• L’Europe doit mettre fin à la répression des défenseurs des droits humains qui aident les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants

    « Dans toute l’Europe, il est de plus en plus fréquent que des organisations et des individus soient harcelés, intimidés, victimes de violences ou considérés comme des délinquants simplement parce qu’ils contribuent à protéger les droits humains des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile et des migrants. Les États européens doivent mettre fin à cette répression », a déclaré aujourd’hui la Commissaire aux droits de l’homme du Conseil de l’Europe, Dunja Mijatović, à l’occasion de la publication d’une Recommandation sur la situation des défenseurs des droits humains qui aident les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants en Europe.

    Cette Recommandation, intitulée Protéger les défenseurs : mettre fin à la répression des défenseurs des droits humains qui aident les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants en Europe, donne un aperçu des défis auxquels sont confrontés les défenseurs des droits humains et présente les mesures que les États membres du Conseil de l’Europe devraient prendre pour les protéger.

    Dans le contexte de politiques d’asile et de migration répressives, sécuritaires et militarisées, les États négligent de plus en plus leur obligation de veiller à ce que les défenseurs des droits humains puissent travailler dans un environnement sûr et favorable. En conséquence, de multiples formes de répression s’exercent sur les défenseurs qui participent à des opérations de sauvetage en mer, fournissent une aide humanitaire ou une assistance juridique, mènent des opérations de surveillance des frontières, assurent une couverture médiatique, mènent des activités de plaidoyer, engagent des procédures contentieuses, ou soutiennent par d’autres moyens encore les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants en Europe.

    La Recommandation examine les problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les défenseurs des droits humains, notamment :

    - des propos hostiles et stigmatisants tenus par des représentants gouvernementaux, des parlementaires et certains médias ;
    – des violences et des menaces, et le manque de réaction des autorités pour y répondre ;
    – la criminalisation du travail humanitaire ou de défense des droits humains mené auprès des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile et des migrants, due à une application trop large des lois sur le trafic illicite de migrants ;
    – le refus d’accès à des lieux où il est essentiel d’assurer un suivi de la situation des droits humains ou de fournir une aide, tels que des centres de détention ou d’accueil ou des zones frontalières.

    « Les gouvernements européens devraient voir les défenseurs des droits humains comme des partenaires qui peuvent contribuer de manière déterminante à rendre les politiques d’asile et de migration plus efficaces et respectueuses des droits humains. Au lieu de cela, ils les traitent avec hostilité. Cette politique délibérée porte atteinte aux droits humains des acteurs de la société civile et des personnes auxquelles ils viennent en aide. Par extension, elle ronge le tissu démocratique des sociétés », a déclaré la Commissaire.

    Afin d’inverser cette tendance répressive, la Commissaire appelle à prendre d’urgence une série de mesures, dont les suivantes :

    - réformer les lois, politiques et pratiques qui entravent indûment les activités des défenseurs des droits humains ;
    – veiller à ce que les lois sur le trafic illicite de migrants ne confèrent le caractère d’infraction pénale à aucune activité de défense des droits humains ou d’aide humanitaire menée auprès des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile et des migrants ;
    - lever les restrictions d’accès aux lieux et aux informations ;
    - mettre fin au discours stigmatisant et dénigrant ;
    - établir des procédures de sécurité efficaces pour les défenseurs confrontés à des violences ou à des menaces et veiller à ce que ces cas fassent l’objet d’enquêtes effectives.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/id/264775174?_com_liferay_asset_publisher_web_portlet_AssetPublisherPortlet_INSTAN
    #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité #asile #migrations #réfugiés #solidarité #recommandation #conseil_de_l'Europe #répression #assistance_juridique #sauvetage #aide_humanitaire #violence #menaces #hostilité #droits_humains #rapport

  • Il Consiglio d’Europa chiede all’Italia di garantire più protezione alle vittime di tratta

    Nel rapporto del Gruppo di esperti sulla lotta alla tratta di esseri umani (Greta) si chiede alle autorità di aumentare le indagini e le condanne, assicurare strumenti efficaci di risarcimento per le vittime e concentrarsi maggiormente sullo sfruttamento lavorativo. Oltre allo stop del memorandum Italia-Libia. Su cui il governo tira dritto.

    Più attenzione alla tratta per sfruttamento lavorativo, maggiori risarcimenti e indennizzi per le vittime e la necessità di aumentare il numero di trafficanti di esseri umani assicurati alla giustizia. Ma anche lo stop del memorandum Italia-Libia e la fine della criminalizzazione dei cosiddetti “scafisti”.

    Sono queste le principali criticità su cui il Gruppo di esperti del Consiglio d’Europa sulla lotta alla tratta di esseri umani (Greta) a fine febbraio ha chiesto al governo italiano di intervenire per assicurare l’applicazione delle normative europee e una tutela efficace per le vittime di tratta degli esseri umani. “Ogni anno in Italia ne vengono individuate tra le 2.100 e le 3.800 -si legge nel report finale pubblicato il 23 febbraio-. Queste cifre non riflettono la reale portata del fenomeno a causa dei persistenti limiti nelle procedure per identificare le vittime, nonché di un basso tasso di autodenuncia da parte delle stesse che temono di essere punite o deportate verso i Paesi di origine”. Una scarsa individuazione dei casi di tratta che riguarderebbe soprattutto alcuni settori “ad alto rischio” come “l’agricoltura, il tessile, i servizi domestici, l’edilizia, il settore alberghiero e la ristorazione”.

    L’oggetto del terzo monitoraggio di attuazione obblighi degli Stati stabiliti dalla Convenzione del Consiglio d’Europa sulla lotta contro la tratta degli esseri umani era proprio l’accesso alla giustizia per le vittime. Dal 13 al 17 febbraio 2023, il gruppo di esperti si è recato in Italia incontrando decine di rappresentanti istituzionali e di organizzazioni della società civile. La prima bozza del report adottata nel giugno 2023 è stata poi condivisa con il governo italiano che a ottobre ha inviato le sue risposte prima della pubblicazione finale del rapporto. Quello in cui il Greta, pur sottolineando “alcuni sviluppi positivi” dall’ultima valutazione svolta in Italia nel 2019, esprime “preoccupazione su diverse questioni”.

    Il risarcimento per le vittime della tratta è una di queste. Spesso “reso impossibile dalla mancanza di beni o proprietà degli autori del reato in Italia” ma anche perché “i meccanismi di cooperazione internazionale sono raramente utilizzati per identificare e sequestrare i beni degli stessi all’estero”. Non solo. Il sistema di indennizzo per le vittime -nel caso in cui, appunto, chi ha commesso il reato non abbia disponibilità economica- non funziona. “Serve renderlo effettivamente accessibile e aumentare il suo importo massimo di 1.500 euro”. Come ricostruito anche da Altreconomia, da quando è stato istituito questo strumento solo in un caso la vittima ha avuto accesso al fondo.

    Il Greta rileva poi una “diminuzione del numero di indagini, azioni penali e di condanne” osservando in generale una applicazione ristretta di tratta di esseri umani collegandola “all’esistenza di un elemento transnazionale, al coinvolgimento di un’organizzazione criminale e all’assenza del consenso della vittima”. Tutti elementi non previsti dalla normativa europea e italiana. Così come “desta preoccupazione l’eccessiva durata dei procedimenti giudiziari, in particolare della fase investigativa”.

    Il gruppo di esperti sottolinea poi la persistenza di segnalazioni di presunte vittime di tratta “perseguite e condannate per attività illecite commesse durante la tratta, come il traffico di droga, il possesso di un documento d’identità falso o l’ingresso irregolare”. Un problema che spesso porta la persona in carcere e non nei progetti di accoglienza specializzati. Che in Italia aumentano. Il Greta accoglie infatti con favore “l’aumento dei fondi messi a disposizione per l’assistenza alle vittime e la disponibilità di un maggior numero di posti per le vittime di tratta, anche per uomini e transgender” sottolineando però la necessità di prevedere un “finanziamento più sostenibile”. In questo momento i bandi per i progetti pubblicati dal Dipartimento per le pari opportunità, hanno una durata tra i 17 e i 18 mesi.

    C’è poi la difficoltà nell’accesso all’assistenza legale gratuita che dovrebbe essere garantita alle vittime che invece, spesso, si trovano obbligate a dimostrare di non avere beni di proprietà non solo in Italia ma anche nei loro Paesi d’origine per poter accedere alle forme di consulenza legale gratuita. Problematico è anche l’accesso all’assistenza sanitaria. “I professionisti del Sistema sanitario nazionale -scrive il Greta- non sono formati per assistere le vittime di tratta con gravi traumi e mancano mediatori culturali formati per partecipare alla fornitura di assistenza psicologica”.

    Come detto, il focus degli esperti riguarda la tratta per sfruttamento lavorativo. Su cui l’Italia ha adottato diverse misure di protezione per le vittime ma che però restano insufficienti. “Lo sfruttamento del lavoro continua a essere profondamente radicato in alcuni settori che dipendono fortemente dalla manodopera migrante” ed è necessario “garantire risorse che risorse sufficienti siano messe a disposizione degli ispettori del lavoro, rafforzando il monitoraggio dei settori a rischio e garantendo che le condizioni di vita e di lavoro dei lavoratori migranti soddisfare i requisiti previsti dalla normativa al fine di prevenire abusi”.

    Infine il Greta bacchetta il governo italiano su diversi aspetti relativi alla nuova normativa sui richiedenti asilo. “Temiamo che le misure restrittive adottate dall’Italia favoriscano un clima di criminalizzazione dei migranti, con il risultato che molte potenziali vittime della tratta non denunciano i loro casi per paura di detenzione e deportazione”, scrivono gli esperti. Sottolineando la preoccupazione rispetto al “rischio di aumento del numero di richiedenti asilo nei centri di detenzione amministrativa” previsto dagli ultimi provvedimenti normativi che aumenterebbe la possibilità anche per le vittime di tratta non ancora identificate di essere recluse. Un rischio riscontrato anche per il Protocollo sottoscritto con l’Albania per gli impatti che avrà “sull’individuazione e la protezione delle persone vulnerabili salvate in mare”.

    Sul punto, nelle risposte inviate al Greta l’8 febbraio 2024, il governo italiano sottolinea che il protocollo siglato con la controparte albanese “non si applicherà alle persone vulnerabili, incluse le vittime di tratta”. Resta il punto della difficoltà di identificazione fatta subito dopo il soccorso, spesso in condizioni precarie dopo una lunga e faticosa traversata.

    Ma nelle dieci pagine di osservazioni inviate da parte dell’Italia, salta all’occhio la puntualizzazione rispetto alla richiesta del Greta di sospendere il memorandum d’intesa tra Italia e Libia che fa sì che “un numero crescente di migranti salvati o intercettati nel Mediterraneo vengano rimpatriati in Libia dove rischiano -scrivono gli esperti- di subire gravi violazioni dei diritti umani, tra cui la schiavitù, il lavoro forzato e lo sfruttamento sessuale”. Nella risposta, infatti, il governo sottolinea che ha scelto di cooperare con le autorità libiche “con l’obiettivo di ridurre i morti in mare, nel pieno rispetto dei diritti umani” e che la collaborazione “permette di combattere più efficacemente le reti di trafficanti di esseri umani e di coloro che contrabbandano i migranti”. Con il rispetto dei diritti umani, del diritti umanitario e internazionale che è “sempre stata una priorità”. Evidentemente non rispettata. Ma c’è un dettaglio in più.

    Quel contrasto al traffico di migranti alla base anche del memorandum con la Libia, sbandierato a più riprese dall’esecutivo italiano (“Andremo a cercare gli ‘scafisti’ lungo tutto il globo terracqueo”, disse la premier Giorgia Meloni a inizio marzo 2023) viene messo in discussione nel rapporto. Dopo aver sottolineato la diminuzione delle indagini sui trafficanti di esseri umani, il Greta scrive che i “capitani” delle navi che arrivano in Italia “potrebbero essere stati costretti tramite minacce, violenza fisica e abuso di una posizione di vulnerabilità nel partecipare all’attività criminali”. Indicatori che li farebbero ricadere nella “categoria” delle vittime di tratta. “Nessuno, però, è stato considerato come tale”, osservano gli esperti. Si scioglie come neve al sole la retorica sulla “guerra” ai trafficanti. I pezzi grossi restano, nel frattempo, impuniti.

    https://altreconomia.it/il-consiglio-deuropa-chiede-allitalia-di-garantire-piu-protezione-alle-

    #traite_d'êtres_humains #Italie #protection #Conseil_de_l'Europe #exploitation #Greta #rapport #agriculture #industrie_textile #hôtelerie #bâtiment #BTS #services_domestiques #restauration #indemnisation #accès_à_la_santé #criminalisation_de_la_migration #Albanie

  • Improving the humanitarian situation of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers in #Calais and #Dunkirk areas

    The report presented by #Stephanie_Krisper (Austria, ALDE) to the Migration Committee, meeting in Paris, highlighted that the basic needs of a high number of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers in the areas of Calais and Dunkirk (France), were not met. It mentions in particular insufficient places of accommodation situated in remote places that are difficult to access, problematic access to food and water with insufficient and overcrowded distribution points, deficient access to non-food items such as blankets or tents, and limited access to healthcare.

    This report follows a fact-finding visit carried out on 25 and 26 October 2023 by a parliamentary delegation chaired by Ms Krisper, whose objective was to examine the situation of asylum seekers and migrants as well as their defenders in the city of Calais and its surroundings.

    It underlines that these people are stuck in Calais and Dunkirk areas mainly because they have nowhere to go and generally cannot return to their country of origin, a situation exacerbated by the inadequacy of the formal reception system, the lack of information about asylum seekers’ rights as well as cumbersome and long procedures.

    Faced with “this appalling situation, especially since winter is here”, the parliamentarians recommend urgently increasing humanitarian and health assistance through additional volunteers and resources for the associations acting on spot, especially the non-mandated structures. The dignity and fundamental rights of these people must be preserved, and violations and harassments committed by police forces must end, they added.

    The report also warns of the danger these people face by risking their lives when crossing the Channel to the United Kingdom, at the mercy of criminal smuggling networks.

    Finally, the parliamentarians call for a shared responsibility between all European countries, “in order not to leave the burden to countries on the external border of the EU, where congestions points are observed”.

    In addition to its President, Ms Krisper, the delegation was composed of Jeremy Corbyn (United Kingdom, SOC), Emmanuel Fernandes (France, GUE), Pierre-Alain Fridez (Switzerland, SOC) and Sandra Zampa (Italy, SOC).

    Pour télécharger le rapport:
    https://rm.coe.int/report-of-the-ad-hoc-sub-committee-to-carry-out-a-fact-finding-visit-t/1680adaf30

    https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9317/improving-the-humanitarian-situation-of-refugees-migrants-and-asylum-seeke
    #France #Manche #La_Manche #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #visite_parlementaire #Dunkerque #frontières #hébergement #accès_à_l'eau #besoins_fondamentaux #nourriture #accès_à_la_nourriture #accès_aux_soins #santé #droits_fondamentaux #dignité #violences_policières #harcèlement_policier #harcèlement #traversée #passeurs #trafiquants_d'êtres_humains #conseil_de_l'Europe

    • Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2023)260

      Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights

      Ilias and Ahmed group against Hungary

      The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that the Committee supervises the execution of final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” and “the Court”);

      Recalling that this group of cases concerns a violation of the procedural obligation under Article 3 to assess the risks of ill-treatment before removing the asylum-seeking applicants to Serbia by relying on a general presumption of “safe third country” (Ilias and Ahmed; W.A. and others); it further concerns violations of the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention following the application of the “apprehension and escort” measure introduced by the State Borders Act, authorising the police to remove the asylum-seeking applicants staying illegally in Hungarian territory to the external side of the border fence (on the border with Serbia) without a decision, as well as the lack of an effective remedy under Article 13 in respect of the applicants’ removal (Shahzad and H.K.);

      Taking note of the authorities’ information that the legislative presumption of “safe third country” in respect of Serbia has not been applied by the asylum authority or the domestic courts since
      26 May 2020;

      Considering nevertheless that sufficient guarantees against the reoccurrence of a violation similar to the one identified by the European Court in Ilias and Ahmed and W.A. and Others are necessary;

      Reiterating its grave concern that despite the authorities’ repeated indications that the reform of the asylum system is underway, no information on concrete measures has been communicated in this respect;

      Reiterating further its grave concern that, despite the concerns expressed in its previous decisions and notwithstanding the adoption of the Shahzad and H.K. judgments by the European Court, collective expulsions reportedly not only continue but that their numbers are increasing at a concerning rate;

      Emphasising the legal obligation of every State, under the terms of Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention to abide by the final judgments of the European Court in any case to which they are a party, fully, effectively and promptly;

      INVITED the authorities to submit an undertaking that, in the absence of a thorough and up-to-date reassessment of the asylum situation in Serbia, they will refrain from again applying the legislative presumption of “safe third country” to that country;

      STRONGLY URGED the authorities to intensify their efforts in reforming the asylum system in order to afford effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures in line with Hungary’s international obligations, and invited them to establish a timeline for the legislative process, to present a draft legislative proposal and to keep the Committee informed of all relevant developments in the legislative process;

      EXHORTED the authorities to terminate, without further delay, the practice of removing asylum-seekers to Serbia pursuant to section 5 of the State Borders Act without their identification or examination of their individual situation;

      REITERATED its call on the authorities to introduce an effective remedy providing a person alleging that their expulsion procedure is “collective” in nature with an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of their complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum, in line with the Court’s case-law;

      INVITED the authorities to submit an updated action plan, including information on all the above issues, by 30 June 2024, and decided to resume consideration of this group, in the light of the information received, at their DH meeting in September 2024;

      ENVISAGED taking new action to ensure that Hungary abides by its obligations deriving from the Court’s judgments in this group of cases, should no tangible progress be achieved by that meeting as regards the issues mentioned above.

      https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680aca0b9

  • Drowning in Lies. Greece tries to cover up its own role in the #Pylos shipwreck by tampering with evidence

    On the night of 13 June, a vessel carrying around 750 men, women and children mainly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria capsized in the Central Mediterranean, in Greek waters. The Greek authorities had been aware of the overloaded vessel the day before because Europe’s border agency Frontex and activists had warned them.

    Instead of rescuing the people, the Greek coast guard stayed close to the boat and observed it from the sky with a helicopter, ignoring Frontex’s offer for help. They sent commercial vessels to the area and later a coast guard boat.

    Shortly after the coast guard vessel arrived on the scene, the overloaded boat capsized. Only 104 men survived. All the others, including all the women and children on board, drowned.

    Survivors alleged that their vessel was towed by the Greek coast guard boat, causing the fatal wreck. The Greek coast guard and the government strongly denied these allegations and claimed the boat was never towed.

    We decided to collect as many survivor testimonies as possible and try to establish what really happened, and whether there had been efforts to cover up the truth.
    METHODS

    Finding visual evidence to determine the cause of the shipwreck was nearly impossible since it happened on the high seas and commercial vessels and surveillance planes were sent away by the Greek authorities. Videos survivors might have had on their phones were no longer accessible due to water damage or because they lost their phones.

    We decided to put a team together, including journalists from the same regions as the passengers, and carried out 17 interviews with survivors – the largest number collected in a single investigation into the wreck so far – to compare their accounts. We also spoke to sources inside the European border agency Frontex.

    We obtained crucial court documents containing two sets of testimonies given by the same nine survivors. They spoke first to the Greek coast guard and later to a local Greek court.
    STORYLINES

    Documents and witness testimony obtained by Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, Monitor, SIRAJ, El País, Reporters United and The Times show the Greek coast guard tampered with official statements to conceal their role in the wreck and pressured survivors into naming certain people as the smugglers.

    Nine survivors were asked by the coast guard to give witness statements just hours after the wreck. On analysing the documents, we discovered that critical parts of several testimonies contain identical phrases.

    The documents reveal that the translator used during one of the survivor’s interviews with the coast guard is a member of the coast guard himself. Other translators were local residents who spoke Arabic and other languages, who were sworn in on the day.

    In the documents, eight survivors are stated to have blamed the capsizing on factors unrelated to towing. Four of them are stated to have testified – in nearly identical wording – that the boat capsized because it was “old” and “there were no life jackets”. Their interviews were translated by three different interpreters.

    None of the survivors interrogated by the coast guard blamed the coast guard at all, according to the transcriptions. But in a later round of questioning by a Greek court of the same nine survivors, six of them are stated to have said the coast guard towed the boat shortly before it capsized.

    We spoke to two of the nine survivors who testified; they told us that the coast guard had omitted the parts of their testimony mentioning towing.

    “They asked me what happened to the boat and how it sank. I told them the Greek coast guard came and tied the rope to our boat and towed us and caused the capsizing of the boat,” said one survivor. “They didn’t type that in my testimony. When they presented it at the end I couldn’t find this part.”

    He added that the coast guard pressured him to single out certain people as the smugglers in charge of the operation. This claim is supported by our analysis of the documents: two answers to the coast guard’s questions about smugglers contain identical sentences.

    Another survivor who testified said he also blamed the shipwreck on towing when asked by the coast guard, but still signed the deposition at the end despite knowing it did not reflect what he said, because he felt “terrified”.

    Sixteen out of the seventeen survivors we spoke to said the coast guard attached a rope to the vessel and tried to tow it shortly before it capsized. Four also claimed that the coast guard was attempting to tow the boat to Italian waters, while four reported that the coast guard caused more deaths by circling around the boat after it capsized, making waves that caused the boat’s carcass to sink.

    While Europe and its border agency Frontex have largely backed Greece on its border practices and said following the shipwreck that they believed the coast guard did everything it could to save the people who drowned, Frontex is now doubting the official version

    The border agency has circulated an internal report on the incident based on survivor testimony, in which survivors state that the Greek coast guard was to blame for the drownings, according to sources.

    https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/drowning-in-lies
    #Grèce #naufrage #asile #migrations #décès #morts #tragédie #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #14_juin_2023 #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #13_juin_2023
    #Lighthouse_reports #enquête #contre-enquête

    Sur ce naufrage voir ce fil de discussion:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1006608

    • Survivors: ‘Greek coastguard was next to us when boat capsized’

      Two Syrian refugees recall their harrowing journey and pin blame on the coastguard for the devastating shipwreck.

      “The boat was too heavy,” he told Al Jazeera.

      “We were sitting next to each other, and there was a constant fear of sinking.”

      On the derelict blue ship that was soon to hit international headlines, he saw about 750 people crammed together, shoulder-to-shoulder, unable to move. They had all hoped to eventually reach Europe.

      In a few days, he would see hundreds of these people drown as a Greek coastguard ship floated nearby.

      Ahmed fled Syria with his friend Mohammed*, 23. They both asked to use pseudonyms because they fear the Greek government would punish them for speaking out about what they saw that night.

      They are two of the 104 survivors of the shipwreck off the coast of Pylos, Greece. Seventy-eight people have been confirmed dead.

      Like hundreds of other people on board, their third companion, Mohammed’s cousin, was never found.

      Their path to the central Mediterranean was taken in many steps. Ahmed and Mohammed said they left home hoping for a future without violence.

      Their journey took them to Lebanon, then Egypt and Libya.

      They spent about a month in Libya, where smugglers kept them closed up in an apartment with Egyptians, Pakistanis and other Syrians also making the journey.

      Mohammed said the smugglers beat the Egyptians and Pakistanis, constantly cursing and insulting them.

      Finally, in the first days of June, they were told, “You are leaving today.”

      They were put on the back of trucks that drove to the shore, were loaded onto small boats and were taken to a trawler, the Adriana, out in deeper waters.

      “They were beating people there,” Ahmed said.

