• Unusual roundup of Eritrean refugees

    A serious and very unusual roundup of Eritrean refugees is underway in Khartoum this week. Security forces are targeting refugees and their establishments, in particular, refugees from Eritrea. Hungry security squads are hunting the helpless refugees from wherever they are: streets, workplaces, and even from their homes. Whoever caught by the security is asked to pay 50,000 or more to be released. Very unfortunately, Eritrean refugees are terrorized and in hiding to save their lives, including who have legal documents from the government and who are recognized by UNHCR.

    This unprecedented and well organized move against Eritrean refugees has no one anticipated. And no one has a clue about the motive behind it. It may have any link with the recent visits to Asmara by the Sudanese authorities. If that is the case, these refugees are in real or in an imminent danger that requires an immediate attention from the international community. The security officers are asking their nationality before they put them on trucks. It’s very worrisome situation for refugees who have no protection from the host country or from their own representative in the country. United Nations and other humanitarian organizations, including UNHCR have the obligation to intervene and save innocent lives. The situation is very alarming and heartbreaking that needs an urgent attention from whoever is engaged in humanitarian works.

    I want to stress that this information is a real that is happening now and continues to happen on innocent people who have no crime or misconduct, their only crime being that they are refugees who fled repression and asked protection in other country. As humans, they don’t deserve protection? They do, in fact, international community shouldn’t wait a second to act; it’s a matter of urgency. Have a look on the pictures below; refugees are under attack, horror, and terror from security and gangs.

    https://africamonitors.org/2019/12/14/unusual-roundup-of-eritrean-refugees-underway/amp
    #rafles #réfugiés_érythréens #Soudan #Khartoum #asile #migrations #réfugiés #enlèvements #prisons #emprisonnement

    @isskein

    • The plight of Eritrean refugees in Sudan: an appeal to the UNHCR

      To:

      UNHCR Khartoum Office, the Sudan

      Sudan Commission for Refugees (COR)

      Higher Council for Community Development

      Excellencies,

      It is to be recalled that on 30 October 2019, a symposium was organized in Khartoum attended by representatives of the Sudanese Ministry of Labor as well as one representative from each of the caseloads of refugees in the Sudan from Eritrea, S. Sudan, Ethiopia, the Congo, Yemen and Syria.

      At the said symposium, the Sudanese authorities and the local UNHCR Office have reached the agreement that refugees in the Sudan can be allowed training and work opportunities like Sudanese citizens, except in security and military spheres. Sadly, this accord was not formally conveyed to the concerned refugees in a manner that they can understand nor did the concerned authorities initiate the pledged training opportunities. Instead, refugees are this month being rounded up from their homes, workplaces and from the streets and taken to prison. Their incarcerators claim that the refugees, including those who held residence permits as of 2000 from the Immigration Ministry, have no work permits. To add insult to injury, the Sudanese “law enforcers” are asking the detained refugees to buy their freedom by paying between 50,000 and 100,000 Sudanese pounds.

      We the undersigned Eritrean political and civic forces demand the most immediate action on the following:

      The Sudanese authorities to stop the unjust action taken and being taken against Eritrean and other refugees in the host country;
      To let the refugees taken from workplaces to safely return to their jobs;
      To release without pre-conditions all detained refugees and respect the right of those refugees already holding residence permits to stay in the Sudan as refugees;
      To provide training courses to refugees as pledged, and to pay back the money taken from refugees who were asked to pay up to 100,000 pounds for their release from prison.

      Likewise, we urge the UNHCR to follow up the implementation of the agreement reached with the Sudanese authorities and the COR at the symposium of 30 October 2019 and protect the rights of victimized Eritrean refugees.

      No one can ignore or forget the historic warm welcome and support of the Sudanese people to Eritrean refugees, and we still call with strong hope the Sudanese Government to pursue fraternal relations that can strengthen existing bonds between our peoples. There is no doubt that Eritreans still take the Sudan as their second home.

      Respectfully yours,

      Eritrean National Council for Democratic Change (ENCDC);
      Eritrean People’s Democratic Party (EPDP);
      United Eritreans for Justice (UEJ)
      Unity for Democratic change (UDC)
      Eritrean National Front (ENF)

      https://eritreahub.org/the-plight-of-eritrean-refugees-in-sudan-an-appeal-to-the-unhcr

    • Un ami érythréen, qui suit cela de près, vient de me dire que cela fait 3 semaines que les rafles continuent, que les érythréens (et que les Erythréens, pas les migrants d’autres nationalités présents au Soudan, comme les Ethiopiens ou les Somaliens ou les Syriens, qui, eux, ne sont pas enlevés).

