• Rercherche, arts et pratiques numériques #31 : Nouvelles écritures indisciplinées
    https://www.antiatlas.net/rapn-31-2

    Lundi 8 février 2021 14h-17h Maison des astronomes IMéRA, 2 place Le Verrier Pour accéder à la visioconférence, veuillez vous … Continuer la lecture de « Rercherche, arts et pratiques numériques #31 : Nouvelles écritures indisciplinées » L’article Rercherche, arts et pratiques numériques #31 : Nouvelles écritures indisciplinées est apparu en premier sur antiAtlas des frontières.

  • #L'espace_d'un_instant #3
    http://liminaire.fr/entre-les-lignes/article/l-espace-d-un-instant-3

    « La grande révélation n’était jamais arrivée. En fait, la grande révélation n’arrivait peut-être jamais. C’était plutôt de petits miracles quotidiens, des illuminations, allumettes craquées à l’improviste dans le noir ; en voici une. » Vers le phare, Virginia Woolf Buenos Aires, Argentine : 17:48 Dans un café, au milieu d’une conversation animée entre amis, un détail attire ton attention et te distrait. C’est un rayon de soleil. Une tâche de lumière sur un vieux mur. Une note juste dans une cacophonie de (...) #Entre_les_lignes / #Écriture, #Cinéma, #Photographie, #Récit, L’espace d’un instant, #Temps, #Mémoire, #Sensation

  • #Saint-Nazaire : #rassemblement de soutien suite aux expulsions de Géronimo
    https://fr.squat.net/2021/01/10/saint-nazaire-rassemblement-de-soutien-suite-aux-expulsions-de-geronimo

    Lundi 11 janvier 2021 à 16:00, rassemblement sur la place François Blancho, devant la mairie de Saint-Nazaire, suite à l’expulsion jeudi 7 janvier à 9h des logements occupés depuis septembre 2020 au 33 rue Émile Littré. Les 10 habitant.e.s restant.e.s de #La_maison_Géronimo se sont retrouvées à la rue sans que des solutions d’hébergement […]

    #33_rue_Émile_Littre #Collectif_Géronimo #expulsion

  • Communauté mon amour #3 nous vieillirons ensemble ? | On n’est pas des cadeaux
    http://www.radiorageuses.net/spip.php?article1197

    Un dernier volet pour cette trilogie communauté mon amour, après « pété-e-s du casque » et « de temps en temps il faut vider les seaux », nous vieillirons ensemble ? vient poser des questions autour du vieillissement et de la transmission dans nos communautés. Comment on tient sur le long terme dans cette communauté ? Qu’est-ce qu’on partage quand on vieillit ? Durée : 59 min. Source : Radio Canut via Radiorageuses

    https://onpdc.poivron.org/2020/pdk-11-12-20-viellir.mp3

  • Florian Philippot : débat hallucinant face à un Macroniste sur Cnews ! (Vaccin, 3è vague,...)
    https://www.crashdebug.fr/florian-philippot-debat-hallucinant-face-a-un-macroniste-sur-cnews-vaccin

    Un peu d’espoir dans ce monde de malades, c’est bien au moins ça discute et philippot à fait un sans fautes.

    http://les-patriotes.fr/jadhere 🇫🇷

    (Pour rappel, Les Patriotes, nouvelle formation politique, ne bénéficient d’AUCUN soutien financier public ni d’aucun soutien bancaire. Ils vivent exclusivement des adhérents et donateurs.)

    ♦️FAIRE UN DON AUX PATRIOTES :

    http://les-patriotes.fr/don

    🇫🇷 ♦️SIGNER LA PÉTITION :

    https://les-patriotes.fr/petition-vac...

    ♦️ACHETER MON NOUVEAU LIVRE : https://les-patriotes.fr/livre-loliga...

    #Vaccin #CouvreFeu #31décembre

    Source : Youtube.com

    Informations complémentaires (...)

  • #Toulouse : opération de police au #PUM
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/12/09/toulouse-operation-de-police-au-pum

    Ce mardi 8 décembre à 6h un gros dispositif de police défonce la porte du PUM pour embarquer 2 personnes et leurs camions. Nous voyons à l’exterieur une dizaine de camions de CRS, plusieurs voitures d’OPJ et d’autres unités difficilement identifiables. Ils sont cagoulés et armés, une cinquantaine environ se balladent dans le batiment. Selon […]

    #30-34_Rue_Émile_Brouardel #perquisition

  • #Montreuil (93) : les AG du Marbré continuent
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/12/06/montreuil-93-les-ag-du-marbre-continuent

    Présentation du Marbré et appel à AG publique tous les dimanches à 14h, au #39_rue_des_Deux_Communes, à Montreuil. Le Marbré s’est fait connaître suite à la visite des flics et du gestionnaire immobilier le 16 septembre 2020. Beaucoup de personnes ont répondu à l’appel à soutien ce jour-là et les suivants, et ça […]

    #gentrification #Le_Marbré #Seine-Saint-Denis

  • Bats ta femme, l’Etat s’occupe de sa rentabilité
    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/marcuss/blog/231120/bats-ta-femme-l-etat-s-occupe-de-sa-rentabilite


    L’État avance toujours davantage dans le chemin de l’ignominie. Le dispositif « 3919 » est sur le point d’être vendu au marché public. Alors que les mouvements féministes ont porté à l’ordre du jour les violences exercées contre les femmes, le gouvernement veut condamner le numéro d’appel d’urgence aux logiques marchandes et à ses valeurs de rentabilité.

  • Trans*PD*Gouines en shorts !
    https://www.nova-cinema.org/prog/2020/180-pink-screens/cloture/article/trans-pd-gouines-en-shorts

    •+ Il trasloco Werther Germondari & Maria Laura Spagnoli, 2019, IT, HD, vo , 3’ •+ Chants d’amour Lamathilde, 2020, CA, HD, vo fr , 3’ •+ Foodgasm #1 #2 #3 Florence Freitag, 2019, DE, HD, st fr & ang, 3’ •+ Vaginas Andreia Dobrota, 2020, NL, HD, , 1’ •+ Sangro Tiago Minamisawa, Bruno H Castro & Guto, 2019, BR, HD, vo , 7’ •+ Dejarse crecer el cuerpo Andrea Gudiño Sosa, 2018, MX, HD, vo , 4’ •+ Divine Lust Anthony de Bono, 2020, DE, HD, vo fr , 10’ •+ TFG – Swallow Sperm Khloaris, 2020, US, HD, vo , 4’ •+ Coffee and Love Schnater, 2020, HD, sans dial, , 2’ •+ Not Your Ordinary Sister Masa Zia Lenardic Anja Wutej, 2019, HD, vo st fr, 8’ •+ Man (...)

  • The worst national security corruption case in Israel’s history
    Akiva Eldar, Gilead Sher, Uzi Arad | Nov. 17, 2020 | 12:37 PM - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-the-worst-national-security-corruption-case-in-israel-s-history-1.

    “Case 3000” – the submarines and war ships affair – is not just another “ordinary” corruption scandal, which relates primarily to unethical practices. Rather, It is Grand Corruption combined with Defense Corruption, both having severe legal implications.

    Grand Corruption is defined as a scheme perpetrated at the highest levels of government, involving leaders and senior officials. It usually entails substantial benefits for the individuals involved and significant losses for the state. It also leads to illicit exchanges in the realm of policy formation. Such corruption causes egregious harm to citizens but regrettably often ends with impunity.

    The common denominator to all transactions in Case 3000 is that they all belong to the defense sector involving the acquisition of major weapon systems. The suspects in the affair are senior officials in the Prime Minister’s Office, relatives of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as senior naval officers. All the acquisitions lead to the German Thyssenkrupp conglomerate.

    In several of these transactions, Netanyahu took decisions which contradicted the official stance of the military and defense establishment. The decision-making process undermined the binding procedure for strategic and defense procurement.

    One such decision related to the acquisition of a sixth submarine shortly after the defense establishment had determined that five submarines should suffice Israel’s military needs. The second decision dealt with the accelerated ordering of future submarines, 7, 8 and 9, despite opposition from the IDF chief of the general staff and the defense establishment who claimed such ordering is premature.

    Then there was another Netanyahu decision to wave Israeli opposition to the supply of advanced German submarines to Egypt, while concealing that decision from the defense establishment. Such supply apparently gave rise to the consideration of Israel purchasing anti-submarine vessels, something the Israel Navy never demanded – ostensibly to defend the sea lanes from the growing Egyptian submarine fleet.

    On top of it, was the distorted decision process to acquire four patrol boats to protect Israel’s economic waters? How come such large, heavy and expensive craft were ordered from Thyssenkrupp, when boats that meet operational requirements as defined could have been acquired from another supplier and at lower cost? Why was the international bidding process canceled, with Thyssenkrupp becoming sole supplier of these boats?

    How was the location of the main natural gas rig approved near the coast, without a comprehensive mandatory security risks assessment, which would have revealed that the site chosen was wrong in terms of security and safety? And finally, what lied behind the idea of privatizing Israel’s navy’s shipyards, in contradiction to the fundamental principle of Israeli self-reliance – for the sake of giving exclusivity to Thyssenkrupp?

    This is how the Israel Police summed up its investigation: “Deficiencies were found in matters relating to administrative procedures in various agencies, relating to strategic defense procurement for the State of Israel. Such deficiencies require that authorized bodies learn their lessons and draw the appropriate conclusions, to improve the defense procurement procedures, render them more efficient, and protect them from extraneous interests and inappropriate influences.”

    So why did the police confine itself only to pointing out the defects, which were exceptional in their scope and severity, without looking into the suspicions of security offences having been noticed by the investigation? Why did the Attorney General claim that the only criminal offences that should be investigated are those related solely to unethical behavior, and has not to-date allowed an investigation into the far more serious criminal offences in the realm of state security, foreign relations and official secrets? After all, the damages caused by such security offenses are often large-scale and the punishment accordingly heavier.

    Yet the Attorney General excluded, at the very outset, Netanyahu from the circle of suspects under investigation, and asserted – without there being any basis for such an assertion at that preliminary stage, as there isn’t one to this day – that Netanyahu is still not even a suspect in the whole affair. This disputed decision, taken by Israel’s chief prosecutor, has never been explained to the public.

    The AG himself said recently that disturbing materials had been brought to his attention, and that “the evidentiary material conveyed to me regarding the patrol boat transactions includes weighty claims, from senior and highly experienced officials in the public establishment … On the face of it, the claims show conduct that does not meet the proper standards of a public authority dealing with a matter of such importance to the national interests of the State of Israel.”

    And despite these very harsh statements, we still know of no process of clarification, examination, inquiry or investigation of the security offences committed under Case 3000, either by the Israel Police or even by the defense establishment. In the past, Israelis have been prosecuted on suspicion of undermining the state’s secrets, defined as serious espionage, harming military supplies or the country’s foreign relations, and some were prosecuted and sentenced – for committing far, far less severe crimes than what has been published to date as defense related violations in this case.

    Israel’s policy toward the German supply of submarines to Egypt was a particularly well-kept secret, and the prime minister himself explained that the reason for the unprecedented exclusion of defense establishment regarding these submarines was by itself a “secret.” Yet, the police investigation has revealed that non-official civilians among those suspected in the affair knew about Netanyahu’s secret approval for selling the submarines to Egypt – even before senior officials in the IDF and the defense establishment learned about it.