      “They were beating them while taking them to the lower deck of the boat. … It was very bad down there. It smelled of diesel and fish. You couldn’t breathe.”

      Ahmed and his companions managed to pay a bribe of $200 to get themselves a spot on the upper deck.

      But wherever the passengers sat on the ship, they were wedged together.

      Women and children were kept below in the hold. From their cramped spot on the top deck, the young men could see the sea.
      ‘People were starting to lose consciousness’

      From the second day of the voyage, the boat’s engine started breaking down.

      “They would repair it, and after a while, it would break down again,” Mohammed said. “Every time they repaired it, it would stop again after two to three hours.”

      After the second day at sea, food and water ran out. Panic began to percolate across the ship.

      “At that time, people were starting to lose consciousness,” Ahmed said.

      “They were falling on the ground. They were fainting. Some were shaking. We were seeing tens, hundreds of people in this state.”

      They heard fights were breaking out all across the boat due to hunger, thirst and fear.

      “Me, Ahmed and my relative who is now missing were always trying to keep our spirits up,” Mohammed said. “When someone cried, we made jokes. ‘We will make it,’ we were saying to ourselves. But everyone was going crazy.”

      By the fourth day, they heard disturbing news from the hold.

      “Some people coming up from below said, ‘There are dead people down there,’” Ahmed said.

      “They said there were six dead bodies on the boat. Five bodies were down below, and we didn’t see them. One was on the upper deck. We saw him.”

      Ahmed and Mohammed said the passengers started telephoning the Italian authorities and the Greek coastguard to ask for help.

      “From the fourth day onwards, the Greek coastguard had been aware of us,” Mohammed said.

      By the fifth day, June 13, they said it looked like the Adriana had stopped moving completely.

      In the afternoon, a helicopter flew overhead.

      The passengers could not understand from the deck, but it was the Greek coastguard. In the afternoon, one and then another commercial ship passed by and tossed those on board water over the waves.

      “People were saying: ‘Take us with you.’ They were saying, ‘No.’” Mohammed said. “We asked for help, but they refused to help us.”

      A Greek coastguard vessel finally approached the fishing trawler around midnight in the first minutes of June 14, the friends said. “‘Follow us,’ they told us. We followed them,” Mohammed said.

      “Half an hour later, our boat stopped completely. It could not move. They came back and tied us to their boat.”

      Ahmed and Mohammed said the coastguard started to tow their stalled-out trawler, but it took a sharp turn, and the Adriana heaved precariously left, then right, then capsized.

      “They were right next to us when it capsized. In the moment it sank, they moved away from us. They deliberately made us sink,” Mohammed said. “We were standing on top of the boat, and we were able to see everything clearly.”

      Tossed into the dark Mediterranean Sea, hundreds of people tried to find something to cling onto, some way to survive. “People were holding onto me,” Ahmed said.

      “I was going under the water and getting away from people. Every time I got away, I would come across someone else, and they would hold onto me to save themselves. When someone grabbed onto me, we both went underwater together.”

      After an hour and a half, Ahmed said he spotted an inflatable coastguard boat and swam towards it.

      “They were 200 or 300 metres [220 to 330 yards] away from us,” he said. “I swam to them and got into the boat. They did not come close to us to save us. They were standing far away, and those who could swim were going towards them, like me.”

      As he made his way towards the inflatable boat, Ahmed had to push aside bodies floating in the water.

      Once taken to the larger coastguard boat, Ahmed was reunited with Mohammed. The two hugged each other, overwhelmed and elated to have found each other.

      They started asking about their third companion. He had not made it, and they realised how incomplete their relief was.

      The survivors of the shipwreck were taken ashore. Mohammed said that when they were first held in the Greek city of Kalamata, the authorities came to take his testimony of the tragedy three or four times.

      “When we told them that we had been towed with a rope, they stopped,” he said. “They were saying that the problem was our boat. They wrote our statements with their own words. They did not write down what we said. They made us say it and write it down.”

      Ahmed said no officials have ever taken his testimony.
      ‘Accountability vacuum’

      Both men are now in the Malakasa refugee camp, 40km (25 miles) north of Athens. They are awaiting their asylum claims to be processed. Mohammed is desperate for news of his cousin, even if that news is confirmation he is dead.

      Ahmed’s and Mohammed’s accounts contradict the account of the Greek coastguard, which has said the passengers of the Adriana refused aid, it was only immobile for about 20 minutes before it capsized and the coastguard had not towed the boat prior to it capsizing.

      Survivors’ accounts line up with other evidence.

      The Greek investigative website Solomon has published emails showing that the Greek authorities had been notified that the ship was in distress by 6pm (15:00 GMT) on June 13. And tracking data published and verified by the BBC and The New York Times show that the trawler was not moving for at least seven hours before it capsized.

      When asked to comment on allegations that the coastguard towed the boat and was involved in the shipwreck, the Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy told Al Jazeera: “The required information is part of the investigation procedure that is being conducted under strict confidentiality based on the instructions given by the prosecutor of the Supreme Court. Regarding the details of the operation plan of the Hellenic coastguard, no further comments can be made by our service.”

      Fingers have been pointed at the Greek coastguard for both the shipwreck and its large death toll.

      “It has been evidenced that the Hellenic coastguard uses a range of tactics to move boats they have intercepted at sea into different territorial areas to avoid responsibility for search and rescue and the lodging of their applications for international protection,” said Hope Barker, a policy analyst at the Border Violence Monitoring Network.

      “Whilst this usually includes towing boats back to Turkish territorial waters, it is equally likely that if the boat was closer to Italian territorial waters, they would try to transfer it there instead.”

      The organisation is calling for an independent investigation and for Frontex, the European Union’s border agency, to withdraw from Greece.

      “Violations of fundamental rights by the Hellenic coastguard are routine and systematised operations that have proven to be under-investigated by the Greek state. There is an accountability vacuum that allows these actions to continue unabated,” Barker said.

      In Malakasa, Mohammed said he cannot stop thinking about the moment the boat capsized and the screams of the people around him. He does not know how he survived in the water.

      “I shouted Ahmed’s and my cousin’s names for a while,” he said. “In that moment, I heard a voice screaming, ‘Mother! Mother!’ I asked that person for his name, and he said, ‘Fuat’.

      “He and I told each other our names, so that whichever of us survived would be able to bring the news to the other’s family.”

      https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/7/5/survivors-greek-coastguard-was-next-to-us-when-boat-capsized

    • Under the unwatchful eye of the authorities’ deactivated cameras: dying in the darkest depths of the Mediterranean

      A collaborative investigation by Solomon, Forensis, The Guardian and ARD presents the most complete tracing, to date, of the course that the fishing vessel Adriana took until it ultimately sank, causing over 600 people to drown − while under the supervision of Greek and European authorities. A document reveals that according to Frontex recommendations, the Coast Guard vessel was obligated to record the operation on video.

      In the early hours of June 14, the state-of-the-art cameras of the Coast Guard vessel ΠΠΛΣ-920 were off.

      The deadliest shipwreck within the Greek Search and Rescue Zone, one of the largest the Mediterranean has ever seen, was reportedly not visually detected.

      Only hours before, aerial photos of the overloaded fishing vessel were taken. Nearby tankers recorded videos before they were ordered to leave the scene. There were satellite images that captured its movement.

      But the exact circumstances in which the Adriana capsized off Pylos, killing more than 600 people, remain unclear three weeks on.

      In affidavits and interviews, some of the 104 survivors attributed the sinking of the fishing vessel to an attempt by the Hellenic Coast Guard to tow it to Italian waters.

      The Coast Guard emphasizes that it saved human lives, and maintains that the fishing vessel overturned due to a disturbance by the passengers.

      Solomon, in a joint investigation with the research group Forensis, The Guardian and German public broadcaster ARD reveals: the Coast Guard vessel ΠΠΛΣ-920, the only vessel present at the time the Adriana capsized, was obligated to “document its operation by video-recording” in accordance with a 2021 Frontex document which recommends that the Greek authorities record their operations continually.

      If this had been done, today there would be answers to the questions that the victims’ families are still asking.

      The ΠΠΛΣ-920 cameras were supposed to record

      By midday on June 13, the Greek and Italian authorities and Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), were aware of the overloaded fishing vessel, which had been sailing aimlessly for four days in the central Mediterranean – its only means of navigation was a compass and the position of the sun.

      The activist network Alarm Phone had also relayed to the authorities the desperate SOS of some 750 men, women, and children — mostly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria — who, lacking potable water, were using their shoelaces to lower containers into the sea: “They are urgently asking for help”.

      ΠΠΛΣ-920, the Coast Guard vessel which received the order to depart from the port of Souda, Crete to assist, has been the pride of the Coast Guard since 2021. European funding covered 90% of its cost, and it is one of the best-equipped vessels available in Greece.

      And it could not be in better hands: earlier this year, in March, its captain was awarded for “his valuable contribution to the protection of maritime borders and human life at sea.”

      According to the Coast Guard, ΠΠΛΣ-920, like its three sister ships (ΠΠΛΣ-900, ΠΠΛΣ-910 and ΠΠΛΣ-930), has two state-of-the-art thermal camera systems. According to the Coast Guard, however, when the fishing vessel capsized, the cameras were not in operation because the crew’s attention was focused on the rescue efforts.

      “When we have an incident, we try to have the ability to operate seamlessly. Making some crew members ‘inactive’ so that they can record a video, you understand, is unethical,” Coast Guard spokesman Nikos Alexiou stated on June 15, justifying why the incident was not recorded on video.

      However, one of the three former and current Coast Guard officers who spoke to us during our investigation, said that these cameras do not require constant manual operation and they exist exactly for this reason – to record such incidents.

      But there is still a critical issue: a document reveals that, according to Frontex recommendations in March 2021, the Coast Guard vessel was obligated to record the operation.

      The document states that “if feasible, all actions taken by Frontex assets or Frontex co-financed assets… should be documented by video consistently.”

      The cost of the ΠΠΛΣ-290, one of four state-of-the-art vessels purchased for €55.5 million, has been 90% financed through Frontex. It is designated to be “available for four months a year, for Frontex missions outside of Greek waters.”

      Frontex had recommended the visual recording of operations, during a meeting where representatives from Greece were present as well as from other European countries, following complaints of human rights violations by the Coast Guard.

      The complaints that were assessed during the meeting referred to the exact same practice, attributed to ΠΠΛΣ-920: towing vessels of asylum seekers outside of Greek waters.
      We created a 3D model of the Adriana

      Solomon, Forensis, The Guardian and ARD worked together and after analyzing a wealth of evidence, we present the most complete picture to date, of the Adriana’s course up to the time of its sinking.

      We collected more than 20 survivor accounts and analyzed material derived from, among others, witness statements, official reports from the Coast Guard and Frontex, deck logs of the Coast Guard vessel and tankers in transit, aerial photographs and data on the position and movement of ships and aircraft. We also secured exclusive footage from the commercial vessels that were in the area and spoke to sources at Frontex, the Coast Guard, and rescuers.

      The analysis of this information resulted in a detailed chronology of the events that occurred on June 13 and 14, an interactive map showing Adriana‘s movement, as well as a 3D model of the fishing vessel.

      With the help of the 3D model, we were able to do what no official authority or journalistic investigation has done so far: to conduct in-person interviews with survivors of the wreck, using the visual impression of this body of data.

      Using the method of situated testimony, the survivors placed themselves in the 3D model of the ship, indicated their location on the deck, and recalled the events that unfolded before the sinking of the Adriana: from the alleged towing to its capsize.

      In this way, we were able to cross-reference accounts of what happened in the presence of the Coast Guard vessel, based on each person’s eyewitness account.
      Main conclusions

      Eleven critical findings emerge from the joint investigation:

      – Frontex offered to help three times. A Frontex source stated that the Coast Guard did not respond to any of the three requests for assistance.

      - The records of ΠΠΛΣ-920 are incoherent and raise questions. For example, while it is reported that immediately before the sinking, the fishing vessel was moving west, it actually appears to be moving for about an hour (00:44 – 01:40) in a southerly direction at a speed of only 0.6 knots. In addition: since, according to the Coast Guard, the fishing vessel’s engine had stopped working at 00:44, why was the preparation of life-saving equipment carried out an hour later, at 01:40?

      - While the fishing vessel’s engine was running but there was no navigation capability, according to testimonies, ΠΠΛΣ-920 approached the vessel and gave directions to Italy. A survivor stated: “[a crew member] told us that the Greek ship would go ahead of us and lead us to Italian waters. He told us that in two hours we would be in Italy.” ΠΠΛΣ-920 directed the fishing vessel from a distance, which followed until its engine broke down again.

      – According to Syrian survivors on deck, when the engine broke down, masked men from ΠΠΛΣ-920 boarded the fishing vessel and tied a blue rope to the stern. The above-mentioned testimonies are also consistent with an entry in the ΠΠΛΣ-920 deck logbook, which mentions the participation of a four-member team from the Special Missions Unit in the operation.

      - According to the same survivors, there were two brief attempts to tow the fishing vessel. The first time the rope broke. The second time the ΠΠΛΣ-920 increased its speed and the fishing vessel rocked to the right, then to the left, then to the right again and flipped onto its right side.

      – The Pakistani survivors were located in the interior of the ship, and could not see what was happening. They stated, however, that while the fishing vessel’s engine was not working, they felt a sharp forward thrust “like a rocket” — a sensation that corroborates the use of a rope for towing.

      – Testimonies in this investigation support testaments presented by other journalistic investigations, as well as survivor statements included in the official case file: this action appears to have led to the capsize and eventual sinking of the ship.

      - The fishing vessel capsized and survivors climbed on top of it. ΠΠΛΣ-920 left the scene, creating waves that made it more difficult for the survivors to stay afloat.

      – After withdrawing, ΠΠΛΣ-920 directed its floodlights on the shipwreck site. Survivors tried to swim to the Coast Guard vessel, but the distance was too great.

      – ΠΠΛΣ-920 began the rescue operation 30 minutes after the sinking, and only after the fishing vessel had completely disappeared from the water’s surface.

      - Survivors claim that their phones (which were protected in plastic cases) contain visual material from the incident. Immediately after the rescue, according to the same testimonies, Coast Guard officers confiscated their phones, which have not been returned to them.

      https://vimeo.com/843117800

      Survivor accounts of the towing

      In the deck log of ΠΠΛΣ-920, which we have seen, there is no mention of any towing attempt. The Coast Guard captain reports that they approached the fishing vessel to offer assistance, received no response, and followed it “from a discreet distance”.

      This is disputed by the accounts of the survivors, some of whom not only tell of a rope that was tied to the fishing vessel, but they all mention its color: blue.

      This investigation documents, for the first time, the blue cable that was used by ΠΠΛΣ-920, which can also be seen in earlier photos of the vessel.

      The estimation that the attempt to tow the fishing vessel by the ΠΠΛΣ-920 led to its sinking is underlined by the statements of survivors, that form part of the case file which is available to the journalists that participated in this investigation.

      “Then the Greek ship came and threw the rope which was tied to the front of our ship,” says a survivor who was on the deck.

      The Coast Guard started towing the fishing vessel, he adds, and “when it was going slowly the fishing vessel was fine, but instead of approaching the Greek ship we were moving away. When they hit the gas, I’m sorry to say, that’s when our ship sank.”

      The same survivor estimates that the fishing boat capsized due to the “pulling from the Greek ship, because then our ship began to lean to one side. And I, who was standing in a corner, slipped into the water with a relative of mine, who died.”

      Another survivor who was also on the deck, but at the stern and without full visibility, says in his testimony that “it was night, the guys in front told me that they tied the rope, but I could feel the motion too, because then we moved, but not for more than two minutes.”

      “Then we said stop-stop because our ship is leaning,” he says, adding, “I think we sank due to the fact that our boat was in bad condition and overloaded and that it shouldn’t have been towed.”

      In another testimony, the description of the towing attempt is concise: “On the last day the Greek ship threw us a rope and tied us to their ship. The Greek one turned right, then ours overturned and we fell into the water.”

      We contacted the Coast Guard, asking questions about the timeline of the shipwreck and asking them to comment on the findings of our investigation. At the time of publication, we have not received a response.
      Why didn’t Greece respond to Frontex?

      The picture of what actually happened would be more complete if the ΠΠΛΣ-920 was not the only vessel present during the incident.

      According to the captain of the merchant ship Faithful Warrior, at 00:18 the Coast Guard’s Search & Rescue Coordination Center gave him permission to depart the scene, thus removing the last witness present. The Faithful Warrior left at 00:30, about 15 minutes before the fishing vessel’s engine stopped working, according to Coast Guard records.

      Frontex, which operates in the central Mediterranean, had informed the Greek authorities about the fishing vessel early in the afternoon, and had offered to help.

      Specifically, at 19:35 (local Greek time) Frontex offered to assist with the Eagle I aircraft. Afterwards, the Greek side asked Frontex to assist in a search and rescue incident south of Crete, where 80 people were in danger. The vessel in question was spotted by the Frontex Heron drone at 22:50.

      At 00:34, Frontex again offered to provide assistance with the Eagle I and a few minutes later, at 00:52, it also offered the Heron. According to a Frontex source who spoke to our joint investigation, the Greek authorities did not respond to any request to send aerial assets to the overloaded fishing vessel.
      Fabricated testimonies?

      Concerns have also been raised about the possible alteration of survivors’ testimonies.

      Survivors gave two rounds of statements: first to the Coast Guard and then to an investigator. Both versions are available to Solomon and the international colleagues who participated in this investigation.

      While there are no references to the attempted towing of the fishing vessel in the survivor testimonies recorded by the Coast Guard, the same survivors spoke about it in the second interview with the investigator.

      Also, when describing the shipwreck, the testimonies that appear to have been given to the Coast Guard by two survivors of different nationalities, are the same, word for word: “There were too many people in the boat, which was old and rusty … that’s why it capsized and sank in the end.”
      Inside the hold

      The TikTok video shows his older brother hugging him tightly and kissing him, before he enters the airport, dragging along his suitcase.

      He had flown from Karachi to Dubai, and from Dubai to Alexandria, Egypt. From there he boarded another plane that took him to Benghazi, Libya, where he spent over ten days locked in a trafficker’s hideout, before he was taken to board the Adriana.

      When he saw the old fishing boat he couldn’t believe it — he thought the trip to Italy would also be by plane. He wanted to go back to Pakistan, but the traffickers wouldn’t let him.

      Inside the Adriana, Abdul traveled on the lowest of three levels, in suffocating conditions where he had to sit with his knees bent. “To get from one place to another, you had to step on people.”

      Conditions were similar on the middle level, where about 300 people were reportedly crammed in, with more than 200 people still on deck. The testimonies speak of another, separate space inside the fishing vessel, where women and children were located. No women were among the 104 people that were rescued.

      The Pakistani travelers had paid a total of €8,000-€10,000 each for the long journey to Europe – Abdul’s family of rice farmers had sold their land to finance his trip.

      Abdul had learned to swim in the canals around his family’s crops – when the Adriana sank, it was his ability to swim that allowed Abdul to reach the Coast Guard vessel and save himself.

      As he walks along in Athens, Abdul’s relatives call him, asking what’s the name of the city he’s in. He tells us about his family, but he also shows us photos of loved ones who perished: he was onboard the Adriana with 14 of his friends and his uncle. Only he survived.

      And of his 350 fellow Pakistanis who were also in the hold with him, only 12 were rescued. “Beautiful people were lost,” says Abdul.

      People who participated in the investigation: Christina Varvia, Lydia Emmanouilidou, Katy Fallon, Ebrahem Farooqui, Armin Ghassim, Sebastian Heidelberger, Stefanos Levidis, Andreas Makas, Stavros Malichudis, Iliana Papangeli, Corina Petridi, Timo Robben, Georgia Skartadou, Sulaiman Tadmory, George Christides.

      https://wearesolomon.com/mag/format/investigation/under-the-unwatchful-eye-of-the-authorities-deactivated-cameras-dying-

    • Greek shipwreck: hi-tech investigation suggests coastguard responsible for sinking

      Research into loss of trawler with hundreds of deaths strongly contradicts official accounts – while finding a failure to mobilise help and evidence that survivor statements were tampered with

      Attempts by the Greek coastguard to tow a fishing trawler carrying hundreds of migrants may have caused the vessel to sink, according to a new investigation by the Guardian and media partners that has raised further questions about the incident, which left an estimated 500 people missing

      The trawler carrying migrants from Libya to Italy sank off the coast of Greece on 14 June. There were 104 survivors.

      Reporters and researchers conducted more than 20 interviews with survivors and drew on court documents and coastguard sources to build a picture of missed rescue opportunities and offers of assistance that were ignored. Multiple survivors said that attempts by the Greek coastguard to tow the vessel had ultimately caused the sinking. The coastguard has strenuously denied that it attempted to tow the trawler.

      The night that the trawler capsized, 47 nautical miles off Pylos, in south-western Greece, was reconstructed using an interactive 3D model of the boat created by Forensis, a Berlin-based research agency founded by Forensic Architecture, which investigates human rights violations.

      The joint investigation by the Guardian, German public broadcaster ARD/NDR/Funk and Greek investigative outlet Solomon, in collaboration with Forensis, has given one of the fullest accounts to date of the trawler’s course up to its sinking. It unearthed new evidence such as a coastguard vessel moored at a closer port but never dispatched to the incident and how Greek authorities failed to respond not twice, as previously reported, but three times to offers of assistance by Frontex, the EU border and coastguard agency.

      Forensis mapped the final hours before the sinking, using data from the coastguard’s log and the testimony of the coast guard vessel’s captain, as well as flight paths, maritime traffic data, satellite imagery and information from videos taken by nearby commercial vessels and other sources. The ship’s last movements contradict the coastguard and reveal inconsistencies within the official account of events, including the trawler’s direction and speed.

      Crucially, the investigation showed the overcrowded trawler started moving westward on meeting the single Greek coastguard vessel sent to the scene. According to multiple survivor testimonies given to the Guardian and Greek prosecutors, the coastguard had told the migrants it would lead them to Italy – clashing with the official version that the trawler started moving west of its own accord. The investigation also showed the trawler had turned to the south and was almost stationary for at least an hour until, survivors said, a second and fatal towing attempt took place.
      Survivors use the 3D model of the boat to describe what happened on the night of the 14 June.

      Two survivors used the 3D model to describe the towing itself, while three others, who were sitting inside or on the vessel’s lower deck, described being propelled forward “like a rocket”, but with the engine not operating. That suggests a towing attempt.

      Another survivor separately said he heard people shouting about a rope being attached by the “Greek army” and described being towed for 10 minutes shortly before the trawler sank. “I feel that they have tried to push us out of Greek water so that their responsibility ends,” a survivor said after considering the map of events and reflecting on his memories of the night.

      Maria Papamina, a lawyer from the Greek Council for Refugees, one of two legal organisations representing between 40 and 50 survivors, said that there had been two towing attempts recounted to her team. Court documents also show that seven out of eight survivors gave accounts to the civil prosecutor of the presence of a rope, towing and a strong pull, in depositions conducted on 17 and 18 June.

      The exact circumstances of the sinking cannot be conclusively proved in the absence of visual evidence. Several survivors testified to having had their phones confiscated by the authorities and some mentioned having filmed videos moments before the sinking. Questions remain over why the newly acquired Greek coastguard vessel at the scene did not record the operation on its thermal cameras. The vessel, called the 920, was 90% financed by the EU to bolster the capabilities of Frontex in Greece and is part of the EU border agency’s joint operations in the country. Frontex recommends that “if feasible, all actions taken by … Frontex co-financed assets should be documented by video consistently”.

      In official statements the Greek coastguard said the operation was not recorded because the crew’s focus was on the rescue operation. But a source within the coastguard said cameras do not need constant manual operation and are there precisely to capture such incidents.

