• The disease-resistant patients exposing Covid-19’s weak spots - BBC Future

    Mayana Zatz, director of the Human Genome Research Centre at the University of São Paulo has identified 100 couples, where one person got #Covid-19 but their partner was not infected. Her team is now studying them in the hope of identifying genetic markers of resilience. “The idea is to try and find why some people who are heavily exposed to the virus do not develop Covid-19 and remain serum negative with no antibodies,” she says. “We found out that this is apparently relatively common. We received about 1,000 emails of people saying that they were in this situation.”

    Zatz is also analysing the genomes of 12 centenarians who have only been mildly affected by the coronavirus, including one 114-year-old woman in Recife who she believes to be the oldest person in the world to have recovered from Covid-19. While Covid-19 has been particularly deadly to the older generations, elderly people who are remarkably resistant could offer clues for new ways to help the vulnerable survive future pandemics.

    But while cases of remarkable resilience are particularly eye-catching for some geneticists, others are much more interested in outliers at the other end of the spectrum. Over the past couple of months, studies of these patients have already yielded key insights into exactly why the #Sars-CoV-2 virus can be so deadly.


    While many of these answers are coming too late to make much of a difference during the current pandemic, understanding what makes people unusually resilient or vulnerable will almost certainly save lives during future outbreaks. As the Sars, H1N1, Ebola, and Mers epidemics of the past 20 years have shown us, it is inevitable that novel viruses will continue to spill over from nature, making it all the more vital to develop new ways of identifying those most at risk, and ways to treat them.


  • 312 suspects belges identifiés après un échange de données ADN avec le Royaume-Uni

    Depuis le 21 décembre dernier, la Belgique échange de façon automatique ses données ADN avec le Royaume-Uni, en matière de recherche judiciaire. Depuis lors, 312 suspects belges identifiés outre-Manche, rapportent les titres Sudpresse lundi. Depuis la mise en connexion des deux banques de données, ce sont très exactement 2.180 correspondances qui ont été obtenues. « Dans environ 16 % des 2.180 correspondances obtenues, soit 312, un profil génétique de traces non identifié a pu être associé à une (...)

    #criminalité #génétique #données


    • Je n’ai pas confiance... A mon avis le rapport erreurs d’analyse/affaires résolues ne peut être que très mauvais. Sans compter qu’il ne faudra pas longtemps pour que les pros de la criminalité ne commencent à ensemencer leurs scènes de crime avec des « mix » d’ADN... SI on cible pas très précisément les cas d’usage, des humain-e-s vont morfler injustement (convocations, interrogatoires,...)

      #surveillance #société

  • Inside China’s unexpected quest to protect data privacy

    A new privacy law would look a lot like Europe’s GDPR—but will it restrict state surveillance?

    Late in the summer of 2016, Xu Yuyu received a call that promised to change her life. Her college entrance examination scores, she was told, had won her admission to the English department of the Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications. Xu lived in the city of Linyi in Shandong, a coastal province in China, southeast of Beijing. She came from a poor family, singularly reliant on her father’s meager income. But her parents had painstakingly saved for her tuition; very few of her relatives had ever been to college.

    A few days later, Xu received another call telling her she had also been awarded a scholarship. To collect the 2,600 yuan ($370), she needed to first deposit a 9,900 yuan “activation fee” into her university account. Having applied for financial aid only days before, she wired the money to the number the caller gave her. That night, the family rushed to the police to report that they had been defrauded. Xu’s father later said his greatest regret was asking the officer whether they might still get their money back. The answer—“Likely not”—only exacerbated Xu’s devastation. On the way home she suffered a heart attack. She died in a hospital two days later.

    An investigation determined that while the first call had been genuine, the second had come from scammers who’d paid a hacker for Xu’s number, admissions status, and request for financial aid.

    For Chinese consumers all too familiar with having their data stolen, Xu became an emblem. Her death sparked a national outcry for greater data privacy protections. Only months before, the European Union had adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), an attempt to give European citizens control over how their personal data is used. Meanwhile, Donald Trump was about to win the American presidential election, fueled in part by a campaign that relied extensively on voter data. That data included details on 87 million Facebook accounts, illicitly obtained by the consulting firm Cambridge Analytica. Chinese regulators and legal scholars followed these events closely.

    In the West, it’s widely believed that neither the Chinese government nor Chinese people care about privacy. US tech giants wield this supposed indifference to argue that onerous privacy laws would put them at a competitive disadvantage to Chinese firms. In his 2018 Senate testimony after the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, urged regulators not to clamp down too hard on technologies like face recognition. “We still need to make it so that American companies can innovate in those areas,” he said, “or else we’re going to fall behind Chinese competitors and others around the world.”

    In reality, this picture of Chinese attitudes to privacy is out of date. Over the last few years the Chinese government, seeking to strengthen consumers’ trust and participation in the digital economy, has begun to implement privacy protections that in many respects resemble those in America and Europe today.

    Even as the government has strengthened consumer privacy, however, it has ramped up state surveillance. It uses DNA samples and other biometrics, like face and fingerprint recognition, to monitor citizens throughout the country. It has tightened internet censorship and developed a “social credit” system, which punishes behaviors the authorities say weaken social stability. During the pandemic, it deployed a system of “health code” apps to dictate who could travel, based on their risk of carrying the coronavirus. And it has used a slew of invasive surveillance technologies in its harsh repression of Muslim Uighurs in the northwestern region of Xinjiang.

    This paradox has become a defining feature of China’s emerging data privacy regime, says Samm Sacks, a leading China scholar at Yale and New America, a think tank in Washington, DC. It raises a question: Can a system endure with strong protections for consumer privacy, but almost none against government snooping? The answer doesn’t affect only China. Its technology companies have an increasingly global footprint, and regulators around the world are watching its policy decisions.

    November 2000 arguably marks the birth of the modern Chinese surveillance state. That month, the Ministry of Public Security, the government agency that oversees daily law enforcement, announced a new project at a trade show in Beijing. The agency envisioned a centralized national system that would integrate both physical and digital surveillance using the latest technology. It was named Golden Shield.

