person:osama

  • Sikh drivers are transforming U.S. trucking. Take a ride along the Punjabi American highway - Los Angeles Times
    https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-col1-sikh-truckers-20190627-htmlstory.html

    By Jaweed Kaleem, Jun 27, 2019 -
    It’s 7:20 p.m. when he rolls into Spicy Bite, one of the newest restaurants here in rural northwest New Mexico. Locals in Milan, a town of 3,321, have barely heard of it.

    https://www.trbimg.com/img-5d12f8d2/turbine/la-1561524431-z6kcx6gnzm-snap-image
    Punjabi-operated truck stops

    The building is small, single-story, built of corrugated metal sheets. There are seats for 20. The only advertising is spray-painted on concrete roadblocks in English and Punjabi. Next door is a diner and gas station; the county jail is across the road.

    Palwinder Singh orders creamy black lentils, chicken curry and roti, finishing it off with chai and cardamom rice pudding. After 13 hours on and off the road in his semi truck, he leans back in a booth as a Bollywood music video plays on TV.

    “This is like home,” says Pal, the name he uses on the road (said like “Paul”).

    There are 3.5 million truckers in the United States. California has 138,000, the second-most after Texas. Nearly half of those in California are immigrants, most from Mexico or Central America. But as drivers age toward retirement — the average American trucker is 55 — and a shortage grows, Sikh immigrants and their kids are increasingly taking up the job.

    Estimates of the number of Sikh truckers vary. In California alone, tens of thousands of truckers trace their heritage to India. The state is home to half of the Sikhs in the U.S. — members of a monotheistic faith with origins in 15th century India whose followers are best recognized by the uncut hair and turbans many men wear. At Sikh temples in Sacramento, Fresno, Bakersfield and Riverside, the majority of worshipers are truck drivers and their families.

    Over the last decade, Indian Americans have launched trucking schools, truck companies, truck washes, trucker temples and no-frills Indian restaurants modeled after truck stops back home, where Sikhs from the state of Punjab dominate the industry.

    “You used to see a guy with a turban and you would get excited,” says Pal, who is in his 15th year of trucking. “Today, you go to some stops and can convince yourself you are in India.”

    Three interstates — the I-5, I-80 and I-10 — are dotted with Indian-American-owned businesses catering to truckers. They start to appear as you drive east from Los Angeles, Reno and Phoenix, and often have the words “Bombay,” “Indian” or “Punjabi” on their storefront signs. But many, with names like Jay Bros (in Overton, Neb.) and Antelope Truck Stop Pronghorn (in Burns, Wyo.) are anonymous dots on a map unless you’re one of the many Sikhs who have memorized them as a road map to America.

    The best-known are along Interstate 40, which stretches from Barstow to North Carolina. The road, much of it alongside Historic Route 66, forms the backbone of the Sikh trucking world.

    It’s a route that Pal, 38, knows well. Three times a month, he makes the seven-day round trip between his Fontana home and Indiana, where he drops off loads and picks up new ones. Over his career, he’s driven 2 million miles and transported items as varied as frozen chickens and paper plates. These days, he mostly hauls chocolate, rice and fruits and vegetables from California farms. Today, it’s 103 containers of mixed produce, with mangoes, bell peppers, watermelons, yellow onions and peeled garlic among them. All are bound for a Kroger warehouse outside Indianapolis.

    Across the street from Spicy Bite, dozens of arriving drivers form a temporary village of 18-wheelers in a vast parking lot by the interstate. Most are white. Nearly all are men. More are older than younger.

    But every now and then there are Sikhs like Pal, with long salt-and-pepper beards, colorful turbans and thick Indian accents. They head straight toward Spicy Bite.

    Lines can form out the door at the restaurant, which opened two years ago outside the Petro Stopping Center, a longtime mainstay for truckers headed east.

    Pal makes a point to stop by the restaurant — even just for a “hello” — when he sleeps next door. The Sikh greeting is “Sat sri akaal.” It means “God is truth.” In trucking, where turnover is high, business uncertain and risk of accidents ever present, each day can feel like a leap of faith and an opportunity to give thanks.

    Punjabi Americans first appeared on the U.S. trucking scene in the 1980s after an anti-Sikh massacre in India left thousands dead around New Delhi, prompting many Sikhs to flee. More recently, Sikhs have migrated to Central America and applied for asylum at the Mexico border, citing persecution for their religion in India; some have also become truckers. Estimates of the overall U.S. Sikh population vary, placing the community’s size between 200,000 and 500,000.

    In recent years, corporations have pleaded for new truckers. Walmart kicked up salaries to attract drivers. Last year, the government announced a pilot program to lower the age for driving trucks from 21 to 18 for those with truck-driving training in the military. According to the American Trucking Assn., the trucker shortage could reach 100,000 within years.

    “Punjabis are filling the gap,” says Raman Dhillon, a former driver who last year founded the North American Punjabi Trucking Assn. The Fresno-based group advises drivers on regulations, offers insurance and tire discounts, and runs a magazine: Punjabi Trucking.

    Like trucking itself, where the threat of automation and the long hours away from home have made it hard to recruit drivers, the Punjabi trucking life isn’t always an easy sell. Three years ago, a group of Sikh truckers in California won a settlement from a national shipping company after saying it discriminated against their faith. The drivers, who followed Sikh traditions by wrapping their uncut hair in turbans, said bosses asked them to remove the turbans before providing hair and urine samples for pre-employment drug tests despite being told of the religious observance. The same year, police charged a man with vandalizing a semi truck at a Sikh temple in Buena Park. He’d scribbled the word “ISIS.”

    Still, Hindi- and Punjabi-language newspapers in the Eastern U.S. regularly run ads promising better wages, a more relaxed lifestyle and warm weather as a trucker out West. Talk to any group of Sikh drivers and you’ll find former cabbies, liquor store workers or convenience store cashiers who made the switch.

    How a rural Oklahoma truck stop became a destination for Sikh Punjabis crossing America »

    “Thirty years ago, it was hard to get into trucking because there were so few people like us in the business who could help you,” says Rashpal Dhindsa, a former trucker who runs Fontana-based Dhindsa Group of Companies, one of the oldest Sikh-owned U.S. trucking companies. When Pal first started, Dhindsa — now a close friend but then an acquaintance — gave him a $1,000 loan to cover training classes.

    It’s 6:36 a.m. the next day when the Petro Stopping Center switches from quiet darkness to rumbling engines. Pal flips on the headlights of his truck, a silver ’16 Volvo with a 500-horsepower engine. Inside the rig, he heats aloo gobi — spiced potatoes and cauliflower — that his wife prepared back home. He checks the thermostat to make sure his trailer isn’t too warm. He takes out a book wrapped in a blue cotton cloth that’s tucked by his driver’s seat, sits on a bed-turned-couch and reads a prayer in Punjabi for safety on the journey: There is only one God. Truth is His name…. You always protect us.

    He pulls east onto the highway as the sun rises.

    Truckers either drive in pairs or solo like Pal. Either way, it’s a quiet, lonely world.

    Still, Pal sees more of America in a week than some people will in their lives. Rolling California hills, spiky desert rock formations, the snow-dusted evergreens of northern Arizona, the fuzzy cacti in New Mexico and, in Albuquerque, hot air balloons rising over an orange sky. There’s also the seemingly endless fast food and Tex-Mex of Amarillo and the 19-story cross of Groom, Texas. There’s the traffic in Missouri. After hours of solitude on the road, it excites him.

    Pal’s not strict on dogma or doctrine, and he’s more spiritual than religious. Trucking has shown him that people are more similar than different no matter where you go. The best of all religions, he says, tend to teach the same thing — kindness to others, accepting whatever comes your way and appreciation for what’s in front of you on the road.

    “When I’m driving,” Pal says, “I see God through his creation.”

    His favorite sights are the farms. You spot them in Central California while picking up pallets of potatoes and berries, or in Illinois and Indiana while driving through the corn and soybean fields.

    They remind him of home, the rural outskirts of Patiala, India.

    Nobody in his family drove trucks. Still, to Pal, he’s continuing tradition. His father farmed potatoes, cauliflower, rice and tomatoes. As a child, Pal would ride tractors for fun with Dad. Today, instead of growing food, Pal transports it.

    He wasn’t always a trucker. After immigrating in 2001 with his younger brother, he settled in Canoga Park and worked nights at 7-Eleven. After he was robbed at gunpoint, a friend suggested trucking. Better pay, flexible hours — and less dangerous.

    Three years later, he started driving a rig he didn’t own while getting paid per mile. Today, he has his own company, two trucks between himself and his brother — also a driver — and bids on shipments directly with suppliers. Nationally, the average pay for a trucker is just above $43,000. Pal makes more than twice that.

    He uses the money to pay for the house he shares with his wife, Harjeet Kaur, 4-year-old son, brother and sister-in-law, nieces and parents. Kaur threads eyebrows at a salon and video chats with him during lunch breaks. Every week before he leaves, she packs a duffel bag of his ironed clothes and stacked containers of food for the road.

    “I love it,” Pal says about driving. “But there are always two sides of the coin, head and tail. If you love it, then you have to sacrifice everything. I have to stay away from home. But the thing is, this job pays me good.”

    The truck is fully equipped. From the road, you can see only driver and passenger seats. But behind them is a sleeper cab with a bed that’s 6-foot-7 by 3-foot-2.

    Pal likes to connect the TV sitting atop a mini-fridge to his phone to stream music videos when he’s alone. His favorite songs are by Sharry Maan, an Indian singer who topped charts two years ago with “Transportiye.” It tells the story of a Sikh American trucker who longs for his wife while on the road. At night, the table folds down to become a bed. Pal is just missing a bathroom and his family.

    The life of a Sikh trucker is one of contrasts. On one hand, you see the diversity of America. You encounter new immigrants from around the world working the same job as people who have been truckers for decades. All transport the food, paper and plastic that make the country run. But you also see the relics of the past and the reminders of how you, as a Sikh in 2019, still don’t entirely fit in.

    It’s 9:40 a.m. on Saturday when Pal pulls into Bowlin’s Flying C Ranch rest center in Encino, N.M., an hour past Albuquerque and two from Texas. Here, you can buy a $19,999 stuffed buffalo, Baja jackets and fake Native American moccasins made in China in a vast tourist stop attached to a Dairy Queen and an Exxon. “God Bless the U.S.A.” by Lee Greenwood plays in the background.

    It reminds Pal of the time he was paying his bill at another gas station. A man suddenly shouted at customers to “get out, he’s going to blow up this place!” “I will not fight you,” Pal calmly replied. The man left. Those kinds of instances are rare, but Pal always senses their danger. Some of the most violent attacks on Sikhs this century have been at the hands of people who mistook them for Muslims or Arabs, including the case of a turban-wearing Sikh man in Arizona who was shot dead by a gunman four days after the Sept. 11 attacks.

    For Pal, suspicious glances are more common. So are the truckers who think he’s new to the business or doesn’t speak English. None of it fazes him.

    “Everybody relates to us through Osama bin Laden because we look the same,” he says, driving across the plains toward the Texas Panhandle. “Or they think because my English sounds different that I am not smart. I know who I am.”

    Every day, he wears a silver bracelet that symbolizes a handcuff. “Remember, you are handcuffed to God. Remind yourself to not do bad things,” Pal says. It reminds him to be kind in the face of ignorance and hatred.

    At a Subway in Amarillo a few hours later, he grabs his go-to lunch when he’s taking a break from Indian food: a chicken sandwich on white bread with pepper jack, lettuce, tomato and onion. At home, the family is vegetarian. Pal relishes chances on the road to indulge in meat. He used to depend solely on his wife’s cooking. Today, he has other options. It’s a luxury to switch from homemade meals to Punjabi restaurants to fast food.

    Trucking has helped Pal find his faith. When he moved to the U.S., he used to shave, drink beer and not care much about religion. But as he got bored on the road, he started listening to religious sermons. Twelve years ago, he began to again grow his hair and quit alcohol; drinking it is against the faith’s traditions. Today, he schedules shipments around the temple calendar so he can attend Sikh celebrations with his family.

    “I don’t mind questions about my religion. But when people say to me, ‘Why do you not cut your hair?’ they are asking the wrong question,” Pal says. “The real question is, why do they cut their hair? God made us this way.”

    It’s 4:59 p.m. when he arrives in Sayre, Okla., at Truck Stop 40. A yellow Punjabi-language billboard advertises it as the I-40 starts to bend north in a rural region two hours from Oklahoma City.

    Among the oldest Sikh truck stops, it has a 24-hour vegetarian restaurant, convenience store, gas station and a housing trailer that functions as a temple — all spread over several acres.

    Pal has been coming here for more than decade, since it was a mechanic shop run by a Sikh former trucker who settled on the plot for its cheap land. When he has time, Pal lingers for a meal. But he’s in a rush to get to Joplin, Mo., for the night so he can make his drop-off the next day.