      The presence of masked men, described by two survivors as attaching a rope to the trawler, is also documented in the ship’s log, which includes an entry about a special ops team known as KEA joining the 920 that night.

      According to coastguard sources, it would not be unusual to deploy KEA – typically used in risky situations such as suspected arms or drug smuggling at sea – given the vessel’s unknown status, but one source said that their presence suggested the vessel should have been intercepted on security and maritime safety grounds alone.

      One source described the failure to mobilise help closer to the incident as “incomprehensible”. The 920 was deployed from Chania, in Crete, about 150 nautical miles from the site of the sinking. The source said the coastguard had somewhat smaller but still capable vessels, based in Patras, Kalamata, Neapoli Voion and even Pylos itself. The 920 was ordered by coastguard HQ to “locate” the trawler at about 3pm local time on 13 June. It finally made contact close to midnight. An eyewitness official confirmed another vessel was stationed in Kalamata on 14 June and could have reached the trawler within a couple of hours. “It should have been a ‘send everything you’ve got’ situation. The trawler was in clear need of assistance,” the source said.

      The Greek coastguard and Frontex were alerted to the trawler on the morning of 13 June. Both agencies had photographed it from the air but no search and rescue operation was conducted – according to the Greek side, because the boat had refused assistance. Authorities received an urgent SOS said to have been relayed to them at 5.53pm local time by the small boats emergency hotline Alarmphone, which was in contact with people on board.

      Two of the coastguard sources told the Guardian they believed towing was a likely reason for the boat capsizing. This would not be without precedent. In 2014, an attempt to tow a refugee boat off the coast of Farmakonisi cost 11 lives. Greek courts cleared the coastguard, but the European court of human rights passed a damning judgment in 2022.

      Allegations have also been made that survivors’ statements were tampered with. Two rounds of testimonies were given – first to the coastguard and then to a civil prosecutor – both seen by the Guardian. Testimonies to the coastguard by two separate survivors of different nationalities are word for word the same when describing the sinking: “We were too many people on the boat, which was old and rusty … this is why it capsized and sank in the end.”

      Under oath to the civil prosecutor, days later, the same survivors describe towing incidents and blame the Greek coastguard for the sinking. The same Syrian survivor who stated in his coastguard testimony that the trawler capsized due to its age and overcrowding would later testify: “When they stepped on it, and I am sorry to mention this, our boat sank. I believe the reason was the towing by the Greek boat.”

      Brussels has asked for a “transparent” investigation into the wreck, while there is frustration within Frontex, which repeatedly offered assets to Greek authorities – a plane twice and later a drone – but received no reply. Although Frontex is facing mounting calls to pull out of Greece, the Guardian understands it is considering less drastic measures such as discontinuing co-financing of Greek coastguard vessels.

      The Coast Guard said it “would not comment on operational issues or the ongoing investigation which is confidential according to a Supreme Court Order.”

      Nine Egyptians on the trawler have been arrested on charges including involuntary manslaughter, causing a shipwreck and migrant smuggling; they deny wrongdoing. According to Guardian information, the accused testified there were two towing attempts, the second resulting in the sinking of the boat. A brother of one of the accused said his sibling paid about £3,000 to be on the boat, amounting to proof, he said, that he was not a smuggler.

      In Greece and beyond, survivors and victims’ families are trying to understand what happened. Three Pakistani survivors said they flew from Pakistan through Dubai or Egypt to Libya. Two believed they would fly from Libya to Italy and were shocked on seeing the trawler. “I can’t sleep properly. When I sleep I feel as if I am sinking into the water and will die,” one said.

      Nearly half of the estimated 750 people on board are thought to have been Pakistani citizens taking an emerging people-smuggling route to Italy. Pakistani authorities estimate that 115 came from Gujranwala in the east of the country, a region known for its rice plantations and cotton fields but deeply mired in Pakistan’s economic crisis.

      Ahmed Farouq, who lives on the outskirts of the city of Gujranwala, lost his son in the Pylos shipwreck. Talking of the alleged towing, he saids: “They wanted it to sink. Why didn’t they save the people first? If they don’t want illegal migrants, let them deport us, but don’t let us drown.”

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/10/greek-shipwreck-hi-tech-investigation-suggests-coastguard-responsible-f

    • Greek coastguard ’pressured’ disaster survivors to blame Egyptian men

      New evidence found by BBC News casts further doubt on the Greek coastguard’s version of events surrounding last month’s deadly migrant boat sinking, in which up to 600 people died.

      Two survivors have described how the coastguard pressed them to identify nine Egyptians on board as traffickers.

      A new video of the overcrowded boat foundering at sea also challenges the Greek coastguard’s account.

      It was taken when the boat was said to be on a “steady course”.

      BBC Verify has confirmed the footage was filmed when the coastguard claimed the boat was not in need of rescue - and was in fact filmed by the coastguard itself.

      We have also confirmed that the larger vessel in the background is the oil tanker Faithful Warrior, which had been asked to give supplies to the migrant boat.

      The official Greek coastguard account had already been challenged in a BBC Verify report - but now we have seen court documents which show serious discrepancies between survivors’ witness statements taken by the coastguards, and the in-person evidence later presented to a judge.

      A translator has also come forward with his account of a people-smuggling investigation last year, after another group of migrants were rescued by the coastguard. He describes how witnesses from that incident were intimidated by the coastguard. The legal case collapsed before it could reach trial.

      The revelations raise fresh questions about how the Greek authorities handle such disasters.

      Both the Greek coastguard and Greek government did not comment and declined our requests for interview.
      A map of a section of the Mediterranean Sea showing the possible route taken by the migrant boat off the coast of Libya, near the city of Tobruk. The possible route shows the last approximate location of the boat before it sunk and the path taken by the Faithful Warrior, which had made contact with the boat. Also shown is the Greek port city of Pylos.

      Survivors ’silenced and intimidated’

      Soon after the 14 June sinking, nine Egyptian men were detained and charged with manslaughter and people-smuggling.

      But two survivors of the disaster say migrants were silenced and intimidated by Greek authorities, after suggesting the coastguards may have been to blame for the tragedy.

      For the past month, allegations have been made that the coastguard used a rope to tow the fishing vessel, causing it to sink.

      The two survivors we spoke to in Athens - who we are calling Ahmad and Musaab to protect their identities - say that is what happened.

      “They attached a rope from the left. Everyone moved to the right side of our boat to balance it,” says Musaab. “The Greek vessel moved off quickly causing our boat to flip. They kept dragging it for quite a distance.”

      The men described how they spent two hours in the water before being picked up by the coastguard.

      When I ask how they knew it was that amount of time, Musaab says his watch was still working so he could tell.

      Once on land, in Kalamata, they claim the coastguard told survivors to “shut up” when they started to talk about how the Greek authorities had caused the disaster.

      “When people replied by saying the Greek coastguard was the cause, the official in charge of the questioning asked the interpreter to tell the interviewee to stop talking,” says Ahmad.

      Ahmad says those rescued were told to be grateful they hadn’t died.

      He says there were shouts of: “You have survived death! Stop talking about the incident! Don’t ask more questions about it!”

      he men say they are scared to speak out publicly because they fear they too will be accused like the Egyptians.

      “If there was a fair system in place, we would contribute to this case,” says Ahmad.

      The men told us they had both paid $4,500 (£3,480) for a spot on the boat. Ahmad’s younger brother was also on board. He is still missing.
      Collapsing court cases

      As well as this testimony given to us by survivors, we have seen court documents which raise questions about the way evidence is being gathered to be presented in court.

      In initial statements from five survivors, none mentioned the coastguard trying to tow the migrant vessel with a rope. But days later, in front of a judge, all explained that there had been a failed attempt to tow it.

      One initial statement reads:

      But the same witness later told a judge:

      BBC Verify has not spoken to these witnesses and so we can’t say why their accounts changed.

      The Greek coastguard initially denied using a rope - but later backtracked, admitting one had been used. But it said it was only to try to board the vessel and assess the situation. It said this was at least two hours before the fishing vessel capsized.

      Eighty-two people are confirmed dead in the sinking, but the United Nations estimates as many as 500 more lost their lives.

      The Greek authorities say the charged Egyptian men are part of a smuggling ring and were identified by fellow passengers. They face up to life imprisonment if found guilty.

      Some survivors allege some of the nine suspects mistreated those on board - while other testimony says some were actually trying to help.

      But Ahmad and Musaab told us the coastguard had instructed all of the survivors to say that the nine Egyptian men were to blame for trafficking them.

      “They were imprisoned and were wrongly accused by the Greek authorities as an attempt to cover their crime,” says Musaab.

      A Greek Supreme Criminal Court deputy prosecutor is carrying out an investigation, but calls - including from the UN - for an international, independent inquiry have so far been ignored. The European Commission has indicated it has faith in the Greek investigation.

      But Ahmad and Musaab are not alone in their concerns about the Greek coastguard.
      Interpreter comes forward to BBC

      When the nine Egyptian men were arrested in the hours after the shipwreck, it was widely reported as an example of efficient detective work by the Greek authorities.

      But for Farzin Khavand it rang alarm bells. He feared history was repeating itself.

      He says he witnessed Greek coastguards put two innocent Iranian men in the frame for people-smuggling last year, following the rescue of 32 migrants whose boat had got into trouble crossing from Turkey.

      Mr Khavand, a UK citizen who speaks Farsi and has lived in the Kalamata area for 20 years, acted as a translator during the coastguard’s investigation into what happened then.

      He says the migrants - 28 from Afghanistan and four from Iran - explained that they had set off from Turkey and been at sea for eight days before being rescued.

      During this time, the Greek coastguard had approached the boat, before leaving, he was told.

      Two Arabic-speaking men had abandoned the boat after the engine blew up, Mr Khavand was told by the Afghan migrants. They said that most people on board had taken turns to try to steer the stricken boat to safety - including the two accused Iranians, who had paid to be on board like everyone else.

      “They [the Iranian men] were highly traumatised,” Mr Khavand said.

      “They were repeating to me that they’d never even seen an ocean before they set off in Turkey. And they kept being told they were the captain and they said: ’We know nothing about the boat. We can’t even swim.’”

      One of the two accused - a man called Sayeed who was facing a long prison sentence - had been rescued with his young son, explained Mr Khavand.

      “I asked him ’Why did you take a six-year-old child on a boat?’ And he said the smugglers told us it’s only two hours’ journey.”

      Mr Khavand relayed their accounts to the coastguard, exactly as it had been told to him - but he says when he saw the transcripts, the Afghans’ testimony had changed. He fears they altered their stories after pressure from the Greek authorities.

      He says the Iranians told him that some of their fellow Afghan passengers had been leaned on by the coastguard to name them as the people-smugglers - to avoid being “treated unpleasantly”, threatened with prison, and being “returned to the Taliban”.

      The case eventually collapsed. Mr Khavand says he was not willing to assist the Greek coastguard again. He says when Sayeed and his son were released from custody the €1,500 (£1,278) that had been confiscated from them was not returned.

      “The scene ended with me thinking I don’t want to do this again because they were not trying to get to the bottom of the truth. They were trying to pick a couple of guys and accuse them of being people smugglers.”

      All of these accusations were put to the Greek authorities by the BBC - but we have received no response. Our request for an interview with Greece’s minister of maritime affairs - who oversees the coastguard - was also rejected.
      Greece previously accused of human rights violations

      Kalamata lawyer Chrysanthi Kaouni says she has seen other criminal cases brought against alleged people smugglers which have troubled her.

      She has been involved in more than 10 such cases, she tells us.

      “My concerns are around the translations, the way evidence is gathered and - later on - the ability of the defendants to challenge this evidence,” she said.

      “Because of these three points, I don’t think there are enough safeguards according to the international law, and in the end I don’t believe justice is done.”

      A new study has found that the average trial in Greece for migrants accused of people smuggling lasted just 37 minutes and the average prison sentence given was 46 years.

      The study, commissioned by The Greens/European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament, looked at 81 trials involving 95 people - all of whom were tried for smuggling in eight different areas of Greece between February 2020 and March 2023.

      The study claims verdicts were reached often on the testimony of a single police or coastguard officer and, in more than three-quarters of the cases, they didn’t appear in court for their evidence to be cross-examined.

      Ahmad says he and the other survivors now want authorities to recover the shipwreck and the people that went down with it, but they have been told it’s too difficult and the water is too deep.

      He compares this to the vast amounts of money and resources spent on searching for five people on the Titan submersible in the North Atlantic in June.

      “But we were hundreds,” he says. “It’s not just a ship. It’s our friends and family.”

      https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66154654

    • Italy warned of dead children on migrant ship hours before it capsized

      The findings of an investigation by Welt am Sonntag and

      POLITICO raise questions about whether the authorities knew the boat was in distress earlier than they admitted.

      Early on the morning of the Adriana’s final day at sea, the Italian authorities sent a troubling warning to their EU and Greek colleagues: Two children had died aboard the overloaded migrant boat.

      The alert was sent at 8:01 a.m. UTC, just over an hour after the Italians initially spotted the vessel at 6:51 a.m., an investigation by Welt am Sonntag and POLITICO found. The ship would later stall out in the ocean and capsize that night, killing hundreds of migrants on board.

      The new details are revealed in an internal document at the EU border agency Frontex and seen by Welt, part of a “serious incident report” Frontex is compiling on the tragedy.

      The findings raise questions about whether the authorities knew of serious distress on the boat much earlier than they have admitted. The document further complicates the timeline European authorities have given about the boat — Frontex has said its own plane was the first to discover the Adriana at 9:47 a.m., while the Greek government has said it was alerted around 8 a.m.

      According to the internal document, Rome’s warning went to both Frontex and the Greek coast guard’s central office for rescue operations in Piraeus, which sits on the coast near Athens. Yet despite the alert, the Greek authorities did not send a coast guard vessel to the boat until 7:40 p.m., nearly 12 hours later. The boat then capsized around 11 p.m., roughly 15 hours after Rome’s notice first came through, leaving approximately 600 people dead.

      Survivors have said the Greek coast guard’s attempts to attach ropes to the ship caused it to capsize — accounts Greek officials say are not definitive. Only 104 people were brought to shore alive.

      Frontex declined to comment on the internal document showing the Italian warning, citing the “ongoing investigations” and referring to a June 16 statement. That statement lists a chronology of events starting at 9:47 a.m. with the Frontex plane spotting the boat.

      Dimitris Kairidis, Greece’s newly appointed migration minister, told POLITICO in Brussels that he had not seen the Frontex note, and he neither confirmed nor denied that Athens had received the Rome alert mentioning dead children.

      There is, he said, an “independent judicial investigation,” and if anyone is found responsible, “there will definitely be consequences.”

      “But until then,” he added, “we should not rush to conclusions and bow to political pressure.”

      Asked for comment, the Greek government referred to a statement on its coast guard website from June 14, which mentions information coming from Rome around 8 a.m. It doesn’t say whether that information included a warning about dead children on board.

      The Italian government did not respond to a request for comment.

      Greece has faced mounting political pressure over the tragedy.

      German lawmaker Clara Bünger, a member of The Left, is pushing for a review of the drama that unfolded off the shore of Pylos.

      She told Welt that “upon sighting such an overcrowded boat, Frontex should have immediately issued a mayday distress signal; even more so if Frontex knew that there were already Tuesday morning about two dead children on board.”

      That this didn’t happen, she added, is “outrageous and unforgivable.”

      Frontex has been trying to rehab its reputation under new Director Hans Leijtens, but Bünger argued he is on a doomed mission. Frontex, she argued, should just be dissolved.

      “This project has failed miserably,” she said.

      Erik Marquardt, a German European Parliament member from the Greens, pointed out that Germany chairs the Frontex Management Board.

      “I expect the German government to enforce full transparency here,” he said.

      The European Commission, the EU’s executive, said it does not comment on “ongoing investigations” or “leaks.”

      But the Commission stressed: “The facts about the tragic incident off the coast of Pylos must be clarified. That is the priority now.”

      https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-warned-greece-of-dead-children-on-migrant-ship-hour-before-it-capsize

    • Frontex und Athen wussten 15 Stunden vor Bootsdrama von toten Kindern an Bord

      Mitte Juni starben vor der griechischen Küste 600 Migranten, als ihr Boot kenterte. Über die Verantwortung für die schlimmste Katastrophe seit Jahren im Mittelmeer wird seitdem gestritten. Nun kommt heraus: Eine wichtige Information zu den wahren Abläufen wird nach Informationen von WELT AM SONNTAG bewusst zurückgehalten.

      Die EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex sowie die griechische Regierung verschweigen die wahren Abläufe eines Bootsdramas im Juni mit rund 600 Toten. Wie WELT AM SONNTAG und das ebenfalls zum Axel-Springer-Verlag gehörende Nachrichtenunternehmen „Politico“ erfuhren, muss die hochdramatische Situation vor der griechischen Küste Athen und den Grenzschützern viel früher bewusst gewesen sein als bislang bekannt.

      Frontex hatte in einer Stellungnahme mitgeteilt, als Erstes habe ein agentureigenes Flugzeug das völlig überladene Boot um 9.47 Uhr (UTC) entdeckt. Allerdings soll das Boot – so geht es aus einem internen Frontex-Dokument hervor – bereits um 6.51 Uhr erstmals gesichtet worden sein – und zwar durch italienische Behörden.

      Um 8.01 Uhr alarmierte die Seenotrettungstelle Rom demnach sowohl Frontex als auch die Leitstelle in Piräus, von wo aus Rettungseinsätze der griechischen Küstenwache gesteuert werden. Noch brisanter: Bestandteil dieses Alarms war die Information, dass an Bord des Bootes bereits zwei Kinder verstorben seien. Wie Italien an seine Informationen zu der Existenz des Bootes und den toten Kindern gelangte, ist unklar.

      Der Alarm ist nach Informationen von WELT AM SONNTAG Teil der Notizen des noch in Arbeit befindlichen „Serious Incident Report“, der das Aktenzeichen 12595/2023 trägt. Trotz des Alarms aus Roms unternahmen die griechischen Behörden lange nichts. Erst gegen 19.40 Uhr traf ein Schiff der Küstenwache in der Nähe der Migranten ein.

      Das Boot kenterte schließlich gegen 23 Uhr, 15 Stunden nach dem Alarm aus Rom. Unmittelbar davor hatten griechische Küstenwächter Seile an das Boot angebracht, was – so berichteten Überlebende – zum Kentern geführt habe. Nur 104 Menschen wurden lebend an Land gebracht.

      WELT AM SONNTAG konfrontierte Frontex mit den Informationen zu dem Alarm aus Rom. Wann ging dieser ein? Was war die Reaktion der Agentur? In einer schriftlichen Antwort hieß es, man könne „aufgrund von laufenden Ermittlungen“ kein Statement abgeben, das über jenes vom 16. Juni hinausgeht. Darin wird die Chronologie der Ereignisse geschildert – mit 9.47 Uhr als Startpunkt, der Sichtung des Bootes durch ein Frontex-Flugzeug.

      Der neu ernannte griechische Migrationsminister Dimitris Kairidis sagte in Brüssel, er habe die Frontex-Notiz nicht gesehen; weder bestätigte noch dementierte er, dass Athen diese Information aus Rom erhalten hat. Er erklärte, dass „eine unabhängige gerichtliche Untersuchung“ stattfinde. Sofern jemand für schuldig befunden werde, „wird es definitiv Konsequenzen geben.

      Bis dahin solle man „keine voreiligen Schlüsse ziehen und sich dem politischen Druck beugen“. Am Freitag verwies Athen auf ein Statement auf der Küstenwache-Webseite vom 14. Juni, in dem eine Info zu dem Boot aus Rom gegen acht Uhr erwähnt wird. Von toten Kindern kein Wort. Die italienische Regierung beantwortete eine Anfrage zu dem Sachverhalt nicht.

      Der Druck aus der Politik auf die Behörde und Athen wächst derweil. Die Linken-Bundestagsabgeordnete Clara Bünger, die auf eine Aufarbeitung des Pylos-Dramas drängt, sagte WELT AM SONNTAG: „Beim Sichten eines derart überfüllten Bootes hätte Frontex sofort einen Mayday-Notruf machen müssen. Das gilt umso mehr, wenn Frontex wusste, dass es am Dienstagmorgen bereits zwei tote Kinder an Bord gab.“ Dass das nicht geschehen ist, sei „ungeheuerlich und unverzeihbar“. Frontex-Direktor Hans Leijtens hätte angekündigt, er wolle Vertrauen wiederherstellen und Menschenrechte achten: „Dieses Vorhaben ist krachend gescheitert.“ Bünger sagte, Frontex sei nicht reformierbar – und forderte die Auflösung.

      Der EU-Parlamentarier Erik Marquardt (Grüne) verwies darauf, dass Deutschland den Vorsitz im Frontex-Verwaltungsrat hat: „Ich erwarte von der Bundesregierung, dass sie hier vollständige Transparenz durchsetzt.“ Derartige Versprechen seitens Leijtens würden bislang nicht eingehalten.

      Die EU-Kommission ließ verlauten, man äußere sich „weder zu laufenden Untersuchungen noch zu Leaks“, machte aber klar: „Die Fakten über den tragischen Vorfall vor der Küste von Pylos müssen geklärt werden. Das ist jetzt die Priorität.“

      https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article246382076/Migration-Frontex-und-Athen-wussten-15-Stunden-vor-Bootsdrama-von-toten-Kindern

    • Pylos shipwreck: the Greek authorities must ensure that effective investigations are conducted

      In a letter to the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, published today, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, stresses that Greece has the legal obligation to conduct effective investigations into the Pylos shipwreck, which resulted in the death of more than 80 persons with many hundreds still missing, to establish the facts and, where appropriate, to lead to the punishment of those responsible.

      The Commissioner expresses concern about reports of pressure having been exercised on survivors and about allegations of irregularities in the collection of evidence and testimonies, which may have led to a minimisation of the focus on certain actors in this tragedy, including the Greek Coast Guard. In the case of Safi and Others v. Greece, the European Court of Human Rights spelled out the parameters of an effective investigation into a similar event. Among those parameters, the Commissioner notes that independence is critical to securing the trust of the victims’ relatives, the survivors, the public and Greece’s international partners. While stressing that investigations cannot be limited to the role of alleged smugglers, she requests clarifications on the scope of the investigations initiated after the shipwreck.

      Referring to the right of missing persons’ families to know the truth, the Commissioner seeks information on the efforts made to ensure that the remains of deceased migrants are located, respected, identified, and buried.

      Expressing concerns at restrictions on survivors’ freedom of movement and the way asylum interviews have been conducted, she requests information on the concrete measures that Greece has taken to abide by its human rights obligations regarding reception conditions and access to the asylum procedure.

      "In my view, the shipwreck of 14 June is unfortunately not an isolated incident”, writes the Commissioner. This should prompt a reconsideration of the approach to refugees and migrants arriving by sea at the political, policy and practical level. In this context, the Commissioner urges the Prime Minister to ensure that Greece abides by its international obligations regarding search and rescue, both under maritime law and human rights law.

      Finally, the Commissioner reiterates her call for the Greek government to actively create and maintain an enabling legal framework and a political and public environment which is conducive to the existence and functioning of civil society organisations and to the work of human rights defenders and investigative journalists, and to stop their criminalisation and other forms of harassment.

      https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/pylos-shipwreck-the-greek-authorities-must-ensure-that-effective-investigations

      Pour télécharger la lettre:
      https://rm.coe.int/letter-addressed-to-the-prime-minister-of-greece-by-dunja-mijatovic-co/1680ac03ce

      #conseil_de_l'Europe

    • Après le naufrage d’un bateau avec 750 personnes à bord au large de la Grèce, une enquête de la médiatrice européenne sur le rôle de Frontex

      #Emily_O’Reilly, dont le rôle est de demander des comptes aux institutions et aux agences de l’Union européenne, a annoncé avoir ouvert cette procédure à la suite du naufrage survenu en juin, le pire en Méditerranée depuis 2016.