    Clearly the flow of top secret security and diplomatic information among suspects involved is no less serious than the flow of suspected money transfer. Prima Facie, the legal definition of such acts, in Israel’s Criminal Law, is “severe espionage.” No less. And the police investigation has explicitly stated some of the suspects were tasked with collecting and passing on of information, evidently classified, connected to the various weapons deals.

    It goes without saying that providing additional German attack submarines to Egypt poses a greater threat than there is now to shipping lanes, leading to and from Israel, places a heavier burden on its forces and adversely affecting its preparedness. That is certainly the reason for the defense establishment’s opposition to giving consent to this transaction. Top officials, former heads of the IDF General Staff and the Shin Bet security service, have described the actions undertaken in connection with the sale of German submarines to Egypt as seriously tainted – to the point of “treason.”

    Any Israeli acquisition of submarines, or patrol or anti-submarine craft, beyond what the army needs based on its multiyear plan, will come at the expense of weapon systems it considers of higher priority .Hence, a net detraction from the country’s military capability. But the greatest damage to Israeli future security stems from the corruption risk that has emerged out of the scandal and puts in jeopardy of the future supply of submarines 7, 8 and 9, which are meant to serve as a pillar of Israel’s future deterrent.

    The 2017 Israeli-German Memorandum of Understanding includes a clause that permits the German government to reconsider the deal for future submarines in the event that any elements of corruption are revealed. This new corruption risk caused by Israelis involved in the transactions, some of them subordinates and confidants of the Prime Minister, allegedly places on them a heavy responsibility, possibly criminal...

    Israel’s involvement in Egypt’s acquisition of submarines from Thyssenkrupp caused tension in relations between Israel and Egypt, and demanded that Jerusalem find ways to calm the anger in Cairo. The cancellation of the international tender for the patrol boats damaged relations with South Korea, and required compensation from Israel. And of course, the prosecution of Israelis accused of corruption in connection with ThyssenKrupp have cast a shadow over Israel-German relations, including relations between the German Chancellor and the Israeli Prime Minister.

    Article 5 of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials reads as follows: “Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall be subject to the applicable rules and principles of each Party … and shall not be influenced by considerations of … the potential effect upon relations with another state.”

    As a member of the OECD, Israel is committed to complying with this convention. In the event that it does not carry out the investigation of this Grand Corruption security affair to the point of prosecution, for reasons of foreign relations, it will find itself in noncompliance of the above-mentioned article. This in itself will damage Israel’s renowned rule of law and standing as a law-abiding country that fights corruption.

    In light of the widespread public call for a government commission of inquiry into Case 3000, the delay in forming it can be described as highly unreasonable. The findings prove that this is the most severe, -security corruption Israel has had. Allegedly, excluding the prime minister from the investigation at the outset, and neglecting criminal security offenses, are also unreasonable in terms of law and national security.
    This affair must be thoroughly investigated, with all its ramifications and consequences, with no further delay – if only to prevent a future recurrence.

    Prof. Uzi Arad served as National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the National Security Council, and as the Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Mossad’s Director of Intelligence.

    Col. (res.) Gilead Sher, an attorney, served as Chief of Staff and Policy Coordinator to former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and as a senior Israeli negotiator. He served recently as visiting professor at Georgetown University.

    Akiva Eldar, a political analyst, previously Haaretz columnist and editorial writer.

    #corruption #3000

  • L’Oreille Électrique | pali meursault
    http://palimeursault.net/oreille.html

    L’Oreille Électrique est une série de de conférences radiophoniques. L’objectif est de développer une anthropologie critique des pratiques de prise de son, en étudiant les conditionnements culturels et technologiques des médiations, et la manière dont les arts sonores se saisissent de ces problématiques. Épisode #1 : Phonographies, une rapide histoire de l’inscription sonore - Épisode #2 : Soundscapes, l’invention du paysage sonore - Épisode #3 : Pour qui joue le Grand Orchestre Animal ? Source : ∏-Node

    http://palimeursault.net/Oreille1.mp3

  • Episode #31 - Goood Morning Web avec François Houste
    https://www.gooodmorningweb.fr/episodes/episode_2020_31

    Episode #31
    Ce matin, René Cotton, Bertrand Demarcq, Cyrièle Piancastelli et Jérôme Neuvéglise nous parlent :
    de Mikrodystopies avec François Houste 🤖
    des écrans pliable chez Apple 📱
    de l’API de Tesla 🚘
    des annonces d’Oxfam 💰
    et du rachat de Carfully 🚗

    #François_Houste #Mikrodystopies

  • RETRACTED — Le féminisme & la théorie de l’évolution (Peggy Sastre) TeL#35

    Emission retirée de la playlist principale car des doutes trop importants s’accumulent sur les méthodes et les valeurs de l’invitée qui s’adonne à une forme de harcèlement de notre équipe depuis des années pour nous accuser de tomber dans l’idéologie, c’est-à-dire toute prise de position qui ne s’aligne pas avec l’idéologie de Peggy Sastre.
    Nous n’avions pas conscience à l’époque que PS était avant tout en mission idéologique sous un alibi scientifique, ce qui nous a empêché de réagir comme nous aurions dû le faire. En conséquence la diffusion de ce programme tel quel est incompatible avec notre mission, elle ne répond pas aux critères de qualité minimale que nous devons honorer.

    Retracted = dans le monde scientifique, quand le ou les auteurs comprennent que l’article repose sur des données fausses ou fragiles, qu’un vice quelconque entache la manifestation du vrai, la rétractation est une mesure appropriée.

    --Communication PERSONNELLE— par Acermendax (extrait)
    Version complète ici : https://www.youtube.com/post/UgzXO1VN...

    L’émission n’est plus en accès libre sur notre chaîne. Je n’ai plus confiance dans son contenu, je suis gêné de la tribune que cette vidéo offre à une personne qui est devenue franchement hostile à notre travail et s’avère même incarner des valeurs qui nous sont étrangères. J’ai honte des comportements trollesques de cette dame et des réactions inappropriées que cela provoque depuis l’enregistrement de cette vidéo.

    Nous sommes contre toutes les instrumentalisations idéologiques de la science, raison pour laquelle certains acharnés nous dépeignent en sympathisants de l’extrême droite tandis que d’autres accablés nous reprochent d’être des intersectionnels endiablés jusque sur mon mur Facebook personnel. Nous sommes la cible d’une animosité bilatérale bien plus lourde que ce que subit Peggy Sastre, et dont nous ne tirons pas la conclusion que nous sommes de pauvres victimes dont on veut censurer la parole, mais simplement que nous œuvrons sur le passage étroit d’un travail juste (jamais neutre, jamais objectif) qui attise la convoitise de ceux qui veulent que la science soit de leur côté, parce qu’eux savent que la réalité est telle qu’ils la vivent.

    Je constate et regrette que le mode de communication à base de coups de canif et de prophéties victimaires de madame Sastre a mis un terme aux possibilités de conversation. Depuis des années, nos rapports se limitent à subir son agitation empressée à base de provocations suivies de plaintes quand on ose la remettre à sa place, abusant alors de la rhétorique « féministe » qu’elle passe par ailleurs son temps à critiquer en nous accusant de « mansplaining » ou de « manterrupting » et plus récemment en faisant des blagues sur la transphobie. Vous devez savoir que nous ne manquons pas d’humour, mais nous sommes dans l’équipe de Pierre Desproges. Ce cirque puéril et désarmant nous met face à des choix : se taire et supporter ; la combattre sur son terrain de la provoc ; mettre un terme à la comédie. J’ai fait le choix numéro 3.

    On ne peut pas m’accuser de ne pas m’être intéressé au travail de Peggy Sastre ou d’être hostile à la psychologie évolutionnaire au sujet de laquelle elle a traduit des travaux très intéressants. Je l’ai invitée, je lui ai donné la parole, je l’ai interrogée, convaincu qu’elle avait des choses à apporter. L’exercice n’a pas porté ses fruits, et pourtant j’ai voulu y « croire » et j’ai repoussé les critiques qui, à l’époque, me mettaient en garde . Depuis, j’ai eu le temps de réfléchir, de travailler, de lire et d’observer. Je le souhaite à tout le monde. J’ai changé d’avis à son sujet. Et à cause de cela, elle m’accable d’injures, affirme que je suis converti au « wokisme », bref me ripoline en vilain traître.

    Dans les faits : j’ai donné sa chance à Peggy Sastre et à ses méthodes. Et puis j’ai pris mes distances. La remise en question est une chose que je valorise, les erreurs de parcours font partie de la vie, et si nous nous en servons pour apprendre, elles ne sont pas vaines.

    Les règles du bullshit sur Internet étant ce qu’elles sont, la moins mauvaise manière de gérer la situation est de ne pas laisser en ligne une vidéo périmée qui envoie le signal faux que madame Sastre se soucie de la philosophie qui est la nôtre, qu’elle appartient à notre famille intellectuelle, que nous avons des choses à apprendre d’elle au sujet du féminisme. Ses livres existent toujours, sa parole demeure sur les réseaux sociaux, elle écrit dans la presse, sera sans doute encore invitée à la télévision, bref sa liberté de parole est intacte. Mais nous ne légitimerons plus son discours de plus en plus décomplexé, nous ne servirons pas d’alibi.

    Nous reviendrons sur les sujets abordés dans cette émission supprimée, mais en nous montrant plus circonspect dans nos choix et dans nos questions. J’ose croire que la grosse centaines d’invités passés chez nous vous montre à quel point nous savons trouver des intervenants de qualité.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S3DzWMrexco

  • À l’aide, @SPIP : j’essaie de convertir un de mes plugins qui permet d’uploader un fichier via un formulaire CVT dans l’espace privé, pour qu’il fonctionne avec BigUp.

    J’arrive maintenant à obtenir l’interface, et le glisser-déposer d’un gros fichier semble se faire jusqu’au bout. Mais à la fin de l’upload (avec la prévisuation, la vignette et la barre de progression), ça se contente de faire disparaître la barre de progression et ça remplace le bouton « Annuler » par le bouton « Enlever ».

    Mais l’action voulue (traiter l’image dans la partie traiter du formulaire) n’est pas du tout déclenchée.

    Mais je ne trouve ni exemple d’utilisation de BigUp en dehors des éléments natifs de l’interface, dans un autre plugin par exemple, ni documentation détaillée de ce qu’il faut faire côté PHP.

    Est-ce qu’il y a un /formulaire quelque part dans l’espace SPIP, par exemple dans un plugin, qui me permettrait de comprendre comment je dois procéder ?

    • Oui. Et notamment ceci que je ne comprends pas :

      Pour recréer le tableu $_FILES tel que le crée habituellement PHP, il faut connaître la valeur de l’attribut name de la balise input.

      Cette valeur est transmise avec le token calculé, et est inscrite dans le chemin de cache des fichiers reçu. Cela permet, à partir d’un fichier cache donné, de recréer le $_FILES qui lui correspondait.

      Apparemment, je ne récupères pas de valeur $_FILES dans mon _traiter ($_FILES qui fonctionne en mode « non bigup ») . Est-ce qu’il y a quelque chose à faire pour récupérer ce tableau calculé à partir du token, et si oui : quoi ?

