naturalfeature:arab gulf

  • Tom Stevenson reviews ‘AngloArabia’ by David Wearing · LRB 9 May 2019
    https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n09/tom-stevenson/what-are-we-there-for

    It is a cliché that the United States and Britain are obsessed with Middle East oil, but the reason for the obsession is often misdiagnosed. Anglo-American interest in the enormous hydrocarbon reserves of the Persian Gulf does not derive from a need to fuel Western consumption . [...] Anglo-American involvement in the Middle East has always been principally about the strategic advantage gained from controlling Persian Gulf hydrocarbons, not Western oil needs. [...]

    Other parts of the world – the US, Russia, Canada – have large deposits of crude oil, and current estimates suggest Venezuela has more proven reserves than Saudi Arabia. But Gulf oil lies close to the surface, where it is easy to get at by drilling; it is cheap to extract, and is unusually ‘light’ and ‘sweet’ (industry terms for high purity and richness). It is also located near the middle of the Eurasian landmass, yet outside the territory of any global power. Western Middle East policy, as explained by Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was to control the Gulf and stop any Soviet influence over ‘that vital energy resource upon which the economic and political stability both of Western Europe and of Japan depend’, or else the ‘geopolitical balance of power would be tipped’. In a piece for the Atlantic a few months after 9/11, Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne explained that Washington ‘assumes responsibility for stabilising the region’ because China, Japan and Europe will be dependent on its resources for the foreseeable future: ‘America wants to discourage those powers from developing the means to protect that resource for themselves.’ Much of US power is built on the back of the most profitable protection #racket in modern history.

    [...]

    It is difficult to overstate the role of the Gulf in the way the world is currently run. In recent years, under both Obama and Trump, there has been talk of plans for a US withdrawal from the Middle East and a ‘#pivot’ to Asia. If there are indeed such plans, it would suggest that recent US administrations are ignorant of the way the system over which they preside works.

    The Arab Gulf states have proved well-suited to their status as US client states, in part because their populations are small and their subjugated working class comes from Egypt and South Asia. [...] There are occasional disagreements between Gulf rulers and their Western counterparts over oil prices, but they never become serious. [...] The extreme conservatism of the Gulf monarchies, in which there is in principle no consultation with the citizenry, means that the use of oil sales to prop up Western economies – rather than to finance, say, domestic development – is met with little objection. Wearing describes the modern relationship between Western governments and the Gulf monarchs as ‘asymmetric interdependence’, which makes clear that both get plenty from the bargain. Since the West installed the monarchs, and its behaviour is essentially extractive, I see no reason to avoid describing the continued Anglo-American domination of the Gulf as #colonial.

    Saudi Arabia and the other five members of the Gulf Co-operation Council are collectively the world’s largest buyer of military equipment by a big margin. [...]. The deals are highly profitable for Western arms companies (Middle East governments account for around half of all British arms sales), but the charge that Western governments are in thrall to the arms companies is based on a misconception. Arms sales are useful principally as a way of bonding the Gulf monarchies to the Anglo-American military. Proprietary systems – from fighter jets to tanks and surveillance equipment – ensure lasting dependence, because training, maintenance and spare parts can be supplied only by the source country. Western governments are at least as keen on these deals as the arms industry, and much keener than the Gulf states themselves. While speaking publicly of the importance of fiscal responsibility, the US, Britain and France have competed with each other to bribe Gulf officials into signing unnecessary arms deals.

    Control of the Gulf also yields less obvious benefits. [...] in 1974, the US Treasury secretary, William Simon, secretly travelled to Saudi Arabia to secure an agreement that remains to this day the foundation of the dollar’s global dominance. As David Spiro has documented in The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony (1999), the US made its guarantees of Saudi and Arab Gulf security conditional on the use of oil sales to shore up the #dollar. Under Simon’s deal, Saudi Arabia agreed to buy massive tranches of US Treasury bonds in secret off-market transactions. In addition, the US compelled Saudi Arabia and the other Opec countries to set oil prices in dollars, and for many years Gulf oil shipments could be paid for only in dollars. A de facto oil standard replaced gold, assuring the dollar’s value and pre-eminence.