      Il me conseille 2 chaînes youtube, qui donnent des news en tigrinya :

      #Mestyat_Betna (la chaîne à suivre selon lui) :
      https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCoycGm-M8WgaZhBGOJYqg_Q
      –-> voir notamment cette #vidéo :
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTNfQiBzjCc


      Mestyat Betna habite en Allemagne.

      –----

      Fnan App Infotech (sport surtout et questions politiques) :
      https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC00qOUnbRX1JgBV4RV1eSRw/videos?disable_polymer=1

  • Africa: povertà e denutrizione in aumento nonostante la crescita economica e l’aumento dell’import di prodotti agro-industriali

    L’Africa nel suo insieme, nonostante i progressi intrapresi a partire dall’inizio del nuovo millennio, si presenta tutt’oggi, sia dal punto di vista economico che sociale, come il continente meno sviluppato.

    Sotto il primo aspetto, benché la ricchezza prodotta dall’intero continente, secondo l’Ocse, sia triplicata fra il 2000 e il 2016,[1], il pil pro capite medio africano risulta ancora di soli 2.000 $ annui[2]. Un valore che uniforma differenze anche marcate, non solo macroregionali fra la parte Mediterranea, più sviluppata, e quella sub-sahariana, più arretrata in assoluto su scala globale, ma anche fra i vari stati all’interno delle stesse, dove, ad esempio, entro quest’ultima, nel 2017[3], troviamo il Burundi con un pil pro capite di soli 312 $ a fronte della Guinea Equatoriale che invece raggiunge i 12.727 $. Avallando la definizione di alcuni analisti che preferiscono utilizzare il termine Afriche per indicare appunto una situazione di relativa differenziazione interna al continente.

    Il quadro sociale

    Anche sotto l’aspetto dello sviluppo sociale complessivamente l’Africa evidenzia una marcata arretratezza: nonostante la speranza di vita media alla nascita sia cresciuta fra il 2015 e il 2018 di ben 3 anni (da 50,8 a 53,9)[4], risulta ancora inferiore rispetto agli altri continenti e la mortalità infantile, benché scesa solo negli ultimi anni al di sotto della soglia del 100 per 1.000, vede gli stati della parte sub-sahariana situati in blocco nelle ultime posizioni nell’apposita graduatoria dell’Unicef relativa al 2018 (tab. 1).

    Tabella 1: mortalità infantile nel primo anno di vita. Fonte (Unicef 2018)[5]

    Un quadro sociale generale ancora indubbiamente critico come certificato dai valori della povertà assoluta dichiarati dalla presidente della Banca africana di sviluppo Celestine Monga[1], con addirittura oltre il 40% della popolazione continentale, a fronte di una media mondiale dell’10%, che cerca di sopravvivere con meno di 1,90 $ al giorno e la sottoalimentazione che nel 2018, secondo la Fao[2], colpiva il 20% degli africani. Una drammatica situazione che vede concentrarsi, nel continente che accoglie solo il 17% della popolazione mondiale, circa un terzo del totale dei denutriti sulla Terra (con meno di 2.000 calorie al giorno), confermando che il binomio fame-povertà, lungi dall’essere sradicato, presenta addirittura un inquietante trend in fase di aggravamento.

    [1] studio americano del Brookings Institution (classifica dei paesi più poveri al mondo)

    [2] http://www.fao.org/news/story/it/item/1180461/icode

    A fronte di un tendenza globale di lungo periodo di riduzione della povertà estrema dai 1,850 miliardi (35%) del 1990 ai 735 milioni (10%) del 2015, nel periodo compreso fra il 2013 e il 2015, al cospetto di una contrazione mondiale di 68 milioni di unità, in Africa sub-sahariana, secondo la Banca Mondiale si è registrato invece un aumento di 8 milioni e addirittura 9 milioni in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente (Tab. 2). In quest’ultima area la situazione è risultata peggiore visto che i poveri sono quasi raddoppiati da 9,5 a 18,6 milioni a causa delle cosiddette Primavere arabe in Tunisia ed Egitto e delle guerre in Libia e in Siria che hanno destabilizzato dal punto di vista politico ed economico la macroregione.

