#gardes-côte

Face à la hausse des arrivées irrégulières, Chypre annonce la suspension des demandes d’asile de Syriens

https://scd.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/cb12b41925368abb348793c58b7cd16c8c684453.jpg

Les autorités chypriotes ont annoncé dimanche la suspension du traitement des demandes d’asile des Syriens. Le président #Nikos_Christodoulides a évoqué « une mesure d’urgence » face à la forte hausse des arrivées irrégulières sur l’île, principalement depuis le Liban voisin.

« Il s’agit d’une mesure d’urgence, d’une décision difficile à prendre pour protéger les intérêts de Chypre », a déclaré dimanche 14 avril le président chypriote Nikos Christodoulides lors de l’annonce de la suspension des demandes d’asile de Syriens dans le pays.

Le gouvernement chypriote a pris cette décision en réaction à une forte augmentation des arrivées irrégulières ce mois-ci sur l’île. Plus de 1 000 personnes sont arrivées à Chypre sur des bateaux en provenance du Liban depuis le début du mois d’avril, dans un contexte d’aggravation des tensions au Moyen-Orient.

Nicosie a donc demandé à ses partenaires de l’Union européenne (UE) de faire davantage pour aider le Liban et de reconsidérer le statut de la #Syrie - jusqu’à aujourd’hui déchirée par la guerre et considérée trop dangereuse pour y rapatrier les demandeurs d’asile.

Nikos Christodoulides et la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, ont discuté de la possibilité de renforcer l’aide économique attribuée à Beyrouth, a indiqué un porte-parole du gouvernement chypriote dans un communiqué. À cette fin, il a été convenu qu’ils se rendraient ensemble au Liban après une visite préparatoire de la Commission.

Le #Liban, en proie à une grave crise financière, accueille des centaines de milliers de réfugiés syriens. Et les arrivées ne cessent de se poursuivre, les Syriens continuant à quitter leur pays désormais en proie à une très grave crise économique.

Chypre, l’État le plus à l’est de l’UE et le plus proche du Moyen-Orient, se trouve à environ 160 km à l’ouest des côtes libanaises ou syriennes. L’île a enregistré plus de 2 000 arrivées par voie maritime au cours des trois premiers mois de l’année, contre seulement 78 au cours de la même période en 2023.

Une mise en application encore floue

Dans la pratique, la suspension du traitement des demandes signifie que les demandeurs d’asile pourront déposer un dossier mais qu’il ne sera pas traité.

Ils seront confinés dans deux camps d’accueil qui fournissent un abri, de la nourriture, et réglementent les sorties, sans autre avantage.

Ceux qui choisissent de quitter ces installations perdront automatiquement toute forme d’aide et ne seront pas autorisés à travailler, ont indiqué des sources gouvernementales.

Pour Corinna Drousiotou, coordinatrice de l’ONG Cyprus Refugee Council interrogée par InfoMigrants, la décision du gouvernement chypriote concernant les demandeurs d’asile syriens ne repose sur aucune base légale. Par ailleurs, « il n’est pas encore clair de savoir comment les autorités vont appliquer cette décision […] Mais, nous ne pensons pas qu’elle parvienne à réduire les arrivées de réfugiés car ils ne sont généralement pas au courant de ce type de décision et les passeurs ne les en informent pas », souligne-t-elle.

La responsable met également en garde : la mesure risque au contraire d’aggraver la crise de l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile, les deux seuls centres d’hébergement de l’île n’ayant que des capacités d’accueil limitées. Or, de plus en plus de demandeurs d’asile syriens risquent de se retrouver bloqués dans ces centres si leurs demandes d’asile ne sont pas examinées.

En 2022, une décision similaire avait déjà été prise pour tenter de limiter les arrivées de Syriens à Chypre. Mais, selon Corinna Drousiotou, elle n’avait eu aucun effet sur le nombre d’arrivées.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/56463/face-a-la-hausse-des-arrivees-irregulieres-chypre-annonce-la-suspensio

#Chypre #asile #migrations #réfugiés #statistiques #chiffres #2024 #réfugiés_syriens

Border security with drones and databases

The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

Notes

[1] ►https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

[2] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

[3] ▻https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

[4] ►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

[5] ▻https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

[6] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[7] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[8] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[9] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

[10] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

[11] ►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

[12] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, ▻https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

[13] ▻https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

[14] ►https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

[15] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
#frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

2,200 #Frontex #emails to #Libya

Frontex has shared locations of migrant boats with Libya’s coast guard more than 2,000 times in three years – despite watching them whip, beat and shoot at passengers

It has long been known that European countries provide support and funding to the Libyan Coast Guard to carry out a controversial mission: intercepting Europe-bound migrants whom EU member states and agencies cannot apprehend directly without breaching international laws.

Numerous media and NGO reports have detailed the abuse and violence practised by the Libyan Coast Guard against migrants during sea interception and inside the detention centres they are taken to after being brought back to Libya.

Lighthouse Reports has previously established suspicious patterns of collaboration between EU border agency Frontex and the Libyan Coast Guard, including direct links between Frontex aerial assets spotting boats and their subsequent interception by the coast guard.

Despite the reports of abuse and torture, Frontex has withheld public criticism of the Libyan Coast Guard. And until now, the extent to which Frontex has shared information with the coast guard, and its internal knowledge of the abuse migrants face after they are intercepted, was unknown.
METHODS

Following the publication of Lighthouse investigation Frontex and the Pirate Ship in December, the EU Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) sent a letter to Frontex Executive Director Hans Leijtens questioning the agency’s collaboration with Libyan actors, including militia, in eastern and western Libya.

Lighthouse Reports and Der Spiegel gained access to the director’s response to the LIBE Committee’s questions. The email included all Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) relating to the Libyan Coast Guard.
STORYLINES

The SIRs reveal three incidents of Frontex aerial surveillance assets witnessing Libyan Coast Guard officers beating people in overcrowded boats at sea. In a separate incident, the agency’s surveillance drone recorded a Libyan officer shooting at a wooden boat to force it to stop.

The letter from Leitjens meanwhile reveals that Frontex gave away the location of migrant boats to the Libyan Coast Guard approximately 2,200 times, usually via email, in the last three years – despite being aware of the regular instances of violence they commit.

When confronted with these facts by our team, Frontex said: “The decision to share information about vessels in distress with the Libyan rescue coordination centre, alongside other national centres, is taken with a heavy heart”

The SIRs contain parts of Frontex’s human rights officer’s recommendations for the agency. The measures proposed range from increasing the sharing of coordinates with NGO rescue ships to involving UN agencies in following the fates of those returned to Libya. Frontex did not comment on whether these recommendations were implemented.

▻https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/2200-frontex-emails-to-libya

#partage #localisation #migrations #asile #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-côtes_libyens #géolocalisation #SIRs #surveillance_aérienne #drones

Cassazione, dare i migranti ai guardiacoste di Tripoli è reato

La consegna di migranti alla guardia costiera libica è reato perché la Libia «non è porto sicuro».

E’ quanto sancisce una sentenza della Corte di Cassazione che ha reso definitiva la condanna del comandante del rimorchiatore #Asso_28 che il 30 luglio del 2018 soccorse 101 persone nel Mediterraneo centrale e li riportò in Libia consegnandoli alla Guardia costiera di Tripoli. Della sentenza scrive Repubblica.

Per i supremi giudici favorire le intercettazioni dei guardiacoste di Tripoli rientra nella fattispecie illecita «dell’abbandono in stato di pericolo di persone minori o incapaci e di sbarco e abbandono arbitrario di persone». Nella sentenza viene sostanzialmente sancito che l’episodio del 2018 fu un respingimento collettivo verso un Paese non ritenuto sicuro vietato dalla Convenzione europea per i diritti umani.

Casarini, dopo Cassazione su migranti pronti a #class_action

"Con la sentenza della Corte di Cassazione, che ha chiarito in maniera definitiva che la cosiddetta «guardia costiera libica» non può «coordinare» nessun soccorso, perché non è in grado di garantire il rispetto dei diritti umani dei naufraghi, diventa un reato grave anche ordinarci di farlo, come succede adesso. Ora metteremo a punto non solo i ricorsi contro il decreto Piantedosi, che blocca per questo le navi del soccorso civile, ma anche una grande class action contro il governo e il ministro dell’Interno e il memorandum Italia-Libia". E’ quanto afferma Luca Casarini della ong Mediterranea Saving Humans.

"Dovranno rispondere in tribunale delle loro azioni di finanziamento e complicità nelle catture e deportazioni che avvengono in mare ad opera di una «sedicente» guardia costiera - aggiunge Casarini -, che altro non è che una formazione militare che ha come compito quello di catturare e deportare, non di «mettere in salvo» le donne, gli uomini e i bambini che cercano aiuto. La suprema corte definisce giustamente una gravissima violazione della Convenzione di Ginevra, la deportazione in Libia di migranti e profughi che sono in mare per tentare di fuggire da quell’inferno". Casarini ricorda, inoltre, che di recente la nave Mare Jonio di Mediterranea "di recente è stata colpita dal fermo amministrativo del governo per non aver chiesto alla Libia il porto sicuro. Proporremo a migliaia di cittadini italiani, ad associazioni e ong, di sottoscrivere la «class action», e chiederemo ad un tribunale della Repubblica di portare in giudizio i responsabili politici di questi gravi crimini. Stiamo parlando di decine di migliaia di esseri umani catturati in mare e deportati in Libia, ogni anno, coordinati di fatto da Roma e dall’agenzia europea Frontex.

E il ministro Piantedosi, proprio ieri, l’ha rivendicato testimoniando al processo a Palermo contro l’allora ministro Salvini. Lui si è costruito un alibi, con la distinzione tra centri di detenzione legali e illegali in Libia, dichiarando che «l’Italia si coordina con le istituzioni libiche che gestiscono campi di detenzione legalmente. Finalmente questo alibi, che è servito fino ad ora a coprire i crimini, è crollato grazie al pronunciamento della Cassazione. Adesso questo ministro deve essere messo sotto processo, perché ha ammesso di avere sistematicamente commesso un reato, gravissimo, che ha causato morte e sofferenze a migliaia di innocenti».

▻https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2024/02/17/cassazione-dare-i-migranti-a-guardiacoste-di-tripoli-e-reato_cfcb3461-c654-4f3c

#justice #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #gardes-côtes_libyens #Libye #jurisprudence #condamnation #externalisation #pull-backs #refoulements #push-backs #cour_de_cassation #cassation #port_sûr

Eight #AFIC risk analysis cells set a benchmark in Africa

This week, Frontex together with the European Commission and representatives from eight African countries forming part of the #Africa-Frontex_Intelligence_Community (AFIC) met in Dakar, Senegal, to wrap up the European Union-funded project on “Strengthening of AFIC as an instrument to fight serious cross-border crimes affecting Africa and the EU”.

https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Images_News/2023/Dakar_AFIC_project_closure.jpg

Launched in 2017 and funded by the European Commission, the project aimed to enhance the capacity and capability of AFIC countries to work jointly on identifying key threats impacting border management in Africa.

After years of hard work and despite the challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Frontex has completed its latest project and is proud to announce the handover of equipment to trained border police analysts who are carrying out their tasks in the risk analysis cells of eight AFIC countries: Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

The role of the cells, which are run by local analysts trained by Frontex, is to collect and analyse data on cross-border crime and support authorities involved in border management.

Frontex delivered a comprehensive risk analysis solution that meets the needs of the eight African border management authorities and enhances the safety and security of borders.

The handover of the equipment marks the end of the project and the beginning of an intensive cooperation between the AFIC countries. Frontex stays committed and ready to continue to support the RACs by organising joint activities - such as workshops, trainings, plenary meetings – together with the AFIC partner countries, aiming at further developing AFIC risk analysis capacities.

The AFIC project in numbers:

– Establishment of eight risk analysis cells in Niger, Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo and Mauritania;
- 14 training sessions for analysts from African countries;
- 10 regional workshops in Gambia, Ghana, Italy, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Poland and Ivory Coast;
- 17 joint analytical field visits in the EU and Africa.

About AFIC

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community was launched in 2010 to promote regular exchanges on migrant smuggling and other border security threats affecting African countries and the EU. It brings together Frontex analysts with those of partner African border authorities. A central element of the network are risk analysis cells, run by local analysts trained by Frontex. There are currently eight cells operating in Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

▻https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eight-afic-risk-analysis-cells-set-a-benchmark-in-africa-uwxHJU

#Frontex #Afrique #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #coopération #équipement #risk_analysis #Côte_d'Ivoire #Gambie #Ghana #Mauritanie #Niger #Nigeria #Sénégal #Togo #données #border_management #contrôles_frontaliers #RACs #training #risk_analysis_cells #formation #gardes-côtes

FROM LIBYA TO TUNISIA : HOW THE EU IS EXTENDING THE PUSH-BACK REGIME BY PROXY IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

On August 21, 2023, the rescue ship Aurora from Sea Watch was detained by the Italian authorities after refusing to disembark survivors in Tunisia as ordered by the Rome MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center), a country which by no means can be considered a place of safety.

This episode is just one example of the efforts of European states to avoid arrivals on their shores at all costs, and to evade their responsibility for reception and #Search_and_Rescue (#SAR). Already in 2018, the European Commission, with its disembarkation platform project, attempted to force sea rescue NGOs to disembark survivors in North Africa. While this project was ultimately unsuccessful as it stood, European states have endeavored to increase the number of measures aimed at reducing crossings in the central Mediterranean.

One of the strategies employed was to set up a “push-back by proxy regime”, outsourcing interceptions at sea to the Libyan Coast guards, enabling the sending back of people on the move to a territory in which their lives are at risk, undertaken by Libyan border forces under the control of the EU authorities, in contravention of principle of non-refoulement, one of the cornerstones of international refugee law. Since 2016, the EU and its member states have equipped, financed, and trained the Libyan coastguard and supported the creation of a MRCC in Tripoli and the declaration of a Libyan SRR (search and rescue region).

This analysis details how the European Union and its member states are attempting to replicate in Tunisia the regime of refoulement by proxy set up in Libya just a few years earlier. Four elements are considered: strengthening the capacities of the Tunisian coastguard (equipment and training), setting up a coastal surveillance system, creating a functional MRCC and declaring a Tunisian SRR.
A. Building capacity of the Garde Nationale Maritime
Providing equipment

For several decades now, Tunisia has been receiving equipment to strengthen its coast guard capabilities. After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Italy-Tunisia cooperation deepened. Under the informal agreement of April 5, 2011, 12 boats were delivered to the Tunisian authorities. In 2017, in a joint statement by the IItalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Tunisian counterpart, the two parties committed to “closer cooperation in the fight against irregular migration and border management,” with a particular focus on the maritime border. In this context, the Italian Minister declared Italy’s support for the modernization and maintenance of the patrol vessels supplied to Tunisia (worth around 12 million euros) and the supply of new equipment for maritime border control. On March 13, 2019, Italy also supplied Tunisia with vehicles for maritime border surveillance, sending 50 4-wheelers designed to monitor the coasts.

Recently, Germany also started to support the coast guard more actively in Tunisia, providing it with equipment for a boat workshop designed to repair coast guard vessels in 2019. As revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question, in the last two years, the Federal Police also donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors. On the French side, after a visit in Tunis in June 2023, the Interior Minister Gérard Darmanin announced 25 million euros in aid enabling Tunisia to buy border policing equipment and train border guards. In August 2023, the Italian authorities also promised hastening the provision of patrol boats and other vehicles aimed at preventing sea departures.

Apart from EU member states, Tunisia has also received equipment from the USA. Between 2012 and 2019, the Tunisian Navy was equipped with 26 US-made patrol boats. In 2019, the Tunisian national guard was also reinforced with 3 American helicopters. Primarily designed to fight against terrorism, the US equipment is also used to monitor the Tunisian coast and to track “smugglers.”

Above all, the supply of equipment to the Tunisian coastguard is gaining more and more support by the European Union. Following the EU-Tunisia memorandum signed on July 16, 2023, for which €150 million was pledged towards the “fight against illegal migration”, in September 2023, Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million “to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment.”

