• #Portogallo: Odair Moniz ucciso dalla polizia
    https://radioblackout.org/2024/10/portogallo-odair-moniz-ucciso-dalla-polizia

    In Portogallo sono proseguite diverse giornate di manifestazione e notti di rivolta contro la violenza della polizia, dopo che un uomo di 43 anni originario di Capo Verde, Odair Moniz, è stato ucciso da un poliziotto. Nei giorni che hanno seguito l’omicidio, sono stati molti i tentativi da parte della polizia di ricamare attorno a […]

    #L'informazione_di_Blackout ##odair_muniz #black_lives_matter
    https://cdn.radioblackout.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/lisbona.mp3

  • Border externalisation: billions of euros, visa sanctions, and a wealth of documentation

    The second edition of the bulletin, published with migration-control.info, includes analyses of multi-billion increases in the EU’s budgets for border externalisation (https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/a-bottomless-pit-billions-more-euros-for-externalised-border-controls) and the growing use of visa sanctions to coax third states into cooperating with EU deportations (https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/visa-sanctions-to-increase-deportations).

    It also includes an extensive update to the document archive, with almost two dozen documents from the secretive Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration, MOCADEM (mécanisme de coordination opérationnelle pour la dimension extérieure des migrations).

    Many of the documents added to the archive have been summarised in the bulletin’s section on thematic and regional developments, intended to provide a useful overview of key issues, themes and events.

    However, there is more in the documents than can be summarised there, and readers are advised to dig into the documents for themselves.

    The bulletin editorial (https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/editorial) looks at the Council of the EU’s stubborn refusal to grant the European Parliament any right of democratic scrutiny over the workings of MOCADEM.

    The next issue of the bulletin will be published at the end of September.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/july/border-externalisation-billions-of-euros-visa-sanctions-and-a-wealth-of-

    #externalisation #frontières #migrations #business #visa #sanctions #pays-tiers #réfugiés #visas

    • A bottomless pit: billions more euros for externalised border controls

      In view of the recently concluded mid-term review of the EU’s budget, funding for the externalisation of migration control has been at the top of the political agendas of EU member states and institutions. In the words of the European Commission and the European External Action Service, funding “ensure[s] that the actions undertaken… continue delivering results.” A substantial increase in the EU budget is on the cards, at the same time as a possible shift towards a supposedly new “preventive model” for external migration control.

      Funding externalisation under the 2021-2027 EU budget

      Under the current budget, EU border externalisation initiatives are funded through three Commission Directorate-Generals: Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). They oversee a variety of different funds that, either in whole or in part, provide what in EU jargon is called “external funding” – that is, funding for projects outside EU territory.

      DG NEAR is responsible for the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) as well as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (#NDICI) funds earmarked for the EU’s “neighbourhood.” DG INTPA administers NDICI funds which are destined for countries beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. This fund, also referred to as “Global Europe,” channels the biggest share of external funding.

      DG HOME is responsible for the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (#AMIF), the Border Management and Visa Instrument (#BMVI), and the Internal Security Fund (#ISF). With regard to externalisation, the AMIF focuses “on supporting actions that are not development-oriented and serve the interest of internal Union policies.” The ISF focuses on enhancing cooperation with third countries “in areas of relevance to the Union’s internal security,” including “combating cross-border criminal smuggling networks.” A report by Statewatch and the Transnational Institute explains in more detail how the home affairs funds finance border externalisation.

      Finally, certain agencies, such as Frontex, the European Asylum Agency (EUAA) and Europol, hold their own budgets which may be used for migration and border related projects beyond EU borders.

      NDICI: institutionalising “#containment_development

      NDICI is fundamental to the external dimension of EU migration control. With a budget of €79.5 billion, it replaces and merges ten different external funding instruments into one. It is the EU’s main development instrument and, as set out in the founding legislation, 93% of NDICI funds must comply with Official Development Assistance (#ODA) criteria, such as recipient country ownership. ODA is supposed to promote and specifically target the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

      At the same time, the NDICI Regulation sets a target for 10% of the total fund to be “dedicated particularly to actions supporting management and governance of migration and forced displacement.” As the Commission’s report on the use of external funding instruments for 2022 shows, 13.6% of the total committed in 2022 was dedicated to migration. This not only underscores the often-raised criticism of diverting development aid for migration control purposes, but also represents a risk to the integrity of ODA. Evaluations of funding under the NDICI by CeSPI and Oxfam have further cemented these concerns.

      Some of the projects funded under NDICI are a direct continuation of projects financed by the European #Trust_Fund for Africa (#EUTF), a €5 billion initiative launched in 2015 which fostered what has been termed the “containment” approach to development. Through this, development interventions for issues such as job creation or adaptation to climate change are based on the idea that addressing these “root causes” will diminish majority world citizens’ ambitions to move to Europe.

      A draft action file produced by the Council of the EU’s Operational Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration (MOCADEM) in January 2023 shows that NDICI is seen as a direct continuation of the EUTF. There is therefore an evident path dependency and normalisation of such migration-related interventions creeping into broader development aims.

      This instrumentalisation of development is further highlighted by the built-in “flexible incitative [sic] approach” of NDICI. This “positive” conditionality mechanism aims to reward countries for their willingness to engage in, for example, fighting against smuggling and trafficking or showing cooperation on deportation and readmission. However, making access to development aid conditional on migration control objectives has been criticised, not least because it goes against the EU’s own development principles and leads to ineffective assistance when funding does not go where it is most needed.

      For the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood”[1] there is a “Multi-Country Migration Programme for the Southern Neighbourhood” (MCMP) which is supposed to “provide a flexible source of funding”, allowing for special measures and “country-specific actions that… offer to selected countries an incentive to go beyond what their country MIP [multiannual indicative programme] offers, in line with a flexible incitative approach”. In Sub-Saharan Africa this approach is operationalised through the action “Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement”. However, there is a lack of transparency regarding what is funded under this mechanism, which has so far mobilised €200m, and how countries are selected to receive additional funding.

      Member states in the driving seat

      While civil society and the European Parliament lament a lack of oversight and transparency of NDICI projects, member states have increased their role through the “NDICI Coordination Group on Migration,” which was set up specifically for member states to oversee migration programming under the NDICI.