    Tabella 2: povertà assoluta in percentuale e in valore assoluto 2013-2015. Fonte: Banca Mondiale[8]

    La gravità della situazione è testimoniata dallo studio realizzato dai ricercatori del World Poverty Clock con il sostegno delle Nazioni Unite e del governo tedesco concluso nel 2018 dal quale emerge che si trovano in Africa sub-shariana 12 dei 14 paesi dove la povertà estrema risulta in aumento in valore assoluto: Nigeria, Niger, Ciad, Repubblica Centrafricana, Somalia, Repubblica Democratica del Congo, Repubblica del Congo, Angola, Zambia, Madagascar, Burundi e Sud Sudan, sul quale ci soffermeremo in seguito.

    Caso paradigmatico è rappresentato, ad esempio, dalla Nigeria, stato più popoloso del continente con circa 195 milioni di abitanti, che in base alle proiezioni del World Poverty Clock 2018 del World Data Lab di Vienna[10], ad inizio 2018, risultava, nonostante le ingenti riserve petrolifere, il paese con il più elevato numero di persone in condizione di povertà assoluta, stimate a fine maggio 2018 in ben 87 milioni scalzando l’India (73 milioni) dal vertice della poco gratificante graduatoria mondiale (grafico 1). La reale gravità della situazione tuttavia emerge dal rapporto fra la consistenza demografica dei due paesi che nel 2018 risultava di ben 7:1 a favore del colosso asiatico.

    Grafico 1: stati per numero di persone in povertà assoluta. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Una situazione molto critica in Nigeria, al cui interno convive il 44,2%[11] della popolazione in situazione di estrema povertà (tab. 3) e al contempo è il Paese d’origine del miliardario più ricco del continente, l’uomo d’affari Aliko Dangote, e quello dove cresce un’elite di benestanti sempre più abbienti. Povertà e disuguaglianza, fenomeno che in Europa dopo la crisi del 2008 è andato sempre consolidandosi.

    Tabella 3: primi 4 paesi africani per numero di abitanti in povertà assoluta. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Riguardo alla sottoalimentazione rileviamo una situazione ancora più critica rispetto a quella della povertà: infatti, in base al report dell’Unicef 2018[12], dopo aver toccato, a livello mondiale, il minimo storico nel 2015 a 785 milioni di persone è risalita nel 2017 a 821, dato confermato anche nel 2018[13], con l’Africa che assorbe la quasi totalità dell’aumento: ben 34,5 su 36 milioni di aumento globale. Il numero di persone sottoalimentate in Africa sale così nel 2017 a 257 milioni di unità, suddivise fra i 20 milioni nella parte Mediterranea ed i 237 in quella sub-sahariana. Quasi la metà dell‘incremento è dovuta all’aumento del numero di persone denutrite nell’Africa occidentale, mentre un altro terzo proviene dall’Africa orientale.

    L’ampia porzione di Africa posta sud del Sahara si conferma così come la macroregione in stato di maggior sofferenza a livello mondiale, con la speranza di vita media più bassa, la più elevata mortalità infantile e con le maggior percentuali di persone sottoalimentate e in condizioni di povertà assoluta.

    Le previsioni

    Dal rapporto del World Poverty Clock pubblicato il 7 settembre 2018[14] fuoriesce, del continente africano, una situazione a luci e ombre: se da un lato, nell’Africa sub-sahariana, la povertà assoluta è prevista in riduzione dal 39% del 2018 al 27% del 2030, lo stesso problema sta invece assumendo, per alcuni paesi, i connotati di una piaga sociale endemica per la quale non si intravedono prospettive di risoluzione nemmeno a medio termine. Infatti, in base alle stime dello stesso report del World Poverty Clock pubblicato il 5 maggio 2018, è previsto che nel Continente Nero nel 2030 si troveranno sia i 13 dei 15 paesi in cui la povertà avrà registrato un aumento in valore assoluto che i primi 4, fra i soli 5, che vedranno aumentare il tasso di povertà assoluta a livello mondiale (tab. 4). Per il 2018 invece è stato calcolato un ulteriore aumento di 3 milioni di unità a livello continentale.

