person:muqrin

  • Khashoggi : pourquoi l’Arabie saoudite l’a tué ? Par Walid Sharara dans Al-Akhbar - Actuarabe
    http://actuarabe.com/khashoggi-pourquoi-larabie-saoudite-la-tue

    Mohammed Ben Salman, sous le patronage de son père, a mené un véritable coup d’état qui a changé la nature du régime saoudien et a mis en place une nouvelle légitimité politique basée sur la monopolisation par un seul pôle de la famille royale des rênes du pouvoir et de ses prérogatives, au point que certains observateurs ont parlé de la fin du royaume saoudien et du début du royaume salmanien. Avant le coup d’état, le régime saoudien était en partie multipolaire, avec un groupe de princes influents à la tête des différentes institutions politiques, sécuritaires et militaires de l’Etat. Ils participaient à la prise de décision politique et cela était très important dans le réseau puissant et profond de relations tissées avec les alliés du Royaume. Parmi ceux-ci, il y a des princes qui ont joué un rôle décisif dans la politique extérieure et sécuritaire du Royaume comme Turki Al-Faysal, Mohammed Ben Nayef, Muqrin Ben Abdelaziz et Saoud Al-Faysal. Mais le Prince héritier n’a pas hésité à arrêter un grand nombre de ces princes et les hommes d’affaires qui leur étaient liés, ainsi que des personnalités politiques possédant des liens organiques avec certains anciens pôles du pouvoir. Il les a torturés et humiliés afin d’arracher leur loyauté et mettre la main sur une bonne partie de leur fortune. C’est dans ce cadre qu’est intervenue l’arrestation du Premier ministre libanais Saad Hariri et l’on ne peut comprendre la décision de Khashoggi de quitter l’Arabie saoudite pour se réfugier aux Etats-Unis et commencer à critiquer publiquement la nouvelle équipe au pouvoir que dans ces circonstances. La violence excessive utilisée par cette équipe envers ses adversaires montre qu’elle a peur de ne pas pouvoir mener à terme son coup d’état en vidant les institutions des éléments fidèles aux anciens pôles et en coupant leurs canaux de communication avec des parties occidentales et américaines influentes. Il ne fait aucun doute que Khashoggi incarnait l’un de ces canaux.

  • Saudi King Salman purging monarchy of Abdullah’s inner circle - Middle East - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.654210

    After the first purge carried out by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman in January, a few days after the death of his predecessor King Abdullah, comes the second round. It is not likely to be the last.

    The first to be ousted was Abdullah’s inner orbit of loyalists, including his bureau chief, Khaled al-Tuwaijri, his two sons, Mashal (governor of Mecca) and Turki (governor of Riyyad), his intelligence chief Khalid bin Bandar and the latter’s father, Bandar bin Sultan, who headed the National Security Council.

    The current round aims to ensure the line of succession. Among others, Salman ousted the crown prince, Muqrin bin Abdulaziz – Abdullah’s favorite – replacing him with the powerful Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef. The king appointed his son, Mohammed bin Salman, as deputy crown prince – that is, the man who will inherit the kingdom if Mohammed bin Nayef departs.

    These moves are not surprising. From the beginning of Salman’s rule, it was clear that Prince Muqrin, once the failed intelligence chief, would not remain crown prince for long. Even Mohammed bin Salman’s appointment as deputy crown prince was expected, and not only because of his diplomatic skills and expertise on terrorism, which he acquired in numerous courses he took at the FBI Academy.

    The distancing of Abdullah’s loyalists and strengthening of the Sudairi branch of the ruling family, of which Mohammed bin Nayef is a member, is part of a settling of scores with King Abdullah, whose reign saw a waning of the influence of the Sudairi princes – the sons of Hassa al-Sudairi, one of the 10 wives of Saudi Arabia’s first king, Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud).

    If there is a surprise appointment, it is that of Adel al-Jubeir as foreign minister, replacing Saud al-Faisal, who designed and implemented Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy for four decades. Al-Faisal, 75, has Parkinson’s disease and it seems his request to leave office was authentic. Jubeir is the first Saudi foreign minister who is not a member of the royal family.