    • Non plus. J’avais déjà ajouté :

              if (!$_FILES) {
                      $_FILES = isset($GLOBALS['HTTP_POST_FILES']) ? $GLOBALS['HTTP_POST_FILES'] : array();
              }

      qui ne m’apporter rien (je ne vois pas d’infos concernant le fichier installé ni dans $_FILES ni dans $_GLOBALS).

    • Ah… il faut ajouter

      $valeurs['_bigup_rechercher_fichiers'] = true;

      dans la partie _charger du formulaire.

      C’est écrit de manière un peu critique dans le README :

      Au chargement d’un formulaire CVT, si la clé _bigup_rechercher_fichiers est présente, le plugin Bigup se chargera de retrouver les fichiers déjà chargés pour ce formulaire et d’ajouter leur liste, pour chaque champ concerné du formulaire, dans l’environnement.

    • Grrrr, ça marchait ça marche plus, et je n’arrive pas à voir pourquoi.

      Quand je valide mon formulaire (après l’upload via Bigup), je me cogne un vilain écran d’erreur :

      Fatal error: Uncaught Error: [] operator not supported for strings in /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/plugins-dist/bigup/inc/Bigup/Files.php:163 Stack trace: #0 /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/plugins-dist/bigup/inc/Bigup.php(93): Spip\Bigup\Files::integrer_fichier('upload_fond_hot...', Array) #1 /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/plugins-dist/bigup/bigup_pipelines.php(169): Spip\Bigup\Bigup->reinserer_fichiers(Array) #2 /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/ecrire/inc/utils.php(199): bigup_formulaire_receptionner(Array) #3 /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/tmp/cache/charger_pipelines.php(640): minipipe('bigup_formulair...', Array) #4 /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/ecrire/inc/utils.php(265): execute_pipeline_formulaire_receptionner(Array) #5 /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/ecrire/public/aiguiller.php(212): pipeline('formulaire_rece...', Array) #6 /home/clients in /home/clients/d674084bbe9c0c511a4685e13dee1efb/web/fabre/plugins-dist/bigup/inc/Bigup/Files.php on line 163

      [EDIT] Corrigé : il faut que le formulaire soit dans une classe .ajax (donc formulaire Ajax).

    • En revanche, il me reste un truc que je ne trouve pas : comment je fais pour que le formulaire se valide dès que ça a terminé l’upload ?

      Ça le fait pour les logos et pour les documents joints, mais je ne trouve pas comment faire pour mon propre formulaire. Parce que pour l’instant, j’ai le barre d’upload, puis ça affiche la petit vignette, le nom du fichier et son poids, mais il faut encore que le valide le formulaire (« Téléverser »).

    • ça peut être fait en surchargeant l’appel de bigup de la façon suivante :

      $('input.bigup').bigup({}, {
              complete: function(){
                      $('.formulaire_bigform form').submit();
              }
      }).on('bigup.fileSuccess', function(){
              setTimeout("ajaxReload('docs_ressource')", 2000);
      });

      (dans cet exemple qui se joue en page publique, la 2ème partie permet de recharger la liste des docs affichés)

    • En tout cas, merci les amis, c’est vraiment une belle bête ce Big-Up. J’avais hâte de réussir à faire tourner mon propre formulaire avec. Surtout que c’est précisément un endroit où j’ai généralement besoin d’installer des gros fichiers…

  • The Fare - Film Recommendation and Explanation
    https://taylorholmes.com/2019/11/27/the-fare-film-recommendation-and-explanation

    Noch’n Taxifilm. Diesmal mit „Penny“ Persephone und „Harris“ Charon als Gast und Fahrer. Reichlich Stoff, um Taxi zu überhöhen, als universelle Metapher für das Leben und überhaupt alles zu betrachten, ähnlich wie es "Jim Jarmush in „Night On Earth“ macht.

    Did you realize that there is an enormous world of film out beyond the tightly defined and constructed box of Hollywood film norms? That the standard Hollywood tropes and narrowly confined screenplays aren’t all there is in the world of film. Which is why, today, we are excited to talk about The Fare. A movie you should all see. And after you’ve seen it, join us for my explanation and detailed walkthrough. And better yet? Today we have a special treat because Brinna Kelly, the co-lead, and screenplay author, was kind enough to help enlighten me on some of the more intricate details of the film. And I have also published an interview with her as well – which you can find right here. I had such a great conversation with her, I can’t wait to bring it to you. More importantly though, I’m so stoked about bringing you this movie (Thanks DeKev for bringing it to my attention!!). And now, the Fare Film Recommendation and Explanation…

    The Fare, directed by D.C. Hamilton, and written by the aforementioned Brinna Kelly, is a really simple story. It’s a story of two people stuck in a perpetual loop. A taxi cab delivery loop that is really satisfying. Here at THiNC. we cover our fair share of looping mindjob movies. No, not just Groundhog Day. Not that there’s anything wrong with it. Movies like A Day, 41, Blood Punch, Russian Doll, Pig, Infinite Chamber, you think I’m even close to being done yet? Nope. And the cause of the looping that happens in these movies are a fascinating study in and of themselves. An unforgiven sin. A chance at a perfect day. A hope for a reason why. Stars aligning. Stars misaligning. But The Fare has one of the most intriguing origin stories of them all. However, from the outside, this movie is as cheesy as it gets. Two people riding in a taxi?? Awful. But, we’ve seen other movies just like it with simpler raisons d’etre – like Locke maybe? Here, watch the trailer – it’s ultra cheesy – but the movie’s plot and explanation are worth the investment.

    But know this, if you haven’t seen this movie yet (and you have lots of places and options to watch, here, here, and here), you really need to stop, and not continue on. Spoilers will be found throughout the rest of this post.

    The Fare Walkthrough

    The reason I walk you guys through the intricate details of the movie is mainly to make certain we are all 100% on the same page. And this movie has a lot more going on under the surface than usual, so I am going to move extra carefully as we walk through this film. (And heck, sometimes it’s more about me getting on the right page than it is about you figuring it out!) Then, afterwards, we’ll discuss the ins and outs of the movie in general. So yeah, remember, SPOILERS.

    Our taxi cab driver, Harris (played by Gino Anthony Pesi), starts the movie off with a fare. He picks up Penny, they head towards Elm and River, and toward a set of events that might rearrange our brains a little along the way. The conversation is congenial, and the two seem to have something else going on. But somewhere along the line, POOF! Penny vanishes.

    Round 2, begins with another taxi cab fare, and Penny in the back seat again. The movie is all black and white, lacking color, and depth. This time the conversation varies slightly, but not very significantly. There is one moment though, when the cab almost hits something and Penny cracks her head, that Harris grabs her hand, and everything goes to color. “Penny, are you alright?” That is when we realize that she never told him her name. What is going on here? And Penny beseeches Harris to remember her and then vanishes again… POOF!

    But the THIRD TIME? The third time it stayed up! (Holy Grail anyone?) No, the third time, their conversation diverges from the previous loops and Harris starts remembering on his own. He remembers their conversations, he remembers the radio details, he remembers the storm, he remembers that she asks if she can call him Harry. He remembers all of it. And he’s immediately curious if he’s in a science lab, “pumped full of cocaine and daffodil juice or something.” And Penny informs him that they have shared maybe over a hundred rides together, and that he had forgotten them all. And then she vanishes again.

    But the fourth time, when he pulls up to Penny, he says, “Get in, it smells like burning.” And they are off. “Sit up front.” “Is that allowed?” “Who’s going to tell on us, we are apparently caught in a time loop together.” The conversation is fast, and fluid, it’s as if they hadn’t missed a beat since the last time they were together. However long ago that was (wink). And we begin to learn that Penny has tried a million different ways to get out of the loop together (different directions, they’ve gotten out and walked, running the cab off the road at 100 mph) but mainly Penny is just thankful to have a real conversation together.

    Ride five – yes, we are to ride five already – and the conversation goes towards real conversation. Stranded island type conversations. Harris’ theories about aliens creating humans to look like them…etc., etc. But mainly Harris is despondent about this loop that they are caught in. That is when Penny tells Harris about being trapped in a joyless marriage back in the real world. And here we begin to get into discussions of aloneness, and existential meaning…purpose. But when Penny is with Harris, she doesn’t feel alone. Most importantly, we learn that Harris once had a significant other in his life…and she got into his cab one day. And that he didn’t know how to fix it. And she’s gone. Harris chooses to not reset his meter, and he floors it. But a bright light and a loud voice orders him to turn back.

    Ride six – is started with a hug, and an honest exclamation from Harris that he can’t lose Penny ever again. And they make a decision to stay there together forever…to never leave. But Harris notices that Penny has a scar where she hit the partition. And that implies to him that these are not recurring and resetting loops, but something else. This is where the spoilers become really important. One last chance – if you haven’t seen the movie, and SOMEHOW, you’ve gotten this far down this page, you really need to go. Harris really needs to understand what is happening to him – understand this non-resetting looping that is happening. And just before Penny disappears, she tells Harris not to drink the water. Which takes the film in a totally new direction.

    The first fare after the sixth is an old man. At the end of the ride, he gives Harris a gold coin. And from there on he begins taking other riders – but amongst the new riders are memories of his first time meeting Penny in real life. Their budding relationship, and then her disappearance. But he does learn one important thing from the dispatcher, that his job is to be the ferryman….to collect golden coins for rides, and deliver people to their destinations. That, oh, and the small detail that Penny is the dispatcher’s wife. That every year Penny leaves, and when she comes back, she comes back via Harris’ cab. And from here on out we have a cavalcade of fares for Harris to ferry.

    But eventually, Penny is back. And Harris has been waiting for this conversation an entire year. The thing he wants most of all to communicate is that even if he only gets 20 minutes a year, he really is a very lucky man. That they are the stars Altair and Vega, and that their paths cross only once a year.

    The Fare Film Explanation

    OK, so as we discussed in the walkthrough…the looping repetitions aren’t actually a standard Groundhog Day sort of loop. Generally when a film invokes a Groundhog Day loop the point of the film is to morally resolve sin, or failure, and direct the hero towards perfection. That isn’t happening here. Instead, the film is continuing to progress in time, but Harris isn’t fully aware of what is actually happening. And it’s only when he sees Penny’s scar that he understands that time is actually progressing quasi-normally.

    When Harris is told by the dispatcher, that he is death, and that Harris is his ferryman, does Harris really understand what is going on. In this moment, you should have immediately started flipping back through your memories of Greek gods, Egyptian gods, Roman gods, in order to place who Harris really is. And when I chatted with Brinna, and she told me that Harris’ last name was Caron…Harris Caron…it all came together. Now, to appreciate that, in the world of classical Greek mythology, the ferryman had several different names – but Charon, or Caron – was the most widely used. And if you are really curious, an A+ over achiever, you’ll find him in Dante’s Divine Comedy (the fifth ring), and also in Milton’s Paradise Lost.

    And, in ancient times, many believed that a coin placed in the mouth of a dead person would pay the fee necessary for Caron to ferry their family member across the river to the underworld. This coin was called Charon’s Obol. But if the dead couldn’t afford the tribute, they would be cursed to never cross the river.