      Member states are also highly involved in the Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs). These are initiatives involving EU and national institutions and agencies “around which European funding instruments and modalities coalesce to bring a transformational impact“ in a selected priority area – one of which is irregular migration. NDICI projects are supposed to support these initiatives, but other funding methods and partners are also used.

      For example, the TEI on the Central Mediterranean brings together the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), along with 11 EU and Schengen member states,[2] which have together mobilised €1.13 billion in national and EU funding. The TEI on the Atlantic/Western Mediterranean Route is taken forward by the Commission and the EEAS, with nine EU and Schengen member states,[3] which have so far mobilised €908 million. Even if “Team Europe” is essentially a branding exercise, it is one which provides another way to create alliances for further externalising migration control.

      Mid-term review: more funding for migration control

      The mid-term review of the current EU budget, the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–27, was finalised this spring. It was launched by the Commission in June 2023, with the institution calling for an increase in the EU budget due to the economic situation and the war in Ukraine, which had “pushed the resources of the EU budget to the point of exhaustion.”

      Several important changes have been agreed. Earlier this year, the Council gave final approval to a total of €64.6 billion in additional funding, which was approved by the Parliament. Of this amount, €7.6 billion is for NDICI, aiming at, amongst other things, the “continuation of actions previously undertaken through the EU Trust Fund for Africa.”

      An additional €2 billion will go to the AMIF and BMVI funds, as well as the budget of the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA). This is to address “urgent challenges and needs related to migration and border management” and the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, including the heavily criticized border procedure.

      Finally, the maximum amount of the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) has been increased by €1.5 billion. This fund is dedicated to both natural disasters on European territories and natural disasters and humanitarian crises in non-EU states.

      A Spanish Council presidency paper discussed in the following section gives some indication of how the additional funding may be used.

      Spanish presidency paper: proposals to improve the “effectiveness” of externalisation funding

      A November 2023 document illustrates both the priorities of the Spanish Council presidency (in place from July-December 2023) and grants some insight into how the increased funding may be used. It builds on an earlier presidency paper that called for the necessity “to achieve more and better funding for the external dimension of migration.”

      The paper contains several suggestions to render internal EU coordination more efficient. It proposes strengthening existing Council working parties or establishing a new ad hoc Council mechanism to monitor the use of funds more closely. It also calls for more regular and systematic dissemination of information on externalisation funding, including the improvement of online databases such as the Financial Transparency System (FTS) and EU Aid Explorer.

      A “migration marker” used by EU officials to track the use of NDICI funds for migration purposes could be extended to other funds, the paper suggests. It also strongly emphasises the need for more “executive and short-term funding mechanisms” to prevent irregular migration, and highlights that the development objective of NDICI restrains the more operational needs required for a “preventive model”.

      The Spanish presidency’s proposed “preventive model” (a term coined in September 2023) deviates from the more common, but equally contested, understanding of a preventive approach that focuses on “root causes”. Instead, it is primarily concerned with operational border and migration management efforts in non-EU states: for example, the purchase of vehicles, vessels, and surveillance equipment; or meeting the needs of forcibly displaced persons hosted by partner countries. To back up this approach, the paper says EU member states “should consider the possibilities of strengthening other funding tools of our external dimension toolbox.”

      Whose crisis?

      According to the Spanish Presidency, a “preventive approach” is necessary because longer-term actions focusing on root causes both fail to “effectively address the migration crises that have already erupted” and “to prevent impending crises that are building up.” This framing overshadows the structural reasons that cause “crises” to emerge in the first place and demonstrates the productivity of crisis labelling.

      Firstly, labelling something as a “migration crisis” shifts the focus from the humanitarian crises produced by the absence of safe and legal pathways to a perceived crisis of state sovereignty. In doing so, it silences the fact that migrants encounter crises on their journeys, which are themselves the result of restrictive migration governance and the absence of legal pathways.

      Secondly, crisis and emergency framing has been used by EU agencies and member states to derogate from legal norms and safeguards. An emphasis on operational cooperation with third states is likely to enhance this trend.

      Thirdly, EU-funded border and migration control capacities in non-EU countries are likely to aggravate the very crises they aim to solve – rendering available pathways more dangerous without significantly reducing migration. This possibility is particularly concerning given the use of the “more for more principle,” heralded by the Spanish presidency as ensuring “genuine involvement of partner countries.” Ultimately, this means that more financial, material and other resources are given to the countries most willing to cooperate in the EU’s migration containment agenda.

      Putting “capacity building” into perspective

      The Spanish presidency’s emphasis on operational support and the “more for more principle” are not new. Two decades ago, the EU set up its first financial instrument dedicated to the provision of financial and material support to non-EU countries for migration and border management operations. Meanwhile, the “more for more principle” was first introduced in 2011 under the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

      Since then, scholars have considered how this so-called capacity building has helped frame migration control initiatives as technocratic, neutral and apolitical. Other research has shown that it reproduces Eurocentric categories of migration governance that do not neatly map onto, for example, less state-centric notions of mobility in countries such as Niger. Further, research has warned of the possibility of it negatively affecting freedom of movement within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Finally, scholars have pointed to the often self-serving nature of capacity building as such, often profiting and being driven by the European (and global) border-industrial complex.

      Migration control considerations that require strengthening the security apparatus of partner states are a central element in capacity building initiatives. Strong concerns have been raised by journalists and rights groups. These concerns pertain to human rights abuses and a lack of scrutiny.

      EU funding for so-called migration management has resulted in pushbacks of refugees and migrant workers to the deserts of Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. Finally, rights groups have repeatedly warned over the negative human rights implications of some projects funded under the NDICI in Tunisia and Libya, especially those building the capacities of the Tunisian and Libyan coast guards. Furthermore, recurrent drownings have been reported at the hands of the Senegalese navy, which has received support from the EU and its member states, in particular Spain, for almost two decades.

      Concerns also relate to the question of who is being funded. For example, prior to the outbreak of the current civil war in Sudan, EU migration funds have reportedly indirectly supported the Rapid Support Forces. Another recurrent question raised by journalists pertains to the question of what (else) is happening with donated materials. In Senegal, vehicles donated by the EU through the EUTF were used to violently repress democratic protests in 2023.

      Finally, there is the collateral damage accepted by EU policy makers. These concerns have been raised strongly in regard to the EU’s anti-smuggling agenda in pre-coup Niger, but also more recently in the context of the EU- Mauritania deal and its linked support for capacity building. Here, observers have raised strong concerns over how these measures aggravate acute risks for the Afro-Mauritanian community, (further) inflaming racial tensions and social polarization in the country.

      Besides these concerns, shifting geopolitical alliances on the African continent also puts in question the future feasibility of the EU externalisation agenda. The ongoing political reconfigurations are likely to impact the EU’s ability to be an “agenda setter”. This is most starkly illustrated by the 2023 military coup in Niger which has resulted not only in the suspension of security cooperation and financial support to the country by the EU, but also the abrogation of the much-criticized 2015 law against migrant smuggling by the Nigerien government. In a statement announcing the repeal, the military government stated that the law “did not take into account the interests of Niger and its citizens.”

      Put differently, the shifting geopolitical context has enabled African states to challenge the EU and EU member states as hegemonic actors. Therefore, an additional question emerges: whether the EU is at risk of undermining its relations with non-EU countries when it pushes them to adopt migration policies which contribute to the global racialized exclusion of their citizens, negatively affect local economies and lead to human insecurity.

      Besides the wider concerns raised above, policies that perpetuate longstanding asymmetric and unequal relations in the field of migration and beyond, are untenable in the longer term. Working towards establishing truly mutually beneficial relations is not only advisable but necessary. The emphasis on enhancing operational cooperation in the EU’s external migration and border management, mirrored both in the proposed MFF budget increase and the Spanish presidency paper, instead falls within the longer-term, broader logics of the increasingly challenged toolbox of EU security and migration control.

      Ways forward

      Billions more euros are being made available for EU migration and border control externalisation initiatives through the mid-term revision of the EU budget. The Spanish presidency paper offers a glimpse behind the scenes of the negotiations and offers some idea of what moving towards a “preventive approach”, centred around operational capacity-building, means in practice.

      While the risks of such an approach are not unknown, the key to challenging it is to build a better understanding of what is happening on the ground. To do so, European civil society needs to develop and reinforce alliances with partners in countries affected by EU policies, to enable joint challenges and confrontations to the externalisation agenda. Civil society may also make use of the concern of some member states – or, at least, the Spanish delegation – over the opacity of EU spending on externalisation. This may make it possible to exert pressure for more transparency of EU external migration funding and its translation into projects on the ground.

      Leonie Jegen and Zina Weisner for migration-control.info

      Notes

      [1] Encompassing Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.

      [2] Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland

      [3] Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland

      https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/a-bottomless-pit-billions-more-euros-for-externalised-border-controls

      #root_causes #causes_profondes #développement #réfugiés_syriens

    • Visa sanctions to increase deportations

      Changes to the EU’s rules on visa issuance that came into force in 2020 have made it possible for sanctions to be introduced against states that fail to cooperate with deportations. For example, non-EU states that consistently fail to provide identity documents for their own nationals facing deportation from the EU can have visa fees increased, or the examination of applications slowed down. The tool appears to be popular with EU institutions and member states, and changes are on the way to “improve” its functioning. This analysis examines the mechanism itself, measures proposed or adopted under the mechanism, and recent proposals to develop and reform the system, and considers the way in which the idea of “solidarity” (between EU member states and EU bodies) is used as a weapon against third countries.

      Visas: privilege and apartheid

      In May 2024 the Commission published figures indicating that 10.3 million worldwide short-stay visa applications were received by EU and Schengen-associated countries, a 37% increase compared to 2022’s 5.9 million applications, but much lower than the figure for 2019 (17 million). A similar pattern applies to the number of visas issued (8.5 million in 2023; 5.9 million in 2022; and 15 million in 2019), as the visa refusal rate declined slightly (from 17.9% in 2022 to 16% in 2023). Over half the visas issued in 2023 (54.2%) allowed multiple entry, compared to 58.1% in 2022, marking a slight decrease. In addition, 85,200 uniform visas were issued at external border points in 2023.

      The visa mechanism also operates within a context that has been criticised for establishing a situation of “passport privilege” and “visa apartheid”, particularly regarding Africans’ access to Europe and America. A 2020 study documented the experiences of Tunisians suffering from higher costs and more restrictive policies, and complaints about the costly, burdensome and discriminatory nature of EU visa procedures often arise from civil society groups in non-EU countries. For instance, in late 2022 high refusal rates for north Africans were criticised, and in November 2023 complaints emerged from Senegal about north-south discrimination, costs and profiteering practices linked to securing interviews and access to the procedure. The visa sanction mechanism outlined in this piece is likely to intensify such problems, yet this does not appear to have been considered amidst efforts to make cooperation between EU and non-EU states on deportation and readmission more “effective”.

      Article 25a: visa sanctions for deportations

      The EU’s longstanding push to increase deportations (“returns”, in official jargon) has seen efforts targeted at all parts of the deportation procedure. The possibility for visa sanctions introduced by article 25a of the Visa Code relates to readmission procedures: the political and bureaucratic guarantees required from non-EU states to enable the return and admission of their citizens removed from EU territory into their country, such as agreeing to accept deportations in the first place, the provision of identity documents for individuals, or landing permits for deportation flights.

      Article 25a(1) of the revised Visa Code establishes that insufficient cooperation by a non-EU state with readmission proceedings may entail a suspension of favourable measures for citizens of the country concerned that apply for Schengen visas. For example, the EU can choose to suspend:

      - fast-track procedures for applicants “known to the consulate or the central authorities for his integrity and reliability, in particular as regards the lawful use of previous visas” (article 14.6);
      - the waiving of visa fees for holders of diplomatic or service passports (article 16(5b));
      - the 15-day time limit for decisions on applications (article 23(1));
      - issuance of multi-entry visas (art. 24(2)) and five-year multi-entry visas (art. 24(2c))for all nationals.

      If the adoption of such measures fails to improve cooperation, higher visa fees (€120 or €160) for nationals of the third country in question (except for children under 12 years old) may be introduced.

      The procedure under article 25a lays out a framework for continuous monitoring of cooperation on readmission and returns, with the Commission obliged to produce an annual report for the Council’s consideration. The criteria to be considered include return decisions issued, forced returns, readmission requests accepted (by member state), assistance in identification, acceptance of an EU travel document or laissez-passer for returns, acceptance of people to be returned to their home country, of return flights and operations. Attention is also paid to how many third-country nationals residing illegally in EU territory have transited through a third country, and whether they accept returns of people who travelled through their territory.

      The intensive nature of this monitoring has led to member state complaints (see the “effectiveness of the visa leverage” section, below) about the administrative burden in relation to third states from which they have few visa applications and/or a low number of people subject to expulsion orders for illegal entry and stay. It must be noted that in the Visa Code itself, and in subsequent policy and discussion documents, third countries and their authorities feature merely as actors to be subjected to concerted pressure to secure cooperation.

      Proposals to date

      Since February 2020, when the Visa Code reform introduced the possibility to apply restrictive visa measures to third countries for inadequate cooperation on readmission, the Commission has tabled proposals concerning Iraq, Bangladesh, Senegal, The Gambia and Ethiopia. A document (17111/23) circulated by the Spanish Council presidency in January this year, for a meeting of the Council’s Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion (IMEX), summarised the history of each proposal.

      In the presidency paper, Iraq is repeatedly cited as an example of best practices. Adoption of a first proposal for restrictive visa measures in July 2021 was averted after constructive engagement by Iraq to help resolve the Belarus border crisis, although shortcomings in cooperation continued, as reported by member states. Measures were proposed again in 2022, and Iraq promised to cooperate in March 2023. In May 2023, Iraq announced that it had lifted a moratorium on accepting forced returns, flanked by outreach towards EU states and indication of a willingness to sign bilateral readmission agreements. The EU deadline thus slid to the October meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, when Iraqi willingness to conclude a non-binding EU-Iraq instrument on readmission and return resulted in the opening of a discussion, scheduled for January 2024.

      Restrictive visa measures were proposed for Bangladesh in July 2021. Improved cooperation levels resulted in the measures not being adopted, but member states insisted on keeping the proposal on the table until improvement with all member states was deemed sustainable, but the quality of cooperation was reported as having decreased “significantly” in 2022.

      In the case of Senegal, restrictive measures were proposed in November 2022 (and discussed in the Council’s Visa Working Party), alongside intense contacts and an improvement in cooperation with some member states, although the picture was mixed and the outcome of February 2024 elections was pending.

      Germany notified the Commission in February 2021 of “substantial and persisting practical problems” with The Gambia, and restrictive visa measures were proposed in July 2021 and adopted in October. A Commission report concluded that the measures had been ineffective despite limited improvements, leading to the proposal and adoption of an increased visa fee in November and December 2022. Cooperation in organising return flights and operations led to repeal of the visa fee measure in December 2023, but the original visa restriction measures were maintained due to insufficient overall cooperation on readmission (assistance in identification, timely issuing of travel documents, frequency of flights). Nevertheless, deportations to The Gambia have resumed, with Yahya Sonko, an advocate for the rights of Gambian migrants in Germany, recently said:

      “…deportations exacerbate the already challenging situation in The Gambia, where the government is struggling to manage high youth unemployment rates. The return of hundreds of citizens each year without adequate reintegration support only serves to worsen the socioeconomic conditions for deportees and their families.”

      In the case of Ethiopia, a Commission evaluation led to a proposal for visa sanctions in September 2023 (suspension of waiver of visa document requirement, of 15-day processing deadline, of multi-entry visa issuing and of visa fee waiver for diplomats and holders of service passports). The following month, a “note verbale” by the Ethiopian authorities announced resumption of the implementation of the 2018 readmission arrangement, alongside a request to renegotiate it. Discussion on the measures has taken place in the EU’s Visa Working Party, and The Commission proposed early 2024 meetings for the EU-Ethiopia working group. Significantly, acknowledgement of an armed conflict in northern Ethiopia from November 2021 to February 2022 did not interrupt these endeavours, nor bring into play considerations as to whether returns to Ethiopia may place people at risk, as reported return rates were low (10% in 2021 and 2022).

      Member states discuss a “new approach”

      In a document (5114/24) circulated for the January meeting of the Visa Working Party, the Spanish presidency proposed a “new approach” for the 25a procedure that would rejig the way in which internal EU discussions take place.

      The proposed approach suggests that introducing punitive visa measures be discussed in the Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion (IMEX) and MOCADEM (operational coordination mechanism for the external dimension of migration), with the Visa Working Party (VWP) only to be involved “at a later stage.” Thus, after an IMEX decision that lack of progress on readmission cooperation warrants adopting visa measures, the VWP would approve such measures and analyse other visa-related aspects.

      Alleged shortcomings in past Visa Working Party scrutiny are mentioned in the presidency document:

      “…the Visa WP has so far missed the opportunity to examine further the implications of the considered visa measures, especially when adopting visa sanctions towards The Gambia. Those ‘visa-related aspects’ to be discussed could include: the number of visas delivered by the Member States in the third country, the additional administrative burden to be expected and to be considered when deciding on the entry into force of the measures, the potential problems that could arise from the adoption of the measures, etc.”

      This appears to be an effort by member states and the Council to seize control of the mechanism and speed it up, as part of efforts to hold the Commission to deadlines to systematically issue visa restriction proposals and to speed up the cycle in pursuit of increased effectiveness (see below).

      A further discussion paper (17110/23) on the “Visa Code Article 25a exercise” was circulated by the presidency on 9 January, to prepare the IMEX working party meeting on 16 January (it was also reported on by Statewatch here). The paper reaffirms the purpose of the “visa leverage” provided by article 25a, as the “only legal tool at our disposal for all third countries to improve readmission cooperation.” The “external dimension” (that is, relations with non-EU states) is deemed crucial to increase the number of returns and ensure satisfactory cooperation by third states to readmit “illegally staying third country nationals vis-à-vis all Member States,” regardless of their caseload. Prioritisation of this objective in this semester requires a “strategic discussion” on the visa leverage’s effectiveness, says the document.

      The moving of preliminary discussions on the “state of play of outreach towards the relevant third countries and the developments in terms of cooperation on readmission” away from the VWP to the IMEX is also noted in the document, adding that this should “increase the coherence and the effectiveness of the mechanism.” Ensuring that the Commission has concrete deadlines to issue proposals on restrictive visa measures is viewed as potentially fruitful, and follow-up to proposals that are on the table are to be discussed within IMEX.

      Weaponising “solidarity” against third countries and a systematic adoption of visa measures

      The presidency document on “effectiveness of the visa leverage” (17110/23) contains a troubling assessment of the mechanism’s “credibility, strategy and solidarity.” Credibility requires “a search for the right and delicate balance between incentivizing cooperation by giving enough time and space for dialogue and taking restrictive visa measures when no real progress is observed.” Member states are required to act jointly, “in a true spirit of solidarity, which sometimes might mean prioritizing a wider European interest over the national interests.” Thus, even if progress with some member states is observed, this should not impede visa restriction measures unless it applies to all member states, regardless of caseloads.

      Member state requests to lessen administrative burdens by linking the information requested to the size of caseloads have led the Commission to adapt its data collection methods. A timeline adopted in December 2023 aims to reduce gaps between data collection, the Commission’s annual evaluation and subsequent visa measure proposals. The adoption of visa measures is deemed secondary to fostering progress in cooperation by third countries. As the presidency puts it, “[t]he power of the mechanism lies in the political message conveyed by the proposals, rather than the measures themselves,” strengthening the Commission’s credibility in outreach activities.

      Nonetheless, “the Presidency believes that the Commission should issue more proposals with regard to other relevant third countries not yet concerned by the proposals currently on the table”. The adoption of positive measures like reducing the visa fee from 80 to 60 euros, the deadline for a decision from 15 to 10 days, or increasing the duration of multiple entry visas also features in the article 25a mechanism, but none have been proposed to date, because the third countries identified already had more favourable visa regimes.

      Regarding the Commission’s selection of third countries to be targeted, the paper notes that having to consider the EU’s overall relations with the third country in question (rather than just cooperation on readmission) should not be treated as a “blocking element,” to prevent the mechanism becoming “inoperative towards some priority countries.” Following the Commission report, member states identify priority countries among those whose cooperation is deemed unsatisfactory, which fall into three categories: those facing visa restriction measures proposals; those not facing such proposals but identified by the Council as priorities; and those which do not face visa sanctions proposals and are not deemed priorities. Close scrutiny of all states that do not cooperate adequately is necessary, but its intensity should be tailored to their category, the presidency paper argues.

      The strategy section argues that the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) contribution to assessing the “third country national context” is crucial for taking decisions in an “enlightened manner,” and that member state involvement when the Commission prepares outreach and visits to third states enables “strategic decision-making.” The communication of clear deadlines to third country authorities is deemed a best practice, drawing on the example of Iraq. Failure to make progress would result in restrictive visa measures, allowing “the EU to put pressure on the third country in a transparent and precise way.” Dilatory tactics (“delays in the appointment of interlocutors or hindrances to meetings”) should not excuse delays in improving operational cooperation. Formal steps like the negotiation or extension of readmission agreements or arrangements should be deemed separate from “concrete progress on readmission cooperation on the ground,” without affecting cooperation evaluation deadlines.

      Regarding the stock of proposals for visa restriction measures under the article 25a mechanism, the management of existing proposals that have not been adopted for years could lead to the Commission withdrawing a proposal but, the presidency paper stresses, this should not be automatic. Moreover, the time that passes without substantial improvement should be a “decisive element” when considering adoption of a decision. Returns of third country nationals posing a security threat must be prioritised, requiring “smooth cooperation on identification, issuance of travel documents and readmission”, for which the article 25a mechanism could contribute to improvement.

      The final section on “solidarity” is striking, because it spells out the power play theme mentioned above. In fact, working as “Team Europe” in a coordinated way, “the message brought collectively is more influential and bears concrete results,” says the paper. Iraq is again cited as an example of success in this regard. The possibility provided by article 25a for a simple majority of member states to compel the Commission to submit proposals within 12 months (while continuing efforts to improve cooperation) has not been used to date. Yet, it is viewed as a “solution” to demonstrate “solidarity” among member states and to “send a strong signal to third countries.”

      Moreover, improving cooperation with some member states should not be deemed adequate to prevent adoption of restrictive visa measures towards a third country unless it applies to all member states regardless of caseloads. A united Council position to prioritise EU interests when outreach does not produce “substantial and sustainable progress” should adopt restrictive measures:

      “The importance of solidarity between Member States at this stage of the mechanism is a key element to further put the third country under pressure and also to ensure the credibility of the Article 25a mechanism.”

      Visa Code evaluation: speeding up cooperation on readmission

      Whilst member states were considering ways to enhance the implementation of article 25a, the Commission was undertaking a broader assessment of the EU’s Visa Code. The evaluation includes an examination of cooperation on return, readmission and migration management, which suggests that procedures should be accelerated to increase effectiveness.

      The main problem identified in the evaluation was the length of the cycles, which was deemed to have hindered accomplishment of the Visa Code reform’s three main goals (below). These are supposed to run annually but have previously exceeded a year in length, resulting in overlaps and faulty evaluation. Nevertheless, the Commission supports a need for flexibility to factor in different aspects to the discussion. The delay between approval of the Commission report and the submission of Commission proposals is identified as the main impediment. Seven member states, and the French and Czech Council presidencies, called for a shorter cycle to address these shortcomings.

      Discussions mentioned in the annual evaluation of the Visa Code include the involvement of different stakeholders and Eurostat and Frontex data used in the annual assessment report, which the EU Court of Auditors identified as containing “weaknesses” in 2021. Frontex has bemoaned the lack of a “robust, integrated electronic data collection system” in several member states, but it supports them in developing integrated return case management systems connected to a central hub operated by the agency, intended to improve data on removals and readmission. Despite member states putting mechanisms in place to temper such shortcomings and duly fill in the relevant questionnaire, they complain about the administrative burden involved.

      The overall evaluation on the three goals that motivated the Visa Code reform complains that:

      - visa fees did not fully cover administrative expenses incurred by member states for visa issuing;
      - an unclear legal basis has resulted in discrepancies and in most member states developing “restrictive practices when issuing multiple-entry visas” (MEVs); and
      - a lack of cooperation and “low levels of readmission and return of irregular migrants to countries of origin” persist.

      Strikingly, while the EEAS called for further involvement in providing expertise about the situation in third countries for the annual article 25a evaluation report (and three member states calling for more information on the political context), this was opposed by the Commission because “including this type of political analysis would detract from the current technical focus and factual nature of the reports.” Eurostat data is used regarding expulsion decisions and effective return rates, whereas Frontex data is used for readmission requests (by member states) and travel documents issued (by third countries). This apparently restricts the scope of the article 25a requirement for the Commission to take into account overall relations with a third state when deciding upon proposals for visa restriction measures. It also appears to exemplify efforts to subordinate the formal level (such as ensuring that deportations do not violate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) in cooperation with third countries to the operative level, squarely focused on achieving strategic migration policy goals (like higher rates of removal, regardless of other considerations).

      Single-minded approach

      The documents examined display a wilful lack of critical scrutiny of the mechanism (other than on the basis of achieving operational goals) and of assessment on proportionality based on the size of caseloads and on conditions in third countries that may mean that some deportations may be unsafe from a formal viewpoint. There appears to be a strong drive to improve “effectiveness” and to speed up the process to pressure third country authorities, even if this may worsen the quality of decision-making and limit the information and stakeholders involved. Only four years after the mechanism was first introduced, amidst admissions that it is burdensome, the Council and some member states already appear eager to pile on pressure to cooperate on targeted third countries and to limit the Commission’s margins of appreciation and initiative before imposing or threatening to impose restrictions to visa access for their citizens, for the sake of “effectiveness”.

      The idea of “solidarity” being used as a weapon to break a third country’s resistance to measures that may penalise their citizens – for example, by increasing the likelihood of them being targeted by police operations in the EU to enable deportations, to lessen remittances from abroad, or give rise to opposition by civil society – is not palatable. Moreover, successes and best practices that are highlighted may amount to the EU and its member states (as “Team Europe”) succeeding in achieving unlawful outcomes (in the case of returns that may place people at risk, for instance in Iraq and Ethiopia).

      Furthermore, the risk that good cooperation on readmission and returns may lead to unsafe third countries being declared “safe” to enable swift refusals of asylum and/or protection, linked to speedy returns at the operative level, may restrict access to protection for bona fide refugees and protection seekers. There is no guarantee that people may not be targeted by authorities and/or armed groups in target countries like Senegal and The Gambia, whereas the Bangladeshi example also brings the issue of potential climate refugees into the picture.

      https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/visa-sanctions-to-increase-deportations

  • Rapport thématique – Durcissements à l’encontre des Érythréen·ne·s : actualisation 2020

    Deux ans après une première publication sur la question (https://odae-romand.ch/rapport/rapport-thematique-durcissements-a-lencontre-des-erythreen%c2%b7ne%c2%b7), l’ODAE romand sort un second rapport. Celui-ci offre une synthèse des constats présentés en 2018, accompagnée d’une actualisation de la situation.

    Depuis 2018, l’ODAE romand suit de près la situation des requérant·e·s d’asile érythréen∙ne∙s en Suisse. Beaucoup de ces personnes se retrouvent avec une décision de renvoi, après que le #Tribunal_administratif_fédéral (#TAF) a confirmé la pratique du #Secrétariat_d’État_aux_Migrations (#SEM) amorcée en 2016, et que les autorités ont annoncé, en 2018, le réexamen des #admissions_provisoires de quelque 3’200 personnes.

    En 2020, le SEM et le TAF continuent à appliquer un #durcissement, alors que la situation des droits humains en #Érythrée ne s’est pas améliorée. Depuis près de quatre ans, les décisions de renvoi tombent. De 2016 à à la fin octobre 2020, 3’355 Érythréen·ne·s avaient reçu une décision de renvoi suite à leur demande d’asile.

    Un grand nombre de requérant·e·s d’asile se retrouvent ainsi débouté·e·s.

    Beaucoup des personnes concernées, souvent jeunes, restent durablement en Suisse, parce que très peu retournent en Érythrée sur une base volontaire, de peur d’y être persécutées, et qu’il n’y a pas d’accord de réadmission avec l’Érythrée. Au moment de la décision fatidique, elles perdent leur droit d’exercer leur métier ou de se former et se retrouvent à l’#aide_d’urgence. C’est donc à la constitution d’un groupe toujours plus important de jeunes personnes, exclues mais non renvoyables, que l’on assiste.

    C’est surtout en cédant aux pressions politiques appelant à durcir la pratique – des pressions renforcées par un gonflement des statistiques du nombre de demandes d’asile – que la Suisse a appréhendé toujours plus strictement la situation juridique des requérant∙e∙s d’asile provenant d’Érythrée. Sur le terrain, l’ODAE romand constate que ces durcissements se traduisent également par une appréciation extrêmement restrictive des motifs d’asile invoqués par les personnes. D’autres obstacles limitent aussi l’accès à un examen de fond sur les motifs d’asile. Au-delà de la question érythréenne, l’ODAE romand s’inquiète pour le droit d’asile au sens large. L’exemple de ce groupe montre en effet que l’application de ce droit est extrêmement perméable aux incitations venues du monde politique et peut être remaniée sans raison manifeste.

    https://odae-romand.ch/rapport/rapport-thematique-durcissements-a-lencontre-des-erythreen%c2%b7ne%c2%b7

    Pour télécharger le rapport :
    https://odae-romand.ch/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/RT_erythree_2020-web.pdf

    #rapport #ODAE_romand #Erythrée #Suisse #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_érythréens #droit_d'asile #protection #déboutés #permis_F #COI #crimes_contre_l'humanité #service_militaire #travail_forcé #torture #viol #détention_arbitraire #violences_sexuelles #accord_de_réadmission #réadmission #déboutés #jurisprudence #désertion #Lex_Eritrea #sortie_illégale #TAF #justice #audition #vraisemblance #interprètes #stress_post-traumatique #traumatisme #trauma #suspicion #méfiance #procédure_d'asile #arbitraire #preuve #fardeau_de_la_preuve #admission_provisoire #permis_F #réexamen #santé_mentale #aide_d'urgence #sans-papiers #clandestinisation #violence_généralisée

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • #Droit_au_séjour et #violences_conjugales et familiales

    Les #violences subies dans le cadre conjugale ou familial peuvent être prises en compte pour décider de l’octroi d’un #titre_de_séjour, de son renouvellement et, éventuellement, du droit au retour en #France en cas de #menace de #mariage_forcé.

    Face à l’ampleur du phénomène des violences faites aux femmes, les mesure législatives successives ne sont pas à la hauteur des besoins.

    Malgré la prise en compte de cette problématique dans les différentes réformes sur l’immigration, notamment la #loi_Collomb de 2018, de nombreuses femmes restent exclues de toute possibilité d’accès à un titre de séjour ou du renouvellement.

    L’#ordonnance_de_protection, qui permet l’octroi d’un titre de séjour à toutes les femmes victimes de violences conjugales et familiales, quelle que soit leur situation administrative, n’est malheureusement pas beaucoup utilisée.

    Cette note pratique s’attache à présenter les différents cas envisagés par la loi pour tenir compte des violences conjugales et familiales dans le cadre du droit au séjour des étrangers et des étrangères.

    https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article6292
    #violence_domestique #femmes #droit_de_séjour #migrations #étrangers #étrangères

    • Et un #rapport de l’#ODAE_romand (association en #Suisse) sur la même thématique (2016) :

      Femmes étrangères victimes de violences conjugales

      A l’occasion de la journée internationale des droits femmes, l’Observatoire romand du droit d’asile et des étrangers (ODAE romand) publie un nouveau rapport, en collaboration avec le groupe de travail « Femmes migrantes et violences conjugales ». Malgré l’importante avancée que constitue la modification de la Loi fédérale sur les étrangers, les femmes concernées ne sont toujours pas certaines d’obtenir le renouvellement de leur permis de séjour si elles quittent leur mari violent. Un grand nombre d’entre elles préfèrent donc taire les violences subies plutôt que de risquer un renvoi, parfois au péril de leur vie. Pour cette troisième édition, de nouveaux cas concrets ont été signalés à l’ODAE romand illustrant les différents aspects de cette problématique peu connue.

      https://odae-romand.ch/rapport/rapport-thematique-femmes-etrangeres-victimes-de-violences-conjugales-ob

  • L’Observatoire suisse publie un rapport sur le visa humanitaire

    Dans son nouveau rapport spécialisé intitulé « Visa humanitaire – Chemin de fuite sûr ou course d’obstacles ? », l’Observatoire suisse du droit d’asile et des étrangers montre les difficultés liées à la délivrance de visas humanitaires et propose des solutions concrètes.

    Ce rapport relève que les conditions d’octroi de ces visas sont trop restrictives et met en lumière les nombreux obstacles formels et techniques rencontrés par les personnes qui ont besoin de protection. Beaucoup d’entre elles restent dans des situations précaires et dangereuses ou doivent se résoudre à fuir dans des conditions difficiles, souvent au péril de leur vie.

    https://odae-romand.ch/breve/lobservatoire-suisse-publie-un-rapport-sur-le-visa-humanitaire
    #visa_humanitaire #Suisse #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #ODAE_romand

    Pour télécharger le rapport :


    https://odae-romand.ch/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Bericht_H_Visum_F.pdf

  • Absurde précarisation. Conditions d’asile durcies pour les Érythréen-ne-s
    https://asile.ch/2019/04/08/absurde-precarisation-conditions-dasile-durcies-pour-les-erythreen-ne-s

    Dans son rapport publié en novembre 2018, l’Observatoire romand du droit d’asile et des étrangers (ODAE romand) pointe les durcissements du droit d’asile qui visent actuellement les Érythréen-ne-s, le groupe le plus représenté dans le domaine de l’asile en Suisse et de ce fait, en proie à des attaques politiques depuis plusieurs années. Un nombre […]

  • Foreign Aid Keeps Flowing Under President Trump
    https://howmuch.net/articles/how-much-foreign-aid-world-receives-from-usa

    Foreign Aid Keeps Flowing Under President Trump

    President Trump loves to talk about cutting U.S. foreign aid, even if he doesn’t always follow through. What’s most often missed in media coverage about this debate is where American dollars are going, and the issues U.S. expenditures are meant to fix.

    Our latest visualization lays out a nice snapshot, revealing the handful of countries with most at stake in Trump’s threats to overseas aid.

    #oda #aides #états-unis

  • Mapping US Foreign Aid
    http://googlemapsmania.blogspot.fr/2016/03/mapping-us-foreign-aid.html

    The US government plans to spend $33.9 billion in foreign aid in the 2017 financial year. The money will provide foreign assistance to more than 100 countries around the world.

    You can learn which countries will benefit from foreign aid and how much will be spent in each country with the foreignassistance.gov Map of Foreign Assistance Worldwide. The map provides a choropleth view showing the amount of money in foreign assistance going to each country.

    If you select an individual country on the map you can view how much money the US plans to spend in foreign assistance in the country and in what areas. You can also click to download a breakdown of the data showing how the aid will be spent.

    The Map of Foreign Assistance Worldwide also allows you to explore where foreign assistance has been spent around the world in previous financial years and how that money was spent.

    avec les #données par pays
    http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore
    #cartographie #Afrique #aides #US

  • Des #communes s’allient pour réinventer la #citoyenneté
    http://www.lagazettedescommunes.com/433666/des-communes-sallient-pour-reinventer-la-citoyennete

    Permettre aux habitants de se réapproprier l’#espace_public. Recréer du lien social. C’est l’objectif des #Journées_citoyennes. Ces journées durant lesquelles les habitants d’une commune ou d’un quartier se mobilisent bénévolement pour réaliser des chantiers, qu’ils ont eux-mêmes proposés, dans le but d’améliorer leur cadre de vie.

    L’#Observatoire national de l’action sociale (#Odas) a organisé le 16 mars 2016, au Sénat, une rencontre permettant aux maires des communes disposant de ce dispositif, ou intéressés par l’initiative, de se retrouver et d’échanger. De s’entraider aussi. Et d’encourager les élus qui n’ont pas encore franchis le pas dans leur commune de se jeter à l’eau.

  • Transferts de fonds et aide au développement : les chiffres « un peu » honteux.

    Depuis plusieurs décennies, la communauté internationale n’arrive pas à « obliger » les nations riches à consacrer au moins 0,7 % de leur PIB à l’aide au développement, à quelques exceptions près : la Norvège, la Suède et la FInlande. C’est tout.

    Depuis quelques années, le montant des envois d’argent des travailleurs migrants dans leur pays d’origine dépassent très largement l’aide au développement, et l’écart se creuse. Quand aux IDE, c’est toujours relativement peu comparé aux fonds consacrés à la spéculation et aux produits dérivés : 600 milliards contre 720 000 milliards, soit 1200 fois plus pour la spéculation, ou 1200 fois moins pour le développement.

    #rémittances #transfert_de_fonds #migrations #aide_au_développement #ODA #IDE #investissement_direct_a-l_étranger

  • Uruguay : La morsure de Suarez analysée par un criminologue
    http://sports.orange.fr/football/uruguay-la-morsure-de-suarez-analysee-par-un-criminologue-newsweb-spor

    David Wilson, professeur de criminologie à l’université de Birmingham, a analysé la morsure polémique de l’Uruguayen Luis Suarez sur l’Italien Giorgio Chiellini, mardi lors du match de Coupe du monde entre les deux sélections (victoire de la Celeste 1-0). Sur son compte Twitter, il a déclaré :

    Pourquoi mordre ? L’#odaxelagnie (le fait de mordre) est une paraphilie - une forme légère de sadisme ; peut être utilisé pour exciter ou « marquer » un partenaire. c’est une expression physique de position dominante.

    et

    Le laps de temps entre les différents incidents de morsure suit le modèle criminologique classique. 28 mois entre l’incident 1 et 2 ; 15 mois entre le 2ème et le 3ème !

    a également tweeté le criminologue.

  • How loans are reported as development aid

    http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/107-links-and-resources/52566-how-loans-are-reported-as-development-aid.html

    A new report by Eurodad’s Stéphanie Colin deal with the issue of concessional loans in development finance. In the context of tighter budgets in OECD-DAC countries governments are looking for methods to increase official development assitance (ODA) levels without budgetary implications. One way of doing this is reporting a larger share of loans to developing countries as ODA.

    Other measures in this directions are ideas to leverage development resources by ’blending’ public with private funds. The report discusses the main developments in this debate and presents recommendations on how to optimize the developmental benefits from the reform proposals.

    January 17, 2014 | eurodad
    A matter of high interest: Assessing how loans are reported as development aid

    by Stéphanie Colin

    The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) compiles aid statistics that allow comparisons and monitoring of aid volumes provided by bilateral governments and multilateral institutions for the purpose of reducing poverty in developing countries. Loans offered at preferential terms can be reported as official development assistance (ODA), provided they meet certain concessionality conditions.

    #aide #développement #ide #oda

  • Publications - Analyses récentes

    L’ODAE romand publie son sixième rapport d’observation, sous le titre :

    Migration et asile en Suisse - Un mot d’ordre : dissuasion
    À cette occasion, l’association invite le public à interpeller Madame Simonetta Sommaruga, conseillère fédérale au travers d’une lettre, estimant qu’une autre politique, plus humaine, à l’égard des requérants d’asile et des étrangers est possible.

    http://www.odae-romand.ch/IMG/pdf/Rapport_d-observation_2013.pdf

    http://www.asile.ch/vivre-ensemble/2013/11/20/odae-romand-migration-et-asile-en-suisse-un-mot-dordre-dissuasion

    Dossier de presse :
    http://www.odae-romand.ch/spip.php?article422

    #suisse #asile #refugie #migration #rapport #odae

  • Le terrible compte à rebours du demandeur d’asile mineur isolé placé en zone d’attente

    http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/resf/141212/le-terrible-compte-rebours-du-demandeur-dasile-mineur-isole-place-en

    Le terrible compte à rebours du demandeur d’asile mineur isolé placé en zone d’attente

    14 décembre 2012 Par RESF

    Le terrible compte à rebours du demandeur d’asile mineur isolé placé en zone d’attente.

    Soit une jeune femme de 16 ans qui arrive en France depuis le Congo (RDC) avec un passeport d’emprunt sur lequel elle apparaît majeure. Elle a transité par la Turquie, elle arrive à l’aéroport de Lyon Saint Exupéry. Au contrôle aux frontières, l’officier de police judiciaire ne se laisse pas abuser et la demoiselle se voit opposer un refus d’entrée sur le territoire français et notifier un placement en zone d’attente pour 4 jours. La jeune femme expose alors être en réalité mineure, se nommer autrement, et vouloir déposer une demande d’asile en France car sa mère a été tuée sous ses yeux par les miliciens du M23 à la fin du mois de novembre au Congo, et elle expose avoir fait l’objet de violences physiques intimes très graves de la part de deux de ces miliciens. Son corps est couvert d’ecchymoses, elle est très émue à l’évocation des derniers jours qu’elle a vécues au Congo et qui ont précédé sa fuite. Un administrateur ad hoc est désigné.

  • #TURQUIE : #Lettre de #SönerYalçin #journaliste em #prisonhttp://goo.gl/P1iv0

    La #blackListe du #Bosphore

    Abjecte record de cette grande nation qu’est la Turquie. 76 journalistes et distributeurs de presse en prison, soit la moitié du contingent mondial des journalistes détenus, croupissent dans les geôles d’un pays qui prétend donner des leçons de démocratie.

    Söner Yalçin est le fondateur d’un site internet appelé « #OdaTV » qui pourfend la politique gouvernementale de l’ #AKP au pouvoir depuis 2002, par Recep Tayyip Erdogan. OdaTv dénonce la corruption, l’accaparement d’une économie par une oligarchie, l’influence des partis religieux et les atteintes répétées à la liberté d’expression.

    Pour lui, la Turquie s’enfonce dans l’obscurantisme, loin de la vision « démocratique » qui est prônée et vendue aux #médias étrangers.

    Il sera jugé le 16 novembre prochain.