    No change in foreign policy due

    These appointments are part of internal housekeeping; they do not change the kingdom’s foreign policy. King Salman, despite his own health issues – he apparently suffers from Alzheimer’s – immediately made his mark when he intensified official public discourse against Iran, supported the establishment of an Arab intervention force and initiated the attack on the Houthis in Yemen to root out Iran’s influence in that country.

    The strong man in the kingdom is no doubt Nayef, who will continue to serve both as interior minister and head of the National Security Council. He is the man who will implement foreign policy, one of whose principles is the effort to establish a “Sunni axis” against Iran.

    As part of this effort, Saudi Arabia has changed its policy toward Turkey, and despite the rift between Egypt and Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was invited to visit the king. Nayef, who met with Erdogan in Turkey before that visit, set its agenda.

    It seems that as part of the efforts toward a “Sunni axis,” Saudi Arabia will encourage Hamas to cut itself off entirely from Iran and return to the “Arab fold,” despite the ongoing enmity between Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s ally, and Hamas.

    Salman’s son Mohammed, who is defense minister, is in his 30s, too young to be seen as successor to the throne, but that could change.

    The main challenge before the new regime is to absorb the strategic changes expected to accompany the emerging nuclear agreement with Tehran, and the rapprochement between Iran and the United States. If and when sanctions on Iran are lifted, new oil will flow that is expected to grab an important share of the Saudi market. Saudi Arabia will also have to build up its influence in Syria and Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian power in those countries, especially if Iran proposes its own solution to the crisis in Syria.

  • Pan-Arab daily expects tough Saudi measures against Qatar over Gaza stance
    Text of report by London-based Arabic e-newspaper Ra’y al-Yawm on 28 July

    [Unattributed report: Saudi Arabia Is Preparing for Taking Escalatory Measures Against Qatar After the Id, and Prince Al-Faysal’s Attack on Doha and Accusing It of Antagonizing Egypt and Its Role in Supporting HAMAS and the War on Gaza Are a Prelude to an Imminent Conflagration."]

    For the Gulf officials to exchange congratulations on the occasion of the holy month of Ramadan and to call one another over the telephone on the occasion of the blessed Id al-Fitr, this is something that is within the framework of the norms and traditions that are usually followed, but for one of them to make a quick tour of the Gulf capitals 48 hours before the advent of Id al-Fitr, this is something unusual and indicates something that is highly important that cannot be delayed.

    We are speaking here about the tour which Prince Muqrin Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia and second deputy prime minister, has made to Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman and ended without visiting the State of Qatar, which is a Gulf country, something which means that this tour concerns it and the relations with it, and that the message which Prince Muqrin is carrying from the Saudi leaders deals with one of two main issues:

    The First: Is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and after the meeting which took place between Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin-Hamad Al Thani and the Saudi monarch King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz in Jedda last Tuesday, has received guarantees and promises from its Gulf sister that stress the implementation of the Riyadh’s document signed last November and the articles in it that are related to the security and stability of the Gulf countries and not harming them, which subsequently means returning the ambassadors of three countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain) to Doha.

    The second: Is that the Saudi leadership has reached a firm conviction that the State of Qatar has not fulfilled its promises to which it was committed towards the implementation of the Riyadh document, something that requires taking other measures against it, which are greater than the step of the withdrawal of ambassadors, such as closing the airspace or the suspension of Qatar’s membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

    The deadline of six months Saudi Arabia has given to the State of Qatar was due to end late in the month of Ramadan and by the end of Id-al-Fitr’s holiday, and perhaps this is the reason that made Prince Muqrin choose the timing of his Gulf tour carefully just two days before the Id.

    Both possibilities are likely since the news that have been leaked about Prince Muqrin’s Gulf tour are very slight and the tour was carried out amid full secrecy, and all that has been said by the official news agencies was that “discussions dealt with the bilateral relations and the situation in the Gulf and the region.” However, it is clear that the second possibility, which is to take tougher measures against the State of Qatar, is probably the most likely one, and there are several indications in this respect:

    First: Muqrin’s tour has excluded Doha, which indicates that Doha is targeted. Had the first possibility been likely, which is returning the ambassadors to it, it would not have been excluded, and every Gulf step from this or that side is intentional and indicates a message from this or that side, whether the way he was received, the team accompanying him, the identity of the prince who is receiving him at the airport and his job and hierarchical order in the family, or even the colour of cloak in some cases.