    The 3 Theories to Explain The Fare

    Now, having spent an hour or so chatting with Brinna about her film, I am fairly biased as to how good it is. But that doesn’t mean I’ve lost all objectivity. With that said, I think there are three possible ways (along an infinite continuum) in which to interpret this movie. Theory 1 is the literal reading of the film. Theory 2 would be a dark view. And Theory 3 would be the mind-blown ultra-dark view. All of which come from Brinna and myself bouncing alternatives off of each other. (Brinna gets 100% of the credit for theory 3…kudos to you Brinna.)

    Theory #1 – The Literal View

    If you are a romantic, and you prefer a little simpler view of life – this is the theory for you. I’m not saying that in a denigrating way at all. Personally wish the optimistic view was my own personal first inclination. But alas.

    This theory basically states that Penny, or Persephone, wasn’t the one who trapped Harris and made him the Ferryman. The Dispatcher, Hades, is the one that did that. Here’s Brinna talking about this particular theory: “He (the Dispatcher) talks about it in his reveal monologue to Harris after the old man was dropped off. (After Harris died, Penny would have wanted his soul to move on like the others, drink from the Lethe and forget about his life and her, and reincarnate. But her husband, who is cruel, had other plans.) What Penny did for Harris was give him the water, so he didn’t have to remember his purgatory, or her, so he would be blissfully unaware. (It’s the only thing she could do for him. Because ultimately, Persephone is not as strong as her husband Hades, who’s one of the big ‘three’, the eldest at that, Kronos’ first born.) But Harris’s memory of her is so strong, that it’s starting to break through the fog, and when they touched, he remembered her despite the water. That’s why, in the end, he chose to stop drinking, so he can always remember her…”

    Make sense? She went kind of fast. Let me try and slow it down a little bit. Persephone, Hades’ wife, met Harris while away from the underworld. They fell in love, but eventually fell distant. Harris came back after realizing he screwed up, but it was too late, Persephone had already left. But she never would have wanted evil to befall Harris. Hades, on the other hand, giggled at the idea of evil befalling Harris… and so he made Harris the perpetual ferryman. But eventually, Harris began to remember, in spite of the water that Persephone gave him to ease his pain. And voila, he stopped drinking it in order to have his 20 minutes with her each year. Make more sense?

    This is the romantic’s view mainly because it shows Harris as someone that saw his eternal existence as a glass half full sort of experience. He was given the opportunity to spend an eternal amount of time (albeit in 20 minute increments) with his one true love. And it wasn’t Persephone that locked him in this experience, but rather, it is Charon & Persephone who are choosing to make the best of this ‘curse’.

    Theory #2 The Pessimistic View

    So, let’s think about the plot of this movie a second, practically. If we were to go back to the beginning and think about it from scratch, knowing what we know about Penny, the Dispatcher, and Harris. Penny is Persephone, who is the daughter of Zeus. Persephone was the queen of the underworld who carries out the curses of men on the souls of the dead. She’s married to Hades, the god of the underworld. Death himself. Right? And let’s just take Penny at her at her word, that her life married to Hades is anything but satisfying. So she courts a mortal man, a taxicab driver. And during this experience, they spend time together for about a year, and then it falls apart. And Penny disappears. But then, somehow, Harris dies, and it is Persephone that installs Harris as the Phlegyas, the Caron, the ferryman for the dead, for all time. Not Hades. Why? So that she can have Harris forever. (Random tangent, if you guys haven’t read the book The Book Thief, I literally cannot recommend it enough. It happens to be narrated by Death, and has some of the most beautiful prose this side of straight up and down poetry.)

    “OK, so?” I hear you asking. Well, I get it that the gods play with mortals regularly… but this is some next level god-playing if you ask me. No? And for Harris to vow his unconditional love to Persephone after learning of how she trapped him in this task seems a bit much. No? Isn’t it literally the definition of a Sisyphean task? WHICH WAS A CURSE! Sisyphus was tasked with rolling his boulder for eternity because he was selfish and deceitful, no? What was Harris’ sin? How do we spin this as a blessing?

    Theory #3 The Mental Mindjob View

    What if, the experiences we watch throughout The Fare are just one of a million different times that Harris has forgotten, and then remembered again? Here’s Brinna again, talking through the ins and outs of this particular theory:

    “Do you think this is even the first time Harris has remembered Penny? Penny’s words are unreliable, she’s lied to him throughout the film (whether or not it’s for his own good is up for debate…). So, what if this has all happened before? What if it hasn’t been 100 rides? What if it’s been 1000? 10,000? He’s in eternity (or limbo, whatever you want to call it..) time is relative…what if they’ve been here before? He remembers her, he re-declares his love for her. They continue like that for an age or two… But eventually, his human mind can’t take the loneliness and isolation, he starts drinking the water again…after awhile, the entire dance starts anew. Imagine that…what if that’s the loop they’re in, and Harris still can only see but a fraction of it. Poor human soul, lost among the Gods…”

    This vantage seems the most real to me only because it is the gods we are talking about here. But the beauty of this movie, and these three theories is that you can choose the one that makes the most sense to you.

    Final Thoughts on The Fare

    The conversation with Brinna Kelly really helped me to clarify my understanding of what happened at the end of The Fare. But even so, a question that still plagues me at the back of my mind is…after Harris walked out on Penny, and then came back to find her gone…how did Harris die? Did Hades kill him? Did Harris kill himself? Was it an accident? Each of these variations could have been added above to the correct theory that matches best. (E.g.: Theory #1 Just a car accident caused by Harris’ drinking. Theory #2 Hades killed Harris. Theory #3 Harris committed suicide.)

    We know that his cab was wrecked. Penny said she had it fixed up after he died. Did he commit suicide after losing his one true love? Was it just a random accident? Or was he just taken from earth by Persephone to help ferry the dead across the Styx and in the process, his cab was crashed mid-teleportation? When I asked Brinna about this particular plot point, here is what she had to say about it, “Yes, the way you described it is pretty much how I imagined it happening…except I don’t think Harris meant to kill himself necessarily (that probably plays into why he can’t remember it clearly). I think he probably had too much to drink and then crashed his cab. Hence why dispatcher taunts him about ‘hitting the sauce’ early on.” She had a lot more to say on that plot point, so watch out for my interview with her in the next few days to hear more.

    I was CERTAIN that The Fare was going to go down the exact same road that all the other looping movies take. That Harris was in desperate need of learning that one critical thing in order to perfect his fare experience with Penny…in order to escape the loop. So, for me to get right hooked by Brinna’s clever screenplay was a real treat. The simple aesthetic (Did you know this movie was filmed in only six days?? Yeah, extraordinarily difficult to pull off even a simple movie like this one in six days.) and magnetic acting of the two leads was a lot of fun to dive into.

    And the movie does a good job juking us on the concept of the loop actually not being a loop. Most importantly, it is a clever romance made out of a tragic circumstance. A curse even. One that I’m not entirely certain is a love story. Remember the movie Passengers, with Jennifer Lawrence and Chris Pratt? It has that similar after taste. I’m stuck, married to Hades, eternally trapped…so, hey you, pleasantly sleeping woman…who happens to be beautiful…why don’t you wake up, and enthrall me a bit as I pass through occasionally! hahah. But ultimately it works for me. Harris has had his close encounter tangle with the gods, and is now the eternal ferryman. Alright. And romance, or no, he really does seem perfect for the job.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fare)

    Cast
    Gino Anthony Pesi as Harris
    Brinna Kelly as Penny
    Jason Stuart as The Dispatcher
    Jon Jacobs as Frail Man
    Matt Fontana as Dewey

    Directed by D.C. Hamilton
    Produced by D.C. Hamilton, Brinna Kelly, Gino Anthony Pesi, Kristin Starns
    Written by Brinna Kelly

    https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charon_(Mythologie)
    https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persephone
    https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raub_der_Persephone
    https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Night_on_Earth

    #Film #Taxi #Mythologie

  • Allemagne, 3 octobre 1990 : le démantèlement de la RDA
    https://journal.lutte-ouvriere.org/2020/10/14/allemagne-le-demantelement-de-la-rda_152208.html


    #RDA #Allemagne #réunification #Hartz_IV #capitalisme #chômage #salaire #éphéméride #3_octobre

    La propagande de l’Ouest expliqua et répète encore que l’économie de RDA était désuète sinon moribonde ; en réalité les entreprises les plus susceptibles de concurrencer les multinationales occidentales furent parmi les premières à être découpées en morceaux puis liquidées. Foron, grand fabricant de réfrigérateurs qui exportait avec succès vers trente pays, fut démantelé ; Robotron, spécialisé dans l’informatique et les réseaux, fut offert à IBM et SAP ; les mines de potasse de Bischofferode attribuées à BASF malgré la grève de la faim des mineurs désespérés, tandis qu’il était fait cadeau à Elf Aquitaine des usines de la Leuna et du réseau de stations-service de RDA.

    6 500 entreprises furent vendues, toujours très en dessous de leur valeur. En fait d’économie de marché, ces rachats et liquidations donnèrent lieu à une orgie de subventions. « En vérité, les cinq années [de construction de l’Est] ont représenté le plus grand programme d’enrichissement d’Allemands de l’Ouest jamais mis en œuvre », déclarait en 1996 l’ancien maire de Hambourg Henning Vors­che­rau (SPD).

    Les grandes entreprises qui ne furent pas liquidées devinrent des ateliers de groupes de l’Ouest, à la main-d’œuvre sous-payée. L’ouvrier et chansonnier est-allemand Gundermann décrivait de manière sarcastique les nouvelles relations Est-Ouest : « J’ai enfin un vrai boulot, et toi tu as quelqu’un qui te fait le travail… »

  • #Saint-Nazaire: mercredi 14 octobre, #procès de #La_maison_Géronimo
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/10/13/saint-nazaire-mercredi-14-octobre-proces-de-la-maison-geronimo

    Les occupant.e.s de la maison Géronimo, situé au #33_rue_Émile_Littre, sont actuellement en procédure. Le propriétaire en droit des logements occupés, Silène, a porté plainte pour récupérer « son » bâtiment en vu de le « restaurer » en installant des ascenseurs neufs et en rénovant les balcons. Sur le papier tout semble positif, mais en pratique […]

  • Open-source #satellite data to investigate #Xinjiang concentration camps

    The second part of this series discusses techniques on how to analyse a dire human rights situation in and around Xinjiang’s re-education and detention facilities.

    A pressing need to investigate characteristics of Xinjiang’s detention camps

    The story has been widely covered. Calls by human rights advocates to define China’s practices as ‘genocide’ grow louder. Hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslims detained in internment camps. Many still are.

    “Inmates undergo months or years of indoctrination and interrogation aimed at transforming them into secular and loyal supporters of the party”, the New York Times wrote and published documents that unmistakably prove a dire human rights situation in the west of China.

    First China denied the camps ever existed. Then the Chinese consulate doesn’t bother anymore to play a smoke and mirror game and admits: “Xinjiang has set up vocational education and training centres in order to root out extreme thoughts…”. Their purpose: ‘compulsory programs for terrorist criminals’.

    Now, the language changed again. China’s President said the ‘strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era is completely correct.’

    Unacceptable (and unwise) of some to deny it. Social media commentators, some who are frequently quoted by large media organisations, keep casting doubt on the tragic story. Margaret_Kimberley tweeted — after an ITV news report emerged — “These are lies. There is no evidence of Uighur concentration camps. More hybrid war against China” (it received 2,000 likes).