    Tabella 4: stati africani col più elevato tasso di povertà assoluta in percentuale: stime 2018-previsioni 2030. Fonte: World Poverty Clock

    Sud Sudan: l’ultimo nato in peggiori condizioni

    Particolarmente drammatica risulta, dal report del Word Poverty Clock pubblicato il 1 agosto 2018[15], la situazione del Sud Sudan, paese di più recente formazione della Terra (2011), che vedrà aumentare il numero di poveri assoluti dagli 11,5 milioni del 2018 ai 14 del 2030, con una incidenza sulla popolazione che passerà dall’85,1% al 95,8% (tab. 4). Il conflitto per la leadership politica fra il presidente, Salva Kiir di etnia Dinka, e il suo vice, Riek Machar leader dei Nuer, il secondo gruppo etnico nazionale, ha insanguinato e destabilizzato il Paese per quasi 5 anni sino al luglio 2018 minandone lo sviluppo e la diversificazione economica: ancora oggi circa l’85% della popolazione attiva risulta impegnata in attività non salariate, principalmente agricoltura di sussistenza e allevamento (circa il 78% degli attivi)[16]. La sostanziale assenza dell’industria manifatturiera costringe all’importazione di quasi tutti i beni sia di consumo che intermedi; l’unico settore industriale moderno risulta quello petrolifero, nel quale dominano gli investimenti stranieri, in particolare cinesi, indiani e malesi[17]. Ricco di risorse del sottosuolo, il Sud Sudan, detiene, oltre ai pozzi petroliferi, giacimenti di oro, argento, ferro e rame.

    Ricoprendo il 99% dell’export e il 60% della ricchezza nazionale, il settore petrolifero risulta di gran lunga dominante, causando tuttavia fragilità alla struttura economica nazionale a seguito della dipendenza della stessa dall’andamento delle quotazioni borsistiche: il pil pro capite secondo la Banca Mondiale è infatti crollato, insieme al valore del petrolio, dai 1.111 $ del 2014 ai meno di 228 $ del 2017[18]. Il conseguente deficit fiscale ha causato un’ondata inflazionistica e gravissime carenze alimentari: nel Paese ben 7 milioni di persone (pari al 63%) sono stati colpiti da carestia e vengono assistite tramite gli aiuti umanitari del World Food Programme (Wfp), mentre quasi 2 milioni sono gli sfollati interni e altri 2,5 milioni sono fuggiti dal Paese, dando vita alla più grave crisi dei rifugiati in Africa dopo quella del Ruanda di metà anni ’90.

    A prescindere dalla grave crisi alimentare in atto, nel complesso il Sud Sudan presenta un quadro strutturale disastroso caratterizzato dall’83% di popolazione rurale, da un elevato analfabetismo (73% maschile e l’84% femminile), da una carenza di servizi pubblici che esclude il 75% della popolazione dall’assistenza sanitaria e dalla maggior percentuale di popolazione in povertà assoluta (85%) a livello mondiale, ai quali si aggiungono carenze infrastrutturali, debolezza delle istituzioni politiche, corruzione al pari del resto del continente, frammentazione etnica (ben 64 gruppi) e dispute di confine[19].

    Fame in aumento e boom dell’import di prodotti agricoli: un’apparente contraddizione

    Dal report del Dipartimento dell’Agricoltura degli Stati Uniti (Usda) del 2 novembre 2015[20] emerge che nel ventennio 1995-2014 le importazioni di cibo e prodotti agricoli intermedi e primari ha subito in Africa sub-sahariana un incremento medio del 13% annuo come effetto combinato della sostenuta crescita economica (60% di incremento del pil totale nei 10 anni precedenti) e del consistente incremento demografico (dai 720 del 1995 ai 1.156 milioni del 2014)[21]. Le importazioni agricole totali hanno raggiunto nel 2014 un controvalore pari a 48,5 miliardi $, secondo solo al 2013, ripartito fra i 11,7 miliardi proveniente da altri Paesi della macroregione e i 36,8 da fuori del continente. Emerge tuttavia un aspetto incoraggiante per il progetto di integrazione panafricano riconducibile alla crescita del commercio agricolo intra-africano, che fra il 2009 e il 2014, ha superato quello proveniente dall’esterno: 100% contro 60% (grafico 2).

