Putting Out the Syrian Fire
▻http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/opinion/international/putting-out-the-syrian-fire.html
On peut, affirme Rami Khoury, satisfaire “la plupart” des revendications de l’Arabie Saoudite (qui sont quand même les suivantes: "... to weaken Iran and end its alleged nuclear arms ambitions, topple Mr. Assad, contain Hezbollah, stop the expansion of Shiite influence, reassert Sunni political predominance in much of the Arab world, and strengthen pro-Western or conservative regimes in the Middle East. ") tout en contentant l’Iran.
Riyadh would enter a dialogue with Tehran, Moscow and Washington if it felt that most of these goals could be achieved peacefully. And if American-Russian-Iranian dialogues generated enough regional momentum, the Saudis would be eager to join the conversation in order to ensure maximum gains.
(...)
Once at the table, each of these four key drivers of the many wars within Syria would likely decide that an agreement best serves their strategic interests.
America and Saudi Arabia would see Mr. Assad removed from power and check what they see as Iran’s hegemonic and nuclear aims (and, significantly for Saudi Arabia, Shiite influence across the region).
Russia would feel it had weakened Islamist rebels, given Mr. Assad a dignified exit and stopped Washington’s unilateral assaults on Mideast regimes; Iran would secure formal American acceptance of its regional significance and its right to a peaceful nuclear capability and an end to the sanctions against it.
With Saudi Arabia in the mix, another Geneva-style gathering would finally have the backing needed to produce results: a cease-fire, humanitarian assistance and refugee repatriations, and a peaceful transition to a post-Assad, post-Baathist government, with significant decentralization of power from the central government, and strong legal protections for all religious groups.