    Eager to cash in, Western companies including American conglomerate Cisco, Finnish telecom giant Nokia, and Canada’s Nortel Networks worked with the agency on different parts of the project. They helped construct a nationwide database for storing information on all Chinese adults, and developed a sophisticated system for controlling information flow on the internet—what would eventually become the Great Firewall. Much of the equipment involved had in fact already been standardized to make surveillance easier in the US—a consequence of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

    Despite the standardized equipment, the Golden Shield project was hampered by data silos and turf wars within the Chinese government. Over time, the ministry’s pursuit of a singular, unified system devolved into two separate operations: a surveillance and database system, devoted to gathering and storing information, and the social-credit system, which some 40 government departments participate in. When people repeatedly do things that aren’t allowed—from jaywalking to engaging in business corruption—their social-credit score falls and they can be blocked from things like buying train and plane tickets or applying for a mortgage.

    In the same year the Ministry of Public Security announced Golden Shield, Hong Yanqing entered the ministry’s police university in Beijing. But after seven years of training, having received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees, Hong began to have second thoughts about becoming a policeman. He applied instead to study abroad. By the fall of 2007, he had moved to the Netherlands to begin a PhD in international human rights law, approved and subsidized by the Chinese government.

    Over the next four years, he familiarized himself with the Western practice of law through his PhD research and a series of internships at international organizations. He worked at the International Labor Organization on global workplace discrimination law and the World Health Organization on road safety in China. “It’s a very legalistic culture in the West—that really strikes me. People seem to go to court a lot,” he says. “For example, for human rights law, most of the textbooks are about the significant cases in court resolving human rights issues.”

    Hong found this to be strangely inefficient. He saw going to court as a final resort for patching up the law’s inadequacies, not a principal tool for establishing it in the first place. Legislation crafted more comprehensively and with greater forethought, he believed, would achieve better outcomes than a system patched together through a haphazard accumulation of case law, as in the US.

    After graduating, he carried these ideas back to Beijing in 2012, on the eve of Xi Jinping’s ascent to the presidency. Hong worked at the UN Development Program and then as a journalist for the People’s Daily, the largest newspaper in China, which is owned by the government.

    Xi began to rapidly expand the scope of government censorship. Influential commentators, or “Big Vs”—named for their verified accounts on social media—had grown comfortable criticizing and ridiculing the Chinese Communist Party. In the fall of 2013, the party arrested hundreds of microbloggers for what it described as “malicious rumor-mongering” and paraded a particularly influential one on national television to make an example of him.

    The moment marked the beginning of a new era of censorship. The following year, the Cyberspace Administration of China was founded. The new central agency was responsible for everything involved in internet regulation, including national security, media and speech censorship, and data protection. Hong left the People’s Daily and joined the agency’s department of international affairs. He represented it at the UN and other global bodies and worked on cybersecurity cooperation with other governments.

    By July 2015, the Cyberspace Administration had released a draft of its first law. The Cybersecurity Law, which entered into force in June of 2017, required that companies obtain consent from people to collect their personal information. At the same time, it tightened internet censorship by banning anonymous users—a provision enforced by regular government inspections of data from internet service providers.

    In the spring of 2016, Hong sought to return to academia, but the agency asked him to stay. The Cybersecurity Law had purposely left the regulation of personal data protection vague, but consumer data breaches and theft had reached unbearable levels. A 2016 study by the Internet Society of China found that 84% of those surveyed had suffered some leak of their data, including phone numbers, addresses, and bank account details. This was spurring a growing distrust of digital service providers that required access to personal information, such as ride-hailing, food-delivery, and financial apps. Xu Yuyu’s death poured oil on the flames.

    The government worried that such sentiments would weaken participation in the digital economy, which had become a central part of its strategy for shoring up the country’s slowing economic growth. The advent of GDPR also made the government realize that Chinese tech giants would need to meet global privacy norms in order to expand abroad.

    Hong was put in charge of a new task force that would write a Personal Information Protection Specification (PIPS) to help solve these challenges. The document, though nonbinding, would tell companies how regulators intended to implement the Cybersecurity Law. In the process, the government hoped, it would nudge them to adopt new norms for data protection by themselves.

    Hong’s task force set about translating every relevant document they could find into Chinese. They translated the privacy guidelines put out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and by its counterpart, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; they translated GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act. They even translated the 2012 White House Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, introduced by the Obama administration but never made into law. All the while, Hong met regularly with European and American data protection regulators and scholars.

    Bit by bit, from the documents and consultations, a general choice emerged. “People were saying, in very simplistic terms, ‘We have a European model and the US model,’” Hong recalls. The two approaches diverged substantially in philosophy and implementation. Which one to follow became the task force’s first debate.

    At the core of the European model is the idea that people have a fundamental right to have their data protected. GDPR places the burden of proof on data collectors, such as companies, to demonstrate why they need the data. By contrast, the US model privileges industry over consumers. Businesses define for themselves what constitutes reasonable data collection; consumers only get to choose whether to use that business. The laws on data protection are also far more piecemeal than in Europe, divvied up among sectoral regulators and specific states.

    At the time, without a central law or single agency in charge of data protection, China’s model more closely resembled the American one. The task force, however, found the European approach compelling. “The European rule structure, the whole system, is more clear,” Hong says.

    But most of the task force members were representatives from Chinese tech giants, like Baidu, Alibaba, and Huawei, and they felt that GDPR was too restrictive. So they adopted its broad strokes—including its limits on data collection and its requirements on data storage and data deletion—and then loosened some of its language. GDPR’s principle of data minimization, for example, maintains that only necessary data should be collected in exchange for a service. PIPS allows room for other data collection relevant to the service provided.

    PIPS took effect in May 2018, the same month that GDPR finally took effect. But as Chinese officials watched the US upheaval over the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal, they realized that a nonbinding agreement would not be enough. The Cybersecurity Law didn’t have a strong mechanism for enforcing data protection. Regulators could only fine violators up to 1,000,000 yuan ($140,000), an inconsequential amount for large companies. Soon after, the National People’s Congress, China’s top legislative body, voted to begin drafting a Personal Information Protection Law within its current five-year legislative period, which ends in 2023. It would strengthen data protection provisions, provide for tougher penalties, and potentially create a new enforcement agency.

    After Cambridge Analytica, says Hong, “the government agency understood, ‘Okay, if you don’t really implement or enforce those privacy rules, then you could have a major scandal, even affecting political things.’”

    The local police investigation of Xu Yuyu’s death eventually identified the scammers who had called her. It had been a gang of seven who’d cheated many other victims out of more than 560,000 yuan using illegally obtained personal information. The court ruled that Xu’s death had been a direct result of the stress of losing her family’s savings. Because of this, and his role in orchestrating tens of thousands of other calls, the ringleader, Chen Wenhui, 22, was sentenced to life in prison. The others received sentences between three and 15 years.Retour ligne automatique
    xu yuyu

    Emboldened, Chinese media and consumers began more openly criticizing privacy violations. In March 2018, internet search giant Baidu’s CEO, Robin Li, sparked social-media outrage after suggesting that Chinese consumers were willing to “exchange privacy for safety, convenience, or efficiency.” “Nonsense,” wrote a social-media user, later quoted by the People’s Daily. “It’s more accurate to say [it is] impossible to defend [our privacy] effectively.”