In a letter to the European Council, leaked by Statewatch in October 2023, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to the Tunisian coast guards: “Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operation and others will be repaired by the end of the year.”
Trainings the authorities

In addition to supplying equipment, the European countries are also organizing training courses to enhance the skills of the Tunisian coastguard. In 2019, Italy’s Interior Ministry released €11 million to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the crossing of people on the move from Tunisia, and to provide training to local security forces involved in maritime border control.

Under the framework of Phase III of the EU-supported IBM project (Integrated Border Management), Germany is also organizing training for the Tunisian coast guards. As revealed in the answer to a parliamentary question mentioned before, the German Ministry of Interior admitted that 3.395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and border police had been trained, including within Germany. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police, and the coast guard. These training sessions were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats.”

In a document presenting the “EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia” for the year 2021, the European Commission announced the creation of a “coast guard training academy.” In Tunisia, the project consists of implementing a training plan, rehabilitating the physical training environment of the Garde Nationale Maritime, and enhancing the cooperation between Tunisian authorities and all stakeholders, including EU agencies and neighboring countries. Implemented by the German Federal Police and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the project started in January 2023 and is supposed to run until June 2026, to the sum of 13,5 million EUR.

Although the European Commission underlines the objective that “the Training Academy Staff is fully aware and acting on the basis of human rights standards” the increase in dangerous maneuvers and attacks perpetrated by the Tunisian coast guard since the increase in European support leaves little doubt that respect for human rights is far from top priority.

On November 17, 2023, the ICMPD announced on its Linkedin account the inauguration of the Nefta inter-agency border management training center, as a benefit to the three agencies responsible for border management in Tunisia (Directorate General Directorate of Borders and Foreigners of the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Border Guard of the National Guard and the General Directorate of Customs).
B. Setting up a coastal surveillance system

In addition to supplying equipment, European countries also organize training courses to enhance the skills of European coastguards in the pursuit of an “early detection” strategy, which involves spotting boats as soon as they leave the Tunisian coast in order to outsource their interception to the Tunisian coastguard. As early as 2019, Italy expressed its willingness to install radar equipment in Tunisia and to establish “a shared information system that will promptly alert the Tunisian gendarmerie and Italian coast guard when migrant boats are at sea, in order to block them while they still are in Tunisian waters.” This ambition seems to have been achieved through the implementation of the system ISMaris in Tunisia.
An Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance (ISMaris)

The system ISMaris, or “Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance”, was first mentioned in the “Support Programme to Integrated Border Management in Tunisia” (IBM Tunisia, launched in 2015. Funded by the EU and Switzerland and implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the first phase of the program (2015-2018) supported the equipment of the Garde Nationale Maritime with this system, defined as “a maritime surveillance system that centralizes information coming from naval assets at sea and from coastal radars […] [aiming] to connect the sensors (radar, VHF, GPS position, surveillance cameras) on board of selected Tunisian Coast Guard vessels, control posts, and command centers within the Gulf of Tunis zone in order for them to better communicate between each other.”

The implementation of this data centralization system was then taken over by the “Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region” (BMP-Maghreb), launched in 2018 and funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Tunisia component, funded with €24,5 million is implemented by ICMPD together with the Italian Ministry of Interior and designed to “strengthen the capacity of competent Tunisian authorities in the areas of maritime surveillance and migration management, including tackling migrant smuggling, search and rescue at sea, as well as in the coast guard sphere of competence.” With the BMP programme, the Tunisian Garde Maritime Nationale was equipped with navigational radars, thermal cameras, AIS and other IT equipment related to maritime surveillance.
Data exchange with the EU

The action document of the BMP program clearly states that one of the purposes of ISMaris is the reinforcement of “operational cooperation in the maritime domain between Tunisia and Italy (and other EU Member States, and possibly through EUROSUR and FRONTEX).” Established in 2013, the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex, to prevent the so-called irregular migration at external borders. Thanks to this system, Frontex already monitors the coast regions off Tunisia using aerial service and satellites.

What remains dubious is the connection between IS-Maris and the EU surveillance-database. In 2020, the European Commission claimed that ISMariS was still in development and not connected to any non-Tunisian entity such as Frontex, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) or the Italian border control authorities. But it is likely that in the meantime information exchange between the different entities was systematized.

In the absence of an official agreement, the cooperation between Frontex and Tunisia is unclear. As already mentioned in Echoes#3, “so far, it has not been possible to verify if Frontex has direct contact with the Tunisian Coast Guard as it is the case with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even if most of the interceptions happen close to Tunisian shores, some are carried out by the Tunisian Navy outside of territorial waters. […] Since May 2021 Frontex has been flying a drone, in addition to its different assets, monitoring the corridor between Tunisia and Lampedusa on a daily basis. While it is clear that Frontex is sharing data with the Italian authorities and that Italian authorities are sharing info on boats which are on the way from Tunisia to Italy with the Tunisian side, the communication and data exchanges between Frontex and Tunisian authorities remain uncertain.”

While in 2021, Frontex reported that “no direct border related activities have been carried out in Tunisia due to Tunisian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate with Frontex”, formalizing the cooperation between Tunisia and Frontex seems to remain one of the EU’s priorities. In September 2023, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Poland, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, briefings were held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and where all threads from surveillance from ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together.

However, as emphasized by Mathias Monroy, an independent researcher working on border externalization and the expansion of surveillance systems, “Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex.”

This does not prevent the EU from continuing its efforts. In September 2023, in the wake of the thousands of arrivals on the island of Lampedusa, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed, in a 10-point action plan, the need to have a “working arrangement between Tunisia and Frontex” and to “step up border surveillance at sea and aerial surveillance including through Frontex.” In a letter written by the European Commission in reply to the LIBE letter about the Tunisia deal sent on the Greens Party initiative in July 2023, the EU also openly admits that IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far and that more surveillance equipment is to come.

To be noted as well is that the EU4BorderSecurity program, which includes support to “inter-regional information sharing, utilizing tools provided by Frontex” has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
C. Supporting the creation of a Tunisian MRCC and the declaration of a Search and rescue region (SRR)
Building a MRCC in Tunisia, a top priority for the EU

In 2021, the European Commission stated the creation of a functioning MRCC in Tunisia as a priority: “Currently there is no MRCC in Tunisia but the coordination of SAR events is conducted by Tunisian Navy Maritime Operations Centre. The official establishment of a MRCC is a necessary next step, together with the completion of the radar installations along the coast, and will contribute to implementing a Search and rescue region in Tunisia. The establishment of an MRCC would bring Tunisia’s institutional set-up in line with the requirements set in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979 (as required by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation IMO).”

The objective of creating a functioning Tunisian MRCC is also mentioned in a European Commission document presenting the “strategy for the regional, multi-country cooperation on migration with partner countries in North Africa” for the period 2021-2027. The related project is detailed in the “Action Document for EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia (2021),” whose overall objective is to “contribute to the improvement of respective state services through the institutional development of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres” in the North Africa region. The EU also promotes a “regional approach to a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center,” that “would improve the coordination in the Central Mediterranean in conducting SAR operations and support the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks in Libya and Tunisia.”

The Tunisia component of the programs announces the objective to “support the establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, [… ] operational 24/7 in a physical structure with functional equipment and trained staff,” establishing “cooperation of the Tunisian authorities with all national stakeholders, EU agencies and neighbouring countries on SAR.”

This project seems to be gradually taking shape. On the website of Civipol, the French Ministry of the Interior’s service and consultancy company, a new project entitled “Support for Search and Rescue Operations at Sea in Tunisia” is mentioned in a job advertisement. It states that this project, funded by the European Union, implemented together with the GIZ and starting in September 2023, aims to “support the Tunisian authorities in strengthening their operational capacities (fleet and other)” and “provide support to the Tunisian authorities in strengthening the Marine Nationale and the MRCC via functional equipment and staff training.”

In October 2023, the German development agency GIZ also published a job offer for a project manager in Tunisia, to implement the EU-funded project “Support to border management institution (MRCC)” in Tunisia (the job offer was deleted from the website in the meantime but screenshots can be shared on demand). The objective of the project is described as such: “improvement of the Tunisia’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity through reinforced border management institutions to conduct SAR operations at sea and the fight against migrant smuggling and human being trafficking by supporting increased collaboration between Tunisian actors via a Maritime RescueCoordination Centre (MRCC).”

According to Mathias Monroy, other steps have been taken in this direction: “[the Tunisian MRCC] has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.”

The establishment of a functional MRCC represents a major challenge for the EU, with the aim to allow Tunisia to engage actively in coordination of interceptions. Another step in the recognition of the Tunisian part as a valid SAR actor by the IMO is the declaration of a search and rescue region (SRR).
The unclear status of the current Tunisian area of responsibility

Adopted in 1979 in Hamburg, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR – Search & Rescue Convention) aimed to establish an international search and rescue plan to encourage cooperation and coordination between neighboring states in order to ensure better assistance to persons in distress at sea. The main idea of the convention is to divide seas and oceans into search and rescue zones in which states are responsible for providing adequate SAR services, by establishing rescue coordination centers and setting operating procedures to be followed in case of SAR operations.

Whereas Tunisia acceded to the treaty in 1998, this was not followed by the delimitation of the Tunisian SAR zone of responsibilities nor by regional agreements with neighboring states. It is only in 2013 that Tunisia declared the limits of its SRR, following the approval of the Maghreb Convention in the Field of Search and Rescue in 2013 and by virtue of Decree No. 2009-3333 of November 2, 2009, setting out the intervention plans and means to assist aircraft in distress. In application of this norm, Tunisian authorities are required to intervene immediately, following the first signal of help or emergency, in the limits of the Tunisia sovereign borders (12 nautical miles). This means that under national legislation, Tunisian authorities are obliged to intervene only in territorial waters. Outside this domain, the limits of SAR interventions are not clearly defined.

A point to underline is that the Tunisian territorial waters overlap with the Maltese SRR. The Tunisian Exclusive Economic Zone – which does not entail any specific duty connected to SAR – also overlaps with the Maltese SRR and this circumstance led in the past to attempts by the Maltese authorities to drop their SAR responsibilities claiming that distress cases were happening in this vast area. Another complex topic regards the presence, in international waters which is part of the Maltese SRR, of Tunisian oil platforms. Also, in these cases the coordination of SAR operations have been contested and were often subject to a “ping-pong” responsibility from the involved state authorities.
Towards the declaration of a huge Tunisian SRR?

In a research document published by the IMO Institute (International Maritime Organization), Akram Boubakri (Lieutenant Commander, Head, Maritime Affairs, Tunisian Coast Guard according to IMO Institute website) wrote that at the beginning of 2020, Tunisia officially submitted the coordinates of the Tunisian SRR to the IMO. According to this document, these new coordinates, still pending the notification of consideration by the IMO, would cover a large area, creating two overlapping areas with neighboring SAR zones – the first one with Libya, the second one with Malta* (see map below):

https://civilmrcc.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/image-4.png

*This delimitation has to be confirmed (tbc). Nothing proves that the coordinates mentioned in the article were actually submitted to the IMO

As several media outlets have reported, the declaration of an official Tunisian SRR is a project supported by the European Union, which was notably put back on the table on the occasion of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia.

During the summer 2023, the Civil MRCC legal team initiated a freedom of information access request to the Tunisian authorities to clarify the current status of the Tunisian SRR. The Tunisian Ministry of Transport/the Office of the Merchant Navy and Ports replied that”[n]o legal text has yet been published defining the geographical marine limits of the search and rescue zone stipulated in the 1979 International Convention for Search and Rescue […]. We would like to inform you that the National Committee for the Law of the Sea, chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, has submitted a draft on this subject, which has been sent in 2019 to the International Maritime Organisation through the Ministry of Transport.” A recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior was sent but no reply was received yet.

Replying in December 2023 to a freedom of information access request initiated by the Civil MRCC, the IMO stated that “Tunisia has not communicated their established search and rescue region to the IMO Secretariat.” However, on November 3, 2023, the Tunisian Ministerial Council adopted a “draft law on the regulation of search and rescue at sea in Tunisia’s area of responsibility.” A text which, according to FTDES, provides for the creation of a Tunisian SAR zone, although it has not yet been published. While the text still has to be ratified by the parliament, it is quite clear that the Tunisian authorities are currently making concrete steps to align on the IMO standards and, by doing so, on the EU agenda.
Conclusion: A EU strategy to escape from its SAR responsibilities

While some analysts have seen the drop in arrivals in Italy from Tunisia in recent months as a sign of the “success” of the European Union’s strategy to close its borders (in November, a drop of over 80% compared to the summer months), in reality, the evolution of these policies proves that reinforcing a border only shifts migratory routes. From autumn onwards, the Libyan route has seen an increase in traffic, with many departing from the east of the country. These analyses fail to consider the agency of people on the move, and the constant reinvention of strategies for transgressing borders.

While condemning the generalization of a regime of refoulement by proxy in the central Mediterranean and the continued brutalization of the border regime, the Civil MRCC aims to give visibility to the autonomy of migration and non-stop solidarity struggles for freedom of movement!

▻https://civilmrcc.eu/from-libya-to-tunisia-how-the-eu-is-extending-the-push-back-regime-by-prox

#push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #Tunisie #Libye #EU #UE #Union_européenne #gardes-côtes_libyens #push-back_by_proxy_regime #financement #training #formation #gardes-côtes #MRCC #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #Libyan_SRR #technologie #matériel #Integrated_Border_Management #surveillance #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMaris) #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_Region #Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUROSUR #Frontex #ISMariS #Search_and_rescue_region (#SRR)

ping @_kg_

Così l’Italia ha svuotato il diritto alla trasparenza sulle frontiere

Il Consiglio di Stato ha ribadito la inaccessibilità “assoluta” degli atti che riguardano genericamente la “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”. Intanto le forniture milionarie del governo a Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto continuano.

L’Italia fa un gigantesco e preoccupante passo indietro in tema di trasparenza sulle frontiere e di controllo democratico dell’esercizio del potere esecutivo. Su parte delle nostre forniture milionarie alla Libia, anche di natura militare, per bloccare le persone rischia infatti di calare un velo nero. A fine 2023 il Consiglio di Stato ha pronunciato una sentenza che riconosce come non illegittima la “assoluta” inaccessibilità di quegli atti della Pubblica amministrazione che ricadono genericamente nel settore di interesse della “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”, svuotando così di fatto l’istituto dell’accesso civico generalizzato che è a disposizione di tutti i cittadini (e non solo dei giornalisti). Non è un passaggio banale dal momento che la conoscenza dei documenti, dei dati e delle informazioni amministrative consente, o meglio, dovrebbe consentire la partecipazione alla vita di una comunità, la vicinanza tra governanti e governati, il consapevole processo di responsabilizzazione della classe politica e dirigente del Paese. Ma la teoria traballa. E ne siamo testimoni.

Breve riepilogo dei fatti. Il 21 ottobre 2021 l’Agenzia industrie difesa (Aid) -ente di diritto pubblico controllato dal ministero della Difesa- stipula un “Accordo di collaborazione” con la Direzione centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere in seno al ministero dell’Interno. Fu il Viminale -allora guidato dalla prefetta Luciana Lamorgese, che come capo di gabinetto ebbe l’attuale ministro, Matteo Piantedosi- a rivolgersi all’Agenzia, chiedendole “la disponibilità a fornire collaborazione per iniziative a favore dei Paesi non appartenenti all’Unione europea finalizzate al rafforzamento delle capacità nella gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione e in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare”. L’accordo dell’ottobre di tre anni fa riguardava una cooperazione “da attuarsi anche tramite la fornitura di mezzi e materiali” per dare impulso alla seconda fase del progetto “Support to integrated border and migration management in Libya”.

Il Sibmmil è legato finanziariamente al Fondo fiduciario per l’Africa, istituito dalla Commissione europea a fine 2015 al dichiarato scopo di “affrontare le cause profonde dell’instabilità, degli spostamenti forzati e della migrazione irregolare e per contribuire a una migliore gestione della migrazione”. La prima “fase” del progetto è dotata di un budget di 46,3 milioni di euro, la seconda, quella al centro dell’accordo tra Aid e ministero dell’Interno, di 15 milioni. A beneficiare di queste forniture (navi, formazione, equipaggiamenti, tecnologie), come abbiamo ricostruito in questi anni, sono state soprattutto le milizie costiere libiche, che si sono rese responsabili di gravissime violazioni dei diritti umani. Nel 2022, pochi mesi dopo la stipula dell’accordo, abbiamo inoltrato come Altreconomia un’istanza di accesso civico alla Aid -allora guidata dall’ex senatore Nicola Latorre, sostituito dal dicembre scorso dall’accademica Fiammetta Salmoni- per avere la copia del testo e degli allegati.

