• #ONU, le #scandale des #abus_sexuels

    De la Centrafrique à New York, une investigation sur les abus sexuels commis par les collaborateurs de l’ONU et l’impuissance de l’organisation à les combattre.

    « Tout ceci est hautement immoral et en totale contradiction avec notre mission. » En 2004, l’ONU et son secrétaire général, Kofi Annan, affrontaient un vaste scandale d’abus sexuels commis par des militaires et des employés de l’organisation en République démocratique du Congo. Dans la foulée, le conseiller Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein présentait ses préconisations pour éradiquer le fléau et l’impunité qui l’accompagne : mise en place de cours martiales dans les pays où des casques bleus sont déployés et adoption d’une convention internationale permettant à l’ONU d’engager des poursuites pénales contre son personnel civil. Près de quinze ans plus tard, alors que les États membres s’opposent toujours au morcellement de leur compétence juridictionnelle, l’exploitation et les violences sexuelles perdurent sur les terrains d’opération, comme en Centrafrique. Malgré les mesures déployées (création d’un poste de défenseur des droits des victimes, couvre-feux pour éviter les contacts entre la population locale et les employés des Nations unies en dehors des heures de service, travail de sensibilisation et d’éducation…) et la tolérance zéro prônée par l’actuel secrétaire général, António Guterres, près de cinquante nouvelles plaintes ont été enregistrées l’année dernière.

    Victimes oubliées
    Cette enquête recueille la parole de victimes oubliées – non signalées ou abandonnées par l’organisation –, les tentatives d’explication de responsables onusiens et le témoignage effarant du Français Didier Bourguet, seul civil condamné à ce jour, pour deux viols sur mineures, alors qu’il reconnaît avoir eu des rapports sexuels avec au moins une vingtaine d’enfants. Elle pointe ainsi l’intolérable impunité qui prédomine dans la grande majorité des cas.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/074593-000-A/onu-le-scandale-des-abus-sexuels
    #viols #impunité #pédophilie #pédocriminalité #documentaire #film_documentaire #casques_bleus #RDC #MINUSCA #Didier_Bourguet #plaintes #justice #faille_juridique #République_Centrafricaine #Centrafrique #abus_sexuels #code_blue #viols_sur_mineurs #Régiment_des_Diables_Rouges #casques_bleus_français #Innocence_en_danger (ONG) #tolérance_zéro #Fondation_Femme_Plus #grossesse #MONUSCO

    • Code Blue

      The Code Blue Campaign works to end impunity for sexual abuse by un personnel.


      The UN has a longstanding crisis caused, first, by UN personnel who commit sexual offenses against members of the populations they’re intended to serve and against other UN personnel and, second, by the institution’s response—the policies, procedures, and practices that create and sustain an institutional culture of impunity.

      We have identified three root causes of the UN’s culture of impunity:

      The institution has taken the liberty to manage its crisis internally.

      UN senior managers responsible for responding to and deliberating on individual cases are all rendered non-neutral by the conflicts of interest inherent in their positions: each is simultaneously called upon to represent and defend the best interests of the UN, the rights of the Organization’s accused employees and witnesses, and the rights of claimants.

      UN immunity makes the Organization’s “words and deeds” uniquely impervious to oversight or audit, shielding its functions and functionaries from external scrutiny and effectively negating the freedom of information that is a cornerstone of due process and a necessary precondition to equal justice for all.

      The Code Blue Campaign is concerned with overhauling several UN practices now in place that allow the UN Organization to dismiss and violate claimants’ fundamental rights to due process and neutral justice before the law:

      In addressing claims of “sexual exploitation and abuse” and “sexual harassment and assault” made against UN personnel, UN officials consistently misinterpret, misrepresent, and misapply UN immunity (an important legal protection intended to protect the multilateral work of the world body) to shield individual personnel from accountability and the Organization’s officials from reputational damage.

      The license to manage its sexual abuse crisis internally has evolved in tandem with the linear, largely unplanned growth of the UN system into a sprawling bureaucracy with many dozens of semi-autonomous “entities” that operate in relative isolation with barely monitored and rarely questioned authority accorded the heads.

      This combination of rapid de-centralization and unmonitored, quasi-independence and authority has in turn given rise within the various “entities” to dozens of inharmonious, non-coherent, and often conflicting policies, procedures, and practices for addressing sexual offense claims made against the personnel of those entities.

      The result is a non-system in which claimants and accused UN personnel associated with one entity of the UN Organization are subject to policies and procedures that may bear no resemblance to those followed by other entities of the same UN Organization. The only unifying factors across the system are the root causes of the UN’s culture of impunity for sexual offenses: the internal handling of all cases including those in which crimes beyond the UN’s “jurisdiction” are alleged; the misinterpretation and misapplication of UN immunity; and the inherent conflicts of interest underlying every case.

      The Code Blue Campaign has arrived at these conclusions through years of intense research. We have exposed several cases that illustrate the injustice, the incoherence, the innate and insurmountable conflicts of interest, and the long history of rights violations and abusive treatment by the UN Organization, primarily of victims but also of the accused. We argue that unjust UN policies and practices have, over decades, resulted in a culture of impunity for sexual “misconduct” ranging from breaches of UN rules to grave crimes. This represents a contravention of the UN Charter. Member States must intervene immediately. The General Assembly could end this crisis by divesting the UN Organization of any role in cases of “sexual misconduct,” and delegating the authority instead to an appropriate entity created, staffed by and reporting directly to the Member States, and entirely independent of the Organization.

      Member States have not yet come to the realization that the day of reckoning is approaching. If they do not take the initiative to fully recognize, understand, and solve a problem that has become an attention-getting Achilles heel, the UN’s sexual abuse crisis is likely to reach a pinnacle soon that could hobble the United Nations’ ability and authority to perform any of its functions. The UN could follow in the unenviable footsteps of another enormously powerful, largely secretive global institution whose former heights of moral authority are now universally queried: the Catholic Church.

      http://www.codebluecampaign.com

    • Taking action on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers: Report of an independent review on sexual exploitation and abuse by international peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic

      Executive Summary

      I. Introduction

      When peacekeepers exploit the vulnerability of the people they have been sent to protect, it is a fundamental betrayal of trust. When the international community fails to care for the victims or to hold the perpetrators to account, that betrayal is compounded.

      In the spring of 2014, allegations came to light that international troops serving in a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (“CAR”) had sexually abused a number of young children in exchange for food or money (the “Allegations”). The alleged perpetrators were largely from a French military force known as the Sangaris Forces, which were operating as peacekeepers under authorization of the Security Council but not under UN command.

      The manner in which UN agencies responded to the Allegations was seriously flawed. The head of the UN mission in CAR failed to take any action to follow up on the Allegations; he neither asked the Sangaris Forces to institute measures to end the abuses, nor directed that the children be removed to safe housing. He also failed to direct his staff to report the Allegations higher up within the UN. Meanwhile, both UNICEF and UN human rights staff in CAR failed to ensure that the children received adequate medical attention and humanitarian aid, or to take steps to protect other potential victims identified by the children who first raised the Allegations.

      Instead, information about the Allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the serious human rights violations. Indeed, even when the French government became aware of the Allegations and requested the cooperation of UN staff in its investigation, these requests were met with resistance and became bogged down in formalities. Staff became overly concerned with whether the Allegations had been improperly “leaked” to French authorities, and focused on protocols rather than action. The welfare of the victims and the accountability of the perpetrators appeared to be an afterthought, if considered at all. Overall, the response of the UN was fragmented and bureaucratic, and failed to satisfy the UN’s core mandate to address human rights violations.

      By examining these failures and recommending reforms to deter future incidents of sexual violence by peacekeepers, this Report provides an opportunity for the UN to chart a new course of action and to undertake meaningful organizational change. If the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy is to become a reality, the UN as a whole—including troop contributing countries (“TCCs”)—must recognize that sexual abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers is not a mere disciplinary matter, but a violation of the victims’ fundamental human rights, and in many cases a violation of international humanitarian and criminal law. Regardless of whether the peacekeepers were acting under direct UN command or not, victims must be made the priority.

      In particular, the UN must recognize that sexual violence by peacekeepers triggers its human rights mandate to protect victims, investigate, report and follow up on human rights violations, and to take measures to hold perpetrators accountable. In the absence of concrete action to address wrongdoing by the very persons sent to protect vulnerable populations, the credibility of the UN and the future of peacekeeping operations are in jeopardy.

      https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Independent-Review-Report.pdf

      #rapport

    • Innocence en danger. Mouvement mondial de protection des enfants contre toutes formes de #violences notamment sexuelles.

      Innocence en Danger (IED) est un mouvement mondial de protection des enfants contre toutes formes de violences notamment sexuelles, présent dans une dizaine de pays et partenaire d’associations internationales actives dans la lutte contre la pédocriminalité.

      Le Directeur Général de l’Unesco, Fédérico Mayor, nomme en 1999, Homayra Sellier Présidente du mouvement de protection mondial de l’enfance. Depuis avril 2000, Innocence en Danger (IED) est une association Loi 1901 en France à vocation internationale. Elle est indépendante de tout organisme, déclarée à la préfecture de Paris, à but non lucratif et reconnue d’intérêt général.

      Innocence en Danger regroupe tous les acteurs militants de notre société : spécialistes d’internet, juristes, experts de l’enfance, décideurs des mondes politiques, économiques et médiatiques. Son but est de sensibiliser l’opinion internationale aux fléaux croissants rencontrés par l’enfance, afin de peser sur les décisions des gouvernements.

      Innocence en Danger constitue une force d’action, de sensibilisation, de proposition, d’éducation et d’information auprès des organisations gouvernementales ou non gouvernementales, des instances européennes et internationales, des entreprises, des écoles, des collectivités locales, des groupes de jeunes…

      Innocence en Danger tient le rôle de relais d’informations entre le public et les institutions publiques. Elle accompagne au quotidien les enfants victimes et le(s) parent(s) protecteur(s). Elle est la première et la seule association à avoir mis en place des séjours de résilience.

      https://innocenceendanger.org

      #violence #violences_sexuelles

  • Décolonisations (1/3) - L’apprentissage | ARTE
    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/086124-001-A/decolonisations-1-3

    1. L’apprentissage
    De la #révolte des #cipayes de 1857 à l’étonnante République du #Rif, mise sur pied de 1921 à 1926 par #Abdelkrim_el-Khattabi avant d’être écrasée par la #France, ce premier épisode montre que la #résistance, autrement dit la #décolonisation, a débuté avec la #conquête. Il rappelle comment, en 1885, les puissances européennes se partagent l’#Afrique à #Berlin, comment les Allemands commettent le premier #génocide du XXe siècle en #Namibie, rivalisant avec les horreurs accomplies sous la houlette du roi belge #Léopold_II au #Congo. Il retrace aussi les parcours de l’anthropologue haïtien #Anténor_Firmin, de la Kényane #Mary_Nyanjiru, de la missionnaire anglaise #Alice_Seeley_Harris ou de #Lamine_Senghor, jeune tirailleur sénégalais devenu #militant #communiste et #anticolonialiste.

  • En #Europe_centrale, une « #alliance des villes libres » contre le populisme

    Les maires de #Budapest, #Varsovie, #Prague et #Bratislava ont signé un #pacte contre les dérives des gouvernements du #groupe_de_Visegrad.

    Ils ont la quarantaine ou presque, sont de fervents défenseurs de la #démocratie_libérale et fermement proeuropéens. A l’occasion d’une journée hautement symbolique, les maires de Prague, Varsovie, Budapest et Bratislava ont célébré, lundi 16 décembre dans la capitale hongroise, la naissance d’une « #alliance_des_villes_libres » destinée à contrecarrer les tendances populistes de leurs gouvernements respectifs.

    Dans ce « groupe de Visegrad » constitué de la #Pologne, la #Hongrie, la #République_tchèque et la #Slovaquie, qui fait régulièrement l’actualité pour ses dérives en matière d’Etat de droit et de refus des #valeurs_européennes, l’initiative des élus des quatre capitales montre que la #résistance_locale est réelle, même si elle est souvent encore minoritaire au niveau national.

    « Ilots de #liberté »

    « Nous venons de différents partis politiques, mais nous avons les mêmes #valeurs. Nos villes sont libres, progressistes, tolérantes et surtout proeuropéennes », a vanté le maire de Varsovie, Rafal Trzaskowski, largement élu en 2018 contre un candidat ultraconservateur du parti Droit et justice, qui gouverne la Pologne depuis 2015 en multipliant les atteintes à l’indépendance des médias et de la justice.

    Cette alliance a été rendue possible par la victoire historique d’un candidat de l’opposition à la mairie de Budapest le 13 octobre. Alors que la capitale hongroise était gouvernée depuis 2010 par le Fidesz, le parti du premier ministre nationaliste Viktor Orban, Gergely Karacsony, président d’un petit parti de centre gauche, a réussi à l’emporter avec 50,9 % des voix. Le Fidesz a aussi perdu à cette occasion le contrôle de six autres grandes villes du pays.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/12/17/en-europe-centrale-une-alliance-des-villes-libres-contre-le-populisme_602311
    #urban_matter #villes #résistance #populisme #pro-Europe #progressisme #tolérance

    ping @karine4

    via @mobileborders

    • Irlande du Nord : les accords de paix d’avril 1998
      https://journal.lutte-ouvriere.org/2023/04/12/irlande-du-nord-les-accords-de-paix-davril-1998_609602.html

      L’accord fut signé au terme de trente ans d’une guerre, appelée par euphémisme « Troubles », qui ravagea l’Irlande du Nord de 1968 à 1998. Aux origines du conflit se trouvait la volonté de la puissance coloniale britannique, au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, de garder la main sur une partie de cette Irlande insurgée. En effet, pour mettre fin au soulèvement armé des nationalistes irlandais (1919-1921), les dirigeants de ce qui était alors le plus grand empire colonial au monde avaient scindé l’île en deux, concédant l’#indépendance à la plus grande part du territoire mais gardant le nord-est, plus industriel et plus riche que le reste de l’île. Londres pouvait garder sous tutelle cette « Irlande du Nord » grâce à une majorité protestante unioniste, c’est-à-dire favorable à l’union avec la Grande-Bretagne, contre les aspirations des nationalistes, largement majoritaires dans l’île mais en minorité au nord-est.

