organization:siniora government

  • Il est grand temps de relire l’article légendaire de Seymour Hersh : The Redirection, 5 mars 2007, dans lequel il racontait comment les États-Unis finançaient le gouvernement Saniora, en sachant pertinemment que celui-ci soutenait à son tour les groupuscules sunnites inspirés d’Al Qaeda. Annals of National Security : The Redirection, “Jihadis in Lebanon”
    http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=5

    The United States has also given clandestine support to the Siniora government, according to the former senior intelligence official and the U.S. government consultant. “We are in a program to enhance the Sunni capability to resist Shiite influence, and we’re spreading the money around as much as we can,” the former senior intelligence official said. The problem was that such money “always gets in more pockets than you think it will,” he said. “In this process, we’re financing a lot of bad guys with some serious potential unintended consequences. We don’t have the ability to determine and get pay vouchers signed by the people we like and avoid the people we don’t like. It’s a very high-risk venture.”

    American, European, and Arab officials I spoke to told me that the Siniora government and its allies had allowed some aid to end up in the hands of emerging Sunni radical groups in northern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and around Palestinian refugee camps in the south. These groups, though small, are seen as a buffer to Hezbollah; at the same time, their ideological ties are with Al Qaeda.

    During a conversation with me, the former Saudi diplomat accused Nasrallah of attempting “to hijack the state,” but he also objected to the Lebanese and Saudi sponsorship of Sunni jihadists in Lebanon. “Salafis are sick and hateful, and I’m very much against the idea of flirting with them,” he said. “They hate the Shiites, but they hate Americans more. If you try to outsmart them, they will outsmart us. It will be ugly.”

    Alastair Crooke, who spent nearly thirty years in MI6, the British intelligence service, and now works for Conflicts Forum, a think tank in Beirut, told me, “The Lebanese government is opening space for these people to come in. It could be very dangerous.” Crooke said that one Sunni extremist group, Fatah al-Islam, had splintered from its pro-Syrian parent group, Fatah al-Intifada, in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, in northern Lebanon. Its membership at the time was less than two hundred. “I was told that within twenty-four hours they were being offered weapons and money by people presenting themselves as representatives of the Lebanese government’s interests—presumably to take on Hezbollah,” Crooke said.

    The largest of the groups, Asbat al-Ansar, is situated in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. Asbat al-Ansar has received arms and supplies from Lebanese internal-security forces and militias associated with the Siniora government.

    In 2005, according to a report by the U.S.-based International Crisis Group, Saad Hariri, the Sunni majority leader of the Lebanese parliament and the son of the slain former Prime Minister—Saad inherited more than four billion dollars after his father’s assassination—paid forty-eight thousand dollars in bail for four members of an Islamic militant group from Dinniyeh. The men had been arrested while trying to establish an Islamic mini-state in northern Lebanon. The Crisis Group noted that many of the militants “had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.”

    According to the Crisis Group report, Saad Hariri later used his parliamentary majority to obtain amnesty for twenty-two of the Dinniyeh Islamists, as well as for seven militants suspected of plotting to bomb the Italian and Ukrainian embassies in Beirut, the previous year. (He also arranged a pardon for Samir Geagea, a Maronite Christian militia leader, who had been convicted of four political murders, including the assassination, in 1987, of Prime Minister Rashid Karami.) Hariri described his actions to reporters as humanitarian.

    Ce qui est très étonnant, c’est la date de cet article (mars 2007). De fait, les prétentions des 14 Mars à expliquer l’émergence des jihadistes du genre Assir comme une « réaction » à l’« humiliation » imposée par le Hezbollah aux sunnites en 2008 est, purement et simplement, un mensonge.

  • Février 2007, rencontre de haut niveau entre les États-Unis et l’Arabie séoudite. Parmi les « gros sujets » : toujours la censure d’Al Manar et le soutien à Siniora.

    24.02.2007 : APHSCT TOWNSEND FEBRUARY 6 MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE SULTAN - Nyheter - Wikileaks - Aftenposten.no
    http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4025287.ece

    The Crown Prince said “we will not hesitate” to cooperate on working with Arabsat to block Al-Manar television broadcasting. He requested that the U.S. fully support the Siniora government in Lebanon, noting said that “positive and rational” steps should be taken to lessen Persian influence over Syria, and confirmed Saudi support for Afghanistan´s President Karzai as a “wise and strong man.”