La richiesta fu negata richiamando a mo’ di “sostegno normativo” un decreto del ministero dell’Interno datato 16 marzo 2022 (ancora a guida Lamorgese). L’oggetto di quel provvedimento era l’aggiornamento della “Disciplina delle categorie di documenti sottratti al diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi”. Un’apparente formalità. Il Viminale, però, agì di sostanza, includendo tra i documenti ritenuti “inaccessibili per motivi attinenti alla sicurezza, alla difesa nazionale ed alle relazioni internazionali” anche quelli “relativi agli accordi intergovernativi di cooperazione e alle intese tecniche stipulati per la realizzazione di programmi militari di sviluppo, di approvvigionamento e/o supporto comune o di programmi per la collaborazione internazionale di polizia, nonché quelli relativi ad intese tecnico-operative per la cooperazione internazionale di polizia inclusa la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”.

Il 16 gennaio 2023 Roma e Ankara hanno firmato un memorandum per “procedure operative standard” per il distacco in Italia di “esperti della polizia nazionale turca”

Non solo. In quel decreto si schermava poi un altro soggetto sensibile: Frontex. Vengono infatti classificati come inaccessibili anche i “documenti relativi alla cooperazione con l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera (appunto Frontex, ndr), per la sorveglianza delle frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea coincidenti con quelle italiane e che non siano già sottratti all’accesso dall’applicazione di classifiche di riservatezza Ue”. Così come le “relazioni, rapporti ed ogni altro documento relativo a problemi concernenti le zone di confine […] la cui conoscenza possa pregiudicare la sicurezza, la difesa nazionale o le relazioni internazionali”.

È per questo motivo che lo definimmo il “decreto che azzera la trasparenza sulle frontiere”, promuovendo di lì a poco un ricorso al Tar -grazie agli avvocati Giulia Crescini, Nicola Datena, Salvatore Fachile e Ginevra Maccarone dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione e membri del progetto Sciabaca&Oruka- contro i ministeri dell’Interno, della Difesa, della Pubblicazione amministrazione, oltreché l’Agenzia industrie difesa (Aid), proprio per vedere riconosciuto il diritto all’accesso civico generalizzato. In primo grado, però, il Tar del Lazio ci ha dato torto.

Ed eccoci arrivati al Consiglio di Stato, il cui pronunciamento, pubblicato a metà novembre 2023, ha ritenuto infondato il nostro appello, riconoscendo come “fonte di un divieto assoluto all’accesso civico generalizzato”, non sorretto perciò da alcuna motivazione, proprio quel decreto ministeriale firmato Luciana Lamorgese del marzo 2022. “All’ampliamento della platea dei soggetti che possono avvalersi dell’accesso civico generalizzato corrisponde un maggior rigore normativo nella previsione delle eccezioni poste a tutela dei contro-interessi pubblici e privati”, hanno scritto i giudici della quarta sezione.

I legali che ci hanno accompagnato in questo percorso non la pensano allo stesso modo. “Il Consiglio di Stato ha affermato che il decreto ministeriale del 16 marzo 2022, una fonte secondaria, non legislativa, adottata in attuazione della disciplina del diverso istituto dell’accesso documentale, abbia introdotto nell’ordinamento un limite assoluto all’accesso civico, che può essere invocato dalla Pubblica amministrazione senza che questa sia tenuta a fornire alcuna motivazione in merito alla sua ricorrenza.

Si tratta di un’evidente elusione del dettato normativo, che prevede in materia una riserva assoluta di legge”, osservano le avvocate Crescini e Maccarone. Che aggiungono: “I giudici hanno respinto anche la censura relativa all’assoluta genericità del limite introdotto con il decreto ministeriale, che non individua precisamente le categorie di atti sottratti all’accesso, ma al contrario solo il settore di interesse, cioè la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, essendo idoneo a ricomprendere qualunque tipologia di atto, documento o dato, di fatto svuotando di contenuto l’istituto”. Questa sentenza del Consiglio di Stato rischia di rappresentare un precedente preoccupante. “L’accesso civico è uno strumento moderno che avrebbe potuto garantire la trasparenza degli atti della Pubblica amministrazione secondo canoni condivisibili che rispecchiano le esigenze che si sono cristallizzate in tutta Europa nel corso degli ultimi anni -riflettono le avvocate-. Tuttavia con questa interpretazione l’istituto viene totalmente svuotato di significato, costringendoci a fare un passo indietro di notevole importanza in tema di trasparenza, che è chiamata ad assicurare l’effettivo andamento democratico di un ordinamento giuridico”.

I mezzi guardacoste che l’Italia si appresta a cedere quest’anno alla Guardia nazionale del ministero dell’Interno tunisino sono sei

Le forniture italiane per ostacolare i transiti, intanto, continuano. Negli ultimi mesi la Direzione centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere del Viminale -retta da Claudio Galzerano, già a capo di Europol- ha ripreso con forza a bandire gare o pubblicare, a cose fatte, affidamenti diretti. Anche per trasferte o distacchi in Italia di “ufficiali” libici, tunisini, ivoriani o “esperti della polizia nazionale turca”. La delegazione della Libyan coast guard and port security, ad esempio, è stata portata dal 15 al 18 gennaio di quest’anno alla base navale della Guardia di Finanza a Capo Miseno (NA) per una “visita tecnica”. Nei mesi prima altre “autorità libiche” erano state formate alle basi di Gaeta (LT) o Capo Miseno. Gli ufficiali della Costa d’Avorio sono stati in missione dal 30 ottobre scorso al 20 gennaio 2024 “in materia di rimpatri”. Sono stati portati nei punti caldi di Lampedusa e Ventimiglia.

Al dicembre 2023 risale invece la firma dell’accordo tra la Direzione centrale e il Comando generale della Gdf per la fornitura di navi, assistenza, manutenzione, supporto tecnico-logistico a beneficio di Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto. Obiettivo: il “rafforzamento delle capacità nella gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione e in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare”. Proprio alla Guardia nazionale del ministero dell’Interno di Tunisi finiranno sei guardacoste litoranei della classe “G.L. 1.400”, con servizi annessi del tipo “consulenza, assistenza e tutoraggio”, per un valore di 4,8 milioni di euro (i soldi li mette il Viminale, i mezzi e la competenza la Guardia di Finanza). Navi ma anche carburante. A inizio gennaio di quest’anno il direttore Galzerano, dietro presunta richiesta di non ben precisate “autorità tunisine”, ha approvato la spesa di “nove milioni di euro circa” (testualmente) per “il pagamento del carburante delle unità navali impegnate nella lotta all’immigrazione clandestina e nelle operazioni di ricerca e di soccorso” nelle acque tunisine. Dove hanno recuperato le risorse? Da un fondo ministeriale dedicato a “misure volte alla prevenzione e al contrasto della criminalità e al potenziamento della sicurezza nelle strutture aeroportuali e nelle principali stazioni ferroviarie anche attraverso imprescindibili misure di cooperazione internazionale”. Chissà quale sarà la prossima fermata.

▻https://altreconomia.it/cosi-litalia-ha-svuotato-il-diritto-alla-trasparenza-sulle-frontiere
#Tunisie #Egypte #transparence #Agenzia_industrie_difesa (#Aid) #Support_to_integrated_border_and_migration_management_in_Libya (#Sibmmil) #Fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l'Afrique #gardes-côtes_libyens #Frontex

#Frontex, Cutro è un ricordo sbiadito: sorvegliare dall’alto resta la priorità

Un anno dopo la strage, l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera investe ancora su velivoli per sorvolare il Mediterraneo. Dal 2016 a oggi la spesa supera mezzo miliardo di euro. Una strategia dagli esiti noti: più respinti e più morti

Frontex è pronta a investire altri 158 milioni di euro per sorvegliare dall’alto il Mediterraneo. A un anno dal naufragio di Steccato di Cutro (KR), costato la vita a 94 persone, la strategia dell’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere esterne europee non cambia. Anzi, si affina con “occhi” sempre più efficaci per rintracciare e osservare dall’alto le imbarcazioni in difficoltà. “Si continua a pensare che Frontex sia un’innocua gregaria degli Stati, senza responsabilità -spiega Laura Salzano, docente di diritto dell’Ue presso l’Università di Barcellona-. Ma in mare, sempre di più, le sue attività hanno conseguenze dirette sulla vita delle persone”.

Lo racconta, in parte, anche la strage di Cutro del 26 febbraio 2023. Alle 22.26 della sera prima infatti fu l’Agenzia, attraverso il velivolo “Eagle 1”, a individuare per prima la “Summer love” e a segnalarla, quand’era a circa 40 miglia delle coste crotonesi, al Frontex coordination centre. Da Varsavia le coordinate della nave furono girate alle autorità competenti: tra queste anche l’International coordination centre (ICC) di Pratica di mare (RM) in cui, allo stesso tavolo, siedono le autorità italiane e la stessa Agenzia che ha il dovere di monitorare quello che succede. “Nonostante fosse noto che c’erano persone nella ‘pancia della nave’ e il meteo stesse peggiorando, si è deciso di attivare un’operazione di polizia e non di ‘ricerca e soccorso’ -spiega Salzano-. Questa classificazione a mio avviso errata è responsabilità anche dell’Agenzia”. Un errore che potrebbe aver inciso anche sul ritardo nei soccorsi.

Lo stabilirà la Procura di Crotone che, a metà gennaio 2024, non ha ancora chiuso le indagini sulla strage. Qualcosa di quanto successo quella sera, però, si sa già, perché il processo contro i presunti manovratori dell’imbarcazione è già in fase di dibattimento. “La prima barca della Guardia costiera -spiega Francesco Verri, avvocato di decine di familiari delle vittime- arriva sul luogo del naufragio alle 6.50, quasi tre ore dopo il naufragio: salva due persone ma recupera anche il cadavere di un bambino morto di freddo. Perché ci hanno impiegato così tanto tempo per percorrere poche miglia nautiche? Sulla spiaggia la pattuglia è arrivata un’ora e 35 minuti dopo il naufragio. Da Crotone a Cutro ci vogliono dieci minuti di macchina”. Domande a cui dovranno rispondere le autorità italiane.

Al di là delle responsabilità penali, però, quanto successo quella notte mostra l’inadeguatezza del sistema dei soccorsi di cui la sorveglianza aerea è un tassello fondamentale su cui Frontex continua a investire. Con importi senza precedenti.

Quando Altreconomia va in stampa, a metà gennaio, l’Agenzia sta ancora valutando le offerte arrivate per il nuovo bando da 158 milioni di euro per due servizi di monitoraggio aereo: uno a medio raggio, entro le 151 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza (budget di 100 milioni), l’altro a lungo raggio che può superare le 401 miglia di distanza (48 milioni).

▻https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/i/web/post/658926323750966119

Documenti di gara alla mano, una delle novità più rilevanti riguarda i cosiddetti “Paesi ospitanti” delle attività di monitoraggio: si prevede infatti espressamente che possano essere anche Stati non appartenenti all’Unione europea. In sostanza: il velivolo potrebbe partire da una base in Tunisia o Libia; e, addirittura, si prevede che un host country liaison officer, ovvero un agente di “contatto” delle autorità di quel Paese, possa salire a bordo dell’aeromobile. “Bisogna capire se sarà fattibile operativamente -sottolinea Salzano-. Ma non escludere questa possibilità nel bando è grave: sono Paesi che non sono tenuti a rispettare gli standard europei”.

Mentre lavora per dispiegare la sua flotta anche sull’altra sponda del Mediterraneo, Frontex investe sulla “qualità” dei servizi richiesti. Nel bando si richiede infatti che il radar installato sopra il velivolo sia in grado di individuare (per poi poter fotografare) un oggetto di piccole dimensioni a quasi dieci chilometri di distanza e uno “medio” a quasi 19. Prendendo ad esempio il caso delle coste libiche, più la “potenza di fuoco” è elevata più il velivolo potrà essere distante dalle coste del Nordafrica ma comunque individuare le imbarcazioni appena partite.

La distanza, in miglia nautiche, che l’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex nel novembre 2023 prevede tra l’aeroporto di partenza del velivolo e l’area di interesse da sorvolare è di 401 miglia. Nella prima gara riguardante questi servizi, pubblicata dall’agenzia nell’agosto 2016, la distanza massima prevista era di 200 miglia

Frontex sa che, oltre alla componente meccanica, l’efficienza “tecnica” dei suoi droni è fondamentale. Per questo il 6 e 7 settembre 2023 ha riunito a Varsavia 16 aziende del settore per discutere delle nuove frontiere tecnologiche dei “velivoli a pilotaggio remoto”. A presentare i propri prodotti c’era anche l’italiana Leonardo Spa, leader europeo nel settore aerospaziale e militare, che già nel 2018 aveva siglato un accordo da 1,6 milioni di euro per fornire droni all’Agenzia.

L’ex Finmeccanica è tra le 15 aziende che hanno vinto i bandi pubblicati da Frontex per la sorveglianza aerea. Se si guarda al numero di commesse aggiudicate, il trio formato da DEA Aviation (Regno Unito), CAE Aviation (Stati Uniti) ed EASP Air (Spagna) primeggia con oltre otto contratti siglati. Valutando l’importo delle singole gare, a farla da padrone sono invece due colossi del settore militare: la tedesca Airbus DS e la Elbit System, principale azienda che rifornisce l’esercito israeliano, che si sono aggiudicate in cordata due gare (2020 e 2022) per 125 milioni di euro. Dal 2016 a oggi, il totale investito per questi servizi supera i cinquecento milioni di euro.

“La sorveglianza è una delle principali voci di spesa dell’Agenzia -spiega Ana Valdivia, professoressa all’Oxford internet institute che da anni analizza i bandi di Frontex- insieme a tutte le tecnologie che trasformano gli ‘eventi reali’ in dati”. E la cosiddetta “datificazione” ha un ruolo di primo piano anche nel Mediterraneo. “La fotografia di una barca in distress ha un duplice scopo: intercettarla ma anche avere un’evidenza digitale, una prova, che una determinata persona era a bordo -aggiunge Valdivia-. Questa è la ‘sorveglianza’: non un occhio che ci guarda giorno e notte, ma una memoria digitale capace di ricostruire in futuro la nostra vita. Anche per i migranti”. E per chi è su un’imbarcazione diretta verso l’Europa è vitale a chi finiscono le informazioni.

Nell’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex, si prevede che “il contraente trasferirà i dati a sistemi situati in un Paese terzo se è garantito un livello adeguato di protezione”. “Fanno finta di non sapere che non possono farlo -aggiunge Salzano- non potendo controllare che Paesi come la Tunisia e la Libia non utilizzino quei dati, per esempio, per arrestare le persone in viaggio una volta respinte”. Quello che si sa, invece, è che quei dati -nello specifico le coordinate delle navi- vengono utilizzate per far intervenire le milizie costiere libiche. Per questo motivo i droni si avvicinano sempre di più alla Libia. Se nel 2016 l’Agenzia, nella prima gara pubblicata per questa tipologia di servizi, parlava di area operativa nelle “vicinanze” con le coste italiane e greche, fino a 200 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza, dal 2020 in avanti questa distanza ha superato le 401 miglia.

Lorenzo Pezzani, professore associato di Geografia all’università di Bologna, ha esaminato giorno per giorno i tracciati di “Heron”, il più importante drone della flotta di Frontex: nel 2021 l’attività di volo si è concentrata tra Zuara e Tripoli, il tratto di costa libica da cui partiva la maggior parte delle barche.

“Il numero di respingimenti delle milizie libiche -spiega Pezzani autore dello studio “Airborne complicity” pubblicato a inizio dicembre 2022- cresce all’aumentare delle ore di volo del drone e allo stesso tempo la mortalità non diminuisce, a differenza di quanto dichiarato dall’Agenzia”. Che tramite il suo direttore Hans Leijtens, entrato in carica a pochi giorni dal naufragio di Cutro, nega di avere accordi o rapporti diretti con la Libia. “Se è così, com’è possibile che un drone voli così vicino alle coste di uno Stato sovrano?”, si chiede Salzano. Chi fornirà il “nuovo” servizio per Frontex dovrà cancellare le registrazioni video entro 72 ore. Meglio non lasciare troppe tracce in giro.