    For the people of the region, the effects of a century of AngloArabia have been less satisfactory. Since the start of the war in Yemen in 2015 some 75,000 people have been killed, not counting those who have died of disease or starvation. In that time Britain has supplied arms worth nearly £5 billion to the Saudi coalition fighting the Yemeni Houthis. The British army has supplied and maintained aircraft throughout the campaign; British and American military personnel are stationed in the command rooms in Riyadh; British special forces have trained Saudi soldiers fighting inside Yemen; and Saudi pilots continue to be trained at RAF Valley on Anglesey. The US is even more deeply involved: the US air force has provided mid-air refuelling for Saudi and Emirati aircraft – at no cost, it emerged in November. Britain and the US have also funnelled weapons via the UAE to militias in Yemen. If the Western powers wished, they could stop the conflict overnight by ending their involvement. Instead the British government has committed to the Saudi position. As foreign secretary, Philip Hammond pledged that Britain would continue to ‘support the Saudis in every practical way short of engaging in combat’. This is not only complicity but direct participation in a war that is as much the West’s as it is Saudi Arabia’s.

    The Gulf monarchies are family dictatorships kept in power by external design, and it shows. [...] The main threat to Western interests is internal: a rising reminiscent of Iran’s in 1979. To forestall such an event, Britain equips and trains the Saudi police force, has military advisers permanently attached to the internal Saudi security forces, and operates a strategic communications programme for the Saudi National Guard (called Sangcom). [...]

    As Wearing argues, ‘Britain could choose to swap its support for Washington’s global hegemony for a more neutral and peaceful position.’ It would be more difficult for the US to extricate itself. Contrary to much of the commentary in Washington, the strategic importance of the Middle East is increasing, not decreasing. The US may now be exporting hydrocarbons again, thanks to state-subsidised shale, but this has no effect on the leverage it gains from control of the Gulf. And impending climate catastrophe shows no sign of weaning any nation from fossil fuels , least of all the developing East Asian states. US planners seem confused about their own intentions in the Middle East. In 2017, the National Intelligence Council described the sense of neglect felt by the Gulf monarchies when they heard talk of the phantasmagorical Asia pivot. The report’s authors were profoundly negative about the region’s future, predicting ‘large-scale violence, civil wars, authority vacuums and humanitarian crises persisting for many years’. The causes, in the authors’ view, were ‘entrenched elites’ and ‘low oil prices’. They didn’t mention that maintenance of both these things is US policy.

    #etats-unis #arabie_saoudite #pétrole #moyen_orient #contrôle

  • Can Islamist moderates remake the politics of the Muslim world? - CSMonitor.com

    https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/0919/Can-Islamist-moderates-remake-the-politics-of-the-Muslim-world

    By Taylor Luck Correspondent

    AMMAN, JORDAN; TUNIS, TUNISIA; KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA
    Alaa Faroukh insists he is the future. After nearly a decade in the Muslim Brotherhood, he says that he has finally found harmony between his faith and politics, not as a hardcore Islamist, but as a “Muslim democrat.”

    “We respect and include minorities, we fight for women’s rights, we respect different points of view, we are democratic both in our homes and in our politics – that is how we honor our faith,” Mr. Faroukh says.

    The jovial psychologist with a toothy smile, who can quote Freud as easily as he can recite the Quran, is speaking from his airy Amman clinic, located one floor below the headquarters of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the very movement he left.

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    “The time of divisive politics of older Islamists is over, and everyone in my generation agrees,” says the 30-something Faroukh. “The era of political Islam is dead.”

    Faroukh is symbolic of a shift sweeping through parts of the Arab world. From Tunisia to Egypt to Jordan, many Islamist activists and some established Islamic organizations are adopting a more progressive and moderate tone in their approach to politics and governing. They are reaching out to minorities and secular Muslims while doing away with decades-old political goals to impose their interpretation of Islam on society.

    Taylor Luck
    “The time of divisive politics of older Islamists is over, and everyone in my generation agrees. The era of political Islam is dead,” says Alaa Faroukh, a young Jordanian who left the Muslim Brotherhood for a moderate political party.
    Part of the move is simple pragmatism. After watching the Muslim Brotherhood – with its call for sharia (Islamic law) and failure to reach out to minorities and secular Muslims – get routed in Egypt, and the defeat of other political Islamic groups across the Arab world, many Islamic activists believe taking a more moderate stance is the only way to gain and hold power. Yet others, including many young Muslims, believe a deeper ideological shift is under way in which Islamist organizations are increasingly recognizing the importance of religious tolerance and political pluralism in modern societies. 

    Think you know the Greater Middle East? Take our geography quiz.
    While Islamist movements remain the largest and most potent political movement in the region, a widespread adoption of democratic principles by their followers could transform the discourse in a region where politics are often bound to identity and are bitterly polarized.