    While there is no room left to doubt that these camps do exist, there remains vast uncertainty whether investigative journalists and human rights advocates located all facilities spread out across the province.

    Researchers/journalists who made it their beat to find them, like Nathan Ruser at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), says “we don’t believe that we have found them all”, after posting 380 facilities online.

    Germany’s chancellor last week said China’s President Xi offered delegates to send envoys to visit Xinjiang province [and camps] to see for themselves. Chances increase to see more of the so-called ‘show camps’ for a short period of time or as long as the visits take (the BBC encountered it when it visited last time). Xi also ensured that there will be an ‘ongoing human-rights dialogue’. But Ursula von der Leyen tweeted “a lot remains to be done .. in other chapters of our relations”.

    Satelite investigations exposing more and more evidence. OSINT journalists rely on them. It’s one reason why some open-source intelligence journalism colleagues keep hearing rumours that some of the camps may have moved underground (e.g. detention in under-surface facilities) to hide from the spying eyes and scrutiny of satellite data analysts (we don’t have proof for this thesis but I encourage you to reach out if you have evidence).
    Mounting number of facilities

    The number of confirmed facilities steadily grew. A 2018 BBC investigation looked at 101 campsites, which got pinpointed via various media reports and academic research, the author says.

    Most recently, Buzzfeed investigated 268 compounds, many from previous lists I worked on too. In February, the list of ‘confirmed re-education camps’, so lower-security sites, mainly for indoctrination purposes, was limited to mere 50 facilities. ‘Confirmed’ in this context means they have been validated by eye-witness reports. Back then, there were another 170 that had yet to be confirmed.

    It is of vital importance to keep this investigation rolling. This means to forensically document the changes in these camps and to spend more time on characterizing each detail. ASPI just dropped a new list and we are going to work with that one instead of the original 50 we received (the list can be downloaded here and geodata that can be simply dragged and dropped into QGIS and Google Earth Pro, it is available here).

    Finally, news broke via Reuters (and research by Adrian Zenz) that evidence of forced labour is mounting also in Tibet (we will look into this later, too).
    List of ‘expanded camps’ extended

    Earlier in the year US-based Uighure group ETNAM shared a list with around 50 confirmed sites. We and others scrutinised this list on increased activity on the ground via aggregated satellite remote sensing data (link). The list was shared as klm. file. It helped enormously with going through them one by one. All the coordinates as well as the Chinese names of the places are accessible via Google Earth Pro. Now that ASPI dropped a new list with coordinates and updated 2020 records, some of the work we have started can be extended and match.

    Because we are most interested in the camps that got expanded (so buildings or features were added), we will concentrate on the list of facilities that were developed. It includes a list of 61 sites.

    Why is the onus on expanded camps? In addition to the characteristics ASPI added as classifiers, the extended camps might tell us where the local administration invests and where forced labour in the firm of Uighur prisoners went. We added a few more details for each facility that we thought was worth looking at (see sheet above).
    We will go through various ways to characterise/investigate facilities and their surroundings

    First significant markers includes the size of the camps. That includes quantitative details such as the number of buildings on the premise and adjacent to it. We will go through how to compare them. There are the walls of camps that are usually quite straight-lined. Their height, which we will define and validate, and the walls’ thickness may tell us something about recent developments (e.g. how secure the sites are, or were meant to be).

    Guard towners are also a quantifiable element. ASPI and others counted them. Because they can be seen from outside they may act as a signal to local residents. That is also likely the reason why those facilities that have some or all of their towers removed recently tend to locate closer to residential buildings (see my stats below).

    These changes are further revealing as they may tell us something about how the local government in various parts of the region varied in their response to international pressure (or not, by keeping them in place). ‘A lot [camps] had their security features removed in the second half of 2019’, Zenz explained. Some remained in place (important to add here, it remains doubtful that conditions improved inside of the camps, even if towers or security features were removed).

    Zenz has an explanation for some of the changes: “On the same time they invited all these delegations and visitors, they released a lot of people. If you release a lot of people, you can afford to run with fewer security features. That can still be run like an internment camp, I’m sure”. We will look closer at what has changed ourselves.

    Including those features above, there are a number of other aspects to take into account. We put them into the list below — each will be discussed separately:

    What blue factory buildings in and around camps can tell us
    What typical ‘prison features’ tell us
    What cars in parking lots tell us about personnel working at the facilities during Covid-19
    What walls can tell us
    What guard towers can tell us
    What sports facilities can tell us
    What the shapes/types of buildings and location can tell us
    What agricultural space (e.g. fields) around the camps can tell us
    What potential crematory sites reveal
    What Xinjiang’s export tell us
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment and surveillance
    What Baidu maps can tell us

    Blue-roofed factory buildings

    In satellite images, they are very pronounced with their blue coating. They may also heat up in the summer.

    Most of them are factory buildings, has been reported. You can see them added in and around camp facilities, whether they are low or high security premises.

    We can quantify them by counting them or via quantifying the space they take up. ASPIT decided to count them, though some buildings are smaller and other are massive. Google Earth has a polygon area measuring tool. A third option is to write a statistical model to calculate square meters factory floor space. If you are lazy you can consult a service that helps you with that via a visual detection algorithm — it calculates the area and records the number of blue roof buildings for a given satellite image.

    One of the camps that expanded in the past two years is the tier 1 low-security re-education facility in Bugur in Bayingolu (41.808855284.3005783). It has a dense network of factory buildings nearby (around 23) and within its own walls there are eight. We used ASPI’s data to confirm this that noted: ‘considerable room for expansion’.

    Let’s run the classification system over it and classify how much blue-roofed buildings that scatter around the camp can we count (importantly not all are factory spaces but many will be).

    On the AI model: I downloaded the images with their highest resolution from Google Earth. To make the image a bit clearer for the model, I adjusted the brightness, upped the contrast and tinkered with the exposure. We can see the blue buildings, roughly in a radius of 1.5 to 2 miles (see image), account for about 1,464.9 m² (0.15ha). The number of little blue buildings expanded considerably since 2014 where they accounted for 1,022m2 (0.10 ha) — sadly we only have an image for 2014 and one for 2019.

    Short intersection on the availability of images available in Google Earth:

    Some of the important images to document the progression of these camps are missing. Some camps have a mere handful of publically available images (as in the case above). This is appalling and private satellite image companies need to be nudged to make more images public. Especially for the latest developments, this is urgently needed. Researchers noted down the latest dates for which images are available at the time of writing. Below we see them grouped by months, and then by facility category (tier 1 to 4).

    What about bias to provide fewer updates on higher-security facilities? We don’t have much to go in here (there is no direct evidence that western satellite companies are being pressured into not publishing their images for camps on Google). Despite only a few camps that didn’t get updated at all over the past two years, we can see at the time of writing that Google and others hold more images for lower tier facilities (1 and 2) than for higher-security facilities (tier 3 and 4):

    Continuing on the factories, another example is the facility in Maralbeshi County (39°49’7.84"N, 78°31’4.37"E). It was erected around 2017/2018. In Google Earth, you can see how the blue-roofed buildings surround the internment complex. Note, how the larger blue factory complexes to the left and right were there before the camp was erected.

    In other words, the camp was planned and embedded into existing factory operation. It further corroborates a thesis that factory work by prisoners (in the form of forced labour), was part of a grander plan all along (though, to be certain, looking at satellite images alone does not suffice).

    Adrain Zenz thinks blue roof factories is something that warrants looking into in more detail. A bunch of these blue roof factory building were erected in 2018, especially in the second half. Zenz explains it’s important timing because the policy documents on forced labour, as explained in his post from last December, shows that a lot of this kind of policy was released in the first half or mid of 2018.

    A recent Buzzfeed investigation did mention blue roofs but surprisingly didn’t pay more attention to the matter. The factories grow in importance as the forced labour of imprisoned groups is being increasingly ‘commercialised’.

    ASPI’s data recorded the distance (measured in km I assume) between the 380 facilitates and the local/nearest industrial parks — where some of the forced labour could have moved to put to work. The data categorizes facilities in four areas of security (ranging from Tier 1= re-education camp to Tier 4= prison facility). Tear two and tier three camps tend to be located more closely to the industrial centre of the towns, the data suggests (see chart below):

    Zenz adds: “what’s significant is the sudden increase of blue roof, single story, flat type factory buildings. It’s consistent with policy, and also release, the Karakax list also talks about people being released into forced labour. A lot of that took place in 2019.”

    The blue metal barracks found in Dabancheng shining light yellow in the sentinel IR images as they are being reflected. Low res Sentinel 2 data also suggests that these metal-like structures in the south of the Payzawat camp (Payzawat County, 39.538372, 76.713606) may also heat up in the summer. SWIR (short-wave infrared imagery) and NIR can be used for heat monitoring.

    Prisons features: camps that imprisoned people become more ‘secure’ not less:

    Among the around 60 camps that have expanded recently, half of it are tier 3 or tier 4 facilities —detention centers and prisons with high security features.

    While it is true that some camps removed some of the towers and other security features (labelled ‘desecuritisation’ by ASPI’s records), others increased theirs. Those happened to be facilities that are detention centres and prison. In the context that Chinese authorities moved prisoners to these more secure facilities with less transparency and harsher treatments, this is cause for concern.

    Let’s look at an example. From the list of expanded camps, there is the camps Yarkant Facility in the Kashgar prefecture (38.351531177.3055467). Since 2018, we saw a nearly 10,000 m2 large factory compound built (compare images from 5/8/2018 with 1/21/2018). Then, a year later, watch downers got added. There are now 8 towners. For such a small facility that’s quite conspicuous. The reason it’s a high-security prison facility.

    Newly built detention/prison facilities created between 2018 and 2020 are of special interest. Camps like the tier 3 (detention) camp of Sanji Facility (#3, 44.102764,86.9960751), a with several watchtowers and an external wall is important as we can follow the progression of each step of the building process with high-resolution images.

    The location was probably chosen because of a lower-security area nearby, north of the facility (3/7/2018). Building must have started in the summer. A couple of months after the last shot (8/11/2018) the blue-roofed factory gets built-in the north-west of the camp (a reason to assume a direct relationship there) and within two weeks in August the main building takes shape. At the same time, the walls get erected and we can make out the layout of the facility with its heavy concrete structures.

    We can see, those are fundamentally different from building built in other lower-security camps. Then two months later it’s almost completed.

    The speed of building is noteworthy (better trackable if we had access to a more continuous stream of images). From the few images we have above and those from Sentinel 2, below, we can assume that it took the developers between three to four months in pure building time to pull it up — an astonishing pace. China is renowned for its fast building pace. For many other areas, such as coal plants and artificial island-building its cookie-cutter approach — where blueprints are being re-used over and over again - it permits building more quickly.

    Other who looked at the situation in Xinjiang reported that many Uighurs held in lower-tier facilities could have been moved/transferred to higher-tier prisons. In other words, despite some re-education camps have experienced ‘de-securitisation’, half of the camps that expanded are higher security facilities, so tier 3 (detention) or tier 4 (prison) camp facilities.