    Grafico 2: importazioni agricole in Africa sub-sahariana in miliardi $ 1994-2014

    Per individuare le cause della contraddizione sottoalimentazione/aumento dell’import agroalimentare è opportuno sovrapporre alla dinamica demografica quella sociale: in Africa sub-sahariana infatti nel decennio 2005-2014 si è registrata un’espansione della classe media addirittura del 90%, ceto sociale che, al pari di quello di altre aree emergenti del Sud del mondo, persegue consumi di tipologia e livello occidentale, alimentando una sensibile crescita della domanda di tali prodotti. Infatti, dall’analisi merceologica del comparto rileviamo come le principali importazioni agroalimentari dell’Africa sub-sahariana siano prodotti orientati al consumatore: alimenti preparati, latticini, pollame, vino/birra e verdure. Tali prodotti diretti al consumo finale hanno registrato nel quinquennio 2010-2014 addirittura un incremento del 70% arrivando, in quell’anno, a rappresentare oltre il 40% delle importazioni totali della macroregione.

    Al pari le importazioni di prodotti intermedi, principalmente olio di palma e zucchero, utilizzati come materie prime dall’industria agroalimentare, sono cresciute anch’esse rapidamente, mentre quelle di merci sfuse, prodotti primari destinati all’alimentazione di base, sono state invece più contenute, tant’è che l’import di cereali, in un sub-continente “affamato” rappresentavano solo il 21% nel 2014: grano 9% e riso 12% (grafico 3).

    Grafico 3: paniere merceologico dell’import agroalimentare in Africa sub-sahariana 2014

    Lo stesso report prospetta un futuro addirittura prosperoso per l’export agricolo statunitense verso l’Africa sub-sahariana teso al recupero delle quote perse, scese nel ventennio 1994-2005 dal 15 al 5%, in quanto la classe media della macroregione dovrebbe crescere di un ulteriore 90% nel successivo decennio 2014-2024 (grafico 4) determinando un incremento della domanda di prodotti orientati al consumatore di un altro 60%. Un business plan che, tuttavia, non mostra particolare attenzione alle fasce sociali in sofferenza.

    Grafico 4: crescita in % della classe media nelle principali macroregioni terrestri 2014 – 2024

    Un modello agroalimentare contraddittorio

    La critica situazione alimentare del Continente Nero, e in particolare della parte sub-sahariana, è riconducibile alle distorsioni del modello agroalimentare mondiale, sempre più caratterizzato dall’Agrobusiness e dalle sue perverse dinamiche. Un settore, definito dal dizionario curato da Aldo Gabrielli come “il complesso di attività e mezzi connessi allo sviluppo capitalistico dell’agricoltura”, nel quale le finalità esulano dalla funzione primaria di soddisfacimento del fabbisogno alimentare per perseguire invece la massimizzazione del profitto in linea con le logiche capitalistiche.

    Basato sull’integrazione fra agricoltura e industria, al suo interno operano poche grandi imprese multinazionali che controllano l’intera filiera: dalla produzione alla trasformazione industriale sino alla commercializzazione dei prodotti finiti. Le produzioni agricole avvengono in ogni area del pianeta, sia del Nord che del Sud, mentre i prodotti finiti vengono indirizzati dove esiste facoltà di spesa, la famosa domanda, quindi principalmente nei paesi sviluppati e verso i ceti sociali emergenti (nuovi ricchi e classi medie) di quelli in via di sviluppo (Cina, India ecc.) e addirittura di quelli ad economia meno sviluppata, come nel caso africano.

    L’agricoltura costituisce l’asse portante del sistema in quanto produttrice delle indispensabili materie prime ma l’attività industriale economicamente ha la preminenza poiché gran parte del valore aggiunto deriva dalla trasformazione dei prodotti agricoli. Negli Stati Uniti, ad esempio, il sistema agroalimentare industriale assorbe il 20% della popolazione attiva ma soltanto l’1% è impiegato nel settore primario. A rimanere schiacciati da questo sistema sono i produttori locali, soprattutto quelli piccoli, del Sud del mondo ai quali vengono dettate le scelte colturali, a discapito della sovranità alimentare quindi dei prodotti di sussistenza, e imposto prezzi di acquisto molto bassi, a causa dell’asimmetria contrattuale fra le parti contraenti. Emblematico risulta a tal proposito il caso del caffè che, contrariamente ad altri prodotti di piantagione, è coltivato da una moltitudine di piccoli contadini che si trovano in condizione di subalternità rispetto alle multinazionali che acquistano la materia prima per la trasformazione e la commercializzazione.