▻https://altreconomia.it/frontex-cutro-e-un-ricordo-sbiadito-sorvegliare-dallalto-resta-la-prior
#migrations #réfugiés #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Cutro #surveillance_aérienne #Leonardo #Elbit_System #Airbus #host_country_liaison_officer #radar #technologie #DEA_Aviation #CAE_Aviation #EASP_Air #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens

La #Grèce condamnée par la #Cour_européenne_des_droits_de_l’homme après les tirs de gardes-côtes sur des embarcations de migrants

La CEDH a condamné le pays à verser 80 000 euros aux proches d’un migrant syrien mort après avoir été blessé par balle par les gardes-côtes grecs, en 2014.

Le #22_septembre_2014, à l’aube, non loin des côtes turques et près de l’îlot grec de #Psérimos, un bateau à moteur transportant quatorze migrants est repéré par les #gardes-côtes_grecs. Le commandant du navire militaire demande au conducteur d’arrêter l’embarcation. Ce dernier refuse. Les gardes-côtes tirent alors vingt balles pour immobiliser la vedette – sept coups de semonce et treize tirs ciblés sur le moteur. Deux ressortissants syriens sont blessés. L’un d’eux, Belal Tello est touché à la tête et conduit par hélicoptère à l’hôpital de Rhodes, une île grecque voisine. En août 215, il est transféré en Suède où habitent sa femme et ses enfants (les requérants). Il est pris en charge à l’hôpital universitaire Karolinska, à Stockholm. Mais il meurt quatre mois plus tard.

Les proches de #Belal_Tello ont attendu près de dix ans pour obtenir le verdict de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH), qui a finalement condamné la Grèce à leur verser 80 000 euros. D’après la cour, Athènes n’a pas prouvé « que l’usage de la force était absolument nécessaire » pour arrêter le bateau qui s’approchait des côtes grecques. « Les treize coups de feu tirés exposaient forcément les passagers de la vedette à un risque », ont estimé les sept juges européens.

« La condamnation concerne également l’enquête inefficace menée par les autorités grecques sur l’incident », souligne, dans un communiqué, l’ONG Refugee Support Aegean (RSA), qui représentait, avec l’association Pro Asyl, la famille de la victime. Le parquet grec avait ouvert une enquête préliminaire sur cet incident, mais la justice avait rapidement classé l’affaire en 2015. D’après la CEDH, l’enquête menée par les autorités nationales comportait « de nombreuses lacunes qui ont conduit notamment à la perte d’éléments de preuve ». « Au cours de la procédure pénale, les deux réfugiés blessés par balle n’ont jamais été appelés à témoigner. Les déclarations des témoins recueillies lors des interrogatoires préliminaires semblent identiques », souligne RSA. La CEDH s’est aussi étonnée que plusieurs mesures pouvant faire avancer l’enquête n’aient pas été prises : une expertise médico-légale sur la blessure à la tête du réfugié syrien ; un rapport balistique établissant les trajectoires des tirs…
« Impunité généralisée »

Ce n’est pas la première fois que les agissements des gardes-côtes grecs sont condamnés ou mis en cause. En juillet 2022, la CEDH avait accordé 330 000 euros à seize requérants dont le bateau avait coulé en mer Egée, près de l’île de Farmakonisi, en janvier 2014. Onze personnes, dont huit enfants, avaient trouvé la mort dans ce naufrage provoqué par un navire garde-côtes grec, qui aurait navigué à grande vitesse à proximité de l’embarcation, entraînant le chavirement de celle-ci.
La CEDH avait déjà noté que les autorités grecques n’avaient pas mené une « enquête approfondie et effective permettant de faire la lumière sur les circonstances du naufrage ». L’une des avocates des requérants, Maria Papamina, du Conseil pour les réfugiés grec, avait déclaré, lors du rendu de cette décision de justice : « Nous avions l’impression que l’intention [des autorités grecques] était de clore rapidement l’affaire. »

Et c’est justement ce que les défenseurs des droits de l’homme souhaitent éviter, que le cas d’un autre naufrage survenu il y a quelques mois, au large du Péloponnèse, à Pylos, ne soit classé, lui aussi, sans suite. Le 14 juin 2023, un chalutier, l’Adriana, parti de Libye, a coulé avec près de 750 migrants à son bord, dans les eaux territoriales grecques. Seules 104 personnes ont survécu et 82 corps ont été retrouvés.

Les témoignages des survivants suggèrent qu’un patrouilleur garde-côtes grec a attaché une corde à l’Adriana et tiré dessus, ce qui aurait conduit à faire chavirer le bateau surchargé de migrants. D’après plusieurs enquêtes journalistiques, les opérations de sauvetage ont été également tardivement mises en place.
Dans un rapport publié en décembre 2023, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch déploraient, six mois après le drame, le « peu de progrès » dans les investigations menées par les autorités grecques. Selon les deux ONG, « les échecs historiques des enquêtes grecques sur les naufrages (…) et l’impunité généralisée pour les violations systémiques des droits humains à ses frontières suscitent des inquiétudes quant à l’adéquation des enquêtes judiciaires en cours sur la tragédie de Pylos ».

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/01/17/la-grece-condamnee-par-la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme-apres-les-ti
#CEDH #justice #condamnation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #gardes-côtes #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #décès #naufrage #tir

Beyond borders, beyond boundaries. A Critical Analysis of EU Financial Support for Border Control in Tunisia and Libya

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bc40e5d2a-3c51e6/pw1GsGJt4170/01Ns0KgPV4Pl91rFF5IrvPERJoIpRNbDGOllF5gV.png

In recent years, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have intensified their effort to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching their borders. One strategy to reach this goal consists of funding programs for third countries’ coast guards and border police, as currently happens in Libya and Tunisia.

These programs - funded by the #EUTF_for_Africa and the #NDICI-Global_Europe - allocate funding to train and equip authorities, including the delivery and maintenance of assets. NGOs, activists, and International Organizations have amassed substantial evidence implicating Libyan and Tunisian authorities in severe human rights violations.

The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament commissioned a study carried out by Profundo, ARCI, EuroMed Rights and Action Aid, on how EU funding is linked to human rights violations in neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Libya.

The study answers the following questions:

- What is the state of EU funding for programs aimed at enhancing border control capacities in Libya and Tunisia?
- What is the human rights impact of these initiatives?
- What is the framework for human rights compliance?
- How do the NDICI-Global Europe decision-making processes work?

The report highlights that the shortcomings in human rights compliance within border control programs, coupled with the lack of proper transparency clearly contradicts EU and international law. Moreover, this results in the insufficient consideration of the risk of human rights violations when allocating funding for both ongoing and new programs.

This is particularly concerning in the cases of Tunisia and Libya, where this report collects evidence that the ongoing strategies, regardless of achieving or not the questionable goals of reducing migration flows, have a very severe human rights impact on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

Pour télécharger l’étude:
►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

#Libye #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #aide_financières #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #rapport #trust_fund #profundo #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument #droits_humains #gestion_des_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #fonds_fiduciaire #IVCDCI #IVCDCI-EM #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_libyens #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #EUTFA #coût #violence #crimes_contre_l'humanité #impunité #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #naufrages

Fewer boat crossings, visit to Frontex : EU and Tunisia implement migration pact

Despite an alleged repayment of funds for migration defence, Tunisia is cooperating with the EU. Fewer refugees are also arriving across the Mediterranean – a decrease by a factor of seven.

In June, the EU Commission signed an agreement on joint migration control with Tunisia. According to the agreement, the government in Tunis will receive €105 million to monitor its borders and “combat people smuggling”. Another €150 million should flow from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) in the coming years for the purposes of border management and countering the “smuggling” of migrants.

Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million in September. The money was to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment. Around €25 million of this tranche was earmarked for “voluntary return” programmes, which are implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Organisation for Migration.

However, a few weeks after the transfer from Brussels, the government in Tunis allegedly repaid almost the entire sum. Tunisia “does not accept anything resembling favours or alms”, President Kais Saied is quoted as saying. Earlier, the government had also cancelled a working visit by the Commission to implement the agreement.

Successes at the working level

Despite the supposed U-turn, cooperation on migration prevention between the EU and Tunisia has got off the ground and is even showing initial successes at the working level. Under the agreement, the EU has supplied spare parts for the Tunisian coast guard, for example, which will keep “six ships operational”. This is what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote last week to MEPs who had asked about the implementation of the deal. Another six coast guard vessels are to be repaired by the end of the year.

In an undated letter to the EU member states, von der Leyen specifies the equipment aid. According to the letter, IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far. An “additional capacity building” is to take place within the framework of existing “border management programmes” implemented by Italy and the Netherlands, among others. One of these is the EU4BorderSecurity programme, which among other things provides skills in sea rescue and has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.

The Tunisian Garde Nationale Maritime, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre benefit from these measures. This MRCC has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.

Departures from Tunisia decrease by a factor of seven

Since the signing of the migration agreement, the departures of boats with refugees from Tunisia have decreased by a factor of 7, according to information from Migazin in October. The reason for this is probably the increased frequency of patrols by the Tunisian coast guard. In August, 1,351 people were reportedly apprehended at sea. More and more often, the boats are also destroyed after being intercepted by Tunisian officials. The prices that refugees have to pay to smugglers are presumably also responsible for fewer crossings; these are said to have risen significantly in Tunisia.

State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.

Now the EU wants to put pressure on Tunisia to introduce visa requirements for individual West African states. This is to affect, among others, Côte d’Ivoire, where most of the people arriving in the EU via Tunisia come from and almost all of whom arrive in Italy. Guinea and Tunisia come second and third among these nationalities.

Reception from the Frontex Director

In September, three months after the signing of the migration agreement, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The visit from Tunis was personally received by Frontex Director Hans Leijtens. EU officials then gave presentations on the capabilities and capacities of the border agency, including the training department or the deportation centre set up in 2021, which relies on good cooperation with destination states of deportation flights.

Briefings were also held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and the “Situation Centre”, where all threads from surveillance with ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together. The armed “permanent reserve” that Frontex has been building up since 2021 was also presented to the Tunisian ministries. These will also be deployed in third countries, but so far only in Europe in the Western Balkans.

However, Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex. Finally, the Tunisian coast guard also turned down an offer to participate in an exercise of European coast guards in Greece.

Model for migration defence with Egypt

Aiding and abetting “smuggling” is an offence that the police are responsible for prosecuting in EU states. If these offences affect two or more EU states, Europol can coordinate the investigations. This, too, is now to get underway with Tunisia: In April, EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson had already visited Tunis and agreed on an “operational partnership to combat people smuggling” (ASOP), for which additional funds will be made available. Italy, Spain and Austria are responsible for implementing this police cooperation.

Finally, Tunisia is also one of the countries being discussed in Brussels in the “Mechanism of Operational Coordination for the External Dimension of Migration” (MOCADEM). This working group was newly created by the EU states last year and serves to politically bundle measures towards third countries of particular interest. In one of the most recent meetings, the migration agreement was also a topic. Following Tunisia’s example, the EU could also conclude such a deal with Egypt. The EU heads of government are now to take a decision on this.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2023/11/01/fewer-boat-crossings-visit-to-frontex-eu-and-tunisia-implement-migrati

#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Tunisie #coopération #Frontex #aide_financière #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #militarisation_des_frontières #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM #UNHCR #EU4BorderSecurity_programme #Seahorse_Mediterranean #officiers_de_liaison #arrivées #départs #chiffres #statistiques #prix #Frontex #operational_partnership_to_combat_people_smuggling (#ASOP) #Mechanism_of_Operational_Coordination_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM)

–—
ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

Les #impasses de la migration

Pour LSD, #Raphaël_Krafft constate que la situation des exilés aux portes ou sur le sol européen a été rendue intenable, malgré les bonnes volontés.

▻https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/serie-les-impasses-de-la-migration

#podcast #audio

EU to step up support for human rights abuses in North Africa

In a letter (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4088/eu-com-migration-letter-eur-council-10-23.pdf) to the European Council trumpeting the EU’s efforts to control migration, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to coast guards in Libya and Tunisia, where refugee and migrant rights are routinely violated.

The letter (pdf) states:

“…we need to build up the capacity of our partners to conduct effective border surveillance and search and rescue operations. We are providing support to many key partners with equipment and training to help prevent unauthorised border crossings. All five vessels promised to Libya have been delivered and we see the impact of increased patrols. Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operational, and others will be repaired by the end of the year. More is expected to be delivered to countries in North Africa in the coming months.”

What it does not mention is that vessels delivered to the so-called Libyan coast guard are used to conduct “pullbacks” of refugees to brutal detention conditions and human rights violations.

Meanwhile in Tunisia, the coast guard has been conducting pullbacks of people who have subsequently been dumped in remote regions near the Tunisian-Algerian border.

According to testimony provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW)¸ a group of people who were intercepted at sea and brought back to shore were then detained by the National Guard, who:

“…loaded the group onto buses and drove them for 6 hours to somewhere near the city of Le Kef, about 40 kilometers from the Algerian border. There, officers divided them into groups of about 10, loaded them onto pickup trucks, and drove toward a mountainous area. The four interviewees, who were on the same truck, said that another truck with armed agents escorted their truck.

The officers dropped their group in the mountains near the Tunisia-Algeria border, they said. The Guinean boy [interviewed by HRW) said that one officer had threatened, “If you return again [to Tunisia], we will kill you.” One of the Senegalese children [interviewed by HRW] said an officer had pointed his gun at the group.”

Von der Leyen does not mention the fact that the Tunisian authorities refused an initial disbursement of €67 million offered by the Commission as part of its more than €1 billion package for Tunisia, which the country’s president has called “small” and said it “lacks respect.” (▻https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247) The EU’s ambassador to Tunisia has said that the refusal “speaks to Tunisia’s impatience and desire to speed up implementation” of the deal.

[voir: ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1020596]

The letter also emphasises the need to “establish a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership with Egypt,” as well as providing more support to Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon. The letter hints at the reason why – Israel’s bombing of the Gaza strip and a potential exodus of refugees – but does not mention the issue directly, merely saying that “the pressures on partners in our immediate vicinity risk being exacerbated”.

It appears that the consequences rather than the causes of any movements of Palestinian refugees are the main concern. Conclusions on the Middle East agreed by the European Council last night demand “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need” in Gaza, but do not call for a ceasefire. The European Council instead “strongly emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law.”

More surveillance, new law

Other plans mentioned in the letter include “increased aerial surveillance” for “combatting human smuggling and trafficking” by Operation IRINI, the EU’s military mission in the Mediterranean, and increased support for strengthening controls at points of departure in North African states as well as “points of entry by migrants at land borders.”

The Commission also wants increased action against migrant smuggling, with a proposal to revise the 2002 Facilitation Directive “to ensure that criminal offences are harmonised, assets are frozen, and coordination strengthened,” so that “those who engage in illegal acts exploiting migrants pay a heavy price.”

It appears the proposal will come at the same time as a migrant smuggling conference organised by the Commission on 28 November “to create a Global Alliance with a Call to Action, launching a process of regular international exchange on this constantly evolving crime.”

Deportation cooperation

Plans are in the works for more coordinated action on deportations, with the Commission proposing to:

“…work in teams with Member States on targeted return actions, with a lead Member State or Agency for each action. We will develop a roadmap that could focus on (1) ensuring that return decisions are issued at the same time as a negative asylum decisions (2) systematically ensuring the mutual recognition of return decisions and follow-up enforcement action; (3) carrying out joint identification actions including through a liaison officers’ network in countries of origin; (4) supporting policy dialogue on readmission with third countries and facilitating the issuance of travel documents, as well as acceptance of the EU laissez passer; and (5) organising assisted voluntary return and joint return operations with the support of Frontex.”

Cooperation on legal migration, meanwhile, will be done by member states “on a voluntary basis,” with the letter noting that any offers made should be conditional on increased cooperation with EU deportation efforts: “local investment and opportunities for legal migration must go hand in hand with strengthened cooperation on readmission.”