    In late October 2019, social-media users once again expressed anger after photos began circulating of a school’s students wearing brainwave-monitoring headbands, supposedly to improve their focus and learning. The local educational authority eventually stepped in and told the school to stop using the headbands because they violated students’ privacy. A week later, a Chinese law professor sued a Hangzhou wildlife zoo for replacing its fingerprint-based entry system with face recognition, saying the zoo had failed to obtain his consent for storing his image.

    But the public’s growing sensitivity to infringements of consumer privacy has not led to many limits on state surveillance, nor even much scrutiny of it. As Maya Wang, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, points out, this is in part because most Chinese citizens don’t know the scale or scope of the government’s operations. In China, as in the US and Europe, there are broad public and national security exemptions to data privacy laws. The Cybersecurity Law, for example, allows the government to demand data from private actors to assist in criminal legal investigations. The Ministry of Public Security also accumulates massive amounts of data on individuals directly. As a result, data privacy in industry can be strengthened without significantly limiting the state’s access to information.

    The onset of the pandemic, however, has disturbed this uneasy balance.

    On February 11, Ant Financial, a financial technology giant headquartered in Hangzhou, a city southwest of Shanghai, released an app-building platform called AliPay Health Code. The same day, the Hangzhou government released an app it had built using the platform. The Hangzhou app asked people to self-report their travel and health information, and then gave them a color code of red, yellow, or green. Suddenly Hangzhou’s 10 million residents were all required to show a green code to take the subway, shop for groceries, or enter a mall. Within a week, local governments in over 100 cities had used AliPay Health Code to develop their own apps. Rival tech giant Tencent quickly followed with its own platform for building them.

    The apps made visible a worrying level of state surveillance and sparked a new wave of public debate. In March, Hu Yong, a journalism professor at Beijing University and an influential blogger on Weibo, argued that the government’s pandemic data collection had crossed a line. Not only had it led to instances of information being stolen, he wrote, but it had also opened the door to such data being used beyond its original purpose. “Has history ever shown that once the government has surveillance tools, it will maintain modesty and caution when using them?” he asked.

    Indeed, in late May, leaked documents revealed plans from the Hangzhou government to make a more permanent health-code app that would score citizens on behaviors like exercising, smoking, and sleeping. After a public outcry, city officials canceled the project. That state-run media had also published stories criticizing the app likely helped.

    The debate quickly made its way to the central government. That month, the National People’s Congress announced it intended to fast-track the Personal Information Protection Law. The scale of the data collected during the pandemic had made strong enforcement more urgent, delegates said, and highlighted the need to clarify the scope of the government’s data collection and data deletion procedures during special emergencies. By July, the legislative body had proposed a new “strict approval” process for government authorities to undergo before collecting data from private-sector platforms. The language again remains vague, to be fleshed out later—perhaps through another nonbinding document—but this move “could mark a step toward limiting the broad scope” of existing government exemptions for national security, wrote Sacks and fellow China scholars at New America.

    Hong similarly believes the discrepancy between rules governing industry and government data collection won’t last, and the government will soon begin to limit its own scope. “We cannot simply address one actor while leaving the other out,” he says. “That wouldn’t be a very scientific approach.”

    Other observers disagree. The government could easily make superficial efforts to address public backlash against visible data collection without really touching the core of the Ministry of Public Security’s national operations, says Wang, of Human Rights Watch. She adds that any laws would likely be enforced unevenly: “In Xinjiang, Turkic Muslims have no say whatsoever in how they’re treated.”

    Still, Hong remains an optimist. In July, he started a job teaching law at Beijing University, and he now maintains a blog on cybersecurity and data issues. Monthly, he meets with a budding community of data protection officers in China, who carefully watch how data governance is evolving around the world.

    #criminalité #Nokia_Siemens #fraude #Huawei #payement #Cisco #CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata #Baidu #Alibaba #domination #bénéfices #BHATX #BigData #lutte #publicité (...)

    ##criminalité ##CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata ##publicité ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##Nortel_Networks ##Facebook ##biométrie ##consommation ##génétique ##consentement ##facial ##reconnaissance ##empreintes ##Islam ##SocialCreditSystem ##surveillance ##TheGreatFirewallofChina ##HumanRightsWatch

  • The Pandemic Could Obliterate a Last Frontier in Our Privacy : Our Biological Selves

    The world of biotech was already blossoming before murmurings of an untreatable mystery virus started to circulate at the end of last year. There are now countless companies offering everything from personalized fitness plans based on your genes to dietary advice based on the bacteria in your gut. These companies and the VC firms that back them believe there is a huge, untapped market for selling AI-driven insights based on health data. Big Tech also wants in. If these dynamics were (...)

    #23andMe #Fitbit #Google #Microsoft #Palantir #Amazon #algorithme #génétique #BigData #bénéfices #COVID-19 #microtargeting (...)


  • Des enfants à la carte

    À propos de : Jonathan Glover, Choisir ses enfants. Conception, #génétique et #handicap, Labor et Fides. L’ingénierie génétique donne la possibilité de choisir, en partie, la personne de nos enfants. Est-ce condamnable ? Au nom de quoi ? J. Glover, grande figure de l’éthique appliquée, répond à ces questions de manière mesurée, en distinguant les opérations de prévention et celles de transformation.

    #Société #Philosophie #bioéthique #transhumanisme

  • Blood, spit and swabs : can you trust home medical-testing kits ?

    Is posting off your bodily fluids to a DIY health-testing company the future of healthcare or just too much information ? On a dark February morning, I wake grainy with sleep and head to the kitchen. Before making toast or coffee, I unscrew the cap from a tiny test tube and spit into it. Over and over, but it’s surprisingly difficult to fill up a whole vial. It takes 10 minutes before my frothy deposit reaches the marked minimum line. My housemate sips her coffee. “Are you ill ?” she asks. (...)