      Un peu plus d’un mois après le pire naufrage d’un bateau de migrants depuis 2016 en Méditerrannée, survenu mi-juin au large de la Grèce et qui a fait des centaines de morts, la médiatrice européenne a annoncé, mercredi 26 juillet, avoir ouvert une enquête afin de « clarifier le rôle » de Frontex, l’agence de l’Union européenne (UE) chargée des frontières, dans les opérations de sauvetage.

      « Alors que le rôle des autorités grecques fait l’objet d’une enquête au niveau national, celui de Frontex dans les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage doit également être clarifié », a souligné dans un communiqué Emily O’Reilly. Le rôle de la médiatrice est de demander des comptes aux institutions et aux agences de l’UE.

      « Il a été signalé que Frontex avait bien alerté les autorités grecques de la présence du navire et proposé son assistance ; mais, ce qui n’est pas clair, c’est ce qu’elle aurait pu ou aurait dû faire d’autre », a-t-elle ajouté.

      Le patron de Frontex, Hans Leijtens, a salué l’ouverture de cette enquête, assurant être prêt à coopérer « en toute transparence » pour expliquer le rôle de son agence. « Si nous ne coordonnons pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, sauver des vies en mer est essentiel. Nous apportons une aide aux autorités nationales lorsque cela est nécessaire », a-t-il ajouté dans un message sur X (ex-Twitter).

      Partage d’informations entre Frontex et les autorités nationales

      Le chalutier vétuste et surchargé, qui était parti de Libye, a fait naufrage au large du sud de Grèce dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin. Il transportait environ 750 personnes à son bord, mais seule une centaine de migrants ont survécu.

      Depuis le naufrage, les interrogations sont tournées autour de la lenteur de l’intervention des gardes-côtes grecs et sur les causes du chavirement de l’embarcation.

      Par cette enquête sur le rôle de Frontex, Mme O’Reilly veut en particulier se pencher sur le partage d’informations entre l’agence européenne et les autorités nationales en matière d’opérations de recherche et de sauvetage.

      Elle la coordonnera aux côtés du médiateur grec, Andreas Pottakis, qui a « la compétence d’examiner » la façon dont les autorités grecques se sont occupées du bateau Adriana.

      Mi-juillet, les eurodéputés ont réclamé l’élaboration d’une « stratégie de recherche et de sauvetage fiable et permanente » des migrants en Méditerranée. Dans une résolution transpartisane, dépourvue de caractère contraignant, ils ont appelé Bruxelles à apporter aux Etats membres de l’UE un « soutien matériel, financier et opérationnel » pour renforcer leurs capacités de sauvetage en mer.

      Les élus du Parlement européen citaient les chiffres de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), selon laquelle plus de 27 600 personnes ont disparu en Méditerranée depuis 2014.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/07/26/naufrage-d-un-bateau-de-migrants-au-large-de-la-grece-la-mediatrice-europeen

    • Smuggler, Warlord, EU ally

      The lead smugglers behind the Pylos shipwreck are closely linked to General Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan warlord who EU leaders are partnering with to curb migration

      On the night of 13 June, a vessel carrying around 750 men, women and children mainly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria capsized in Greek waters. Only 104 men survived. All women and children died.

      In an earlier investigation we revealed Greek coastguard efforts to cover up their role in the fatal shipwreck. The country’s naval court has since launched a preliminary investigation into the coastguard’s response to the sinking, with no arrests or suspensions of officers so far.

      The only arrests made were those of nine Egyptians, accused in a separate inquiry of being part of the smuggling network behind the deadly voyage. They were charged with six counts including illegal trafficking of foreigners, organisation crime and manslaughter by negligence.

      Using the contacts and documents already available to us, we pursued a follow-up investigation to establish the truth about any smugglers behind the fatal sea crossing, with the aim of identifying the key players and establishing the extent to which the nine Egyptians in prison in Greece are actually responsible.
      METHODS

      Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, SIRAJ, El País and Reporters United used the previously established relationships with survivors and their families, as well as a network of sources in Libya, to investigate the smuggling network behind the Pylos wreck.

      We also looked into the ongoing court case against nine alleged smugglers, analysing confidential court documents and speaking to five of the families of those arrested.
      STORYLINES

      While investigating the circumstances that led to the shipwreck and Greece’s responsibility in it, we spoke to 17 survivors.

      Many named the key smugglers involved in organising the trip during our interviews with them – none of them were people on board the ship.

      Some were Eastern Libyan nationals with ties to the region’s powerful ruler, Khalifa Haftar.

      One name stood out: Muhammad Saad Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi. Three sources identified him as a key player in the smuggling operation: a survivor, a lower level smuggler and a Libyan insider all gave his name.

      Al-Kahshi works for a special forces navy unit called the “frogmen”, run by a family member of his, Bahar Al-Tawati Al-Mnfi. Al-Tawati Al-Mnfi works under the direct orders of Khalifa Haftar.

      One survivor explained that Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi used his position to issue the licence that allowed the boat (which came from Egypt) to navigate in Libyan waters and made sure the Libyan coast guards were paid to shut off the marine radar devices that detect ship movements to allow the departure.

      We found that the network goes far beyond Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi.

      Survivors, insiders and analysts explained that the trip was organised with wide ranging support from powerful people reporting to Haftar.

      Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui said the “migrant business” had been flourishing in Eastern Libya in the last 18 months. “Haftar cannot say that he’s not aware,” he added. “He can’t say that he’s not involved.”

      “All trips are overseen by his son, Saddam Haftar” said one survivor. “Saddam leads the cooperation himself or assigns one of the frogmen battalions [this may have been the case for the Pylos trip] or the 2020 battalion, depending on who has more migrants to pay the fees.”

      Five survivors who flew from Syria to Libya describe how immigration officials facilitated their arrival at Benghazi’s military airport. One said: “At the airport, a person took my passport, went to immigration office, put a stamp and took us outside”.

      There was a curfew in Eastern Libya on the night of departure (حظر التجول ليلاً في طبرق الليبية), yet the survivors we interviewed said that it was at night that they, along with hundreds of passengers, were taken to a small bay near Wadi Arzouka, east of Tobruk, and boarded onto the vessel.

      Militias supported by Khalifa Haftar are not only involved in smuggling, they are also active in illegal “pullbacks” of migrants in EU waters.

      At least two pullbacks (in May and July this year) were carried out by a militia (Tariq Bin Ziyad) controlled by Haftar’s son, including one in Maltese waters.

      At least four of the people who died in the Pylos shipwreck were on the boat that was pulled back by the Tariq Bin Ziyad militia on 25 May, according to family members.

      These findings raise serious questions about EU member states’ migration prevention policies.

      It is known by EU authorities that Eastern Libyan militias answering to Haftar carry out both pullback and smuggling operations. The IOM and the UNHCR briefed EU officials on an increase in departures from eastern Libya , describing them as a “lucrative source of income for the eastern Libyan rulers involved”.

      In spite of this, Italy and Malta are making deals with Haftar to prevent migration.

      In May, Haftar met with Italian PM Meloni to discuss migration related issues and in June Italy’s interior minister said they would ask Haftar to collaborate in stopping departures.

      The same month, for the first time, a Maltese delegation met Haftar in Benghazi to discuss security challenges in the region, with particular emphasis on irregular migration.

      Internal EU documents show the commission is looking for ways to curb arrivals from Benghazi’s airport with the collaboration of local operators.

      Harchaoui described Italian efforts to encourage Khalifa Haftar to stop departures as “bribery” and pointed to “a very clear admission of how Italy intends to work and what it promised to Haftar: if you reduce the human smuggling volumes, we will inject capital”.

      Meanwhile, there’s growing evidence that nine Egyptians imprisoned for trafficking in Greece are being scapegoated.

      We spoke to the families of five of the nine Egyptians under arrest – all of them say that they were passengers, not smugglers.

      Three of them provided evidence that their relatives paid for their trip, indicating that it’s highly unlikely that they were involved in organising the smuggling operation.

      We were able to verify the identity of a smuggler who asked one of the accused men for money ahead of the trip.

      We previously found that witness testimony provided to the coast guard had been tampered with, including survivors’ answers to questions about smugglers.

      In the documents, two answers to questions about smugglers contain identical sentences.

      Those who were interrogated by the coast guard mentioned being pressured to place the blame on the nine Egyptians later indicted.

      https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/smuggler-warlord-eu-ally

    • Naufrage au large de la Grèce : deux ONG pointent les défaillances des autorités grecques

      Dans un rapport publié le 3 août, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch reviennent sur les circonstances troubles du drame survenu aux portes de l’Europe dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin, qui a coûté la vie à au moins six cents personnes. Les associations réclament une enquête « efficace, indépendante et impartiale ».

      C’est un naufrage qui a d’abord marqué les esprits de par son ampleur : pas moins de 750 personnes se trouvaient à bord d’un bateau de pêche en bois, L’Adriana, au moment où il a chaviré, dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin, au large de Pýlos en Grèce. Partie de Tobrouk en Libye pour rejoindre l’Italie, l’embarcation surchargée transportait des ressortissants syriens, égyptiens, palestiniens ou pakistanais, dont de nombreuses femmes et enfants placés dans la cale pour être « à l’abri » des éventuelles intempéries ou du soleil.

      Mais on retient aussi les circonstances troubles dans lequel il s’est produit. Très vite après le naufrage, des premières voix parmi la centaine de rescapés se sont élevées pour pointer le rôle potentiel des gardes-côtes grecs dans ce drame.

      Mediapart a documenté, dès le 17 juin, cette version différente de celle avancée par les autorités du pays. Une enquête de la BBC est venue l’appuyer, puis le New York Times a suivi : des témoignages de survivant·es attestent que les gardes-côtes ont non seulement tardé à organiser un sauvetage, mais ont aussi tenté de tirer le bateau à l’aide d’une corde, pouvant ainsi avoir contribué à le faire chavirer.

      Après un déplacement de neuf jours en Grèce et une vingtaine d’entretiens réalisés avec des exilé·es sur place, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch ont relevé également les « disparités extrêmement préoccupantes » entre les récits des survivant·es du Pýlos et la version des événements livrée par les autorités.

      Les survivant·es interrogé·es par les deux ONG « ont systématiquement déclaré que le navire des gardes-côtes grecs envoyé sur les lieux avait attaché une corde à L’Adriana et l’avait remorqué, le faisant tanguer, puis chavirer », peut-on lire dans le rapport d’enquête publié conjointement ce jeudi 3 août.

      Aux ONG, les responsables des gardes-côtes ont de leur côté affirmé que leurs équipes s’étaient approchées du bateau, reconnaissant avoir utilisé une corde, mais qu’après de « premières négociations », les passagers avaient repoussé la corde pour poursuivre leur trajet.
      Le rôle des gardes-côtes grecs et de Frontex interrogé

      Une version contredite par le témoignage des survivant·es interrogé·es : « Peu importe leur position sur le bateau, les survivants disent tous avoir ressenti le mouvement du bateau une fois tracté, qui avançait alors très vite alors que le moteur ne fonctionnait plus, précise Alice Autin, chercheuse pour la division Europe et Asie centrale à Human Rights Watch. Tous sont d’accord pour dire que c’est cela qui a fait vaciller le bateau, avant de le faire chavirer. »

      Frontex a par ailleurs déclaré avoir repéré l’embarcation dès la veille du naufrage, ce qui a poussé certains acteurs à s’interroger sur le rôle de l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières. Pourquoi n’est-elle pas intervenue pour venir en aide aux passagers ? A-t-elle bien alerté les autorités grecques pour qu’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage soit menée en urgence ?

      Dans un communiqué, Frontex a précisé que l’un de ses avions de surveillance « avait immédiatement informé les autorités compétentes », sans toutefois intervenir, au prétexte que les exilé·es avaient refusé « toute aide ». Le lendemain du drame, le patron de l’agence Hans Leijtens était en déplacement en Grèce pour « mieux comprendre ce qu’il s’était passé », et voir comment ses équipes pouvaient aider les autorités grecques, précisant que le fait de « sauver des vies était leur priorité ».

      Une version qui ne semble pas avoir convaincu la médiatrice européenne, qui a décidé, le 24 juillet dernier, d’ouvrir une enquête de sa propre initiative pour interroger le rôle de Frontex dans les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage à la suite du naufrage survenu en Grèce.

      « Il est clair que Frontex a joué un rôle important dans la mission de recherche et de sauvetage du point de vue de la coordination. À ce titre, je pense qu’il est possible de clarifier davantage son rôle dans de telles opérations », a déclaré dans une lettre ouverte Emily O’Reilly, qui occupe le poste de Médiateur européen.

      « Il a été signalé que Frontex avait bien alerté les autorités grecques de la présence du navire et proposé son assistance ; mais ce qui n’est pas clair, c’est ce qu’elle aurait pu ou aurait dû faire d’autre », a-t-elle souligné. Frontex s’est dite prête à coopérer « en toute transparence ».

      « Cela posera des questions importantes sur le rôle, les pratiques et les protocoles de l’agence dans le contexte des opérations [en mer] et sur les mesures qu’elle a prises pour se conformer à ses obligations en matière de droits fondamentaux et aux lois de l’UE », estiment Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch.
      Des appels à l’aide ignorés

      Les deux ONG s’interrogent aussi sur l’aide que les gardes-côtes grecs auraient pu apporter aux migrant·es dans les heures ayant précédé le naufrage. De hauts responsables des gardes-côtes leur auraient affirmé que « les personnes à bord du bateau limitaient leur demande d’aide à de l’eau et de la nourriture » et avaient exprimé leur volonté de poursuivre leur route vers l’Italie.

      Mais les survivant·es interrogé·es par Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch ont « déclaré que les passagers avaient demandé à être secourus » et qu’ils avaient entendu d’autres personnes à bord de l’embarcation appeler à l’aide lors d’un échange avec un téléphone satellite, plusieurs heures avant le naufrage. Certains auraient enlevé leur T-shirt pour le secouer en l’air et appeler à l’aide, d’autres auraient hurlé à l’attention des deux navires marchands croisés avant le drame.

      « Des récits concordent pour dire que des personnes ont perdu la vie à bord du bateau avant le naufrage et que l’un des corps a été placé sur le pont supérieur au-dessus de la cabine pour signifier l’urgence de la situation », poursuit Alice Autin d’Human rights watch. Et d’ajouter : « Les gardes-côtes grecs avaient la responsabilité de venir en aide aux passagers du bateau et il apparaît au vu des résultats de notre enquête qu’il y a des doutes sur la manière dont cela s’est déroulé. »

      Plusieurs survivants ont enfin déclaré que les autorités leur auraient confisqué leur téléphone après le naufrage, poursuivent les ONG. Or, certaines personnes auraient « tout filmé ». Ces téléphones pourraient, s’ils réapparaissaient, servir dans le cadre de l’enquête ouverte par la justice grecque.

      « Il est essentiel d’analyser ce qu’ils contiennent pour faire toute la lumière sur le déroulement des faits », conclut Alice Autin. Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch réclament une enquête « efficace, indépendante et impartiale ».

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030823/naufrage-au-large-de-la-grece-deux-ong-pointent-les-defaillances-des-autor

    • Greece: Disparities in accounts of Pylos shipwreck underscore the need for human rights compliant inquiry

      Starkly divergent accounts from survivors and Greek authorities around the circumstances of the deadly Pylos shipwreck, underscore the urgent need for an effective, independent, and impartial investigation, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said today. 

      The disparities between survivors’ accounts of the Pylos shipwreck and the authorities’ version of the events are extremely concerning

      The fishing vessel, Adriana, was carrying an estimated 750 people when it sank on 14 June off the coast of Pylos. In the aftermath, accounts from several of the 104 survivors suggest that the vessel was towed by a Greek coast guard boat, causing the fatal wreck.  The Greek authorities have strongly denied these claims.

      “The disparities between survivors’ accounts of the Pylos shipwreck and the authorities’ version of the events are extremely concerning” said Judith Sunderland, Associate Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights Watch.

      “The Greek authorities, with support and scrutiny from the international community, should ensure that there is a transparent investigation to provide truth and justice for survivors and families of the victims, and hold those responsible to account.”  

      A delegation from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch visited Greece between 4 and 13 July 2023 as part of ongoing research into the circumstances of the shipwreck and steps toward accountability. They interviewed 19 survivors of the shipwreck, 4 relatives of the missing, and nongovernmental organizations, UN and international agencies and organizations, and representatives of the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Greek Police.

      The organizations’ initial observations confirm the concerns reported by several other reputable sources as to the dynamics of the shipwreck. Survivors interviewed by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch consistently stated that the Hellenic Coast Guard vessel dispatched to the scene attached a rope to the Adriana and started towing, causing it to sway and then capsize. The survivors also consistently said that passengers asked to be rescued, and that they witnessed others on the boat plead for a rescue by satellite phone in the hours before their boat capsized.  

      In a meeting with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, senior officials of the Hellenic Coast Guard said individuals on the boat limited their request for assistance to food and water and expressed their intention to proceed to Italy. They said the crew of the Coast Guard vessel came close to the Adriana and used a rope to approach the boat to assess whether passengers wanted help, but that after the first “negotiations”, passengers threw the rope back and the boat continued its journey.

      This preventable tragedy demonstrates the bankruptcy of EU migration policies predicated on the racialized exclusion of people on the move and deadly deterrence

      Greek authorities have opened two criminal investigations, one targeted at the alleged smugglers, and another into the actions of the coast guard. It is vital for these investigations to comply with international human rights standards of impartiality, independence, and effectiveness. 

      To enhance the credibility of judicial investigations both in practice and perception, they should be under the supervision of the Supreme Court Prosecutor’s Office. Further, Greek authorities should ensure that the Greek Ombudsman’s office is promptly provided with information and resources necessary to carry out its functions as the National Mechanism for Investigating Incidents of Arbitrariness, in relation to any disciplinary investigation.   

      Several survivors said that the authorities confiscated their phones following the shipwreck but did not give them any related documentation or tell them how to retrieve their property. Nabil, a survivor of Syrian origin, told the organisations, “It’s not only the evidence of the wreck that has been taken from me, it is my memories of my friends who were lost, my life has been taken from me”. 

      The Greek authorities’ longstanding failure to ensure accountability for violent and unlawful pushbacks at the country’s borders raises concerns over their ability and willingness to carry out effective and independent investigations.

      Lessons should be learned from the European Court of Human Rights 2022 decision about the 2014 “Farmakonisi” shipwreck, in which survivors argued that their boat had capsized because the Hellenic Coast Guard used dangerous maneuvers to tow them towards Turkish waters. The Court condemned Greece for the authorities’ failures in handling rescue operations and for shortcomings in the subsequent investigation of the incident, including how victims’ testimony was handled.  

      In view of the seriousness and international significance of the Pylos tragedy, Greek authorities should seek out and welcome international and/or European assistance and cooperation in the conduct of national investigations as an additional guarantee of independence, effectiveness and transparency.  

      A full and credible investigation into the shipwreck should seek to clarify any responsibility for both the sinking of the ship and delays or shortcomings in the rescue efforts that may have contributed to the appalling loss of life. The investigation should involve taking the testimonies of all survivors, under conditions that guarantee their trust and safety.

      All forensic evidence, such as traces of communications, videos, and photographs, should be collected, assessed and safeguarded to facilitate accountability processes. Any property, such as cell phones, taken from survivors for investigative purposes should be appropriately logged and returned within a reasonable amount of time.  

      All of those involved in or with knowledge of the incident, including the Hellenic Coast Guard, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the captains and crews of the two merchant vessels, and others who took part in the rescue operation after the shipwreck should be invited or required to testify, as appropriate, and should cooperate fully and promptly with the investigations.

      To ensure this is the last, and not the latest, in an unconscionably long list of tragedies in the Mediterranean, the EU should reorient its border policies towards rescue at sea and safe and legal routes

      In parallel to the national investigation, the EU Ombudsman has announced that it will open an inquiry into the role of Frontex in search and rescue (SAR) activities in the Mediterranean, including in the Adriana shipwreck. This will pose important questions about the agency’s role, practices and protocols in the context of SAR operations and on what actions it has taken to comply with its fundamental rights obligations and EU laws during this and other shipwrecks.

      Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are continuing to investigate the Pylos shipwreck and demand justice for all those harmed.

      “This preventable tragedy demonstrates the bankruptcy of EU migration policies predicated on the racialized exclusion of people on the move and deadly deterrence,” said Esther Major, Amnesty International’s Senior Research Adviser for Europe.

      “To ensure this is the last, and not the latest, in an unconscionably long list of tragedies in the Mediterranean, the EU should reorient its border policies towards rescue at sea and safe and legal routes for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants.”  

      Background 

      As part of their ongoing investigation, the organizations have sent letters requesting information to several key entities, including the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, the Prosecutors of the Supreme Court and of the Piraeus Naval Court and Frontex.

      On 13 June 2023, Frontex said its surveillance plane spotted the Adriana at 09:47 UTC (12:47 EEST/in Athens) and alerted authorities in Greece and Italy. In the following hours, two merchant vessels and later a Hellenic Coast Guard vessel interacted with the Adriana. After the boat capsized at around 2 a.m. EEST on 14 June, only 104 survivors, including several children, were rescued.

      The Prosecutor of Kalamata ordered the arrest of nine Egyptian nationals who survived the shipwreck on charges of smuggling, membership in an organized criminal network, manslaughter, and other serious crimes.

      Following an order by the Head of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Piraeus Naval Court, a prosecutor is currently conducting a preliminary investigation into the conditions of the shipwreck and the potential punishable offences by members of the Hellenic Coast Guard. The organizations have sought information with the Greek Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy about any disciplinary investigation opened into the actions of members of the Hellenic Coast Guard.

      https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/08/greece-disparities-in-accounts-of-pylos-shipwreck-underscore-the-need-for-h

  • Dans les champs de fraises en Espagne, les migrants victimes « d’exploitation », selon le #Conseil_de_l'Europe

    Dans son tout dernier rapport, un groupe d’experts du Conseil de l’Europe fustige les conditions de travail et de vie des travailleurs migrants employés dans les champs de fraises, à #Huelva, dans le sud de l’Espagne. Une situation qui, malgré la « prise de conscience » des autorités, perdure depuis plus de 20 ans.

    C’est un nouveau rapport accablant pour les autorités espagnoles. Dans son dernier compte-rendu publié le 12 juin, le Groupe d’experts contre la traite des êtres humains du Conseil de l’Europe (Greta) dénonce les conditions de vie et de travail des migrants employés dans les champs de fraises à Huelva, dans le sud de l’Espagne. Leurs conclusions ont été rédigées suite à une visite du groupe sur place, entre le 4 et le 8 juillet 2022.

    Lors de leur venue, les membres du groupe ont constaté l’existence de 25 « camps informels », dans lesquels vivaient 914 migrants dont 99 femmes. La plupart étaient des sans-papiers originaires du Maroc, du Mali et du Ghana. Ces personnes « logent dans des cabanes faites de films en plastique, les mêmes qui sont utilisées pour couvrir les plantations de fraises ». Et d’après l’étude, elles n’ont en aucun cas « accès à l’eau potable, à l’électricité et à des sanitaires ».

    https://twitter.com/CoE_Trafficking/status/1668129337822855171

    Seul soutien pour ces travailleurs qui vivent dans une très grande précarité : un petit centre de jour, situé à côté des cultures. Créée par quelques associations présentes sur place, comme la Croix-Rouge, Caritas, et l’ONG espagnole d’aide aux migrants ACCEM, la structure prodigue des services basiques aux personnes dans le besoin. Son fonctionnement est toutefois menacé, à terme, par « le manque de financements publics », précise le Greta.