    Second: The Saudi-Qatari relations are witnessing great tension these days against the backdrop of the disagreement between the two countries on the current regime in Egypt, the support for the Muslim Brotherhood, and the current war in Gaza. While the State of Qatar strongly supports HAMAS in this war and launches an initiative in parallel with the Egyptian initiative and makes great political and media efforts to stop the war, Saudi Arabia strongly supports the Egyptian initiative and accuses HAMAS of igniting this war with Qatari and Turkish support to implicate the ruling Egyptian regime and embarrass it on the Arab and international levels. An article by Prince Turki al-Faysal in the Saudi newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat on Saturday pointed out this fact when he “held HAMAS responsible for the repercussions of the massacres that are going on in Gaza as a result of its arrogance and the repetition of the past mistakes,” pointing out that “Qatar and Turkey are ! concerned with depriving Egypt of its leadership role more than preventing Israel from destroying Gaza.” He accused HAMAS and not Israel of being responsible for the war, which reminds of a similar Saudi charge to Hizballah during the Israeli aggression against Lebanon in 2006.

    Third: The State of Qatar has not altered its supportive stand for the Muslim Brotherhood for even one millimeter, and continued its “unfriendly” stands towards the Egyptian regime. This has clearly been reflected in the coverage by Al-Jazeera of the developments of the situation in Egypt and the intensification of the charges of failure and betrayal by the Egyptian regime towards the Israeli aggression against the Gaza Strip and of closing the Rafah crossing in face of the wounded and the relief teams even if such charges have been made by guests, experts, commentators, or Palestinian officials from HAMAS.

    Fourth: The relations between Qatar and Iran, which are developing quickly, and the signing of defence agreements by the two countries, and the occurrence of a “change” in the Qatari stand towards the Syrian crisis, as well as the hegemony of the Saudi wing in the Syrian opposition and the Opposition Coalition in particular, and excluding those who are loyal to Qatar from the Political Body, the latest of whom is Prime Minister Ahmad Tu’mah during the leadership elections held in Istanbul one week ago.

    Fifth: The gradual restoration of relations between the Lebanese Hizballah and the State of Qatar on a noteworthy pace. The observers have seriously noted that Al-Jazeera has broadcast the full speech which [Hizballah Secretary General] Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah delivered on Friday on the occasion of the International Jerusalem Day.

    Therefore, we should expect surprise and important developments on the level of the Qatari relations with the Saudi, UAE, and Bahraini triangle by the end of Id al-Fitr holiday, which began in the Gulf states yesterday, and the only interpretation of Prince Muqrin’s tour, who has not made any similar tour since he was appointed in his post nearly one year ago, is that he wanted to inform all the Gulf leaders with whom he met of the details of the expected Saudi decisions.

    It is clear that Saudi Arabia, and the same as has been said in the article of Prince Turki al-Faysal, has decided to launch a media war as a prelude to a political war against the State of Qatar, since Prince Al-Faysal cannot write an article that includes these serious charges to the State of Qatar without consulting on them with his leadership, and within the framework of a greater estrangement between the two countries that is going to happen.

    Source: Ra’y al-Yawm, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 28 Jul 14

    BBC Mon ME1 MEEauprt 300714 mj

  • Saudi crown prince slams banks for “giving little” to society
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19354

    Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz speaks during the inauguration of the first Saudi Human Genome Project in the Middle East at the King Abdulaziz City for Science in Riyadh on December 8, 2013. (Photo: AFP - Fayez Nureldine)

    The second-in-line to the Saudi Arabian throne has denounced banks in the kingdom, saying they are contributing too little to society compared to what they take, Saudi media reported on Wednesday. There were no indications that the comments by Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, who was appointed to the post last month, would be followed by any concrete policies against banks in the oil-rich country. read (...)