    #NHS #génétique #santé #prédiction #23andMe #Fitbit


  • Huawei Reportedly Tested a ‘Uighur Alarm’ to Track Chinese Ethnic Minorities With Facial Recognition

    The system also identifies information such as age and sex Chinese tech giants Huawei and Megvii have allegedly tested software that could identify Uighurs, an ethnic minority in China, according to a new report from the Washington Post and video surveillance trade publication IPVM. The system being tested tried to identify whether a person was Uighur but also information such as their age and sex. If the system detected a Uighur person, it could notify government authorities with a (...)

    #Dahua #Hikvision #Huawei #Megvii #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #génétique #racisme #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #discrimination #Islam (...)


  • La techno-science contre l’agriculture paysanne | Racine de moins un

    Pour Jean-Pierre Berlan, ancien économiste de l’INRA, la confiscation du vivant à des fins de profit ne date pas d’hier. Dans « La Planète des clones » (éd. La Lenteur, 2019), il montre que la grande innovation agronomique du XXe siècle, le maïs hybride, relève de la même logique : faire croire que les semences mises au point par des chercheurs sont plus productives que le grain récolté dans les champs. Ce livre se lit comme une enquête policière et démasque l’imposture du progrès le plus célébré de la science agronomique. Durée : 51 min. Source : Radio Zinzine


  • DHS Plans to Start Collecting Eye Scans and DNA

    As the agency plans to collect more biometrics, including from U.S. citizens, Northrop Grumman is helping build the infrastructure. Through a little-discussed potential bureaucratic rule change, the Department of Homeland Security is planning to collect unprecedented levels of biometric information from immigration applicants and their sponsors — including U.S. citizens. While some types of applicants have long been required to submit photographs and fingerprints, a rule currently under (...)

    #NorthropGrumman #Clearview #ICE #DHS #BAE_ #FBI #CBP #biométrie #migration #données #facial #reconnaissance #iris #empreintes #génétique #surveillance (...)


  • George Orwell, Aldous Huxley : « 1984 » ou « Le meilleur des mondes » ?

    Le film raconte l’histoire croisée de George Orwell et d’Aldous Huxley, les auteurs des deux grands romans d’anticipation : « 1984 » et « Le meilleur des mondes ». Ecrits il y a plus de 70 ans, ces deux romans trouvent un écho extraordinaire dans nos sociétés d’aujourd’hui : faits alternatifs, fake news, ultra-surveillance... Orwell et Huxley semblent avoir imaginé toutes les dérives de nos sociétés. Avant l’ère de la surveillance généralisée, des fake news ou des bébés sur mesure, deux romans d’anticipation (...)

    #art #génétique #manipulation #vidéo-surveillance #surveillance


  • Machine-Readable Refugees

    Hassan (not his real name; other details have also been changed) paused mid-story to take out his wallet and show me his ID card. Its edges were frayed. The grainy, black-and-white photo was of a gawky teenager. He ran his thumb over the words at the top: ‘Jamhuri ya Kenya/Republic of Kenya’. ‘Somehow,’ he said, ‘no one has found out that I am registered as a Kenyan.’

    He was born in the Kenyan town of Mandera, on the country’s borders with Somalia and Ethiopia, and grew up with relatives who had escaped the Somali civil war in the early 1990s. When his aunt, who fled Mogadishu, applied for refugee resettlement through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, she listed Hassan as one of her sons – a description which, if understood outside the confines of biological kinship, accurately reflected their relationship.

    They were among the lucky few to pass through the competitive and labyrinthine resettlement process for Somalis and, in 2005, Hassan – by then a young adult – was relocated to Minnesota. It would be several years before US Citizenship and Immigration Services introduced DNA tests to assess the veracity of East African refugee petitions. The adoption of genetic testing by Denmark, France and the US, among others, has narrowed the ways in which family relationships can be defined, while giving the resettlement process the air of an impartial audit culture.

    In recent years, biometrics (the application of statistical methods to biological data, such as fingerprints or DNA) have been hailed as a solution to the elusive problem of identity fraud. Many governments and international agencies, including the UNHCR, see biometric identifiers and centralised databases as ways to determine the authenticity of people’s claims to refugee and citizenship status, to ensure that no one is passing as someone or something they’re not. But biometrics can be a blunt instrument, while the term ‘fraud’ is too absolute to describe a situation like Hassan’s.

    Biometrics infiltrated the humanitarian sector after 9/11. The US and EU were already building centralised fingerprint registries for the purposes of border control. But with the start of the War on Terror, biometric fever peaked, most evidently at the borders between nations, where the images of the terrorist and the migrant were blurred. A few weeks after the attacks, the UNHCR was advocating the collection and sharing of biometric data from refugees and asylum seekers. A year later, it was experimenting with iris scans along the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier. On the insistence of the US, its top donor, the agency developed a standardised biometric enrolment system, now in use in more than fifty countries worldwide. By 2006, UNHCR agents were taking fingerprints in Kenya’s refugee camps, beginning with both index fingers and later expanding to all ten digits and both eyes.

    Reeling from 9/11, the US and its allies saw biometrics as a way to root out the new faceless enemy. At the same time, for humanitarian workers on the ground, it was an apparently simple answer to an intractable problem: how to identify a ‘genuine’ refugee. Those claiming refugee status could be crossed-checked against a host country’s citizenship records. Officials could detect refugees who tried to register under more than one name in order to get additional aid. Biometric technologies were laden with promises: improved accountability, increased efficiency, greater objectivity, an end to the heavy-handed tactics of herding people around and keeping them under surveillance.

    When refugees relinquish their fingerprints in return for aid, they don’t know how traces of themselves can travel through an invisible digital architecture. A centralised biometric infrastructure enables opaque, automated data-sharing with third parties. Human rights advocates worry about sensitive identifying information falling into thehands of governments or security agencies. According to a recent privacy-impact report, the UNHCR shares biometric data with the Department of Homeland Security when referring refugees for resettlement in the US. ‘The very nature of digitalised refugee data,’ as the political scientist Katja Jacobsen says, ‘means that it might also become accessible to other actors beyond the UNHCR’s own biometric identity management system.’

    Navigating a complex landscape of interstate sovereignty, caught between host and donor countries, refugee aid organisations often hold contradictory, inconsistent views on data protection. UNHCR officials have long been hesitant about sharing information with the Kenyan state, for instance. Their reservations are grounded in concerns that ‘confidential asylum-seeker data could be used for non-protection-related purposes’. Kenya has a poor record of refugee protection. Its security forces have a history of harassing Somalis, whether refugees or Kenyan citizens, who are widely mistrusted as ‘foreigners’.

