• Ghaith Abdul-Ahad · Some Tips for the Long-Distance Traveller : How to Get to Germany · LRB 8 October 2015

    https://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n19/ghaith-abdul-ahad/some-tips-for-the-long-distance-traveller

    référence de 2015 mais le livre a l’air passionnant

    https://cdn.lrb.co.uk/assets/covers/q/cov3719.jpg?1447442601

    A Kurdish friend of mine in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq recently posted an image of a hand-drawn diagram on his Facebook page. With little arrows and stick figures and pictures of a train and boat or two, the diagram shows how to get from Turkey to the German border in twenty easy steps. After you’ve made the thousand-mile trip to western Turkey, the journey proper begins with a taxi to Izmir on the coast. An arrow points to the next stage: a boat across the Aegean to ‘a Greek island’, costing between €950 and €1200. Another boat takes you to Athens. A train – looking like a mangled caterpillar – leads to Thessaloniki. Walking, buses and two more worm-like trains take you across Macedonia to Skopje, and then through Serbia to Belgrade. A stick figure walks across the border into Hungary near the city of Szeged. Then it’s on to Budapest by taxi, and another taxi across the whole of Austria. At the bottom of the page a little blue stick figure is jumping in the air waving a flag. He has arrived in Germany, saying hello to Munich, after a journey of some three thousand miles, taking perhaps three weeks, at a total cost of $2400.

    #migrations #asile #itinéraire #circulations #migrants_voyageurs

  • Adam Shatz · Magical Thinking about Isis ·
    Adam Shatz
    LRB 3 December 2015
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n23/adam-shatz/magical-thinking-about-isis

    Before the Lebanese civil war, Beirut was known as the Paris of the Middle East. Today, Paris looks more and more like the Beirut of Western Europe, a city of incendiary ethnic tension, hostage-taking and suicide bombs. Parisians have returned to the streets, and to their cafés, with the same commitment to normality that the Lebanese have almost miraculously exhibited since the mid-1970s. Même pas peur, they have declared with admirable defiance on posters, and on the walls of the place de la République. But the fear is pervasive, and it’s not confined to France. In the last few weeks alone, Islamic State has carried out massacres in Baghdad, Ankara and south Beirut, and downed a Russian plane with 224 passengers. It has taunted survivors with threats of future attacks, as if its deepest wish were to provoke violent retaliation.

    Already traumatised by the massacres in January, France appears to be granting that wish. ‘Nous sommes dans la guerre,’ François Hollande declared, and he is now trying to extend the current state of emergency by amending the constitution. Less than 48 hours after the event, a new round of airstrikes was launched against Raqqa, in concert with Russia. With a single night’s co-ordinated attacks, IS – a cultish militia perhaps 35,000 strong, ruling a self-declared ‘caliphate’ that no one recognises as a state – achieved something France denied the Algerian FLN until 1999, nearly four decades after independence: acknowledgment that it had been fighting a war, rather than a campaign against ‘outlaws’. In the unlikely event that France sends ground troops to Syria, it will have handed IS an opportunity it longs for: face to face combat with ‘crusader’ soldiers on its own soil.

    • In an earlier era, these conflicts might have remained separate, but they are now linked thanks to the very devices that are the symbol of globalisation, our phones and laptops. It no longer makes sense to speak of near and far, or even of ‘blowback’: the theatre of conflict has no clear borders, and its causes are multiple, overlapping and deeply rooted in histories of postcolonial rage and Western-assisted state collapse. The attacks in Paris don’t reflect a clash of civilisations but rather the fact that we really do live in a single, if unequal world, where the torments in one region inevitably spill over into another, where everything connects, sometimes with lethal consequences. For all its medieval airs, the caliphate holds up a mirror to the world we have made, not only in Raqqa and Mosul, but in Paris, Moscow and Washington.

      #ISIS #OEI

  • Too Weak, Too Strong
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n21/patrick-cockburn/too-weak-too-strong

    .... a Russian air support won’t be enough to defeat IS and the other al-Qaida-type groups, because years of fighting the US, Iraqi and Syrian armies has given their fighters formidable military expertise. Tactics include multiple co-ordinated attacks by suicide bombers, sometimes driving armoured trucks that carry several tons of explosives, as well as the mass use of IEDs and booby traps. IS puts emphasis on prolonged training as well as religious teaching; its snipers are famous for remaining still for hours as they search for a target. IS acts like a guerrilla force, relying on surprise and diversionary attacks to keep its enemies guessing.