    Ces associations, citées dans le rapport, considèrent que « de nombreux travailleurs migrants du camp sont victimes d’exploitation par le travail et de traite d’êtres humains ». En cause, notamment, des heures travaillées qui dépassent souvent la limite légale, pour un salaire fixé, lui, en dessous du salaire minimum. « Parfois, les travailleurs ne sont même pas payés du tout », ajoute le document. Les ONG dénoncent aussi des cas de femmes exploitées sexuellement dans les camps.
    Contre l’exploitation, « un espace d’échanges et de bonnes pratiques »

    Parallèlement à ces conclusions, les experts du Greta dénoncent « l’inaction des autorités » et s’inquiètent que « les inspecteurs du travail n’aient pas de mandat pour venir dans les bidonvilles ». À leur grand étonnement, seule la Garde civile est en droit de s’y déplacer, seulement en cas d’incident, ou pour identifier les personnes vulnérables comme les femmes enceintes ou celles avec enfants.

    En réponse, le gouvernement espagnol a fait savoir qu’à Huelva, il y a eu « une prise de conscience notable » sur la situation. En 2022, 329 inspections du travail ont été menées, contre 57 en 2018. D’après les autorités, « la formation des agents chargés d’enquêter sur les cas de traite des personnes a été renforcée ». Et depuis cinq ans, des « formations spécifiques ont été réalisées à destination des partenaires sociaux », afin de constituer « un espace d’échanges et de bonnes pratiques ».

    Quelques jours avant la publication du Greta, le 7 juin, la ministre du Travail Yolanda Diaz, en visite à Doñana près de Huelva, avait assuré de son côté que « la plupart » des entreprises de fruits rouges de la région « respectaient la loi » en matière de travail, rapporte Europa Press. Et que les travailleurs et travailleuses y ont « des conditions de travail correctes ». Avant tout de même de nuancer : « Il est également vrai qu’il existe des entreprises qui ne respectent pas la législation en vigueur ».

    En Andalousie, région à laquelle appartient Huelva, l’agriculture représente 7,8% du PIB, soit le double de la moyenne espagnole. La culture des fruits rouges, dont les fraises, en est le fleuron. Selon Interfresa, la province de Huelva produit 300 000 tonnes de fraises par an, soit plus de 90% de la production espagnole.

    Le secteur, très dynamique, nécessite une main-d’œuvre conséquente : chaque saison de récolte, de février à juin, requiert le travail de 100 000 personnes, dont une majorité de travailleurs étrangers. À Huelva, en 2019, seules 970 citoyens originaires de la province ont répondu présents pour exercer dans les 23 000 parcelles de fraises. « La main-d’œuvre étrangère reste alors indispensable », explique El Diario.

    Si les autorités autorisent bien volontiers ces milliers d’exilés à travailler dans ces cultures, elles ferment donc les yeux sur leurs conditions de travail déplorables, dénoncées pourtant inlassablement par de multiples organisations. Et ce, depuis près de deux décennies. Le 20 juin 2000 déjà, le Syndicat des ouvriers agricoles avait fait un bilan implacable : plus de 1 300 migrants sur les 5 000 qui s’étaient déplacés pour la récolte des fraises de Huelva vivaient dans des cabanes et des camps informels.
    « De nombreux migrants perdent la tête »

    Plus de 20 ans plus tard, le constat est le même. Pour le président de l’association Andalucia Acoge, José Miguel Morales, cette situation persiste à cause du « racisme social et institutionnel qui suppose que des personnes de certaines origines peuvent être maintenues dans des conditions indignes ». « Nous demandons au Parlement européen et à l’Europe de s’impliquer pour en faire un sujet à l’ordre du jour », s’est-il exprimé en décembre 2022, à l’occasion d’une réunion entre les ONG et le commissaire européen à l’Emploi, Nicolas Schmit.

    « Parce qu’ils vivent sans électricité et sans eau courante, de nombreux migrants perdent la tête », a déclaré lors de cette même rencontre Abdoulaye Sanogo, de l’Association des Maliens de Mazagón. Dans une interview donnée à la chaîne de télévision Euronews, le représentant du Syndicat andalou des travailleurs (SAT), José Antonio Brazo, explique que les travailleurs qui ne sont pas assez productifs sont maltraités. « C’est le Moyen-Âge ! Si vous ne récoltez pas le nombre de kilos voulus, on vous punit : vous restez un, deux ou trois jours sans travailler et sans être payé, donc pendant ce temps-là, vous ne ramenez pas d’argent », raconte le militant.

    En avril 2022 encore, Najat Bassit, cofondatrice de l’association Jornaleras de Huelva en Lucha et ancienne ouvrière agricole déplorait que « les abus augmentent d’année en année ». Selon elles, il arrive que certains travailleurs migrants n’aient pas le droit d’emporter avec eux une bouteille d’eau, en plein été, pour ne pas mouiller les fruits. « Le travailleur peut mourir de soif, mais le fruit, lui, doit survivre », rapporte Ameco Press.

    https://twitter.com/asnuci/status/1517031897540538368

    Deux ans plus tôt, en juillet 2020, les autorités espagnoles avaient été pressées par l’expert du Conseil des droits de l’Homme de l’ONU, Olivier de Schutter, « d’améliorer immédiatement les conditions de vie déplorables des travailleurs migrants saisonniers, avant que les gens ne meurent ».

    Les habitations très spartiates dans lesquelles les migrants sont forcés d’habiter sont fragiles et dangereuses. Régulièrement, nombre d’entre elles partent en fumée. En avril 2022, Mohamed Alam, un jeune marocain de 27 ans, a perdu la vie alors qu’il était venu travailler dans les champs à Lepe, près de Huelva. Il est mort brûlé vif dans l’incendie de sa cabane qu’il occupait avec cinq autres personnes.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/49841/dans-les-champs-de-fraises-en-espagne-les-migrants-victimes-dexploitat

    –—

    voir ce fil de discussion consacré à ce sujet :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/693859

  • Communiqué de presse du Conseil « Justice et affaires intérieures » (#JAI) de l’Union européenne :

    Migration policy : Council reaches agreement on key asylum and migration laws

    The Council today took a decisive step towards a modernisation of the EU’s rulebook for asylum and migration. It agreed on a negotiating position on the asylum procedure regulation and on the asylum and migration management regulation. This position will form the basis of negotiations by the Council presidency with the European Parliament.

    “No member state can deal with the challenges of migration alone. Frontline countries need our solidarity. And all member states must be able to rely on the responsible adherence to the agreed rule. I am very glad that on this basis we agreed on our negotiating position.”
    Maria Malmer Stenergard, Swedish minister for migration
    Streamlining of asylum procedure

    The asylum procedure regulation (APR) establishes a common procedure across the EU that member states need to follow when people seek international protection. It streamlines the procedural arrangements (e.g. the duration of the procedure) and sets standards for the rights of the asylum seeker (e.g. being provided with the service of an interpreter or having the right to legal assistance and representation).

    The regulation also aims to prevent abuse of the system by setting out clear obligations for applicants to cooperate with the authorities throughout the procedure.
    Border procedures

    The APR also introduces mandatory border procedures, with the purpose to quickly assess at the EU’s external borders whether applications are unfounded or inadmissible. Persons subject to the asylum border procedure are not authorised to enter the member state’s territory.

    The border procedure would apply when an asylum seeker makes an application at an external border crossing point, following apprehension in connection with an illegal border crossing and following disembarkation after a search and rescue operation. The procedure is mandatory for member states if the applicant is a danger to national security or public order, he/she has misled the authorities with false information or by withholding information and if the applicant has a nationality with a recognition rate below 20%.

    The total duration of the asylum and return border procedure should be not more than 6 months.
    Adequate capacity

    In order to carry out border procedures, member states need to establish an adequate capacity, in terms of reception and human resources, required to examine at any given moment an identified number of applications and to enforce return decisions.

    At EU level this adequate capacity is 30 000. The adequate capacity of each member state will be established on the basis of a formula which takes account of the number of irregular border crossings and refusals of entry over a three-year period.
    Modification of Dublin rules

    The asylum and migration management regulation (AMMR) should replace, once agreed, the current Dublin regulation. Dublin sets out rules determining which member state is responsible for the examination of an asylum application. The AMMR will streamline these rules and shorten time limits. For example, the current complex take back procedure aimed at transferring an applicant back to the member state responsible for his or her application will be replaced by a simple take back notification
    New solidarity mechanism

    To balance the current system whereby a few member states are responsible for the vast majority of asylum applications, a new solidarity mechanism is being proposed that is simple, predictable and workable. The new rules combine mandatory solidarity with flexibility for member states as regards the choice of the individual contributions. These contributions include relocation, financial contributions or alternative solidarity measures such as deployment of personnel or measures focusing on capacity building. Member states have full discretion as to the type of solidarity they contribute. No member state will ever be obliged to carry out relocations.

    There will be a minimum annual number for relocations from member states where most persons enter the EU to member states less exposed to such arrivals. This number is set at 30 000, while the minimum annual number for financial contributions will be fixed at €20 000 per relocation. These figures can be increased where necessary and situations where no need for solidarity is foreseen in a given year will also be taken into account.

    In order to compensate for a possibly insufficient number of pledged relocations, responsibility offsets will be available as a second-level solidarity measure, in favour of the member states benefitting from solidarity. This will mean that the contributing member state will take responsibility for the examination of an asylum claim by persons who would under normal circumstances be subject to a transfer to the member state responsible (benefitting member state). This scheme will become mandatory if relocation pledges fall short of 60% of total needs identified by the Council for the given year or do not reach the number set in the regulation (30 000).
    Preventing abuse and secondary movements

    The AMMR also contains measures aimed at preventing abuse by the asylum seeker and avoiding secondary movements (when a migrant moves from the country in which they first arrived to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere). The regulation for instance sets obligations for asylum seekers to apply in the member states of first entry or legal stay. It discourages secondary movements by limiting the possibilities for the cessation or shift of responsibility between member states and thus reduces the possibilities for the applicant to chose the member state where they submit their claim.

    While the new regulation should preserve the main rules on determination of responsibility, the agreed measures include modified time limits for its duration:

    - the member state of first entry will be responsible for the asylum application for a duration of two years
    - when a country wants to transfer a person to the member state which is actually responsible for the migrant and this person absconds (e.g. when the migrant goes into hiding to evade a transfer) responsibility will shift to the transferring member state after three years
    - if a member state rejects an applicant in the border procedure, its responsibility for that person will end after 15 months (in case of a renewed application)

    https://nsl.consilium.europa.eu/104100/Newsletter/axgy5g4bs3zixsx3bkhgg2epeiecucjvrcybx7b6shr3lt7za5b4x3vrbmpevnc

    #conseil_de_l'Europe #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_Dublin #accord #8_juin_2023 #UE #Union_européenne #EU #asylum_procedure_regulation (#APR) #procédure_d'asile #frontières #procédure_accélérée #inadmissibilité #procédure_de_frontière #frontières_extérieures #capacité_adéquate #asylum_and_migration_management_regulation (#AMMR) #mécanisme_de_solidarité #solidarité #relocalisation #contribution_financière #compensation #responsibility_offsets #mouvements_secondaires #abus

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

    • Analyse de #Fulvio_Vassallo_Paleologo:

      Paesi terzi “sicuri”, sicurezza delle persone migranti e propaganda di Stato

      1.Le conclusioni del Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea riuniti a Lussembugo lo scorso 8 giugno sono state propagandate come una vittoria della linea tenuta dal governo Meloni fino alle ultime ore di una convulsa trattativa, che si è conclusa con una spaccatura che avrà certamente ripercussioni sulla prossima fase di codecisione sulle politiche migratorie e sulle procedure di asilo, nella quale analoghe divisioni si potrebbero riprodurre all’interno del Parlamento europeo.

      La materia sulla quale i ministri del’interno dei diversi paesi europei hanno alla fine trovato una soluzione di compromesso, su cui il ministro Piantedosi ha espresso soddisfazione, riguarda buona parte della vigente legislazione europea in materia di imigrazione ed asilo, sia per quanto riguarda la cd. dimensione esterna, con riferimento ai paesi terzi di origine e transito, che per quanto concerne i cd. meccanismi di solidarietà, in materia di rimpatri forzati e al fine di contrastare i cd. movimenti secondari, con una sostanziale rivisitazione del vigente Regolamento Dublino III del 2013. A tale riguardo si prevede espressamente che “Gli Stati membri hanno piena discrezionalità quanto al tipo di solidarietà cui contribuiscono. Nessuno Stato membro sarà mai obbligato a effettuare ricollocazioni”. Una sconfitta che il governo italiano non può nascondere dietro i propositi di espellere o respingere i richiedenti asilo denegati nei paesi di transito.

      I ministri dell’interno dei diversi paesi dell’Unione Europea hanno così trovato a maggioranza una intesa che però appare come una scatola vuota, se si pensa alla mole delle normative (dal Regolamento frontiere Schengen alla Direttiva 2008/115/ CE sui rimpatri) che dovrebbero essere modificate per approvare definitivamente quanto si è deciso a Lussemburgo, ed all’esiguo tempo che manca in vista delle prosime elezioni europee, dopo tre anni di stallo seguiti alla prima versione del Patto sull’immigrazione e l’asilo adottata dalla Commissione nel 2020. Inoltre la spaccatura tra i paesi di Visegrad Ungheria e Polonia, ed i conservatori del gruppo della Meloni, non lasciano presagire risultati definitivi nel breve periodo.

      2. La proposta di regolamento sulla procedura di asilo (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] tenta di stabilire una procedura comune in tutta l’UE che gli Stati membri devono seguire quando le persone fanno richiesta di protezione internazionale. Si snelliscono le disposizioni procedurali (ad esempio la durata della procedura) e si stabiliscono norme per i diritti del richiedente asilo (ad esempio, la fornitura del servizio di un interprete o il diritto all’assistenza e alla rappresentanza legali). La procedura di frontiera si applicherebbe quando un richiedente asilo presenta domanda a un valico di frontiera esterna, a seguito di arresto in relazione a un attraversamento illegale della frontiera e in seguito allo sbarco dopo un’operazione di ricerca e soccorso. Ma anche quando proviene da un paese terzo ritenuto sicuro. La procedura è obbligatoria per gli Stati membri se il richiedente rappresenta un pericolo per la sicurezza nazionale o l’ordine pubblico, ha ingannato le autorità con informazioni false o nascondendo informazioni e se il richiedente ha una nazionalità di un paese con un tasso di riconoscimento delle richieste di asilo inferiore al 20%.

      Il punto sul quale in Italia il governo Meloni ed il ministro dell’interno Piantedosi hanno insistito di più, a livello di comunicazione, ma anche come base per una intensa attività diplomatica che conducono da mesi senza risultati effettivi, riguardava la possibilità di rinviare nei paesi di transito i richiedenti asilo denegati dopo la procedura in frontiera, già prevista in modo più rigoroso dalla legge 50 del 2023 (ex Decreto Cutro). Una legge approvata senza il parere delle competenti Comissioni Affari costituzionali, che sta già facendo vitime, con espulsioni comminate dai prefetti “in automatico” a persone già inserite in Italia, che chiedono il rinnovo del permesso di soggiorno per protezione speciale, ma che ad oggi appare in contrasto non solo con importanti principi fondamentali del nostro ordinamento (come gli articoli 10, 13,24,32,113 della Costituzione), ma anche con molti dei principi di garanzia ribaditi con grande nettezza dalle proposte legislative adottate a Lussemburgo dal Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea.

      Durante l’iter di conversione del decreto legge in Parlamento, l’Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (ACNUR- UNHCR) aveva inviato una “Nota tecnica” al governo, nel tentativo di avviare un confronto su diversi punti “critici” che non rispettavano norme internazionali o Direttive dell’Unione Europea. Come ha dichiarato la rappresentante dell’UNHCR per l’Italia, “Avevamo rappresentato queste criticità, confidando che nel procedimento legislativo alcuni correttivi potessero essere apportati”.

      Nella sua ultima nota tecnica, l’UNHCR evidenzia innanzitutto come la nuova legge 50/2023 “ estende la preesistente procedura accelerata di frontiera ai richiedenti provenienti da Paesi di origine designati come sicuri e dispone il trattenimento per quei richiedenti, tra coloro che siano stati avviati a tale procedura, i quali non abbiano consegnato il “passaporto o altro documento equipollente” o non prestino “idonea garanzia finanziaria”. Il trattenimento avverrà nei punti di crisi (hotspot) esistenti presso i maggiori luoghi di sbarco, nelle strutture analoghe ai punti di crisi che verranno individuate o nei Centri di Permanenza per i Rimpatri (CPR) che si trovino in prossimità della frontiera. I minori e tutte le altre persone con esigenze particolari, come da disposizioni vigenti, sono esonerati da ogni forma di procedura accelerata”.

      L’ACNUR dopo una generale considerazione positiva delle procedure accelerate in frontiera, soprattuto nei casi in cui appare maggiormente probabile l’esito positivo della domanda di protezione, “Raccomanda, tuttavia, di incanalare in procedura di frontiera (con trattenimento) solo le domande di protezione internazionale che, in una fase iniziale di raccolta delle informazioni e registrazione, appaiano manifestamente infondate.
      In particolare, la domanda proposta dal richiedente proveniente da un Paese di origine sicuro non deve essere incanalata in tale iter quando lo stesso abbia invocato gravi motivi per ritenere che, nelle sue specifiche circostanze, il Paese non sia sicuro. Si sottolinea, a tal fine, la centralità di una fase iniziale di screening, volta a far emergere elementi utili alla categorizzazione delle domande (triaging) e alla conseguente individuazione della procedura più appropriata per ciascun caso.

      3. La nozione di Paese terzo sicuro è presente nella legislazione eurounitaria con la direttiva 2005/85/Ce del Consiglio del 1° dicembre 2005. L’art. 29 prevedeva che il Consiglio, deliberando a maggioranza qualificata su proposta della Commissione e previa consultazione del Parlamento europeo, potesse adottare un elenco comune minimo dei paesi terzi considerati dagli Stati membri paesi d’origine sicuri. Tale disposizione fu annullata dalla Corte di giustizia perché introduceva una riserva di competenza in favore del Consiglio, con semplice obbligo di consultazione del Parlamento europeo, che non poteva essere prevista da un atto derivato.

      Con la cd. direttiva procedure (dir. 2013/32/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 26 giugno 2013) la traccia è stata ripresa e ampliata.
      Gli articoli da 36 a 39 disciplinano infatti in termini molto dettagliati i contorni della nozione di Paese di origine sicuro e le conseguenze di tale nozione sulle procedure di valutazione delle domande.
      L’art. 36 detta le condizioni soggettive alle quali è subordinato il riconoscimento della natura di Paese sicuro di un determinato richiedente: questi deve essere cittadino del Paese di provenienza definito sicuro o apolide che in quel Paese soggiornasse abitualmente; inoltre, non deve avere invocato gravi motivi a lui riferibili, tesi a escludere che il Paese di origine sia sicuro.
      L’art. 37 fa rinvio all’allegato I della stessa direttiva, dove sono dettate le condizioni alle quali è possibile designare un Paese come sicuro. Il testo dell’Allegato I è il seguente: “Un paese è considerato paese di origine sicuro se, sulla base dello status giuridico, dell’applicazione della legge all’interno di un sistema democratico e della situazione politica generale, si può dimostrare che non ci sono generalmente e costantemente persecuzioni quali definite nell’articolo 9 della direttiva 2011/95/UE, né tortura o altre forme di pena o trattamento disumano o degradante, né pericolo a causa di violenza indiscriminata in situazioni di conflitto armato interno o internazionale.
      Per effettuare tale valutazione si tiene conto, tra l’altro, della misura in cui viene offerta
      protezione contro le persecuzioni ed i maltrattamenti mediante:
      a) le pertinenti disposizioni legislative e regolamentari del paese ed il modo in cui sono applicate;
      b) il rispetto dei diritti e delle libertà stabiliti nella Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali e/o nel Patto internazionale relativo ai diritti civili e sociali

      L’art. 38 della Direttiva atualmente in vigore, fino a quando non verrà espressamente abrogata, fornisce il: “Concetto di paese terzo sicuro”.

      1. Glic Stati membri possono applicare il oncetto di paese terzo sicuro solo se le autorità competenti hanno accertato che nel paese terzo in questione una persona richiedente protezione internazionale riceverà un trattamento conforme ai seguenti criteri:
      a) non sussistono minacce alla sua vita ed alla sua libertà per ragioni di razza, religione,
      nazionalità, opinioni politiche o appartenenza a un determinato gruppo sociale;
      b) non sussiste il rischio di danno grave definito nella direttiva 2011/95/UE;
      c) è rispettato il principio di «non-refoulement» conformemente alla convenzione di Ginevra;
      d) è osservato il divieto di allontanamento in violazione del diritto a non subire torture né
      trattamenti crudeli, disumani o degradanti, sancito dal diritto internazionale; e
      e) esiste la possibilità di chiedere lo status di rifugiato e, per chi è riconosciuto come rifugiato,
      ottenere protezione in conformità della convenzione di Ginevra.
      2. L’applicazione del concetto di paese terzo sicuro è subordinata alle norme stabilite dal diritto nazionale, comprese:
      a) norme che richiedono un legame tra il richiedente e il paese terzo in questione, secondo le quali sarebbe ragionevole per detta persona recarsi in tale paese;
      b) norme sul metodo mediante il quale le autorità̀ competenti accertano che il concetto di paese terzo sicuro può̀ essere applicato a un determinato paese o a un determinato richiedente. Tale metodo comprende l’esame caso per caso della sicurezza del paese per un determinato richiedente e/o la designazione nazionale dei paesi che possono essere considerati generalmente sicuri;
      c) norme conformi al diritto internazionale per accertare, con un esame individuale, se il paese terzo interessato sia sicuro per un determinato richiedente e che consentano almeno al richiedente di impugnare l’applicazione del concetto di paese terzo sicuro a motivo del fatto che quel paese terzo non è sicuro nel suo caso specifico. Al richiedente è altresì data la possibilità di contestare l’esistenza di un legame con il paese terzo ai sensi della lettera a)”

      4. Secondo la nuova proposta legislativa sulle procedure di asilo, approvata dal Consiglio dei ministri del’interno dell’Unione Europea a Lussemburgo, gli Stati membri dovrebbero avere la possibilità di applicare il concetto di terzo sicuro paese […] come motivo di inammissibilità ove esista la possibilità per il richiedente[…] di chiedere e, se ne ricorrono i presupposti, di ricevere effettivo protezione in un paese terzo, dove la sua vita e la sua libertà non sono minacciate conto di razza, religione, nazionalità, appartenenza a un particolare gruppo sociale o opinione politica, dove lui o lei non è soggetto a persecuzione né affronta un rischio reale di danno grave come definito nel regolamento (UE) n. XXX/XXX [Nuovo Regolamento sulle Qualifiche ancora da approvare] ed è tutelato contro il respingimento e contro l’allontanamento, o contro le violazioni del diritto alla protezione dalla tortura e da trattamenti crudeli, inumani o degradanti prevista dal diritto internazionale.
      Si aggiungono poi nuove condizioni per considerare inammissibile una domanda di asilo.
      Si prevede in particolare che Il concetto di un paese terzo sicuro può essere applicato solo se esiste […] un collegamento tra il richiedente e […] il paese terzo in base al quale sarebbe […] ragionevole[…] che il richiedente […] si rechi in quel paese […], compreso il fatto che […] ha transitato […] in quel paese terzo. La connessione in particolare tra il richiedente e il paese terzo sicuro potrebbe essere considerata stabilita dove i membri della famiglia del richiedente siano presenti in quel paese o dove il richiedente si è stabilito o ha soggiornato in quel paese. Nella fase convulsa di ricerca del compromesso finale, nella notte dei ministri del’interno a Lussemburgo, è saltata la previsione sostenuta dall’Italia che anche un transito temporaneo avrebbe potuto comportare l’acertamento di questa “commessione” e dunque comportare l’inammissibilità della domanda di protezione già nella procedura in frontiera e la possibilità di respingimento o espulsione con immediato accompagnamento forzato. La posizione dei cittadini di paesi terzi “in transito” rimane comunque molto a rischio e sarà sicuramente oggetto di trattative in sede di rinegoziazione degli accordi bilaterali già esistenti.