    Such well-founded concerns did not deter the UNHCR from sharing data with, funding and training Kenya’s Department of Refugee Affairs (now the Refugee Affairs Secretariat), which since 2011 has slowly and unevenly taken over refugee registration in the country. The UNHCR hasconducted joint verification exercises with the Kenyan government to weed out cases of double registration. According to the anthropologist Claire Walkey, these efforts were ‘part of the externalisation of European asylum policy ... and general burden shifting to the Global South’, where more than 80 per cent of the world’s refugees live. Biometrics collected for protection purposes have been used by the Kenyan government to keep people out. Tens of thousands of ethnic Somali Kenyan citizens who have tried to get a Kenyan national ID have been turned away in recent years because their fingerprints are in the state’s refugee database.

    Over the last decade, biometrics have become part of the global development agenda, allegedly a panacea for a range of problems. One of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is to provide everyone with a legal identity by 2030. Governments, multinational tech companies and international bodies from the World Bank to the World Food Programme have been promoting the use of digital identity systems. Across the Global South, biometric identifiers are increasingly linked to voting, aid distribution, refugee management and financial services. Countries with some of the least robust privacy laws and most vulnerable populations are now laboratories for experimental tech.

    Biometric identifiers promise to tie legal status directly to the body. They offer seductively easy solutions to the problems of administering large populations. But it is worth asking what (and who) gets lost when countries and international bodies turn to data-driven, automated solutions. Administrative failures, data gaps and clunky analogue systems had posed huge challenges for people at the mercy of dispassionate bureaucracies, but also provided others with room for manoeuvre.

    Biometrics may close the gap between an ID and its holder, but it opens a gulf between streamlined bureaucracies and people’s messy lives, their constrained choices, their survival strategies, their hopes for a better future, none of which can be captured on a digital scanner or encoded into a database.

    #biométrie #identité #réfugiés #citoyenneté #asile #migrations #ADN #tests_ADN #tests_génétiques #génétique #nationalité #famille #base_de_donnée #database #HCR #UNHCR #fraude #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #iris #technologie #contrôle #réinstallation #protection_des_données #empreintes_digitales #identité_digitale

    ping @etraces @karine4
    via @isskein

  • Covid-19 : les chercheurs français peu partageurs des séquences génétiques

    Il n’y a de pire aveugle que celui qui ne veut pas voir. En matière de Covid-19, le dicton s’appliquerait-il à la France ? Notre pays semble en effet peu enclin à utiliser un outil de pointe qui permettrait de répondre à des questions importantes sur l’épidémie, comme de déterminer l’origine géographique des nouvelles contaminations à Marseille ou même dans le pays. Ou de savoir si le virus mute sur notre territoire. Ou d’évaluer un paramètre-clé, toujours mal connu, comme le temps entre la date d’apparition des symptômes chez l’infectant et la date d’apparition des symptômes chez l’infecté…Cet outil, qui n’a rien de novateur, est le séquençage du génome du nouveau coronavirus, c’est-à-dire l’établissement de la liste exacte des quelque 30 000 lettres qui composent les gènes viraux. Depuis mars, le Royaume-Uni a séquencé 35 965 génomes. La France… 559 (dont trois de virus de chats), selon les chiffres de la plus grande base de données mondiale de génomes, Gisaid, au 26 août.Avec ces informations, nos voisins enchaînent les « révélations ». Ainsi, selon leurs analyses, plus de 1 000 introductions du virus en Grande-Bretagne expliquent la pandémie ; une souche devenue dominante du coronavirus n’est pas plus virulente que les autres, les syndromes de Kawasaki touchant des enfants ne seraient pas liés à une souche particulière du coronavirus ; etc.Pendant ce temps-là, en France, une équipe de Pasteur décrivait l’origine de l’épidémie en France… sans données du Grand-Est, alors qu’un foyer alsacien est soupçonné d’avoir contribué fortement à la diffusion du virus. Une autre équipe, aux hospices civils de Lyon, parvenait à quantifier, grâce à 5 198 génomes mondiaux, l’effet des diverses mesures de confinement sur la transmissibilité du virus. « Le faire pour la France seule aurait été intéressant mais nous avons trop peu de séquences », précise l’une des coauteurs, Laurence Josset, responsable du séquençage pour la partie sud du pays, aux hospices de Lyon.


  • Blackstone to acquire Ancestry.com for $4.7 billion

    Blackstone Group Inc (BX.N) said on Wednesday it agreed to acquire genealogy provider Ancestry.com Inc from private equity rivals for $4.7 billion, including debt, placing a big bet on family-tree chasing as well as personalized medicine. Ancestry.com is the world’s largest provider of DNA services, allowing customers to trace their genealogy and identify genetic health risks with tests sent to their home. Blackstone is hoping that more consumers staying at home amid the COVID-19 pandemic (...)

    #bénéfices #génétique #Ancestry.com #Blackstone


  • EFF and ACLU Tell Federal Court that Forensic Software Source Code Must Be Disclosed

    Can secret software be used to generate key evidence against a criminal defendant ? In an amicus filed ten days ago with the United States District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania, EFF and the ACLU of Pennsylvania explain that secret forensic technology is inconsistent with criminal defendants’ constitutional rights and the public’s right to oversee the criminal trial process. Our amicus in the case of United States v. Ellis also explains why source code, and other aspects of (...)

    #algorithme #génétique #justice #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #santé #surveillance #ACLU #EFF #TrueAllele (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##santé ##Cybergenetics

  • Severe #COVID-19 in the young and healthy: monogenic inborn errors of immunity? | Nature Reviews Immunology

    Severe COVID-19 is rare in previously healthy individuals who are less than 50 years of age, affecting probably no more than 1 in 1,000 such infected individuals. We suggest that these patients may become critically ill because of monogenic inborn errors that disrupt protective immunity to SARS-CoV-2.


  • La #génétique, autre clé de l’#inégalité face à la #COVID-19 | COVID-19 | La Tribune - Sherbrooke

    Les recherches génétiques lancées autour du nouveau #coronavirus portent aussi sur la diversité des symptômes, ou encore la #résistance de certaines personnes.

    « Des infirmières, des médecins, des conjoints de patients ne développent pas la maladie et ne sont pas infectés par le virus », note le Pr Casanova. « Une hypothèse est que ces individus ont des variations génétiques qui les rendent résistants au virus ».

    C’est le cas pour d’autres virus.

    Par exemple, une mutation du gène CCR5 confère une immunité naturelle contre le VIH. Cette découverte a permis le développement de stratégies thérapeutiques.