    “We believe that young Jordanians and young Arabs in general see that the future is not in partisan politics, but in cooperation, understanding, and putting the country above petty party politics,” says Rheil Gharaibeh, the moderate former head of the Jordanian Brotherhood’s politburo who has formed his own political party.

    Is this the beginning of a fundamental shift in the politics of the Middle East or just an expedient move by a few activists?

    *

    Many Islamist groups say their move to the center is a natural step in multiparty politics, but this obscures how far their positions have truly shifted in a short time.

    Some 20 years ago, the manifesto of the Muslim Brotherhood – the Sunni Islamic political group with affiliates across the Arab world – called for the implementation of sharia and gender segregation at universities, and commonly employed slogans such as “Islam is the solution.”

    In 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings swept these Islamist movements into power or installed them as the leading political force from the Arab Gulf to Morocco, sparking fears of an Islamization of Arab societies.

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    But instead of rolling back women’s rights, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda pushed through gender equality laws and helped write the most progressive, gender-equal constitution in the Arab world. The Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD) has played down its Islamic rhetoric, abandoning talk of Islamic identity and sharia and instead speaking about democratic reform and human rights. And the Brotherhood in Jordan traded in its slogan “Islam is the solution” for “the people demand reform” and “popular sovereignty for all.”

    The past few years have seen an even more dramatic shift to the center. Not only have Islamist movements dropped calls for using sharia as a main source of law, but they nearly all now advocate for a “civil state”­ – a secular nation where the law, rather than holy scriptures or the word of God, is sovereign.

    Muhammad Hamed/Reuters
    Supporters of the National Alliance for Reform rally in Amman, Jordan, in 2016. They have rebranded themselves as a national rather than an Islamic movement.
    In Morocco and Jordan, Islamist groups separated their religious activities – preaching, charitable activities, and dawa (spreading the good word of God) – from their political branches. In 2016, Ennahda members in Tunisia went one step further and essentially eliminated their religious activities altogether, rebranding themselves as “Muslim democrats.”

    Islamist moderates say this shift away from religious activities to a greater focus on party politics is a natural step in line with what President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has done with his Justice and Development Party in Turkey, or even, they hope, with the Christian democrats in Europe: to become movements inspired by faith, not governing through faith.

    “While we are a Muslim country, we are aware that we do not have one interpretation of religion and we will not impose one interpretation of faith over others,” says Mehrezia Labidi, a member of the Tunisian Parliament and Ennahda party leader. “As Muslim democrats we are guided by Islamic values, but we are bound by the Constitution, the will of the people, and the rule of law for all.”

    Experts say this shift is a natural evolution for movements that are taking part in the decisionmaking process for the first time after decades in the opposition.

    “As the opposition, you can refuse, you can criticize, you can obstruct,” says Rachid Mouqtadir, professor of political science at Hassan II University in Casablanca, Morocco, and an expert in Islamist movements. “But when you are in a coalition with other parties and trying to govern, the parameters change, your approach changes, and as a result your ideology changes.”

    The trend has even gone beyond the borders of the Arab world. The Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM), founded in 1971 by Malaysian university students inspired by the Brotherhood and now one of the strongest civil society groups in the country, is also shedding the “Islamist” label.

    In addition to running schools and hospitals, ABIM now hosts interfaith concerts, partners on projects with Christians and Buddhists, and even reaches out to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender activists in its campaign for social justice.

    “We are in the age of post-political Islam,” says Ahmad Fahmi Mohd Samsudin, ABIM vice president, from the movement’s headquarters in a leafy Kuala Lumpur suburb. “That means when we say we stand for Islam, we stand for social justice and equality for all – no matter their faith or background.”

    *

  • L’émir du Qatar à Rouhani : nos relations sont profondes et solides et nous devons les renforcer encore.

    الميادين | الأخبار - أمير قطر في اتصال مع روحاني : علاقتنا عريقة ومتينة ونريد تعزيزها أكثر
    http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/57861/أمير-قطر-في-اتصال-مع-روحاني--علاقتنا-عريقة-ومتينة-ونريد-تعزي

    Assez logiquement, le Qatar, subissant les attaques (médiatiques pour l’heure) de l’Arabie saoudite (+ Bahreïn, Emirats, Egypte et un peu Koweït) se tourne vers l’Iran...