    #Liban #Arabie_séoudite #al_Manar #cablegate

  • De mieux en mieux : une semaine après les événements de mai 2008, les séoudiens suggèrent aux Américains l’envoi d’une « force arabe » sous mandat des Nations unies et sous couverture navale et aérienne des États-Unis et de l’OTAN pour chasser le Hezbollah du Liban.

    US embassy cables : Saudi prince urges need for ’security response’ to Hezbollah threat in Lebanon | guardian.co.uk
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/153797

    Opening a discussion with S/I Satterfield focused largely on Iraq, Saud first turned to Lebanon and stated that the effort by “Hizballah and Iran” to take over Beirut was the first step in a process that would lead to the overthrow of the Siniora government and an “Iranian takeover of all Lebanon.” Such a victory, combined with Iranian actions in Iraq and on the Palestinian front, would be a disaster for the US and the entire region. Saud argued that the present situation in Beirut was “entirely military” and that the solution must be military as well. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were too fragile to bear more pressure; they needed urgent backing to secure Beirut from Hizballah’s assault. What was needed was an “Arab force” drawn from Arab “periphery” states to deploy to Beirut under the “cover of the UN” and with a significant presence drawn from UNIFIL in south Lebanon “which is sitting doing nothing.” The US and NATO would be asked to provide equipment for such a force as well as logistics, movement support, and “naval and air cover.”

    3. (S) Satterfield asked what support this concept had from Siniora and from other Arab states. Saud responded that “Siniora strongly supports,” but that only Jordan and Egypt “as well as Arab League SYG Moussa” were aware of the proposal, lest premature surfacing result in its demise. No contacts had been made with Syria on any Beirut developments, Saud said, adding, “what would be the use?”

    An “Easier Battle to Win”
    –-

    4. (S) Saud said that of all the regional fronts on which Iran was now advancing, the battle in Lebanon to secure peace would be an “easier battle to win” (than Iraq or on the Palestinian front). Satterfield said that the “political and military” feasibility of the undertaking Saud had outlined would appear very much open to question. In particular, attempting to establish a new mandate for UNIFIL would be very problematic. Satterfield said the US would carefully study any Arab decision on a way forward. Saud concluded by underscoring that a UN/Arab peace-keeping force coupled with US air and naval support would “keep out Hezbollah forever” in Lebanon.

    Après le « coup du 5 mai » :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/6224
    le soutien principal du 14 Mars se verrait bien en train d’envahir et bombarder le Liban. Charmant.

    Saud prétend que ce « concept » est « fortement soutenu » par Sanioura. Ça ne prouve rien (ouï-dire), mais ça va encore tanguer pour les 14 Mars...

    Saud, représentant d’un des principaux acteurs arabes de la région, utilise l’expression « easy to win » pour désigner, avec les américains :
    – une guerre contre le Hezbollah (on s’en doutait),
    – mais aussi l’Iraq et « le front palestinien » !
    Ce passage est proprement scandaleux.

    #cablegate #Liban #Arabie_séoudite #Sanioura

    • Une autre remarque : ce qui est sidérant dans ce câble, c’est la nullité absolue de la proposition séoudienne.
      – Qui peut imaginer qu’il soit possible de déployer une « force arabe » au Liban sans l’accord de la Syrie ?
      – Quels États arabes pourraient bien se permettre, face à l’opinion publique (notamment arabe), d’envoyer des troupes pour combattre le Hezbollah, la seule force arabe ayant réellement résisté efficacement à Israël ? Quel État arabe (même dictatorial) dispose de soldats réellement motivés pour aller combattre le Hezbollah ?
      – Par transitivité : les armées arabes n’ont pas vaincu Israël, Israël n’a pas vaincu le Hezbollah, donc il faut vivre sur une autre planète pour imaginer une force arabe vaincre le Hezbollah.

      Du coup, je ne vois que deux explications :
      – le ministre des affaires étangères séoudien, le Prince Saud Al-Faisal, est vraiment un simplet et un détraqué mental, ce qui n’est jamais à exclure ;
      – sinon, le véritable but de ces manœuvres n’est, une fois de plus, pas de détruire le Hezbollah, mais tout simplement de déstabiliser et faire éclater le Liban. Parce qu’une intervention militaire arabe au Liban n’aurait aucun autre effet que celui-là.