    What parking lots tell us about the camps during Covid-19

    I believe this topic has largely remained unexplored. Busy parking lots are one way to tell how many staff members are on site. Especially interesting it this for the recent month that were affected by coronavirus. We dont know much about the conditions inside of the facilities.

    But with fewer staff members around (and fewer visitors allowed — previous reporting has revealed that detention centres have ‘small visitor centres’), the lives of inmates may have worsened. There was some reporting that Covid-19 cases spiralled in the province of Xinjiang and some expressed concern that cases could spread within camps. It’s possible, no doubt. With only a few cases in the whole region, though, the risk is lower.

    Pandemic related fears may have affected the material and food supply. Sick imprisoned detainees may go without healthcare treatment for weeks or months. All these are assumptions for which we have little evidence. But the possibility alone raises concerns. If it is true that prisoners remained in the facilities during Covid, they could have suffered from the absence of staff and proper care.

    From satellite images, it is hard to know — though there is some evidence from an eyewitness account shared by a historian, a Georgetown professor on his Medium page.

    We might be able to tell how many temporary people were on sites (those that use their car to leave for the night). Counting vehicles at nearby car parks is one way.

    At some facilities, we can clearly see the parking lot. An example is Ghulja City (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). It’s a fairly large car park. We can use Picterra system (there is a 10 day free trial version) to check the satellite images for May 23 — thought there isn’t much to count, the car park is empty.

    Seven months earlier, on October 24th of 2019, we count around 120 cars (with some false positives, but that’s good enough for us). The algo gives you a count so you don’t have to count the red boxes one by one. Once trained, we can run it on subsequent images.

    Let’s walk you through how to train and count the cars. I simplify here (a more complete tutorial can be found here and in their platform). First, we use one of the images to train the algorithm on the cars in the car park. Then we run it on the other pictures. It’s neat and simple (and quick if you don’t have time to run your own statistical model in python).

    The number of vehicles dropped during the heights of Covid-19.

    We could do this for other confirmed location such as the facility in Chochek City (Tǎchéng Shì, 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E) where car numbers dropped in April. We see this in many other facilities (for those that expanded).

    Hotan City Facility #1 (37.1117019, 79.9711546) with 81 cars in the parking lot at the end of 2019 dropped to 10 during the height of the pandemic. Similar developments have been perceived at Hotan County Facility 1 (37.2420734 79.8595074), Ghulja Facility 1 (43.9756437 81.5009539) and a number of others.
    Calculating rooms and capacity

    How many people fit in a facility. If we take the example of the re-education camp in Chochek City ( 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E), we have high res Google images for the end of March and end of April of 2020. We can see the thin middle part is three stories high and in earlier images (Jul 18, 19) we can see the southern part is four stories high. In 2018, we got an image of the foundation when it was built. This provides enough detail to calculate that the facility has around 367 rooms — for the total t-shaped building with the arms.

    –—

    –—

    In the example above, we shouldn’t be too sure that alls detainees were kept in the facility during Covid. Some reports claim that some of the other lower security re-education centres kept people ‘only during the day for indoctrination classes’ (it’s certainly different for the high-security prison facility that is also on the premise of the Payzawat facility, see in the south, with their towers).

    Comparing camp sizes

    The total size of the camps matters, especially when they get extended. Most of the camps have clear wall frames build around them. It’s one of the most important and simple characteristics. The wall frames makes it relatively easy to draw shapes in your geolocation system of choice (the sheer size of the walls, might be less ideal to gauge the number of prisoners).

    Some have vast empty space in between might suggest that other faculty sections or factory buildings are due to be added. Some are cramped with building.

    Tracing and calculating the area of wall frames in Google Earth for some of the largest camps, we get what we already knew:

    To emulate the work ASPI’s data was posted here. A number of track and trace tutorials for Google Earth (one here on measuring property space) are available on YouTube.
    Staking out camp size:

    The Qariqash County/قاراقاش ناھىيىسى‎ /墨玉县(Mòyù Xiàn, 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E) sits in the South of the large stretch of desert.

    We use the polygon tool in Google Earth to stake out the clearly marked walls. You usually end up with a rectangle. Under measurements (right-click on the item) you can see the perimeter is around 1.65 km and the area is roughly 16.7 hectares (0.17 square km).

    Now we can compare it with another one on the list, the camp in Aqsu City (41°11’27.12"N, 80°16’25.08"E). It’s markedly smaller, with a perimeter of 1.1km and only an area of 5.65 hectares. There are other ways to do this in QGIS, a geoinformation system more efficiently.
    What can walls and towers tell us?

    How tall are walls at some of the camps? The answer varies across the vast variety of facilities. Height may tell us something about who built the camp and the level of security. It’s unsurprising to find different heights at different camps built by different planners.

    Where we don’t have shades available, we can check the two images above and reference them with the people in the image and define the height this way. Another standard way to calculate height is using the shades by the walls and towers and calculate the height via Google Earth and SunCalc.

    The shade of the southern wall in the satellite image from 03/19/2020 for the Dabancheng camp is around 7.62 meters long. The towers on the southern wall for those dates result in a height of around ~8meters.

    But the images in the Reuters shots look different. That’s why they were taken a year or two earlier. Satellite images from 4/22/2018 show clearly the octagonal shapes of the tower shades. If we calculate again, the shade of the tower is around 9 meters long, translating into around 14 meters in height.

    We do this for the wall as well. What we find is that, although the towers disappeared (though, some are still there, just not protruding so visibly), the only thing that really changed is the height of the walls — now around 13.5m tall, compared with 9.5m in 2018. The same towners, removed from one Dabancheng camp, then re-emerged half a kilometre south-east at the other newly built one (2019).

    Why are we even bothering measuring height? On one hand we want to answer how security changed across the camps. Are walls getting higher? Do they change in their layout. It helps to classify the type of camps. The higher the walls, the more secure they probably were meant to be. Higher wall might mean higher chance that prisoners are held at facilities over night. It also may help to disprove claims by XJ denialists.

    We can verify the Suncalc analysis with images. Cherchen County, for which we reviewed images for 12/14/19 shows roughly the same height. Explainer how to measure the height of an object from satellite image available here and here.

    The number of press images of the camps is limited. Most are by Reuters or AFP/Badung Police. It is this one here (37°14’29.78"N, 79°51’35.00"E). More local street footage, though not of camps, might be obtainable via Mapillary.

    Buildings shapes/outlines and location of camps

    Let’s start with the location of the facilities first. ASPI recorded the type of security for its 380 odd facilities, and for many the distance to populated areas such as residential buildings. When local administration planned on where to place the facilities they might have taken into account how the neighbouring public should (or shouldn’t) perceived them. More secluded camps are more hidden from public scrutiny. Those near people’s homes or schools may be placed there to have the opposite effect.

    What’s immediately apparent when running a few inferential statistics on the records is that the more secure detention centres tend to be kept further away from buzzing residential areas — meaning, further away than for instance Tier 1 re-education camps, which are often nestled between residential parts of cities, or occupying old schools.

    Agriculture/fields around the camps — investigating forced labour by detainees

    Identifying agricultural fields near or around facilities may reveal some potential aspects of how forced labour in the camps were used in close vicinity.

    Especially for secluded faculties, with not much else urban life going on (so reducing the possibility that other local farmers were involved in working the them), the chance increases that Uighurs detained were used.

    One example is the facility near Yingye’ercun, in Gulja, with a 0.16km2 large campground (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). The farming area that was developed since 2018 (shortly after the multistorey buildings was built in the core of the facility) spans 1.7km2 and is clearly marked (which includes the facility itself, see in red below).

    In other words, once the camp was built the fields surrounding it got worked and developed— unlikely to be only a convenient coincident. The nearby factory complex was also extended.

    Often it warrant also checking with Sentinel 2 images on EO browser. In this case, it’s useful because it allows us to visualise agricultural development via its invisible light remote sensing capabilities. Additional bands (which Google images lack) give access to the invisible spectrum and shows the agricultural expansion (here shown in red via the false colour composite, commonly used to assess plant density and health, “since plants reflect near-infrared and green light, while they absorb red”. Exposed ground are grey or tan, vegetation is red).
    Image for post

    Another camp in this regard is the Maralbeshi Facility (#6) in Kashgar (39.7406222 78.0115086) with lots of fields surrounding it.

    Why is the forced labour aspect in Xinjiang’s agriculture so important in this debate? For one, it’s part of the human rights abuse that more and more governments and industry leaders recognise (such as Swedish company H&M, who profited from cotton supplies and other kinds within their supply chain). Some decided to cut ties with suppliers in the region. It may the answer for the short term. In the long run, western businesses much apply pressure to get suppliers on their own to dissuade local forced labour practices (see example on ads that emerged to sell Uighur forced labour online).

    According to the ILO Forced Labour Convention from 1930, forced or compulsory labour is defined as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily’.
    Sports grounds: (basketball and other sports courts)

    Some found value in observing their development. BBC’s John Sudworth found that just before a press tour organised for his press teams two years ago the appearance of recreational areas altered. In some of the places they were taken to, satellite images and the internal security fencing — and what looked like watchtowers- where taken down shortly before the tours for journalists began. Specifically on sports grounds, they noticed that empty exercise yards have been transformed into sports facilities.

    The reporters asked: if the journalists have been presented with mere ‘show camps’, what may this say about the places they were not taken to. Sport facilities are quite easy to spot from satellite. The BBC travelled to Kaxgar in the very east of the region, about 100km south of Kazakhstan’s border. Their footages shows how the camp put up courts shortly before the press trip. But they didn’t last long. We found evidence that these very courts disappeared again in early 2020 (see below).

    In one of the camps in Qariqash (37°15’32.54"N, 79°44’52.08"E) the sports facilities were made unavailable as recently as July. Now big brown sheets, what looks like blankets with knobs on them, cover them. Those have never appeared on satellite images before and extend to the soccer field in the north and the big parking lot next to the sports courts.

    I have mixed feelings about recreational activities. We must strongly doubt that they benefit people held for indoctrination. So are they only a smoke and mirror game to show the friendliness of re-educational camps? Or are they actually benefiting the imprisoned? It is hard to say. In recent time, they are more likely to be added than removed. In around 37 facilities on the ASPI list basketball courts, running tracks or other sports fields were noted to have been added or extended.

    When we compare the average distance of residential building for these places (1.2km) with the average distance of all the places where we have a record on the distance to buildings (1.8km), we find the recreational activities might be used as an element to signal the locals that the facilities have those recreational features.

    Dabancheng has one court in the western block and a number of other ones in the centre part. In the eastern wing, there is nothing. We haven’t got any further high res satellite images on Dabancheng (other than those until March 2020, that leaves only checking Sentinel 2 images or commercial images).

    I am going to stop here. The analysis of recreational areas yielded rather little, for me and the folks at ASPI. “I don’t think the sports grounds mean much in the detention regime”, Nathan Ruser says. If you have more info do reach out or leave a comment.
    Crematories

    The New York Times followed the lead of findings (that emerged last year, also mentioned in the state.gov report) and check the extent of description of religious sites and burial grounds. In September, the team reported that ‘thousands of religious sites’, such as mosques, shrines and other sites were bulldozed or replaced.