    Une version très proche en espagnol : Irán y Qatar dispuestos a reforzar cooperación bilaterales
    http://espanol.almayadeen.net/news/pol%C3%ADtica/11898/ir%C3%A1n-y-qatar-dispuestos-a-reforzar-cooperaci%C3%B3n-bilater

    • Qatar must choose sides over Iran | The National
      http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/qatar-must-choose-sides-over-iran

      (Site des émirats)

      Gulf leaders who have spent the past few days irritated at Qatar over the emir’s reported comments will have been incensed to wake up yesterday morning and find that Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani had decided to take a widely publicised phone call from a regional leader – the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. When so much of politics is conducted by signals, what sort of message does that send? In truth, much the same message as Qatar has been sending for some time now. That, rather than see itself as part of the GCC, it wishes to remain neutral, half in the Arab Gulf camp, half in Iran’s camp. Actually, the willingness to accept a phone call from Mr Rouhani at this moment would seem to position Qatar further on that side. It shows either a shocking unwillingness to understand his Gulf neighbours – or a dangerous naivete that has allowed Sheikh Tamim to be used by Iran for publicity purposes.

  • The Debate Over Syria Has Reached a Dead End | The Nation
    https://www.thenation.com/article/the-debate-over-syria-has-reached-a-dead-end

    The first narrative asserts the purity and consistency of a revolution that started in 2011. This revolution, the narrative goes, seeks the removal of a brutal dictatorship in favor of a more accountable and just order. Many of its adherents recognize the problem of militarization and radicalization in the uprising, and even of problematic external interventions on that side. However, such dynamics are not allowed to impinge on the nature of the revolution. In this view, no degree of militarization, radicalization, or sectarianism of the uprising is enough to fundamentally change its potential in securing a more accountable and just order in Syria. This narrative thus acknowledges that various jihadists are practically spearheading the fight against the Assad regime on the battlefield. Yet it simultaneously either denounces their worldview or writes them off as a product of repression, in both cases distancing “the revolution” from jihadists. This narrative may also decry the subordination of the official representatives of the revolution to Arab Gulf states and Turkey, and by connection the United States, including their role in funding or facilitating the entry of jihadists into Syria. Yet it does not recognize the implications of doing so. The revolution is always said to be able to emerge unscathed, and rejection of this claim is dismissed as akin to betrayal.
    The second narrative acknowledges the regime’s repression, but sees only external conspiracy and internal jihadists.
    The second narrative recognizes the repression of the regime and the need for change. Its adherents often even recognize the legitimacy of protest, at least in theory. Yet when it comes to the actual uprising, they only see external conspiracy and internal jihadists. In this narrative, the rest of the protesters either fade into an irrelevant background or are brought to the fore as stooges of problematic external actors. Accordingly, there are no secular, anti-imperialist Syrians who are still working, one way or another, to overthrow the regime. They either do not exist or are too few to be counted. Concomitantly, this narrative makes the regime’s destruction of Syria less visible by its descriptive privileging of the imperialist forces that benefit from such destruction. Some go so far as to put the regime’s scale of destruction on par with that of the much weaker rebels. In this view, Syria is not only a theater for regional and international conflict; it is also where external designs must be defeated, no matter the cost to Syrians themselves. Participating in the opposition thus becomes a form of betrayal against anti-imperialism (and the nation itself).

    Both narratives fail to recognize the legitimate aspects of their counterpart. Adherents of both narratives refuse to allow facts and developments to alter their views. Both adopt hypocritical stances regarding intervention. According to the first narrative, US intervention is good only if it is against the regime. For the second narrative, external intervention is good if it supports the regime—Russia is not imperialist, but the United States is, the argument goes. For the first narrative, the potential dangers resulting from state collapse is a moot point. Yet for the second narrative, state collapse is unacceptable no matter how bad things get. On the question of state collapse (as distinguished from regime overthrow), neither position is based on weighted analysis or a consideration of consequences. Instead, both start with an assumption about which side must be defeated, and both reverse-engineer the argument that suits that end. Usually, the first narrative is associated with the West and the second narrative with the regime, with all sorts of “incriminating” implications. And finally, neither side seems open to compromise: Nothing less than complete defeat of either the regime or the opposition is acceptable, forfeiting thereby a number of potential exits from the mayhem.

  • IS received secret funding from Gulf states : British parliament report | Middle East Eye
    http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/received-secret-funding-gulf-states-british-parliament-report-conclud

    A British parliamentary report released on Tuesday has concluded there is “historical evidence” the Islamic State (IS) group received funding from within Arab Gulf states.

    In evidence submitted to the foreign affairs select committee, the Ministry of Defence said: “[There] is historical evidence of financial donations to Daesh [IS] from within Gulf states. Furthermore, it is understood that family donations are being made to Daesh, through the unregulated Alternative Value Transfer Systems (AVTS).”

    AVTS include ways of globally transferring money that includes little information about the individuals involved in the transaction – examples include the open source online currency Bitcoin.

    Au cas où certains l’ignoreraient encore... #syrie

  • Nasrallah accuses rivals of conspiring against Hezbollah in support of Israel
    http://yalibnan.com/2016/05/25/nasrallah-accuses-rivals-of-conspiring-against-hezbollah-in-support-of-isr

    ddressing the Palestinian people, Hezbollah’s chief said : “Beware of those who are trying to take advantage of the current ambiguities in the region in order to turn Israel into a friend and ally. Beware and do not count on those who have let you down for 70 years.”

    “You won’t receive any support or good things from them and your only salvation lies in your unity and perseverance,” he said, referring to Arab Gulf countries.

    “The axis of resistance will not be defeated in the ongoing battle in the region. It will emerge victorious and the banner of Palestine will be raised again. The only conflict in the region will be over the Palestinian cause,” vowed the Iranian backed leader .

  • L’Egypte a suffisamment de pétrole (essence, etc) pour couvrir ses besoins jusqu’à la fin de l’année ? | Al Bawaba
    http://www.albawaba.com/business/gasoline-egypt--528001

    Egypt’s petroleum products supply is sufficient until the end of the current year due to Arab Gulf aid and available funds for imports, state-owned Al-Ahram daily newspaper reported Sunday.

    #oil

  • Twelve men to be executed by Libyan militia for allegedly being gay « MasterAdrian’s Weblog
    http://masteradrian.com/2012/11/26/twelve-men-to-be-executed-by-libyan-militia-for-allegedly-being-gay

    Twelve men to be executed by Libyan militia for allegedly being gay
    An extremist Salafist militia in Libya captured twelve men promising to mutilate and kill them for allegedly being gay
    25 November 2012 | By Dan Littauer
    A Libyan militia threatens to mutilate and kill 12 allegedly gay men

    Twelve men face mutilation and execution for allegedly being gay after being captured by an extremist Libyan Islamist militia.

    The twelve men were, apparently, having a private party in Ain Zara, a suburb of Tripoli, the country’s capital, when the militia captured them, late on Thursday night (22 November).

    The group boasted by posting the pictures of the men on Facebook, describing them as the ‘third sex’ (a term used in the Arab Gulf area to denote ‘queers’) including one of the men who had a henna ‘tattoo’ on his back.

    One of the pictures was accompanied by the Quranic call ‘there is no power but the power of Allah!’

    At the time of writing, the picture of the men received 121 likes, 118 shares, and mainly violent comments such as ‘flog them hard!’, ‘let them see bullets!’, ‘free Libya! [I.e. From gays]’, ‘ride them like camels’ and so on.

    Human Rights Watch Libya left a comment saying the organization hopes the men will not be treated inhumanely and called upon the militia to hand the men to the civil authorities (the comment received no likes).

    The militia Facebook page entitled as the ‘special deterrence unit’ boasted that the men were captured doing the ‘practices of the people of Lot’ (I.e. Gay sex) and that they are to be mutilated and executed.

    The militia also claim they have now become a legal part of the Libyan Ministry of Interior.

    The group states its mission is to remove ‘corruption’, ‘vice’, alcoholic drinks and now gays from the streets of Libya.

    Human Rights Watch Libya identified the group as the Al-Nawasi militia, who are considered to be extreme Salafists.

    The militia has been previously been reported as being responsible for attacks against Sufi (moderate form of Islam) shrines and followers.

    Gay Star News has, so far, not been able to independently verify the reports.

    Speaking with Gay Star News, a Libyan LGBT activist nicknamed Khaleed stated: ‘We never had any gay nightclubs in Libya, so it is not uncommon for Libyans – straight, bisexual and gay men to party in a private space, drink, dance, have fun and sometimes even have sex.

    ‘That fact that they were captured by this extreme Salafist militia is very worrying.

    ‘The situation for LGBT people after the revolution generally improved, people can meet each other more easily than under the Qadaffi [Gadaffi] regime, although, of course we still have to be very discreet and careful.

    ‘Many of us fear that some of the militias [there are over 250 of them in the country], which are extreme Islamists who are very well armed and financed, will focus on the LGBT community and hunt us down.

    ‘The police is largely absent or powerless so Libyan civil society has a real problem; the militias often take the law onto their own hands.