    #finance #Saudi_Arabia #Top_News

  • Saudi Prince Muqrin named second-in-line to succeed king
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/saudi-prince-muqrin-named-second-line-succeed-king

    Saudi Arabia’s Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, a former intelligence chief, has been appointed deputy crown prince, Saudi state television reported on Thursday, making it more likely he will one day become king. The appointment makes Muqrin, the youngest son of the kingdom’s founder King Abdulaziz al-Saud, next in line to succeed in the world’s top oil exporter after his half-brothers King Abdullah and Crown Prince Salman. read more

    #monarchy #Saudi_Arabia #Top_News

  • As‘ad AbuKhalil commente l’élection partielle de Koura qui opposait, principalement, un candidat des Forces libanaises (vainqueur) à un candidat du Parti social nationaliste syrien.
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/angry-corner/elections-koura-taste-future

    The elections exposed the two vices of Lebanese electoral politics: sectarianism and foreign money. It is not known how much Saudi Arabia has spent in this election, but it is certain that there has been no elections in Lebanon since 2005 in which Prince Muqrin and his money were not the biggest players. There were visible signs of a richly funded campaign for the Lebanese Forces candidate, and Samir Geagea replaced his old Israeli benefactor with Saudi, Kuwaiti, and UAE sponsors.

    The GCC countries distrust the leadership abilities of Saad Hariri and believe that Geagea can be useful in their Israeli-linked campaign against Hezbollah. Saudi money also helps fly back ex-pats from the Gulf or from anywhere else in the world to cast a ballot for their candidate. In this election, Iran did not bother to care for a secular candidate and the Syrian regime is bogged down in the bloody daily civil war.

    Pour la préoccupation ultra-confessionnelle, lire L’Orient-Le Jour :
    http://www.lorientlejour.com/numero/4963/article/768539/Koura+:_un_remake_de_2009.html

    Ailleurs, la coloration confessionnelle a, comme en 2009, joué son rôle. Les villages maronites se sont prononcés nettement en faveur du candidat du 14 Mars (à 70 % selon le chef des FL, Samir Geagea), de même que les localités sunnites.
     
    Selon le secrétaire général du courant du Futur, Ahmad Hariri, qui a passé trois jours la semaine dernière au Koura pour diriger la campagne de sa formation, plus de 3 500 électeurs sunnites se sont mobilisés et ils ont voté à 68 % pour le candidat FL et à 25 % pour celui du 8 Mars.
     
    Le PSNS a de son côté affirmé que 3 000 sunnites ont participé au vote contre 4 700 en 2009 et que, d’autre part, un plus grand nombre de sunnites se sont prononcés cette fois-ci pour le candidat du 8 Mars. Si ces affirmations sont vraies, cela signifie que le 14 Mars a amélioré quelque peu sa performance chez les électeurs chrétiens, puisque le rapport de force global entre 2009 et 2013 n’a pas bougé d’autant.
     
    Par ailleurs, il existe au Koura un millier de voix chiites et alaouites et, selon certaines informations, elles seraient allées à 100 % au candidat du PSNS.

    Si tu veux savoir où est le caza de Koura :
    http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/District_du_Koura

  • Je vous livre la traduction de la deuxième partie du billet d’As‘ad AbuKhalil dans la version anglaise du Akhbar : Le Liban au bord du précipice (II sur II)
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/angry-corner/lebanon-brink-ii-ii

    La crise actuelle au Liban – comme toutes les crises de l’histoire contemporaine libanaise – ont des dimensions domestique et étrangère. Typiquement, les enjeux locaux ont des ramifications étrangères, et vice versa.

    Il serait injuste de soutenir que le leadership incompétent de Saad Hariri serait largement responsable de la crise, alors que l’homme s’est contenté d’implémenter des politiques dont l’origine est à Washington et à Riyad. Son père, comme lui, était tout juste un outil au service des puissances étrangères (principalement l’Arabie séoudite, la Syrie, la France et les États-Unis, mais sa loyauté envers l’Arabie séoudite dépassait ses autres loyautés).

    Rafik Hariri a été capable de négocier avec ses patrons pour pouvoir ajuster [leurs politiques] aux paramètres domestiques du Liban. Saad Hariri connaît peu de choses du pays qu’il a reçu la tâche de diriger par décret de la Maison des Saoud. Mais les politiques de Saad lui ont été livrées depuis Riyad et Washington.

    Le plan d’agitation sectaire des sunnites contre les chiites est le produit d’un plan étatsunien-séoudien pour isoler l’Iran et le Hezbollah, et pour détourner l’attention (et l’hostilité) des Arabes envers Israël vers l’Iran.

    Le plan s’est intensifié au Liban après 2006 quand Israël a échoué à vaincre et désarmer le Hezbollah. Israël avait besoin d’un autre coup contre le Hezbollah : les clients des États-Unis et des Séoudiens ont défendu les intérêts israéliens depuis l’assassinat de Rafik Hariri (il y a toujours un camp dans le conflit libanais qui est aligné, ouvertement ou de manière secrète, avec Israël).