  • Presence of Genetic Variants Among Young Men With Severe COVID-19 | Allergy and Clinical Immunology | JAMA | JAMA Network

    Key Points
    Question Are genetic variants associated with severe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in young male patients?

    Findings In a case series that included 4 young male patients with severe COVID-19 from 2 families, rare loss-of-function variants of the X-chromosomal #TLR7 were identified, with immunological defects in type I and II interferon production.

    Meaning These findings provide insights into the pathogenesis of COVID-19.

    #COVID-19 : Une #vulnérabilité #génétique aussi | santé log

    Les observations actuelles suggèrent que le coronavirus #SARS-CoV-2 provoque des symptômes graves principalement chez les patients âgés atteints de maladie chronique. Cependant, lorsque [des] médecins ont dû prendre en charge 2 jeunes frères auparavant en bonne santé, que ces jeunes patients ont nécessité une ventilation mécanique en unité de soins intensifs (USI), ils se sont évidemment posé la question des facteurs génétiques. Ces recherches identifient alors un #gène au rôle clé dans la réponse immunitaire contre le #SRAS-CoV-2 [avec par la suite confirmation chez deux autres frères d’une autre famille avec une forme sévère.]

    La découverte pourrait avoir des conséquences importantes pour le traitement des patients atteints de formes sévères de #COVID-19 et ouvre pour ces patients la piste de l’administration d’#interféron pour soutenir la réponse immunitaire.

  • Large DNA Study Traces Violent History of American Slavery

    Scientists from the consumer genetics company 23andMe have published the largest DNA study to date of people with African ancestry in the Americas.

    An 1823 cross-section diagram of a ship used to carry enslaved people. The illustration, which was used in abolitionist campaigns and contains several historical inaccuracies, has become one of the most famous depictions of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

    More than one and a half centuries after the trans-Atlantic slave trade ended, a new study shows how the brutal treatment of enslaved people has shaped the DNA of their descendants.

    The report, which included more than 50,000 people, 30,000 of them with African ancestry, agrees with the historical record about where people were taken from in Africa, and where they were enslaved in the Americas. But it also found some surprises.

    For example, the DNA of participants from the United States showed a significant amount of Nigerian ancestry — far more than expected based on the historical records of ships carrying enslaved people directly to the United States from Nigeria.

    At first, historians working with the researchers “couldn’t believe the amount of Nigerian ancestry in the U.S.,” said Steven Micheletti, a population geneticist at 23andMe who led the study.

    After consulting another historian, the researchers learned that enslaved people were sent from Nigeria to the British Caribbean, and then were further traded into the United States, which could explain the genetic findings, he said.

    The study illuminates one of the darkest chapters of world history, in which 12.5 million people were forcibly taken from their homelands in tens of thousands of European ships. It also shows that the historical and genetic records together tell a more layered and intimate story than either could alone.

    The study, which was published on Thursday in the American Journal of Human Genetics, represents “real progress in how we think that genetics contributes to telling a story about the past,” said Alondra Nelson, a professor of social science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., who was not involved in the study.

    Although the work is commendable for making use of both historical and genetic data, Dr. Nelson said, it was also “a missed opportunity to take the full step and really collaborate with historians.” The history of the different ethnic groups in Africa, for example, and how they related to modern and historical geographic boundaries, could have been explored in greater depth, she said.

    The study began as a dream project of Joanna Mountain, senior director of research at 23andMe, even before the company had any customers. Over 10 years she and her team built a genetic database. Primarily the participants were 23andMe customers whose grandparents were born in one of the geographic regions of trans-Atlantic slavery. All participants consented to have their DNA used in the research.

    In the new study, Dr. Micheletti’s team compared this genetic database with a historical one, Slave Voyages, which contains an enormous amount of information about slavery, such as ports of embarkation and disembarkation, and numbers of enslaved men, women and children.

    The researchers also consulted with some historians to identify gaps in their data, Dr. Mountain said. Historians told them, for example, that they needed representation from critical regions, like Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The team worked with academics connected to West African institutions to find that data.

    The size of the project’s dataset is “extraordinary,” said David Reich, a professor of genetics at Harvard who was not part of the project.

    Because it drew participants from a direct-to-consumer database of millions of people, the study was able to “ask and answer questions about the past and about how people are related to each other” that could not be asked by academics like himself, he said. At best, academic projects are able to study hundreds or a few thousand people, and generally that data does not also include the genealogical information that the 23andMe research participants provided.

    The findings show remarkable alignment with the historical record. Historians have estimated, for example, that 5.7 million people were taken from West Central Africa to the Americas. And the genetic record shows a very strong connection between people in West Central Africa and all people with African ancestry in the Americas.

    Historians have also noted that the people who were taken to Latin America from Africa disembarked from West Central Africa, but many were taken originally from other regions like Senegambia and the Bight of Benin. And the new genetic evidence supports this, showing that the descendants of enslaved people in Latin America generally carry genetic connections with two or three of these regions in Africa.

    Historical evidence shows that enslaved people in the United States and the British Caribbean, by contrast, were taken from a larger number of regions of Africa. Their descendants today show a genetic connection to people in six regions in Africa, the study found.

    The historical record shows that of the 10.7 million enslaved people who disembarked in the Americas (after nearly 2 million others died on the journey), more than 60 percent were men. But the genetic record shows that it was mostly enslaved women who contributed to the present-day gene pool.

    The asymmetry in the experience of enslaved men and women — and indeed, many groups of men and women in centuries past — is well understood. Enslaved men often died before they had a chance to have children. Enslaved women were often raped and forced to have children.

    The 23andMe project found this general pattern, but also uncovered a startling difference in the experience of men and women between regions in the Americas.

    The scientists calculated that enslaved women in the United States contributed 1.5 times more to the modern-day gene pool of people of African descent than enslaved men. In the Latin Caribbean, they contributed 13 times more. In Northern South America, they contributed 17 times more.

    What’s more, in the United States, European men contributed three times more to the modern-day gene pool of people of African descent than European women did. In the British Caribbean, they contributed 25 times more.

    This genetic evidence, the scientists say, may be explained by local practices. In the United States, segregation between enslaved people and the European population may have made it more likely that the child of an enslaved mother would have an enslaved father. But in other regions where enslaved men were less likely to reproduce, dangerous practices like rice farming — in which harsh conditions and muddy fields made it easier to drown, and malaria was common — may have killed many of them before they could have children.

    In some regions in Latin America, the government enacted programs that brought men from Europe to father children with enslaved women in order to intentionally diminish the African gene pool.