    He grabs a chai and heads to the temple. Resting on a small pillow upon the altar is the Guru Granth Sahib, the Sikh holy book. An audiotape plays prayers on a loop. A print of Guru Nanak, the faith’s founder, hangs on the wall.

    Pal prostrates and leaves a few dollar bills on the floor as a donation for upkeep. He prays for God to protect the temple, his family and himself on the 891 miles that remain until he hits the Indianapolis suburbs.

    “This feels like a long drive,” Pal says. “But it’s just a small part of the journey of life.”

    #USA #LKW #Transport #Immigration #Zuwanderung

  • Egypt. Arrests target political figures involved in new coalition to run in 2020 parliamentary elections | MadaMasr
    https://madamasr.com/en/2019/06/25/feature/politics/arrests-target-political-figures-involved-in-new-coalition-to-run-in-2020-

    Several political figures involved in discussions to form a new political alliance meant to stand in 2020 parliamentary elections were arrested beginning at dawn on Tuesday.

    At least eight people have been swept up in the arrest campaign, most prominently former Member of Parliament Zyad Elelaimy, journalist Hisham Fouad, Omar El-Shenety, the founder of the Multiples Group investment firm, and Hossam Moanis, the former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi’s campaign manager.

    The other four people identified by the Interior Ministry in a press release issued this morning are Mostafa Abdel Moez Abdel Sattar, Osama Abdel Aal Mohamed al-Aqbawy, Ahmed Abdel Galeel Hussein Ghoneim, and Hassan Mohamed Hussein Barbary.

    Those detained face accusations of leading a plot “to bring down the state” ahead of the June 30 anniversary. This plot — identified by the ministry as “The Plan for Hope” — was backed by 19 companies and economic entities secretly managed by Muslim Brotherhood leaders from abroad, according to the Interior Ministry.

  • Pour Nicolás Maduro, El Español annonce une « extraction à la Oussama Ben Laden », courte et propre organisée depuis Washington…

    El Español: La extracción de Maduro se estaría organizando desde Washington
    http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/politica/espanol-extraccion-maduro-estaria-organizando-desde-washington_282042


    Cortesía

    El Departamento de Estado de EE UU, la OEA y parte de la oposición en el exilio estarían negociando la salida del poder de Nicolás Maduro, reseñó El Español

    «La operación de extracción, si es necesaria, será como la de Osama bin Laden, limpia y corta. Son sólo tres o cuatro personas a las que hay que apresar», explicó una fuente directamente implicada en la negociación del oficialista. 

    De acuerdo con el documento que ya estaría finalizado pero aún sigue en discusión, plantea “la intervención de tropas extranjeras para sacar de sus posiciones de poder a los líderes chavistas”.

  • Israeli Soldiers Shot Bound Palestinian Teen Because Live Fire Is Their Only Language- Haaretz.Com
    https://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/.premium-israeli-soldiers-speak-just-one-language-live-fire-1.7152274

    Two photographs tell the whole story, of about 2,000 words. In the first you see the Israeli commando soldier, armed and protected from head to toe, his face hidden, standing above a hooded mass. The obscure sight is Palestinian teen Osama Hajajeh from Tuqu village, 15 and a half years old, who was arrested a short while beforehand by Israeli soldiers in an ambush. The teen’s hands are tied behind his back, his eyes are covered with a piece of flannel, he is kneeling under orders on the ground, his face down, his back bent over as a soldier from an elite unit of the Israeli Defense Forces points a sophisticated sniper’s rifle at him.

    This is the #grotesque face of military action. All the training, all the equipment, all the prestige of a commando unit lead to a school boy, blindfolded and bound. A commando soldier facing a punk from Tuqu. That’s the booty. The Israeli military’s daily picture of victory.

    The suspicion: the youth from Tuqu threw stones at passing vehicles. If he were a settler teen, he would be chasing the soldiers away, throwing stones and cursing at them. The story would be over. But Hajajeh is a Palestinian teen. The main street leading to his village has been blocked lately, and not long ago a woman from his village was killed in a hit and run by an Israeli vehicle. His village decided to protest. The stone is his protest. The occupier is his enemy.

    The second photograph is much more grotesque than the first. The youth whose hands are tied behind his back, his eyes covered, somehow succeeds in getting up and fleeing from the Israeli commando forces. At least four armed soldiers surround him. They stand at point blank range, stretch out their arms to grab him, or catch him, if that was their intention. But IDF soldiers know to speak only one language. There is none other. The language of gunfire. Live gunfire, to be precise. Whether it’s a suicide bomber or a high school student throwing stones, only their gun can speak. Without it, there’s no other language. That’s how they were taught. That’s how they were trained. They no longer have the ability to discern right from wrong, war from antics. To grab a tied up teen with their hands and arrest him? That’s for the weak. And why should they even break a sweat? So they shoot the tied-up youth, whose eyes are covered, from point blank range, with live fire, straight at his crotch. The teen falls down, bleeding. The IDF has won.

    This picture can only raise much deeper questions: Who’s the blind one here? The teen whose eyes are covered by a rag or the soldiers whose eyes are open? And more than that, who’s the brave one and who’s a coward? The blindfolded and bound teen who tried to flee facing the ready rifles of commando troops, or the soldiers who shot him? It’s not hard to guess who the cowards are in this picture.

    And then comes a surprising turn of events, unexpected and unusual. A voice of reason awakens in the soldiers’ minds. They let the angry residents who gather around to take the wounded, bleeding teen to the hospital, to save his life. In one moment the soldiers rescue their nearly-lost honor. They treat the teen the same way as the officer from the Ahed Tamimi case did, wiser than the chain of command both above and below: He exercised restraint after Tamimi’s slap and showed strength and wisdom. Now it’s the commando troops’ turn to show restraint. The right-wing will of course scream and shout, “you’re not letting the IDF win,” but at least this farce ended almost okay. Good job, IDF.

    #sionisme #impunité #lâcheté

  • Sudan. A desperate Bashir | MadaMasr
    https://madamasr.com/en/2019/02/10/opinion/u/a-desperate-bashir

    It has been eight weeks since anti-government protests began in Sudan, and the government is running out of money. And so Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is not spending his time addressing rallies and strategizing with his inner circle on how to quell or placate the most serious protests in his government’s 30 year history. He is on a plane, criss-crossing the Middle East and North Africa, visiting heads of states in the hope that he can extract some support to bridge his regime for another few months, to fill petrol pumps with fuel and ATMs with cash. These financial boosts have, in the past, come in many forms, ranging from vanilla aid to development schemes, where land or strategic ports are sold off to foreign sovereign leaders and billionaires. During Osama bin Laden’s years in Sudan, it was rumored that, at one point, the government had sold him over half of the agricultural land under its control. When he was expelled from Sudan, his losses were estimated to have reached US$300 million.

  • The Real Reasons Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Wanted Khashoggi ‘Dead or Alive’
    https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-real-reasons-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-wanted-khasho

    Christopher Dickey 10.21.18
    His death is key to understanding the political forces that helped turn the Middle East from a region of hope seven years ago to one of brutal repression and slaughter today.

    The mind plays strange tricks sometimes, especially after a tragedy. When I sat down to write this story about the Saudi regime’s homicidal obsession with the Muslim Brotherhood, the first person I thought I’d call was Jamal Khashoggi. For more than 20 years I phoned him or met with him, even smoked the occasional water pipe with him, as I looked for a better understanding of his country, its people, its leaders, and the Middle East. We often disagreed, but he almost always gave me fresh insights into the major figures of the region, starting with Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, and the political trends, especially the explosion of hope that was called the Arab Spring in 2011. He would be just the man to talk to about the Saudis and the Muslim Brotherhood, because he knew both sides of that bitter relationship so well.

    And then, of course, I realized that Jamal is dead, murdered precisely because he knew too much.

    Although the stories keep changing, there is now no doubt that 33-year-old Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the power in front of his decrepit father’s throne, had put out word to his minions that he wanted Khashoggi silenced, and the hit-team allegedly understood that as “wanted dead or alive.” But the [petro]buck stops with MBS, as bin Salman’s called. He’s responsible for a gruesome murder just as Henry II was responsible for the murder of Thomas Becket when he said, “Who will rid me of that meddlesome priest?” In this case, a meddlesome journalist.

    We now know that a few minor players will pay. Some of them might even be executed by Saudi headsmen (one already was reported killed in a car crash). But experience also tells us the spotlight of world attention will shift. Arms sales will go ahead. And the death of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi risks becoming just one more entry in the annals of intensifying, murderous repression of journalists who are branded the “enemy of the people” by Donald Trump and various two-bit tyrants around the world.

    There is more to Khashoggi’s murder than the question of press freedom, however. His death holds the key to understanding the political forces that have helped turn the Middle East from a region of hope seven years ago to one of brutal repression and ongoing slaughter today. Which brings us back to the question of the Saudis’ fear and hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regional rivalries of those who support it and those who oppose it, and the game of thrones in the House of Saud itself. Khashoggi was not central to any of those conflicts, but his career implicated him, fatally, in all of them.

    The Muslim Brotherhood is not a benign political organization, but neither is it Terror Incorporated. It was created in the 1920s and developed in the 1930s and ‘40s as an Islamic alternative to the secular fascist and communist ideologies that dominated revolutionary anti-colonial movements at the time. From those other political organizations the Brotherhood learned the values of a tight structure, party discipline, and secrecy, with a public face devoted to conventional political activity—when possible—and a clandestine branch that resorted to violence if that appeared useful.

    In the novel Sugar Street, Nobel Prize-winning author Naguib Mahfouz sketched a vivid portrait of a Brotherhood activist spouting the group’s political credo in Egypt during World War II. “Islam is a creed, a way of worship, a nation and a nationality, a religion, a state, a form of spirituality, a Holy Book, and a sword,” says the Brotherhood preacher. “Let us prepare for a prolonged struggle. Our mission is not to Egypt alone but to all Muslims worldwide. It will not be successful until Egypt and all other Islamic nations have accepted these Quranic principles in common. We shall not put our weapons away until the Quran has become a constitution for all Believers.”

    For several decades after World War II, the Brotherhood’s movement was eclipsed by Arab nationalism, which became the dominant political current in the region, and secular dictators moved to crush the organization. But the movement found support among the increasingly embattled monarchies of the Gulf, including and especially Saudi Arabia, where the rule of the king is based on his custodianship of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites in Islam. At the height of the Cold War, monarchies saw the Brotherhood as a helpful antidote to the threat of communist-led or Soviet-allied movements and ideologies.

    By the 1980s, several of the region’s rulers were using the Brotherhood as a tool to weaken or destroy secular opposition. Egypt’s Anwar Sadat courted them, then moved against them, and paid with his life in 1981, murdered by members of a group originally tied to the Brotherhood. Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, then spent three decades in power manipulating the Brotherhood as an opposition force, outlawing the party as such, but allowing its known members to run for office in the toothless legislature, where they formed a significant bloc and did a lot of talking.

    Jordan’s King Hussein played a similar game, but went further, giving clandestine support to members of the Brotherhood waging a covert war against Syrian tyrant Hafez al-Assad—a rebellion largely destroyed in 1982 when Assad’s brother killed tens of thousands of people in the Brotherhood stronghold of Hama.

    Even Israel got in on the action, initially giving Hamas, the Brotherhood branch among the Palestinians, tacit support as opposition to the left-leaning Palestine Liberation Organization (although PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat once identified with the Brotherhood himself).

    The Saudi royals, too, thought the Brotherhood could be bought off and manipulated for their own ends. “Over the years the relationship between the Saudis and the Brotherhood ebbed and flowed,” says Lorenzo Vidino, an expert on extremism at George Washington University and one of the foremost scholars in the U.S. studying the Brotherhood’s history and activities.

    Over the decades factions of the Brotherhood, like communists and fascists before them, “adapted to individual environments,” says Vidino. In different countries it took on different characteristics. Thus Hamas, or its military wing, is easily labeled as terrorist by most definitions, while Ennahda in Tunisia, which used to be called terrorist by the ousted Ben Ali regime, has behaved as a responsible political party in a complex democratic environment. To the extent that Jamal Khashoggi identified with the Brotherhood, that was the current he espoused. But democracy, precisely, is what Mohammed bin Salman fears.

    Vidino traces the Saudis’ intense hostility toward the Brotherhood to the uprisings that swept through much of the Arab world in 2011. “The Saudis together with the Emiratis saw it as a threat to their own power,” says Vidino.

    Other regimes in the region thought they could use the Brotherhood to extend their influence. First among these was the powerful government in Turkey of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has such longstanding ties to the Islamist movement that some scholars refer to his elected government as “Brotherhood 2.0.” Also hoping to ride the Brotherhood wave was tiny, ultra-rich Qatar, whose leaders had used their vast natural gas wealth and their popular satellite television channel, Al Jazeera, to project themselves on the world stage and, they hoped, buy some protection from their aggressive Saudi neighbors. As one senior Qatari official told me back in 2013, “The future of Qatar is soft power.” After 2011, Jazeera’s Arabic channel frequently appeared to propagandize in the Brotherhood’s favor as much as, say, Fox News does in Trump’s.