    Le plan était de promouvoir une campagne sectaire sunnite contre le Hezbollah. En l’espace d’un an ou deux (et même avant les événéments du 7 mai 2008, que la propagande de Hariri a présenté comme des journées d’horreur telles que le Liban n’en aurait pas connu de toute son histoire), Jeffrey Feltman et le prince Muqrin d’Arabie séoudite (le chef des renseignements) ont cru qu’ils tenaient un plan brillant pour saper les bases du soutien au Hezbollah.

    Le plan a réussi. En moins de deux ans, l’opinion publique sunnite s’est retournée contre le Hezbollah et Hassan Nasrallah. Mais les conspirateurs n’avaient pas anticipé toutes les conséquences de leur plan. Les chiites se sont sentis menacés et cela a cristallisé leur soutien au Hezbollah, et l’agenda sectaire du camp Hariri n’a finalement laissé aux chiites aucune place pour des chiites non-Hezbollah (malgré les efforts comiques de l’Ambassade américaine et du renseignement séoudien pour promouvoir « des chiites modérés » – des gens sans aucun statut dans leur communauté, et qui étaient souvent tout juste des escrocs à la recherche d’argent facile).

    L’autre conséquence a été que les bénéficiaires logiques de l’ordre du jour sectaire n’étaient autres que les groupes fanatiques sunnites salafistes (jihadistes). Des groupes qui servaient à recruter des volontaires pour rejoindre Al Qaeda en Irak étaient désormais actifs dans le camp Hariri et recevaient de l’argent étatsunien-séoudien (et dans certains cas des armes).

    Mais le camp salafiste était très agité dans le camp Hariri. Ils voulaient un agenda plus agressif en Syrie et demandaient un engagement militaire. De plus, Saad Hariri ne pouvait pas s’adresser à la base des sunnites pauvres, parce qu’il ne se souvient des gens de Tripoli, du Akkar et de la Bekaa qu’une fois tous les quatre ans pour les élections.

    La base s’est alors tournée dans une direction salafiste plus radicale, et Hariri est en dehors du pays depuis plus d’un an maintenant. Les extrémistes salafistes locaux contrôlaient désormais la « rue » sunnite et recevaient (comme le député militant ben-ladiste Khaled Daher) directement les financements séoudiens du prince Muqrin, sans avoir à passer (comme auparavant) par le bureau Hariri qui monopolisait les financements des groupes pro-séoudiens au Liban. Cette « décentralisation » a permis aux leaders locaux de recruter directement parmi les jeunes chômeurs pauvres du Akkar, de Tripoli et de la Bekaa.

    Mais il ne serait pas juste d’accuser le seul camp Hariri de sponsoriser ces tendances. Les rivaux de Hariri à Tripoli (à savoir Najib Mikati et Muhammad Safadi, qui souffrent tous deux d’une manque de charisme et de compétences sociales défaillantes avec les masses) ont cherché à gagner plus de soutien électoral en finançant ces groupes militants salafistes.

    Il est non seulement possible que le mouvement salafiste soit désormais hors de contrôle (c’est-à-dire hors du contrôle du camp Hariri), mais aussi qu’il ait abandonné la cause séoudienne (tout en recevant de l’argent de l’Arabie séoudienne et du Koweit). Il n’est pas totalement impossible d’imaginer une situation où des recrues d’Al Qaeda se rendent dans le Nord du Liban pour recevoir un entraînement militaire. En fait, cela est peut-être déjà en train de se passer avec des groupes de Syrie qui reçoivent leur entraînement dans le Akkar.

    Les récentes escarmouches entre des groupes salafistes armés et l’armée libanaise ont peut-être pour but d’expulser l’armée de la région pour obtenir la liberté de mouvement politique et militaire. Cela ne pourrait que s’aggraver. Nasrallah s’est montré très efficace à contenir la jeunesse chiite, mais le public est en train de bouillir de colère, et le mouvement Amal, lui, est beaucoup plus sujet que le Hezbollah aux affrontements confessionnels et aux actes de brutalité. Amal est peut être en train de gagner du terrain.

    J’avais traduit la première partie ici :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/70401