region:us middle east

  • http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=227633&cid=31&fromval=1&frid=31&seccatid=91&s1=1

    Looking at the obscene photograph of old archeologist Khaled al-Asaad’s headless corpse tied to a lamp-post in Palmyra – another image for the library of pornography that Isis produces weekly – I was struck by how deeply the “Islamic Caliphate” has stabbed the world of journalism. I’m not just talking about the reporters it has murdered or of poor John Cantlie, whose videos from inside “Caliphate territory” is a “Thousand and One Nights” saga of Scherezade-style stories, each allowing him another day of life. In fact, Cantlie’s furious objections to the US and UK governments’ refusal to talk to Isis to save the lives of hostages are valid, not least when the Americans can release Taliban prisoners in exchange for one of their own.

    No. I’m talking of the insidious, dramatic yet almost unnoticed way in which Isis and its propagandists in the Caliphate’s movie business – and in its house magazine Dabiq – have invalidated and in many ways erased one of the prime duties of journalism: to tell “the other side of the story”. Since the Second World War, we journos have generally tried to explain the “why” as well as the “who” behind the story. If we failed after 9/11 – when the political reasons behind this crime against humanity would have necessitated an examination of US Middle East policy and our support for Israel and Arab dictators – we’ve sometimes held our ground when it comes to “terror”.

    (...)

    Isis has changed all this. The Express has exhausted its dictionary of revulsion on Isis. “Bloodthirsty”, “sick”, “twisted”, “depraved”, “sadistic”, “vile” – we can only hope that nothing more horrible emerges to further test the paper’s eloquence. Isis – in videos and online – proudly publishes its throat-cuttings and massacres. It revels in the mass shooting of prisoners, videotapes a pilot burning alive in a cage and prisoners tied in a car which is used as target practice for a rocket-propelled grenade. It depicts captives having their heads blown off with explosives or trapped in another cage while being slowly drowned in a swimming pool. Isis is turning to the world of journalism and saying: “We’re not bloodthirsty, sick and depraved, we’re worse than that!”

    And we can – we must – spend far more time investigating the links between Isis and their Islamist and rebel friends (Nusrah, Jaish al-Islam, even the near-non-existent Free Syria Army) and the Saudis and Qataris and Turks, and indeed the degree to which US weapons have been sent across the border of Syria almost directly into Isis hands. Why does Isis never attack Israel – indeed, why does its hatred of Crusaders and Shias and Christians and sometimes Jews rarely if ever mention the very word “Israel”? And why do Israel’s air raids on Syria always target Syrian government or pro-Syrian Iranian forces, but never Isis? Indeed, why are Turkey’s air assaults on Isis – happily supported by Nato – far outnumbered by their air raids on the Kurdish PKK, some of whose forces in Syria are fighting Isis? And how come the Turkish press have publicised a convoy of weapons being taken across the Syrian border to Isis by Turkish intelligence agents? Are Turkish engineers running the Isis-controlled oil wells, as Syrian oil engineers claim? And why did the Isis propaganda boys wait until this month before denouncing – via a pretty lowly Caliphate official – Turkish President Erdogan, calling him “Satan” and urging Turks to rise up against his government?

    *It’s not the violence in Isis videos and Dabiq we should be concentrating on. It’s what the Isis leadership don’t talk about, don’t condemn, don’t mention upon which we should cast our suspicious eye. But that, of course, also means asking some questions of Turkey, America, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Israel.$ Are we up to this? Or are we going to let Isis stop us at last from carrying out one of the first duties of our trade – reporting the “other side of the story”?

    #daesh #isil #Etat_islamique

  • Sunni Alliances Trump Obama Administration Terrorism Concerns in Syria
    http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/31266-sunni-alliances-trump-obama-administration-terrorism-concerns-in-sy

    The government of Qatar and some in al-Nusra itself had hoped to placate Washington by rebranding the al-Qaeda affiliate as a nationalist resistance organization that is separate from al-Qaeda and interested in ousting the Assad regime only. But that ruse has now collapsed, and the Obama administration has still made no move to demand that its allies shut down their support for al-Nusra.