      Al Considerando 37b) si prevede comunque che, “Nel valutare se i criteri per una protezione effettiva come stabilito nel presente Regolamento sono soddisfatte da un paese terzo, l’accesso ai mezzi di sussistenza sufficienti a mantenere un tenore di vita adeguato dovrebbe essere inteso come comprensivo dell’accesso a vitto, vestiario, alloggio o alloggio e il diritto a svolgere un’attività lavorativa remunerata a condizioni non meno favorevoli di quelle previste per gli stranieri del Paese terzo generalmente nelle stesse circostanze”. Anche nella proposta di nuovo Regolamento oltre alla situazione dei transitanti nei paesi terzi ritenuti sicuri si deve aggiungere anche la considerazione della maggiore ampiezza operativa che si sta attribuento, anche a livello interno, alla categoria di paese di origine sicuro.

      Al Considerando (46) si aggiunge che […] Dovrebbe essere possibile designare un paese terzo come paese di origine sicuro con eccezioni per parti specifiche del suo territorio o categorie chiaramente identificabili di persone. Inoltre, il fatto che un paese terzo sia incluso in una lista di paesi di origine sicuri non può stabilire una garanzia assoluta di sicurezza per i cittadini di tale paese paese, anche per coloro che non appartengono a una categoria di persone per le quali tale è fatta eccezione, e quindi non dispensa dalla necessità di condurre un’adeguata esame individuale della domanda di protezione internazionale. Per sua stessa natura, la valutazione sottesa alla designazione non può che tener conto del carattere generale, civile, circostanze legali e politiche in quel paese e se autori di persecuzioni, torture o trattamenti o punizioni inumani o degradanti sono soggetti a sanzione quando ritenuti responsabili in quel paese. Per questo motivo, dove il richiedente può dimostrare elementi che giustificano il motivo per cui il concetto di paese di origine sicuro non è applicabile a lui, la designazione del paese come sicuro non può più essere considerata rilevante per lui o lei.

      5. Il governo italiano si vanta di avere costretto l’Unione europea a spostare l’attenzione dai problemi che interssano maggiormente agli Stati continentali, e dunque dai cd. “movimenti secondari” alla questione dei “movimenti primari”, con particolare riferimento alle frontiere esterne del Mediteraneo. La prospettiva che si persegue, magari in collaborazione con l’UNHCR, che però ha posizioni di garanzia molto precise sul punto, è di favorire la “deportazione” in questi paesi, ritenuti “sicuri”, di immigrati irregolari di diversa nazionalità, dopo il diniego sulla domanda di protezione, alla fine della “procedura in frontiera”. Sfugge evidentemente alla premier Meloni, o si preferisce nascondere, la situazione dei diritti umani nei paesi nordafricani di transito, come l’Egitto, la Libia, la Tunisia, l’Algeria, che pure ministri e sottosegretari italiani hanno intensamente frequentato in questi ultimi mesi. Con i risultati che sono sotto gli occhi di tutti. Adesso ci riproveranno a Tunisi, con la visita in programma per domenica 11 giugno in cui la Meloni sarà accompagnata adirittura da Ursula Von der Layen a nome della Commissione europea e dal premier olandese Rutte.

      Nella propaganda governativa si omette di ricordare che nessun accordo di riammissione stipulato con paesi terzi, anche quello tuttora vigente con la Tunisia, prevede deportazioni di cittadini provenienti da altri Stati e giunti irregolarmente nel nostro territorio, o che hanno ricevuto un diniego sulla richiesta di protezione internazionale. A parte la considerazione che l’ingresso per ragioni di soccorso non può essere equiparato all’ingresso clandestino. E questo lo chiarisce bene la Corte di Cassazione con la sentenza sul caso Rackete n.6626/2020. Si vedrà se la prossima missione della Meloni a Tunisi, in compagnia della Presidente della Commissione europea convincerà l’autocrate Saied che sta espellendo sistematicamente dal suo paese tutti i migranti subsahariani, ad accettare di riprendersi cittadini non tunisini sbarcati in Italia. Ed è pure abbastanza improbabile che aumenti la quota di cittadini tunisini che, in base agli accordi vigenti, vengono espulsi o respinti (respingimento differito) verso Tunisi, sulla base degli accordi bilaterali già vigenti con l’Italia. Due voli alla settimana, o poco più per circa sessanta persone. Difficile immaginare una intensificazione dei rimpatri con accompagnamento di polizia. In questi casi, come osserva il Garante nazionale per le persone private della libertà personale in un recente rapporto, “L’aspetto di maggiore criticità è che “le regole dell’attività di rimpatrio forzato da parte della Polizia di Stato sono in larga parte definite da semplici circolari e disposizioni interne e non da fonti normative di rango primario. Manca cioè un quadro legislativo che specifichi le regole operative e ciò ha inevitabili ricadute”. Per esempio, “la disciplina compiuta del possibile ricorso all’impiego della forza, al di là di principi generali, che definisca i possibili strumenti contenitivi, le modalità e la durata del loro impiego. Così come mancano disposizioni operative sui controlli di sicurezza, la cui attuazione talvolta si avvicina a una perquisizione personale, pratica eccezionale anche in contesti ben più problematici”. Ma anche in Tunisia la discrezionalità di polizia sconfina sempre più spesso nell’arbitrio.

      Come denuncia l’ASGI, “Alla luce dell’attuale trasformazione autoritaria dello Stato tunisino e dell’estrema violenza e persecuzione della popolazione nera, delle persone in movimento, degli oppositori politici e degli attori della società civile, noi, le organizzazioni firmatarie, rilasciamo questa dichiarazione per ricordare che la Tunisia non è né un paese di origine sicuro né un paese terzo sicuro e pertanto non può essere considerato un luogo sicuro di sbarco (Place of Safety, POS) per le persone soccorse in mare”.

      Come riferisce il sito Meltingpot, a margine di un diniego dopo la richiesta di protezione internazionale alla competente Commissione territoriale, il Tribunale di Cagliari ha accolto la richiesta di sospensiva di un cittadino tunisino. La situazione è peculiare e occorrerà attendere il merito per approfondirla ma il decreto è significativo perché, il Tribunale “smentisce” il fatto che la Tunisia sia un Paese Sicuro“. Si tratta naturalmente di decisioni che valgono per casi individuali, e sarà fondamentale provare la situazione di ciascuna persona che in frontiera, ma anche nei CPR, possa risultare destinataria di un provedimento di allontanbamento forzato verso la Tunisia.

      6. La seconda proposta legislativa su nuovi criteri di gestione in materia di immigrazione ed asilo di portata più ampia approvata a Lussemburgo lo scorso 8 giugno (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] non prevede particolari impegni dell’Unione Europea per sostenere le politiche di rimpatrio forzato di citt che adini di paesi terzi verso gli Stati da cui sono transitati prima di entrare in territorio europeo. Materia che richiederebbe una modifica radicale della Direttiva rimpatri 2008/115/CE.

      Il nuovo regolamento sulla gestione della migrazione e dell’asilo dovrebbe sostituire, una volta concordato, l’attuale regolamento Dublino che stabilisce norme che determinano quale Stato membro è competente per l’esame di una domanda di protezione internazionale. Il nuovo Regolamento dovrebbe semplificare queste regole e ridurre i termini. Ad esempio, l’attuale complessa procedura di ripresa in carico finalizzata al trasferimento di un richiedente nello Stato membro responsabile della sua domanda sarà sostituita da una semplice notifica di ripresa in carico. Rimane comunque confermata la responsabilità primaria dei paesi di primo ingresso, quello che Salvini voleva evitare ricattando i paesi membri con la chiusura dei porti. Lo Stato membro di primo ingresso sarà competente per la domanda di asilo per una durata di due anni. Quando un paese vuole trasferire una persona nello stato membro che è effettivamente responsabile del migrante e questa persona fugge (ad esempio quando il migrante si nasconde per eludere un trasferimento) la responsabilità passerà allo stato membro di trasferimento solo dopo tre anni.

      La nuova proposta legislativa su immigrazione ed asilo, faticosamente elaborata a Lussemburgo, si limita, con l’art. 7 (Cooperazione con i paesi terzi per facilitare il rimpatrio e la riammissione), a prevedere che dove la Commissione e il Consiglio ritengano che un terzo paese non collabora sufficientemente alla riammissione di cittadini di paesi terzi il cui soggiorno è irregolare, la Commissione e il Consiglio, nell’ambito delle rispettive competenze, prendono in considerazione le azioni appropriate tenendo conto delle competenze dell’Unione e delle relazioni generali degli Stati membri con il paese terzo.
      In particolare, in questi casi, 1. […] La Commissione può, sulla base dell’analisi effettuata a norma dell’articolo 25 bis, paragrafi 2 o 4, del regolamento (UE) n. 810/2009 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e di qualsiasi altra informazione disponibile dagli Stati membri, nonché dall’Unione istituzioni, organi e organismi, […] presentare al Consiglio una relazione comprendente, se del caso, l’identificazione di eventuali misure che potrebbero essere adottate per migliorare la cooperazione di tale paese terzo in materia di riammissione, tenendo conto dell’Unione e delle relazioni generali degli Stati membri con il paese terzo.

      7. Al di là delle perplessità sui tempi di attuazione delle proposte varate dal Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione europea e della loro dubbia compatibilità con il vigente diritto eurounitario e con il diritto internazionale umanitario e dei rifugiati, si deve rimarcare come il governo italiano, con un decreto interministeriale approvato lo scorso marzo, abbia ulteriormente ampliato la lista di paesi terzi sicuri che preclude di fatto sia l’esame approfondito delle domande di protezione nelle procedure in frontiera, che il rinnovo della maggior parte dei permessi di soggiorno finora concessi per protezione speciale. Con questo ultimo aggiornamento di marzo 2023 vengono ritenuti paesi terzi sicuri: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Erzegovina, Capo Verde, Costa d’Avorio, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Kosovo, Macedonia del Nord, Marocco, Montenegro, Nigeria, Senegal, Serbia e Tunisia.

      La categoria di “paese terzo sicuro” esisteva da anni nella legislazione italiana e nella normativa europea, ma è stato con il Decreto sicurezza Salvini n.113 del 2018 che se ne è estesa la portata e assieme ad altre modifiche legislative, ha ridotto di molto la portata effettiva del diritto di asilo riconosciuto dall’art. 10 della Costituzione italiana.

      L’art. 7-bis del dl 4 ottobre 2018, n. 113 (cd. decreto sicurezza), introdotto in sede di conversione dall’art. 1 della l. 1°dicembre 2018, n. 132, ha inserito nel d.lgs 28 gennaio 2008, n. 25 l’art. 2-bis, intitolato «Paesi di origine sicuri». E’ dunque chiaro che nell’ordinamenro italiano non esiste al momento alcuna categoria di paese di transito “sicuro” e dunque questo criterio, ancora allo stato di proposta legislativa da parte del Conisglio dei ministri dell’interno dell’Unione Europea NON potrà avere nell’immediato alcuna portata normativa, almeno fino a quando, al termine della procedura di codecisione, un nuovo Regolamento che lo preveda non venga pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale europea.

      L’art. 2-bis del d. lgs n. 25 del 2008, modificato dal decreto sicurezza del 2018, era articolato in cinque commi:

      «Art. 2-bis (Paesi di origine sicuri). – 1. Con decreto del Ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale, di concerto con i Ministri dell’interno e della giustizia, è adottato l’elenco dei Paesi di origine sicuri sulla base dei criteri di cui al comma 2. L’elenco dei Paesi di origine sicuri è aggiornato periodicamente ed è notificato alla Commissione europea.

      2. Uno Stato non appartenente all’Unione europea può essere considerato Paese di origine sicuro se, sulla base del suo ordinamento giuridico, dell’applicazione della legge all’interno di un sistema democratico e della situazione politica generale, si può dimostrare che, in via generale e costante, non sussistono atti di persecuzione quali definiti dall’articolo 7 del decreto legislativo 19 novembre 2007, n. 251, né tortura o altre forme di pena o trattamento inumano o degradante, né pericolo a causa di violenza indiscriminata in situazioni di conflitto armato interno o internazionale. La designazione di un Paese di origine sicuro può essere fatta con l’eccezione di parti del territorio o di categorie di persone.

      3. Ai fini della valutazione di cui al comma 2 si tiene conto, tra l’altro, della misura in cui è offerta protezione contro le persecuzioni ed i maltrattamenti mediante: a) le pertinenti disposizioni legislative e regolamentari del Paese ed il modo in cui sono applicate; b) il rispetto dei diritti e delle libertà stabiliti nella Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali del 4 novembre 1950, ratificata ai sensi della legge 4 agosto 1955, n. 848, nel Patto internazionale relativo ai diritti civili e politici, aperto alla firma il 19 dicembre 1966, ratificato ai sensi della legge 25 ottobre 1977, n. 881, e nella Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite contro la tortura del 10 dicembre 1984, in particolare dei diritti ai quali non si può derogare a norma dell’articolo 15, paragrafo 2, della predetta Convenzione europea; c) il rispetto del principio di cui all’articolo 33 della Convenzione di Ginevra; d) un sistema di ricorsi effettivi contro le violazioni di tali diritti e libertà.

      4. La valutazione volta ad accertare che uno Stato non appartenente all’Unione europea è un Paese di origine sicuro si basa sulle informazioni fornite dalla Commissione nazionale per il diritto di asilo, che si avvale anche delle notizie elaborate dal centro di documentazione di cui all’articolo 5, comma 1, nonché su altre fonti di informazione, comprese in particolare quelle fornite da altri Stati membri dell’Unione europea, dall’EASO, dall’UNHCR, dal Consiglio d’Europa e da altre organizzazioni internazionali competenti.

      5. Un Paese designato di origine sicuro ai sensi del presente articolo può essere considerato Paese di origine sicuro per il richiedente solo se questi ha la cittadinanza di quel Paese o è un apolide che in precedenza soggiornava abitualmente in quel Paese e non ha invocato gravi motivi per ritenere che quel Paese non è sicuro per la situazione particolare in cui lo stesso richiedente si trova».

      8. Adesso si sta tentando di estendere la nozione di paese terzo sicuro non solo ai cittadini di quel paese, ma anche a coloro che provengono da altri paesi e sono transitati nel paese terzo “sicuro”. Anche per queste persone, con la sola eccezione di MSNA (minori non accompagnati) e di altri soggetti vulnerabili, si prevedono procedure accelerate in frontiera e un numero più ampio di casi di trattenimento amministrativo, per facilitare respingimenti ed espulsioni al termine delle procedure in frontiera, in modo forse da dissuadere le partenze verso l’Italia e l’Europa, aspirazione di vari governi, che comunque, nel corso degli anni, è stata sistematicamente smentita dai fatti. Non si vede peraltro con quali mezzi, risorse umane e luoghi di detenzione amministrativa, si potrà attuare il trattenimento dei richiedenti asilo nelle procedure in frontiera, subito dopo gli sbarchi. Le norme al riguardo, tra l’altro, non saranno operative per 90 giorni dall’entrata in vigore della legge n.50/2023, in assenza del decreto interministeriale che dovrebbe fissare l’entità delle risorse economiche che il richiedente asilo dovrebbe dimostrare per evitare il trattenimento nella prima fase di esame della sua richiesta di protezione. Per tutta l’estate, dunque, la situazione nei punti di sbarco, ma anche nei centri di prima accoglienza, resterà caotica, e sarà affidata esclusivamente ai provvedimenti delle autorità amministrative, prefetti e questori, senza una chiara cornice legislativa.

      Su questo sarà battaglia legale, e solidarietà verso chi chiede comunque protezione, soprattutto nei territori più vicini alle frontiere esterne, sempre che sia possibile esercitare i diritti di difesa, e che le misure di accompagnamento forzato non vengano eseguite prima del riesame da parte della giurisdizione, dato l’abbattimento dei casi di effetto sospensivo del ricorso, ed i precedenti purtroppo non sono molti. La sentenza della Cassazione (Sez. 1, 18 novembre 2019, n. 29914) ha cassato una precedente decisione di merito che aveva rigettato la domanda di protezione internazionale, facendo leva sul principio, già più volte enunciato, secondo cui “nei giudizi di protezione internazionale, a fronte del dovere del richiedente di allegare, produrre o dedurre tutti gli elementi e la documentazione necessari a motivare la domanda, la valutazione delle condizioni socio-politiche del Paese d’origine del richiedente deve avvenire, mediante integrazione istruttoria officiosa, tramite l’apprezzamento di tutte le informazioni, generali e specifiche di cui si dispone pertinenti al caso, aggiornate al momento dell’adozione della decisione, sicché il giudice del merito non può limitarsi a valutazioni solo generiche ovvero omettere di individuare le specifiche fonti informative da cui vengono tratte le conclusioni assunte, potendo incorrere in tale ipotesi, la pronuncia, ove impugnata, nel vizio di motivazione apparente”. Rimane quindi alto il rischio che la categoria dei paesi terzi sicuri, o dei paesi di transito sicuri, considerate anche le nuove procedure in frontiera introdotte dalla legge n.50 del 2023, riducano fortemente la portata effettiva del diritto di asilo costituzionale.

      Il Diritto di asilo previsto nelle sue diverse forme dall’art. 10 della Costituzione italiana, e ribadito nelle Direttive europee e nei Regolamenti fin qui vigenti, ha natura individuale e costituisce un dirito fondamentale della persona. La ratio fondante di tutta la disciplina in materia di protezione internazionale consiste proprio nella protezione dei singoli da condotte gravemente lesive dei loro diritti umani. Ciò è confermato con grande apertura e
      chiarezza dalla nostra Costituzione, all’art. 10, co. 3 che ha una portata molto più ampia della formulazione dello stesso diritto nella Convenzione di Ginevra del 1951 e nelle Direttive europee. Al contrario, la nozione di «Paesi di origine sicuri» si fonda su una valutazione di «safety for the majority» che difficilmente si concilia con la dimensione individuale del diritto di asilo, fortemente sminuendo «the role of individual case by case assessment»”previsto dalle Convenzioni internazionali. In Italia la legge vigente prevede soltanto una presunzione relativa di sicurezza rispetto al Paese di origine, ma senza alcun riferimento automatico alla situazione in questo paese o al transito in un altro paese terzo ritenuto sicuro. Il richiedente e la Commissione teritoriale, e poi il giudice in caso di ricorso giurisdizionale, sono tenuti a cooperare per fare emergere i necesari elementi probatori per affermare o escludere un diritto alla protezione. Ma non ci può essere alcun automatismo nel diniego di uno status di protezione nei confronti di chi provenga o sia transitato da un paese terzo sicuro.

      Si deve ricordare a tale proposito la sentenza della Corte Europea dei diritti dell’Uomo del 21 novembre 2019, Ilias and Ahmed c. Ungheria, che ha accertato la violazione dell’art. 3 della CEDU da parte dell’Ungheria, le cui autorità avevano rigettato la domanda di protezione di due cittadini bengalesi espulsi verso la Serbia, sul semplice presupposto che tale Stato era stato incluso in un elenco governativo sui Paesi sicuri, senza compiere una
      valutazione seria e approfondita del caso specifico e senza preoccuparsi degli effetti di
      un respingimento a catena verso altri Stati.

      9. La pressione dei governi europei, e del governo italiano in particolare, sulle procedure in frontiera e sulla possibilità di ricorrere alle categorie di paese terzo di origine o di transito “sicuro” apre scenari inquietanti, soprattutto dopo che con la legge n.50/2023 si sono introdotte norme procedurali che intaccano i diritti di difesa dei richiedenti asilo giunti in frontiera, sia pure a seguito di operazioni di soccorso in mare. Toccherà operare un attento monotoraggio sul riconoscimento effettivo dei diritti fondamentali, a partire dai diritti all’informazione ed alla comprensione linguistica, e dal diritto di accesso effettivo ad una procedura di asilo, in tutti i luoghi di frontiera soprattutto in quelli che sono definiti “punti di fontiera esterna”. Ocorrerà vigilare sulla attuazione degli accordi con i paesi di transito e origine che possano essere ritenuti “sicuri”, ma solo sulla carta, dalle autorità amministrative. Bisogna impedire che attraverso l’esecuzione immediata di misure di allontanamento forzato, adottate magari con modalità sostanzialmente uniformi e collettive, senza riguardo alla situazione individuale delle singole persone, o delle loro condizioni psico-fisiche, possano ripetersi quelle violazioni dei diritti umani che hanno già portato a pesanti condanne dell’Italia da parte dei Tribunali internazionali, come nei tre fondamentali casi Hirsi, Sharifi e Khlaifia.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2023/06/09/paesi-terzi-sicuri-sicurezza-delle-persone-migranti-e-propaganda-di-stato

    • Editorial : Migration Pact Agreement Point by Point

      What was agreed? What are the consequences? Where are we now?

      ECRE will analyse the detailed texts of the General Approach, when they are available. In the meantime, 48 points can already be made on the agreement reached yesterday among the EU Member States on the Pact on Migration and Asylum to reform EU asylum law.

      - The EU Member States have reached an agreement on key pillars of the EU asylum system, responsibility, solidarity and procedural rules. The agreement has been under discussion throughout the Swedish Presidency.
      - This is not the final word – the Council will negotiate with the Parliament on the basis of this agreement and the Parliament’s respective agreement in order to reach a common position which will become law. However, it is to be expected that Parliament will concede – and these are more or less the positions likely to be adopted.
      - The agreement reduces protection standards in Europe, which is kind of the point. Whether it will meet its other objectives of deterring arrivals, rapid returns or reducing so-called secondary movement remains to be seen.
      – Two countries opposed the agreement: Hungary and Poland, primarily on the basis that they don’t believe that Europe should have an asylum system. Four countries abstained: Bulgaria, Malta, Lithuania and Slovakia, for different reasons in each case.

      The headlines

      - Overall, states have agreed on labyrinth of procedural rules, byzantine in their complexity and based on trying to limit the number of people who are granted international protection in Europe.
      - They fail to address the major the dysfunction of the system, the Dublin rules, which escape largely intact.
      - An underlying objective is to transfer responsibility to countries outside Europe, even though 85% of the world’s refugees are hosted outside Europe, mainly in desperately poor countries. The targets are the countries of the Western Balkans and North Africa, through the use of legal tools such as the “safe third country” concept. Nonetheless, the reforms do nothing to increase the likelihood that these countries agree to host people returned from the EU.
      - Within Europe, the reforms increase the focus at the borders.
      - As such, the reforms go in the opposite direction to the successful response to displacement from Ukraine, which demonstrated the value of light procedures, rapid access to a protection status, allowing people to work as soon as possible so they can contribute, and freedom of movement which allows family unity and a fairer distribution of responsibility across Europe.

      Procedural changes

      – Instead, new elements include expanded use of border procedures, inadmissibility procedures, and accelerated procedures, and the Pact deploys legal concepts to deflect responsibility to other countries, such as the safe third country concept. More people will be stuck at the borders in situations akin to the Greek island model.
      - There will be an expanded use of the border procedure with it becoming mandatory for people from countries where the protection rate is 20% or below.
      - Countries in the centre and north insisted on this change before agreeing to solidarity because their primary concern is ending so-called “secondary movement”. Safeguards such as access to legal assistance or to an appeal are reduced. There will be almost no exemptions for vulnerable people, families or children, and more procedures will be managed in detention.