    The study illustrates how much physical and sexual violence were part of slavery — and how they are still built into our society, Dr. Nelson said. It confirms the “mistreatment, discrimination, sexual abuse, and violence that has persisted for generations,” she said, and that many people are protesting today.

    #DNA #American_Slavery #ancestry #trans-Atlantic_slave_trade #United_States


  • Hackers Attacked Two Leading Genetic Genealogy Websites

    First GEDmatch, the DNA database that helped identify the Golden State Killer, was hacked. Then email addresses from its users were used in a phishing attack on another leading genealogy site. On July 19, genealogy enthusiasts who use the website GEDmatch to upload their DNA information and find relatives to fill in their family trees got an unpleasant surprise. Suddenly, more than a million DNA profiles that had been hidden from cops using the site to find partial matches to crime scene (...)

    #GEDmatch #MyHeritage #génétique #police #données #hacking #phishing

  • Aux Etats-Unis, des profils ADN très peu confidentiels

    Les résultats des tests « maison », dont raffolent les particuliers américains, forment de colossales bases de données génétiques. Si mal protégées que même la police s’en sert… Joseph James DeAngelo et William Earl Talbott II n’avaient sans doute jamais entendu ­parler de GEDmatch. Située en Floride, cette ­entreprise de taille modeste spécialisée dans les recherches généalogiques n’avait non plus jamais eu affaire à eux. A la surprise générale et à leur insu, leurs routes se sont pourtant croisées ces (...)

    #FamilyTreeDNA #AncestryDNA #23andMe #GEDmatch #MyHeritage #génétique #police #données #prédiction #BigData #hacking #santé (...)

    ##santé ##AfricanAncestry

  • Après une faille de sécurité, un site américain laisse accessible à la police un million de profils ADN

    En réactualisant des paramètres après une attaque informatique, le site généalogique GEDmatch a laissé en libre accès à la police l’ensemble des données génétiques de ses utilisateurs, y compris ceux qui n’y avaient pas consenti. C’est le genre de messages que l’on n’aime pas recevoir de la part d’une entreprise. Surtout quand on lui a confié son profil génétique. Lundi 20 juillet, le site généalogique américain GEDmatch a confirmé qu’il avait été victime d’une attaque informatique. Les données présentes sur (...)

    #GEDmatch #MyHeritage #génétique #police #données #phishing #hacking

  • Race After the Internet - Lisa Nakamura - Peter Chow-W

    In Race After the Internet, Lisa Nakamura and Peter Chow-White bring together a collection of interdisciplinary, forward-looking essays exploring the complex role that digital media technologies play in shaping our ideas about race. Contributors interrogate changing ideas of race within the context of an increasingly digitally mediatized cultural and informational landscape. Using social scientific, rhetorical, textual, and ethnographic approaches, these essays show how new and old styles (...)

    #algorithme #génétique #racisme #sexisme #discrimination

  • Des croisements anciens entre Polynésiens et Amérindiens mis en évidence par la génétique

    Des analyses ADN confortent l’hypothèse de l’anthropologue Thor Heyerdahl. Mais on ignore si des Amérindiens ont débarqué en Polynésie, ou si ce sont les Polynésiens qui ont « découvert » l’Amérique avant Christophe Colomb.

    Par Hervé Morin Publié, lemonde.fr, mercredi 8 juillet 2020

    En 1937, le jeune anthropologue norvégien Thor Heyerdahl et sa femme Liv débarquent à Fatu Hiva, une île des Marquises, pour leur voyage de noces. Le séjour du couple de Robinson se prolonge. Heyerdahl est fasciné par des légendes locales, selon lesquelles les occupants de l’île seraient venus du Soleil-Levant. Dix ans plus tard, il s’embarque depuis le Pérou sur un radeau de balsa, pour prouver qu’un tel voyage d’est en ouest est possible. Le 7 août 1947, après cent un jours de mer, lui et ses cinq coéquipiers s’échouent sur un atoll des Tuamotu, au terme de 7 000 km d’une navigation mouvementée, apportant une éclatante démonstration de la faisabilité d’une telle dérive.

    L’odyssée du Kon-Tiki deviendra mythique dans le grand public, mais jusqu’à ce jour, les cercles académiques continuent de débattre avec fièvre de l’hypothèse d’Heyerdahl. La théorie dominante étant que le Pacifique a progressivement été exploré et colonisé depuis l’Asie, par les « nomades de la mer » de la civilisation Lapita, sur une période courant de 1 500 avant J.-C. à la fin du XIVe siècle.

    Sans nier la prépondérance de cette ruée maritime vers l’est, une étude, publiée le 9 juillet dans Nature, appuie l’intuition initiale d’Heyerdahl. Elle compare les génomes de 807 individus issus de 17 îles du Pacifique et de 15 groupes amérindiens de la côte du Pacifique. Alexander Ioannidis, postdoctorant à l’université de Stanford, et ses collègues, mettent en évidence des croisements qui seraient survenus vers 1 200 après J.-C. entre Polynésiens et Améridiens, à une époque où les premiers étaient en pleine exploration des derniers confettis du Pacifique.

    Génétique, linguistique et botanique

    Heyerdahl aurait-il vu juste ? « Nous ne pouvons pas dire si les Polynésiens ont atteint les Amériques et sont repartis (avec une certaine ascendance amérindienne), ou si les Amérindiens se sont rendus en Polynésie, comme le croyait Heyerdahl, mais nous pouvons confirmer qu’il y a eu contact, comme il le pensait, répond Alexander Ioannidis. Cela signifie que les influences culturelles des Amérindiens ont pu se propager dans la lointaine Polynésie, comme le théorisait Heyerdahl. »

    L’analyse génétique conforte des indices d’une autre nature, qui mêlent linguistique et botanique. « D’autres chercheurs avaient noté que la patate douce, dont nous savons qu’elle était originaire des Amériques et qu’elle y était largement utilisée comme culture, est arrivée en Polynésie des siècles avant que les marins européens n’atteignent le Pacifique, rappelle Alexander Ioannidis. En outre, le nom de la patate douce, dans de nombreuses langues polynésiennes, kumara, ressemble au nom autochtone utilisé pour la désigner dans certaines langues du nord-ouest de l’Amérique du Sud. »