More funds

For all this to happen, the letter calls on the European Council to make sure that “migration priorities - both on the internal and external dimension - are reflected in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework,” the EU’s 2021-27 budget.

Mid-term revision of the budget was discussed at the European Council meeting yesterday, though the conclusions on that point merely state that there was an “in-depth exchange of views,” with the European Council calling on the Council of the EU “to take work forward, with a view to reaching an overall agreement by the end of the year.”

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/eu-to-step-up-support-for-human-rights-abuses-in-north-africa

#migrations #asile #réfugiés #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #Ursula_von_der_Leyen #lettre #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Libye #bateaux #aide #gardes-côtes_libyens #surveillance_frontalière #surveillance_frontalière_effective #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Memorandum_of_Understanding #MoU #pull-backs #Egypte #Turquie #Jourdanie #Liban #réfugiés_palestiniens #Palestine #7_octobre_2023 #Operation_IRINI #IRINI #surveillance_aérienne #passeurs #directive_facilitation #renvois #déportation #officiers_de_liaison #réadmissions #laissez-passer #Frontex

ping @isskein @_kg_ @karine4

Libia. Il Consiglio di sicurezza Onu conferma le sanzioni ai guardacoste-trafficanti

Approvato all’unanimità l’inasprimento delle sanzioni per i boss del traffico di esseri umani, petrolio e armi. Dal guardacoste «#Bija» ai capi della «polizia petrolifera» fino al direttore dei «#lager»

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La Libia non è un porto sicuro di sbarco, e le connessioni dirette tra guardia costiera libica e trafficanti di esseri umani, petrolio e armi, sono il motore della filiera dello sfruttamento e dell’arricchimento. All’unanimità il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha accolto le richieste degli investigatori Onu, che hanno proposto l’inasprimento delle sanzioni contro i principali boss di un sistema criminale che tiene insieme politica, milizie e clan.

La decisione mette in difficoltà il governo italiano e le direttive Piantedosi, secondo cui le organizzazioni del soccorso umanitario dovrebbero prima coordinarsi con la cosiddetta guardia costiera libica, che invece l’Onu indica tra i principali ingranaggi del sistema criminale. Dopo una lunga discussione interna il Consiglio di sicurezza ha accolto le richieste degli investigatori Onu in Libia a cui è stato rinnovato il mandato fino al 2025. Gli esponenti per i quali è richiesto il blocco dei beni e il divieto assoluto di viaggio sono cinque, ma uno risulta deceduto il 16 marzo di quest’anno in Egitto. Gli altri componenti del «poker libico» sono nomi pesanti, a cominciare da #Saadi_Gheddafi, il figlio ex calciatore del colonnello Gheddafi, che sta tentando di vendere una proprietà in Canada aggirando le sanzioni anche attraverso il consolato libico in Turchia. Il cinquantenne Gheddafi avrebbe viaggiato indisturbato e il 27 giugno 2023, gli esperti Onu hanno scritto al governo turco «in merito all’attuazione delle misure di congelamento dei beni e di divieto di viaggio. Non è stata ricevuta alcuna risposta». Secondo gli investigatori la firma di Gheddafi su una procura depositata in Turchia, costituisce «una prova della mancata osservanza da parte della Turchia della misura di divieto di viaggio».

Se i Gheddafi rappresentano il passato che continua a incombere sulla Libia, soprattutto per lo smisurato patrimonio lasciato dal patriarca dittatore e mai realmente quantificato, nella lista dei sanzionati ci sono i nuovi boss della Libia di oggi. Come #Mohammed_Al_Amin_Al-Arabi_Kashlaf. «Il Gruppo di esperti ha stabilito che la #Petroleum_Facilities_Guard di Zawiyah è un’entità che è nominalmente sotto il controllo del Governo di unità nazionale», dunque non una polizia privata in senso stretto ma un gruppo armato affiliato alle autorità centrali e incaricato di sorvegliare i principali stabilimenti petroliferi, da cui tuttavia viene fatta sparire illegalmente un certa quantità di idrocarburi che poi vengono immessi nel mercato europeo grazie a una fitta rete di contrabbandieri. «Il gruppo di esperti - si legge ancora - ha chiesto alle autorità libiche di fornire informazioni aggiornate sull’attuazione del congelamento dei beni e del divieto di viaggio nei confronti di questo individuo, compresi i dettagli sullo status attuale e sulla catena di comando della Petroleum Facilities Guard a Zawiyah, nonché sulle sue attività finanziarie e risorse economiche personali». Anche in questo caso le autorità libiche «non hanno ancora risposto».

Collegato a Kashlaf è #Abd_al-Rahman_al-Milad, forse il più noto del clan. Noto anche come “Bija”, ha utilizzato «documenti delle Nazioni Unite contraffatti nel tentativo di revocare il divieto di viaggio - si legge - e il congelamento dei beni imposti nei suoi confronti». Bija si è però mosso trovando appoggi sia «nel governo libico che in interlocutori privati all’interno della Libia», con l’obiettivo di ottenere il sostegno «alla sua richiesta di cancellazione» delle sanzioni. In particolare, gli investigatori Onu sono in possesso «di un documento ufficiale libico, emesso il 28 settembre 2022 dall’Ufficio del Procuratore Generale, in cui si ordina alle autorità responsabili - denunciano gli esperti - di rimuovere il nome di #Al-Milad dal sistema nazionale di monitoraggio degli arrivi e delle partenze». Una copertura al massimo livello della magistratura, che lo aveva già assolto dalle accuse di traffico di petrolio, e che «consentirebbe ad Al-Milad di lasciare la Libia con i beni in suo possesso, in violazione della misura di congelamento dei beni». Il 25 gennaio 2023 «il Gruppo di esperti ha chiesto alle autorità libiche di fornire informazioni aggiornate sull’effettiva attuazione del congelamento dei beni e del divieto di viaggio nei confronti di Al-Milad. La richiesta è stata fatta a seguito della ripresa delle sue funzioni professionali nelle forze armate libiche, compresa la nomina a ufficiale presso l’Accademia navale di Janzour dopo il suo rilascio dalla custodia cautelare l’11 aprile 2021». A nove mesi di distanza, le autorità libiche «non hanno ancora risposto».

La risoluzione approvata dal Consiglio di sicurezza si basa anche su un’altra accusa del «Panel of Expert» i quali hanno «hanno stabilito che il comandante della Petroleum Facilities Guard di Zawiyah, Mohamed Al Amin Al-Arabi Kashlaf , e il comandante della Guardia costiera libica di #Zawiyah, Abd al-Rahman al-Milad (Bija), insieme a #Osama_Al-Kuni_Ibrahim, continuano a gestire una vasta rete di traffico e contrabbando a Zawiyah». Le sanzioni non li hanno danneggiati. «Da quando i due comandanti sono stati inseriti nell’elenco nel 2018, hanno ulteriormente ampliato la rete includendo entità armate che operano nelle aree di Warshafanah, Sabratha e Zuara». Tutto ruota intorno alle prigioni per i profughi. «La rete di Zawiyah continua a essere centralizzata nella struttura di detenzione per migranti di Al-Nasr a Zawiyah, gestita da Osama Al-Kuni Ibrahim», il cugino di Bija identificato grazie ad alcune immagini pubblicate da Avvenire nel settembre del 2019. Il suo nome ricorre in diverse indagini. Sulla base «di ampie prove di un modello coerente di violazioni dei diritti umani, il Gruppo di esperti ha rilevato - rincara il “panel” - che Abd al-Rahman al-Milad e Osama al-Kuni Ibrahim, hanno continuano a essere responsabili di atti di tortura, lavori forzati e altri maltrattamenti nei confronti di persone illegalmente confinate nel centro di detenzione di Al-Nasr», allo scopo di estorcere «ingenti somme di denaro e come punizione».

Il modello di #business criminale è proprio quello che Roma non vuole riconoscere, ma che gli investigatori Onu e il Consiglio di sicurezza ribadiscono: «La rete allargata di Zawiyah - si legge nel rapporto - comprende ora elementi della 55esima Brigata, il comando dell’Apparato di Supporto alla Stabilità a Zawiyah, in particolare le sue unità marittime, e singoli membri della Guardia Costiera libica, tutti operanti al fine di eseguire il piano comune della rete di ottenere ingenti risorse finanziarie e di altro tipo dalle attività di traffico di esseri umani e migranti».

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Al Consiglio di Sicurezza è stato mostrato lo schema che comprende «quattro fasi operative: (a) la ricerca e il ritorno a terra dei migranti in mare; (b) il trasferimento dai punti di sbarco ai centri di detenzione della Direzione per la lotta alla migrazione illegale; (c) l’abuso dei detenuti nei centri di detenzione; (d) il rilascio dei detenuti vittime di abusi». Una volta rimessi in libertà i migranti, rientrano nel ciclo dello sfruttamento: rimessi in mare, lasciando che una percentuale venga catturata dai guardacoste per giustificare il sostegno italiano ed europeo alla cosiddetta guardia costiera libica, e di nuovo «trasferimento dai punti di sbarco ai centri di detenzione della Direzione per la lotta alla migrazione illegale; l’abuso dei detenuti nei centri di detenzione; il rilascio dei detenuti vittime di abusi».

Il rapporto Onu e il voto unanime dei 15 Paesi che siedono nel Consiglio di sicurezza sono uno schiaffo. «Per quanto riguarda il divieto di viaggio e il congelamento dei beni - si legge in una nota riassuntiva della seduta al Palazzo di Vetro -, gli Stati membri, in particolare quelli in cui hanno sede le persone e le entità designate, sono stati invitati a riferire» al Comitato delle sanzioni circa «le rispettive azioni per attuare efficacemente entrambe le misure in relazione a tutte le persone incluse nell’elenco delle sanzioni». Tutte gli esponenti indicati dal «Panel of expert» sono inclusi nell’elenco degli «alert» dell’Interpol. La risoluzione approvata ieri riguarda anche il contrabbando di petrolio e di armi. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha prorogato «l’autorizzazione delle misure per fermare l’esportazione illecita di prodotti petroliferi dalla Libia e il mandato del gruppo di esperti che aiuta a supervisionare questo processo».

▻https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/libia-il-consiglio-di-sicurezza-conferma-le-sanzioni-ai-guardacoste-traffic
#gardes-côtes_libyens #sanctions #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Libye #externalisation #sanctions #conseil_de_sécurité_de_l'ONU #conseil_de_sécurité #ONU #détention #prisons

Leaked letter on intended Cyprus-Lebanon joint border controls: increased deaths and human rights violations

In an increasingly worrying context for migrants and refugees in Cyprus, with the recent escalation of violent racist attacks and discrimination against refugees on the island and the continued pushback policy, civil society organisations raise the alarm concerning Cyprus’ increased support to the Lebanese Army to harden border control and prevent departures.

A letter leaked on 26 September 2023 (▻https://www.philenews.com/kipros/koinonia/article/1389120/exi-metra-protini-ston-livano-i-kipros), from the Cypriot Interior Minister to his Lebanese counterpart, reveals that Cyprus will provide Lebanon with 6 vessels and speedboats by the end of 2024, trainings for the Lebanese Armed Forces, will carry out joint patrol operations from Lebanese shores, and will finance the salaries of members of the Lebanese Armed Forces “who actively contribute to the interception of vessels carrying irregular migrants to Cyprus”. In this way, by providing equipment, funding and training to the Lebanese Army, Cyprus will have a determining influence, if not effective control, on the interceptions of migrants’ boats in Lebanese territorial waters and forced returns (the so-called “pullbacks”), to Lebanon. This in violation of EU and international law, which is likely to trigger legal liability issues. As seen in numerous cases, refugees, especially Syrians, who are pulled back to Lebanon are at risk of detention, ill-treatment and deportations to Syria where they are subject to violence, arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance. The worsening situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, who face increasing violence and deportations, confirms that Lebanon is not a “safe” third country.

As seen in the past with several examples from other examples at the EU’s external borders, (e.g. Turkey, Libya and most recently Tunisia), striking deals with EU neighboring countries of departure in order to increase border controls and contain migratory movements has several catastrophic consequences. Despite officially aiming at decreasing the number of lost lives, they actually increase border violence and deaths, leading to serious human rights abuses and violations of EU and international laws. They also foster a blackmail approach as third countries use their borders as leverage against European countries to get additional funds or negotiate on other sensitive issues, at the expense of people’s lives. All these contribute to having a negative impact on the EU and Member States’ foreign policy.

As demonstrated by a recent article from the Mixed Migration Centre (▻https://mixedmigration.org/articles/how-to-break-the-business-model-of-smugglers), the most effective way to “disrupt the business model of smugglers” and reduce irregular departures, migrants’ dangerous journeys and the consequent losses of lives, is to expand legal migratory routes.

By going in the complete opposite direction, Cyprus, for many years now, has prevented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from reaching the island in a legal way and from leaving the island for other EU countries1. Cyprus has resorted to systematic practices of pushbacks sending refugees back to countries where they are at risk of torture, persecution and arbitrary detention, has intensified forced returns, has dismantled the reception and asylum system, and has fueled a toxic anti-refugee narrative that has led to indiscriminate violent attacks that were initially against Syrian refugees and their properties in #Chloraka (▻https://kisa.org.cy/sundays-pogrom-in-chloraka) and a few days later to against migrants and their properties in #Limassol (▻https://cde.news/racism-fuelled-violence-spreads-in-cyprus). More recently, Cyprus has also announced its willingness to push the EU and Member States to re-evaluate Syria’s status and consider the country as “safe” in order to forcibly return Syrian refugees to Syria – despite on-going clashes, structural human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

These deadly externalisation policies and unlawful practices have and continue to kill individuals and prevent them from accessing their rights. A complete change in migration and asylum policies is urgently needed, based on the respect of human rights and people’s lives, and on legal channels for migration and protection. Cyprus, as well as the EU and its Member States, must protect the human rights of migrants at international borders, ensure access to international protection and proper reception conditions in line with EU and international human rights law. They must open effective legal migratory pathways, including resettlement, humanitarian visas and labour migration opportunities; and they must respect their obligations of saving lives at sea and set up proper Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean.

▻https://euromedrights.org/publication/leaked-letter-on-intended-cyprus-lebanon-joint-border-controls-increa

#mourir_aux_frontières #frontières #droits_humains #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Chypre #Liban #racisme #attaques_racistes #refoulements #push-backs #militarisation_des_frontières #joint_operations #opérations_conjointes #aide #formation #gardes-côtes_libanaises #pull-backs #réfugiés_syriens #externalisation

EU Commission gifts Egypt patrol boats to become a gatekeeper for migration, following Tunisian model

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The EU Commission wants to conclude a migration defense agreement with Egypt and is upgrading the country’s land and sea borders. However, hardly any refugee boats leave from Egyptian shores for Europe.

The government in Cairo is to receive two new ships for its coast guard. A corresponding tender worth €23 million was published by the EU Commission in May. This was confirmed by Neighborhood Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi in a response to a question from MEP Özlem Demirel. Accordingly, the funds come from the NDICI fund, which is intended to provide financial support for the EU’s Neighborhood Policy. As a purpose, the Commission states border management and search and rescue operations. Egypt will also receive thermal imaging cameras, satellite tracking systems and other surveillance equipment.

With the donations, the Commission wants to build Egypt into a new partner in migration defense. In 2021, the government had sent a “list” of border protection equipment to Brussels for this purpose. EU Migration Commissioner Ylva Johansson then traveled to the Egyptian capital to negotiate them, followed by a visit by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2022.

Before the end of this year, the Commission intends to conclude an “Operational Partnership to Combat People Smuggling” with Egypt. Tunisia recently became the first African country to sign such a deal with the EU. However, this “partnership” violates EU treaties. This is because the Commission should actually have obtained the approval of the 27 member states before concluding the contract with Tunisia.

Egypt is also upgrading its land borders with EU funds. To this end, the Commission has promised the country a further €87 million – a significant increase on plans from last year, which still envisaged €57 million. For the “protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants,” the government in Cairo will receive an extra €23 million.

In addition, 20 million will be used to take in people who have fled Sudan because of the civil war. Two months ago, however, the Egyptian government drastically tightened conditions for displaced Sudanese, who must now apply for a visa to cross the border. Since then, thousands have been stranded at the border in dire humanitarian conditions, writes the organization Human Rights Watch.