      À la fin des années 1960, une part croissante de la classe ouvrière catholique d’Irlande du Nord n’acceptait plus la pauvreté, le chômage, les inégalités criantes et les discriminations dont elle faisait l’objet. Les protestations, d’abord pacifiques au sein d’un mouvement pour les droits civiques et le droit au logement, furent brutalement réprimées par la police, puis par l’armée britannique d’occupation, comme lors du « #Bloody_Sunday », le « dimanche sanglant », de 1972. L’#État\britannique était ainsi responsable de l’escalade violente qui s’engageait. Parmi les unionistes, des milices se constituaient, suppléant les forces britanniques et ciblant souvent des catholiques de façon aveugle. Du côté des nationalistes, les organisations paramilitaires comme l’IRA s’érigeaient en bras armé des catholiques, frappant l’armée, les paramilitaires unionistes, ainsi que de nombreux civils lors d’attentats dans des centres commerciaux, des centres-villes, etc. Les Troubles allaient faire quelque 3 500 morts et 38 000 blessés, un bilan considérable à l’échelle d’une province de 1,5 million d’habitants. Aujourd’hui encore, de nombreuses familles gardent des séquelles de cette guerre. Et c’est d’abord au sein de la population que l’aspiration à la cessation des violences s’est exprimée.

      En 1998, l’accord de paix fut négocié sous la houlette du Premier ministre britannique #Tony Blair et, derrière lui, des États-Unis. Il était censé mettre un terme aux trente années de guerre civile. Pour cela, les dirigeants britanniques ont confié des prérogatives aux différents protagonistes du conflit. Les anciens paramilitaires ont enfilé le costume et obtenu des postes de pouvoir. Les partis nationalistes et unionistes ont obtenu un droit de veto dans les institutions locales, par conséquent souvent paralysées, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui où le principal parti unioniste (#DUP) refuse de reconnaître sa défaite aux dernières élections. L’accord de 1998 prévoyait également l’ouverture de la frontière avec la #République_d’Irlande, une ouverture dont les unionistes se sont accommodés… jusqu’au #Brexit, qui s’est traduit, à leur grand dam, par la mise en place d’une frontière douanière entre l’Irlande du Nord et la Grande-Bretagne.

      L’#accord_de_1998 a figé les Nord-Irlandais dans deux « communautés » confessionnelles, #protestants et #catholiques, en créant des institutions partagées où leurs partis respectifs, unionistes et nationalistes, doivent siéger ensemble. Le poids de ces partis ainsi que celui des Églises font que la plupart des écoles restent ségréguées et que, encore aujourd’hui, des dizaines de « #murs_de_la_paix » séparent quartiers catholiques et protestants. La politique coloniale de « diviser pour régner » a éloigné ainsi les travailleurs les uns des autres pendant longtemps, mais n’a pas pu les empêcher d’entretenir d’innombrables liens de solidarité. Une partie des #Nord-Irlandais, qui côtoient dans leurs relations de travail, amicales voire familiales, des membres de « l’autre » #communauté, refusent désormais de s’inscrire dans ce #clivage_confessionnel gravé dans le marbre par les accords de 1998.

      Si la fin des affrontements a fait le bonheur des capitalistes qui font des affaires en Irlande du Nord, elle n’a mis fin ni aux inégalités, ni à la pauvreté, aujourd’hui plus importante qu’en #Grande-Bretagne. Le NHS, le système national de santé, est dans un état catastrophique dans la province d’Irlande du Nord où, par exemple, 6 000 patients attendent une opération depuis plus de cinq ans.

      Il y a donc quelque chose d’indécent à voir les dirigeants du monde impérialiste célébrer aujourd’hui l’accord sordide qu’ils négocièrent pour mettre fin à une guerre civile dont ils étaient largement responsables.

  • Africa: povertà e denutrizione in aumento nonostante la crescita economica e l’aumento dell’import di prodotti agro-industriali

    L’Africa nel suo insieme, nonostante i progressi intrapresi a partire dall’inizio del nuovo millennio, si presenta tutt’oggi, sia dal punto di vista economico che sociale, come il continente meno sviluppato.

    Sotto il primo aspetto, benché la ricchezza prodotta dall’intero continente, secondo l’Ocse, sia triplicata fra il 2000 e il 2016,[1], il pil pro capite medio africano risulta ancora di soli 2.000 $ annui[2]. Un valore che uniforma differenze anche marcate, non solo macroregionali fra la parte Mediterranea, più sviluppata, e quella sub-sahariana, più arretrata in assoluto su scala globale, ma anche fra i vari stati all’interno delle stesse, dove, ad esempio, entro quest’ultima, nel 2017[3], troviamo il Burundi con un pil pro capite di soli 312 $ a fronte della Guinea Equatoriale che invece raggiunge i 12.727 $. Avallando la definizione di alcuni analisti che preferiscono utilizzare il termine Afriche per indicare appunto una situazione di relativa differenziazione interna al continente.

    Il quadro sociale

    Anche sotto l’aspetto dello sviluppo sociale complessivamente l’Africa evidenzia una marcata arretratezza: nonostante la speranza di vita media alla nascita sia cresciuta fra il 2015 e il 2018 di ben 3 anni (da 50,8 a 53,9)[4], risulta ancora inferiore rispetto agli altri continenti e la mortalità infantile, benché scesa solo negli ultimi anni al di sotto della soglia del 100 per 1.000, vede gli stati della parte sub-sahariana situati in blocco nelle ultime posizioni nell’apposita graduatoria dell’Unicef relativa al 2018 (tab. 1).

    Tabella 1: mortalità infantile nel primo anno di vita. Fonte (Unicef 2018)[5]

    Un quadro sociale generale ancora indubbiamente critico come certificato dai valori della povertà assoluta dichiarati dalla presidente della Banca africana di sviluppo Celestine Monga[1], con addirittura oltre il 40% della popolazione continentale, a fronte di una media mondiale dell’10%, che cerca di sopravvivere con meno di 1,90 $ al giorno e la sottoalimentazione che nel 2018, secondo la Fao[2], colpiva il 20% degli africani. Una drammatica situazione che vede concentrarsi, nel continente che accoglie solo il 17% della popolazione mondiale, circa un terzo del totale dei denutriti sulla Terra (con meno di 2.000 calorie al giorno), confermando che il binomio fame-povertà, lungi dall’essere sradicato, presenta addirittura un inquietante trend in fase di aggravamento.

    [1] studio americano del Brookings Institution (classifica dei paesi più poveri al mondo)

    [2] http://www.fao.org/news/story/it/item/1180461/icode

    A fronte di un tendenza globale di lungo periodo di riduzione della povertà estrema dai 1,850 miliardi (35%) del 1990 ai 735 milioni (10%) del 2015, nel periodo compreso fra il 2013 e il 2015, al cospetto di una contrazione mondiale di 68 milioni di unità, in Africa sub-sahariana, secondo la Banca Mondiale si è registrato invece un aumento di 8 milioni e addirittura 9 milioni in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente (Tab. 2). In quest’ultima area la situazione è risultata peggiore visto che i poveri sono quasi raddoppiati da 9,5 a 18,6 milioni a causa delle cosiddette Primavere arabe in Tunisia ed Egitto e delle guerre in Libia e in Siria che hanno destabilizzato dal punto di vista politico ed economico la macroregione.

    Tabella 2: povertà assoluta in percentuale e in valore assoluto 2013-2015. Fonte: Banca Mondiale[8]

    La gravità della situazione è testimoniata dallo studio realizzato dai ricercatori del World Poverty Clock con il sostegno delle Nazioni Unite e del governo tedesco concluso nel 2018 dal quale emerge che si trovano in Africa sub-shariana 12 dei 14 paesi dove la povertà estrema risulta in aumento in valore assoluto: Nigeria, Niger, Ciad, Repubblica Centrafricana, Somalia, Repubblica Democratica del Congo, Repubblica del Congo, Angola, Zambia, Madagascar, Burundi e Sud Sudan, sul quale ci soffermeremo in seguito.

    Caso paradigmatico è rappresentato, ad esempio, dalla Nigeria, stato più popoloso del continente con circa 195 milioni di abitanti, che in base alle proiezioni del World Poverty Clock 2018 del World Data Lab di Vienna[10], ad inizio 2018, risultava, nonostante le ingenti riserve petrolifere, il paese con il più elevato numero di persone in condizione di povertà assoluta, stimate a fine maggio 2018 in ben 87 milioni scalzando l’India (73 milioni) dal vertice della poco gratificante graduatoria mondiale (grafico 1). La reale gravità della situazione tuttavia emerge dal rapporto fra la consistenza demografica dei due paesi che nel 2018 risultava di ben 7:1 a favore del colosso asiatico.

    Grafico 1: stati per numero di persone in povertà assoluta. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Una situazione molto critica in Nigeria, al cui interno convive il 44,2%[11] della popolazione in situazione di estrema povertà (tab. 3) e al contempo è il Paese d’origine del miliardario più ricco del continente, l’uomo d’affari Aliko Dangote, e quello dove cresce un’elite di benestanti sempre più abbienti. Povertà e disuguaglianza, fenomeno che in Europa dopo la crisi del 2008 è andato sempre consolidandosi.

    Tabella 3: primi 4 paesi africani per numero di abitanti in povertà assoluta. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Riguardo alla sottoalimentazione rileviamo una situazione ancora più critica rispetto a quella della povertà: infatti, in base al report dell’Unicef 2018[12], dopo aver toccato, a livello mondiale, il minimo storico nel 2015 a 785 milioni di persone è risalita nel 2017 a 821, dato confermato anche nel 2018[13], con l’Africa che assorbe la quasi totalità dell’aumento: ben 34,5 su 36 milioni di aumento globale. Il numero di persone sottoalimentate in Africa sale così nel 2017 a 257 milioni di unità, suddivise fra i 20 milioni nella parte Mediterranea ed i 237 in quella sub-sahariana. Quasi la metà dell‘incremento è dovuta all’aumento del numero di persone denutrite nell’Africa occidentale, mentre un altro terzo proviene dall’Africa orientale.

    L’ampia porzione di Africa posta sud del Sahara si conferma così come la macroregione in stato di maggior sofferenza a livello mondiale, con la speranza di vita media più bassa, la più elevata mortalità infantile e con le maggior percentuali di persone sottoalimentate e in condizioni di povertà assoluta.

    Le previsioni

    Dal rapporto del World Poverty Clock pubblicato il 7 settembre 2018[14] fuoriesce, del continente africano, una situazione a luci e ombre: se da un lato, nell’Africa sub-sahariana, la povertà assoluta è prevista in riduzione dal 39% del 2018 al 27% del 2030, lo stesso problema sta invece assumendo, per alcuni paesi, i connotati di una piaga sociale endemica per la quale non si intravedono prospettive di risoluzione nemmeno a medio termine. Infatti, in base alle stime dello stesso report del World Poverty Clock pubblicato il 5 maggio 2018, è previsto che nel Continente Nero nel 2030 si troveranno sia i 13 dei 15 paesi in cui la povertà avrà registrato un aumento in valore assoluto che i primi 4, fra i soli 5, che vedranno aumentare il tasso di povertà assoluta a livello mondiale (tab. 4). Per il 2018 invece è stato calcolato un ulteriore aumento di 3 milioni di unità a livello continentale.

    Tabella 4: stati africani col più elevato tasso di povertà assoluta in percentuale: stime 2018-previsioni 2030. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Sud Sudan: l’ultimo nato in peggiori condizioni

    Particolarmente drammatica risulta, dal report del Word Poverty Clock pubblicato il 1 agosto 2018[15], la situazione del Sud Sudan, paese di più recente formazione della Terra (2011), che vedrà aumentare il numero di poveri assoluti dagli 11,5 milioni del 2018 ai 14 del 2030, con una incidenza sulla popolazione che passerà dall’85,1% al 95,8% (tab. 4). Il conflitto per la leadership politica fra il presidente, Salva Kiir di etnia Dinka, e il suo vice, Riek Machar leader dei Nuer, il secondo gruppo etnico nazionale, ha insanguinato e destabilizzato il Paese per quasi 5 anni sino al luglio 2018 minandone lo sviluppo e la diversificazione economica: ancora oggi circa l’85% della popolazione attiva risulta impegnata in attività non salariate, principalmente agricoltura di sussistenza e allevamento (circa il 78% degli attivi)[16]. La sostanziale assenza dell’industria manifatturiera costringe all’importazione di quasi tutti i beni sia di consumo che intermedi; l’unico settore industriale moderno risulta quello petrolifero, nel quale dominano gli investimenti stranieri, in particolare cinesi, indiani e malesi[17]. Ricco di risorse del sottosuolo, il Sud Sudan, detiene, oltre ai pozzi petroliferi, giacimenti di oro, argento, ferro e rame.