    Egypt, the most populous country in the Arab world, and the birthplace of the Brotherhood, became a test case. Although Jamal Khashoggi often identified the organization with the idealistic hopes of the peaceful popular uprising that brought down the Mubarak dynasty, in fact the Egyptian Brotherhood had not taken part. Its leaders had a modus vivendi they understood with Mubarak, and it was unclear what the idealists in Tahrir Square, or the military tolerating them, might do.

    After the dictator fell and elections were called, however, the Brotherhood made its move, using its party organization and discipline, as well as its perennial slogan, “Islam is the solution,” to put its man Mohamed Morsi in the presidential palace and its people in complete control of the government. Or so it thought.

    In Syria, meanwhile, the Brotherhood believed it could and should lead the popular uprising against the Assad dynasty. That had been its role 30 years earlier, and it had paid mightily.

    For more than a year, it looked like the Brotherhood’s various branches might sweep to power across the unsettled Arab world, and the Obama administration, for want of serious alternatives, was inclined to go with the flow.

    But then the Saudis struck back.

    In the summer of 2013, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, the commander of the Egyptian armed forces, led a military coup with substantial popular support against the conspicuously inept Brotherhood government, which had proved quickly that Islam was not really the “solution” for much of anything.

    Al-Sissi had once been the Egyptian military attaché in Riyadh, where he had many connections, and the Saudis quickly poured money into Egypt to shore up his new regime. At the same time, he declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, and launched a campaign of ruthless repression. Within weeks of the coup, the Egyptian military attacked two camps of Brotherhood protesters and slaughtered hundreds.

    In Syria, the efforts to organize a credible political opposition to President Bashar al-Assad proved virtually impossible as the Qataris and Turks backed the Brotherhood while the Saudis continued their vehement opposition. But that does not mean that Riyadh supported moderate secular forces. Far from it. The Saudis still wanted to play a major role bringing down the Syrian regime allied to another arch enemy, the government of Iran. So the Saudis put their weight behind ultra-conservative Salafis, thinking they might be easier to control than the Muslim Brothers.

    Riyadh is “okay with quietist Salafism,” says Vidino. But the Salafis’ religious extremism quickly shaded over into the thinking of groups like the al Qaeda spinoff called the Nusra Front. Amid all the infighting, little progress was made against Assad, and there to exploit the chaos was the so-called Islamic State (which Assad partially supported in its early days).

    Then, in January 2015, at the height of all this regional turmoil, the aged and infirm Salman bin Abdelaziz ascended to the throne of Saudi Arabia. His son, Mohammed bin Salman, began taking into his own hands virtually all the reins of power, making bold decisions about reforming the Saudi economy, taking small measures to give the impression he might liberalize society—and moving to intimidate or otherwise neutralize anyone who might challenge his power.

    Saudi Arabia is a country named after one family, the al Saud, and while there is nothing remotely democratic about the government, within the family itself with its thousands of princes there traditionally has been an effort to find consensus. Every king up to now has been a son of the nation’s founder, Abdelaziz ibn Saud, and thus a brother or half brother of the other kings.

    When Salman took over, he finally named successors from the next generation. His nephew Mohammed bin Nayef, then 57 and well known for his role fighting terrorism, became crown prince. His son, Mohammed bin Salman, became deputy crown prince. But bin Nayef’s position between the king and his favorite son clearly was untenable. As one Saudi close to the royals put it: “Between the onion and the skin there is only the stink.”

    Bin Nayef was pushed out in 2017. The New York Times reported that during an end-of-Ramadan gathering at the palace he “was told he was going to meet the king and was led into another room, where royal court officials took away his phones and pressured him to give up his posts as crown prince and interior minister. … At first, he refused. But as the night wore on, the prince, a diabetic who suffers from the effects of a 2009 assassination attempt by a suicide bomber, grew tired.” Royal court officials meanwhile called around to other princes saying bin Nayef had a drug problem and was unfit to be king.

    Similar pressure was brought to bear on many of the richest and most powerful princes in the kingdom, locked up in the Ritz Carlton hotel in 2017, ostensibly as part of an extra-legal fight against corruption. They were forced to give allegiance to MBS at the same time they were giving up a lot of their money.

    That pattern of coerced allegiance is what the Saudis now admit they wanted from Jamal Khashoggi. He was no prince, but he had been closely associated in the past with the sons of the late King Faisal, particularly Turki al-Faisal, who was for many years the head of the Saudi intelligence apparatus and subsequently served as ambassador to the United Kingdom, then the United States.

    Although Turki always denied he had ambitions to be king, his name often was mentioned in the past as a contender. Thus far he seems to have weathered the rule of MBS, but given the record of the crown prince anyone close to the Al Faisal branch of the family, like Khashoggi, would be in a potentially perilous position.

    Barbara Bodine is a former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, which has suffered mightily since MBS launched a brutal proxy war there against Iran. Both MBS and Trump have declared the regime in Tehran enemy number one in the region. But MBS botched the Yemen operation from the start. It was dubbed “Decisive Storm” when it began in 2015, and was supposed to last only a few weeks, but the war continues to this day. Starvation and disease have spread through Yemen, creating one of the world’s greatest humanitarian disasters. And for the moment, in one of those developments that makes the Middle East so rich in ironies, in Yemen the Saudis are allied with a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

    “What drives MBS is a ruthless effort toward total control domestically and regionally; he is Putin of the Desert,” says Bodine. “He has basically broken the back of the princelings, the religious establishment and the business elite, brought all ministries and agencies of power under his sole control (’I alone can fix it’), and jailed, killed or put under house arrest activists and any and all potential as well as real opposition (including his mother).”

    In 2017, MBS and his backers in the Emirates accused Qatar of supporting “terrorism,” issuing a set of demands that included shutting down Al Jazeera. The Saudis closed off the border and looked for other ways, including military options, to put pressure on the poor little rich country that plays so many angles it has managed to be supportive of the Brotherhood and cozy with Iran while hosting an enormous U.S. military base.

    “It was Qatar’s independent streak—not just who they supported but that they had a foreign policy divorced from the dictates of Riyadh,” says Bodine. “The basic problem is that both the Brotherhood and Iran offer competing Islam-based governing structures that challenge the Saudi model.”

    “Jamal’s basic sin,” says Bodine,“was he was a credible insider, not a fire-breathing radical. He wrote and spoke in English for an American audience via credible mainstream media and was well regarded and highly visible within the Washington chattering classes. He was accessible, moderate and operated within the West. He challenged not the core structure of the Kingdom but the legitimacy of the current rulers, especially MBS.”

    “I do think the game plan was to make him disappear and I suspect the end game was always to make him dead,” said Bodine in a long and thoughtful email. “If he was simply jailed within Saudi there would have been a drumbeat of pressure for his release. Dead—there is certainly a short term cost, whether more than anticipated or longer than anticipated we don’t know yet, but the world will move on. Jamal will become a footnote, a talking point perhaps, but not a crusade. The dismembered body? No funeral. Taking out Jamal also sends a powerful signal to any dissident that there is no place safe.”

    #Arabie_Saoudite #Turquie #politique #terrorisme #putsch

  • The Islamic fundamentalist Jeremy Corbyn should be ashamed of himself – if only he’d behaved more like Margaret Thatcher | The Independent
    https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/jeremy-corbyn-islam-jewish-antisemitism-israel-labour-party-margaret-

    Un peu d’humour (anglais) ne fait jamais de mal en politique.

    It gets worse and worse for Jeremy Corbyn and Labour. There’s a rumour that photos have emerged of a courgette grown on his allotment which is a similar shape to a rocket propeller used by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

    This comes on top of revelations that he has a beard, much like Palestinian terrorists, and his constituency is Islington, which starts with IS, or Islamic State. As a vegetarian he doesn’t eat pork, his friend John McDonnell’s initials are JM – that stands for Jihadist Muslim – and he travels on underground trains, that are under the ground, just like the basements in which Isis make their little films.

    The Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and various others have also published a photo of him folding his thumb while holding up his fingers, in a way they describe as a salute to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. That settles it. If you don’t constantly check the shape of your thumb to make sure it’s not folded in a way similar to the way it’s folded by Muslim groups in Egypt, you might as well strap Semtex to your chest and get a bus to Syria.

    Thankfully there are some brave journalists who discovered the truth: that Corbyn laid a wreath in Tunisia at a memorial for civilians who were bombed, but also buried in that cemetery are the “Munich terrorists”. It turned out that the terrorists are not buried there at all, as they’re buried in Libya, but you can’t expect those journalists to get bogged down in insignificant details like that.

    We’ve all turned up for a funeral to be told we’re in the wrong country. “I’m afraid the service for your Uncle Derek is in Eltham Crematorium,” we’re told, “and you’ve come to Argentina.” It doesn’t make any difference to the overall story.

    Because there are Palestinian leaders who may have been terrorists in that cemetery. And when you attend a memorial service, you are clearly commemorating everyone in the cemetery, and the fact that you’ve probably never heard of most of them is no excuse.
    Corbyn takes on Margaret Thatcher over homelessness in Parliament in 1990

    If it’s possible to bring comfort to all those shocked by this outrage, it may be worth recalling that one of the first scandals about Corbyn after he became leader was that he wasn’t dressed smartly enough when he laid a wreath at the Cenotaph, which was an insult to our war dead. He’s just as scruffy in the pictures from Tunisia, so perhaps what he’s actually doing is insulting the terrorists, by laying a wreath near them while his coat is rumpled.

    I suppose it may just be possible that the wreath he laid at an event organised to mark the bombing of civilians in 1985 was actually put there to mark the bombing of civilians in 1985.

    But it’s much more likely that secretly, Jeremy Corbyn supports Palestinian terrorists who murder athletes. You may think that if you hold such an unusual point of view, it might have slipped out in conversation here and there. But the fact he’s never said or done anything to suggest he backs the brutal murder of civilians only shows how clever he is at hiding his true thoughts.

    This must be why he’s always been a keen supporter of causes beloved by Islamic jihadists, such as gay rights. For example, Jeremy Corbyn was a passionate opponent of Margaret Thatcher’s Section 28 law that banned the mention of homosexuality in schools. He supported every gay rights campaign at a time when it was considered extremist to do so. And the way he managed to be an extremist Islamic fundamentalist and an extremist gay rights fanatic at the same time only shows how dangerous he is.

    One person who appears especially upset by all this is Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and it’s always distressing when someone that sensitive gets dragged into an issue.

    Sadly he’s going to be even more aghast when he reads about another event in which wreaths were laid for terrorists. Because a plaque was unveiled to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the bombing of the King David Hotel, in which 91 people died, mostly civilians and 28 of them British. This was carried out by the Irgun, an Israeli terror gang, and one man, who by coincidence was also called Benjamin Netanyahu, declared the bombing was “a legitimate act with a military target”.
    The most ridiculous claims made about Jeremy Corbyn
    He called Hezbollah and Hamas ‘friends’
    ‘Jeremy Corbyn thinks the death of Osama bin Laden was a tragedy’
    He is ‘haunted’ by the legacy of his ‘evil’ great-great-grandfather
    Jeremy Corbyn raised a motion about ‘pigeon bombs’ in Parliament

    When Benjamin Netanyahu hears about this other Benjamin Netanyahu he’ll be furious.

    The Labour MPs who pine for Tony Blair are even more enraged, and you have to sympathise. Because when Blair supported murderers, such as Gaddafi and Asad, he did it while they were still alive, which is much more acceptable.

    So you can see why Conservative politicians and newspapers are so disgusted. If you subjected the Conservative Party to a similar level of scrutiny, you’d find nothing comparable. There might be the odd link to torturers, such as their ex-leader Margaret Thatcher describing General Pinochet, who herded opponents into a football stadium and had them shot, as a close and dear friend. Or supporting apartheid because “Nelson Mandela is a terrorist”. But she was only being polite.

    We can only guess what the next revelation will be. My guess is “Corbyn supported snakes against iguanas in Attenborough’s film. Footage has emerged of the Labour leader speaking alongside a snake, and praising his efforts to catch the iguana and poison and swallow him. One iguana said he was ‘shocked and horrified’ at the story, told in this 340-page special edition, and one anti-Corbyn Labour MP said, ‘I don’t know anything about this whatsoever, which is why I call on Mr Corbyn to do the decent thing and kill himself.’”

    #Jeremy_Corbin #Fake_news #Calomnies #Violence

  • The Islamic fundamentalist Jeremy Corbyn should be ashamed of himself – if only he’d behaved more like Margaret Thatcher | The Independent
    https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/jeremy-corbyn-islam-jewish-antisemitism-israel-labour-party-margaret-

    It gets worse and worse for Jeremy Corbyn and Labour. There’s a rumour that photos have emerged of a courgette grown on his allotment which is a similar shape to a rocket propeller used by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

    This comes on top of revelations that he has a beard, much like Palestinian terrorists, and his constituency is Islington, which starts with IS, or Islamic State. As a vegetarian he doesn’t eat pork, his friend John McDonnell’s initials are JM – that stands for Jihadist Muslim – and he travels on underground trains, that are under the ground, just like the basements in which Isis make their little films.

    The Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and various others have also published a photo of him folding his thumb while holding up his fingers, in a way they describe as a salute to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. That settles it. If you don’t constantly check the shape of your thumb to make sure it’s not folded in a way similar to the way it’s folded by Muslim groups in Egypt, you might as well strap Semtex to your chest and get a bus to Syria.

    Thankfully there are some brave journalists who discovered the truth: that Corbyn laid a wreath in Tunisia at a memorial for civilians who were bombed, but also buried in that cemetery are the “Munich terrorists”. It turned out that the terrorists are not buried there at all, as they’re buried in Libya, but you can’t expect those journalists to get bogged down in insignificant details like that.

    We’ve all turned up for a funeral to be told we’re in the wrong country. “I’m afraid the service for your Uncle Derek is in Eltham Crematorium,” we’re told, “and you’ve come to Argentina.” It doesn’t make any difference to the overall story.

    Because there are Palestinian leaders who may have been terrorists in that cemetery. And when you attend a memorial service, you are clearly commemorating everyone in the cemetery, and the fact that you’ve probably never heard of most of them is no excuse.
    Corbyn takes on Margaret Thatcher over homelessness in Parliament in 1990

    If it’s possible to bring comfort to all those shocked by this outrage, it may be worth recalling that one of the first scandals about Corbyn after he became leader was that he wasn’t dressed smartly enough when he laid a wreath at the Cenotaph, which was an insult to our war dead. He’s just as scruffy in the pictures from Tunisia, so perhaps what he’s actually doing is insulting the terrorists, by laying a wreath near them while his coat is rumpled.
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    I suppose it may just be possible that the wreath he laid at an event organised to mark the bombing of civilians in 1985 was actually put there to mark the bombing of civilians in 1985.

    But it’s much more likely that secretly, Jeremy Corbyn supports Palestinian terrorists who murder athletes. You may think that if you hold such an unusual point of view, it might have slipped out in conversation here and there. But the fact he’s never said or done anything to suggest he backs the brutal murder of civilians only shows how clever he is at hiding his true thoughts.

    This must be why he’s always been a keen supporter of causes beloved by Islamic jihadists, such as gay rights. For example, Jeremy Corbyn was a passionate opponent of Margaret Thatcher’s Section 28 law that banned the mention of homosexuality in schools. He supported every gay rights campaign at a time when it was considered extremist to do so. And the way he managed to be an extremist Islamic fundamentalist and an extremist gay rights fanatic at the same time only shows how dangerous he is.

    One person who appears especially upset by all this is Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and it’s always distressing when someone that sensitive gets dragged into an issue.

    Sadly he’s going to be even more aghast when he reads about another event in which wreaths were laid for terrorists. Because a plaque was unveiled to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the bombing of the King David Hotel, in which 91 people died, mostly civilians and 28 of them British. This was carried out by the Irgun, an Israeli terror gang, and one man, who by coincidence was also called Benjamin Netanyahu, declared the bombing was “a legitimate act with a military target”.
    The most ridiculous claims made about Jeremy Corbyn
    He called Hezbollah and Hamas ‘friends’
    ‘Jeremy Corbyn thinks the death of Osama bin Laden was a tragedy’
    He is ‘haunted’ by the legacy of his ‘evil’ great-great-grandfather
    Jeremy Corbyn raised a motion about ‘pigeon bombs’ in Parliament

    When Benjamin Netanyahu hears about this other Benjamin Netanyahu he’ll be furious.

    The Labour MPs who pine for Tony Blair are even more enraged, and you have to sympathise. Because when Blair supported murderers, such as Gaddafi and Asad, he did it while they were still alive, which is much more acceptable.

    So you can see why Conservative politicians and newspapers are so disgusted. If you subjected the Conservative Party to a similar level of scrutiny, you’d find nothing comparable. There might be the odd link to torturers, such as their ex-leader Margaret Thatcher describing General Pinochet, who herded opponents into a football stadium and had them shot, as a close and dear friend. Or supporting apartheid because “Nelson Mandela is a terrorist”. But she was only being polite.

    We can only guess what the next revelation will be. My guess is “Corbyn supported snakes against iguanas in Attenborough’s film. Footage has emerged of the Labour leader speaking alongside a snake, and praising his efforts to catch the iguana and poison and swallow him. One iguana said he was ‘shocked and horrified’ at the story, told in this 340-page special edition, and one anti-Corbyn Labour MP said, ‘I don’t know anything about this whatsoever, which is why I call on Mr Corbyn to do the decent thing and kill himself.’”

  • L’interview de la mère d’Oussama Ben Laden, Alia Ghanem, par Martin Chulov dans le Guardian est l’évènement médiatique du moment :
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/osama-bin-laden-mother-speaks-out-family-interview
    L’article a été largement signalé et commenté (positivement) dans les grands médias français.

    Or, en dehors d’Angry Arab, personne ne semble vouloir remarquer que l’interview reprend tous les talking points de la propagande séoudienne de l’ère Mohamed Bin Salman.

    D’entrée de jeu, Chulov admet qu’il interviewe la famille Ben Laden sous le contrôle du régime séoudien :

    Now, Saudi Arabia’s new leadership – spearheaded by the ambitious 32-year-old heir to the throne, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman – has agreed to my request to speak to the family. (As one of the country’s most influential families, their movements and engagements remain closely monitored.)

    Voilà l’une des dictatures les plus violentes de la planète, où le déplaisir du prince vous vaudra la ruine, ou la prison, ou la réclusion à vie dans une résidence privée, ou quelques centaines de coups de fouets, voire la décapitation. Un pays où des milliardaires parmi les plus puissants ont été retenus dans un hôtel, possiblement torturés, avant d’être proprement ruinés. Où un Premier ministre étranger a été retenu et démissionné d’office.

    Mais si la famille accepte enfin de parler – avec l’accord de la nouvelle direction du régime – c’est, selon Chulov, pour éviter de « réouvrir d’anciennes plaies » :

    Unsurprisingly, Osama bin Laden’s family are cautious in our initial negotiations; they are not sure whether opening old wounds will prove cathartic or harmful. But after several days of discussion, they are willing to talk.

    L’idée qu’il n’est pas bien sain, d’un point de vue journalistique, de présenter dans de telles conditions la parole de ces gens comme un authentique entretien, est soulevée dans la fin de l’article par une demi-sœur de Ben Laden installée (réfugiée ?) à Paris. Objection balayée d’une phrase et l’euphémisme « complicated status in the kingdom » :

    From her home in Paris, she later emailed to say she strongly objected to her mother being interviewed, asking that it be rearranged through her. Despite the blessing of her brothers and father, she felt her mother had been pressured into talking. Ghanem, however, insisted she was happy to talk and could have talked longer. It is, perhaps, a sign of the extended family’s complicated status in the kingdom that such tensions exist.

    D’ailleurs la conversation se fait ouvertement en présence d’un commissaire politique du régime mais, précise notre grand reporter : qui ne fait aucune tentative pour influencer la conversation…

    When we meet on a hot day in early June, a minder from the Saudi government sits in the room, though she makes no attempt to influence the conversation.

    On est heureux de constater que les méthodes séoudienness se sont affinées depuis l’interview grotesque de Saad Hariri.

    Bref, l’entretien commence.

    D’entrée de jeu, premier élément de langage tiré de la propagande officielle saoudienne : Oussame Ben Laden s’est radicalisé sous l’influence d’un membre des Frères musulmans. Subtile…

    “The people at university changed him,” Ghanem says. “He became a different man.” One of the men he met there was Abdullah Azzam, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was later exiled from Saudi Arabia and became Osama’s spiritual adviser.

    Un autre élément de langage, central, reviendra plusieurs fois dans l’interview : en Afghanistan, Ben Laden est un type très bien : il n’est pas encore un jihadiste (jusqu’en 1999…).

    “[…] He spent all his money on Afghanistan – he would sneak off under the guise of family business.” Did she ever suspect he might become a jihadist? “It never crossed my mind.”

    Tant qu’à faire, le petit détail sectaire qui ne trompe pas : la maman de Ben Laden est alaouite :

    Ghanem begins to relax, and talks about her childhood in the coastal Syrian city of Latakia, where she grew up in a family of Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Islam.

    Évidemment, le bon fan-boy de la rébellitude syrienne ne tarde pas à en faire la bonne lecture : la mère de Ben Laden est alaouite « comme les Assad ». Par exemple Sam Dagher te conseille l’article en commençant par cette remarque (subtile) :
    https://twitter.com/samdagher/status/1025343757229678597

    Must read by ⁦@martinchulov⁩ on Bin Laden’s mother. She’s Syrian Alawite like the Assads. […]

    Un autre talking point typique de MBS : l’Arabie séoudite était un pays relativement libéral dans les années 70 (ah ah… comment traduire « freewheeling » ici sans paraître totalement ridicule), mais a adopté une interprétation rigoriste du wahhabisme en réaction à la révolution iranienne (dont le but, écrit-il, était d’exporter le chiisme dans le monde arabe sunnite).

    Osama bin Laden’s formative years in Jeddah came in the relatively freewheeling 1970s, before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which aimed to export Shia zeal into the Sunni Arab world. From then on, Saudi’s rulers enforced a rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam – one that had been widely practised across the Arabian peninsula since the 18th century, the era of cleric Muhammed ibn Abdul Wahhab.

    Ah, il faut te dire qu’à ce moment de ce long article, l’interview proprement dite de la mère de Ben Laden est terminée depuis longtemps, et n’a dû occuper que deux gros paragraphes…

    À la place, on part dans des considérations enthousiastes sur cette nouvelle direction saoudienne, sous l’influence de Bin Salman, qui voudrait instaurer un « islam modéré » en Arabie (Chulov est d’ailleurs sans surprise coupable, dans le Guardian, de plusieurs articles enthousiastes sur les femmes séoudiennes autorisées à conduire) :

    In 2018, Saudi’s new leadership wants to draw a line under this era and introduce what bin Salman calls “moderate Islam”. This he sees as essential to the survival of a state where a large, restless and often disaffected young population has, for nearly four decades, had little access to entertainment, a social life or individual freedoms. Saudi’s new rulers believe such rigid societal norms, enforced by clerics, could prove fodder for extremists who tap into such feelings of frustration.

    Reform is beginning to creep through many aspects of Saudi society; among the most visible was June’s lifting of the ban on women drivers. There have been changes to the labour markets and a bloated public sector; cinemas have opened, and an anti-corruption drive launched across the private sector and some quarters of government. The government also claims to have stopped all funding to Wahhabi institutions outside the kingdom, which had been supported with missionary zeal for nearly four decades.

    Such radical shock therapy is slowly being absorbed across the country, where communities conditioned to decades of uncompromising doctrine don’t always know what to make of it. Contradictions abound: some officials and institutions eschew conservatism, while others wholeheartedly embrace it. Meanwhile, political freedoms remain off-limits; power has become more centralised and dissent is routinely crushed.

    Toujours plus éloigné du sujet initial (la maman d’Oussama), le prince Turki al-Faisal, l’« érudit » ancien chef des services secrets saoudiens :

    I meet Prince Turki al-Faisal, who was the head of Saudi intelligence for 24 years, between 1977 and 1 September 2001 (10 days before the 9/11 attacks), at his villa in Jeddah. An erudite man now in his mid-70s, Turki wears green cufflinks bearing the Saudi flag on the sleeves of his thobe.

    Lequel te synthétise l’élément de langage central de l’article : en Afghanistan c’est un combattant de la liberté, et c’est après que ça se gâte :

    “There are two Osama bin Ladens,” he tells me. “One before the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and one after it. Before, he was very much an idealistic mujahid. He was not a fighter. By his own admission, he fainted during a battle, and when he woke up, the Soviet assault on his position had been defeated.”

    As Bin Laden moved from Afghanistan to Sudan, and as his links to Saudi Arabia soured, it was Turki who spoke with him on behalf of the kingdom. In the wake of 9/11, these direct dealings came under intense scrutiny.

    Et une autre explication totalement tirée par les cheveux : si la plupart des terroristes du 11 Septembre étaient séoudiens, ce n’était pas parce que les Séoudiens vivent dans un environnement toxique depuis l’enfance, mais parce que Ben Laden voulait tourner le monde occidental contre l’Arabie… Oui, c’est une très jolie théorie du complot dans laquelle on présente le royaume comme une victime du 11 Septembre :

    “There is no doubt that he deliberately chose Saudi citizens for the 9/11 plot,” a British intelligence officer tells me. “He was convinced that was going to turn the west against his ... home country. He did indeed succeed in inciting a war, but not the one he expected.”

    Et pour terminer, enfonçons le clou sur l’authentique conviction réformatrice (« mais pourra-t-il réussir ? ») de ce brave Mohammed Bin Salman :

    While change has been attempted in Saudi Arabia before, it has been nowhere near as extensive as the current reforms. How hard Mohammed bin Salman can push against a society indoctrinated in such an uncompromising worldview remains an open question.

    Saudia Arabia’s allies are optimistic, but offer a note of caution. The British intelligence officer I spoke to told me, “If Salman doesn’t break through, there will be many more Osamas. And I’m not sure they’ll be able to shake the curse.”

  • » Palestinian Dies From Wounds Suffered Friday
    IMEMC News | June 24, 2018 10:32 AM
    http://imemc.org/article/palestinian-dies-from-wounds-suffered-friday

    The Health Ministry in the Gaza Strip has reported that a young Palestinian man died, on Sunday at dawn, from serious wounds he suffered, last Friday, after Israeli soldiers shot him with live fire.

    Dr. Ashraf al-Qedra, the spokesperson of the Health Ministry in Gaza said the young man, identified as Osama Khalil Abu Khater , 29, was shot with a live Israeli army bullet in the abdomen, during Friday’s Great Return March procession.

    He added that Abu Khater, who was shot east of Khan Younis in southern Gaza Strip, suffered a serious injury, and was rushed to the Gaza European Hospital, in southern Gaza, but succumbed to his wounds.

    #Palestine_assassinée #marcheduretour

  • Under Sisi, firms owned by Egypt’s military have flourished
    https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/egypt-economy-military

    In the four years since former armed forces chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi became Egypt’s president, companies owned by the military have gone from strength to strength. Local businessmen and foreign investors are concerned.

    By Reuters staff Filed May 16, 2018, 11 a.m. GMT

    CAIRO – In a four-decade military career, Osama Abdel Meguid served in the first Gulf War and was an assistant military attaché in the United States.

    These days he issues orders from an office that overlooks the Nile, as chairman of the Maadi Co. for Engineering Industries, owned by the Ministry of Military Production.

    Maadi was founded in 1954 to manufacture grenade launchers, pistols and machine guns. In recent years the firm, which employs 1,400 people, has begun turning out greenhouses, medical devices, power equipment and gyms. It has plans for four new factories.

    “There are so many projects we are working on,” said Abdel Meguid, a 61-year-old engineer, listing orders including a 495 million Egyptian pound ($28 million) project for the Ministry of Electricity and an Algerian agricultural waste recycling contract worth $400,000.

    Maadi is one of dozens of military-owned companies that have flourished since Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a former armed forces chief, became president in 2014, a year after leading the military in ousting Islamist President Mohamed Mursi.

    The military owns 51 percent of a firm that is developing a new $45 billion capital city 75 km east of Cairo. Another military-owned company is building Egypt’s biggest cement plant. Other business interests range from fish farms to holiday resorts.

    In interviews conducted over the course of a year, the chairmen of nine military-owned firms described how their businesses are expanding and discussed their plans for future growth. Figures from the Ministry of Military Production - one of three main bodies that oversee military firms - show that revenues at its firms are rising sharply. The ministry’s figures and the chairmen’s accounts give rare insight into the way the military is growing in economic influence.

  • Names and ages of Palestinians killed by Israeli troops in Gaza

    These are the names of the unarmed Palestinians shot dead by Israeli troops since Friday 30 March, 2018. They were protesting at the Gaza border for the right of return to their ancestral lands and homes, from which they were driven out in 1948. The list does not include the many thousands wounded by live fire.

    Name and age of victims :
    01. Omar Wahid Samour, 31 years old
    02. Mohammed Kamal al-Najjar, 25 years old
    03. Jihad Zuhair Abu Jamous, 30 years old
    04. Amin Mansour Abu Muammar, 22 years old
    05. Ibrahim Salah Abu Sha’er, 17 years old
    06. Nagy Abdullah Abu Hjeir, 25 years old
    07. Musab Zuhair Al-Soloul, 23 years old
    08. Abd al-Qader Mardi al-Hawajri, 42 years old
    09. Mahmoud Saadi Rahmi, 23 years old
    10. Mohammed Naeem Abu Amro, 26.
    11. Ahmed Ibrahim Ashour Odeh, 19.
    12. Jihad Ahmed Farina, 34 years old
    13. Abdel-Fattah Abdel-Nabi, 18 years old
    14. Bader Fayiq al-Sabbagh, 22 years old
    15. Sari Walid Abu Odeh, 27 years old
    16. Hamdan Isma’il Abu Amsha, 23 years old
    17. Fares Al-Ruqab, 29 years old
    18. Ahmad Omar Arafah, 25 years old
    19. Osama Khamis Qdeih, 38 years old
    20. Majdi Ramadan Shabat, 38 years old
    21. Hussein Muhammad Adnan Madi, 13 years old
    22. Subhi Abu Atawi, 20 years old
    23. Mohammad Said al-Haj-Saleh, 33 years old
    24. Sedqi Faraj Abu Atawi, 45 years old
    25. Alaa al-Din Yahya Ismail al-Zamli, 15 years old
    26. Hamza Abd al-Al, 20 years old
    27. Yaser Murtaja, 30 years old
    28. Ibrahim Al-‘ur, 19 years old
    29. Mujahed Nabil Al-Khudari, 25 years old
    30. Marwan Odeh Qdeih, 45 years old
    31. Mohammed Hjeila, 30 years old
    32. Abdallah Al-Shahri, 28 years old
    33. Tahrir Wahba, 17 years old
    34. Saad Abu Taha, 29 years old
    35. Mohammed Ayoub, 15 years old
    36. Ahmed Abu Hussein, 25 years old
    37. Abdullah Shamali, 20 years old
    38. Ahmad Rashad Al Athamna, 23 years old
    39. Ahmed Nabil Aqel, 25 years old
    40. Mahmoud Wahba, 18 years old
    41. Ahmed Dabour, 23 years old
    42. Ayed Hamaydeh, 23 years old
    43, Amjad Qartous, 18 years old
    44. Hesham Abdul-Al, 22 years old
    45. Abd al-Salam Bakr, 29 years old
    46. Mohammed Amin al-Maqeer, 21 years old
    47. Khalil Na’im Mustafa Atallah, 22 years old
    48. Azzam Oweida, 15 years old
    49. Anas Shawqi, 19 years old
    50. Jaber Salem Abu Mustafa, 40 years old
    51. Amin Mahmoud Muammar, 26 years old
    52. Hani Fayez al-Ardarba, 23 years old
    53. Mohammed Khaled Abu Reida, 20 years old
    54. Jamal Abu Arahman Afaneh, 15 years old
    55. Laila Anwar Al-Ghandoor, 8 months old
    56. Ezz el-din Musa Mohamed Alsamaak, 14 years old
    57. Wisaal Fadl Ezzat Alsheikh Khalil, 15 years old
    58. Ahmed Adel Musa Alshaer, 16 years old
    59. Saeed Mohamed Abu Alkheir, 16 years old
    60. Ibrahim Ahmed Alzarqa, 18 years old
    61. Eman Ali Sadiq Alsheikh, 19 years old
    62. Zayid Mohamed Hasan Omar, 19 years old
    63. Motassem Fawzy Abu Louley, 20 years old
    64. Anas Hamdan Salim Qadeeh, 21 years old
    65. Mohamed Abd Alsalam Harz, 21 years old
    66. Yehia Ismail Rajab Aldaqoor, 22 years old
    67. Mustafa Mohamed Samir Mahmoud Almasry, 22 years old
    68. Ezz Eldeen Nahid Aloyutey, 23 years old
    69. Mahmoud Mustafa Ahmed Assaf, 23 years old
    70. Ahmed Fayez Harb Shahadah, 23 years old
    71. Ahmed Awad Allah, 24 years old
    72. Khalil Ismail Khalil Mansor, 25 years old
    73. Mohamed Ashraf Abu Sitta, 26 years old
    74. Bilal Ahmed Abu Diqah, 26 years old
    75. Ahmed Majed Qaasim Ata Allah, 27 years old
    76. Mahmoud Rabah Abu Maamar, 28 years old
    77. Musab Yousef Abu Leilah, 28 years old
    78. Ahmed Fawzy Altetr, 28 years old
    79. Mohamed Abdelrahman Meqdad, 28 years old
    80. Obaidah Salim Farhan, 30 years old
    81. Jihad Mufid Al-Farra, 30 years old
    82. Fadi Hassan Abu Salah, 30 years old
    83. Motaz Bassam Kamil Al-Nunu, 31 years old
    84. Mohammed Riyad Abdulrahman Alamudi, 31 years old
    85. Jihad Mohammed Othman Mousa, 31 years old
    86. Shahir Mahmoud Mohammed Almadhoon, 32 years old
    87. Mousa Jabr Abdulsalam Abu Hasnayn, 35 years old
    88. Mohammed Mahmoud Abdulmoti Abdal’al, 39 years old
    89. Ahmed Mohammed Ibrahim Hamdan, 27 years old
    90. Ismail Khalil Ramadhan Aldaahuk, 30 years old
    91. Ahmed Mahmoud Mohammed Alrantisi, 27 years old
    92. Alaa Alnoor Ahmed Alkhatib, 28 years old
    93. Mahmoud Yahya Abdawahab Hussain, 24 years old
    94. Ahmed Abdullah Aladini, 30 years old
    95. Saadi Said Fahmi Abu Salah, 16 years old
    96. Ahmed Zahir Hamid Alshawa, 24 years old
    97. Mohammed Hani Hosni Alnajjar, 33 years old
    98. Fadl Mohamed Ata Habshy, 34 years old
    99. Mokhtar Kaamil Salim Abu Khamash, 23 years old
    100. Mahmoud Wael Mahmoud Jundeyah, 21 years old
    101. Abdulrahman Sami Abu Mattar, 18 years old
    102. Ahmed Salim Alyaan Aljarf, 26 years old
    103. Mahmoud Sulayman Ibrahim Aql, 32 years old
    104. Mohamed Hasan Mustafa Alabadilah, 25 years old
    105. Kamil Jihad Kamil Mihna, 19 years old
    106. Mahmoud Saber Hamad Abu Taeemah, 23 years old
    107. Ali Mohamed Ahmed Khafajah, 21 years old
    108. Abdelsalam Yousef Abdelwahab, 39 years old
    109. Mohamed Samir Duwedar, 27 years old
    110. Talal Adel Ibrahim Mattar, 16 years old
    111. Omar Jomaa Abu Ful, 30 years old
    112. Nasser Ahmed Mahmoud Ghrab, 51 years old
    113. Bilal Badeer Hussein Al-Ashram, 18 years old
    114. Unidentified
    115. Unidentified
    116. Unidentified

    –-> https://medium.com/@thepalestineproject/names-and-ages-of-palestinians-killed-by-israeli-troops-in-gaza-29bad3a12db6

  • » Palestinian Dies From Serious Wounds Suffered On March 30th
    IMEMC News | April 9, 2018
    http://imemc.org/article/palestinian-dies-from-serious-wounds-suffered-on-march-30th

    Palestinian medical sources have reported, on Monday morning, that a man who was shot by Israeli army fire on March 30th, in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, has succumbed to his wounds.


    Dr. Ashraf al-Qedra, spokesperson of the Health Ministry in Gaza, identified the Palestinian as Marwan Odah Qdeih , 45, from Khuza’a town, east of Khan Younis, in the southern part of the Gaza Strip.

    He added that his death brings the number of Palestinians who were killed by the Israeli military since the “Great Return March” on March 30th, to thirty Palestinians, (excluding a farmer who was killed on his land that morning), while at least 2860 have been injured, including dozens who suffered serious wounds.

    On the same day of his serious injury, the first day of massive nonviolent protests marking the Palestinian Land Day, the soldiers killed 16 Palestinians, including a farmer who was killed on his land during morning hours, hours before the protests took place.

    On Friday, April 6, one of Marwan’s relatives, identified as Osama Khamis Qdeih, 38, was among seven Palestinians, including one child, who were killed by Israeli forces during protests at the Gaza-Israel border.

    #Palestine_assassinée #marcheduretour

  • » Army Kills Two Palestinians, Injures At least 252, Including Many Who Suffered Serious Wounds, In Gaza
    April 6, 2018 4:50 PM IMEMC News
    http://imemc.org/article/army-kills-one-palestinian-injures-at-least-100-including-five-who-suffered-s

    Israeli soldiers killed, Friday, two Palestinians and injured at least 252 others, including may who suffered life-threatening wounds, and moderate injuries, in several parts of the Gaza Strip, after the army resorted to the excessive use of force against nonviolent protesters.

    The Health Ministry and the Red Crescent in Gaza has confirmed that the soldiers killed Majdi Ramadan Shbat , 38, east of Gaza city.

    In addition that 252 Palestinians were injured by army fire, including many who suffered life-threatening wounds, and serious injuries, in addition to dozens who suffered the severe effects of teargas inhalation.

    Dr. Ashraf al-Qedra, the spokesperson of the Health Ministry in Gaza has confirmed that the soldiers killed Osama Khamis Qdeih , 38, from Abasan al-Kabeera town, east of Khan Younis.


    He added that Qdeih died from serious wounds he suffered after the soldiers shot him with live fire, east of Khan Younis.

    #Palestine_assassinée #marcheduretour

  • Egypt and Sudan: Diplomatic pacification, unresolved affairs | MadaMasr

    https://madamirror.appspot.com/www.madamasr.com/en/2018/03/08/feature/politics/egypt-and-sudan-diplomatic-pacification-unresolved-affairs/?platform=hootsuite

    Quietly and without an official announcement is how Osama Shaltout, Egypt’s ambassador to Sudan, returned to his post in Khartoum on Tuesday. On the same day, Abdel Mahmoud Abdel Halim, Sudan’s ambassador to Egypt, returned to Cairo two months after he was recalled due to tension between the neighboring countries.

    Shaltout spent the better part of two months in Cairo, as the Egyptian government worked to resolve the tension. Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ahmed Abu Zeid told Mada Masr on Wednesday morning that the reason for the ambassador’s stay in Cairo had been to “take part in official meetings.” Abu Zeid also stressed that Cairo did not recall Shaltout, either in response to Khartoum’s January decision or at any point since.

    Although the return of both ambassadors to their respective posts is an indication of the end of the public escalation of tensions, several Egyptian and Western diplomats as well as observers believe that the matters which originally triggered the crisis earlier this year have yet to be settled, even if the restoration of diplomatic relations is a step in the right direction.

    “The kind of escalation we saw in the January [between Sudan and Egypt] was kind of a negotiation being carried out in public, with a ratcheting up of rhetoric that didn’t necessarily match what was happening on the ground,” International Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Analyst Magnus Taylor tells Mada Masr. “Of course, there are some real structural problems in the relationship on the Renaissance Dam, on the Muslim Brotherhood, the border conflict over Halayeb. But I’ve never really seen any of those issues as escalating into a border war or proxy war.”

  • ☆☆ Call for a Global Day of Action 18.02.2018 ☆☆
    Free the Tamimis Campaign calls on allies, comrades and supporters around the world to protest the ongoing incarceration and systematic targeting of members of the Tamimi family and the village of Nabi Saleh.
    ? What can you do on the 18th of February?
    ■ Organize marches and sit-ins in front of the Israeli embassies and consulates.
    ■ Organize vigils in your towns, neighborhoods, and streets.
    ■ Call and email your political representatives and demand they take action.
    ■ Take it to social media and use #FreeTheTamimis

    ➡ For inquiries and support to plan your action, please contact: falastine@freetamimis.info
    Thank you for your support! Free the Tamimis Campaign.

    On Tuesday the 19th of December 2017, 17 year old Ahed Tamimi was arrested from her family home in Nabi Saleh by the Israeli army under the cover of darkness. Ahed is one of over 300 Palestinian children in Israeli military detention. Her mother, Nariman Tamimi was arrested later on the same day when she went to inquire about her daughter. On Thursday the 11th of January 2018, Mohammad Tamimi, Ahed’s cousin, was arrested from his home in Nabi Saleh. 11 days later, his brother Osama was also arrested on his way home from work. All of them remain incarcerated and have been subjected to sleep deprivation, emotional abuse and inhumane interrogation.

    The Tamimi family and the village of Nabi Saleh are targets of a political campaign that aims to crush their resistance to the Israeli settler colonial regime. The Free the Tamimis Campaign calls on Palestine’s allies, comrades and supporters around the world to take action and demand the release of Ahed, Nariman, Mohammad and Osama, as well as all Palestinian prisoners.

  • La police britannique rouvre l’enquête sur le meurtre d’un célèbre caricaturiste palestinien -
    France 24 | Dernière modification : 30/08/2017
    http://www.france24.com/fr/20170830-naji-al-ali-enquete-meurtre-caricature-palestine-royaume-uni

    La police britannique a décidé de rouvrir l’enquête sur l’assassinat de l’un des plus célèbres caricaturistes du monde arabe, Naji al-Ali , trente ans après sa mort.

    Le 22 juillet 1987, à 17 h, l’un des plus célèbres caricaturistes du monde arabe, le Palestinien Naji al-Ali s’effondre sur le trottoir d’Ives Street dans le quartier londonien de Chelsea. Il vient d’être mortellement blessé, touché à bout portant à la tempe par un tireur dont l’identité n’a jamais été découverte. Le dessinateur décèdera le 29 août 1987, après être resté un mois dans le coma.

    Trente ans plus tard, jour pour jour, la police britannique a décidé de rouvrir l’enquête. Elle a vieilli, pour l’occasion, le portrait-robot d’un suspect vu sur les lieux du crime. Les enquêteurs n’ont pas précisé si de nouveaux éléments justifiaient la réouverture de l’affaire. “Les choses changent beaucoup en trente ans ; des allégeances ont pu évoluer et des personnes qui n’avaient pas envie de parler à l’époque sont peut-être prêtes à fournir maintenant des informations cruciales”, a déclaré Dean Haydon, le patron de l’unité de contre-terrorisme de la police de Londres dans un communiqué.(...)

    @gonzo https://seenthis.net/messages/624728

    • La police britannique rouvre l’enquête sur le meurtre du dessinateur Naji Salim Hussain al-Ali
      30 août 2017 – Al-Jazeera – Traduction : Chronique de Palestine
      http://chroniquepalestine.com/police-britannique-rouvre-lenquete-meurtre-dessinateur-naji-sali

      (...) Le Scotland Yard’s Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) a lancé un appel à témoin pour des informations sur un homme armé [sur les lieux du crime] et un second vu plus tard, loin de la scène.

      « Le meurtre brutal de M. Al-Ali a profondément affecté sa famille, et 30 ans après elle continue à souffrir de son absence », a déclaré le responsable du CTC, Dean Haydon.

      « Beaucoup de choses peuvent changer en 30 ans : « Les affiliations changent et les personnes qui ne voulaient pas parler au moment du meurtre peuvent maintenant être prêtes à fournir des informations cruciales. »

      Osama al-Ali, le fils du dessinateur, a qualifié la mort subite de son père de « traumatique ».

      En parlant à Al Jazeera, le fils d’al-Ali a déclaré que des personnes alors influentes ont peut-être caché des informations cruciales pour savoir qui était derrière l’assassinat de son père.

      « Il y avait des gens actifs sur la scène politique à l’époque – qui le sont encore dans une moindre mesure – qui ont des informations qu’ils n’ont pas partagés », a-t-il déclaré.(...)

  • Embassy killings fuel Jordan-Israel tensions
    Osama Al Sharif | Posted July 27, 2017
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/07/jordan-israel-embassy-shooting-tensions-aqsa-clashes.html

    Two days after an Israeli Embassy guard shot and killed two Jordanians on July 23 in what appeared to be an argument over the installation of bedroom furniture at the assailant’s apartment, a talk-show guest on Jordan’s government-run TV station described Israel as “the usurper Zionist entity." Public acrimony against Israel has transcended even the usual scorn often directed at the Jewish state that one can hear on private TV and radio stations and read on social media platforms and local news websites.

    #Jordanie #Ziv

  • 3 Palestinians dead, 1 injured as Israeli officer killed in Jerusalem stabbing
    June 16, 2017 8:06 P.M. (Updated: June 17, 2017 11:40 A.M.)
    http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=777676

    BETHLEHEM (Ma’an) — Israeli police reported on Friday evening that an attack took place outside the Damascus Gate entrance to the Old City of occupied East Jerusalem, saying that one Israeli police officer was critically injured and later succumbed to her wounds, while the three attackers — who police spokesperson Micky Rosenfeld referred to as “Arab terrorists” — were shot dead.

    Israeli news daily Haaretz reported all three Palestinians were shot dead by Israeli police at the scene. Israeli police spokeswoman Luba al-Samri said that the Israeli police officer, a 23-year old woman named Hadas Malka, succumbed to her wounds after being stabbed by one of the attackers, while a number of others were injured in the attack.

    According to Rosenfeld, the attackers used knives and an automatic weapon. Israeli news outlet Ynet reported that the three Palestinians had carried out simultaneous stabbing and shooting attacks in two different areas near Damascus Gate.

    Al-Samri said two of the Palestinians, aged 18 and 19, were from the Ramallah-area villages of Deir Abu Mashal and Shuqba in the central occupied West Bank, and the third was a 30-year-old resident of the southern West Bank city of Hebron. However, reports later emerged that the three Palestinian attackers were all from the village of Deir Abu Mashal in Ramallah, while the Palestinian from Hebron was a bystander who was injured during the incident and taken to a hospital for treatment.

    Rosenfeld reported that following the attack, police units implemented heightened security measures in the area — which had already seen an increased police presence earlier in the day for the third Friday of the holy month of Ramadan, as thousands of Palestinians from across Israel and the occupied West Bank travelled to Jerusalem to perform prayers at Al-Aqsa mosque.

    • Israel rescinds permits, puts Ramallah-area village on lockdown following deadly attack
      June 17, 2017 11:36 A.M. (Updated: June 17, 2017 11:40 A.M.)
      http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=777683

      (...) Israeli forces put Ramallah-area village under lockdown and prepare for punitive demolitions

      Shortly after the attack on Friday night, Israeli forces surrounded Deir Abu Mashal village, northwest of Ramallah city, where the three Palestinian attackers originated, according to Palestinian sources.

      The Palestinian Ministry of Health identified the slain attackers as Adel Hasan Ahmad Ankoush ,18, Baraa Ibrahim Salih Taha , 18, and Osama Ahmad Dahdouh , 19.

      Locals told Ma’an that Israeli forces set up military checkpoints in the village and prevented residents from leaving or entering the area.

      The mayor of Deir Abu Mashal Imad Zahran told Ma’an on Saturday that Israeli forces raided the homes of the three Palestinian youths and took measurements, while Israeli soldiers informed the families that their homes would be demolished soon — an Israeli policy used against family members of Palestinian attacks, which rights groups have deemed a form of “collective punishment.”

      Israeli news daily Haaretz reported that Israel would also revoke Israeli permits for the extended families of the Palestinian attackers.

      Zahran confirmed that “fierce clashes” broke out in the village during the raid, adding that two Palestinians were shot with live ammunition in the legs and another Palestinian was struck with a live bullet. Dozens of Palestinians, he added, suffered from tear gas inhalation during the clashes.
      (...)
      Palestinians injured and detained following the attack

      As reports continue emerge regarding the deadly attack, Palestinians told Ma’an that a number of bystanders were injured and detained by Israeli forces following the attack.

      Several Palestinians were injured by shrapnel from bullets shot by Israeli forces, who witnesses said shot “haphazardly” in every direction during the attack. Among the injured was a young man from Jerusalem who was shot in the spine and kidney, according to witnesses.

      The Palestinian Red Crescent ambulance service told Ma’an that its teams had treated one person who was injured by shrapnel in the foot and three others who suffered from tear gas inhalation after Israeli forces fired tear gas into the crowds.

      Meanwhile, witnesses told Ma’an that Israeli forces and police officers had detained at least six young men following the incident and “assaulted” Palestinian bystanders.

      Israeli forces had detained three Palestinian bystanders near Herod’s Gate in the Old City after allegedly assaulting them, according to witnesses. Israeli forces also fired stun grenades to disperse bystanders and passersby who were exiting through the gate after finishing prayers at Al-Aqsa Mosque.

      Three other Palestinian bystanders were detained in Musrara neighborhood and on Nablus street in East Jerusalem where Israeli forces had also fired stun grenades at Palestinians in the area.

      Meanwhile, all shop owners in Musrara and Sultan Solomon streets near the site of the attack were forced to close their shops following the incident.

      According to witnesses, Israeli forces also stormed the al-Maqasid hospital at the Mount of Olives reportedly in search of a young Palestinian man who was shot in the Damascus Gate area. Witnesses added that Israeli forces were deployed outside the hospital and were inspecting vehicles.

      #Palestine_assassinée

  • Plongée dans la tête des kamikazes

    Après chaque attentat commandité ou inspiré par l’Etat islamique (EI), l’organisation publie un message de revendication exposant ses éléments de langage. Elle y martèle l’idée que ses opérations extérieures constituent une réponse aux bombardements de la " coalition internationale " en Syrie et en Irak, qui fragilisent son assise territoriale et la subsistance même du -" califat " autoproclamé.

    Cette lecture, parfaitement encadrée par ses organes de propagande, constitue l’argument central de l’EI pour légitimer les attentats de Paris, Bruxelles, Manchester ou Londres, et susciter de nouvelles vocations. Mais comment les candidats au martyre intègrent-ils ce mot d’ordre ? Comment justifient-ils auprès de leurs proches le mas-sacre de civils ? Quels sont les ressorts qui les convainquent, in fine, de sacrifier leur vie à cette cause ?

    Le Monde a analysé la façon dont les terroristes de Paris et de Bruxelles avaient justifié leurs missions en confrontant des lettres laissées à leurs proches, les déclarations des rares membres de cette cellule à avoir été interpellés et des éléments de propagande. Entre considérations géopolitiques, impératifs religieux et rêveries mystiques, leurs propos forment un tissu complexe décrivant le processus de fabrication d’un kamikaze.

    Un argumentaire ambigu, dans lequel le " djihad défensif " glisse insensiblement vers sa version offensive, la protection des musulmans désinhibant le désir d’une victoire finale de l’islam contre la " mécréance ". Sur cette base idéologique martelée par la propagande de l’EI se greffent des causes plus intimes : un sentiment de culpabilité qui, transcendé par la promesse d’un au-delà purificateur, achève de les convaincre de consentir au sacrifice ultime.

    Parmi les documents retrouvés par les enquêteurs figurent trois lettres manuscrites adressées par Salah Abdeslam à sa mère, à sa sœur et à sa petite amie. Les policiers ont également exhumé d’un ordinateur des fichiers enregistrés par les frères Ibrahim et Khalid El Bakraoui, qui se sont fait respectivement exploser à l’aéroport de Zaventem et dans le métro de Bruxelles, le 22 mars 2016. Là encore, les kamikazes s’adressent à des femmes : mère, sœur et compagne.

    Le " djihad défensif " : la défense des opprimés

    Le document le plus élaboré de cette correspondance est un enregistrement sonore de trente-trois minutes, réalisé par Ibrahim El Bakraoui, intitulé" Pour ma mère ". Dans ce message posthume, l’aîné de la fratrie anticipe les condamnations de responsables religieux et présente le djihad comme une réponse à l’oppression dont seraient victimes les musulmans.

    " Donc voilà, maman, tu vas entendre tout et n’importe quoi de la part des gens, donc je voudrais clarifier une ou deux situations (…). Il y a des personnes qui ont des barbes de deux mètres, qui connaissent Ie Coran par cœur, voilà, qui pratiquent, euh, l’islam on va dire ça comme ça. Mais ils mentent sur Allah et son Messager (…). Ils vont nous traiter de monstres, euh, de non-musulmans. Malgré qu’on n’a pas de science, malgré qu’on connaît pas le Coran par cœur, On a un cœur qui vit et (…) lorsqu’on voit les musulmans qui sont persécutés depuis des décennies (…) et que ces gens-là n’ont jamais déclaré le djihad dans le sentier d’Allah, mais qu’ils se permettent de critiquer les gens qui combattent, (…) notre rendez-vous avec eux le jour de la résurrection et devant Allah, exalté soit-il, on verra les arguments qu’ils vont avancer. "

    L’engagement djihadiste d’Ibrahim El Bakraoui, tel qu’il l’exprime, trouve son origine dans un sentiment de révolte et d’humiliation. A en croire les déclarations aux enquêteurs d’un de ses complices, Mohamed Abrini, cette colère sourde préexistait à la création de l’EI. " Ce genre de détermination, je l’avais déjà avant quand je voyais le massacre en Palestine ", explique le seul membre du commando à ne pas avoir déclenché sa bombe à l’aéroport de Bruxelles.

    Ce sentiment d’impuissance face aux souffrances des musulmans a atteint son acmé avec le déclenchement de la guerre civile syrienne. Il trouvera concomitamment une issue avec la proclamation du " califat ", le 29 juin 2014, perçu comme une promesse de réparation des humiliations passées.

    Dans son message à sa mère, Ibrahim El Bakraoui présente ainsi l’EI comme un espoir de revanche historique : " Maintenant, nous, gloire à Dieu, depuis des centaines d’années, on a perdu l’Andalousie, on a perdu la Palestine, on a perdu, euh, tous les pays musulmans en fait, l’Afghanistan, l’lrak, la Syrie, le Maroc, il est gouverné par un tyran, la Tunisie, l’Algérie tous les pays, gloire à Dieu, il y a un Etat islamique qui a été créé. "

    Cette fierté retrouvée de l’oumma (la communauté des musulmans), près d’un siècle après l’abolition du dernier califat ottoman, en 1924, Khalid El Bakraoui tente de l’expliquer à son épouse dans une lettre d’adieu manuscrite : " Sache Nawal qu’il y a toujours eu des Etat islamique. Le dernier a été detruit début des annes 1920, mais ensuite les gens ont abandonner le djihad et Allah depuis n’a cesser de nous humilier (…) Mais aujourd’hui nous avons un Etat islamique qui a remporter beaucoup de victoir. "

    Les promesses du nouveau " califat " seront rapidement contrariées, deux mois seulement après sa création, par la formation d’une coalition internationale visant à endiguer sa propagation. Les membres de cette offensive militaire deviennent aussitôt une cible privilégiée de l’EI. A compter de cette date, l’organisation multiplie les appels à frapper les pays occidentaux, au premier rang desquels la France.

    Cette lecture des attentats comme une réponse aux bombardements est développée devant les enquêteurs par Osama Krayem, qui affirme avoir renoncé à la dernière minute à déclencher sa bombe dans le métro de Bruxelles : " Tant qu’il y aura des coalitions et des bombardements contre l’Etat islamique, il y aura des attentats. Il y aura une riposte de la part de l’Etat islamique. Ils ne vont pas offrir des fleurs ou du chocolat ", explique-t-il.

    " Le “djihadisme”, comme vous l’appelez, moi j’appelle cela l’islam ", insiste-t-il, avant de présenter le meurtre d’innocents comme une réponse aux victimes civiles de la coalition : " C’est triste parfois de dire qu’on peut faire la même chose à une population parce que leur gouvernement fait la même chose avec notre population. Les civils en Syrie, ce ne sont pas des combattants. C’est là que l’Etat - islamique - dit : “Œil pour œil et dent pour dent”. "

    Si le nombre de civils tués par la coalition en Irak et en Syrie est impossible à établir de façon précise, il a été estimé par l’ONG indépendante Airwars dans une fourchette comprise entre 3 530 et 5 637 victimes depuis le début de l’intervention, en août 2014. Cette réalité est abondamment exploitée par les cercles djihadistes sur les réseaux sociaux – photos de corps déchiquetés à l’appui – pour justifier la campagne d’attentats visant l’Occident.

    Le djihad " offensif " : la soumission des mécréants

    Cette approche " militaire " du djihad défensif permet aux sympathisants de l’EI de tuer sans remords : ils ne se vivent pas comme des terroristes, mais comme des soldats. A les lire plus en détail, cependant, le mobile affiché de leur combat dérive insensiblement vers une issue plus radicale : la soumission des mécréants.

    C’est là que se glissent toute l’ambiguïté et la perversité de l’idéologie de l’EI. L’argument humanitaire sert à toucher au " cœur " les nouvelles recrues ; la propagande fait ensuite son œuvre pour les transformer en armes de destruction. Dans les lettres laissées par les kamikazes, le sentiment d’une fierté retrouvée des musulmans glisse systématiquement vers un désir de conquête.

    " Donc nous les musulmans, l’islam, c’est une religion de paix, comme ils ne font que le répéter, explique Ibrahim El Bakraoui à sa mère. Mais les musulmans, c’est pas des serpillières. Les musulmans, quand tu leur donnes une claque, ils te donnent pas l’autre joue, au contraire, ils répondent agressivement ", poursuit-il, avant de conclure sur cet avertissement : " Tant que la loi d’Allah elle n’est pas respectée, les musulmans, ils doivent se lancer de toute part et combattre pour l’islam. "

    Il développe ensuite le sentiment profond qui sous-tend son engagement : " Ces gens-là,on doit avoir une haine envers eux parce que ce sont des mécréants. Ils veulent pas croire en Allah (…). Premièrement, on doit les détester, et deuxièmement, on doit leur faire la guerre (…). En fait, une fois qu’on aura le dessus sur eux, là on leur propose les trois conditions : soit ils acceptent l’islam, soit ils payent la jizya - taxe imposée aux gens du Livre - , c’est-à-dire qu’ils s’humilient de leurs propres mains, comme Allah, exalté soit-il, a dit dans le Coran, soit ils nous combattent. "

    L’extension du " djihad défensif " – initialement cantonné à la défense des terres musulmanes – à des attaques visant des pays non musulmans n’a pas toujours été de soi. Cette dérive a longtemps suscité un vif débat au sein de la mouvance djihadiste. Elle a été popularisée par Al-Qaida à la fin des années 1990, avant d’être adoptée et amplifiée par l’EI.

    " La défense des pays musulmans occupés a toujours fait consensus dans la mouvance djihadiste, explique Kévin Jackson, chercheur au Centre d’analyse du terrorisme. Les attentats hors du champ de bataille sont en revanche plus difficiles à justifier d’un point de vue théologique et stratégique, et moins mobilisateurs en termes de recrutement. Les groupes djihadistes ont donc construit toute leur propagande autour du djihad défensif, y compris lorsqu’il s’agit de justifier des attentats dans des pays en paix. "

    Cette exportation du " djihad défensif " vers l’Occident sert aujourd’hui d’alibi à un " djihad offensif " qui ne dit pas son nom, l’objectif affiché de protection de l’islam devant, à terme, mener à sa propagation. Ce glissement a été formalisé par l’EI dans un article intitulé " Pourquoi nous vous haïssons, pourquoi nous vous combattons ", publié par l’organe de propagande Dabiq, en juillet 2016.

    L’article développe son titre en six points. Les trois premiers ont trait à la nature de l’Occident : " Nous vous haïssons, d’abord et avant tout parce que vous êtes des mécréants " ; " Nous vous haïssons parce que vous vivez dans des sociétés libérales et sécularisées qui autorisent ce qu’Allah a interdit " ; " Pour ce qui concerne la frange athée, nous vous haïssons et vous faisons la guerre parce que vous ne croyez pas en l’existence de notre Seigneur ". Les trois points suivants font référence aux actions prêtées à l’Occident : les " crimes contre l’islam ", les " crimes contre les musulmans " et " l’invasion " des terres musulmanes.

    La liste se conclut sur cette clarification : " Ce qu’il est important de comprendre ici, c’est que même si certains assurent que votre politique extérieure est à l’origine de notre haine, cette cause est secondaire, raison pour laquelle nous ne l’exposons qu’en fin de liste. En réalité, même si vous cessez de nous bombarder, de nous emprisonner, de nous torturer, de nous diffamer, de prendre nos terres, nous continuerons à vous détester parce que la cause principale de cette haine ne cessera pas tant que vous n’aurez pas embrassé l’islam. "

    Le ressort psychologique : impuissance et culpabilité

    Ainsi la propagande de l’EI fait-elle insensiblement dériver ses soldats d’un combat humanitaire vers sa finalité totalitaire : l’annihilation de toute altérité. La seule paix envisagée est la Pax islamica. Ce basculement ne séduit cependant qu’une minorité de candidats, mettant en lumière les ressorts psychologiques propres au processus de radicalisation. Une dimension intime évidemment rejetée par les intéressés.

    " Quel était l’état d’esprit des El Bakraoui ?, demande à Osama Krayem la juge belge chargée de l’enquête sur les attentats de Bruxelles.

    – Ce sont des gens ordinaires. D’ailleurs lbrahim me disait que sans cette coalition, ces musulmans qui se font opprimer là-bas, il aurait eu une vie ordinaire avec des enfants. Je crois qu’à un certain moment il a changé de comportement. (…) Khalid El Bakraoui, sa femme, était enceinte. (…) Le terrorisme n’est pas une personnalité, en fait. Vous pouvez lire l’histoire des musulmans, à aucun moment ce sont les musulmans qui ont pris l’initiative d’attaquer ou de faire du mal. "

    Osama Krayem affirme que le terrorisme n’est pas " une personnalité ". Mais qu’est-ce qui a finalement convaincu Ibrahim El Bakraoui de renoncer à sa " vie ordinaire " et son frère Khalid d’abandonner sa femme enceinte pour se faire exploser ? Comme nombre de candidats au djihad, les frères El Bakraoui étaient des délinquants, très éloignés de la religion, avant leur conversion à l’islam radical.

    " Beaucoup de délinquants se sentent en réalité coupables, explique le psychanalyste Fethi Benslama, auteur d’Un furieux désir de sacrifice. Le surmusulman (2016, Seuil). Or, les religions monothéistes jouent sur la culpabilité. En arabe, religion se dit din, qui signifie “dette”. Leur entrée dans le djihad peut atténuer ce sentiment en leur offrant une cause. Il s’opère ensuite ce qu’on pourrait appeler un renversement moral de culpabilité : l’hostilité intérieure se transforme en hostilité extérieure et autorise l’agression d’autrui dans un sentiment de toute-puissance. "

    A travers ses publications, l’EI ne cesse de jouer sur ce ressort à l’intention des musulmans vivant en Occident, leur reprochant de préférer le confort de leur vie matérielle au combat sur le sentier d’Allah. Une culpabilisation qui porte parfois ses fruits : " Maintenant, nous, comment on peut rester chez nous à la maison, manger et boire alors que les musulmans n’ont pas trouvé un morceau de pain, explique Ibrahim El Bakraoui à sa mère. Comment est-ce qu’on peut rester chez nous à la maison en train de dormir, faire comme si de rien n’était ? "

    Devant les enquêteurs, Mohamed Abrini a analysé, avec une distance étonnante, l’évolution de ses amis de quartier qui se sont fait exploser à Paris et à Bruxelles. Il explique comment une réalité perçue – l’injustice faite aux musulmans – s’articule avec des causes plus intimes dans l’engagement djihadiste.

    " Concernant leur changement d’attitude, je pense qu’une chose se passe chez beaucoup de jeunes avec tout ce qui se passe dans le monde. Ces gens-là n’ont jamais prié de leur vie, ils n’ont jamais été à la mosquée et ils ont perdu tout un temps à faire des péchés (…). Quand ilsrentrent dans la religion, pour moi ces gens-là veulent se rattraper. Ils veulent être plus musulmans que les vrais musulmans. Il y en a, ça leur travaille la conscience. Ils voient tous les péchés commis. Et ils savent que le martyre efface tous les péchés à partir de la première goutte de sang qui tombe sur le sol. "

    La voie du martyre : une place au paradis

    Parmi les membres de la cellule des attentats de Paris et Bruxelles, seuls trois candidats au martyre ont renoncé ou ont échoué à se faire exploser : Salah Abdeslam à Paris, Mohamed Abrini à l’aéroport de Zaventem et Osama Krayem dans le métro bruxellois. A en croire ce dernier, c’est leur plus faible religiosité qui serait susceptible d’expliquer ces échecs :

    " Salah Abdeslam et Abrini, ils ne sont pas au même niveau que les frères El Bakraoui, explique-t-il à la juge.

    – Que voulez-vous dire par “pas le même niveau” ?, demande la magistrate.

    – Je parle de la foi. C’est la foi qui pousse les gens à résister. Les gens qui atteignent un certain niveau dans la foi sont prêts à rentrer dans l’ennemi sans peur, et je crois que les frères El Bakraoui y étaient. Salah et Abrini je ne crois pas. Les frères El Bakraoui avaient atteint un certain degré dans la foi et étaient prêts à mourir. "

    Dans son message à sa mère, Ibrahim El Bakraoui évoque, avec force détails, l’histoire d’un compagnon du Prophète tué lors d’une bataille contre les " mécréants ". Ce récit mystique vise à lui faire comprendre que le martyr est " le bien-aimé d’Allah " et gagnera sa place au paradis : " Y a encore plein d’autres compagnons, on pourrait rester des heures à parler d’eux, mais pour que t’as un exemple, Hamza Abou Taleb, on l’appelle le lion d’Allah, Jafar Ibn Abou Taleb, on l’appelle l’homme aux deux ailes. Allah, exalté soit-il, va le doter de deux ailes au paradis car il a perdu ses deux bras dans une bataille et ainsi de suite, on en a plein, je te jure, on a en plein. "

    Si Salah Abdeslam ne s’est pas fait exploser à Paris, les trois lettres découvertes dans une planque du quartier bruxellois de -Forest, le 15 mars 2016, attestent de son intention de mourir en martyr. Nettement moins élaborés que ceux des frères El Bakraoui, ses courriers sont empreints d’un mysticisme rudimentaire. A sa sœur, il -explique que " cette vie d’ici-bas est un test " visant à départager le croyant, promis au paradis, de l’incroyant, voué à l’enfer : " Comment pourrai-je échanger cette vie d’ici-bas contre l’au-delà ? Le paradis est meilleur ", conclut-il.

    La lettre adressée à sa mère, longue de deux pages, comporte dix-sept mentions du mot " Allah "ou " Dieu " : " Si tu crois au destin tu comprendras qu’Allah m’a guidée et choisie parmi ses serviteurs, écrit-il. Dieu a acheté des croyants, leur personne et leurs biens, en échange du paradis (…) Allah dit aussi : “Et ne dites pas de ceux qui sont morts dans le sentier d’Allah qu’ils sont morts, au contraire ils sont vivants mais vous en êtes -inconscients.” J’ai moi aussi pris ce chemin car il est celui de la Vérité. Qui s’en écarte aura pour refuge l’enfer. "

    La peur de l’enfer apparaît ici comme un levier décisif du passage à l’acte : c’est en payant de sa vie que le martyr s’acquitte de sa " dette " (" Dieu a acheté des croyants ") et accède à l’au-delà. Par son sacrifice, l’ancien pécheur devient l’élu. Loin de se réduire à un nihilisme, le djihadisme est une aspiration inquiète : le kamikaze ne désire pas tant le néant qu’une autre vie, augmentée, soulagée de l’angoisse du châtiment. En traversant une mort qui n’est qu’apparente, il accède à la " vérité ".

    Soren Seelow

    http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/06/07/dans-la-tete-des-kamikazes_5139774_3224.html?h=11

  • Plongée dans la tête des kamikazes
    http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/06/07/dans-la-tete-des-kamikazes_5139774_3224.html?h=11

    Le Califat, promesse de réparation historique

    Ce sentiment d’impuissance face aux souffrances des musulmans a atteint son acmé avec le déclenchement de la guerre civile syrienne. Il trouvera concomitamment une issue avec la proclamation du « califat », le 29 juin 2014, perçu comme une promesse de réparation des humiliations passées.

    Dans son message à sa mère, Ibrahim El Bakraoui présente ainsi l’EI comme un espoir de revanche historique : « Maintenant, nous, gloire à Dieu, depuis des centaines d’années, on a perdu l’Andalousie, on a perdu la Palestine, on a perdu, euh, tous les pays musulmans en fait, l’Afghanistan, l’lrak, la Syrie, le Maroc, il est gouverné par un tyran, la Tunisie, l’Algérie tous les pays, gloire à Dieu, il y a un Etat islamique qui a été créé. »

    Cette fierté retrouvée de l’oumma (la communauté des musulmans), près d’un siècle après l’abolition du dernier califat ottoman, en 1924, Khalid El Bakraoui tente de l’expliquer à son épouse dans une lettre d’adieu manuscrite : « Sache Nawal qu’il y a toujours eu des Etat islamique. Le dernier a été detruit début des annes 1920, mais ensuite les gens ont abandonner le djihad et Allah depuis n’a cesser de nous humilier (…) Mais aujourd’hui nous avons un Etat islamique qui a remporter beaucoup de victoir. »

    « Pourquoi nous vous haïssons »

    Cette exportation du « djihad défensif » vers l’Occident sert aujourd’hui d’alibi à un « djihad offensif » qui ne dit pas son nom, l’objectif affiché de protection de l’islam devant, à terme, mener à sa propagation. Ce glissement a été formalisé par l’EI dans un article intitulé « Pourquoi nous vous haïssons, pourquoi nous vous combattons », publié par l’organe de propagande Dabiq, en juillet 2016.

    L’article développe son titre en six points. Les trois premiers ont trait à la nature de l’Occident : « Nous vous haïssons, d’abord et avant tout parce que vous êtes des mécréants » ; « Nous vous haïssons parce que vous vivez dans des sociétés libérales et sécularisées qui autorisent ce qu’Allah a interdit » ; « Pour ce qui concerne la frange athée, nous vous haïssons et vous faisons la guerre parce que vous ne croyez pas en l’existence de notre Seigneur ». Les trois points suivants font référence aux actions prêtées à l’Occident : les « crimes contre l’islam », les « crimes contre les musulmans » et « l’invasion » des terres musulmanes.

    La liste se conclut sur cette clarification : « Ce qu’il est important de comprendre ici, c’est que même si certains assurent que votre politique extérieure est à l’origine de notre haine, cette cause est secondaire, raison pour laquelle nous ne l’exposons qu’en fin de liste. En réalité, même si vous cessez de nous bombarder, de nous emprisonner, de nous torturer, de nous diffamer, de prendre nos terres, nous continuerons à vous détester parce que la cause principale de cette haine ne cessera pas tant que vous n’aurez pas embrassé l’islam. »
    Le ressort psychologique : impuissance et culpabilité

    Ainsi la propagande de l’EI fait-elle insensiblement dériver ses soldats d’un combat humanitaire vers sa finalité totalitaire : l’annihilation de toute altérité. La seule paix envisagée est la pax islamica. Ce basculement ne séduit cependant qu’une minorité de candidats, mettant en lumière les ressorts psychologiques propres au processus de radicalisation. Une dimension intime évidemment rejetée par les intéressés.

    « Quel était l’état d’esprit des EI Bakraoui ?, demande à Osama Krayem la juge belge chargée de l’enquête sur les attentats de Bruxelles.

    – Ce sont des gens ordinaires. D’ailleurs lbrahim me disait que sans cette coalition, ces musulmans qui se font opprimer là-bas, il aurait eu une vie ordinaire avec des enfants. Je crois qu’à un certain moment il a changé de comportement. (…) Khalid El Bakraoui, sa femme était enceinte. (…) Le terrorisme n’est pas une personnalité, en fait. Vous pouvez lire l’histoire des musulmans, à aucun moment ce sont les musulmans qui ont pris l’initiative d’attaquer ou de faire du mal. »

    Osama Krayem affirme que le terrorisme n’est pas « une personnalité ». Mais qu’est-ce qui a finalement convaincu Ibrahim El Bakraoui de renoncer à sa « vie ordinaire » et son frère Khalid d’abandonner sa femme enceinte pour se faire exploser ? Comme nombre de candidats au djihad, les frères El Bakraoui étaient des délinquants, très éloignés de la religion, avant leur conversion à l’islam radical.

    « Beaucoup de délinquants se sentent en réalité coupables, explique le psychanalyste Fethi Benslama, auteur d’Un furieux désir de sacrifice. Le surmusulman (2016, Seuil). Or, les religions monothéistes jouent sur la culpabilité. En arabe, religion se dit din, qui signifie “dette”. Leur entrée dans le djihad peut atténuer ce sentiment en leur offrant une cause. Il s’opère ensuite ce qu’on pourrait appeler un renversement moral de culpabilité : l’hostilité intérieure se transforme en hostilité extérieure et autorise l’agression d’autrui dans un sentiment de toute- puissance. »

    #djihadisme #EI #Al-Queda #psychologie #impérialisme

    http://zinc.mondediplo.net/messages/68962 via BoOz

  • Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam – Mark Curtis
    http://markcurtis.info/2015/12/17/britains-collusion-with-radical-islam

    Britain’s contribution to the rise of the terrorist threat goes well beyond the impacts its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have had on some individuals. The more important story is that British governments, both Labour and Conservative, have, in pursuing the so-called ‘national interest’ abroad, colluded for decades with radical Islamic forces, including terrorist organisations. They have connived with them, worked alongside them and sometimes trained and financed them, in order to promote specific foreign policy objectives. Governments have done so in often desperate attempts to maintain Britain’s global power in the face of increasing weakness in key regions of the world, being unable to unilaterally impose their will and lacking other local allies. Thus the story is intimately related to that of Britain’s imperial decline and the attempt to maintain influence in the world.

    With some of these radical Islamic forces, Britain has been in a permanent, strategic alliance to secure fundamental, long-term foreign policy goals; with others, it has been a temporary marriage of convenience to achieve specific short-term outcomes. The US has been shown by some analysts to have nurtured Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida, but Britain’s part in fostering Islamist terrorism is invariably left out of these accounts, and the history has never been told. Yet this collusion has had more impact on the rise of the terrorist threat than either Britain’s liberal culture or the inspiration for jihadism provided by the occupation of Iraq.

  • The Manchester Bombing as Blowback: The latest evidence
    https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/the-manchester-bombing-as-blowback-the-latest-evidence-83ec2127801d

    In summary, the evidence so far shows that there are six inter-related aspects of blowback:

    1. Salman Abedi and his father were members of a Libyan dissident group — the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) — covertly supported by the UK to assassinate Qadafi in 1996. At this time, the LIFG was an affiliate of Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and LIFG leaders had various connections to this terror network.

    2. Members of the LIFG were facilitated by the British ‘security services’ to travel to Libya to fight Qadafi in 2011. Both Salman Abedi and his father, Ramadan, were among those who travelled to fight at this time (although there is no evidence that their travel was personally facilitated or encouraged by the security services).