    [...]

    The Russian intervention in Syria, the greater involvement of Iran and the Shia powers, and the rise of the Syrian Kurds has not yet changed the status quo in Iraq and Syria, though it has the potential to do so. The Russian presence makes Turkish military intervention against the Kurds and the government in Damascus less likely. But the Russians, the Syrian army and their allies need to win a serious victory – such as capturing the rebel-held half of Aleppo – if they are to transform the civil war. Assad won’t want his experienced combat units to be caught up in the sort of street-by-street fighting described by the wounded soldiers in the hospitals. On the other hand, the Russian air campaign has an advantage over that of the Americans in that it has been launched in support of an effective regular army.

  • John Lanchester reviews ‘The Wright Brothers’ by David McCullough and ‘Elon Musk’ by Ashlee Vance · LRB 10 September 2015
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n17/john-lanchester/lets-all-go-to-mars
    http://cdn.lrb.co.uk/assets/covers/cov3717.jpg?1440766273

    The juxtaposition of the Wrights’ story with Musk’s suggests that America is thinking about innovation and new technologies, and perhaps that it deeply wants to believe in the new thing, to believe that the new inventions will be as consequential as the old ones proved to be.

    très intéressante revue sur les deux sujets (les frères Wright puis Elon Musk)

    #technologie #espace #aviation

  • What to do with the people who do make it across?

    Since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, more than 12 million people have been displaced by the fighting, 4.1 million of whom have fled the country. The flow of refugees from Syria has been constant, but there have been two great surges in the past four years. The first was in the middle of 2013, when fighting intensified. That was when the Assad regime stepped up its attacks, the Arab League agreed to arm rebel groups, and a former branch of al-Qaida emerged as Isis. Between March and September that year, a million people fled the country – as many as had left in the two years before.

    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n19/daniel-trilling/what-to-do-with-the-people-who-do-make-it-across
    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Syrie #réfugiés_syriens

  • Some Tips for the Long-Distance Traveller

    A Kurdish friend of mine in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq recently posted an image of a hand-drawn diagram on his Facebook page. With little arrows and stick figures and pictures of a train and boat or two, the diagram shows how to get from Turkey to the German border in twenty easy steps. After you’ve made the thousand-mile trip to western Turkey, the journey proper begins with a taxi to Izmir on the coast. An arrow points to the next stage: a boat across the Aegean to ‘a Greek island’, costing between €950 and €1200. Another boat takes you to Athens. A train – looking like a mangled caterpillar – leads to Thessaloniki. Walking, buses and two more worm-like trains take you across Macedonia to Skopje, and then through Serbia to Belgrade. A stick figure walks across the border into Hungary near the city of Szeged. Then it’s on to Budapest by taxi, and another taxi across the whole of Austria. At the bottom of the page a little blue stick figure is jumping in the air waving a flag. He has arrived in Germany, saying hello to Munich, after a journey of some three thousand miles, taking perhaps three weeks, at a total cost of $2400.


    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n19/ghaith-abdul-ahad/some-tips-for-the-long-distance-traveller
    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #visualisation #parcours_migratoire #dessin #esquisse #itinéraire_migratoire #Balkans
    cc @reka

    Plus loin dans le texte :

    Not all smugglers toil at the dirt tracks on the frontiers between nations. Nabil is a Swedish-Iraqi whose main talent is marketing. His job has been made difficult lately: who needs a smuggler if they can find their own way to Europe? He made the decision to cater for more exclusive clients, those who want to spare themselves and their families the hardship of a long trek through the Balkans.