The Egyptian government continues to oppose the stationing of Frontex in Egypt. As early as 2007, the EU states had commissioned their border agency to negotiate a working agreement with Cairo, but this has not yet come to pass. However, Frontex coordinates “Joint Return Operations” of rejected asylum seekers to Egypt.

With about 108 million inhabitants, Egypt is one of the EU’s neighbors with the largest population. A third of them are under 24 years old. Many of them seek a better future in Europe and cross the Mediterranean Sea by boat to do so. According to the Commission, the number of these irregular entries into the EU increased sixfold in 2021 compared to the previous year.

Most border crossings by Egyptian nationals take place in Italy. However, these depart mainly from Libya, the Commission confirms: not even one percent of the crossings started from Egyptian shores, according to the figures. This also applies to refugees from other countries after they have passed through Egypt as a transit country.

However, the refugee route via Libya is also becoming increasingly closed: In recent years, Egypt has significantly strengthened its military border surveillance to the neighboring country. Refugees are therefore increasingly reliant on aid workers, who are also facing more persecution. The “Law No. 82 on Combating Illegal Migration and Smuggling of Migrants,” enacted in 2016 and strengthened in 2022, allows authorities to take tougher action against any kind of aid to escape.

Refugees are also criminalized in this way, confirms human rights lawyer Muhammad Al Kashef, who is active in the Alarmphone project and the Abolish Frontex campaign: “Thousands of people have been arrested under Law No. 82 for trying to enter or leave the country irregularly.” Egypt’s poor human rights record is compounded by its new partnership with the EU, Al Kashef told “nd.”

Not all migration from Egypt is unwanted in Europe. EU states want to benefit from skilled workers from Egypt and facilitate their entry. Egypt is therefore one of the priority countries to be won over for a so-called “Talent Partnership”. The Commission began negotiations on this in June.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/08/eu-commission-gifts-egypt-patrol-boats-to-become-a-gatekeeper-for-migr

#externalisation #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #Egypte #accord #gardes-côtes #aide_financière #militarisation_des_frontières #surveillance #matériel #Operational_Partnership_to_Combat_People_Smuggling #partenariat

#modèle_tunisien

The Migration Managers

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How a little-known organization far from public scrutiny is helping to shape Europe’s migration policy.

“Making Migration Better” is what the #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) promises its members. ICMPD advises countries in the background, creates international networks and also becomes active itself in border regions of the EU. ICMPD is an organization that is known to only a few, but at the same time has become an important player in EU migration policy.

Together with a team of international journalists, we investigated what exactly ICMPD does. We filed numerous requests under the EU and German Freedom of Information laws and received hundreds of documents in response. Additionally, we were able to view internal ICMPD documents, some of which we are also publishing today after thorough examination and careful consideration. We shared our findings in advance with ZDF Magazin Royale and the Austrian daily DerStandard, and jointly coordinated articles.

Our investigation led to the EU’s external borders in the Western Balkans and to North Africa; to training camps for border guards and “dead body management”, and the roleplayed not only by ministries and governments, but also by the German Federal Police, a former Austrian Vice Chancellor, and the now internationally wanted white-collar criminal Jan Marsalek.
Our research shows:

– As an international organization, ICMPD is subject to few transparency obligations. This allows ICMPD to create and host spaces where member states like Germany can discuss migration policy out of the public eye.
- ICMPD directly and indirectly influences European migration policy. Strengthening of asylum law, which is publicly proposed by politicians, was partly worked out beforehand in informal meetings or outlined in documents of ICMPD.
– ICMPD directly and indirectly supports border and coast guards in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia - authorities that are accused of grave human rights violations. In doing so, ICMPD is helping to push the EU’s external border towards North Africa. Currently, the EU is also discussing border procedures at the EU’s external borders as part of the asylum system reform.
- ICMPD co-developed ideas for a dubious asylum project - including for Germany. In the process, ICMPD also worked closely with Jan Marsalek, a white-collar criminal who has since gone underground.

ICMPD was founded in 1993. The organization’s purpose was to make it possible to exchanges views on migration policy. Due to the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia,, the focus was mainly on the Balkans. Nearly two decades later, ICMPD’s focus would radically shift.

Michael Spindelegger was appointed as he ICMPD’s Director General in 2016. He is a former Austrian vice chancellor, former Secretary General of ÖVP, the countrys’ biggest governing party, and the political foster father of Austria’s former chancellor Sebastian Kurz. Commenting on his arrival at ICMPD, Spindelegger said in an interview, “I want to give the organization more political weight and visibility.”

Since Spindelegger took office, ICMPD’s projects, staff and annual budget have steadily increased. While the budget was 16.8 million euros in 2015, it was already 74.5 million in 2022. 56 percent of the money ICMPD received in 2022 came from the EU Commission. The rest came from EU member states, transit countries and countries of origin: the members of the ICMPD.

Technocratic terms to disguise the true essence

ICMPD describes its main business as a three-pillar model of “migration management”: research, dialogue and capacity building. The organization writes studies on migration, it brings states to the table for negotiations, and then implements what governments have decided. But what sounds mundane in theory has far-reaching consequences in practice.

“I think the notion of migration management appeals to a lot of people because it makes migration more of a technocratic issue,” explains Jeff Crisp. Crisp was a senior staff member of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and is an expert on migration. The term migration management, according to him, is so popular among governments and organizations because it obscures the true nature of their actions and there is no need to talk openly about restriction and deterrence.

In 2020, ICMPD’s chief Spindelegger described how he envisions successful “migration management” in several interviews. EU states should enter into more partnerships with countries of origin for a “more efficient return policy,” i.e., deport more people. Asylum applications should be processed in a few days near the border, which human rights organizations criticize as insufficient time for a fair process. Similarly, the ICMPD chief argued that migrants should be selected according to the needs of companies in the destination countries.

These ideas have been widely criticized by human rights activists and lawyers, but they fit into the political line of many European governments, especially in view of the current debate about reforming the EU asylum system.

In early 2023, the need for deportations and cooperation with third countries is now publicly the dogma of EU migration policy. In Germany, the governing coalition came to conclusions after a summit which are in fact contrary to the coalition agreements: the government wants more deportations, asylum procedures at the EU’s external borders, agreements with third countries, as shown by a document we recently published. To enforce more deportations, Germany has even created its own special envoy since the beginning of the year.

This strategic orientation has been discussed for some time, but in an informal setting: at negotiation rounds, events and congresses such as those organized by ICMPD. So far, however, little of this has reached the outside world, because ICMPD has almost no transparency obligations.
Backroom Talks and Racist Comments

Legally, ICMPD is an “International Organization” - an intergovernmental association to carry out a supranational task. It has the same status as, for example, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As an international organization, ICMPD does not pay taxes, is difficult to prosecute in court, and cannot be summoned before any parliament for information.

This special status seems to be welcomed, above all, by EU states whose migration policies are particularly controversial. For example, according to the minutes of a meeting with Spindelegger in July 2020, the then-deputy migration minister of Greece said, “ICMPD can provide a flexible and informal forum (for discussions) without the pressure of the media; A forum to solve problems.” One solution he may have wanted to discuss at the time was a heavily criticized asylum law which contemplated rejected asylum seekers to be detained on a blanket basis.

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In the informal setting provided by ICMPD, some seem to dare to formulate what would probably be strongly criticized publicly. A representative of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, in an informal exchange with representatives of EU states and EU institutions in May 2020 on “The Protection of Human and Public Security in the New Migration Agenda,” said that the “Refugee Treaty is not the issue”, but the European Convention on Human Rights is. According to the representative, “the right to request asylum makes migration management” very difficult”.

Insights into the inner workings of ICMPD are provided by an internal diversity report from 2019, which we were able to view. Half of the respondents said they believe that not all employees have the same opportunities. More than one in three said they had been discriminated against or harassed while working at ICMPD. Similarly, the report found that employees regularly made racist and discriminatory comments about people from regions where ICMPD works - especially from the African continent.

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When asked, ICMPD said that “internal steps” have been taken since then and “will be subject to a new review soon.”
Externalization of the EU’s external borders

In 2015, the EU launched the Trust Fund for Africa with a funding budget of five billion euros. It was an indirect reaction to the increasing number of migrants coming to Europe. Since then, EU funds have been flowing to North African states and their border institutions for technological and personnel development, among other things - and ICMPD is helping with this.

Exactly what that looks like is revealed at a meeting in January 2019 between Spindelegger and the EU Commission. It says that an agreement with Morocco for ICMPD “border management assistance operations” had been concluded. A previous investigation shows that, in the course of this project, surveillance technologies that allow access to secured phones had been delivered. According to a former ICMPD employee, there were no mechanisms to prevent abuses by Morocco, such as using this technology to target activists, academics and journalists.

Furthermore, the meeting between ICMPD and the EU Commission relates to border security through “provide training and technical assistance” in Libya. The EU stresses that ICMPD’s involvement is “instrumental” to moving this forward quickly - for example, with regard to the “White Paper,” a strategy document that, while not binding on the parties involved, sets the political direction and next steps.

For several years, journalists and human rights organizations have reported on how migrants are systematically pushed back along the central Mediterranean and the inhumane detention conditions that await them in Libya. The fact that the EU and some member states support Libya is also an issue. What is less known, however, is what mediating role ICMPD had in the elaboration of the strategy.

Just a few months after the EU highlighted ICMPD’s mediating role in the process, representatives from the EU, UN, Libya, France, Italy, and ICMPD met in Tunis in June 2019. The aim of this meeting was to start the elaboration of a strategy paper for a “fully-fledged border security and management system”.
Training and coordination with the so-called Libyan Coast Guard

We had filed a request under the EU Freedom of Information law for the white paper from the EU Commission, but it was denied. The reason given was that, if the document became public, the relationship between the EU and Libya would be endangered. Nevertheless, we have obtained the document and publish it after a thorough examination. It is a version from December 2019, which is described as final.

The document justifies why the preparation of such a strategy document is necessary: Libya would need to reform its structures in order to regain full control over its borders. The reason given is that the country faces “immense challenges” from “the flow of migrants, who, to a large extent, intend to use Libya as a transit route to Europe.” Migration “has complicated an already fragile political situation” and is “undermining the security, stability, and social wellbeing of the Libyan state and society.

What should follow from this, with the participation of ICMPD among others, is shown in an EU document from 2021: A training center for the so-called Libyan coast guard is to be established. Likewise, mechanisms are to be created to forge cooperation between Libya, the EU and neighboring countries - for the Border Guard Training Academy and the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Center.

Human rights organizations call this approach the “externalization of the EU’s external borders,” which means the outsourcing of border protection and migration management tasks to third countries. Likewise, cooperation with the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Unit would lead to more pull-backs. This means that third countries, with the support of the EU, would prevent fleeing people from reaching Europe.

“The support given by the EU to the Libyan coast guard in terms of pull-backs, pushbacks, (and) interceptions led to violations of certain human rights,” said Chaloka Beyani in late March 2023, who was a member of the Fact-Finding Mission to Libya of the U.N. Human Rights Council, which released its report in the process.

“You can’t push back people to areas that are unsafe, and the Libyan waters are unsafe for the embarkation of migrants,” Beyani continued. He added that the EU and its member states are not found to be responsible for war crimes, but “the support given has aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.”
Atmosphere of hatred towards migrants

ICMPD is not only active in Libya, but also in Tunisia - and since 2019, on a much larger scale.

That same year, Tunisia elected a new president who is now not only pushing the state system towards dictatorship, but also creating an atmosphere of hatred towards migrants. At the end of February 2023, he called on Tunisian security forces to take urgent measures against migrants.

Romdhane Ben Amor, spokesman for the Tunisian Forum for Social and Economic Rights, tells us exactly what that looks like. “There is a political pressure on the coast guard to prevent people from leaving, no matter what the cost, no matter what the damage. That’s how the violence started, and the Coast Guard is responsible for a lot of it.”

Reports of human rights abuses by the Tunisian coast guard are mounting. Alarmphone writes about this, saying that the Tunisian coast guard beats migrants with sticks, demands money for rescues, and even steals the boat engines.

And it is these security forces that continue to be supported and trained by ICMPD with the support of the EU, Germany, Austria and Denmark. In fact, this cooperation is even being expanded, as EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson reiterated at a meeting in Tunis in late April 2023.

When asked about this, ICMPD says that it learned about the violence emanating from the Tunisian coast guard through the media and therefore cannot comment further.
Active support of the German Federal Police

Regarding EU support to the Tunisian coast guard, a dossier was prepared in 2019 jointly with ICMPD. “Preferred options in line with the National vision” had been identified, as well as “requests for equipment and capacity building measures.” Underwater drones, radars and even a dedicated IT system, the Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance, or ISMariS, were to be provided.

Germany was presented with the plans for Tunisia at a meeting in January 2020 between the Federal Police and ICMPD. The goal: “Make migration and mobility of people orderly, safe and regular.” To this end, the coast guards of North African states are to be trained and provided with equipment. Two training centers are being built in Tunisia for this purpose, one in the south and one in the north of the country. The northern center is financed by Germany.

The minutes of a meeting in January 2022 show how Germany is continuing to provide support: the Federal Police have equipped the Tunisian coast guard with 12 speedboats. Likewise, the Federal Police was “involved in SAR-connected trainings”. In an email written after the meeting, the Federal Police representative again advocates that Tunisia’s fleet be further expanded through “donor support.” For the following years, he proposed “boating training for Fast Control Boats” and “modernization of the boat fleet.”

We were unable to find out in detail what curriculum ICMPD, the German Federal Police and other authorities of EU member states use to train the Tunisian coast guard. However, the minutes of various meetings provide an insight into the subject areas. French security authorities organized for example a “training course on the management of dead bodies at sea.”

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When asked, the German Federal Police confirmed that it was supporting the Tunisian coast guard with “training, advisory and procurement services.” In response to criticism of its involvement in Tunisia, the Federal Police pointed out that Tunisia was described as a “safe port” on the UNHCR website. However, this description can no longer be found on the UNHCR website.
More deportations through migration diplomacy

ICMPD is very active not only on the African continent, but also along the so-called Balkan route.

In July 2020, the “Salzburg Forum”, a meeting of 18 EU interior ministers, EU commissioners, EU agencies such as Frontex and ICMPD took place in Vienna. The result was, among other things, the establishment of the “Joint Cooperation Platform on Irregular Migration”. This was chaired by the former deputy director of Frontex Berndt Körner.

According to preparatory documents and an email, ICMPD elaborated on why such a platform was needed at a follow-up meeting in February 2021. “Irregular economic migration” is a shared problem, ICMPD said, and therefore there is a need to build capacity for “quick procedures, quick returns, and to coordination border closures again”.

ICMPD will not only assist with training and capacity building, it said, but will also help with the “implementation of a regional returns mechanism” - meaning deportations. Through “migration diplomacy,” ICMPD would support the negotiation of agreements with third countries.

Previous experience in supporting deportations has been gained by ICMPD in Turkey. The project, with the acronym FRMON, aims to “strengthen the capacity to conduct return operations in Turkey.” The duration was from 2021 to 2022, during which time Human Rights Watch wrote that deportations from Turkey to Afghanistan had increased by 150 percent. Many other states had suspended this after the Taliban took power.
More money for migration management

Those who try to enter the EU via the so-called Western Balkan route often arrive from Bosnia-Herzegovina and want to get to Croatia. In recent years, journalists and activists have documented how Croatian border officials use batons to push back migrants, preventing them from applying for asylum in an EU country.

The Western Balkan states, where many of the migrants are then stranded, are therefore of great importance to the EU. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been an official candidate for EU membership since 2022 and must therefore fulfill certain conditions. For this purpose, a so-called Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) fund was set up years before. Part of the money goes to migration and border management.

What this means exactly is revealed in documents from meetings between ICMPD and Bosnian authorities, which we have obtained and will publish following a detailed examination.

In January 2021, shortly before the second meeting of the coordination platform, Spindelegger made a phone call on behalf of ICMPD to then-Bosnian Security Minister Selmo Cikotić. According to the minutes, the telephone call had been initiated by ICMPD. We have the preparatory documents.