    ‘That the Al Nawasi militia claims they are now part of the Ministry of Interior is very worrying; this move should be unacceptable to the public and to civil society groups.’

  • Twelve men to be executed by Libyan militia for allegedly being gay
    An extremist Salafist militia in Libya captured twelve men promising to mutilate and kill them for allegedly being gay
    25 November 2012 | By Dan Littauer
    A Libyan militia threatens to mutilate and kill 12 allegedly gay men

    Twelve men face mutilation and execution for allegedly being gay after being captured by an extremist Libyan Islamist militia.

    The twelve men were, apparently, having a private party in Ain Zara, a suburb of Tripoli, the country’s capital, when the militia captured them, late on Thursday night (22 November).

    The group boasted by posting the pictures of the men on Facebook, describing them as the ‘third sex’ (a term used in the Arab Gulf area to denote ‘queers’) including one of the men who had a henna ‘tattoo’ on his back.

    One of the pictures was accompanied by the Quranic call ’there is no power but the power of Allah!’

    At the time of writing, the picture of the men received 121 likes, 118 shares, and mainly violent comments such as ‘flog them hard!’, ‘let them see bullets!’, ‘free Libya! [I.e. From gays]’, ‘ride them like camels’ and so on.

    Human Rights Watch Libya left a comment saying the organization hopes the men will not be treated inhumanely and called upon the militia to hand the men to the civil authorities (the comment received no likes).

    The militia Facebook page entitled as the ‘special deterrence unit’ boasted that the men were captured doing the ‘practices of the people of Lot’ (I.e. Gay sex) and that they are to be mutilated and executed.

    The militia also claim they have now become a legal part of the Libyan Ministry of Interior.

    The group states its mission is to remove ‘corruption’, ‘vice’, alcoholic drinks and now gays from the streets of Libya.

    Human Rights Watch Libya identified the group as the Al-Nawasi militia, who are considered to be extreme Salafists.

    The militia has been previously been reported as being responsible for attacks against Sufi (moderate form of Islam) shrines and followers.

    Gay Star News has, so far, not been able to independently verify the reports.

    Speaking with Gay Star News, a Libyan LGBT activist nicknamed Khaleed stated: ‘We never had any gay nightclubs in Libya, so it is not uncommon for Libyans - straight, bisexual and gay men to party in a private space, drink, dance, have fun and sometimes even have sex.

    ‘That fact that they were captured by this extreme Salafist militia is very worrying.

    ‘The situation for LGBT people after the revolution generally improved, people can meet each other more easily than under the Qadaffi [Gadaffi] regime, although, of course we still have to be very discreet and careful.

    ‘Many of us fear that some of the militias [there are over 250 of them in the country], which are extreme Islamists who are very well armed and financed, will focus on the LGBT community and hunt us down.

    ‘The police is largely absent or powerless so Libyan civil society has a real problem; the militias often take the law onto their own hands.

    ‘That the Al Nawasi militia claims they are now part of the Ministry of Interior is very worrying; this move should be unacceptable to the public and to civil society groups.’

  • GCC Hasbara: “Zionist-y Rhetoric” Pervades Reporting on Gaza War
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/boxes-briefs/gcc-hasbara-%E2%80%9Czionist-y-rhetoric%E2%80%9D-pervades-reporti

    Media commentators in the Arab Gulf and beyond are using social media to push the press there to be more aggressive in its Gaza coverage, as most major outlets tried to remain as circumspect as possible.

    Twitter on Thursday was rife with criticism over Gulf media reactions to Israel’s assault on Gaza – particularly that of al-Arabiya, much of it aired under the hashtag tafkeek al-khitab al-mutasahien (dismantling the Zionist-y rhetoric).

    Print coverage of the attacks on Gaza focused on official condemnations from the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab leaders, but conspicuously avoided evocative details from the ground or mentions of popular reactions. Yet again, the GCC states have gotten themselves in an awkward position and are hoping media scrutiny of Israel’s war in Palestine will not widen to include their own role in contributing to the current crisis.

  • Reform in Arab Gulf regimes is unattainable – for now | Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jan/26/reform-arab-gulf-regimes-unattainable?cat=commentisfree&type=article

    Much has been said over the past 12 months about the need for reform and democratisation by Arab Gulf governments. While it is evident that Gulf governments have an aversion to genuine democratic reform, it is far too simplistic to put the blame for political stagnation squarely on them. For behind these governments is a network of interests so powerful and intricately woven that it acts as a resistance lever even in the rare instances where serious political reform is suggested.