    In base al rapporto “Scopri il marchio“ di Oxfan le 10 più grandi aziende agroalimentari vale a dire Associated British Foods (Abf), Coca-Cola, Danone, General Mills, Kellogg’s, Mars, Mondelez International (ex Kraft Foods), Nestlé, PepsiCo e Unilever generano collettivamente entrate superiori a 1,1 miliardi di dollari al giorno[22] 1 con un volume d’affari stimato intorno ai 7.000 miliardi annui, addirittura 18 volte superiore al settore dell’energia, rappresentando circa il 10% dell’economia globale. Nei vari comparti in cui operano tendono a crearsi oligopoli egemonizzati da queste imprese di enormi proporzioni, come nel comparto del cacao in cui tre aziende controllano il 30% del mercato mondiale[23] o quello della frutta tropicale dove cinque multinazionali ne coprono addirittura l’80%[24] .

    Le dimensioni economiche di queste macroaziende superano talvolta quelle di stati del Sud del mondo consentendo loro di esercitare pressioni sui governi tese ad influenzarne le scelte politiche a proprio vantaggio, ma che finiscono per concretizzarsi in dinamiche vessatorie per le popolazioni locali quali: l’espansione dei latifondi, delle monocolture da esportazione e del land grabbing (l’accaparramento delle terre). Quest’ultimo fenomeno, attuato sia da imprese che da stati, affligge Sud America, Sud-est asiatico, Asia centrale e, soprattutto, l’Africa, nella quale quasi 30 milioni di ettari di terreni coltivabili, di cui ben il 64% per colture non alimentari (carta 1), sono controllati attraverso due forme contrattualistiche: acquisizioni e leasing. In particolare, principali vittime risultano i piccoli contadini che vengono schiacciati dal potere soverchiante delle grandi aziende che ne provoca un impoverimento sino a costringerli a vendere loro i terreni; in altri casi vengono addirittura espulsi con la violenza, da eserciti o paramilitari, dalle proprie terre trasformandoli in profughi, spesso costretto a fuggire all’estero. Il Centro Studi Internazionali, riporta alcuni casi emblematici relativi all’Africa come quello della regione di Gambella in Etiopia dove, dal 2010 l’esercito ha costretto molti abitanti ad abbandonare le terre e a spostarsi in altre aree a vantaggio delle imprese straniere fra le quali spicca l’impresa Saudi Star (Arabia Saudita) che è riuscita ad impossessarsi di ben 15.000 ettari di territorio per la coltivazione di canna da zucchero e riso[25]

    Carta tematica 1: i principali attori attivi e passivi del land grabbing. Fonte: land matrix 2018[26]

    Crescita senza redistribuzione

    Un continente che, dopo la lunga recessione del ventennio 1980-2000, causata dalla contrazione delle quotazioni delle commodities, ha finalmente imboccato col nuovo millennio il percorso di sviluppo economico, triplicando, in base ai dati Ocse[27], la ricchezza prodotta tra il 2000 e il 2016 con una crescita media annua del 4,6% (tab. 5), la seconda più elevata a livello mondiale dopo i paesi asiatici in via di sviluppo

    Tabella 5: crescita economica media annua nelle principali macroregioni del Sud del mondo fra 2.000 e 2016 in base ai dati Ocse 2018[28]

    Parallelamente, l’Africa nel suo complesso è risultato l’unico continente a registrare un aumento della povertà assoluta da 405 a 413 milioni fra il 2013 e il 2015 (tab. 2) ed ha assorbito nel 2017 la quasi totalità dell’incremento mondiale della sottoalimentazione, 34,5 su 36 milioni, facendo salire il numero di coloro che soffrono la fame a 257 milioni, paradossalmente in contemporanea all’aumento dell’import di prodotti agroalimentari che, fra il 1995 e il 2014, si è attestato su un valore medio annuo del +13%. Indubbiamente la rapida crescita demografica che sta interessando il continente, quasi 60 milioni fra il 2013 e il 2015 (tab. 6), ha creato problemi sociali aggiuntivi ma non è stata determinante visto che la povertà al contempo ha registrato un incremento di 8 milioni nella parte sub-sahariana e altrettanti in Nord Africa e Medio Oriente.