      No new responsibility rules

      - The rules on responsibility remain the same as now under Dublin, with the principle of first entry still in place.
      - The period of responsibility of the country of arrival for an applicant is extended. It will be two years for people who enter at the external border, but reduced to 15 months after a rejection in the border procedure (to give states an incentive to use the border procedure), and reduced to 12 months for those rescued at sea (to give states an incentive to stop watching people drown).
      – The improvements to the rules on responsibility (compared to Dublin) proposed by the Commission have been rejected, including a wider family definition to allow family unification with siblings.

      A new solidarity mechanism

      - To compensate for the effects of the rules, a solidarity mechanism is introduced to compensate the countries at the borders in situations of “migratory pressure”. A separate mechanism for situations of search and rescue has been rejected.
      – Solidarity is mandatory but flexible, meaning that all countries have to contribute but that they can chose what to offer: relocation and assuming responsibility for people; capacity-building and other support; or a financial contribution.

      The numbers

      – The states have agreed on a minimum of 30,000 people to have their applications processed in a border procedure every year. There will also be a “cap”, a maximum set several times this number which increases over the first three years.
      – Member States’ individual adequate capacity (minimum number or target for border procedures) will be set using a formula based on the overall adequate capacity and the number of a “irregular” entries (i.e. people arriving to seek protection).
      – Member States can cease to use the border procedure when they approach their target with a notification to the Commission.
      – At the same time, the target for relocations is also set at 30,000.
      – There is an incentive to provide relocations (rather than other solidarity) in the form of “offsets” (reductions of solidarity contributions for those offering relocation).
      - The financial equivalent of a relocation is set at EUR 20,000. Money will also be provided from EU funding for reception capacity to manage the border procedure.

      The good news

      - This is the beginning of the end of the reforms.
      - There is a solidarity mechanism, to be codified in EU law.

      The bad news

      – Expanded use of the border procedure equals more people in detention centres at the external border, subject to sub-standard asylum procedures.
      – With the increase in responsibility for countries at the border, and given how controversial centres are for local communities, there is a risk that they chose pushbacks instead. If Italy’s share of the 30,000 annual border procedure cases is 5000, for example, are they likely to go ahead with detention centres or to deny entry?
      – Setting a numerical target for the use of the border procedure – which will almost always take place in detention – creates the risk of arbitrariness in its application.
      - The rules on responsibility remain as per Dublin. The Commission’s improvements have been removed so the incentives to avoid compliance, for instance on reception conditions, remain.
      – There is strong encouragement of the use of “safe third concept” as a basis for denying people access to an in-merits asylum procedure or to protection in Europe.
      - The definition of a safe third country has been eroded as Member States will decide which countries meet the definition. A country needs to meet certain protection criteria and there needs to be a connection between the person and the country, as per international law. However, what constitutes a connection is determined by national law. Examples in the text are family links and previous residence, but a MS could decide that pure transit is a sufficient connection.
      - Solidarity is flexible. If Member States can choose, how many will choose relocation? Relocation of people across the EU would lead to a fairer division of responsibility instead of too much being required of the countries at the external border.
      - The procedural rules appear complex to the point of unworkability.

      Uncertain as yet

      – What has been agreed on offsets – solidarity obligation offsets (reductions in a country’s solidarity obligations to others) in the case of offering relocation places and solidarity benefit offsets (reductions in solidarity entitlements of a country under pressure) in the case of failure to accept Dublin transfers.
      - Definition of migratory pressure and whether and how it incorporates “instrumentalisation” and SAR.

      What will change in practice?

      – More of the people arriving to seek protection in Europe will be subject to a border procedure, rather than having their case heard in a regular asylum procedure.
      – People will still arrive seeking protection in Europe but they will face a harsher system.
      - Responsibilities of the countries at the external borders are increased, which continues to provide an incentive to deny access to territory and to keep standards – on reception or inclusion, for example – low.
      - There could now be greater focus on implementation and management of asylum systems. However, the only concrete references to compliance are in relation to achieving the set number of border procedures and in ensuring Dublin transfers happen.
      – Onward (“secondary”) movement is still likely, and smugglers will continue to adapt, offering more to take people to countries away from the external borders.

      The winners

      – The Commission, which has invested everything on getting the Pact passed. “Trust and cooperation is back in the Council,” according to the Commissioner.
      – France, the Netherlands and the other hardliners, who have largely got what they wanted.
      - The Swedish Presidency, which has brokered a deal and one that suits them – as a less than honest broker. The Minister’s presentation at the press conference underlined secondary movement and enforcement of Dublin.
      – Smugglers, who will be able to charge more for the more complex and longer journeys that people will have to take.

      The losers

      - Refugees, for whom access to a fair asylum procedure will be harder. Risk of detention is higher. Risk of pushbacks is increased. Length and complexity of procedures is increased.
      - Non-EU countries at the borders who will deal with more pushed back people and who will be under pressure to build asylum systems to be safe enough to be “safe” third countries.
      - The Med5+ who have conceded on every major point and gained very little. They will have to manage the border procedures and, while solidarity is mandatory, it is flexible, meaning that relocation is not prioritised. It all begs the question: what have they really been offered in return?
      - Germany, which refused to stand firm and defend the even minor improvements that the government coalition agreement required, and on which it had the support of a small progressive alliance, and potential alliances with the south. For example, on exemptions to the border procedure. Given the desperation to reach a deal more could and should have been demanded.

      https://ecre.org/editorial-migration-pact-agreement-point-by-point

    • Décryptage – Pacte UE migration et asile : une approche répressive et sécuritaire au mépris des droits humains

      Le #8_juin_2023, les Etats membres de l’UE réunis en #Conseil_Justice_et_Affaires_Intérieures sont parvenus à un #accord sur deux des #règlements du #pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile. Alors que les négociations entre le Parlement et le Conseil se poursuivent, La Cimade décrypte les principaux enjeux des réformes européennes en cours d’adoption en matière de migration et d’asile et rend publique ses analyses et propositions.

      Le 23 septembre 2020, la Commission européenne dévoilait sa proposition de « pacte euro­péen sur la migration et l’asile » comme une « une nouvelle approche en matière de migration » visant à « instaurer un climat de confiance et un nouvel équilibre entre responsabi­lité et solidarité ».

      Sur la forme, ce pacte se traduit par un éventail de mesures législatives et opérationnelles pour la mise en œuvre de cette « nouvelle » politique migra­toire. À ce jour, la plupart de ces propositions n’ont pas encore été adoptées et font encore l’objet d’intenses négociations entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen.

      Sur le fond, les mesures proposées s’inscrivent dans la continuité des logiques déjà largement éprouvées. Elles sont fondées sur une approche répressive et sécuritaire au service de l’endiguement des migrations et de l’encouragement des expulsions, solutions qui ont prouvé leur inefficacité, et surtout qui coutent des vies humaines.

      La Cimade appelle l’UE et ses Etats membres à engager un véritable changement de paradigme, pour une Europe qui se fonde sur le respect des droits humains et les solidarités internationales, afin d’assurer la protection des personnes et non leur exclusion. La Cimade continuera à se mobiliser avec d’autres pour défendre les droits des personnes en exil tout au long des parcours migratoires.

      A travers ce document de décryptage, La Cimade souhaite contribuer à la compréhension des principaux enjeux des réformes européennes en cours d’adoption en matière de migration et d’asile et rendre publique ses analyses ainsi que ses propositions.

      https://www.lacimade.org/decryptage-pacte-ue-migration-et-asile-une-approche-repressive-et-securita
      #pacte #pacte_migration_et_asile #pacte_migration_asile

    • L’Europe se ferme un peu plus aux réfugiés

      Au moment où le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés des Nations unies (UNHCR) annonce, dans son rapport annuel, que le nombre de réfugiés et de déplacés dans le monde n’a jamais été aussi élevé qu’en 2022, le Conseil de l’Union européenne (UE) se félicite qu’après trois ans de négociation, les Etats membres se sont mis enfin mis d’accord sur un projet de réforme du droit d’asile.

      Ce pourrait être une bonne nouvelle. Car le rapport de l’ONU indique que les pays riches, dont font partie la plupart des Etats européens, sont loin de prendre leur part de cet exode. Ils n’accueillent que 24 % de l’ensemble des réfugiés, la grande majorité de ceux-ci se trouvant dans des Etats à revenu faible ou intermédiaire.

      En témoigne la liste des cinq pays qui accueillent le plus de réfugiés : si l’on excepte l’Allemagne, qui occupe la quatrième place, il s’agit de la Turquie (3,6 millions), de l’Iran (3,4 millions), du Pakistan (1,7 million) et de l’Ouganda (1,5 million).

      Et si l’on rapporte le nombre de personnes accueillies à la population, c’est l’île caribéenne d’Aruba (un réfugié pour six habitants) et le Liban (un réfugié pour sept habitants) qui viennent en tête du classement. A titre de comparaison, on compte en France un réfugié pour 110 habitants.
      Un partage plus équitable

      L’Europe aurait-elle décidé de corriger ce déséquilibre, pour répondre à l’appel de Filippo Gandi, le Haut-Commissaire pour les réfugiés, qui réclame « un partage plus équitable des responsabilités, en particulier avec les pays qui accueillent la majorité des personnes déracinées dans le monde » ?

      S’il s’agissait de cela, quelques moyens simples pourraient être mis en œuvre. En premier lieu, on pourrait ouvrir des voies légales permettant aux personnes en besoin de protection de gagner l’Europe sans être confrontées aux refus de visas qui leur sont quasi systématiquement opposés.

      On pourrait ensuite mettre en place une politique d’accueil adaptée, à l’instar de celle que les pays européens ont su mettre en place pour faire face à l’arrivée de plusieurs millions d’Ukrainiens en 2022.

      A la lecture du communiqué du Conseil de l’UE du 8 juin, on comprend que la réforme ne vise ni à faciliter les arrivées, ni à offrir de bonnes conditions d’accueil. Il y est certes question d’un « besoin de solidarité », mais l’objectif n’est pas de soulager ces pays qui accueillent la majorité des déracinés : il s’agit d’aider les Etats membres « en première ligne » à faire face aux « défis posés par la migration ».

      Autrement dit, de faire baisser la pression qui pèse sur les pays qui forment la frontière méditerranéenne de l’UE (principalement l’Italie, la Grèce et Malte) du fait des arrivées d’exilés par la voie maritime.

      Non que leur nombre soit démesuré – il était de l’ordre de 160 000 personnes en 2022 –, mais parce que la loi européenne prévoit que le pays responsable d’une demande d’asile est celui par lequel le demandeur a pénétré en premier dans l’espace européen.

      En vertu de ce règlement dit « Dublin », ce sont donc les pays où débarquent les boat people qui doivent les prendre en charge, et ces derniers sont censés y demeurer, même si leur projet était de se rendre ailleurs en Europe.

      L’accord conclu le 8 juin, qui doit encore être approuvé par le Parlement européen, ne remet pas en cause ce principe profondément inéquitable, qui n’est réaménagé qu’à la marge. Il porte sur deux propositions de règlements.

      La première réforme la procédure d’asile applicable à la frontière, avec notamment une phase de « screening » impliquant l’obligation de placer en détention la plupart des personnes qui demandent l’asile à la suite d’un débarquement, le temps de procéder au tri entre celles dont les demandes seront jugées irrecevables – pour pouvoir procéder à leur éloignement rapide – et celles dont les demandes seront examinées.

      Un dispositif contraire aux recommandations du Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés qui rappelle, dans ses lignes directrices sur la détention, que « déposer une demande d’asile n’est pas un acte criminel ».

      La seconde met en place un « mécanisme de solidarité », particulièrement complexe, destiné à organiser la « relocalisation » des exilés admis à déposer une demande d’asile dans un autre Etat membre que celui dans lequel ils ont débarqué.
      Un goût de réchauffé

      Ces deux « innovations », dont le Conseil de l’UE prétend qu’elles marquent « une étape décisive sur la voie d’une modernisation du processus en matière d’asile et d’immigration », ont pourtant un goût de réchauffé.

      En 2015, en réaction aux arrivées en grand nombre de boat people sur les côtes grecques et italiennes, essentiellement dues à l’exil massif de Syriens fuyant la guerre civile – épisode qui fut alors qualifié de « crise migratoire majeure » – , le Conseil de l’UE avait mis en place l’« approche hotspot », destinée à assister les pays dont les frontières extérieures sont soumises à une « pression migratoire démesurée ».

      Ce dispositif, incluant déjà une procédure de filtrage pour distinguer les potentiels réfugiés des migrants présumés « irréguliers », visait à organiser l’expulsion de ces derniers dans des délais rapides et à répartir les autres ailleurs en Europe.

      A cette fin, le Conseil avait adopté un programme de « relocalisation », en vue de transférer 160 000 personnes reconnues éligibles à demander l’asile depuis l’Italie et la Grèce vers d’autres Etats membres de l’UE.

      On le voit, les innovations de 2023 présentent de grandes similitudes avec le plan d’action de 2015. Qu’est-il advenu de celui-ci ? Loin de permettre la prise en charge rapide des exilés ayant surmonté la traversée de la Méditerranée, l’approche hotspot a entraîné la création, dans cinq îles grecques de la mer Egée, de gigantesques prisons à ciel ouvert où des milliers de personnes ont été entassées sans possibilité de rejoindre le continent, parfois pendant plusieurs années, dans un déni généralisé des droits humains (surpopulation, insécurité, manque d’hygiène, violences sexuelles, atteintes aux droits de l’enfant et au droit d’asile). Un désastre régulièrement documenté, à partir de 2016, tant par les ONG que par les agences onusiennes et européennes, et qui perdure.

      La principale raison de cet échec tient à l’absence de solidarité des autres Etats de l’UE à l’égard de la Grèce et, dans une moindre mesure, de l’Italie. Car les promesses de « relocalisation » n’ont pas été tenues : sur les 160 000 demandeurs d’asile qui auraient dû être transférés en 2015, 30 000 seulement ont bénéficié de ce programme.

      La France, qui s’était engagée pour 30 000, en a accueilli moins du tiers. Un signe, s’il en était besoin, que les pays européens répugnent à remplir leurs obligations internationales à l’égard des réfugiés, malgré le nombre dérisoire de ceux qui frappent à leur porte, au regard des désordres du monde.

      On se souvient de l’affaire d’Etat qu’a suscitée l’arrivée à Toulon, au mois de novembre 2022, de l’Ocean Viking, ce bateau humanitaire qui a débarqué quelque 230 boat people sauvés du naufrage, immédiatement placés en détention.

      Emboîtant le pas d’une partie de la classe politique qui s’est empressée de crier à l’invasion, le ministre de l’Intérieur avait annoncé que la plupart seraient expulsés – avant que la justice ordonne leur mise en liberté.
      Quelle efficacité ?

      On peine à croire, dans ce contexte, que les promesses de 2023 seront mieux tenues que celles de 2015. Si le nouveau « mécanisme de solidarité » est présenté comme « obligatoire », le communiqué du Conseil de l’UE ajoute qu’il sera « flexible », et qu’« aucun Etat membre ne sera obligé de procéder à des relocalisations » !

      Une façon de prévenir l’opposition frontale de quelques pays, comme la Pologne ou la Hongrie, dont le Premier ministre a déjà fait savoir que le programme de relocalisation imposé par Bruxelles était « inacceptable ». Sur cette base, le système de compensation financière imaginé pour mettre au pas les récalcitrants n’a guère plus de chances de fonctionner.

      De nombreux commentateurs ont salué l’accord conclu le 8 juin comme l’étape inespérée d’un processus qui paraissait enlisé depuis plusieurs années. Ils voient surtout dans ce texte de compromis un espoir de voir la réforme de l’asile adoptée avant le renouvellement, en 2024, du Parlement européen, pour éviter que ces questions ne phagocytent la campagne électorale.

      C’est une analyse à courte vue. Car il y a tout lieu de craindre que cette réforme, qui s’inscrit dans la continuité d’une politique européenne de rejet des exilés, ne fera qu’intensifier le déséquilibre constaté par les Nations unies dans la répartition mondiale des réfugiés. Et poussera toujours davantage ceux-ci vers les routes migratoires qui font de l’Europe la destination la plus dangereuse du monde.

      https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/claire-rodier/leurope-se-ferme-un-plus-aux-refugies/00107291

      #Claire_Rodier

    • Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile : repartir sur d’autres bases

      La présidence belge de l’UE qui aura lieu en 2024 ambitionne de faire adopter le nouveau pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile. L’approche qui domine est essentiellement répressive et contraire aux droits fondamentaux. Elle ne répond pas aux enjeux des migrations internationales. A ce stade, le pacte ne semble plus pouvoir apporter une amélioration à la situation des personnes exilées. Il faut donc y mettre fin et redémarrer les discussions sur base d’une approche radicalement différente.
      Le nouveau pacte UE : le phénix de Moria ?

      En septembre 2020, à la suite de l’incendie meurtrier du hotspot grec surpeuplé et insalubre de Moria (centre d’enregistrement et de tri mis en place lors de la crise de l’accueil de 2015), la Commission européenne a présenté son projet de pacte sur la migration et l’asile. Celui-ci est censé répondre au « plus jamais ça » et offrir « un modèle de gestion prévisible et stable des migrations internationales ». Il est décrit par Margarítis Schinás, vice-président de la Commission, chargé des Migrations et de la promotion du mode de vie européen, comme une maison commune dont les fondations sont l’externalisation, les étages sont les contrôles aux frontières, et le grenier est l’accueil.

      Mais le nouvel « air frais » annoncé n’est en réalité qu’un air vicié. Ce pacte présente en effet les mêmes solutions inefficaces, couteuses et violatrices des droits qui dès lors continueront de produire inévitablement les mêmes crises structurelles de l’accueil et l’aggravation des situations humanitaires et meurtrières le long des routes de l’exil. De nombreuses études documentées, depuis plus d’une vingtaine d’années, analysent l’impact d’une politique migratoire basée sur l’externalisation des frontières ainsi qu’une vision restrictive de l’accueil, et montrent ses dérives et son inefficacité

      .
      Un pacte contre les migrations : détenir, trier, expulser

      Le projet de Pacte repose sur cinq règlements législatifs et quelques recommandations et lignes directrices. Ceux-ci concernent respectivement : les procédures et contrôles aux frontières (APR et Filtrage), le Règlement de Dublin (AMMR), la gestion des crises aux frontières, l’enregistrement, ainsi que le partage des données numériques des personnes exilées (EURODAC)

      .

      A ce jour, les négociations autour du nouveau pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile sont au stade ultime du trilogue

      . La Présidence belge de l’Union européenne, qui aura lieu au premier semestre 2024, ambitionne d’aboutir à son adoption. Les positions de la Commission (septembre 2020), du Parlement (mars 2023) et du Conseil (juin 2023) sont, malgré des nuances, globalement similaires.

      L’orientation répressive et sélective des personnes exilées tout comme l’externalisation des questions migratoires dominent le contenu du pacte. Il est donc inéluctable, qu’une fois le trilogue terminé et le pacte en voie d’être adopté, la mise en œuvre par les Etats membres de ces cinq règlements occasionnera pour les personnes exilées :

      – une pérennisation des entraves, contrôles et criminalisation de leurs départs avec des risques de refoulements en chaîne, y compris vers des pays aussi dangereux que la Lybie et la Syrie ;
      - une procédure de filtrage ou tri avec une fiction de non entrée, à savoir que les droits et devoirs garantis sur le territoire européen ne leur sont pas applicables, malgré leur présence sur ce territoire ;
      - une mise en détention quasi systématique aux frontières y compris pour les enfants dès douze ans avec la possibilité de prolongation en cas de situation dite de crise ;
      – une procédure express d’analyse des demandes de protection qui est incompatible avec une réelle prise en compte des vulnérabilités notamment chez les mineurs, les femmes et les personnes LGBTQI+ ;
      – des décisions rapides d’expulsions sur base du concept de pays tiers « sûrs » avec un recours non suspensif ;
      – la récolte obligatoire, l’enregistrement et le partage des données personnelles entre agences européennes (Frontex, Europol, EASO etc.) et ce, dès l’âge de 6 ans ;
      - un système d’accueil à la carte est envisagé par le Conseil où les 27 auront le choix entre la relocalisation ou la participation financière à un pot commun européen en vue de financer notamment la dimension externe du pacte. Il s’agit du seul progrès par rapport à la situation actuelle, mais la Hongrie et la Pologne, malgré la position prise à la majorité qualifiée au Conseil de juin 2023, ont déjà annoncé leur refus d’y participer.

      Il est clair qu’avec ce type de mesures, le droit d’asile est en danger, les violences et le nombre de décès sur les routes de l’exil (faute de voies légales accessibles et de refoulements systématiques) vont augmenter et que les crises structurelles de l’accueil ne pourront être résolues.
      Le respect des droits des personnes exilées est résiduel

      La situation actuelle des migrations internationales exige des solutions immédiates et durables vu l’étendue du non-respect des droits fondamentaux des personnes exilées et du droit international.
      Selon l’ONU, près de 300 enfants sont morts depuis le début de l’année 2023

      en essayant de traverser la Méditerranée pour atteindre l’Europe. « Ce chiffre est deux fois plus important que celui des six premiers mois de l’année 2022. Nous estimons qu’au cours des six premiers mois de 2023, 11 600 enfants ont effectué la traversée, soit également le double par rapport à la même période de 2022. Ces décès sont absolument évitables », a souligné la responsable aux migrations et aux déplacés à l’Unicef, Verena Knaus. Les chiffres réels sont probablement plus élevés car de nombreux naufrages ne sont pas enregistrés.

      Le racisme et la répression contre les personnes exilées augmentent en Europe et dans les pays du Maghreb, entrainant à leur tour des refoulements systématiques impunis parfois même sous la surveillance de Frontex. Le récent naufrage de Pylos
      au large des côtes grecques et les refoulements effectués depuis la Tunisie dans le désert aux frontières algériennes et libyennes en sont les dramatiques illustrations.
      Quant au volet de l’accueil, il fait l’objet de profonds désaccords. Premièrement, les pays du « MED5 » (Italie, Espagne, Grèce, Malte et Chypre) se disent toujours seuls à assumer la responsabilité de l’accueil sur le sol européen. D’autres pays comme la Belgique se disent également victimes des mouvements secondaires. Face à eux, les pays du groupe de Visegrad (Pologne, Hongrie, Tchéquie, Slovaquie) bloquent tout mécanisme de répartition solidaire. Au niveau européen, la Commission promeut, comme elle l’a fait en juillet 2023 avec la Tunisie, l’adoption de protocoles d’entente avec des Etats peu respectueux des droits humains comme le Maroc et l’Egypte. Cela en vue de limiter la mobilité vers et en Europe. Ces partenariats ont un objectif essentiellement sécuritaire (matériel et formations des garde-côtes aux services du contrôle des frontières et des retours) et n’abordent pas les questions de protection et intégration des personnes migrantes dans les pays du Sud et du Nord

      .
      La solution : suspendre les négociations en repartant sur d’autres bases

      Ni la vision générale du Pacte, ni le contenu de ses cinq règlements législatifs ne répondent aux nombreux défis et opportunités que représentent les migrations internationales. Comme l’a démontré Alice Chatté dans son analyse Regard juridique sur les cinq volets législatifs du pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile

      , « les cinq instruments législatifs proposés dans le pacte, qu’ils soient nouveaux ou réformés, ne sont en réalité que la transcription en instruments légaux des pratiques actuelles des Etats membres, qui ont hélas montré leurs faiblesses et dysfonctionnements. Cela se traduit par des procédures, dorénavant légales, qui autorisent le tri et le recours à la détention systématique à l’ensemble des frontières européennes ainsi que l’examen accéléré des demandes de protection internationale sur base du concept de pays « sûrs » favorisant de facto les pratiques de refoulement et le non-accueil au bénéfice du retour forcé ». Elle ajoute que « le projet du pacte, ainsi que les cinq règlements qui le traduisent juridiquement, ne respectent pas les droits fondamentaux des personnes exilées. Il est en l’état incompatible avec le respect du droit international et européen, ainsi qu’avec le Pacte mondial sur les migrations des Nations Unies ».