ICMPD criticized that EU funds “for the management of migration would be mainly provided for humanitarian needs." Ninety percent of the budget has been used on basic needs of migrants and only 10 percent for “migration management,” he said. Therefore, according to ICMPD, it “became evident that it is necessary to intensify the efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the migration management authorities in BiH”. For a good “migration management” ICMPD will provide equipment, training but also personnel.

The Lipa camp, whose detention center had been reported on several times in the previous weeks, was also discussed. The security minister was pleased that ICMPD had sent a “project proposal” regarding Lipa.

500,000 € had been paid by the EU Commission to ICMPD for the construction of the detention unit. According to the documents, the order was for “temporary detention facilities
for migrants within the multi-purpose reception centre Lipa in line with European and international standards.”. When asked, ICMPD did not answer what was meant by this term. The detention unit would be built to “support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to further develope and implement capacity in the area of returns in order to adress irregular migration.”

We publish the “Action Plan” prepared by ICMPD with the EU.
Dialogue only

Another point raised in the conversation between ICMPD and Bosnia’s minister is a “facilitation of dialogue between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and Slovenia regarding readmission and prevention of push-backs.” It is true that there has been a so-called “readmission” agreement between Bosnia and Croatia since 2007. This allows a state to send migrants back to another country. So far, however, this agreement has not been implemented, and Croatia was not yet a member of the EU at the time of the agreement.

The Border Violence Monitoring Network reports that migrants who enter Croatia through Bosnia and Herzegovina are apprehended, imprisoned, and forced to sign a document in Croatian agreeing to be sent back to Bosnia. According to a conversation with representatives of the network and a report by Human Rights Watch, this is made possible by the revival of the readmission agreement – the dialogue that ICMPD wanted to promote.
A dubious card project

Even before Germany became a member of ICMPD, the organization had come up with something very special for German “migration management.” The now internationally wanted white-collar criminal Jan Marsalek and the now insolvent financial services provider Wirecard were a part of it.. Their plan: a “digital refugee card”. Asylum seekers were no longer to receive cash, but all financial support was to be paid out digitally.

According to the project description, which we are now publishing, this card should not be limited to the payment function. The “usability of certain functions, such as payment transactions” should be limited to “certain geographies” and “deployment scenarios.” Similarly, the card “could be extended to include the possibility of direct retrieval of cardholder data with government/police terminals/equipment.”

The project should not be limited to Bavaria, according to documents we received following a Freedom of Information Act request to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior. Bavarian State Secretary Joachim Herrmann wrote in a letter to then-Interior Minister Horst Seehofer in October 2020 that he planned to "implement this new payment system in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Spindelegger and ICMPD. He said it could “serve as a model for similar projects in Europe.” In his response, Seehofer called the project a “lighthouse project.”

“If a German politician were to propose introducing an identity card that is also a bank card that all Germans use to pay for their purchases, and which could then be read by all authorities, including the police, one thing would be certain: he would be out of a job within hours,” said Matthias Spielkamp of AlgorithmWatch. “But the fact that Seehofer and others call it a lighthouse project to force people seeking protection to use such a card shows abundantly clear their contempt for the human rights of those who need protection the most.”

What Herrmann and Seehofer’s emails do not mention, however, is who was originally intended to carry out the project alongside ICMPD. The project description comes from a mail in November 2019 for preparation of a meeting between state secretaries from Bavaria and Brandenburg, a CDU politician, ICMPD head Michael Spindelegger and Jan Marsalek, at that time still CFO of Wirecard. Another email we publish shows that Marsalek had already had a conversation with a company about the idea of a Digital Refugee Card in July 2019 and had helped develop the idea.

As the report from Wirecard’s investigative committee shows, Marsalek had a very unique idea when it came to migrants. He wanted to pay for a border guard force of 15,000 to 20,000 “militiamen” to stop people trying to get to Europe via Libya and the central Mediterranean Sea as early as Libya’s southern border.

Wirecard is now insolvent and is considered Germany’s biggest financial scandal. However, the “Digital Refugee Card” project is not completely on hold. In Bavaria, the legal framework for the project has already been adjusted accordingly. An email from the State Ministry to the BMI in March 2021 states that a “private sector payment service provider” will provide the cards. An “involvement of NGOs” is not planned.

In response to a press inquiry, the Bavarian Ministry of Interior said that it was currently looking for an implementing company.

▻https://fragdenstaat.de/en/blog/2023/05/19/the-migration-managers

#lobby #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #lobbying #influence #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Afrique_du_Nord #Tunisie #route_des_Balkans #Jan_Marsalek #gardes-côtes_libyens #Maroc #Libye #Michael_Spindelegger #migration_management #Spindelegger

EU responds to Italy drownings with more support for Libya

The European Commission wants to further shore up the Libyan coast guard and launch anti-smuggling partnerships with Tunisia and Egypt.

The proposals were outlined in a letter sent earlier this week by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, and seen by EUobserver, to Italy’s prime minister Giorgia Meloni.

The letter came in response to Meloni, who had queried the European Commission over the recent drowning deaths of some 70 people, including small children, off the Calabrian coast.

“First, we must coordinate our actions with key patterns to prevent irregular departures and save lives at sea,” said von der Leyen, in her letter.

This includes priority funding with Tunisia and Egypt, as well as “further support to Libya’s maritime border management and search-and-rescue capacities,” she said.

The boat which sank off the Italian coast late last month departed from Turkey and in an area not patrolled by NGO search-and-rescue boats.

Those NGO boats are currently under intense pressure from Rome’s far-right government under Meloni’s leadership. Geo Barents, a rescue boat operated by Doctor’s without Borders, was recently detained and fined up to €10,000 by Italian authorities.

Von der Leyen’s emphasis on North Africa, however, is part of a larger effort to stem irregular migration.

The European Commission had in February, along with Italian authorities, already handed over new patrol boats to the Libyan Coast Guard and announced some €800m for North Africa up until 2024.

But those intercepted at sea by the Libyans, including in search-and-rescue zones controlled by the Maltese , are returned to a country where they are often locked up in inhumane conditions.

The Libyans intercepted and returned almost 31,000 people last year, up from around 12,000 in 2020.

Over 330 have died or gone missing in the attempt across all Mediterranean routes, so far this year, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a UN body.

Meanwhile, the Egypt and Tunisia police plans will be part of a new north African multi-country program against smuggling in the region, she said.

Von der Leyen also mentioned €500m to help resettle some 50,000 people up until 2025, noting the need to create humanitarian corridors.

A first meeting had also taken place on how to best coordinate and cooperate on search and rescues among national authorities, she said.
Interior ministers in Brussels

The letter comes ahead of a crunch meeting in Brussels on Thursday (9 March) of interior ministers, where migration will be a key point of talks.

Although no decisions are expected, the discussions will likely feed into an European summit later this month.

Ministers on Thursday are set to discuss visa policy and how to best use it as leverage to get origin countries to take back their rejected nationals.

But internal aspects are also on the table.

Since December, the Dutch, along with other EU states, have been unable to return migrants to Italy under the so-called Dublin rules.

“The reason, as far as we understand right now, is that the Italians have a lack of reception capacities,” an EU diplomat told reporters on Wednesday.

The Swedish EU presidency is also hoping to get some in-house agreements on the outstanding overhaul of the EU’s asylum and migration policy.

Key to that reform is the regulation on asylum and migration management.

The rule is a core component of the overhaul first proposed by the European Commission in September 2020 and is set to replace the broken Dublin system currently in place.

A second EU diplomat said the Council, representing member states, is on track to get an internal agreement on the regulation.

But talks on politically sensitive issues, when it comes defining so-called mandatory solidarity, won’t likely start until the next EU presidency, under Spain, in July.

“We need to have the legal framework in place first. I mean, there is there are a lot of opinions on this issue,” said the EU diplomat.

That in-house agreement is needed before negotiations can start with the European Parliament amid a wider plan to get all the outstanding asylum files sorted before next year’s European elections.

▻https://euobserver.com/migration/156808

#externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Libye #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Egypte #gardes-côtes_libyens #commission_européenne #UE #EU

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Fil de discussion sur le #naufrage de #Crotone:
►https://seenthis.net/messages/992511

Des appareils de #surveillance de #Frontex sont utilisés par les #gardes-côtes_libyens pour intercepter illégalement des migrants

« Le Monde » a identifié l’origine de sept images aériennes publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens sur leurs pages Facebook. Elles ont été réalisées par des appareils de surveillance de Frontex, et démontrent comment les activités de l’agence européenne facilitent des interceptions illicites par les Libyens en Méditerranée. Frontex a toujours soutenu ne pas collaborer avec les garde-côtes libyens.

« Le patrouilleur Fezzan a porté secours à un chalutier en feu et a sauvé son équipage de huit personnes. » Le 24 août 2021, la page Facebook « Gardes-côtes et sécurité portuaire » publie le bilan d’une opération de sauvetage menée au cours de la journée par les gardes-côtes libyens.

La présence d’informations temporelles et de localisations sur l’image indique qu’il s’agit d’une prise de vue réalisée par un appareil de surveillance aérienne, et non par un simple appareil photo. Ce genre d’images, entre 2018 et 2022, les gardes-côtes libyens en ont publié une douzaine, sur différents comptes et réseaux. Sauf que la Libye n’est pas dotée d’appareils capables de réaliser ces images. Qui en est à l’origine ?

Pour identifier leur source, Le Monde a recoupé les informations qu’elles contiennent avec des données ADS-B, un signal émis par les avions en vol, ainsi qu’avec les journaux de bord de plusieurs ONG actives en Méditerranée, dans les airs ou en mer. Dans le cas du 24 août 2021, par exemple, les informations présentes sur l’image indiquent les coordonnées, l’altitude et l’heure précise à laquelle l’appareil se trouvait lorsqu’il a réalisé cette image. Elles donnent aussi la position approximative du chalutier observé par l’appareil.

Nous avons reconstitué le trafic aérien au-dessus de la Méditerranée dans la matinée du 24 août 2021. En comparant les parcours des différents appareils avec les données disponibles sur l’image, nous avons ainsi pu identifier un appareil qui se trouvait précisément aux coordonnées et à l’altitude à laquelle la photo a été prise, lorsqu’elle a été réalisée : le drone AS2132, opéré par Frontex.

Pour d’autres images, nous avons eu accès aux observations d’ONG, comme SeaWatch ou SOS Méditerranée, consignées dans des journaux de bord. Ceux-ci sont librement accessibles ici. Au total, ce travail nous permet d’affirmer que sur cinq dates différentes les images publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens ont été réalisées par des appareils de Frontex. Au moins une autre l’a été par un appareil de l’EunavforMed, la force navale européenne en Méditerranée, qui collabore avec Frontex.

Des interceptions impossibles sans renseignements extérieurs

Sollicitée, l’agence de garde-frontière l’assure : « il n’y a pas de collaboration entre Frontex et les gardes-côtes libyens », ce qu’affirmait déjà en mars 2021 son ex-directeur Fabrice Leggeri.

L’agence précise, en revanche : « Chaque fois qu’un avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en détresse, une alerte – et une image, le cas échéant – est immédiatement envoyée au centre de coordination des sauvetages régional. L’information envoyée inclut notamment la position, la navigabilité du navire et la probabilité qu’il n’atteigne pas sa destination finale. »

De fait, dans les cinq cas identifiés par Le Monde, les images de Frontex ont pourtant bien fini entre les mains des gardes-côtes libyens. Et certaines ont vraisemblablement rendu possible l’interception d’embarcations, autrement impossibles à localiser pour les Libyens. Dans le cas du 8 mai 2019, par exemple, l’avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en route pour l’Europe en Méditerranée centrale. Un contact est établi entre les autorités libyennes et l’agence, mais il n’émet pas de Mayday. Ce message d’urgence aurait pu être capté par tous les avions et navires à proximité à ce moment-là, dont le Mare Jonio, de l’ONG Mediterranea Saving Humans, spécialisé dans le sauvetage. Frontex dit n’envoyer des Maydays que « lorsqu’il existe un danger imminent pour la vie des occupants ».

Les gardes-côtes libyens retrouvent finalement sans difficulté l’embarcation, pourtant située à plus d’une centaine de kilomètres de leurs côtes. A 17 heures, ils font monter les migrants à bord de leur patrouilleur avant de les rapatrier en Libye. Une interception que les informations de Frontex ont vraisemblablement facilitée, voire rendue possible. Pendant toute la durée de l’opération, l’avion de Frontex continue de survoler la zone, et de filmer la scène. Des images auxquelles les gardes-côtes ont aussi eu accès.

Frontex souligne que, conformément au règlement européen relatif à la surveillance des frontières maritimes extérieures, ses alertes ne sont pas adressées aux gardes-côtes libyens, mais au « centre régional de coordination des sauvetages (#RCC) [libyen] (…) internationalement reconnu ». Une fois l’alerte envoyée, « Frontex ne coordonne pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage (...), c’est la responsabilité des centres de secours régionaux« . Reste à savoir si ce RCC existe réellement. Frontex s’en tient à la position de l’Organisation maritime internationale (OMI), qui a reconnu officiellement l’existence d’un RCC en 2018.

Plusieurs enquêtes ont pourtant mis en doute l’existence d’un tel RCC libyen. Derrière les adresses e-mail et les numéros de téléphone du RCC se trouvent en réalité les gardes-côtes, selon les différentes ONG impliquées dans des opérations de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée. Et le 8 novembre 2022, le vice-président de la commission européenne, Josep Borrell, lui-même affirmait : « Le centre de coordination des secours maritime n’est pas encore opérationnel. »

Parmi les règles européennes, que Frontex dit respecter, figure le principe du non-refoulement : « Nul ne peut être (…) débarqué, forcé à entrer, conduit dans un pays ou autrement remis aux autorités d’un pays où il existe (…) un risque sérieux qu’il soit soumis à la peine de mort, à la torture, à la persécution ou à d’autres peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. » Des situations courantes en Libye, de sorte qu’en 2020 la Commission européenne affirmait que le pays n’était pas un « lieu sûr » vers lequel il serait possible de renvoyer des migrants. Dans un rapport de 2018, l’ONU constatait que « les migrants subissent des horreurs inimaginables en Libye (…). Ils s’exposent à des meurtres extrajudiciaires, à la torture et à des mauvais traitements, à la détention arbitraire (…), au viol (…), à l’esclavage et au travail forcé, à l’extorsion et à l’exploitation ».

►https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/11/23/enquete-comment-des-appareils-de-surveillance-de-frontex-sont-utilises-par-l
#frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Méditerranée #Libye #mer_Méditerranée #pull-backs #pull-back #push-backs

Des appareils de #surveillance de #Frontex sont utilisés par les #gardes-côtes_libyens pour intercepter illégalement des migrants

« Le Monde » a identifié l’origine de sept images aériennes publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens sur leurs pages Facebook. Elles ont été réalisées par des appareils de surveillance de Frontex, et démontrent comment les activités de l’agence européenne facilitent des #interceptions illicites par les Libyens en Méditerranée. Frontex a toujours soutenu ne pas collaborer avec les garde-côtes libyens.

« Le patrouilleur #Fezzan a porté secours à un chalutier en feu et a sauvé son équipage de huit personnes. » Le 24 août 2021, la page Facebook « Gardes-côtes et sécurité portuaire » publie le bilan d’une opération de sauvetage menée au cours de la journée par les gardes-côtes libyens. Pour l’illustrer, la page publie une photo du chalutier en feu.

https://img.lemde.fr/2022/11/18/0/0/1485/1242/630/0/75/0/39f51a4_1668786835923-fb-00.png

La présence d’informations temporelles et de localisations sur l’image indique qu’il s’agit d’une prise de vue réalisée par un appareil de #surveillance_aérienne, et non par un simple appareil photo. Ce genre d’images, entre 2018 et 2022, les gardes-côtes libyens en ont publié une douzaine, sur différents comptes et réseaux. Sauf que la #Libye n’est pas dotée d’appareils capables de réaliser ces images. Qui en est à l’origine ?

Pour identifier leur source, Le Monde a recoupé les informations qu’elles contiennent avec des données #ADS-B, un signal émis par les #avions en vol, ainsi qu’avec les journaux de bord de plusieurs ONG actives en Méditerranée, dans les airs ou en mer. Dans le cas du 24 août 2021, par exemple, les informations présentes sur l’image indiquent les coordonnées, l’altitude et l’heure précise à laquelle l’appareil se trouvait lorsqu’il a réalisé cette image. Elles donnent aussi la position approximative du chalutier observé par l’appareil.

