• Turkey’s Syria Policy Ain’t Gonna Change - The Daily Beast
    http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/09/turkey-s-syria-policy-ain-t-gonna-change.html

    La perte du vote kurde, en réaction à l’aide apportée par les Turcs aux « djihadistes », comme explication de l’échec relatif de l’AKP

    Ironically, by trying to keep the PYD at bay, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan undercut his personal appeal in Turkey’s Kurdish majority southeast and undermined his former party’s efforts to continue to attract support from religiously-minded Kurds. This key constituency defected from the AKP in this past election, choosing instead to vote for Turkey’s fourth largest political party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).

    [...]

    In November 2012, the PYD accused Turkey of supporting a number of rebel groups, including the then-recently formed Jabhat al-Nusra, the official al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, during an offensive against PYD strongholds. Turkey’s reported support for these groups, combined with Kurdish complaints about Ankara’s lax border policy during this period, ultimately birthed the now-widely held belief among the region’s Kurds that Ankara supports Islamist rebels, including Nusra and its ideological cousin, the Islamic State.

    This perception has since become fact in much of Turkey’s southeast. Most Kurds now take it for granted that “Ankara supports IS,”

    Cependant les adversaires politiques non kurdes de Erdogan auraient la même stratégie d’appui aux djihadistes que ce dernier, ce qui fait que le vote des kurdes aurait peu de chance de modifier la politique syrienne de la Turquie,

    While Erdogan may choose to replace Davutoglu, it is unlikely that any of the potential candidates will dramatically break with the AKP’s policy—especially now that Turkish-backed rebel groups are on the march in Idlib.

    Thus, while HDP outperformed the AKP with Kurdish voters, its success may not actually result in much difference to the direction of Turkey’s Syria policy. These dynamics suggest maintenance of the status quo, albeit with more details about Ankara’s actions in Syria being aired in Parliament. Ankara is thus likely to continue to arm rebel factions and provided cross-border aid, but these activities are unlikely to stay secret for very long. This could make life difficult for the AKP, but its top leadership remains committed to the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, both as a means to end the Syrian conflict and as a longer-term effort to enact key elements of its foreign policy.