    N’est-il pas trop beau pour être vrai que le signal le plus fort d’un héritage génétique d’origine amérindienne – provenant des Zenu de Colombie – pointe vers Fatu Hiva, vers 1150 après J.-C., là même où Heyerdhal a été happé par les légendes insulaires ? « Ce n’est pas une coïncidence totale, puisque cette île a été incluse dans notre base de données en partie à cause de ces légendes, répond Alexander Ioannidis. Nous avons trouvé un signe de contact sur Fatu Hiva, là où nous avons cherché, mais il y a beaucoup d’autres îles des Marquises et des Tuamotu qui ne figurent pas dans notre base de données, si bien que nous ne pouvons donc pas dire avec certitude où le contact a eu lieu précisément. »

    La « marge d’approximation » de la génétique

    L’étude de Nature évoque la « possibilité intrigante » que les Amérindiens aient été les premiers à s’installer à Fatu Hiva, et que des navigateurs venus de l’ouest soient arrivés en second lieu. Mais l’alternative a la préférence d’Alexander Ioannidis : « Je pense qu’il est plus probable que des Polynésiens aient atteint les Amériques, étant donné leur technologie de voyage et leur capacité démontrée à parcourir des milliers de milles en haute mer, ce qu’ils faisaient avec succès, à cette époque, à la recherche de nouveaux territoires insulaires. » Un voyage de cette nature a été recréé en 1976 par l’expédition, d’Hawaï à Tahiti, du Hokulea, un bateau polynésien traditionnel, bien plus manœuvrant qu’un radeau de balsa.

    « Il est également possible que certains Amérindiens, qui disposaient de bateaux empruntant la route commerciale côtière de l’Equateur-Colombie vers la Méso-Amérique, aient dérivé dans l’océan Pacifique et, portés par les courants équatoriaux, aient atteint les Tuamotu, convient Alexander Ioannidis. C’est exactement là qu’Heyerdahl a débarqué lors de son voyage de dérive reconstitué avec le Kon-Tiki depuis l’Amérique du Sud. » Mais l’hypothèse d’une découverte précolombienne des Amériques par d’aventureux Polynésiens reste pour lui plus convaincante.

    « Le sujet est vraiment fascinant ! », commente Vincent Lebot (Cirad) qui, en 2013, avait dirigé une étude génétique sur la diffusion de la patate douce dans le Pacifique, laquelle appuyait déjà fortement l’hypothèse de transferts du tubercule depuis l’Amérique du Sud (région du Pérou et de l’Equateur) vers la Polynésie. Il estime que la méthodologie et les marqueurs génétiques décrits dans Nature sont « suffisamment solides pour révéler des échanges entre deux populations qui étaient, à cette époque, suffisamment distantes génétiquement. » Lui aussi penche pour l’hypothèse d’un aller-retour de Polynésiens en Amérique, qui « auraient ramené avec eux des femmes ou des marins amérindiens ». Il note cependant que la génétique laisse « une marge d’approximation » concernant la datation de ces échanges, et salue le fait que les auteurs eux-mêmes mentionnent les limites de leur modèle.

    Héritage génétique indéchiffrable

    Jusqu’alors, l’hypothèse d’une origine amérindienne des Polynésiens avait été essentiellement testée sur les habitants de l’île de Pâques (les Rapa Nui), précisément parce qu’elle est la plus proche du continent américain (3 525 km des côtes chiliennes, tout de même), et distante de plus de 2 000 km de Pitcairn, la première île habitée vers l’ouest. L’héritage génétique de ses habitants était particulièrement indéchiffrable, du fait d’échanges, au XIXe siècle, avec des navigateurs d’origines européenne et amérindienne (peuples chiliens précolombiens). Les analyses ADN apportaient des résultats contradictoires sur une influence amérindienne antérieure.

    Une indécision tranchée par l’étude de Nature : « La composante amérindienne préhistorique sur Rapa Nui, sur laquelle tant de recherches ont porté, est probablement issue d’un événement de contact non pas sur Rapa Nui, mais quelque part en amont dans le processus de colonisation polynésienne des îles du Pacifique », y lit-on. L’arrivée d’ADN amérindien sur l’île de Pâques est datée de 1380.

    Combien d’individus ont-ils été impliqués dans ces croisements dont la trace génétique ténue s’est conservée et diffusée si largement dans l’immensité du Pacifique ? « Nous ne pouvons pas le dire, mais nous pouvons dire que l’ascendance amérindienne sur les différentes îles étudiées a été héritée des mêmes ancêtres, répond Alexander Ioannidis. Tous les ancêtres amérindiens préeuropéens proviennent également de la même région du nord de l’Amérique du Sud et datent d’à peu près la même époque. Cela nous amène à penser qu’une seule expédition a permis d’apporter ces ancêtres sur une île de la Polynésie orientale. Puis, lorsque les dernières îles polynésiennes éloignées ont été colonisées (comme l’île de Pâques), cette trace ancestrale a été portée vers ces nouveaux territoires avec les nouveaux colons, dans leur ADN désormais combiné. »

    « La nouvelle étude de Ionnidis et al. est passionnante et les résultats sont très convaincants, estime le paléogénéticien Lars Fehren-Schmitz (Université de Californie, à Santa Cruz), qui avait pourtant publié, en 2017, une étude excluant tout apport génétique amérindien avant l’arrivée des Européens sur l’île de Pâques. L’idée de déplacer l’attention de Rapa Nui vers d’autres communautés de Polynésie orientale me paraît logique, étant donné que même l’expérience de Thor Heyerdahl ne l’a pas conduit à Rapa Nui. Je suis particulièrement enthousiaste quant à leur hypothèse selon laquelle un flux génétique pourrait provenir de groupes vivant dans le nord de l’Amérique du Sud-Amérique centrale. »

    Pour lui, la preuve la plus convaincante de l’ascendance amérindienne chez des individus des communautés insulaires viendra, in fine, de l’analyse d’ADN ancien prélevé sur des squelettes datant de l’époque préeuropéenne. « Mais c’est aux communautés de ces îles de décider si cette question les intéresse », conclut-il.

    Hervé Morin


    #anthropologie #génétique #Amérindiens #Amérique #Polynésie #Pacifique

  • EU data watchdog to ‘convince’ Commission to ban automated recognition tech

    Automated recognition technologies in public spaces should be temporarily banned, the EU’s institutional data protection watchdog has said, arguing in favour of a moratorium. Applications that should be outlawed for a limited period of time not only include facial recognition technologies but also software that captures “gait, fingerprints, DNA, voice, keystrokes and other biometric or behavioral signals,” the European Data Protection Supervisor said on Tuesday (30 June). EDPS head Wojciech (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #biométrie #génétique #données #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #clavier #comportement #empreintes (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##marche ##surveillance ##voix