Nous avons reconstitué le trafic aérien au-dessus de la Méditerranée dans la matinée du 24 août 2021. En comparant les parcours des différents appareils avec les données disponibles sur l’image, nous avons ainsi pu identifier un appareil qui se trouvait précisément aux coordonnées et à l’altitude à laquelle la photo a été prise, lorsqu’elle a été réalisée : le #drone AS2132, opéré par Frontex.

Pour d’autres images, nous avons eu accès aux observations d’ONG, comme SeaWatch ou SOS Méditerranée, consignées dans des journaux de bord. Ceux-ci sont librement accessibles ici. Au total, ce travail nous permet d’affirmer que sur cinq dates différentes les images publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens ont été réalisées par des appareils de Frontex. Au moins une autre l’a été par un appareil de l’#EunavforMed, la force navale européenne en Méditerranée, qui collabore avec Frontex.

Des interceptions impossibles sans renseignements extérieurs

Sollicitée, l’agence de garde-frontière l’assure : « il n’y a pas de collaboration entre Frontex et les gardes-côtes libyens », ce qu’affirmait déjà en mars 2021 son ex-directeur Fabrice Leggeri. L’agence précise, en revanche : « Chaque fois qu’un avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en détresse, une alerte – et une image, le cas échéant – est immédiatement envoyée au centre de coordination des sauvetages régional. L’information envoyée inclut notamment la position, la navigabilité du navire et la probabilité qu’il n’atteigne pas sa destination finale. »

De fait, dans les cinq cas identifiés par Le Monde, les images de Frontex ont pourtant bien fini entre les mains des gardes-côtes libyens. Et certaines ont vraisemblablement rendu possible l’interception d’embarcations, autrement impossibles à localiser pour les Libyens. Dans le cas du 8 mai 2019, par exemple, l’avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en route pour l’Europe en Méditerranée centrale. Un contact est établi entre les autorités libyennes et l’agence, mais il n’émet pas de Mayday. Ce message d’urgence aurait pu être capté par tous les avions et navires à proximité à ce moment-là, dont le Mare Jonio, de l’ONG Mediterranea Saving Humans, spécialisé dans le sauvetage. Frontex dit n’envoyer des Maydays que « lorsqu’il existe un danger imminent pour la vie des occupants ».

Les gardes-côtes libyens retrouvent finalement sans difficulté l’embarcation, pourtant située à plus d’une centaine de kilomètres de leurs côtes. A 17 heures, ils font monter les migrants à bord de leur patrouilleur avant de les rapatrier en Libye. Une interception que les informations de Frontex ont vraisemblablement facilitée, voire rendue possible. Pendant toute la durée de l’opération, l’avion de Frontex continue de survoler la zone, et de filmer la scène. Des images auxquelles les gardes-côtes ont aussi eu accès.

Frontex souligne que, conformément au règlement européen relatif à la surveillance des #frontières_maritimes_extérieures, ses alertes ne sont pas adressées aux gardes-côtes libyens, mais au « #centre_régional_de_coordination_des_sauvetages (#RCC) [libyen] (…) internationalement reconnu ». Une fois l’alerte envoyée, « Frontex ne coordonne pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage (...), c’est la responsabilité des centres de secours régionaux« . Reste à savoir si ce RCC existe réellement. Frontex s’en tient à la position de l’#Organisation_maritime_internationale (#OMI), qui a reconnu officiellement l’existence d’un RCC en 2018.

Plusieurs enquêtes ont pourtant mis en doute l’existence d’un tel RCC libyen. Derrière les adresses e-mail et les numéros de téléphone du RCC se trouvent en réalité les gardes-côtes, selon les différentes ONG impliquées dans des opérations de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée. Et le 8 novembre 2022, le vice-président de la commission européenne, Josep Borrell, lui-même affirmait : « Le centre de coordination des secours maritime n’est pas encore opérationnel. »

Parmi les règles européennes, que Frontex dit respecter, figure le principe du non-refoulement : « Nul ne peut être (…) débarqué, forcé à entrer, conduit dans un pays ou autrement remis aux autorités d’un pays où il existe (…) un risque sérieux qu’il soit soumis à la peine de mort, à la torture, à la persécution ou à d’autres peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. » Des situations courantes en Libye, de sorte qu’en 2020 la Commission européenne affirmait que le pays n’était pas un « lieu sûr » vers lequel il serait possible de renvoyer des migrants. Dans un rapport de 2018, l’ONU constatait que « les migrants subissent des horreurs inimaginables en Libye (…). Ils s’exposent à des meurtres extrajudiciaires, à la torture et à des mauvais traitements, à la détention arbitraire (…), au viol (…), à l’esclavage et au travail forcé, à l’extorsion et à l’exploitation ».

►https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/11/23/enquete-comment-des-appareils-de-surveillance-de-frontex-sont-utilises-par-l

#garde-côtes_libyens #frontières #asile #migrations #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée

EU funds border control deal in Egypt with migration via Libya on rise

The European Union signed an agreement with Egypt on Sunday (30 October) for the first phase of a €80 million border management programme, a statement from the EU delegation in Cairo said, at a time when Egyptian migration to Europe has been rising.

The project aims to help Egypt’s coast and border guards reduce irregular migration and human trafficking along its border, and provides for the procurement of surveillance equipment such as search and rescue vessels, thermal cameras, and satellite positioning systems, according to an EU Commission document published this month.

Since late 2016, irregular migration to Europe from the Egypt’s northern coast has slowed sharply. However, migration of Egyptians across Egypt’s long desert border with Libya and from Libya’s Mediterranean coast to Europe has been on the rise, diplomats say.

From1 January to 28 October this year 16,413 migrants arriving by boat in Italy declared themselves to be Egyptian, making them the second largest group behind Tunisians, according to data published by Italy’s interior ministry.

In 2021 more than 26,500 Egyptians were stopped at the Libyan border, according to the EU Commission document.

Egypt is likely to experience “intensified flows” of migrants in the medium to long term due to regional instability, climate change, demographic shifts and lack of economic opportunities, the document says.

The agreement for the first 23 million-euro phase of the project was signed during a visit to Cairo by the EU’s commissioner for neighbourhood and enlargement, Oliver Varhelyi.

It will be implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and CIVIPOL, a French interior ministry agency, and is expected to include the provision of four search and rescue vessels, Laurent de Boeck, head of IOM’s Egypt office, said.

The EU Commission document says that to date, Egypt has addressed irregular migration “predominantly from a security perspective, sometimes at the expense of other dimensions of migration management, including the rights based protection migrants, refugees and asylum seekers”.

The programme will seek to develop the capacity of the Egyptian ministry of defence and other government and civil society stakeholders to apply “rights-based, protection oriented and gender sensitive approaches” in their border management, it says.

▻https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-funds-border-control-deal-in-egypt-with-migration-via-libya-on-rise

#EU #UE #Union_européenne #migrations #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #externalisation #Egypte #accord #border_management #aide_financière #gardes-côtes #surveillance #complexe_militaro-industriel #réfugiés_égyptiens #CIVIPOL #IOM #OIM

EU to provide €80 million to Egyptian coast guard

The European Commission has confirmed that €23 million will be allocated in 2022 and €57 million in 2023 to provide equipment and services to Egyptian authorities for “search and rescue and border surveillance at land and sea borders”.

Following a Parliamentary question (▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002428_EN.html) submitted by MEPs Erik Marquardt and Tineke Strike (of the Greens), the Commission stated that while it is “developing an action in support of border management… in close coordination with Egyptian authorities… no overview of equipment or services to be delivered to Egyptian authorities is available at this stage.” (▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002428-ASW_EN.html)

Responding to Marquardt and Strik’s concern over the “dire human rights situation in Egypt,” and the fact that this funding will go towards preventing Egyptians, 3,500 of whom have fled the country to Italy since January last year, from being able to exercise their right to leave their country, the Commission states that it:

“...stands ready to support Egypt in maintaining its capacity to prevent irregular migration by sea, as well as to strengthen the control of its border with Libya and Sudan. This is of particular importance in light of the six-fold increase of irregular arrivals of Egyptian nationals to the EU in 2021 (9 219), of which over 90% to Italy, mostly via Libya.

An ex ante risk assessment will be conducted and monitoring will take place throughout the action to ensure that it does not pose any threats to the respect of international human rights standards and the protection of refugees and migrants."

The two paragraphs would appear to directly contradict one another. No answer was given as to what indicators the Commission will use to ensure compliance with Article 3(5) of the Treaty of the European Union on upholding and promoting human rights.

Commenting on this response, Erik Marquardt states:

"The commission wants ’to prevent irregular migration by sea’. Therefore, they are willing to work together with the Egyptian military-regime. The European Union should not cooperate with the Egyptian Coast Guard in order to prevent people from fleeing. We should use the tax payers money to prevent suffering and to support people in need of international protection - not to build a fortress europe

“The Commission needs to tell us what exactly the €80 million are going to be spend on. We need to know if the funds will be used to buy weapons and see how exactly they plan to prevent people from fleeing. In Libya, we saw how funds were used to arm militias, we cannot let something similar happen again.”

The €80 million allocation for border control makes up part of a €300 million total in short and long-term EU funding for Egypt.

Après les #gardes-côtes_libyens... les #gardes-côtes_égyptiens

#EU #UE #union_européenne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #externalisation #Egypte #financement

ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

Plateforme « drift-backs » en mer Egée

Une enquête de #Forensic_Architecture et Forensis menée avec une grande rigueur –recoupements de photos et de vidéos, géolocalisations, recoupements de témoignages- révèle que, entre mars 2020 et mars 2020, 1018 opérations de refoulement -la plupart par la méthode dite ‘#drift-back’- ont été menées en mer Egée, impliquant 27.464 réfugiés. Remarquez que ce chiffre concerne uniquement les refoulements en Mer Egée et non pas ceux effectués d’une façon également systématique à la frontière terrestre d’Evros.

https://i.imgur.com/XAe6HJn.png

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Présentation succincte des résultats de l’enquête parue au journal grec Efimérida tôn Syntaktôn (►https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/352169_pano-apo-1000-epanaproothiseis).

Plus de 1 000 opérations de refoulements en mer Egée répertoriés et documentés par Forensic Architecture 15.07.2022, 10:26

Dimitris Angelidis

L’enquête des groupes Forensic Architecture et Forensis est très révélatrice. ● De mars 2020 à mars 2022, 1 018 cas de refoulement d’un total de 27 464 réfugiés ont été enregistrés, dont 600 ont été recoupés et documentés de façon qui ne laisse aucune place au doute ● « Des preuves d’une pratique assassine qui s’avère non seulement systématique et généralisée, mais aussi bien planifiée émergent », rapportent les deux groupes.

Plus de 1 000 opérations illégales de refoulement de réfugiés dans la mer Égée, de mars 2020 à mars 2022, ont été enregistrées et documentées par le célèbre groupe de recherche Forensic Architecture et l’organisation sœur Forensis (fondée à Berlin, 2021).

Les résultats de leurs enquêtes depuis plus d’un an sont aujourd’hui publiés en ligne (►https://aegean.forensic-architecture.org ), sur une plateforme électronique qui constitue l’enregistrement le plus complet et le plus valide des refoulements grecs en mer Égée, alors que sa mise à jour sera effectuée régulièrement.

« Des preuves d’une pratique de meurtre systématique, étendue et bien planifiée émergent », rapportent les deux groupes, notant que le déni des refoulements par le gouvernement grec manque tout fondement.

Les preuves qu’ils ont croisées et documentées avec des techniques de géolocalisation et d’analyse spatiale proviennent de réfugiés et d’organisations telles que Alarm Phone et l’organisation Agean Boat Report, la base de données Frontex, le site Web des garde-côtes turcs et des recherches open source.

Il s’agit de 1 018 cas de refoulement d’un total de 27 464 réfugiés, dont 600 ont été recoupés et documentés d’une façon si complète que leur existence ne peut pas être mise en doute. Il y a aussi 11 morts et 4 disparus lors de refoulements, ainsi que 26 cas où les garde-côtes ont jeté des réfugiés directement à la mer, sans utiliser les radeaux de sauvetage (life-rafts) qu’ils utilisent habituellement pour les refoulements, depuis mars 2020. Deux des personnes jetées à l’eau mer ont été retrouvées menottées.

Dans 16 cas, les opérations ont été menées loin de la frontière, dans les eaux grecques, soulignant « un degré élevé de coopération entre les différentes administrations et autorités du pays impliquées, ce qui indique un système soigneusement conçu pour empêcher l’accès aux côtes grecques », comme le note l’ enquête.

Frontex est directement impliquée dans 122 refoulements, ayant été principalement chargée d’identifier les bateaux entrants et de notifier leurs présences aux autorités grecques. Frontex a également connaissance de 417 cas de refoulement, qu’elle a enregistrés dans sa base de données sous le terme trompeur « dissuasion d’entrée ».

Lors de trois opérations le navire de guerre allemand de l’OTAN FGS Berlin a été présent sur les lieux.

►https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/352169_pano-apo-1000-epanaproothiseis

voir aussi la vidéo introductive ici : ▻https://vimeo.com/730006259

#architecture_forensique #mer_Egée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #push-backs #chiffres #statistiques #Grèce #Turquie #refoulements #gardes-côtes #life_rafts #abandon #weaponization #géolocalisation #recoupement_de_l'information #contrôles_frontaliers #base_de_données #cartographie #carte_interactive #visualisation #plateforme

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pour voir la plateforme :
►https://aegean.forensic-architecture.org

Migrants : enquête sur le rôle de l’Europe dans le piège libyen

Des données de vol obtenues par « Le Monde » révèlent comment l’agence européenne #Frontex encourage les #rapatriements de migrants vers la Libye, malgré les exactions qui y sont régulièrement dénoncées par l’ONU.

300 kilomètres séparent la Libye de l’île de Lampedusa et de l’Europe. Une traversée de la #Méditerranée périlleuse, que des dizaines de milliers de migrants tentent chaque année. Depuis 2017, lorsqu’ils sont repérés en mer, une partie d’entre eux est rapatriée en Libye, où ils peuvent subir #tortures, #viols et #détentions_illégales. Des #exactions régulièrement dénoncées par les Nations unies.

L’Union européenne a délégué à la Libye la responsabilité des #sauvetages_en_mer dans une large zone en Méditerranée, et apporte à Tripoli un #soutien_financier et opérationnel. Selon les images et documents collectés par Le Monde, cela n’empêche pas les garde-côtes libyens d’enfreindre régulièrement des règles élémentaires du #droit_international, voire de se rendre coupables de #violences graves.

Surtout, l’enquête #vidéo du Monde révèle que, malgré son discours officiel, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières Frontex semble encourager les #rapatriements de migrants en Libye, plutôt que sur les côtes européennes. Les données de vol du drone de Frontex montrent comment l’activité de l’agence européenne se concentre sur la zone où les migrants, une fois détectés, sont rapatriés en Libye. Entre le 1er juin et le 31 juillet 2021, le drone de Frontex a passé 86 % de son temps de vol opérationnel dans cette zone. Sur la même période, à peine plus de la moitié des situations de détresse localisées par l’ONG Alarm Phone y étaient enregistrées.

►https://www.lemonde.fr/international/video/2021/10/31/migrants-enquete-sur-le-role-de-l-europe-dans-le-piege-libyen_6100475_3210.h
#responsabilité #Europe #UE #EU #Union_européenne #Libye #migrations #asile #réfugiés #pull-backs #pullbacks #push-backs #refoulements #frontières #gardes-côtes_libyens

déjà signalé sur seenthis par @colporteur
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/934958

What to expect with the new European budget and the new pact on asylum and migration?

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NzCP4ls3mA

#externalisation #frontières #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #push-backs #Libye #refoulements #Trust_Fund
#vidéo #ressources_pédagogique #pacte #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité #gardes-côtes_libyens #EUTFA #new_pacte_on_migration_and_asylum #urgence #sécurité #approche_sécuritaire

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la vidéo existe aussi en italien:
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvUXPVTxGrc