallel to the astonishing ideological convergence between the Parisian ex-Leftists and certain former CIA analysts, there is a perceptible propagation of Sunni Islamism (in varying degrees) from Chechnya to Chinese Xinjiang, and it affects all the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union. With the active support of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates andother oil monarchies and with the benevolence of the American services engaged in these areas, we can expect a “Talebanization” of Central Asia, particularly in Chechnya.
Following a series of terrorist attacks in Moscow during the autumn of 1999, the Russian army launched a series of operations in Chechnya and Dagestan. This new war in Chechnya came on the heels of a series of grave events ascribable to the Sunni Muslims, whose networks are still expanding from the Caspian Sea to the gates of China. Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president, had sought to unify his country via Islam; in the end, threatened by militants who want to establish an Islamic State in Chechnya similar to that of the Taleban in Afghanistan.
After the withdrawal of the Russian troops in 1996, incidents between Islamists and the police force escalated dramatically. An emir of Arab origin, who wanted to found an Islamic State covering the whole of the Caucasus, raised an army of 2000 men. On July 15, 1998, conflicts between 1000 Islamic combatants and the security forces killed more than 50 people in the town of Gudermes, 23 miles east of Grozny. Shortly after these clashes, Chechen President Maskhadov called on the population and the local religious authority to resist the “Wahhabis and those who are behind these misled insurrectionaries.” He affirmed his intention to excise from Chechnya “those who are trying to impose a foreign ideology on the population.” On July 31, 1998 he barely escaped an assassination attempt attributed to Islamic activists.
On December 12, 1998, the Chechen authorities announced the arrest of Arbi Baraev, a Wahhabi militant. He had proclaimed a “Jihad against the enemies of the true religion,” and was implicated in the murder of the four Western engineers (three British and one New Zealander) whose severed heads were found on December 10, 1998. He also admitted participating in the kidnapping and the detention of Frenchman Vincent Cochetel, a delegate from the U.N.’s High Commission of Refugees. Cochetel disappeared in Ossetia; he was released on December 10, 1998, after 317 days in captivity. The Islamists, in addition, acknowledged kidnapping the Chechen Attorney General Mansour Takirov, on December 11, 1998. And on March 21, 1999, the Chechen President escaped a second bombing, right in the center of Grozny.
While Aslan Maskhadov proclaims his determination to eradicate Wahhabi Islamism in his country, he is opposed by several members of his government who protect the religious activists. Thus Movadi Uklugov, a member of the Chechen government, wants to establish diplomatic relation with the Taleban of Afghanistan. The Chechen Vice President Vakha Arsanov called for reprisals against the United States after the August 20, 1998 bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan. One year later, Chechnya was cut in two by the Russian forces; 170,000 women and children headed for exile in Ingushetia, another Islamic sanctuary. The pressure of refugees fleeing the war in Ossetia is growing and the entire area is slipping into a civil war mode, like Afghan — just what Maskhadov wanted to avoid. But “Talebanization” is gaining ground in Dagestan, Tatarstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the fringes of China as well.
In May 1997, in Dagestan, Wahhabi militants wielding automatic weapons clashed with representatives of local Sufi brotherhoods. Two people were killed, three others wounded and eighteen Wahhabis were taken hostage by the Sufis. On December 21, 1997, three units of former volunteers from the Afghan resistance attacked a Russian military base in Dagestan. These combatants, coming from Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, assassinated several dozen Russian soldiers and officers, and then set fire to some three hundred vehicles. Before retiring to Chechnya, these Islamists handed out leaflets proclaiming, among other things, that new military training camps would be opened in Chechnya to prepare additional combatants “who will teach the impious Russians a lesson.”
In August 1998, the Wahhabi communities of three Dagestani villages proclaimed “independent Islamic republics,” recognized Sharia as the only law valid in the state, and sought to leave the Russian Federation to join Chechnya. Lastly, August 21, 1998, the mufti of Dagestan, Saïd Mohammad Abubakarov (who had urged the authorities to react firmly against Wahhabi terrorism) and his brother were killed when his residence was bombed. The chaos caused by this attack led the country to the brink of civil war.
In Tatarstan, the authorities see the development of a radical Islamist movement as a serious threat to the country’s stability, since the appearance of “religious political organizations” endangers the coexistence of the Russian and Tatar populations. In March 1999, Mintimer Chaîmiev — President of Tatarstan — denounced “the action of emissaries from Islamic countries who recruit young people in Russia, and give them military training abroad, leading to terrorist actions.” During 1999, several Pakistani, Afghan and Saudi “missionaries” wereexpelled from the country for proselytism intended to unleash a “holy war.”
The Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan has long been the site of an Islamist education and agitation center with close ties to Pakistan and the Saudi Wahhabi organizations. In 1992, after an uprising in Namangan, the biggest town in the Ferghana Valley, President Islam Karimov (the former head of the Uzbek Communist Party) ordered a series of arrests against the Islamist agitators while seeking to promote an official form of Islam through the International Center of Islamic Research financed by the State. In December 1997, several police officers were assassinated by Wahhabi activists. On February 16, 1998, the Uzbek Minister for Foreign Affairs blamed the Islamist organizations in Pakistan and accused them of training the terrorists who conducted these assassinations. According to his information services, more than 500 Uzbeks, Kirghiz and Tajiks were trained in Pakistan and in Afghanistan before returning to their home lands in order to propagate a holy war against the “impious authorities.”
Between July 1998 and January 1999, a hundred Wahhabi Islamists were tried and sentenced to three to twenty years in prison. On February 16, 1999, six explosions ripped through Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, killing 15 and wounding some 150. The first three charges exploded near the government headquarters; three others hit a school, a retail store and the airport. Shortly after this lethal night, the Uzbek authorities denounced acts “financed by organizations based abroad” and reiterated their intention to fight Wahhabi extremism. On March 18, 1999, some thirty Wahhabi militants (suspected of involvement in the February 16 attacks) were arrested in Kazakhstan. According to Interfax, the Russian press agency, they were holding airplane tickets for the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Chechnya and Azerbaidjan.
In Kyrgyzstan, in February 1998, the Muslim religious authorities launched a vast information campaign to counter Saudi proselytism and the propagation of Wahhabi ideology. On May 12, the Kyrgyzstan security forces arrested four foreigners, members of a very active clandestine Wahhabi organization. This group was training recruits from Kyrgyzstan in military boot camps linked to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The police also seized Afghan and Pakistani passports, a large sum in U.S. dollars, video cassettes summoning viewers to a “holy war,” and other propaganda documents. The authorities announced a series of measures against those who were using religious instruction “to destabilize the country.” In May 1998, the Kyrgyz authorities, who had already arrested and extradited eight Uzbek activists in 1997, signed two agreements on anti-terrorist cooperation with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
China has not been spared. Xinjiang (southern China), has a population that is 55% Uighur (a turkophone Sunni ethnic group); it has been confronted with Islamist violence since the beginning of the 1990’s. Created in 1955, Xinjiang (which means “new territory”) is one of the five autonomous areas of China and is the largest administrative unit of the country. The area is highly strategic at the geopolitical level — Chinese nuclear tests and rocket launches take place on the Lop Nor test grounds — as well as from an economic standpoint, since it abounds in natural wealth (oil, gas, uranium, gold, etc.). Against this backdrop, attacks have proliferated by independence-seeking cliques, all preaching “Holy War.”
Some are acting in the name of Turkish identity, while others are fighting in the name of Allah (especially in the southern part of the region). As in the rest of Central Asia, in Xinjiang we are witnessing the rising influence of Wahhabi groups and the increasing proselytism of preachers from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Traditionally allied with popular China, Pakistan is nevertheless trying to extend its influence to this part of China, using the Islamists as it did in Afghanistan. For this reason Beijing closed the road from Karakorum, connecting Xinjiang to Pakistan, between 1992 and 1995. Since 1996, the frequency of the incidents has skyrocketed. In February 1997, riots exploded in Yining (a town of 300,000 inhabitants located to the west of Urumqi, near the Kazakh border). This violence caused ten deaths, according to Chinese authorities, and the Uighurs have counted more than a hundred victims.
Every week in 1998 saw a bombing or an attack with automatic weapons. The region’s hotels, airports and railway stations are in a constant state of alert. In April, Chinese authorities in the vicinity of Yining seized 700 cases of ammunition from Kazakhstan. In September, the Secretary of the Xinjiang Communist Party declared that “19 training camps, in which specialists returning from Afghanistan educate young recruits in the techniques of terrorism, with the assistance of the Taleban,” were neutralized. In January 1999, 29 activists implicated in the February 1997 riots were arrested. On February 12, violent clashes between the police and groups of Uighur militants wounded several dozen people in Urumqi. Two hundred people were arrested. In early March, 10,000 additional soldiers arrived at Yining to beef up security, while in Beijing, the Uighur Islamist organizations took credit for several bomb attacks.
Le texte du International Crises Group recommande finalement :
Russia and China are already concerned and have urged the Central Asian states to address the problem of radicalisation in light of the rise of IS. The region’s other international partners, including, the EU and the U.S., should recognise that Central Asia is a growing source of foreign fighters and consider prioritising policing reform, as well as a more tolerant attitude to religion, in their recommendations for combating the problem.
Ce qui me laisse penser que là, comme dans d’autres situations (notamment la Syrie), on s’abstrait volontairement (et avec une fausse-naïveté épatante) des aspects géopolitiques et de l’histoire des deux dernières décennies. (Parce qu’on ne sait toujours pas à quel moment on devrait admettre que les Occidentaux et leurs relais Séoudiens et Pakistanais auraient définitivement renoncé à jouer la carte jihadiste dans le monde… après 2001, après l’Irak, après la Libye, après la Syrie, après Charlie Hebdo ?).