(En prenant pour argent comptant les déclarations de l’armée sioniste quant aux pertes du Hamas)
“The war has become the objective,” former Shin Bet security agency director Ami Ayalon told me in a recent Haaretz interview. The statement attracted wide attention in Israel and around the world among about half a million readers and followers on social media.
And now that we have passed the 100-day milestone since Hamas’ surprise October 7 attack, the statement resonates all the more strongly.
Many of the country’s decision-makers appear enamored of a situation in which the war continues with no end in sight and consider it an unavoidable necessity. At Sunday’s cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that the war will continue for many more months. That’s no surprise.
Since the initial weeks of the war, many Israelis have sensed that war’s declared aims have been largely unrealistic and that Netanyahu’s hidden objectives are personal and political – evading testifying at his criminal corruption trial, preventing a resumption of the protests against his government and disrupting any attempt to hold early elections.
This week in conversations with Israeli media outlets, American officials expressed major disappointment over the prime minister’s conduct. So what else is new? Did they expect Netanyahu to thank them for America’s diplomatic, military and moral support for Israel? Were they surprised that he has taken the aid for granted and isn’t taking the United States into account? Didn’t they know that he misleads, that he’s a manipulator who hasn’t read verse from the Book of Exodus that states “keep thee far from a false matter”?
But Netanyahu isn’t alone in his efforts to prolong the war. He has partners among the political and military leadership. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, National Unity Party leader Benny Gantz, IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi, Shin Bet security agency director Ronen Bar and other senior Shin Bet officers and IDF generals share the wish to prolong the war, each for his own reasons.
Gallant comes right behind Netanyahu in bearing responsibility for the political and security failure of October 7. Even if he deserves credit for warning last March that the government’s proposed judicial coup was damaging national security, he’s a full partner to the cabinet’s policies, procedures and decisions. After issuing his warning and being fired – and restored to office following a spontaneous protest – Gallant has continued to loyally serve Netanyahu’s malicious government.
Gantz is not responsible for the failure. Together with his party colleague and fellow former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, he has demonstrated national responsibility and statesmanship. Despite hesitations on the part of Netanyahu, who really didn’t want him, Gantz swallowed his pride and joined the war cabinet without conditions. But it quickly became apparent that he had no influence and that he and Eisenkot were merely there for show.
Judging by Gantz’s conduct, the National Unity Party leader has no intention of giving Netanyahu an ultimatum, even after 100 days of war. Several weeks ago, he should have said the following: “If the government doesn’t initiate a comprehensive deal that would end the war and release most of the terrorists in exchange for all of the hostages, I and the National Unity Party will resign.”
Gantz seems to be basking in his success in the polls , concerned that he would lose his high rating in the polls if he quits the government. From that perspective, there’s little difference between him and Netanyahu. In their management of the war, the decisions of both are also motivated by personal and political considerations.
Netanyahu, who at the beginning of the war suffered anxiety and panic, recovered within a few days from the trauma and took control of managing the war, the decision-making and the public agenda. He appears at press conferences, is photographed with soldiers at the front and on the home front and releases several statements per day. He also manipulates families of the hostages, takes credit for himself for accomplishments of the entire intelligence and defense community and minimizes the importance of Gantz and Eisenkot.
Also obvious is the responsibility of Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Halevi, Intelligence Corps chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, military intelligence research department head Brig. Gen. Amit Saar, IDF Southern Command head Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and other senior officers, as well as Ronen Bar and his staff. All of them, including Gallant, have admitted responsibility for the failures of October 7 – some more so and some less, some publicly and others privately – but none have publicly announced that they would resign.
On Sunday, in an interview with Army Radio, former Shin Bet director Jacob Perry recounted that the agency’s current director, Ronen Bar, told his staff that he would resign after the war. Shin Bet staff were quick to make it clear that during the war’s first week, Bar had only told his staff that he was responsible for the agency’s failure to provide a timely warning that could have foiled the attack.
What is driving the concern that Gallant, Halevi, Bar and their senior subordinates have an interest in continued combat? Apart from the need to salve their tormented consciences, there is the unstated assumption that the longer the military campaign lasts, the more military accomplishments there will be, which would mitigate the scope of their failures and permit them to emerge as partial successes.
In fact, the IDF and Shin Bet can claim some successes. Most of Hamas’ military force has been severely damaged. It has lost 9,000 fighters (almost half of the force) and thousands more have been wounded. Its chain of command – of battalion and brigade commanders and its naval and air commanders – have been either killed, wounded or captured. The lion’s share of its rockets, particularly its long-range rockets, have been either destroyed or “wasted” when fired.
On the other hand, the IDF’s efforts to rescue the hostages have failed. The theory embraced by Halevi, Bar and Gallant that only military pressure can bring about the hostages’ release has not proven itself. Of the 268 hostages, 121 were freed in exchange for a cease-fire and Israel’s release of terrorists. The promise to eliminate Hamas’ leadership in Gaza and abroad has also been shown to be arrogant.
The IDF and Shin Bet have had difficulty through intelligence to find Hamas’ top three leaders in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa, and to reach them through military operations. The IDF and Shin Bet are also politically constrained from acting against Hamas’ leadership in Qatar and Turkey. The sole achievement in this regard has been the assassination of Saleh al-Arouri, for which Israel has not taken responsibility. The destruction of the tunnels in Gaza has also only been a partial success.
Such limited achievements are tactical in any event. Strategically, Israel is losing the war. It has not managed, as Netanyahu and Gallant had promised, to bring about the collapse of Hamas and is now facing in a war of attrition. Statements made both before and during the war that Israel can fight simultaneously on multiple fronts are being proven to be vain boasting. Israel is perceived as a weak country, with 150,000 of its citizens internally displaced refugees.
Talk of unity and the slogan “together we will win” are hollow lip service. Israel remains a divided and fractured country run by a reckless government that hasn’t changed and doesn’t intend to change direction and is unwilling to learn any real lessons. Evidence of that can be seen in the allocation of funding based on government coalition agreements and patronage appointments as well as a budget that doesn’t hold future promise.
Above all, what stands out is a lack of political courage that would lead to the conclusion that it would be better to declare limited achievements now and cut our losses. Instead, the government and army prefer to evade making difficult or critical decisions to end the war, to restore calm to the borders with Gaza and Lebanon and to free the hostages, even at the painful price of the release of all the Palestinian prisoners from Israeli custody.
Netanyahu, Gallant, and their coalition understand that if they act as expected of a country facing one of the most difficult times in its history – on their watch – their government would fall. And that’s the last thing that they want.