    #smugglers #passeurs

  • Excellent article (mais très long) dans la London Review of books : « The hijackers » par Hugh Roberts.
    L’article se présente comme un passage en revue fouillé de l’histoire politique de la Syrie du début de l’époque mandataire à nos jours pour critiquer la thèse de J.P. Filiu selon laquelle l’"Etat profond" syrien (ou les nouveaux « Mamelouks ») a produit l’Etat islamique pour pirater la révolution syrienne afin d’assurer sa survie.
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n14/hugh-roberts/the-hijackers

    • Malgré la haute tenue de l’article trois remarques :
      – l’auteur a omis d’indiquer que le concept d’"Etat profond" tiré de l’histoire turque contemporaine où il désignait un ensemble de forces (mafieuses, militaires, des services turcs et étrangers et des Loups gris d’Anatolie) orientant de manière secrète la politique en Turquie, a par la suite été développé et popularisé par l’universitaire canadien Peter Dale Scott pour désigner par analogie un complexe de forces occultes au sein de l’Etat US. Son emprunt par Filiu censé étayer sa thèse que l’Etat syrien est le concepteur de Da3ich n’est donc pas anodin car Filiu retourne un concept développé pour tenter de donner un fondement théorique aux thèses dénonçant une implication US dans le 11.09 (Dale Scott est proche des truthers) en une arme dans la propagande de guerre contre le régime d’Assad, clairement ciblé par l’Etat américain, profond ou pas.
      – je me demande si l’auteur ne s’illusionne pas un peu sur la bonne volonté de Lakhdar Brahimi dont il omet de rappeler les liens avec la famille royale jordanienne (la princesse Rym de Jordanie est la fille de Brahimi)
      – l’auteur s’avère incapable de rendre compte de l’aspect « révolution colorée » des révoltes arabes et des conséquences de cet aspect

  • Hugh Roberts reviews ‘From Deep State to Islamic State’ by Jean-Pierre Filiu, ‘Syrian Notebooks’ by Jonathan Littell, ‘The Rise of Islamic State’ by Patrick Cockburn and ‘Isis’ by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan · LRB 16 July 2015
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n14/hugh-roberts/the-hijackers

    Contexte : le fameux document déclassifié de la DIA http://seenthis.net/messages/372860

    Ainsi le service du renseignement américain a vu l’Etat Islamique venir et était non seulement détendu à cette perspective, mais, paraît-il, positivement intéressé. La formule précise utilisée dans le paragraphe 8c est intrigante. Elle ne parle pas de ‘ la possibilité que l’Isis puisse établir une principauté salafiste ’ mais de ‘ la possibilité d’établissement ’ d’une principauté salafiste. [...]

    Un deuxième élément de preuve est une carte préparée par le lieutenant-colonel Ralph Peters de l’Académie de guerre des États-Unis et publiée dans le Journal des Forces armées en Juin 2006. Elle montre un « Nouveau #Moyen-Orient » qui, tel qu’imaginé par le colonel Peters, contrarierait la plupart des gouvernements actuels de la région.

    Ce qui est frappant c’est que, à la place de l’Irak et de la Syrie, il suggère qu’il pourrait y avoir trois états, un état "arabe chiite" s’étendant jusqu’à Bagdad, un« Irak sunnite », puis « la Syrie », les deux derniers étant dépouillés de leur régions kurdes, maintenant incluses dans un nouvel état de « Kurdistan libre ». En elle-même la carte ne prouve rien au-delà de l’imagination d’un homme et le fait qu’un journal l’a trouvé assez intéressante pour l’imprimer.

    Mais elle suggère que depuis neuf ans la partition de l’Irak est envisagée par les hauts responsables américains comme une possibilité. Avec les progrès que l’EI a réalisés au cours de la dernière année, des discussions sur une partition, à la fois de l’Irak et de la Syrie, se font de plus en plus.

    Ce que nous pouvons en faire n’est, bien sûr, pas clair.

    À un extrême, les théoriciens de la conspiration diront que ça va dans le sens de leurs affirmations, à savoir que les puissances occidentales ont délibérément créé le chaos pour des raisons personnelles inavouables. À l’autre extrémité du spectre, on peut émettre l’hypothèse que le document de la DIA peut avoir été lu par quatre personnes sans importance à Washington et été ignoré par tout le monde. Entre les deux, en affichant plus de respect pour la DIA, nous pourrions imaginer autre chose : la possibilité que, en 2012, les services de renseignement américains et d’autres services occidentaux ont vu l’Isis autant qu’ils virent Jabhat al-Nusra et d’autres groupes djihadistes, comme des auxiliaires utiles dans la dynamique anti-Assad, et pouvaient envisager sa prise de contrôle du nord-est de la Syrie comme un développement utile sans implications préoccupantes. Si l’État islamique a échappé à toute influence que les services de renseignement ont initialement cherché à avoir sur lui et s’il ne roule que pour lui-même, cela signifie que des personnes ont joué avec le feu.

    Je ne prétends pas savoir ce qu’est la vérité. Mais il n’y a pas besoin de prouver des intentions malignes de la part des puissances occidentales. La théorie la plus charitable à notre disposition, la théorie de l’histoire ’qui foire éternellement de manière récurrente ’, convient assez bien. Si une théorie plus sophistiquée est nécessaire, je suggère que nous nous rappelions l’évaluation de C. Wright Mills quand il disait que la politique américaine était faite par des « réalistes cinglés », des gens qui étaient des réalistes accomplis quant à la façon de promouvoir leurs carrières à l’intérieur du Beltway et d’incorrigibles cinglés quand on en venait à la formulation de la politique étrangère.

  • Patrick Cockburn · Why join Islamic State ? · LRB 2 July 2015
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n13/patrick-cockburn/why-join-islamic-state?hq_e=el&hq_m=3818645&hq_l=9&hq_v=61a0624cf7

    La #corruption et l’#arbitraire de l’""""#élite"""" moyen-orientale parmi les garants de la pérennité de l’#ISIS,

    He told the story of his former leader or emir, an Iraqi Kurd with the nom de guerre Abu Abbas al-Kurdistani, who had recently been killed in battle. Faraj asked him why he had joined Islamic State and Abu Abbas replied that he had been imprisoned by the Kurdistan Regional Government for four years without a fair trial. ‘Corruption and torture,’ Faraj said, ‘had pushed him to find any organisation that gives him the opportunity for taking revenge. Our emir’s pain was similar to ours. We all fight as a reaction to the tyranny and injustice we had known before. Islamic State is the best option for oppressed people in the Middle East.’

    The capture of Tal Abyad by the Kurds may well lead to a fresh wave of speculation that Islamic State is going into decline. But, like most of the other participants in the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, the self-declared caliphate is too well rooted to disappear.

  • Chase Madar · Short Cuts · LRB 2 July 2015
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n13/chase-madar/short-cuts

    Représentants (personnes et institutions) théoriques des droits humains agissant ou prenant position en faveur de la violence létale,

    Harold Koh is the former dean of Yale Law School and an expert in human rights law. As the State Department’s senior lawyer between 2009 and 2013, he provided the Obama administration with the legal basis for assassination carried out by drones. And despite having written academic papers backing a powerful and restrictive War Powers Act, he made the legal case for the Obama administration’s right to make war on Libya without bothering to get congressional approval. Koh, who has now returned to teaching human rights law, is not the only human rights advocate to call for the use of lethal violence. Indeed, the weaponisation of human rights – its doctrines, its institutions and, above all, its grandees – has been going on in the US for more than a decade.

    Take Samantha Power, US Ambassador to the United Nations, former director of Harvard’s Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy and self-described ‘genocide chick’, who advocated war in Libya and Syria, and argued for new ways to arm-twist US allies into providing more troops for Obama’s escalated but unsuccessful war in Afghanistan. This last argument wasn’t successful in 2012, though she was at it again recently when interviewed on Charlie Rose. Or there’s Sarah Sewall, another former director of the Carr Centre, who was responsible for the material on human rights in the reworked US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Or Michael Posner, the founder of Human Rights First, now a business professor at NYU, who, as assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labour in Obama’s first term, helped bury the Goldstone Report, commissioned by the United Nations to investigate atrocities committed during Israel’s 2008-9 assault on Gaza. Or John Prendergast, a former Human Rights Watch researcher and co-founder of Enough, an anti-genocide group affiliated with the Centre for American Progress, who has called for military intervention to oust Robert Mugabe.

    [...]

    Human rights organisations have also been at it. Although it’s the policy of Human Rights Watch not to comment on matters of jus ad bellum – whether or not a war should be waged – in 2011 the UN resolution authorising military force in Libya was warmly endorsed by the outfit’s executive director and top Washington lobbyist. Just days after airstrikes began against the Qaddafi government, a Human Rights Watch researcher called Corinne Dufka called for ‘nothing less than the type of unified and decisive action the UN Security Council has brought to bear in Libya’ to be employed in Côte d’Ivoire in an article published in Foreign Policy. Amnesty International consistently backed US military operations in Afghanistan, which it seemed to view as a Peace Corps programme with soldiers attached.

    #droits_humains #états-unis

  • Scott Ritter · ‘We ain’t found shit’ · LRB 2 July 2015
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n13/scott-ritter/we-aint-found-shit

    The facts appear to support Iran’s position. Countries subjected to intrusive no notice inspections have to be confident that the process isn’t actually an intelligence-led operation aimed at undermining their legitimate interests. The nuclear framework agreement with Iran doesn’t require the IAEA to accept anything Iran declares at face value, but none of its protocols justifies no notice inspections of military sites. Iran signed the Joint Plan of Action in 2013, and has abided by the verification conditions it required without incident. This track record should count in its favour, especially when you consider the dubious results of no notice inspections since they were first carried out in 1991.

    #AIEA #Iran #nucléaire

  • Seymour M. Hersh : The Killing of Osama bin Laden · LRB 21 May 2015
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n10/seymour-m-hersh/the-killing-of-osama-bin-laden

    It’s been four years since a group of US Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden in a night raid on a high-walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The killing was the high point of Obama’s first term, and a major factor in his re-election. The White House still maintains that the mission was an all-American affair, and that the senior generals of Pakistan’s army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were not told of the raid in advance. This is false, as are many other elements of the Obama administration’s account. The White House’s story might have been written by Lewis Carroll: would bin Laden, target of a massive international manhunt, really decide that a resort town forty miles from Islamabad would be the safest place to live and command al-Qaida’s operations? He was hiding in the open. So America said.

    The most blatant lie was that Pakistan’s two most senior military leaders – General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the army staff, and General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, director general of the ISI – were never informed of the US mission. This remains the White House position despite an array of reports that have raised questions, including one by Carlotta Gall in the New York Times Magazine of 19 March 2014. Gall, who spent 12 years as the Times correspondent in Afghanistan, wrote that she’d been told by a ‘Pakistani official’ that Pasha had known before the raid that bin Laden was in Abbottabad. The story was denied by US and Pakistani officials, and went no further. In his book Pakistan: Before and after Osama (2012), Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, a think tank in Islamabad, wrote that he’d spoken to four undercover intelligence officers who – reflecting a widely held local view – asserted that the Pakistani military must have had knowledge of the operation. The issue was raised again in February, when a retired general, Asad Durrani, who was head of the ISI in the early 1990s, told an al-Jazeera interviewer that it was ‘quite possible’ that the senior officers of the ISI did not know where bin Laden had been hiding, ‘but it was more probable that they did [know]. And the idea was that, at the right time, his location would be revealed. And the right time would have been when you can get the necessary quid pro quo – if you have someone like Osama bin Laden, you are not going to simply hand him over to the United States.’

    This spring I contacted Durrani and told him in detail what I had learned about the bin Laden assault from American sources: that bin Laden had been a prisoner of the ISI at the Abbottabad compound since 2006; that Kayani and Pasha knew of the raid in advance and had made sure that the two helicopters delivering the Seals to Abbottabad could cross Pakistani airspace without triggering any alarms; that the CIA did not learn of bin Laden’s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the White House has claimed since May 2011, but from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US, and that, while Obama did order the raid and the Seal team did carry it out, many other aspects of the administration’s account were false.

    ‘When your version comes out – if you do it – people in Pakistan will be tremendously grateful,’ Durrani told me. ‘For a long time people have stopped trusting what comes out about bin Laden from the official mouths. There will be some negative political comment and some anger, but people like to be told the truth, and what you’ve told me is essentially what I have heard from former colleagues who have been on a fact-finding mission since this episode.’ As a former ISI head, he said, he had been told shortly after the raid by ‘people in the “strategic community” who would know’ that there had been an informant who had alerted the US to bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad, and that after his killing the US’s betrayed promises left Kayani and Pasha exposed.

    (pas encore lu)

    • Pakistanis Knew Where Bin Laden Was, Say U.S. Sources
      http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/pakistanis-knew-where-bin-laden-was-say-us-sources-n357306

      Two intelligence sources tell NBC News that the year before the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, a “walk in” asset from Pakistani intelligence told the CIA where the most wanted man in the world was hiding - and these two sources plus a third say that the Pakistani government knew where bin Laden was hiding all along.

      The U.S. government has always characterized the heroic raid by Seal Team Six that killed bin Laden as a unilateral U.S. operation, and has maintained that the CIA found him by tracking couriers to his walled complex in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

      The new revelations do not necessarily cast doubt on the overall narrative that the White House began circulating within hours of the May 2011 operation. The official story about how bin Laden was found was constructed in a way that protected the identity and existence of the asset, who also knew who inside the Pakistani government was aware of the Pakistani intelligence agency’s operation to hide bin Laden, according to a special operations officer with prior knowledge of the bin Laden mission. The official story focused on a long hunt for bin Laden’s presumed courier, Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.

      While NBC News has long been pursuing leads about a “walk in” and about what Pakistani intelligence knew, both assertions were made public in a London Review of Books article by investigative reporter Seymour Hersh.

    • Author Reported Essentials of Hersh’s bin Laden Story in 2011 — With Seemingly Different Sources
      https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/11/former-professor-reported-basics-hershs-bin-laden-story-2011-seemingly-di

      R.J. Hillhouse, a former professor, Fulbright fellow and novelist whose writing on intelligence and military outsourcing has appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times, made the same main assertions in 2011 about the death of Osama bin Laden as Seymour Hersh’s new story in the London Review of Books — apparently based on different sources than those used by Hersh.

      Bin Laden was killed by Navy SEALs on May 2, 2011. Three months later, on August 7, Hillhouse posted a story on her blog “The Spy Who Billed Me” stating that (1) the U.S. did not learn about bin Laden’s location from tracking an al Qaeda courier, but from a member of the Pakistani intelligence service who wanted to collect the $25 million reward the U.S. had offered for bin Laden; (2) Saudi Arabia was paying Pakistan to keep bin Laden under the equivalent of house arrest; (3) Pakistan was pressured by the U.S. to stand down its military to allow the U.S. raid to proceed unhindered; and (4) the U.S. had planned to claim that bin Laden had been killed in a drone strike in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but was forced to abandon this when one of the Navy SEAL helicopters crashed.

      The Spy Who Billed Me: Hersh Did Not Break Bin Laden Cover Up Story
      http://www.thespywhobilledme.com/the_spy_who_billed_me/2015/05/hersh-did-not-break-bin-laden-cover-up-story.html

      Seymour Hersh’s story, “The Killing of Bin Laden,” in the London Review of Books has a fundamental problem: it’s either plagiarism or unoriginal.

      If it’s fiction—as some have implied, it’s plagiarism. If it’s true, it’s not original. The story was broken here on The Spy Who Billed Me four years ago, in August 2011

      […]

      I have had great respect for Seymour Hersh, arguably one of the greatest investigative journalists of our time. I do not believe his story is fiction. I trust my sources—which were clearly different than his. I am, however, profoundly disappointed that he has not given credit to the one who originally broke the story.

    • La presse semble vouloir régler son compte à ce grand journaliste.

      Etats-Unis. Mort de Ben Laden : une enquête très polémique
      Publié le 12/05/2015

      (...) D’aucuns, à l’instar du site internet Vox [ http://www.vox.com/2015/5/11/8584473/seymour-hersh-osama-bin-laden ] , n’hésitent cependant pas à parler du penchant du journaliste pour la théorie du complot. Pour le journaliste Max Fisher, “l’enquête de Seymour Hersh est certes impressionnante à lire, mais elle ne résiste pas à un examen minutieux des faits et est bourrée de contradictions et d’incohérences”. Elle serait une bonne illustration de la dérive de Seymour Hersh “qui s’est éloigné, ces dernières années, du journalisme d’investigation pour s’engager sur le terrain glissant des conspirations.” (...)

      cet article a été repris et cité ce matin sur France-Culture Par Thomas CLUZEL

      Que s’est-il passé la nuit où Ben Laden a été tué ? x
      12.05.2015
      http://www.franceculture.fr/emission-revue-de-presse-internationale-que-s-est-il-passe-la-nuit-ou-

    • Oui, l’article de Vox a beaucoup circulé. Cet article de The Nation (assez marrant) répond à l’article de Vox : It’s a Conspiracy ! How to Discredit Seymour Hersh | The Nation
      http://www.thenation.com/blog/207001/its-conspiracy-how-discredit-seymour-hersh

      Max Fisher, now at Vox, learned well during his apprenticeship under Marty Peretz at The New Republic. This week, he was among the first to try to smear Seymour Hersh’s piece in the London Review of Books, which argued that pretty much everything we were told about the killing of Osama bin Laden was a lie. Most importantly, Hersh’s report questions the claim that Washington learned of OBL’s whereabouts thanks to torture—a claim popularized in the film Zero Dark Thirty.

      There’s a standard boiler plate now when it comes to going after Hersh, and all Fisher, in “The Many Problems with Seymour Hersh’s Osama bin Laden Conspiracy Theory,” did was fill out the form: establish Hersh’s “legendary” status (which Fisher does in the first sentence); invoke his reporting in My Lai and Abu Ghraib; then say that a number of Hersh’s recent stories—such as his 2012 New Yorker piece that the United States was training Iranian terrorists in Nevada—have been “unsubstantiated” (of course, other reporters never “substantiated” Hersh’s claim that Henry Kissinger was directly involved in organizing the cover-up of the fire-bombing of Cambodia for years—but that claim was true); question Hersh’s sources; and then, finally, suggest that Hersh has gone “off the rails” to embrace “conspiracy theories.”

      […]

      To accuse Hersh of falling under the thrall of “conspiracy theory” is to repudiate the whole enterprise of investigative journalism that Hersh helped pioneer. What has he written that wasn’t a conspiracy? But Fisher, and others, believe Hersh went too far when in a 2011 speech he made mention of the Knights of Malta and Opus Dei, tagging him as a Dan Brown fantasist. Here’s Fisher, in his debunking of Hersh’s recent essay: “The moment when a lot of journalists started to question whether Hersh had veered from investigative reporting into something else came in January 2011. That month, he spoke at Georgetown University’s branch campus in Qatar, where he gave a bizarre and rambling address alleging that top military and special forces leaders ‘are all members of, or at least supporters of, Knights of Malta.… many of them are members of Opus Dei.’”

      But here’s Steve Coll, a reporter who remains within the acceptable margins, writing in Ghost Wars about Reagan’s CIA director, William Casey: “He was a Catholic Knight of Malta educated by Jesuits. Statues of the Virgin Mary filled his mansion.… He attended Mass daily and urged Christian faith upon anyone who asked his advice…. He believed fervently that by spreading the Catholic church’s reach and power he could contain communism’s advance, or reverse it.” Oliver North, Casey’s Iran/Contra co-conspirator, worshiped at a “’charismatic’ Episcopalian church in Virginia called Church of the Apostles, which is organized into cell groups.”

      Not too long ago, no less an establishment figure than Ben Bradlee, the editor of The Washington Post, could draw the connections between the shadowy national security state and right-wing Christianity: Iran/Contra was about many things, among them a right-wing Christian reaction against the growing influence of left-wing Liberation Theology in Latin America. Likewise, the US’s post-9/11 militarism was about many things, among them the reorganization of those right-wing Christians against what they identified as a greater existential threat than Liberation Theology: political Islam. Fisher should know this, as it was reported here, here, and here, among many other places.

      Eager to debunk Hersh, it’s Fisher who has fallen down the rabbit hole of imperial amnesia.

    • Seymour Hersh Article Alleges Cover-Up in Bin Laden Hunt - NYTimes.com
      http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/us/seymour-hersh-article-alleges-cover-up-in-bin-laden-hunt.html?ref=todayspap

      In one conceivable episode, Mr. Hersh writes that American intelligence officials were alerted to Bin Laden’s whereabouts by a Pakistani military officer who walked into the United States Embassy in Islamabad and was subsequently paid a reward and moved by the C.I.A. to the United States. The account told by the Obama administration after the raid — that the C.I.A. tracked down Bin Laden through the work of dogged analysts — was a ruse intended to protect the real informant, according to Mr. Hersh.

      It is a deception that the C.I.A. has employed before, claiming for years that it discovered that one of its own, Aldrich H. Ames, was passing intelligence to the Soviet Union through the work of a team of analysts. The truth that eventually emerged was that crucial evidence against Mr. Ames came from a Soviet spy working for the C.I.A.

      Yet other claims by Mr. Hersh would have required a cover-up extending from top American, Pakistani and Saudi officials down to midlevel bureaucrats.

      [...]

      Mr. Hersh is standing by his article. In a brief telephone interview on Monday, he said, “You can have your skepticism.”

      His manner was cheerful and breezy, and he seemed unfazed about the controversy his reporting has stirred up. It is not the first time that Mr. Hersh’s work has been met with hostility from the authorities, and he laughed loudly at the mention of the denials from the White House and others.

      “Those are classic nondenial denials,” he said, before rushing off to take a call from another reporter.

      [...]

      [...] Mr. Hersh’s story would probably have gained much less traction had it not been for the often contradictory details presented by the Obama administration after the raid, and the questions about it that remain unanswered.

    • Les révélations de Seymour Hersh sur l’assassinat de Ben Laden sont à prendre au sérieux
      12 mai 2015 | Par Thomas Cantaloube
      http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/120515/les-revelations-de-seymour-hersh-sur-lassassinat-de-ben-laden-sont-prendre

      Le vétéran américain du journalisme d’investigation livre dans un long article une version différente de ce qui s’est passé en mai 2011 à Abbottabad, quand le leader d’Al-Qaïda a été tué par un commando américain. Son récit est crédible et informé, autant en tout cas que celui fourni jusqu’ici par la Maison Blanche.

    • « L’Assassinat d’Oussama ben Laden » par Seymour Hersh (3/4)
      Par Seymour Hersh pour la London Review of Books, le 10 mai 2015
      http://www.reopen911.info/News/2015/05/14/lassassinat-doussama-ben-laden-par-seymour-hersh-34
      Suite de la deuxième partie de l’article.

      ““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““
      L’Assassinat d’Oussama ben Laden (London Review of Books) - (4/4)
      http://www.legrandsoir.info/l-assassinat-d-oussama-ben-laden-london-review-of-books-4-4.html
      ou
      http://www.reopen911.info/News/2015/05/15/lassassinat-doussama-ben-laden-par-seymour-hersh-44

    • The Detail in Seymour Hersh’s Bin Laden Story That Rings True - Carlotta Gall
      http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/magazine/the-detail-in-seymour-hershs-bin-laden-story-that-rings-true.html

      On this count, my own reporting tracks with Hersh’s. Beginning in 2001, I spent nearly 12 years covering Pakistan and Afghanistan for The Times. (In his article, Hersh cites an article I wrote for The Times Magazine last year, an excerpt from a book drawn from this reporting.) The story of the Pakistani informer was circulating in the rumor mill within days of the Abbottabad raid, but at the time, no one could or would corroborate the claim. Such is the difficulty of reporting on covert operations and intelligence matters; there are no official documents to draw on, few officials who will talk and few ways to check the details they give you when they do.

      Two years later, when I was researching my book, I learned from a high-level member of the Pakistani intelligence service that the ISI had been hiding Bin Laden and ran a desk specifically to handle him as an intelligence asset. After the book came out, I learned more: that it was indeed a Pakistani Army brigadier — all the senior officers of the ISI are in the military — who told the C.I.A. where Bin Laden was hiding, and that Bin Laden was living there with the knowledge and protection of the ISI.

      […]

      I do not recall ever corresponding with Hersh, but he is following up on a story that many of us assembled parts of. The former C.I.A. officer Larry Johnson aired the theory of the informant — credited to “friends who are still active” — on his blog within days of the raid. And Hersh appears to have succeeded in getting both American and Pakistani sources to corroborate it. His sources remain anonymous, but other outlets such as NBC News have since come forward with similar accounts. Finally, the Pakistani daily newspaper The News reported Tuesday that Pakistani intelligence officials have conceded that it was indeed a walk-in who provided the information on Bin Laden. The newspaper names the officer as Brigadier Usman Khalid; the reporter is sufficiently well connected that he should be taken seriously.