    Ricoprendo il 99% dell’export e il 60% della ricchezza nazionale, il settore petrolifero risulta di gran lunga dominante, causando tuttavia fragilità alla struttura economica nazionale a seguito della dipendenza della stessa dall’andamento delle quotazioni borsistiche: il pil pro capite secondo la Banca Mondiale è infatti crollato, insieme al valore del petrolio, dai 1.111 $ del 2014 ai meno di 228 $ del 2017[18]. Il conseguente deficit fiscale ha causato un’ondata inflazionistica e gravissime carenze alimentari: nel Paese ben 7 milioni di persone (pari al 63%) sono stati colpiti da carestia e vengono assistite tramite gli aiuti umanitari del World Food Programme (Wfp), mentre quasi 2 milioni sono gli sfollati interni e altri 2,5 milioni sono fuggiti dal Paese, dando vita alla più grave crisi dei rifugiati in Africa dopo quella del Ruanda di metà anni ’90.

    A prescindere dalla grave crisi alimentare in atto, nel complesso il Sud Sudan presenta un quadro strutturale disastroso caratterizzato dall’83% di popolazione rurale, da un elevato analfabetismo (73% maschile e l’84% femminile), da una carenza di servizi pubblici che esclude il 75% della popolazione dall’assistenza sanitaria e dalla maggior percentuale di popolazione in povertà assoluta (85%) a livello mondiale, ai quali si aggiungono carenze infrastrutturali, debolezza delle istituzioni politiche, corruzione al pari del resto del continente, frammentazione etnica (ben 64 gruppi) e dispute di confine[19].

    Fame in aumento e boom dell’import di prodotti agricoli: un’apparente contraddizione

    Dal report del Dipartimento dell’Agricoltura degli Stati Uniti (Usda) del 2 novembre 2015[20] emerge che nel ventennio 1995-2014 le importazioni di cibo e prodotti agricoli intermedi e primari ha subito in Africa sub-sahariana un incremento medio del 13% annuo come effetto combinato della sostenuta crescita economica (60% di incremento del pil totale nei 10 anni precedenti) e del consistente incremento demografico (dai 720 del 1995 ai 1.156 milioni del 2014)[21]. Le importazioni agricole totali hanno raggiunto nel 2014 un controvalore pari a 48,5 miliardi $, secondo solo al 2013, ripartito fra i 11,7 miliardi proveniente da altri Paesi della macroregione e i 36,8 da fuori del continente. Emerge tuttavia un aspetto incoraggiante per il progetto di integrazione panafricano riconducibile alla crescita del commercio agricolo intra-africano, che fra il 2009 e il 2014, ha superato quello proveniente dall’esterno: 100% contro 60% (grafico 2).

    Grafico 2: importazioni agricole in Africa sub-sahariana in miliardi $ 1994-2014

    Per individuare le cause della contraddizione sottoalimentazione/aumento dell’import agroalimentare è opportuno sovrapporre alla dinamica demografica quella sociale: in Africa sub-sahariana infatti nel decennio 2005-2014 si è registrata un’espansione della classe media addirittura del 90%, ceto sociale che, al pari di quello di altre aree emergenti del Sud del mondo, persegue consumi di tipologia e livello occidentale, alimentando una sensibile crescita della domanda di tali prodotti. Infatti, dall’analisi merceologica del comparto rileviamo come le principali importazioni agroalimentari dell’Africa sub-sahariana siano prodotti orientati al consumatore: alimenti preparati, latticini, pollame, vino/birra e verdure. Tali prodotti diretti al consumo finale hanno registrato nel quinquennio 2010-2014 addirittura un incremento del 70% arrivando, in quell’anno, a rappresentare oltre il 40% delle importazioni totali della macroregione.

    Al pari le importazioni di prodotti intermedi, principalmente olio di palma e zucchero, utilizzati come materie prime dall’industria agroalimentare, sono cresciute anch’esse rapidamente, mentre quelle di merci sfuse, prodotti primari destinati all’alimentazione di base, sono state invece più contenute, tant’è che l’import di cereali, in un sub-continente “affamato” rappresentavano solo il 21% nel 2014: grano 9% e riso 12% (grafico 3).

    Grafico 3: paniere merceologico dell’import agroalimentare in Africa sub-sahariana 2014

    Lo stesso report prospetta un futuro addirittura prosperoso per l’export agricolo statunitense verso l’Africa sub-sahariana teso al recupero delle quote perse, scese nel ventennio 1994-2005 dal 15 al 5%, in quanto la classe media della macroregione dovrebbe crescere di un ulteriore 90% nel successivo decennio 2014-2024 (grafico 4) determinando un incremento della domanda di prodotti orientati al consumatore di un altro 60%. Un business plan che, tuttavia, non mostra particolare attenzione alle fasce sociali in sofferenza.

    Grafico 4: crescita in % della classe media nelle principali macroregioni terrestri 2014 – 2024

    Un modello agroalimentare contraddittorio

    La critica situazione alimentare del Continente Nero, e in particolare della parte sub-sahariana, è riconducibile alle distorsioni del modello agroalimentare mondiale, sempre più caratterizzato dall’Agrobusiness e dalle sue perverse dinamiche. Un settore, definito dal dizionario curato da Aldo Gabrielli come “il complesso di attività e mezzi connessi allo sviluppo capitalistico dell’agricoltura”, nel quale le finalità esulano dalla funzione primaria di soddisfacimento del fabbisogno alimentare per perseguire invece la massimizzazione del profitto in linea con le logiche capitalistiche.

    Basato sull’integrazione fra agricoltura e industria, al suo interno operano poche grandi imprese multinazionali che controllano l’intera filiera: dalla produzione alla trasformazione industriale sino alla commercializzazione dei prodotti finiti. Le produzioni agricole avvengono in ogni area del pianeta, sia del Nord che del Sud, mentre i prodotti finiti vengono indirizzati dove esiste facoltà di spesa, la famosa domanda, quindi principalmente nei paesi sviluppati e verso i ceti sociali emergenti (nuovi ricchi e classi medie) di quelli in via di sviluppo (Cina, India ecc.) e addirittura di quelli ad economia meno sviluppata, come nel caso africano.

    L’agricoltura costituisce l’asse portante del sistema in quanto produttrice delle indispensabili materie prime ma l’attività industriale economicamente ha la preminenza poiché gran parte del valore aggiunto deriva dalla trasformazione dei prodotti agricoli. Negli Stati Uniti, ad esempio, il sistema agroalimentare industriale assorbe il 20% della popolazione attiva ma soltanto l’1% è impiegato nel settore primario. A rimanere schiacciati da questo sistema sono i produttori locali, soprattutto quelli piccoli, del Sud del mondo ai quali vengono dettate le scelte colturali, a discapito della sovranità alimentare quindi dei prodotti di sussistenza, e imposto prezzi di acquisto molto bassi, a causa dell’asimmetria contrattuale fra le parti contraenti. Emblematico risulta a tal proposito il caso del caffè che, contrariamente ad altri prodotti di piantagione, è coltivato da una moltitudine di piccoli contadini che si trovano in condizione di subalternità rispetto alle multinazionali che acquistano la materia prima per la trasformazione e la commercializzazione.

    In base al rapporto “Scopri il marchio“ di Oxfan le 10 più grandi aziende agroalimentari vale a dire Associated British Foods (Abf), Coca-Cola, Danone, General Mills, Kellogg’s, Mars, Mondelez International (ex Kraft Foods), Nestlé, PepsiCo e Unilever generano collettivamente entrate superiori a 1,1 miliardi di dollari al giorno[22] 1 con un volume d’affari stimato intorno ai 7.000 miliardi annui, addirittura 18 volte superiore al settore dell’energia, rappresentando circa il 10% dell’economia globale. Nei vari comparti in cui operano tendono a crearsi oligopoli egemonizzati da queste imprese di enormi proporzioni, come nel comparto del cacao in cui tre aziende controllano il 30% del mercato mondiale[23] o quello della frutta tropicale dove cinque multinazionali ne coprono addirittura l’80%[24] .

    Le dimensioni economiche di queste macroaziende superano talvolta quelle di stati del Sud del mondo consentendo loro di esercitare pressioni sui governi tese ad influenzarne le scelte politiche a proprio vantaggio, ma che finiscono per concretizzarsi in dinamiche vessatorie per le popolazioni locali quali: l’espansione dei latifondi, delle monocolture da esportazione e del land grabbing (l’accaparramento delle terre). Quest’ultimo fenomeno, attuato sia da imprese che da stati, affligge Sud America, Sud-est asiatico, Asia centrale e, soprattutto, l’Africa, nella quale quasi 30 milioni di ettari di terreni coltivabili, di cui ben il 64% per colture non alimentari (carta 1), sono controllati attraverso due forme contrattualistiche: acquisizioni e leasing. In particolare, principali vittime risultano i piccoli contadini che vengono schiacciati dal potere soverchiante delle grandi aziende che ne provoca un impoverimento sino a costringerli a vendere loro i terreni; in altri casi vengono addirittura espulsi con la violenza, da eserciti o paramilitari, dalle proprie terre trasformandoli in profughi, spesso costretto a fuggire all’estero. Il Centro Studi Internazionali, riporta alcuni casi emblematici relativi all’Africa come quello della regione di Gambella in Etiopia dove, dal 2010 l’esercito ha costretto molti abitanti ad abbandonare le terre e a spostarsi in altre aree a vantaggio delle imprese straniere fra le quali spicca l’impresa Saudi Star (Arabia Saudita) che è riuscita ad impossessarsi di ben 15.000 ettari di territorio per la coltivazione di canna da zucchero e riso[25]

    Carta tematica 1: i principali attori attivi e passivi del land grabbing. Fonte: land matrix 2018[26]

    Crescita senza redistribuzione

    Un continente che, dopo la lunga recessione del ventennio 1980-2000, causata dalla contrazione delle quotazioni delle commodities, ha finalmente imboccato col nuovo millennio il percorso di sviluppo economico, triplicando, in base ai dati Ocse[27], la ricchezza prodotta tra il 2000 e il 2016 con una crescita media annua del 4,6% (tab. 5), la seconda più elevata a livello mondiale dopo i paesi asiatici in via di sviluppo

    Tabella 5: crescita economica media annua nelle principali macroregioni del Sud del mondo fra 2.000 e 2016 in base ai dati Ocse 2018[28]

    Parallelamente, l’Africa nel suo complesso è risultato l’unico continente a registrare un aumento della povertà assoluta da 405 a 413 milioni fra il 2013 e il 2015 (tab. 2) ed ha assorbito nel 2017 la quasi totalità dell’incremento mondiale della sottoalimentazione, 34,5 su 36 milioni, facendo salire il numero di coloro che soffrono la fame a 257 milioni, paradossalmente in contemporanea all’aumento dell’import di prodotti agroalimentari che, fra il 1995 e il 2014, si è attestato su un valore medio annuo del +13%. Indubbiamente la rapida crescita demografica che sta interessando il continente, quasi 60 milioni fra il 2013 e il 2015 (tab. 6), ha creato problemi sociali aggiuntivi ma non è stata determinante visto che la povertà al contempo ha registrato un incremento di 8 milioni nella parte sub-sahariana e altrettanti in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente.

    Tabella 6: crescita della popolazione in Africa fra il 2013 e il 2010. Fonte: population pyramid [29]

    Causa principale della situazione è un modello economico non inclusivo che evidentemente va a beneficio dei ricchi e del ceto medio, quest’ultimo in espansione nell’Africa sub-sahariana fra il 2005 e il 2015 addirittura del 90%, al quale vanno aggiunti problemi economici strutturali quali un’eccessiva dipendenza dall’export di prodotti primari grezzi e una massiccia penetrazione delle multinazionali, tipica dei rapporti di subordinazione neocoloniale, che fanno incetta delle abbondanti risorse minerarie, energetiche, agricole e naturali drenando ingenti profitti.

    Conclusioni

    Sullo sfondo di questo quadro economico e sociale resta la questione delle disparità sociali, che seppur ridottesi a livello continentale fra il 1998 e il 2013, nella parte sub-sahariana rimangono ancora le più elevate a livello mondiale dopo l’America Latina (tab. 7).

    Tabella 7: riduzione dell’indice Gini nelle principali macroregioni nel breve periodo 2008-2013

    La situazione risulta critica soprattutto nell’Africa australe, dove si trovano, a parte Haiti, 4 fra i 5 paesi con il più alto livello di disuguaglianza nella graduatoria mondiale nella distribuzione del reddito fra le fasce sociali, calcolata in base all’Indice Gini: Sudafrica, Botswana, Namibia e Zambia, seguiti dalla Repubblica Centrafricana nell’area equatoriale (tab. 8).

    Tabella 8: stati per indice indice Gini più elevato. Fonte: World Population Rewiew 24/10/2019[30]

    Ed è lo stesso Ocse a confermare il rapporto disparità sociali/povertà: “Se l’Africa abbassasse ulteriormente il proprio coefficiente di Gini, da 41 a 35 (il livello dei Paesi asiatici in via di sviluppo), ciascun punto percentuale di crescita del PIL ridurrebbe i dati sulla povertà di un altro mezzo punto percentuale l’anno. Un tale calo nelle disuguaglianze diminuirebbe il numero di persone che vivono in povertà di 130 milioni. I progressi compiuti per ridurre la povertà estrema sono troppo lenti: nel periodo 2009-16, il 36% della popolazione africana (circa 400 milioni di persone) viveva con 1,90 dollari USA al giorno o meno, rispetto al 49% degli anni ‘90. Per una più rapida lotta alla povertà, la crescita deve diventare più inclusiva e le disuguaglianze devono essere ridotte“[31].

    Rileviamo, a conforto della nostra analisi, la coincidenza di conclusioni con il Rapporto regionale 2018 sulla sicurezza alimentare e la nutrizionedella Fao[32], il quale testualmente riporta che “È interessante notare come le economie africane siano cresciute a ritmi impressionanti, spesso superiori al 5% negli ultimi dieci anni, dal 2004 al 2014. Tuttavia, la povertà e la fame sono ancora in sospeso poiché una crescita economica significativa non è risultata né integrata e né inclusiva“ aggiungendo che “L’insicurezza alimentare in alcuni paesi dell’Africa è stata aggravata dai conflitti, spesso in combinazione con condizioni meteorologiche avverse (riconducibili ai cambiamenti climatici ndr.)” e che è necessario “Orientare le politiche nazionali di sicurezza alimentare verso una maggiore autosufficienza alimentare interna“, vale a dire eliminare il land grabbing, ridurre i latifondi ed estromettere le monocolture da esportazione e riacquisire la sovranità alimentare.

    Una sfida impegnativa per il Continente nero quella dello sviluppo autonomo, integrato ed inclusivo che passa attraverso un processo di integrazione continentale (un passo significativo in tal senso è rappresentato dall’entrata in vigore dell’Area di Libero Scambio dell’Africa – Afcfta – il 30 maggio 2019 che secondo la Commissione economica Onu per l’Africa potrebbe incrementare del 53% il commercio intra-africano[33]) e per il superamento della subordinazione neocoloniale, imposta dalle potenze Occidentali e in forme diverse, recentemente, anche dalla Cina.

    Un percorso, come tutti i processi emancipatori, che non può prescindere da una rottura della storica subalternità politica dei Paesi africani e la riscrittura di un nuovo ordine economico, commerciale e finanziario che può essere implementato solo da una nuova classe dirigente preparata, non corrotta e con un efficace progetto panafricano. In pratica l’effettiva indipendenza, 60 anni dopo quella formale.

    http://www.pisorno.it/africa-poverta-e-denutrizione-in-aumento-nonostante-la-crescita-economica-e-

    #Afrique #pauvreté #économie #croissance_économique #exportation #importation #industrie_agro-alimentaire #sous-alimentation #alimentation #mortalité_enfantile #pauvreté_absolue #Nigeria #RDC #République_démocratique_du_congo #statistiques #chiffres #Sud_Soudan #Soudan_du_Sud #land_grabbing #accaparement_des_terrres

  • Un vrai communiste : Werner Scholem
    Le livre que lui a consacré le spécialiste de la révolution (allemande) de Novembre (1918/19), Ralf Hoffrogge, est disponible en anglais. Pour celles et ceux qui se sont toujours demandé ce que pouvait bien être cette révolution allemande et qui était le frère rebelle de Gershom Scholem.

    Ralf Hoffroge, A Jewish Communist in Weimar Germany: The Life of Werner Scholem (1895-1940)

    Merilyn Moos reviews a new biography of Werner Scholem: an implacable opponent of any accommodation with the far right, and an uncompromising critic of Soviet state capitalism.

    Werner Scholem is a figure rarely heard of in the UK. That he fell out with the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in the direction of Trotskyism has not helped. This new biography uses Scholem’s life to reveal the long-term impact of the revolutionary days of 1918-19 in Munich and Berlin on both the left and hard right in Germany and the isolation of the Russian Revolution after the failure of the German revolution. It also exposes how early the KPD leadership saw its task as to appeal to members of the ultra-right, rather than to defeat them.

    This 600-page book requires a strong interest in revolutionary politics in Germany in the early 1920s. For those who persevere, the author presents much detail on the period 1919-1926, drawing on a remarkable number of original sources about Scholem’s personal and political life, although not always providing a full analysis of the material it presents.

    Despite the book’s title, the ‘Jewish’ aspect is brief. Scholem was originally a part of a Zionist youth group, Jung Juda. Zionism of the time was secular and had broken with traditional Judaism and with the prevalent assimilationist perspective. Although the book does not suggest this, maybe this involvement encouraged Scholem’s later resilience and refusal to bow to instruction. He soon fell out with Zionism, criticising its ‘war objectives’, which would end up with the occupation of Syria and parts of the Sinai Peninsula.

    [...]

    https://www.rs21.org.uk/2019/10/18/review-a-jewish-communist-in-weimar-germany

    #Werner_Scholem #révolution_de_novembre #révolution_allemande_de_1918 #république_de_Weimar #communisme #parti_communiste_allemand #KPD #Buchenwald

  • Après les #milices qui surveillent les #frontières en #Hongrie, #Bulgarie, #République_Tchèque :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/719995

    ... voici le même type de groupes en #Slovénie...
    Vigilantes in Slovenia patrol borders to keep out migrants

    Blaz Zidar has a mission: patrol along a razor-wire fence on Slovenia’s border with Croatia, catch migrants trying to climb over, hand them to police and make sure they are swiftly sent out of the country.

    The 47-year-old former Slovenian army soldier, dressed in camouflage trousers with a long knife hanging from his belt, is one of the vigilantes who call themselves “home guards” — a mushrooming anti-migrant movement that was until recently unthinkable in the traditionally liberal Alpine state. The name of the self-styled group evokes memories of the militia that sided with fascists during World War II.

    “I would prefer to enjoy my retirement peacefully, but security reasons are preventing this,” Zidar said as he embarked on yet another of his daily foot patrols together with his wife near their home village of Radovica nestled idyllically among vineyards and lush green forested hills.

    Zidar complained that he had to act because Slovenian police aren’t doing their job of guarding the borders from the migrant flow which peaked in 2015 when hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East, Africa and Asia, fleeing wars and poverty, crossed from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia via Hungary or Croatia and Slovenia toward more prosperous Western European states.

    Zidar said that his six children often join them in the border monitoring mission “because they have to learn how to protect their nation from intruders.”

    Slovenia’s volunteer guards illustrate strong anti-migrant sentiments not only in the small European Union nation of 2 million people, but also across central and eastern Europe which is a doorway into Western Europe for migrants and where countries such as Hungary have faced criticism for open anti-migrant policies. Similar right-wing guards that frequently attacked migrants crossing the borders previously openly operated in Hungary and Bulgaria.

    Police in Croatia — an EU member state that is still not part of the borderless EU travel zone — routinely face accusations of pushbacks and violence against migrants trying to come in from Bosnia. In Slovenia, the authorities are putting up additional fences on the border with Croatia after Italy’s former hard-line interior minister, Matteo Salvini, threatened “physical barriers” would be built between Slovenia and Italy if the migrant flow wasn’t completely stopped.

    The fiery anti-migrant rhetoric by Salvini and Hungarian President Victor Orban, who was the first to order fences on Hungary’s border with Serbia at the start of the migrant crisis, have resonated among some in Slovenia, an exceptionally calm, nature-loving country.

    Miha Kovac, a Slovenian political analyst who is a professor at the University of Ljubljana, described the anti-migrant guards as “guys with big beer bellies who don’t have much of an education, who didn’t have much of a career, who don’t know what to do with themselves in the contemporary world.

    “They find their meaning in this kind of movement and this kind of hatred toward migrants.”

    Kovac said that in the short run, the right-wing groups represent no real danger to the tiny EU nation. But if the European migrant crisis continues “this kind of movement might become more aggressive.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zte9nDFcACY

    “Slovenia is a country of 2 million and if you would become a kind of immigrant pocket with the population of ... 20, 30, 40, 50,000 immigrants, this could cause quite significant problems,” Kovac said.

    Slovenian authorities don’t seem to mind the self-styled guards patrolling the country’s borders, as long as they don’t do anything against the law.

    “The self-organization of individuals does not in any way imply mistrust of police work,” said France Bozicnik, the head of criminal police at a police station near the border. “It’s just the opposite.”

    “People call us on the phone every day and give us information about suspicious vehicles and suspicious persons, and we sincerely thank them for this information,” he said. “They are welcome to continue with this reporting.”

    Nevertheless, the images of masked men in military uniforms that appeared about a year ago have shocked many in Slovenia, the birthplace of U.S. first lady Melania Trump. The largest volunteer group called the Stajerska Garda was filmed taking an oath to secure public order in the country.

    The group commander, Andrej Sisko, said his goal is “to train people to defend their country and help the military and police at a time of massive migrations from the African and Asian states, mostly Muslims.”


    Sisko, who spent six months in prison for his paramilitary activities, insisted that his guards don’t carry real weapons or do anything illegal.

    “People are mostly supporting us, they are stopping and congratulating us on the streets,” Sisko said in an interview with The Associated Press as four of his men in camouflage uniforms, wearing genuine-looking mock guns, stood watch at his house in the suburb of the northern Slovenian town of #Maribor.

    With the continuing migrant flow in the region, human rights groups have accused authorities in Slovenia, Serbia, Greece, Hungary and particularly Croatia of illegal and forced pushbacks from their borders.

    Witnesses cited by the Border Violence Monitoring Network described Croatian police officers at the border with Bosnia burning clothes, sleeping bags, backpacks and tents in addition to targeting other possessions such as cellphones, cash and personal documents. Croatian officials have repeatedly denied the claims.

    “The police first attacked by shooting up in the air, and then they ordered us to lay down,” said Shabbir Ahmed Mian from Pakistan, adding that after police body searches they “pushed” the group of 15 that included women, children and the elderly into a small van that dumped them back to Bosnia.

    “We couldn’t breathe, there was no oxygen,” he said.

    https://www.apnews.com/57424e6bf60046e594b4c052bac86b6c

    #Stajerska_Garda #Andrey_Sisko
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #xénophobie #racisme #patrouilles #chasse_aux_migrants #anti-réfugiés #milices #milices_privées #extrême_droite #néo-nazis

    ping @reka @isskein @marty

    • Nouvelle reçu via le rapport « Border violence monitoring network - Balkan Region » de septembre 2019 (p. 13 et segg.) :
      https://www.borderviolence.eu/balkan-region-report-september-2019

      Extrait :

      SloveniaVigilante groups patrol the Slovenian border with CroatiaOn September 17th the Associated Press reported (https://www.apnews.com/57424e6bf60046e594b4c052bac86b6c) on the alarming activities of a Slovenian para-military group called “#Stajerska_Varda”, operating along the border with Croatia. Members of the group are reportedly taking part in vigilante activities, apprehending people-in-transit who try to cross the border, and calling the police to push them back. Until now the groups’ members have not been observed carrying out any violent actions, but their rise in numbers and presence on the border is deeply concerning. A video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2KOSTXp4fA

      ) from October 2018 shows a large number of armed people taking an oath nearMaribor, stating their intent to take border security into their own hands.

      Andrey Sisko, the leader of the far-right group, confirmed that at that time the militia had existed for longer than a year. Sisko himself was arrested and detained (https://www.total-slovenia-news.com/politics/3328-militia-leader-jailed-for-trying-to-subvert-the-constituti) for six months with the charge of “trying to subvert the constitutional order”. He was released in March. The open activities of far-right groups at the border are a telling development, not only for pressure on transit conditions, but also the growth in nationalist logic pervading Slovenia today. Stajerska Varda have stepped into the political void opened up by centre and right-wing politicians who have stoked domestic opinion against people-in-transit. While extreme right activists frame their role as a necessary defense, their actual ideology is explicitly aggressive. As shown in a report (https://eeradicalization.com/the-militarization-of-slovenian-far-right-extremism) by European Eye on radicalization, Stajerska Varda has the nationalist ideas of “Greater Slovenjia” (https://eeradicalization.com/the-militarization-of-slovenian-far-right-extremism) as a reference point, and has inserted itself in a context of growing militarization as part of Slovenia’s right.

      Yet media response to this rise in armed groups presented some worrying attitudes towards the issue. Namely the views of Miha Kovac, a political analyst interviewed by AP for their report, is dangerous in two senses. Kovac dismisses radical groups as “guys with big beer bellies [...] who don’t know what to do with themselves”, and even goes on to allege that the root cause of facism is the presence of migrants in Slovenia. Marking out people-in-transit as instigators falls into a traditional cycle of victim blaming, a route which absolves the role of fear mongering party politics in abetting radicalization.
      As shown by right wing leaders around Europe, such as Matteo Salvini and Victor Orban, open praise for and facilitation of radical groups is an explicit tactic used to build a right wing consensus on the ground. The example of vigilantes operating in Hungaryas early as 2015, suggests that the development of state borders and growth of the extra-parliamentary right go hand in hand. These two strands are evidently complicit in Slovenia, seen especially in the silence at the party and state levels in regards to a self publicized military juntaoperating on state soil. September’s revelations again highlight the liminal space between conservative migration politics and paramilitary fascism. The existence of these activities call into direct question the responsibilities of the Slovenian state, and are a concerning augmentation of the current institutional pushback framework.

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/September-2019-Report-1.pdf

    • Patriot games: Slovenian paramilitaries face down migrant ’threat’ on border

      Dressed in camouflage and armed with air rifles, Slovenian paramilitaries moves in formation through woods a stone’s throw from Croatia, patrolling a border zone where the group’s leader says illegal migration is rife.

      The more than 50-strong group, some of whom mask their faces with balaclavas and which includes a handful of women, is led by Andrej Sisko, who also heads Gibanje Zedinjena Slovenija, a fringe nationalist party that has so far failed to win seats in parliament.