    And therein lies a key to understanding the real dynamics governing US Middle East policy: The policy makers regard the alliances and the US military bases located in the Sunni states as more important than the threat they have helped to create.

    • Honnêtement je ne suis pas trop convaincu par l’explication de Gareth Porter.

      Ici l’"allié sunnite" Erdogan se plaint :
      Turkey’s Erdogan says West backing Kurdish terrorists in Syria | Reuters
      http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/11/us-syria-crisis-turkey-erdogan-idUSKBN0OR11620150611

      Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan accused the West on Thursday of bombing Arabs and Turkmens in Syria while supporting Kurdish “terrorist” groups he said were filling the void left behind.

      Il me semble qu’il s’agit plus pour les #Etats-Unis de couper toute tête qui dépasse.

    • @kassem : Vous avez raison, donc je vais essayer de préciser mon appréciation.
      Le tableau général de la position américaine actuelle avec le rappel des faits récents, et de ses relations ambivalentes avec ses « alliés », sur fond de négociation avec l’Iran, m’a paru intéressant. D’autant qu’une analyse approfondie sur les raisons qui amènent à ce rééquilibrage périlleux des alliances - un peu plus d’Iran, mais pas trop - est rarement faite.
      D’accord, par contre, pour dire que la thèse de GP qui cherche à expliquer la position américaine de soutien à la « rébellion » par le fait qu’ils dépendent des bases de ses alliés « sunnites » est un peu courte. D’autant que dans la région, il y a tout de même un autre allié que les Etats « sunnites » qui a, lui, autrement plus de poids pour influencer la définition de la politique étrangère US...

    • U.S. Counter-Terrorism and the Saudi-Turkish-Israeli Strategic Alliance to Overthrow Assad (1/2)
      http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=14044

      I would say that there are really two major kinds of forces that are sort of sucking the Obama administration into precisely this situation. And one of them is [...] that the Israelis and the other, the Sunni allies of the United States in the Middle East on whom we rely for military bases, the access to military bases in that region, as well as in the case of the Saudis for a huge bonanza of arms trade, arms sales, which add up to hundreds of million—excuse me, hundreds of billions of dollars over the next couple of decades. This is a very powerful set of interests that incline the U.S. national security state to go along with this.

      But on the second interest, I think, the second situation that does impel the Obama administration that direction, is that Obama definitely does not want the United States military to go to war in, against Isis or al-Nusra on the ground. And he’s inclined to say to the Sunni states, well, if you want to fight it out with these people in Syria then go ahead. So he’s kind of washing his hands of the outcome in Syria in that regard, it appears to me.

  • Kerry-Lavrov Agreement | Al Akhbar English
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/angry-corner/kerry-lavrov-agreement

    US Middle East policy is now fully and squarely in the hands of Likud Zionists (and that applies to Democrats and Republicans in Capitol Hill and in the White House). The dithering of Obama reflected the debate about US role in Syria in … Israel. The Israelis were not sure on the best course of action, and Obama dutifully reflected that uncertainty. But now it seems Obama has settled on a US policy toward Syria: The war would go on, endlessly and indefinitely, provided all weapons that could pose a danger to Israel be removed from Syria.

    The Syrian regime obliged. The main focus of the Syrian regime has always been one of self-preservation, regardless whether that is expressed in a friendly or hostile way toward Israel. A regime that spoke in the past of a “strategic balance” with Israel (and that was purely a reference to chemical weapons because the Syrian military degenerated since the collapse of the Soviet Union and since the Saudi royal family stopped subsidizing the Syrian military), is more than willing to assure Israel that it intends to take no hostile action toward it. The Syrian regime basically pledged to direct its fire against the Syrian armed groups, and the US could not be happier.

    The debate in Washington was never about the Syrian people. It has always been (as it always is in such cases) about Israel and what is best for Israel. The US Congress often considers the interests of Israel before even considering the interests of the US because the US public does not care one way or another, and a mere 3 or 4% of the public actually follow foreign policy.