      A ce stade final du trilogue, les positions des trois Institutions (Commission, Parlement, et Conseil) ne divergent pas fondamentalement entre elles. Les quelques améliorations défendues par le Parlement (dont un monitoring des droits fondamentaux aux frontières et une réforme des critères du Règlement Dublin), sont insuffisantes pour constituer une base de négociation et risquent de ne pas survivre aux négociations ardues du trilogue

      . Puisque le Pacte ne peut plus suffisamment être réformé pour apporter une amélioration immédiate et durable à la situation des personnes exilées, il faut donc se résoudre à mettre fin aux négociations en cours pour repartir sur de nouvelles bases, respectueuses des droits humains et des principes des Pactes mondiaux sur les migrations et sur les réfugiés.
      La Présidence belge de l’UE doit promouvoir la justice migratoire

      Face aux dérives constatées dans de nombreux Etats membres, y compris la Belgique, condamnée à de nombreuses reprises par la justice pour son manque de respect des droits fondamentaux des personnes en demande d’asile, une approche européenne s’impose. Celle-ci doit être basée sur une approche multilatérale, cohérente et positive des migrations internationales, guidée par le respect des droits fondamentaux des personnes exilées et par la solidarité. Le Pacte mondial des migrations des Nations unies adopté en 2018 et la gestion de l’accueil en 2022 d’une partie de la population ukrainienne sont des sources d’inspiration pour refonder les politiques migratoires de l’Union européenne. Plutôt que de chercher à faire aboutir un pacte qui institutionnalise des pratiques de violation des droits humains, la future Présidence belge de l’UE devrait promouvoir une telle vision, afin de promouvoir le respect du droit d’asile et, plus largement, la #justice_migratoire.

      https://www.cncd.be/Pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et

  • European countries should lift the taboo on Afrophobia and start addressing this phenomenon
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKs5N0mq7A4&feature=emb_logo

    “Racism and racial discrimination against people of African descent remain a widespread yet unacknowledged problem in Europe. It is time to recognise it and take measures to combat Afrophobia more effectively”, said today the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, releasing a report on the topic ahead of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

    The report is based on the discussions that the Commissioner held on 24 November 2020 with human rights defenders working on combating Afrophobia. It highlights that people of African descent continue to be exposed to particularly grave forms of racism and racial discrimination, including racial stereotyping, racist violence, racial profiling in policing and criminal justice, and practices which perpetuate social and economic inequalities.

    This situation is compounded by the prevailing denial of the problem and a lack of public debate on Afrophobia in Europe. Cases and patterns of human rights violations affecting people of African descent are not given adequate consideration, even when they are reliably attested.

    The report also points to the limited research and equality data, the insufficient efforts to address the legacy of colonialism and the slave trade, and the lack of educational and awareness-raising efforts that contribute to the invisibility of the problem.

    The Commissioner underlines the important work carried out by human rights defenders of African descent and NGOs working on combating Afrophobia. She regrets the threats to their lives and safety and the various forms of pressure they are subjected to, such as harassment and attacks in the media online and offline, as well as surveillance and censorship.

    Human rights activists of African descent are also regularly sanctioned for occupying the public space, for example in conducting demonstrations. They face a higher risk of being profiled by automated tools and there appears to be inadequate police protection and a lack of prosecution for attacks against human rights defenders, often carried out by right-wing extremist groups.

    “There is a wealth of international standards and guidelines underlying states’ obligations to combat racism and racial discrimination, paying particular attention to persons of African descent. Member states should implement them as a matter of urgency to reverse the situation”, said the Commissioner.

    She recommends making the fight against racism and racial discrimination a top priority and showing a clear commitment to addressing the legacy of colonialism and the slave trade. “There is a need to overcome the resistance to the acknowledgment of responsibility for these violations”, says the Commissioner. She also stresses the need to reflect historical slavery and the colonial past, as well as their present-day ramifications, in school curricula.

    The Commissioner also draws attention to the importance of taking steps to stamp out racial profiling and impunity for racist crimes committed by law enforcement agents; taking action against all forms of incitement to hatred against people of African descent and enhancing protection against hate crimes; strengthening measures to combat discrimination in access to education, employment, housing and health care, and ensuring that artificial intelligence systems do not discriminate.

    Lastly, the Commissioner stresses member states’ obligation to provide protection and support to human rights defenders working to combat Afrophobia, facilitating a safe and free environment for them to carry out their work without unnecessary or disproportionate legal, political or administrative obstacles. They must be given a voice in national policy and should have more opportunities for dialogue at regional level. “It is time that European countries face the roots and present forms of racism and discrimination and start building more inclusive societies”, concluded the Commissioner.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/european-countries-should-lift-the-taboo-on-afrophobia-and-start-addressing-thi
    #Afrophobie #discriminations #racisme #discriminations_raciales #conseil_de_l'Europe #Europe #rapport #droits_humains #stéréotypes #violence #violence_raciale #profilage_ethnique #inégalités #colonialisme #esclavage #invisibilisation #harcèlement #censure #surveillance #responsabilité #éduction #intelligence_artificielle #IA #AI

    Pour télécharger le rapport:


    https://rm.coe.int/combating-racism-and-racial-discrimination-against-people-of-african-d/1680a1c0b6

    ping @cede @isskein @_kg_ @karine4

  • Council of Europe’s anti-torture Committee calls on Malta to improve the treatment of detained migrants

    In a report published today on a rapid reaction ad hoc visit to Malta in September 2020, the Council of Europe’s anti-torture committee (CPT) urges the Maltese authorities to change their approach towards immigration detention and to ensure that migrants deprived of their liberty are treated with both dignity and humanity.

    The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has published today the report on its ad hoc visit to Malta focussing on immigration detention, which took place from 17 to 22 September 2020, together with the response of the Maltese authorities.

    In the report, the CPT acknowledged the significant challenges posed to the Maltese authorities by the arrival of increasing numbers of migrants, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, this situation cannot absolve Malta from its human rights obligations and the duty of care owed to all migrants deprived of their liberty by the Maltese authorities.

    Overall, the CPT found an immigration system that was struggling to cope: a system that purely “contained” migrants who had essentially been forgotten, within poor conditions of detention and regimes which verged on institutional mass neglect by the authorities. Indeed, the living conditions, regimes, lack of due process safeguards, treatment of vulnerable groups and some specific Covid-19 measures were found to be so problematic that they may well amount to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

    The carceral design of detention centres such as Hermes Block and the Warehouses at Safi Detention Centre remained totally inappropriate: large rooms crammed with beds, no privacy, and communication with staff via locked doors. Migrants were generally locked in their accommodation units with little to no access to daily outdoor exercise and no purposeful activities. Other deficiencies included a lack of maintenance of the buildings (especially the sanitary facilities), insufficient personal hygiene products and cleaning materials and an inability to obtain a change of clothes. Moreover, there was also a systematic lack of information provided to detained persons about their situation, compounded by minimal contact with the outside world or even staff.

    Vulnerable migrants in particular were not getting the care and support they required. Not only were young children and their parents as well as unaccompanied/separated minors being detained, but they were held in very poor conditions, together with unrelated adult men. Clear protection policies and protocols for looking after vulnerable migrants need to be put in place.

    The CPT underlined that there is an urgent need for Malta to revisit its immigration detention policy, towards one better steered by its duty of care to treat all persons deprived of their liberty with dignity.

    The CPT stressed that the problem of migration into Malta was not new and will almost certainly continue given the push factors that exist in those countries from which the vast majority of migrants come. Therefore, Malta together with the support of the European Union and other member states must put in place an immigration detention system which abides by European values and norms.

    In their response, the Maltese authorities provided detailed information on the steps being taken to improve the conditions of detention for detained migrants and outlined the measures taken and currently underway to reduce the pressure on the immigration detention system, including notably the significant reduction in the number of migrants being detained and instead transferred into open centres and the many refurbishment works underway to improve conditions.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-s-anti-torture-committee-calls-on-malta-to-improve-the-treatm

    #détention_administrative #rétention #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Malte #rapport #Conseil_de_l'Europe

    ping @isskein @karine4


  • Un #syndicat français de policiers diffuse une liste de journalistes présentés comme des ennemis de la police nationale

    Le #Syndicat_Indépendant_des_Commissaires_de_Police (#SICP) a diffusé, le 7 décembre 2019, un message sur le réseau social Twitter désignant nommément cinq journalistes français (#David_Dufresne - @davduf, #Taha_Bouhafs, #Gaspard_Glanz, « #Le_Général » et #Alexis_Poulin) comme « les principaux acteurs » du « combat anti-Police Nationale », en #France. Les journalistes nommés sont affublés de qualificatifs insultants ("imposteur", « menteur », « harceleur », « usurpateur », « haineux »). Le SICP accuse ces journalistes d’ « alimenter cette haine » et de « se délecter de ce climat », après que la porte du domicile d’un officier de la brigade anti-criminalité (BAC) a été recouverte de slogans hostiles à la police. Plusieurs représentant de la profession, dont la Fédération Européenne des Journalistes, ont dénoncé le caractère intimidatoire et diffamatoire du message du syndicat policier, largement relayé sur Twitter.

    https://www.coe.int/fr/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=c
    #intimidation #diffamation #presse #journalisme #réseaux_sociaux #police #conseil_de_l'Europe #maintien_de_l'ordre

    Le tweet en question du syndicat policier :


    https://twitter.com/SICPCommissaire/status/1203437519544684544

    • D’un coté c’est prestigieux de recevoir ces titres, pas comme leur légion (de crimes) d’honneur.
      #dictature #etat_policier #liberté_de_la_presse #liberté_d'informé #diffamation

      Il faudrait respecter aussi la présomption d’innocence, tout porte à pensé que ces policiers ont eux meme salit leurs portes et se sont ecit à eux memes pour justifier de nouvelles exactions et détruire tous les droits - droit de manifesté, droit d’informer, droit d’expression, droit de se déplacé...

      J’espère que ces 5 journalistes vont porter plainte pour diffamation, menace et insitation à la violence.

  • Conseil de l’Europe — Commissaire aux droits de l’homme

    France : le projet de loi sur la lutte contre le terrorisme doit être mis en conformité avec la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme - View
    http://www.coe.int/fr/web/commissioner/-/france-le-projet-de-loi-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-doit-etre-mis-en-conf

    Le Commissaire publie aujourd’hui une lettre dans laquelle il appelle les sénateurs français à améliorer le projet de loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme afin de le mettre en conformité avec les normes du Conseil de l’Europe, notamment la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme.

    Le Commissaire souligne le besoin d’éviter que le projet de loi ne se traduise en un prolongement indéfini de l’état d’urgence. Il attire également l’attention des sénateurs sur certaines dispositions qu’il considère problématiques, en particulier celle donnant au préfet des pouvoirs d’instaurer des périmètres de protection au sein desquels des fouilles et palpations, jusque-là soumis à une réquisition judiciaire, pourront être organisées ; le manque de critères précis et de garanties légales adéquates encadrant ces pouvoirs ; et la possibilité de fermer des lieux de culte dans lesquels sont tenus des propos qui provoquent la commission d’actes de terrorisme ou incitent à la violence.

    Le Commissaire s’inquiète également de la possibilité d’assigner à résidence et surveiller électroniquement toute personne soupçonnée de constituer une menace « d’une particulière gravité pour la sécurité et l’ordre publics » sans que des critères précis soient établis par la loi.

    « Le terrorisme constitue une grave menace pour les droits de l’homme et la démocratie et les Etats ont le devoir de prendre des mesures pour empêcher et sanctionner efficacement les actes terroristes. Néanmoins, toute limitation des libertés individuelles doit être strictement nécessaire pour protéger le public et proportionnée au but légitime poursuivi », rappelle le Commissaire dans sa lettre.

    Heureusement qu’ll ya le #Conseil_de_l'Europe

    • @mad_meg je ne sais pas répondre précisément à ta question mais je crois qu’à ce stade il s’agit pour les « institutions européennes » de mettre en garde le législateur français sur des dispositions qui seraient radicalement en contradiction avec le droit communautaire.
      Genre le/la palpé·e, fouillé·e, assigné·e à résidence
      va devant l’euro-justice et est sûr·e de gagner, donc en gros la loi française est à mettre au panier et à recommencer.

  • #Justice. Les #prisons se vident en #Europe… sauf en #France | L’Humanité
    http://www.humanite.fr/justice-les-prisons-se-vident-en-europe-sauf-en-france-633453

    Une étude [du #Conseil_de_l'Europe]publiée mardi révèle que le nombre de personnes incarcérées en Europe a baissé en moyenne de 6,8 %, mais augmenté de 5,4 % dans l’Hexagone.

    Lien vers l’étude : http://www.coe.int/fr/web/portal/-/europe-s-prison-population-falls-but-there-is-no-progress-in-tackling-overcrowd

    #COE

  • Législation | Mieux protéger les mineurs isolés : les recommandations du Conseil de l’Europe
    http://asile.ch/2017/01/24/legislation-mieux-proteger-mineurs-isoles-recommandations-conseil-de-leurope

    Disparitions, exposition à de mauvais traitements voire à l’exploitation : la vulnérabilité et l’absence de protection des mineurs non accompagnés (MNA) ont conduit le Conseil de l’Europe –organisation internationale distincte de l’UE dont la Suisse est membre– à adopter le 13 octobre 2016 une résolution contenant 16 recommandations à l’attention des pays membres (1). Les Etats y […]

  • L’Union européenne et la #Russie, le nécessaire reset
    http://www.taurillon.org/l-union-europeenne-et-la-russie-le-necessaire-reset

    Les événements récents en Ukraine, de l’invasion russe du Donbass au referendum en Crimée sur l’adhésion à la Fédération de Russie en 2014, ont résulté en des sanctions mutuelles entre la Russie et l’UE et augurent, selon certains, une « nouvelle guerre froide ». Il faut y mettre fin et retrouver un climat de négociations serein avec la Russie, partenaire clé de l’Union.

    #Opinions

    / #Conseil_de_l'Europe, Russie, #Diplomatie

    https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwinkLzAzIfO
    https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwit_5iRyof
    http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml
    http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/erasmus_mundus_coop/index_en.htm

  • Démocratie en #Ukraine : Le verdict du #Conseil_de_l'Europe
    http://www.taurillon.org/democratie-en-ukraine-le-verdict-du-conseil-de-l-europe

    Les élections locales en Ukraine ont eu lieu le 25 octobre 2015. Pendant que les municipalités votaient et qu’un certain nombre de citoyens n’avaient pas accès au vote, une délégation du Conseil de l’Europe faisait partie d’une mission d’observation menée par l’OSCE pour l’élection après l’invasion russe de la Crimée et une guerre civile qui a déchiré et déchire toujours la population. Retour sur le rapport de cette mission.

    Actualités

    / Ukraine, #Élections, Conseil de l’Europe

    http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/monde/l-ukraine-guette-les-resultats-des-elections-locales-un-test-pour-le-pouvoi
    http://www.theguardian.com/news/live/2016/apr/04/panama-papers-global-reaction-to-huge-leak-of-offshore-tax-files-live
    https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=20151024-news-gudrun-ukraine&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=ori
    http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/177901?download=true
    http://elections-en-europe.net/calendrier-electoral-2015

  • Egalité des chances : Un système scolaire européen nécessaire
    http://www.taurillon.org/egalite-des-chances-un-systeme-scolaire-europeen-necessaire

    Connue pour être une valeur européenne, l’égalité des chances est inscrite dans les textes de l’Union européenne. C’est vers une telle vertu que devrait tendre l’Union européenne, en vue de former les jeunes à l’excellence et de manière la plus égalitaire possible. Pour cela, le #Conseil_de_l'Europe avait commencé il y a une quinzaine d’années à lancer une politique commune sur l’enseignement. Pourtant, depuis le processus de Bologne et l’harmonisation des systèmes universitaires européens, l’éducation n’est plus la politique prioritaire de l’Union européenne. Pour quelles conséquences ?

    #Opinions

    / #Education, Conseil de l’Europe, (...)

    #Erasmus

  • « Une alliance contre la haine »
    http://www.taurillon.org/une-alliance-contre-la-haine

    Anne Brasseur, présidente de l’Assemblée parlementaire du #Conseil_de_l'Europe, ancienne ministre libérale au Luxembourg du gouvernement de Jean-Claude Juncker de 1999 à 2004, répond à nos questions, tout comme Jari Vilén, ambassadeur de l’Union européenne auprès du Conseil de l’Europe, qui réside à Strasbourg. Regards croisés sur les relations entre le Conseil de l’Europe et l’Union européenne en cette année 2015, rythmée par les crises et les défis.

    Actualités

    / Conseil de l’Europe

    • Tout va bien, belle description l’entre soi de la caste européenne !

      Les statistiques européennes 2015 ne vont pas tarder à être publiées.

      En 2014, d’aprés Médecin du monde : Le taux de mortalité infantile avait progressé en Grèce, depuis le début de la crise, de 43 %.
      Combien pour 2015 ?

      C’est à ce taux que l’on reconnaît le niveau de développement de la HAINE du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Union européenne pour sa population.

      L’Entre Soi, l’Arrogance, le Mépris total, la Finance, le Lobying, La Faillite permanente garantie, c’est ça le logiciel l’union européenne.
      Combien de nouvelles guerres cette année pour les pays européens ?
      Combien de nouveaux milliardaires en euro ?
      Combien de nouvelles crises.

      On peut rêver qu’une des centrales nucléaires épaves belges saute afin de nous débarrasser de cela, mais c’est pas certain.
      https://vimeo.com/123941637

      #mortalité_infantile #Arrogance #Mépris #Finance #Lobbying #nucléaire #crise #guerre #faillite

  • Les Européens n’ont pas à connaître la position de la #France sur les #Frontières_intelligentes
    https://reflets.info/les-europeens-nont-pas-a-connaitre-la-position-de-la-france-sur-les-fronti

    Nous vous parlions il y a quelques jours de la contribution française à la création des frontières « intelligentes ». #Statewatch avait récupéré un document exposant la position française. Nous avions immédiatement demandé viaz le formulaire ad hoc au Conseil une copie de ce document. Nous avons reçu une réponse à notre demande. Et, elle est, comment […]

    #Politique #Technos #Conseil_de_l'Europe #Europe #Shengen

  • Enseigner les langues régionales pour construire l’Europe
    http://www.taurillon.org/enseigner-les-langues-regionales-pour-construire-l-europe

    Un des arguments typiques des nationalistes pour persuader l’opinion publique de l’impossibilité de construire une Europe unie est celui de la langue : comment nous unir si nous ne pouvons même pas nous comprendre ?

    #Opinions

    / #Conseil_de_l'Europe, #Multilinguisme, #Europe_des_Régions

  • La charte européenne des langues régionales et minoritaires déchaîne les chauvinismes
    http://www.taurillon.org/la-charte-europeenne-des-langues-regionales-et-minoritaires-dechaine-les

    Plus d’un siècle après le passage du rouleau compresseur jacobin qui a méthodiquement éradiqué les cultures locales sur les territoires continentaux et d’outre-mer dominés par la bureaucratie française, voilà que celle-ci envisage désormais de ratifier la charte européenne des langues régionales et minoritaires. Évidemment, l’annonce de la ratification peu avant les élections régionales – alors même que l’État français mène actuellement une réforme territoriale avec le même zèle centralisateur et autoritaire que d’habitude indépendamment du respect de la subsidiarité – peut susciter quelques interrogations sur la considération que porte le gouvernement vis-à-vis de l’intelligence de ses administrés. Mais concédons pour une fois l’absence de manœuvre politicienne dans un souci de fair-play.

    #Opinions

    / Conseil (...)

    #Conseil_de_l'Europe #Multilinguisme
    http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Rapport_sur_la_n%C3%A9cessit%C3%A9_et_les_moyens_d%E2%80%99an%C3%A9an
    http://www.vie-publique.fr/focus/vers-ratification-charte-europeenne-langues-regionales.html
    http://urmis.revues.org/304
    http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langues_en_voie_de_disparition#France
    http://www.jean-luc-melenchon.fr/2015/06/04/charte-des-langues-regionales-et-minoritaires
    http://www.frontnational.com/contre-la-charte-europeenne-et-la-balkanisation-de-la-france-signons-
    http://www.contrepoints.org/2013/11/19/146659-le-nationalisme-une-insulte-a-la-raison
    http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/fr/Treaties/Html/148.htm
    https://www.contrepoints.org/2013/01/06/110421-comme-pour-la-presse-la-subvention-a-massacre-le-cinema-francai
    http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_sp%C3%A9cialis%C3%A9e_de_terminologie_et_de_n%C3%A9ologie
    http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005616341
    http://www.lopinion.fr/16-fevrier-2015/honni-soit-qui-mal-y-pense-21413
    http://www.csa.fr/Radio/Le-suivi-des-programmes/La-diffusion-de-chansons-d-expression-francaise/Le-fondement-juridique-des-quotas

  • Une plateforme pour protéger les journalistes
    http://www.taurillon.org/une-plateforme-pour-proteger-les-journalistes

    Créée en partenariat avec plusieurs associations, la plateforme pour la protection du journalisme et la sécurité des journalistes permet de recenser et de dénoncer les atteintes à la #Liberté_de_la_presse au sein des 47 Etats membres du #Conseil_de_l'Europe. Le but ? Endiguer une détérioration générale de la liberté de la presse à travers le continent, dénoncée par les associations.

    Actualité

    / Conseil de l’Europe, #Droits_de_l'Homme, Liberté de la presse

    http://index.rsf.org/#!/presentation
    https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage

  • La victoire des bambins, ou la fin des châtiments corporels
    http://www.taurillon.org/la-victoire-des-bambins-ou-la-fin-des-chatiments-corporels

    Par une décision du 4 mars 2015, le Comité européen des droits sociaux du #Conseil_de_l'Europe, basé à Strasbourg, considère que le droit français ne prévoit pas d’interdiction suffisamment claire et contraignante des châtiments corporels infligés aux enfants ni par la loi ni par la jurisprudence.

    Économie & Société

    / Conseil de l’Europe, #Droits_de_l'Homme, Société

    #Économie_&_Société #Société

  • Pour la #France, le principe de subsidiarité est-il à sens unique ?
    http://www.taurillon.org/pour-la-france-le-principe-de-subsidiarite-est-il-a-sens-unique

    Tiré de l’oubli à la fin des années 1980, pour être ensuite explicitement promu par le traité de Maastricht en 1992 comme l’une des valeurs fondamentales de l’intégration européenne, le principe de subsidiarité vise à garantir, en termes d’action publique, que la responsabilité d’une décision est toujours située au niveau le plus proche possible du citoyen : cette responsabilité doit ainsi incomber à la plus petite entité capable de résoudre les problèmes. Dès lors qu’il s’agit d’organiser la vie démocratique d’un grand ensemble politique, il est inséparable, comme le sont les deux faces d’une même médaille, du principe contraposé dit « de suppléance ».

    #Fédéralisme

    / France, #Conseil_de_l'Europe, (...)

    #Fédéralisme
    http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000461161
    http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2015/2014-709-dc/decision-n-2014-709-dc-du-15-janvier-2015.143021.html