      He believes authorities are failing in their duty to protect Slovenia against what he views as the migrant threat, and founded Stajerska and Krajnska Varda (Stajerska and Krajnska Guard) to fill that gap.

      Members of both organistions were participating in the patrol when Reuters TV met them.

      “It is a duty of all of us to ensure security in our own country,” he said. “If state bodies who are paid for that cannot or do not want to ensure security we can help ensure it, that is what we do.”

      Anti-migrant sentiment in Slovenia and other ex-Communist states has risen sharply since 2015, when eastern Europe bore the initial brunt of a refugee crisis.

      Much of the region has since then resisted attempts by EU authorities in Brussels to enforce a continent-wide quota system for new arrivals, which Slovenia has however signed up for.

      According to Slovenian police, numbers of migrants crossing illegally from Croatia to Slovenia - where a razor-wire fence has been erected along stretches of the border since 2015 - rose to 11,786 in the first nine months of this year from 6,911 a year earlier.

      Sisko this year served time in jail for forming Stajerska Varda and urging the overthrow of state institutions.

      He says the group, which generally meets in the border zone at weekends, does not intercept migrants - which he emphasises would be against the law - but advertises their presence to security forces.

      Police told Reuters they were monitoring the group’s behaviour and had not detected any recent illegal activities.

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovenia-paramilitary/patriot-games-slovenian-paramilitaries-face-down-migrant-threat-on-border-i

    • On en parle ici aussi :
      Patrouille de miliciens d’extrême-droite

      « C’est une honte, il y a la police, l’armée, maintenant cette clôture et il y a même une milice ! », fulmine à son tour Katarina Bernad Sterva, directrice de l’association slovène d’aide aux réfugiés, qui se désespère de la situation à la frontière.

      Depuis quelques jours en effet, des #milices en treillis militaires, visages cachés derrière des cagoules noires, patrouillent aussi le long de la rivière #Kolpa. Dirigée par le leader d’extrême-droite, #Andrej_Sisko,cette #milice se veut un « renfort » à l’armée régulière pour « défendre la frontière » et intercepter les migrants. « Nous sommes le point d’entrée de l’espace Schengen », se justifie Andrej Sisko. « Nous voulons faire passer un message. Nous voulons dire aux étrangers de rester chez eux. La clôture est fragile, elle ne permet pas de stopper les migrants alors nous venons contrôler les abords de la rivière nous-mêmes ».

      La milice d’Andrej Sisko n’a aucun mandat légal. Et visiblement, les villageois s’expliquent mal leur présence.

      Si certains rient à leur passage - « C’est le carnaval quand ils sont là », entend-t-on ici et là dans les villages frontaliers – d’autres comme Katarina Bernad Sterva regarde cette armée parallèle avec une inquiétude grandissante. « Ce qui m’effraie, c’est qu’ils existent. Publiquement, le gouvernement a condamné leurs actions, mais, dans les faits, les autorités ne font rien. Ces hommes sont fous, nous nous attendions à une réaction forte du gouvernement, comme par exemple l’annonce de la dissolution de ces patrouilles ».

      Interrogée par InfoMigrants, la police reste muette sur le sujet. « Je n’ai rien à dire sur ces hommes. Ils n’ont pas le soutien de la police », déclare simplement Vicjem Toskan, l’un des commandants en chef de la police de Koper, à l’ouest du pays.

      Ce soir-là, à Kostel, les amis du café s’interrogent surtout sur le sort réservé aux migrants interceptés par cette milice d’extrême-droite. « On a déjà la police et l’armée pour intercepter les migrants. On a une clôture pour les empêcher de continuer leur route. Eux, qu’est-ce qui vont leur faire, la nuit, dans la montagne ? », s’inquiète Rudy. « Ils portent des masques, ils marchent dans la forêt. J’ai plus peur d’eux que des immigrés qui traversent la rivière », chuchote à son tour, une jeune fille en bout de table. « Si j’étais migrante, je n’aimerais vraiment pas tomber sur eux ».

      https://seenthis.net/messages/791703#message811227

  • Evaluation of #Emergency_Transit_Centres in Romania and the Slovak Republic

    Executive summary

    The Emergency Transit Centres were established to provide emergency protection and the possibility to evacuate refugees who could not be protected in their countries of asylum. Temporary relocation of refugees who required resettlement on an urgent or emergency basis to an Evacuation Transit Facility (ETF) was expected to serve five objectives, namely:

    Provide timely and effective protection to an individual or group of individuals of concern to UNHCR;

    Demonstrate a tangible form of burden‐ and responsibility‐sharing, enabling States not otherwise involved in emergency resettlement to accept cases from an ETF;

    Enable officials from UNHCR and resettlement countries to undertake interviews in a stable, safe and secure environment;

    Promote the subsequent realization of the durable solution of permanent resettlement; and - Encourage States hosting ETFs to become involved in resettlement.

    To date, three ETFs have become operational, namely the Emergency Transit Centres (ETCs) in Romania in 2008 and the Slovak Republic in 2011(although the Tri-Partite Agreement was signed in 2010), and the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in the Philippines in 2009. The ETCs are managed on the basis of Tri-Partite Agreements signed by their hosting governments, UNHCR and IOM. The ETC in Timisoara, Romania, can accommodate a maximum of 200 refugees, whereas the one in Humenné, Slovak Republic, a total of 150 refugees (from mid-2012 onwards). As of 30 September 2015, 1,717 refugees had departed from the ETC in Timisoara, and 797 refugees from Humenné to resettlement countries. Since 2012, the main resettlement countries using the two centres are the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and Finland, with the USA the sole resettlement country using Humenné since 2013.

    At the request of UNHCRs Resettlement Service in the Division of International Protection UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service commissioned an evaluation of the ETCs in Romania and the Slovak Republic. As the ETCs have been in place for seven (Timisoara) and four years (Humenné) respectively, the evaluation presented UNHCR with an opportunity to assess whether the objectives set out at their establishment have been met. A comparative approach was used to assess the functioning of the two ETCs. The evaluation’s main findings should inform the development of strategies to meet emergency resettlement needs. Additionally, the results of the evaluation contribute to reflections on minimum standards and on whether the ETCs should continue with the same or similar objectives, or if there are other objectives that could lead to enhanced protection dividends for refugees.

    The evaluation team was composed of one PDES staff member and one external evaluation consultant.

    The ETCs in Timisoara, Romania, and in Humenné, Slovak Republic, have been relevant and appropriate for UNHCR, IOM, the ETC-hosting governments, resettlement countries and refugees. The ETCs offer a mechanism to UNHCR to provide a safe environment for refugees pending resettlement processing, including those classified under emergency or urgent priority, and to realize the durable solution of resettlement. While the number of refugees with emergency prioritization is small relative to the total number of refugees transferred to the centres, interlocutors described the ETCs as “life-saving” and “indispensable” for those few high-profile or high-risk refugees. This function for the most compelling protection cases is seen as core to UNHCR’s protection mandate.

    The centres also have an advocacy function. This is of pivotal importance to UNHCR and the hosting countries, as the agency must be seen to be able to respond immediately to lifethreatening situations to provide immediate protection. Although the overall contribution to global resettlement figures is small, the positive change brought about by the immediate safety and security (and access to basic services) and the overall realization of resettlement for hundreds of refugees has considerable value. In the evaluation period from the beginning of 2012 until 30 September, 2015 a total of 1,568 refugees were resettled through the two ETCs. The life-saving dimension in compelling protection cases is seen as vital even if there are very few emergency cases.

    Moreover, ETCs provided resettlement countries (and the IOM as part of its Resettlement Service Centre function for the US-government) access to refugees to undertake activities necessary to complete the resettlement process, including the selection of municipalities in resettlement countries. Some countries, in particular the US, are unable to process emergency cases due to long and complicated state procedures. The existence of the ETCs allows the US to process resettlement cases of persons who have been evacuated, and thereby increase accessibility of resettlement to some refugees, even if not on an emergency basis. The centre in Humenné has gradually expanded into one which solely caters to US-government processing, while only Timisoara has received emergency cases due to the shorter Romanian government clearance, and the absence of visa requirements. For the ETC-hosting governments, Romania and the Slovak Republic, the centres provided an opportunity to show their solidarity with countries hosting large refugee case-loads, while neither providing a permanent home to larger groups of refugees nor carrying all the operational costs of these centres.

    While the coverage of the ETCs is in principle global, only refugees of some nationalities and countries of first asylum have been accommodated in the centres. Ad hoc planning and the obstacles experienced by some resettlement countries in the process of adjudication or completion of resettlement procedures, including selecting municipalities, has generally driven the use of ETCs. Most of the refugees transferred to the ETCs were resettled to the USA or the UK.

    Male and female refugees of all age groups have been transferred to the ETCs, although some restrictions have been imposed with respect to refugees with high medical needs, including serious mental health needs due to limitations of the ETCs with respect to providing services to persons with high medical needs. There have also been challenges in providing accommodation to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) refugees. Since 2014, Iraqi refugees from Syria for resettlement to the USA are no longer transferred due to the refusal of already pre-vetted cases during the period 2012 - 2014. This has resulted in traumatic experiences for the concerned refugees, as three of them have remained in Timisoara since 2012 without a durable solution. Although alternative resettlement countries have been found for most of the rejected cases, this created an extra burden for UNHCR as well as delays for the concerned refugees.

    The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.

    The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.

    The centres are respectively under the supervision of the UNHCR Country Representative in Bucharest, and the UNHCR Deputy Regional Representative of the Regional Representative Office for Central Europe (RRCE) in Budapest. The resulting reporting lines and management of the budgets has led to limited coordination to ensure commonalities in approach in terms of staffing and assistance provided. Thus, in Timisoara, three UNHCR staff (with UNHCR or UNOPS contracts) work in the centre. In the Slovak Republic, the only UNHCR staff member manages the centre on a UNOPS contract. The difference in ETC-level staffing cannot be fully justified on the basis of their capacity. The above has also led to different budgets and variations in IP capacity, responsibilities and assistance, with the division of responsibilities between the different actors in Timisoara resulting in an overstretched IP with reduced capacity for counseling and other refugee-oriented activities.

    As the host countries’ contributions are different in each of the ETCs, the contribution of UNHCR also differs, the biggest difference being that UNHCR pays the food costs in Timisoara, which amounted to between 40-49% of total expenditures in the period 2012-2014. The overall expenditures for Timisoara, excluding food costs ranged from USD 621,700 in 2012, USD 654,900 in 2013 to USD 657,000 in 2014. If food costs are included, the annual costs are USD 1,031,000 in 2012, USD 1,278,100 in 2013, USD 1,195,800 in 2014 and USD 1,157,000 in 2015. The ETC requires 51% (2015) to 60% (2012, 2013) of the total budget for the Romania operation. The overall expenditure for Humenné was USD 406,700 in 2012, USD 747,800 in 2013, USD 979,900 in 2014, and USD 666,700 in 2015 (first 11 months).

    The underutilization of the ETCs was regularly raised as a concern by interlocutors. Their occupancy rate has historically been relatively low. The average daily occupancy rate for Timisoara is between one third to one half, and for Humenné approximately half of its capacity. Considering the nature of emergency case handling, and the flexibility this requires, the ETCs must always have space available to receive cases with serious protection needs. However, the planning documents for the ETCs do not allocate a specific number of spaces for emergency evacuations. In addition, the turnover of refugees has been slower than envisaged, with some refugees submitted to the US overstaying the maximum period of six months. The overwhelming majority of refugees stay an average of four to five months. Capacity has generally been viewed in terms of the available number of beds instead of in relation to site and shelter space available.

    Minimum standards for ETCs have not been developed. The application of minimum humanitarian standards in the areas of shelter confirms that the centres would not fully comply with these criteria if used to capacity. As the ETCs have become a semi-permanent response mechanism in the resettlement process, it is necessary to consider developing minimum standards for ETCs to guarantee the well-being of refugees. These standards should be based for example on the Sphere minimum humanitarian standards for shelter and non-food items.1 The standards should also take into account the objectives of preparing refugees for life in a resettlement country.

    The Romanian government has received funds from the EU to upgrade an existing facility to house the ETC. Work is expected to begin in 2016 so that refugees could be accommodated in 2017. It is imperative that UNHCR seize the opportunity to be involved at the planning stage of this process in order to ensure that the physical set-up is conducive to providing adequate assistance and protection, and to preparing refugees for resettlement. Some input into planning would also allow cost-savings if, for example, kitchens were included so that refugees could cook for themselves.

    The utilization of the ETCs has also been viewed in connection with the selection of refugees, and the process of obtaining clearances and organizing the transfer to one of the centres. The ETCs are directly linked to UNHCR’s global resettlement operation through the ETC focal point in the Resettlement Service, UNHCR headquarters. UNHCR Field Offices and Regional Resettlement Hubs are vital in identifying refugees for whom transfer to the ETC is an appropriate solution. Yet not all resettlement staff are aware of the existence of these facilities or know how to use these centres. This can be partially attributed to outdated guidance notes and a gap between vision and practice, which has led to different views on the usage of these centres.

    The underutilization of the ETCs is also a consequence of the use of emergency priority quota and/or a direct transfer to the resettlement country, which is the preferred option for all parties. Other obstacles include lengthy exit procedures of some countries of asylum, and a bureaucratic and lengthy process to organize the transfer of cases. Additionally, the part-time nature of the ETC focal point at headquarters does not encourage a more pro-active advocacy role.

    There are some differences in the provision of protection and assistance in the two ETCs. The major protection deficit noted by the evaluation team was the application of “limited freedom of movement” in Romania. Article 2 (2) of the Tri-Partite Agreement states that refugees “shall be required to reside in the ETC facility designated by the Romanian government.” This provision has been implemented in a manner that restricts freedom of movement of refugees as they are not permitted to leave the centre unless escorted by the implementing partner. This limitation is extremely frustrating for refugees and leads to a degree of institutionalization.

    While most of the refugees interviewed during the mission were satisfied with the standards of assistance offered, they felt that their lives in the ETC were on hold and many expressed a desire to have a “normal” life and to move on quickly from the ETC. Especially in Timisoara, concerns were expressed regarding the difficulties arising from living with many other refugees in a relatively small area, including sharing rooms with other families and/or individuals, the limited to no freedom of movement, few opportunities for leisure and language training for adults, and a general sense of boredom. This has produced a living environment in which stress and tensions between individuals can more easily build up. Overall, the services provided in Humenné were more comprehensive than in Timisoara. This was reflected in the level of satisfaction expressed by refugees during the focus group discussions.

    Resettlement is by definition a partnership activity. Cooperation with external stakeholders was generally viewed as efficient and effective by all respondents. Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of Romania was regarded in a positive light, especially with respect to the limited time needed to process clearance requests, and the provision of identification documentation and security in the premises. However, the “limited freedom of movement” for refugees in the town, the lack of maintenance of the premises, and the regular provision of basic household items has led to some concern.

    Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of the Slovak Republic was generally considered efficient and effective by all interlocutors, despite some challenges in obtaining visas from embassies in countries of asylum or neighboring countries. The third partner to the agreements, IOM, has taken effective care of travel logistics, medical assessments and cultural orientation training. Possible challenges were ironed out in the beginning of these local partnerships. Some communication challenges were however noted at the field level in countries of asylum between UNHCR and IOM (and some ICRC delegations) due to staff turnover.

    A similar positive note can be recorded with regard to the cooperation between UNHCR and the nine resettlement countries that used the ETCs in the 2012-2015 period. However, concern was expressed about referring an adequate number of refugees for the US “pipeline” on the one hand, and the US speed of processing, both during the pre-vetting stage and the stay of refugees in the ETCs, on the other hand. The first issue was resolved in 2015 with stronger coordination taking place between the three partners: UNHCR, the US and IOM.

    The two ETCs have been effective to some degree considering the initial objectives established especially considering that a transfer can only be approved if a resettlement country is already identified. Only the centre in Timisoara was used for emergency priority cases in 2013 and 2014. An overall reduction of this function is visible during the period 2012-2015. However, for refugees classified under normal priority, the transfer to an ETC was still viewed as life-saving if evacuated from an unsafe situation.

    The majority of refugees were transferred to the ETCs to support either the processing of resettlement cases by means of interviews, biometrics or to find municipalities in the resettlement country. Providing opportunities for recovery and preparing for the integration process has only been achieved to some degree, depending on the situation in countries of asylum and the protection and assistance provided in the two centres. The centres have however supported the objective “potential for resettlement realized”. The overwhelming majority of refugees arriving in the ETCs actually departed for resettlement. The ETCs have therefore contributed to facilitating the resettlement process of some refugees that otherwise could not have been resettled.

    The main impact of the ETCs has been the provision of immediate and effective protection to refugees. Moreover, as a tangible form of responsibility-sharing, the centres have given Romania and the Slovak Republic the opportunity to present their contribution to the international protection regime in international fora. Romania established a resettlement programme with a quota of 40 refugees per year, with the first group of 38 refugees arriving in 2010, and the second group in 2014. The Slovak Republic also pledged, on a voluntary basis, 100 resettlement places in the period 2015-2017 towards the Council of the European Conclusions on Resettlement of 20 July 2015. However, arrivals under this programme are still pending.

    Given the current situation in Europe it could be argued that more responsibility-sharing could be expected, and the existence of the ETCs should not absolve these governments of the obligation to provide durable solutions to a greater number of refugees. The host governments might also be persuaded to contribute more resources to the running of the ETCs.

    The ETCs have contributed modestly to global resettlement figures and to reducing protracted refugee case-loads in countries of first asylum. But they have provided a safe alternative for cases that could not be transferred directly to resettlement countries, thereby offering the only available durable solution to these refugees. For some refugees, without the ETCs, there would simply be no possibility of resettlement.

    In conclusion, the evolution in the operation of the ETCs shows a move away from their original vision. In the words of one interlocutor “there is nothing emergency about this process.” This has resulted in a situation whereby the policies and practices of resettlement countries to a large extent actually determine the use of the ETCs. Internal factors further impact upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the centres. Thus, replacing the first word of the acronym “ETC” with resettlement (“Resettlement Transit Centres”) would actually give a clearer indication of the main purpose of these centres, namely to support the realization of this durable solution. This could then also cover possible shifts or changes in their functions as RTCs continue to respond to the needs of different stakeholders. The sustainability of these centres must also be viewed in relation to UNHCR’s responsibility to manage the “pipeline” in cooperation with resettlement states.

    The key recommendations of this evaluation are directed to DIP’s Resettlement Service, the RRCE and CO Romania.

    https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/575935d17_0.pdf
    #Roumanie #République_Tchèque #ETC #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #réinstallation #évacuation #protection_d'urgence #Evacuation_Transit_Facility (#ETF) #hub
    –-> document de 2016, mis ici pour archivage

    via @pascaline

  • After peace deal, a bittersweet homecoming for CAR refugees

    ‘If we want to facilitate repatriations, we need to reinforce schools, water points, health centres.’
    More than six months after rebel groups in the Central African Republic signed a peace deal with the government, a trickle of refugees is returning back to the shattered country, but one in four Central Africans remain either internally displaced or living in neighbouring states.

    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/photo-feature/2019/09/04/Central-African-Republic-refugees-peace-deal
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #retour_au_pays #République_centrafricaine #Centrafrique #Mongoumba #centres_de_transit

  • #Prague : Dernières mises à jour sur les amendes, ce qu’est devenu #Klinika et comment nous battre pour la ville
    https://fr.squat.net/2019/07/25/prague-dernieres-mises-a-jour-sur-les-amendes-ce-quest-devenu-klinika-et-c

    Amendes et frais Vous avez peut-être déjà entendu dire qu’un juge a réduit les honoraires de l’exécuteur testamentaire à « seulement » 900 000 CZK (oui, neuf cent mille, environ 36 000 EUR), ce qui, grâce à votre immense solidarité, semble avoir été perçu en grande partie. Cependant, ce n’est malheureusement pas la fin de la répression […]

    #République_Tchèque

  • Briefing: How Congo’s Ebola epidemic became the world’s second deadliest

    More than 11 months after an Ebola outbreak was declared in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the viral disease has claimed more than 1,500 lives, infected 2,244 people, and spread across the border into neighbouring Uganda, where two deaths and three suspected cases were reported mid-June. A new confirmed case just 43 miles from South Sudan’s border was reported Monday.


    https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/07/02/Ebola-outbreak-congo-epidemic-attacks-community
    #ébola #ebola #Congo #épidémie #RDC #république_Démocratique_du_congo #Ouganda
    ping @fil

  • The European benchmark for refugee integration: A comparative analysis of the National Integration Evaluation Mechanism in 14 EU countries

    The report presents a comparative, indicator-based assessment of the refugee integration frameworks in place in 14 countries: Czechia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

    Conclusions cover the full range of integration dimensions, such as housing, employment, education and aspects of legal integration, and refer to recognized refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.

    Legal and policy indicators are the focus of analysis, as well as indicators on mainstreaming, coordination and efforts to involve refugees and locals.

    Results are presented in terms of concrete steps that policymakers need to take in order to establish a refugee integration framework in line with the standards required by international and EU law.


    http://www.ismu.org/en/the-european-benchmark-for-refugee-integration-a-comparative-analysis-of-the-n

    #rapport #intégration #France #Grèce #République_Tchèque #Hongrie #Italie #Lettonie #Lituanie #Pays-Bas #Pologne #Portugal #Roumanie #Slovénie #Espagne #Suède #réfugiés #migrations #asile #regroupement_familial #citoyenneté #logement #hébergement #emploi #travail #intégration_professionnelle #éducation #santé #sécurité_sociale
    ping @karine4

  • #RDC : la #dépendance_agricole du #Katanga

    Elle est connue pour ses richesses minières. Mais on le dit assez peu, avec 80 millions d’hectares de terres arables, la RDC pourrait aussi devenir un géant agricole. Au lieu de quoi, elle importe une grande partie de ses denrées alimentaires de base.

    https://pbs.twimg.com/card_img/1137405822454181889/7tl5sZSh?format=png&name=600x314
    https://information.tv5monde.com/video/rdc-la-dependance-agricole-du-katanga
    #République_démocratique_du_Congo #alimentation #dépendance_alimentaire #importations

  • Un #barrage suisse sème le chaos en #Birmanie

    L’#Upper_Yeywa, un ouvrage hydroélectrique construit par le bureau d’ingénierie vaudois #Stucky, va noyer un village dont les habitants n’ont nulle part où aller. Il favorise aussi les exactions par l’armée. Reportage.

    Le village de #Ta_Long apparaît au détour de la route en gravier qui serpente au milieu des champs de maïs et des collines de terre rouge, donnant à ce paysage un air de Toscane des tropiques. Ses petites demeures en bambou sont encaissées au fond d’un vallon. Les villageois nous attendent dans la maison en bois sur pilotis qui leur sert de monastère bouddhiste et de salle communale. Nous sommes en terre #Shan, une ethnie minoritaire qui domine cette région montagneuse dans le nord-est de la Birmanie.

    « Je préférerais mourir que de partir, lance en guise de préambule Pu Kyung Num, un vieil homme aux bras recouverts de tatouages à l’encre bleue. Je suis né ici et nos ancêtres occupent ces terres depuis plus d’un millénaire. » Mais Ta Long ne sera bientôt plus.

    Un barrage hydroélectrique appelé Upper Yeywa est en cours de construction par un consortium comprenant des groupes chinois et le bureau d’ingénierie vaudois Stucky à une vingtaine de kilomètres au sud-ouest, sur la rivière #Namtu. Lors de sa mise en service, prévue pour 2021, toutes les terres situées à moins de 395 mètres d’altitude seront inondées. Ta Long, qui se trouve à 380 mètres, sera entièrement recouvert par un réservoir d’une soixantaine de kilomètres.

    « La construction du barrage a débuté en 2008 mais personne ne nous a rien dit jusqu’en 2014, s’emporte Nang Lao Kham, une dame vêtue d’un longyi, la pièce d’étoffe portée à la taille, à carreaux rose et bleu. Nous n’avons pas été consultés, ni même informés de son existence. » Ce n’est que six ans après le début des travaux que les villageois ont été convoqués dans la ville voisine de #Kyaukme par le Ministère de l’électricité. On leur apprend alors qu’ils devront bientôt partir.

    Pas de #titres_de_propriété

    En Birmanie, toutes les #terres pour lesquelles il n’existe pas de titres de propriété – ainsi que les ressources naturelles qu’elles abritent – appartiennent au gouvernement central. Dans les campagnes birmanes, où la propriété est communautaire, personne ne possède ces documents. « Nous ne quitterons jamais notre village, assure Nang Lao Kham, en mâchouillant une graine de tournesol. Nous sommes de simples paysans sans éducation. Nous ne savons rien faire d’autre que cultiver nos terres. »

    Le gouvernement ne leur a pas proposé d’alternative viable. « Une brochure d’information publiée il y a quelques années parlait de les reloger à trois kilomètres du village actuel, mais ce site est déjà occupé par d’autres paysans », détaille Thum Ai, du Shan Farmer’s Network, une ONG locale. Le montant de la compensation n’a jamais été articulé. Ailleurs dans le pays, les paysans chassés de leurs terres pour faire de la place à un projet d’infrastructure ont reçu entre six et douze mois de salaire. Certains rien du tout.

    Ta Long compte 653 habitants et 315 hectares de terres arables. Pour atteindre leurs vergers, situés le long de la rivière Namtu, les villageois empruntent de longues pirogues en bois. « La terre est extrêmement fertile ici, grâce aux sédiments apportés par le fleuve », glisse Kham Lao en plaçant des oranges et des pomélos dans un panier en osier.

    Les #agrumes de Ta Long sont connus loin à la ronde. « Mes fruits me rapportent 10 800 dollars par an », raconte-t-elle. Bien au-delà des maigres 3000 dollars amassés par les cultivateurs de riz des plaines centrales. « Depuis que j’ai appris l’existence du barrage, je ne dors plus la nuit, poursuit cette femme de 30 ans qui est enceinte de son troisième enfant. Comment vais-je subvenir aux besoins de mes parents et payer l’éducation de mes enfants sans mes #vergers ? »

    Cinq barrages de la puissance de la Grande Dixence

    La rivière Namtu puise ses origines dans les #montagnes du nord de l’Etat de Shan avant de rejoindre le fleuve Irrawaddy et de se jeter dans la baie du Bengale. Outre l’Upper Yeywa, trois autres barrages sont prévus sur ce cours d’eau. Un autre, le Yeywa a été inauguré en 2010. Ces cinq barrages auront une capacité de près de 2000 mégawatts, l’équivalent de la Grande Dixence.

    Ce projet s’inscrit dans le cadre d’un plan qui a pour but de construire 50 barrages sur l’ensemble du territoire birman à l’horizon 2035. Cela fera passer les capacités hydroélectriques du pays de 3298 à 45 412 mégawatts, selon un rapport de l’International Finance Corporation. Les besoins sont immenses : seulement 40% de la population est connectée au réseau électrique.

    L’Etat y voit aussi une source de revenus. « Une bonne partie de l’électricité produite par ces barrages est destinée à être exportée vers les pays voisins, en premier lieu la #Chine et la #Thaïlande, note Mark Farmaner, le fondateur de Burma Campaign UK. Les populations locales n’en bénéficieront que très peu. » Près de 90% des 6000 mégawatts générés par le projet Myitsone dans l’Etat voisin du Kachin, suspendu depuis 2011 en raison de l’opposition de la population, iront à la province chinoise du Yunnan.

    Les plans de la Chine

    L’Upper Yeywa connaîtra sans doute un sort similaire. « Le barrage est relativement proche de la frontière chinoise, note Charm Tong, de la Shan Human Rights Foundation. Y exporter son électricité représenterait un débouché naturel. » L’Etat de Shan se trouve en effet sur le tracé du corridor économique que Pékin cherche à bâtir à travers la Birmanie, entre le Yunnan et la baie du Bengale, dans le cadre de son projet « #Belt_&_Road ».

    Le barrage Upper Yeywa y est affilié. Il compte deux entreprises chinoises parmi ses constructeurs, #Yunnan_Machinery Import & Export et #Zhejiang_Orient_Engineering. Le suisse Stucky œuvre à leurs côtés. Fondé en 1926 par l’ingénieur Alfred Stucky, ce bureau installé à Renens est spécialisé dans la conception de barrages.

    Il a notamment contribué à l’ouvrage turc #Deriner, l’un des plus élevés du monde. Il a aussi pris part à des projets en #Angola, en #Iran, en #Arabie_saoudite et en #République_démocratique_du_Congo. Depuis 2013, il appartient au groupe bâlois #Gruner.

    Le chantier du barrage, désormais à moitié achevé, occupe les berges escarpées de la rivière. Elles ont été drapées d’une coque de béton afin d’éviter les éboulements. De loin, on dirait que la #montagne a été grossièrement taillée à la hache. L’ouvrage, qui fera entre 97 et 102 mètres, aura une capacité de 320 mégawatts.

    Son #coût n’a pas été rendu public. « Mais rien que ces deux dernières années, le gouvernement lui a alloué 7,4 milliards de kyats (5 millions de francs) », indique Htun Nyan, un parlementaire local affilié au NLD, le parti au pouvoir de l’ancienne Prix Nobel de la paix Aung San Suu Kyi. Une partie de ces fonds proviennent d’un prêt chinois octroyé par #Exim_Bank, un établissement qui finance la plupart des projets liés à « Belt & Road ».

    Zone de conflit

    Pour atteindre le hameau de #Nawng_Kwang, à une vingtaine de kilomètres au nord du barrage, il faut emprunter un chemin de terre cabossé qui traverse une forêt de teck. Cinq hommes portant des kalachnikovs barrent soudain la route. Cette région se trouve au cœur d’une zone de #conflit entre #milices ethniques.

    Les combats opposent le #Restoration_Council_of_Shan_State (#RCSS), affilié à l’#armée depuis la conclusion d’un cessez-le-feu, et le #Shan_State_Progress_Party (#SSPP), proche de Pékin. Nos hommes font partie du RCSS. Ils fouillent la voiture, puis nous laissent passer.

    Nam Kham Sar, une jeune femme de 27 ans aux joues recouvertes de thanaka, une pâte jaune que les Birmans portent pour se protéger du soleil, nous attend à Nawng Kwang. Elle a perdu son mari Ar Kyit en mai 2016. « Il a été blessé au cou par des miliciens alors qu’il ramenait ses buffles », relate-t-elle. Son frère et son cousin sont venus le chercher, mais les trois hommes ont été interceptés par des soldats de l’armée régulière.

    « Ils ont dû porter l’eau et les sacs à dos des militaires durant plusieurs jours, relate-t-elle. Puis, ils ont été interrogés et torturés à mort. » Leurs corps ont été brûlés. « Mon fils avait à peine 10 mois lorsque son papa a été tué », soupire Nam Kham Sar, une larme coulant le long de sa joue.

    Vider les campagnes ?

    La plupart des hameaux alentour subissent régulièrement ce genre d’assaut. En mai 2016, cinq hommes ont été tués par des soldats dans le village voisin de Wo Long. L’armée a aussi brûlé des maisons, pillé des vivres et bombardé des paysans depuis un hélicoptère. En août 2018, des villageois ont été battus et enfermés dans un enclos durant plusieurs jours sans vivres ; d’autres ont servi de boucliers humains aux troupes pour repérer les mines.

    Les résidents en sont convaincus : il s’agit d’opérations de #nettoyage destinées à #vider_les_campagnes pour faire de la place au barrage. « Ces décès ne sont pas des accidents, assure Tun Win, un parlementaire local. L’armée cherche à intimider les paysans. » Une trentaine de militaires sont stationnés en permanence sur une colline surplombant le barrage, afin de le protéger. En mars 2018, ils ont abattu deux hommes circulant à moto.

    Dans la population, la colère gronde. Plusieurs milliers de manifestants sont descendus dans la rue à plusieurs reprises à #Hsipaw, la ville la plus proche du barrage. Les habitants de Ta Long ont aussi écrit une lettre à la première ministre Aung San Suu Kyi, restée sans réponse. En décembre, une délégation de villageois s’est rendue à Yangon. Ils ont délivré une lettre à sept ambassades, dont celle de Suisse, pour dénoncer le barrage.

    « L’#hypocrisie de la Suisse »

    Contacté, l’ambassadeur helvétique Tim Enderlin affirme n’avoir jamais reçu la missive. « Cette affaire concerne une entreprise privée », dit-il, tout en précisant que « l’ambassade encourage les entreprises suisses en Birmanie à adopter un comportement responsable, surtout dans les zones de conflit ».

    La Shan Human Rights Foundation dénonce toutefois « l’hypocrisie de la Suisse qui soutient le #processus_de_paix en Birmanie mais dont les entreprises nouent des partenariats opportunistes avec le gouvernement pour profiter des ressources situées dans des zones de guerre ».

    La conseillère nationale socialiste Laurence Fehlmann Rielle, qui préside l’Association Suisse-Birmanie, rappelle que l’#initiative_pour_des_multinationales_responsables, sur laquelle le Conseil national se penchera jeudi prochain, « introduirait des obligations en matière de respect des droits de l’homme pour les firmes suisses ». Mardi, elle posera une question au Conseil fédéral concernant l’implication de Stucky dans le barrage Upper Yeywa.

    Contactée, l’entreprise n’a pas souhaité s’exprimer. D’autres sociétés se montrent plus prudentes quant à leur image. Fin janvier, le bureau d’ingénierie allemand #Lahmeyer, qui appartient au belge #Engie-Tractebel, a annoncé qu’il se retirait du projet et avait « rompu le contrat » le liant au groupe vaudois.

    https://www.letemps.ch/monde/un-barrage-suisse-seme-chaos-birmanie
    #Suisse #barrage_hydroélectrique #géographie_du_plein #géographie_du_vide #extractivisme
    ping @aude_v @reka

  • #PLAIDOYER POUR L’OUVERTURE DES FRONTIÈRES ET LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES ÊTRES HUMAINS À L’ÉCHELLE MONDIALE : CAS DE LA DIASPORA DE LA RD CONGO.

    https://www.emmaus-international.org/images/site/menu/qui-sommes-nous/emmaus-monde/europe/danemark/GTU/docs_FR/Julien_K_M_Murhula_migration.pdf
    #RDC #Congo #République_démocratique_du_congo #ouverture_des_frontières #libre_circulation

    signalé par @karine4, qui commente :

    dans ce plaidoyer pour l’ouverture des frontières écrit par un Congolais de la diaspora, beaucoup d’éléments sur les #transferts_financiers, notamment en comparaison avec l’#aide_publique_au_développement.

    #APD #remittances

  • Faire le pari de la société contre la politique du pire
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/190519/faire-le-pari-de-la-societe-contre-la-politique-du-pire

    Plutôt le Rassemblement national que le mouvement social ! Après les avoir violemment réprimés, Emmanuel Macron entend congédier les « gilets jaunes » par la promotion électorale de l’extrême droite en seul adversaire de sa politique. Cette politique du pire est un hommage paradoxal à la nouveauté démocratique et sociale du mouvement.

    #Parti_pris #République_démocratique_et_sociale,_extrême_droite,_gilets_jaunes,_Emmanuel_Macron

  • #Poland: The Bosses Need #Immigrants — The Spark #1080
    https://the-spark.net/np1080403.html
    Translated from Lutte Ouvrière, the newspaper of the revolutionary workers group of that name active in France : “#Pologne : les patrons ont besoin des migrants… que le gouvernement dénonce”
    https://journal.lutte-ouvriere.org/2019/04/24/pologne-les-patrons-ont-besoin-des-migrants-que-le-gouvernem #émigration #Russie #République_tchèque #Slovaquie #xénophobie #marché_du_travail

  • Agriculture en RDC : un collectif d’associations appelle à soutenir les familles plutôt que les industriels
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/04/17/agriculture-en-rdc-un-collectif-d-associations-appelle-a-soutenir-les-famill

    « Nous demandons à la Banque mondiale et à la Banque africaine de développement de soutenir en priorité l’agriculture familiale et le désenclavement des zones rurales », a déclaré ce collectif de quatre associations au cours d’une conférence de presse mardi à Kinshasa.

    Ces associations demandent à la Banque mondiale de « tirer les leçons de la débâcle » du parc agro-industriel de Bukanga Lonzo, une exploitation de 75 000 hectares lancée en 2014 sous la présidence de Joseph Kabila à 220 km à l’est de la capitale. Avec l’appui d’un partenaire sud-africain, Africom Commodities, les autorités congolaises voulaient dépasser la petite agriculture de subsistance.
    « Concentration de la richesse »

    Le projet n’a jamais véritablement été mis en œuvre hormis l’ouverture de six points de vente à Kinshasa, mégalopole de 12 millions d’habitants. La production est au point mort. Africom réclame à la RDC le remboursement de 20 millions de dollars (17,67 millions d’euros).

    Africom est une entreprise sud-africaine
    #agriculture #agro-industrie

  • Le #WWF accusé de «#colonialisme_vert» au #Congo - Page 2 | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/200319/le-wwf-accuse-de-colonialisme-vert-au-congo?page_article=2
    #republique_du_congo
    #terres
    #conservation

    « Le système occidental de conservation se fait généralement contre les populations »
    Au moins une partie des personnes concernées manifestent depuis longtemps leur opposition au projet de parc. Fiore Longo rapporte avoir rencontré en février une douzaine de communautés locales disant toutes leur désaccord. Une situation que le WWF connaît : en 2017, une étude qu’il a financée a montré, elle aussi, qu’une partie des habitants étaient « réticents à l’idée de la présence d’un parc ». Pour l’instant, le WWF a surtout facilité des négociations entre l’État congolais et deux grosses #entreprises_forestières : le parc national tel qu’il a été envisagé couvre une petite partie de leurs concessions, à laquelle il faudrait donc qu’elles acceptent de renoncer. L’ONG au panda a aussi eu des discussions avec les autorités pour les convaincre d’annuler des permis miniers accordés dans Messok-Dja.

    Pour le journaliste allemand Wilfried Huismann, auteur d’un livre et d’un film critiques sur le WWF, il n’y a pas grand-chose à attendre de ce dernier en matière de respect des droits des populations locales : « Le WWF a toujours vu dans les #peuples_autochtones du Sud une source potentielle de danger pour la nature pure et intacte. C’est un modèle de conservation raciste qui est dans ses gènes », a-t-il dit dans un récent entretien avec Der Spiegel.

    La controverse autour de Messok-Dja a un mérite : elle remet la lumière sur l’échec de la politique de conservation introduite dans la région par la colonisation européenne. Malgré l’évolution des discours et des règles, la création de parcs et autres surfaces de protection reste associée à l’expulsion de ceux qui y vivent. Ces aires protégées couvrent aujourd’hui 9,8 % du bassin du Congo, contre 0,12 % attribuées formellement aux communautés forestières. Elles remplissent mal leur objectif de conservation : la biodiversité est en déclin dans près de 50 % des aires protégées établies dans des forêts tropicales dans le monde, selon une étude scientifique publiée en 2012 qui a pris en compte l’Afrique. Le WWF n’a pour sa part pas été en mesure de fournir à Mediapart un bilan du système de conservation dans le bassin du Congo.

    Samuel Nguiffo, qui dirige une #ONG camerounaise, le Centre pour l’environnement et le développement (CED), fait partie de ceux qui constatent depuis longtemps les limites de cette politique. « Le système occidental de conservation est conçu par des biologistes et se fait généralement contre les #populations, alors que ces dernières ne sont pas forcément opposées à l’idée de conservation, souligne-t-il. Nous avons des croyances selon lesquelles la nature est un être vivant, capable de réfléchir, d’agir et de punir. Nous avons des habitudes de conservation, avec des forêts sacrées, des interdits sur des animaux qu’on ne tue pas à certains endroits et certains moments, etc. La conservation aurait pu être construite sur ces fondements. Quand ils se voient imposer, sans explication suffisante, des restrictions d’usage et d’accès, les gens ne comprennent pas. »

    Aujourd’hui, les traditions ne permettent pas de protéger l’environnement à grande échelle, en particulier là où la démographie et la pression sur les ressources augmentent. « Il est donc important de trouver un mécanisme de protection. Mais avec un impératif : les communautés locales doivent avoir une responsabilité dans la gestion. Il faut avant tout répondre à leurs besoins de développement local, créer une relation de confiance, et avec elles faire de l’aménagement du territoire », insiste Samuel Nguiffo.

    Dans l’immédiat, le WWF et ses bailleurs de fonds doivent gérer le feu déclenché par Buzzfeed, qui fait se multiplier les réactions. L’ONG britannique Rainforest Foundation UK (RFUK) a demandé par exemple à la Commission européenne de prendre ses responsabilités en ordonnant une enquête indépendante sur les financements qu’elle a donnés aux aires protégées du bassin du Congo – soit au moins 258 millions d’euros en vingt-sept ans. En 2016, cette organisation avait elle-même rassemblé de nombreuses preuves de violations des droits de l’homme commises dans au moins neuf de ces zones protégées bénéficiant du soutien de l’UE. La Commission européenne a jusqu’ici ignoré ses données, tout comme celles de Survival.

  • A #Ladispoli una piazza per #Almirante. Anpi: «Tra trent’anni intitoleremo vie a Mussolini»

    Una piazza dedicata a #Giorgio_Almirante, la piazza più grande di Ladispoli. È questa la decisione della giunta di centrodestra guidata dal sindaco #Alessandro_Grando che ha suscitato lo sdegno dell’Anpi e di tanti ladispolani che scesi in piazza a protestare in occasione della cerimonia di intitolazione. «La costituzione è antifascista», o «#No Piazza Almirante» e foto dei rastrellamenti contro gli ebrei: sono questi gli striscioni che accompagnavano la manifestazione sulle note di Bella Ciao. Alla cerimonia, invece, a difendere la memoria di Giorgio Almirante c’era la figlia Giuliana De Medici: «Le persone che protestano non conoscono la storia, all’epoca erano tutti fascisti». Davanti alla nuova piazza non è mancato chi, sulle note dei vecchi comizi di Almirante, si è esibito in un saluto romano.


    https://video.repubblica.it/edizione/roma/a-ladispoli-una-piazza-per-almirante-anpi-tra-trent-anni-intitoleremo-vie-a-mussolini/329671/330272?ref=fbpr
    #extrême_droite #Italie #toponymie #fascisme #noms_de_rue #toponymie_politique

    ping @albertocampiphoto @wizo

  • #Prague : Appel à la solidarité de #Klinika
    https://fr.squat.net/2019/02/18/prague-appel-a-la-solidarite-de-klinika

    En janvier 2019, le seul squat politique de Prague, Klinika, a été évacué par un huissier et une service de sécurité privés. Pendant 4 ans, ce centre social autogéré était un espace de rencontres pour les mouvements sociaux d’émancipation, les voisins et la culture indépendante. Alors que Klinika constituait un des premiers centres tchèques d’aide […]

    #expulsion #République_Tchèque

  • Israel wants to deport 300 refugees to one of the world’s most dangerous countries

    It was nine years ago that Julie Wabiwa Juliette narrowly fled her home in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for Israel, where she has since built a life. Juliette, 33, married another Congolese refugee, Christian Mutunwa, and together they raise two children.

    The Congolese are legal residents of Israel, with some in the community having lived in the country for 20 years. The majority arrived between 1999 and 2009, during and following the Second Congo war, considered the world’s deadliest crisis since World War II. Until now, the Congolese, 3o0 in total, were protected under a policy referred to by the Interior Ministry as “general temporary protection.” They have B1 visas, which entitles them to live and work in Israel as any other foreign nationals do. Moreover, each of them also has a pending asylum request.

    This is in contrast with the much larger population of Sudanese and Eritreans, who are regarded by the government as “illegal infiltrators” and have no legal status.

    Now, Israel seeks to deport the Congolese. In October 2018, the Interior Ministry announced that Congolese group protection would terminate on January 5, at which point they would be forced to leave. The decision was made by Interior Minister Aryeh Deri based on an assessment by the Foreign Ministry that there is “no impediment to the expatriation” of Israel’s Congolese population.

    Not a single Congolese asylum seeker abided by the state’s deadline. It passed without much fanfare, after which the Interior Ministry issued 10 deportation notices, while rejecting a number of visa renewal applications. The Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, an Israeli NGO that protects the rights of asylum seekers, migrant workers, and victims of human trafficking, successfully appealed to the Jerusalem District Court, which suspended the deportations and forced the state to continue renewing the visas. The Interior Ministry has until February 20 to appeal the court’s decision.

    “The court was on our side and made the state continue to renew visas,” says Shira Abbo, spokesperson for the Hotline. “For now, the Congolese are safe.”

    Their future, however, remains uncertain. Sabine Hadad, spokesperson for the Israeli Interior Ministry’s Population and Immigration Authority, confirmed that despite the delays, the ministry has decided to “stop the collective protection for Congolese in Israel.” Hadad says the Interior Ministry will then look into those with open asylum requests; the community will continue to receive work permit visas until an official decision is handed down.

    Less than one percent of asylum claimants in Israel receives refugee status, according to Hotline. “Our experience with the Israeli asylum system is not a good one,” says Abbo. “We know that the system is designed to reject everyone.”

    A rejection means deportation or staying in Israel illegally like Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers. For many in the Congolese community, repatriation is a death sentence. Israel is the only country to revoke protection for its Congolese refugee community.

    Julie Wabiwa Juliette tells me about the circumstances in which she left her hometown of Bukavu in the DRC as we sit in her colorful, sparsely decorated apartment in Holon. Her two children, Yonatan, 8, and Joanna, 5, greet me in French, the official language in their parents’ home country, although they also speak Hebrew. They were both born in Israel.

    Bukavu, a small city of just under a million inhabitants, is situated on the southern banks of Lake Kivu on Congo’s eastern most border. Remnants of colonialism are apparent even in its skyline. The bright roofs of the more than 100 Art Deco buildings constructed by the Belgians a century ago dot the hillsides. Just a stone’s throw away is Rwanda, on the opposite side of the Ruzizi River.

    It is in this otherwise picturesque landscape where much of the conflict that has ravaged the DRC for more than two decades has taken place.

    The Congolese eventually bucked the Belgian colonial yolk in 1960 and the Republic of Congo became a sovereign nation. Military dictator Mobutu Sese Seko changed the name to Zaire in 1971. The Central African nation was an American Cold War proxy but floundered following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and subsequent withdrawal of U.S. support.

    The First Congo War began two years after the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which precipitated a refugee crisis in eastern Zaire. The 1996 rebellion, backed by a coalition of Central African countries — though primarily fomented by Rwanda — resulted in a new government and a new name, the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    Less than a year later, the Second Congo war erupted. The conflict was so brutal that aid groups deemed sexual violence in DRC to be a “weapon of war.” The war formally concluded in 2003, but in eastern Congo the fighting never stopped. The region is home to the vast majority of the 70 armed groups currently fighting, according the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

    Juliette left Bukavu in 2009. She was in her third year of university, while working on her final thesis for her bachelor’s degree in sociology, which focused on the reentrance into society by victims of rape.

    Juliette’s research was conducted in rural villages that were a couple of hours drive from the city. She worked with a hospital team to collect testimonies from women who were abducted and assaulted during the fighting; many returned pregnant with their attacker’s child. Though the idea of raising the child of the man who raped them is unimaginable, abortion is taboo in rural Congo and carries a high risk of complication.

    Many assumed the numerous rebel militias operating in eastern Congo were responsible for the atrocities. Juliette uncovered evidence that a high-ranking local commander of the DRC military gave direct orders to commit mass rape.

    “It was too much for me when I come back from the field and I’ve heard all the screams, all the atrocities,” Juliette says. “To stay quiet was not for me.” But in Congo, that is not so simple. “I wanted to tell the truth, but once you talk about something, you must count your days.”

    She shared her research with Bruno Koko Chirambiza, a radio journalist at Star Radio in Bukavu, who named the commander, accusing him of orchestrating the rape.

    The mere mention of Chirambiza’s name brings tears to Juliette’s eyes. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, he was murdered by eight assailants on August 24, 2009 at the age of 24. “Many activists, many journalists don’t have long lives in Congo,” Juliette says. According to CPJ, Koko was the third Congolese journalist to be murdered in two years.

    Soldiers, who Juliette believes were acting at the behest of the commander named in Chirambiza’s report, searched for Juliette’s at her aunt’s house. She happened to be out of the house when they arrived, so they sexually assaulted her cousin and came back the next morning. Juliette was resolute to remain in DRC and might not have left if were it not for her now-husband.

    Juliette and Christian Mutunwa were partners back in DRC. Mutunwa, a human rights activist, fled in 2007, after uniformed police officers who claimed they were from the DRC’s intelligence service, Agence Nationale de Renseignement, came to his home. They wanted to bring him in for “interrogation.”

    “I knew if they took me this so-called interrogation process, I would not come back,” Mutunwa says. So he left, spending a few months in Egypt where refugee protection was “nonexistent.” A fellow asylum seeker there told him that there was a democratic country on the other side of the border.

    He then went to Israel where he received asylum protection. Mutunwa encouraged Juliette to join him.

    Juliette managed to get a visa to go to Israel with a delegation of Christians traveling to the holy land. She didn’t know much about Israel except its importance in Christianity. “We talked about Israel every time in church,” Julie remembers. “We prayed for peace in Israel.” She remained in the country after the delegation returned home, and applied for asylum.

    Juliette and Mutunwa are now married and raise their two children in Holon, which, along with neighboring Bat Yam, is where the majority of the Congolese community lives. They support their children by working in Tel Aviv hotels. Six days a week, Juliette rises before dawn to be at work by 5 a.m., and often won’t return home until late afternoon.

    Neither Julietter nor Mutunwa feel integrated into Israeli society. “I’m not a free woman,” says Juliette. “I can’t do what I know I can do.” They yearn for a change in their home country so they can safely return.

    After 18 years of autocracy under Joseph Kabila, DRC elected a new president, Félix Tshisekedi, in December of last year. The Congolese in Israel can only wait and hope he effects true change, and that Israel will give them the time they need to wait for that to happen.

    “Home is home,” she explains. “We didn’t come here to stay for life.”

    It is unclear why Israeli authorities decided to act now. Human rights organizations speculate that the government wants to flex its muscles following the failed deportation of the Eritreans and Sudanese in the beginning of 2018.

    The timing could not be worse. The presidential election has brought about an increase in violence. The political instability, coupled with the second deadliest Ebola outbreak in recorded history, has left the country struggling once again.

    Annick Bouvier, spokesperson for the Great Lakes region at the International Committee of the Red Cross, says that 2018 saw a deterioration of the humanitarian situation in eastern Congo “as a result of the fragmentation of armed groups and increased crime.” According to Bouvier, ICRC’s response to the Ebola outbreak has been “temporarily paralyzed” by the violence.

    The DRC is also the second worst place to be a woman, according to Amnesty International. “Wherever clashes occur, women find themselves at heightened risk of all forms of violence,” says Joao Martins, Médecins Sans Frontières head of mission for South Kivu in eastern DRC. “This is particularly the case in pockets of conflict across eastern DRC.”

    Emilie Serralta, a researcher for Amnesty International in DRC, condemned the government’s response to war crimes perpetrated by state actors as “inadequate.” Amnesty reports that a single high-ranking officer, General Jérôme Kakwavu, has been found guilty of war crimes. He is the exception; the other military commanders, says Serralta, are “untouchable.”

    Meanwhile, the commander named by Juliette and Chirambiza has never faced justice for his crimes. In fact, says Juliette, the government promoted him.

    “I am afraid for my life, for my family, and for my kids,” says Juliette about the prospect of her deportation. “I don’t see myself going back to a place where I didn’t even have the power to save my own life.”

    https://972mag.com/israel-wants-to-deport-300-refugees-to-one-of-the-worlds-most-dangerous-countries/140169
    #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Israël #RDC #république_démocratique_du_congo #réfugiés_congolais

  • Une histoire des #micro-états

    #Paradis_fiscaux : une longue histoire ?

    Indissociables du fonctionnement de l’économie mondiale, les paradis fiscaux, du #Luxembourg aux #îles_Caïman, de l’état américain du #Delaware au #Panama en passant par la #Suisse n’ont pas toujours bénéficié de leur récente surexposition médiatique. Retour sur une histoire qui remonte au XIXe siècle.

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/la-fabrique-de-lhistoire/une-histoire-des-micro-etats-14-paradis-fiscaux-une-longue-histoire

    Le #Vatican, un Etat à part ?

    Créé le 11 février 1929 par les #accords_du_Latran, le Vatican est avec moins de 900 habitants le plus petit état souverain du monde. Mais le Saint-Siège, état théocratique où le pape dispose d’un pouvoir absolu, se considère-t-il comme un micro-état ?

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/la-fabrique-de-lhistoire/une-histoire-des-micro-etats-24-le-vatican-un-etat-a-part

    L’Etat libre de #Fiume (1919-1924)

    A la suite du #Traité_de_Versailles et de la paix de 1919, l’Italie a récupéré le #Trentin et #Trieste, mais malgré l’ampleur de ses protestations, d’autres territoires convoités n’ont pas été obtenus. Fiume, en #Dalmatie, symbolise cette frustration devant une « victoire mutilée ».

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/la-fabrique-de-lhistoire/une-histoire-des-micro-etats-34-letat-libre-de-fiume-1919-1924


    #histoire

    Et le 4ème épisode, sur la #république_des_Escartons :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/758082

    #micro-nations