    As many burial grounds disappeared and people within camps families have never heard from again, the question of how Uighurs’ life proceeded became more pressing. Crematories may be one aspect. Some anecdotal evidence by a source spoke of a nascent growth of crematory sites in the areas near camps. This appears important in the context of how prisoners are treated in facilities and what happens if they die and at what rates.

    High prevalence of tuberculosis in facilities worries insiders. TB is spread via droplets through the air by someone who is infected. It’s especially deadly when the immune system of those who caught it, can’t cope with it. With the conditions reported by some of the eyewitnesses, it is feasible that the hard conditions prisoners are being subjected to, could enhance the deadliness of TB.

    The think tank which produced a previous list of facilities searched and found a handful of crematories (I don’t think they concluded the research and it continues, perhaps with your help of OSINT research).

    The reason why crematories are of interest is that Uighur are Muslim, Muslims don’t burn the bodies of their dead. They bury them (creation is strictly forbidden). Seeing more crematories pop up might be a first clue on whether dead bodies from detention facilities are being burned. We have to stress here, we have to be extremely careful with drawing quick conclusions, the base of evidence is thin. One would need to check local statistics and cross-examine them with other data source.

    We will concentrate only on the sites itself. The ‘unconfirmed sample of crematory’ consists of ten sites. These are listed below. Just a word of warning. Feel free to investigate them further — either via additional satellite footage or on-site visits. Nonetheless, these get us started. The first three are confirmed by eyewitness accounts or local records (as far as I was told, this is sadly only secondary research).

    Cr_Gholja_01 (Existed, 44° 0’17.86"N, 81°13’40.43"E); Cr_Artush_01(Existed, 39°44’35.47"N, 76°12’7.49"E); Urumchi 2 Funeral Parlor (Existed, 43°54’55.20"N; 87°36’9.01"E)

    Cri_Hotan01_(Suspected)
    Cr_Artush_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Hotan_02(Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01(Suspected)
    CrArtush_02 (Suspected)

    Now let’s take a look at the characteristics of the confirmed crematories. They have some distinctive shapes, including a rectangular architecture, walls or a treeline that fence the premises (framed in black). Where marked ‘burial grounds’, I was unable to confirm this but checked with a few other sites mentioned in the coverage that was exposed in 2019 and it looked similar (in short, more time needs to be spent on this).

    What helped the researchers identify the confirmed ones? According to the source, the Chinese called them ‘burial management facilities’. It’s apparently a euphuism for ‘crematories’. The Chinese government bulldozed some burial grounds with the justification that they would take up too much space which was covered in the 2019 reporting.

    The other aspect is whether relatives receive the body of loved ones that die in the camps. Salih Hudayar (now Prime Minister of the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile) says he had a relative who died in a facility (he don’t know whether in the camps or the prison) and his family was not able to have his body returned. He thinks that many other Uighurs have not had the body of a deceased family members returned to them. He assumes they are being cremated as no record exists of a burial site.

    More crematories are only possible if you have employees who staff and run them. The Chinese government tried to find those employees online. “We assume they are being cremated because the government ran job ads and offering high salaries to work on these [crematory] sites”, he added.

    The suspected crematory facilities were then modelled upon the layout of the existing/confirmed ones — e.g. compared with buildings in and around the area. “We found a couple, but we are not 100% sure”, the source admits. Here OSINT journalists could become useful (let me know if you have intel on this matter to follow up with).

    On the description in 2019: evidence surfaced that 45 Uighur cemeteries have been destroyed since 2014, including 30 in just the past two years (research was carried out by AFP and satellite imagery by Earthrise Alliance, here reported by the SCMP).
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment

    Salih Hudayar explained that what worries him is that population statistics don’t square. An often-cited figure of 7 million Uighurs in the province is much lower than the official estimates of the Uighur people.

    The number often used is 12 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs. The number could be higher. Especially in the villages — Uighurs are allowed to have only three kids — some families have more than that and don’t register their offspring, as a result, many kids lack birth certificates. Other figures on the number of Uighur population is much taller (larger than twice of the 12 million figure, but remains hard to confirm that. The closes figure the Chinese government will have internally after the government’s extensive and invasive security and surveillance campaigns, in part to gain information regarding individuals’ religious adherence and practices).

    The rising number of orphanages and kindergartens is also of interest. A satellite and local administrative data analysis should track them. The premise here: the more aggressive the detention of families are in XJ (moving Uighurs from low to higher security facilities), demand for places that house children increases. More orphanages and child-caring facilities could be revealed.
    What can exports tell us about forced labour?

    The type of exports of a region can help to figures out what to look for when it comes to forced labour. Increasingly, the international textile and fashion industry wakes up to reputational damage if supply chains incorporate Xinjiang forced labour. EU leaders held a meeting with China’s president Xi last week where Xi ‘rejected’ foreign [political] meddling in his nation’s affairs. But businesses have more leverage. Xinjiang is busy trading with foreign powers. The Chinese province accounted for a large part of the world’s supply in cotton. Exports amounted to $19.3bn according to export documents (export data for the west of China can be found in China’s official data stats, Stats.gov.cn, customs.gov.cn, or mofcom — this might be useful. Comparing what the government reports and what’s happening on the ground might reveal discrepancies, as it did before).

    Exports (to Europe, across the silk road to the west) is directly connected at A busy train station connecting to the neighbouring country of Kazakstan in the northeast (the export route is called Ala Pass. A short promotional video here). Given the rebound of the Chinese economy, the shipments/trainloads must have increased in May after the effects of the pandemic subsided. What’s unclear is to what extent and whether that matches what the government said.

    Satellite images might reveal discrepancies when train containers at the Dzungarian Gate (the Dzungarian Alatau mountain range along the border between Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) are analysed. It’s the main connection between China and the west.

    The main railway station in Xinjiang for the Alataw pass is the Alashankou railway station (situated here: 45°10′13″N 82°34′13″E). It’s the last resort for export containers before entering Kazakhstan.

    OSINT journalists may be able to gauge Xinjiang export traffic by counting the number of containers on rail tracks. It might be laborious effort, not sure if it yields anything.

    More useful would it be to monitor the use of agriculture and factories in the nearby vicinity of camps, as shown before. Or perhaps they can be linked up.
    Baidu maps: Checking what the Chinese tech companies are ‘hiding’:

    The Chinese government may have little interest to showcase their human-rights violations which they deem as justified (Xi’s statement). Satellite images on Baidu Maps show maps that hide most of the facility. What to make of it? Google Earth lets you upload so-called ‘overlays’. If you stretch them to the right size you can compare the uploaded screenshot (we took from Baidu) with those present in Google Earth. For Tumshuq City/تۇمشۇق شەھىرى/图木舒克市(Túmùshūkè Shì) (39°54’40.02"N, 79° 1’26.09"E), see below.

    Why is Baidu’s involvement increasing relevant? On one hand, it is important to see the connection between private sector companies and the government. Chinese satellites are able to update and provide high-resolution images to the maps on Baidu. But they don’t. We had a similar debate on Twitter, that some government used to press companies to blur our images. But because images are available on other platforms ‘unblurred’, the practice was largely discontinued (there are still examples but they are getting fewer). One reason is that if a blurred area appears, it signals others to be extra vigilant and look out for other images. Instead, what increasing happens is that companies with private satellite are ordered not to release them (read more about the debate here).

    Baidu map’s decision to not show images on certain facilities have backfired. It can be reverse-engineered. Areas where images are unavailable became extra interesting. In this way Buzzfeed used Baidu Maps to their advantage. They located/confirmed some of the camps because of it. This way, they turned shortcoming into an opportunity. You may want to be quick in replicating this principle for other parts of the country where forced labour/detention camps are expected (e.g. Tibet). Such loopholes will usually be fixed swiftly.

    Bit more on the tech. According to a 2019 report by Human Rights Watch, Baidu’s map function used in the IJOP app, a controversial system used by the police and the state that generates “a massive dataset of personal information, and of police behaviour and movements in Xinjiang (it is not known how the authorities plan to use such data): The IJOP app logs the police officer’s GPS locations and other identifying information when they submit information to the IJOP app. The IJOP app uses a map functionality by Baidu, a major Chinese technology company, for purposes including planning the shortest route for police vehicle and officers on foot, according to the app’s source code.
    https://miro.medium.com/max/653/1*umOMbKghZDqPPiy0TpGZ7w.png

    What can the camps in Tibet tell us about the camps in Xinjiang?

    Reuters reported just last week that forced labour expanded to Tibet (south of XJ). Reuter’s own reporting corroborated the findings obtained by Adrian Zenz. It would take another post to go into how to investigate the state of transferred Tibetan labourers. The quick and dirty check on the situation shows the merit of using satellite images to investigate grows as foreign journalists are being barred from areas, such as entering the Tibet region (foreign citizens are only permitted on government-approved tours). OSINT lessons from investigating XJ should be applied to Tibet too.

    How does Xinjiang link to Tibet? The former Tibet Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was chosen for the same job in Xinjiang in 2016 and headed the development of Xinjiang’s camp system, Reuters reported.

    Mass incarceration started before Quanguo came onto the scene: A fanghuiju work team was dispatched to a village in Guma wherein 38 individuals were allegedly detained in a government campaign, in early 2016 — it’s true however that Party Secretary Quanguo, appointed in August 2016, who waged a ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ against violent activities and terrorism increased repression.

    In an article last year, The Print used satellite images to prove that at least three Tibetan “re-education camps” are currently under construction. The author of the survey was Vinayak Bha, an ex-colonel retired from the Indian military intelligence unit.

    Col Vinayak Bhat (@rajfortyseven on Twitter) found three camps in 2018/2019 and share them. One of them is the one in Botuocun (see below). Bha writes about Chinese military deployment dynamics. The temple of Tibetan Buddhism is a ‘concentration camp’ that is surrounded by high walls and guard towers and has the same structural design as a prison. It is feasible that China’s mass detention to spread to Tibetans. Methods will likely base on the model executed in XJ.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*ln7TsCnetV75EKNcv4LBJg.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*DtJKKnYJUH1K7p1_Pyyicw.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*4dU7K9DK9agNbitNmLBT4g.png

    The reports of the three camps emerged in 2019. “Small-scale versions of similar military-style training initiatives have existed in the region for over a decade, but construction of new facilities increased sharply in 2016, and recent policy documents call for more investment in such sites”, one report stated. Looking at the three sites, some of them are quite old but the one below is less than three years old.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*xFr73HSkbxVqDGNgicuVCQ.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*Ylxp6Hk1Nj8AAkvvxXI21Q.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/278/1*a4UgMAeLCBp9LvRfOuf6Tw.png
    The allegation is that these facilities are now be used as detention centres for political indoctrination. “The detainees are allegedly used as forced labour in government factories and projects during the day time or as per shift timings”. It is something that rings true under the light of camps in Xinjiang but we lack evidence from the satellite images.

    There is some evidence that additional factory buildings were added. For the facility above, buildings in the upper east wing, with red roofing was added recently. Their layout reminds us of the blue-roofed buildings in and scattered around Xinjiang facilities, which we also have present: “This architecture is bang on a XJ prison, [though] with a different style roof”, Ruser said.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/512/1*GL1DwZmaqVdgUtaWsZHWdA.png

    https://miro.medium.com/max/303/1*Jr03h6ADK4_iNNfYP5YLkA.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/328/1*RyzDtEa9SjE0WsBSwUaMfA.png

    The prison layout from the older prison facility above — with its long and vertically arranged wings and the rippled features — is similar to prisons seen in Xinjian, such as the two portrayed below (one at Qariqash County at 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E and the other facility in 39°25’54.60”N, 76° 3’20.59"E).
    https://miro.medium.com/max/389/1*w01GGfJZZlcNCWm5MR4csQ.png

    Closing remarks:

    There is a mountain of stuff not included here. This is a training post and not an investigation with full-rested conclusion. This post should encourage other open-source investigative journalists to look into the facilities, follow their own reporting and help monitor developments/details that others may have missed.

    At present there are only a handful of OSINT journalists looking into it. Even fewer have the time to continuously keep this rolling, e.g. analysing the camps as other stories press them to move on.

    We need more eyes on this. The alleged human right abuse must receive all the international scrutiny it can get. People like Shawn Zhang and others with Nathan Ruser and APSI) started the journey. Other journalists must continue and expand on it.

    Also, the more open we are about sources and the analysis (hopefully) the fewer people might try to cast doubt on the existence of the camps (good thread here)

    OSINT techniques used must master the skill to help others to replicate the findings, step by step. That’s the reason this post resulted more in a hands-on tutorial than an explanatory post. I encourage anyone to start looking into the human rights abuse (though, I must stress, be careful to draw quick conclusions. Instead, share what you see on satellite images with the community of serious journalists and OSINT investigators).

    One last thought on commercial satellite imagery companies. It is crucial to get their support on this. For more than 100 camps mentioned in the latest update of the ASPI list (nearly 80 of them high-security detention facilities — classified as tier 3 or 4), we have no updated record of satellite images. This leaves researchers and journalists only to low-resolution devices, by Sentinel 2 images, or beg for images from Maxar or Planet Labs. That’s not good enough. Transparency requires companies inc to make those high-resolution images available, to anyone. Intelligence services should also consider making their high-resolution images available to the public for scrutiny, though, that unlikely to happen.

    https://medium.com/@techjournalism/open-source-satellite-data-to-investigate-xinjiang-concentration-camps-2713c
    #camps_de_concentration #architecture_forensique #images_satellitaires #rééducation #ré-éducation #camps_de_rééducation #Chine #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #Tibet

    ping @reka @isskein @visionscarto

    • I scripted a screen capture of 8000 xinjiang satellite images and uploaded them to here

      Detention Facilities in Xinjiang China : Google Earth Satellite Timelapse : 2002-2020 : 新疆看守所卫星延时摄影
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmoXVvU8G0c

      you can play them fast or find a location by latitude/longitude and step through one image at a time

      later i posted an addendum with another 20 sites, and showing China’s rebuttal to satellite evidence
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHc-TdusgaI

      other possible relevant sites not in ETNAM or ASPI datasets, that I saw in Google Earth
      46.917, 87.837
      43.958, 87.555
      43.450, 82.738
      40.594, 81.111
      40.567, 81.525
      40.563, 81.252
      40.069, 79.471
      39.947, 79.415
      39.270, 88.906
      39.269, 88.849
      39.247, 88.963
      38.197, 85.384
      37.004, 81.617

  • #Montreuil : Le Marbré, nouvel espace pour faire vivre nos luttes
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/10/01/montreuil-le-marbre-nouvel-espace-pour-faire-vivre-nos-luttes

    Le Marbré s’est fait connaître suite à la visite des flics et du gestionnaire immobilier le 16 septembre 2020. Beaucoup de personnes ont répondu à l’appel à soutien ce jour-là et les suivants, et ça faisait trop plaisir. À la suite d’une ouverture collective et parce que nous souhaitons que ce lieu soit auto-organisé, les […]

    #1_rue_Jean-Jacques_Rousseau #39_rue_des_Deux_Communes #gentrification #Le_Marbré #Seine-Saint-Denis

  • Comment l’industrie agroalimentaire a intoxiqué mon enfance #3 : les légumes de la cantine
    https://www.frustrationmagazine.fr/comment-lindustrie-agroalimentaire-a-intoxique-mon-enfance-2-les

    L’industrie agroalimentaire n’est pas dirigée par des enfants de coeur, on le sait désormais tous. Ultra-polluante, modifiant nos habitudes alimentaires pour y incorporer toujours plus de sucre de façon sournoise, ce secteur régit nos vies plus qu’on le croit, et pas seulement par le Coca, le Mac Do et les pots de crème glacée. Pour sortir des généralités, nous avons choisi d’illustrer cette réalité pas si bien connue par le biais de quatre produits qui ont eu une place centrale dans l’alimentation d’un jeune ayant grandi dans les années 1990 et la première décennie des années 2000 : l’auteur lui-même. Après avoir évoqué, dans des épisodes précédents, les céréales et les jus de fruits, il est temps de parler des plats de cantines scolaires. Source : (...)

    • Du jour où ma fille est restée à la maternelle pour déjeuner, elle ne voulait plus manger de courgettes, d’épinards, de sardines crues ou de roquefort.
      Il y avait 3 services entre 11h et 13h, c’était la course et les parents qui le souhaitaient ont été invités à tester le fiasco, et venir manger avec les petits. Je crois avoir déjà raconté sur seenthis comment je me suis retrouvée à table avec eux devant une assiette de sauce sucrée où baignaient différents objets également sucrés aux formes et couleurs censées rappeler carottes, pommes de terre, petits pois mais sans le goût.
      J’ai été surprise que personne ne soit là pour leur expliquer ce qu’ils avaient dans leur assiette, vu qu’ils ne lisaient pas encore le menu, je leur ai donc demandé de me citer ce qu’illes voyaient. Malheureusement, aucun d’eux n’a été capable de me dire (pas plus que moi) ce qu’était le machin blanc sucré caoutchouteux qui flottait, peut-être du poulet du veau ou de la dinde, voire de la pâte à pizza cuite dans de l’eau, impossible à deviner.
      Sauf que je n’étais pas là pour juger de ce qui était servi mais du rush des employé·es surbooké·es qui empêchait la sérénité d’un repas.
      A l’époque je travaillais dans la zone à Vélizy, le seul endroit pour manger était en face des bureaux, chez #Sodexo, on voyait arriver de nos fenêtres les denrées, comme les poches d’eau ou baignaient les pommes de terre épluchées et déjà cuites imprégnées de conservateurs. On devait prendre nos voitures pour se trouver un autre lieu et personne n’avait envie de bouffer là. N’empêche, c’était aussi Sodexo à la cantine de la maternelle et c’était bien pire, parce que les petits ne peuvent pas critiquer ce qu’ils mangent ni aller ailleurs donc c’est vraiment sans aucun scrupule que l’#agro-industrie leur refile sa merde avec une couche de #sucre dessus.

  • #Gap : nouveau squat pour les exilés
    https://fr.squat.net/2020/08/31/gap-nouveau-squat-pour-les-exiles-a-gap

    Communiqué du collectif Cesaï : Le collectif Césaï tient à remercier Roger Didier. Roger Didier ayant été choqué par le communiqué de presse de la préfète du 20/08/2020 concernant l’expulsion du Césaï, a décidé de mettre l’un de ses nombreux bâtiments personnels vides à la disposition des plus démunis. Ne pouvant plus rester sans rien […]

    #3_cours_du_vieux_moulin #CESAI #Chez_Roger #Hautes-Alpes #manifestation #ouverture #sans-papiers

  • l’histgeobox : Addis Abeba, 1969-1975 : une plongée dans l’âge d’or de la musique moderne éthiopienne.
    https://lhistgeobox.blogspot.com/2020/08/addis-abeba-1969-1975-une-plongee-dans.html

    La musique fut longtemps malfamée en Ethiopie. Pour les Amharas et les Tigréens qui se partageaient le pouvoir, il était exclu de jouer de la musique sans déchoir. Seules les catégories de la population marginalisées, principalement originaires des régions méridionales, s’abaissaient à une telle pratique. Les azmari, équivalents des ménestrels médiévaux, improvisaient souplement leurs paroles sur des canevas musicaux minimalistes à l’aide d’instruments locaux comme le krar, une lyre à six corde, le masenqo, une vielle monocorde à archet, la washint, une flûte, le kebero, une percussion... Méprisés, les azmari disposaient cependant de la liberté de parole, maniant le « double entendre » à merveille.

  • Statues contestées #3 : Antilles, États-Unis, les épicentres de la contestation
    https://parolesdhistoire.fr/index.php/2020/07/22/142-statues-contestees-3-antilles-etats-unis-les-epicentres-de-la-c

    Depuis mai 2020, à travers le monde, les statues et monuments ayant un lien avec le passé colonial et esclavagiste sont contestées et parfois renversées. Une irruption des enjeux mémoriels dans l’espace public qui fait l’objet de cinq émissions du podcast. Aujourd’hui : Antilles, États-Unis, les épicentres de la contestation. Avec Audrey CÉLESTINE, MCF en sociologie politique à l’Université de Lille, Silyane LARCHER, politiste, chargée de recherche au CNRS, Emmanuelle PEREZ TISSERANT, MCF à l’Université Toulouse 2 Jean-Jaurès, Michael ROY, MCF en études américaines à l’Université Paris-Nanterre, Dominique TAFFIN, directrice de la Fondation pour la mémoire de l’esclavage. Durée : 47 min. Source : Paroles (...)

    https://media.blubrry.com/parolesdhistoire/s/content.blubrry.com/parolesdhistoire/STATUESCONTESTEES3.mp3

  • Du coeur au ventre
    #Documentaire d’Alice Gauvin. 38 minutes. Diffusé le 28 octobre 2012 dans 13h15 Le Dimanche sur France 2.

    Il y a 40 ans, une jeune fille de 17 ans, Marie-Claire était jugée au #Tribunal de Bobigny. Jugée pour avoir avorté.
    Nous sommes en 1972 et l’#avortement est interdit en #France.
    Les #femmes avortent quand même, dans la #clandestinité et des conditions dramatiques, parfois au péril de leur vie.
    Des femmes, des médecins vont s’engager pour briser la #loi_du_silence et obtenir une loi qui autorise l’#interruption_volontaire_de_grossesse.
    C’est l’histoire d’un #combat, d’un débat passionné. Sur la #vie, la #mort, et un acte encore #tabou aujourd’hui.
    « Aucune femme ne recourt de gaieté de cœur à l’avortement » dira Simone Veil à la tribune de l’Assemblée nationale. « Il suffit d’écouter les femmes ».

    https://vimeo.com/77331979


    #IVG #film #film_documentaire #histoire #justice #planning_familial #avortement_clandestin #faiseuses_d'anges #Suisse #décès #343_femmes #résistance #lutte #avortement_libre #343_salopes #Marie-Claire_Chevalier #procès_de_Bobigny #procès_politique #Gisèle_Halimi #injustice #loi #aspiration #méthode_Karman #Grenoble #Villeneuve #Joëlle_Brunerie-Kauffmann #Olivier_Bernard #manifeste_des_médecins #choix #désobéissance_civile #maternité #parentalité #liberté #Simon_Veil #Simon_Iff #clause_de_conscience #commandos #anti-IVG #commandos_anti-IVG #RU_486 #centre_IVG #loi_Bachelot #hôpitaux_publics #tabou