    Tabella 6: crescita della popolazione in Africa fra il 2013 e il 2010. Fonte: population pyramid [29]

    Causa principale della situazione è un modello economico non inclusivo che evidentemente va a beneficio dei ricchi e del ceto medio, quest’ultimo in espansione nell’Africa sub-sahariana fra il 2005 e il 2015 addirittura del 90%, al quale vanno aggiunti problemi economici strutturali quali un’eccessiva dipendenza dall’export di prodotti primari grezzi e una massiccia penetrazione delle multinazionali, tipica dei rapporti di subordinazione neocoloniale, che fanno incetta delle abbondanti risorse minerarie, energetiche, agricole e naturali drenando ingenti profitti.

    Conclusioni

    Sullo sfondo di questo quadro economico e sociale resta la questione delle disparità sociali, che seppur ridottesi a livello continentale fra il 1998 e il 2013, nella parte sub-sahariana rimangono ancora le più elevate a livello mondiale dopo l’America Latina (tab. 7).

    Tabella 7: riduzione dell’indice Gini nelle principali macroregioni nel breve periodo 2008-2013

    La situazione risulta critica soprattutto nell’Africa australe, dove si trovano, a parte Haiti, 4 fra i 5 paesi con il più alto livello di disuguaglianza nella graduatoria mondiale nella distribuzione del reddito fra le fasce sociali, calcolata in base all’Indice Gini: Sudafrica, Botswana, Namibia e Zambia, seguiti dalla Repubblica Centrafricana nell’area equatoriale (tab. 8).

    Tabella 8: stati per indice indice Gini più elevato. Fonte: World Population Rewiew 24/10/2019[30]

    Ed è lo stesso Ocse a confermare il rapporto disparità sociali/povertà: “Se l’Africa abbassasse ulteriormente il proprio coefficiente di Gini, da 41 a 35 (il livello dei Paesi asiatici in via di sviluppo), ciascun punto percentuale di crescita del PIL ridurrebbe i dati sulla povertà di un altro mezzo punto percentuale l’anno. Un tale calo nelle disuguaglianze diminuirebbe il numero di persone che vivono in povertà di 130 milioni. I progressi compiuti per ridurre la povertà estrema sono troppo lenti: nel periodo 2009-16, il 36% della popolazione africana (circa 400 milioni di persone) viveva con 1,90 dollari USA al giorno o meno, rispetto al 49% degli anni ‘90. Per una più rapida lotta alla povertà, la crescita deve diventare più inclusiva e le disuguaglianze devono essere ridotte“[31].

    Rileviamo, a conforto della nostra analisi, la coincidenza di conclusioni con il Rapporto regionale 2018 sulla sicurezza alimentare e la nutrizionedella Fao[32], il quale testualmente riporta che “È interessante notare come le economie africane siano cresciute a ritmi impressionanti, spesso superiori al 5% negli ultimi dieci anni, dal 2004 al 2014. Tuttavia, la povertà e la fame sono ancora in sospeso poiché una crescita economica significativa non è risultata né integrata e né inclusiva“ aggiungendo che “L’insicurezza alimentare in alcuni paesi dell’Africa è stata aggravata dai conflitti, spesso in combinazione con condizioni meteorologiche avverse (riconducibili ai cambiamenti climatici ndr.)” e che è necessario “Orientare le politiche nazionali di sicurezza alimentare verso una maggiore autosufficienza alimentare interna“, vale a dire eliminare il land grabbing, ridurre i latifondi ed estromettere le monocolture da esportazione e riacquisire la sovranità alimentare.

    Una sfida impegnativa per il Continente nero quella dello sviluppo autonomo, integrato ed inclusivo che passa attraverso un processo di integrazione continentale (un passo significativo in tal senso è rappresentato dall’entrata in vigore dell’Area di Libero Scambio dell’Africa – Afcfta – il 30 maggio 2019 che secondo la Commissione economica Onu per l’Africa potrebbe incrementare del 53% il commercio intra-africano[33]) e per il superamento della subordinazione neocoloniale, imposta dalle potenze Occidentali e in forme diverse, recentemente, anche dalla Cina.

    Un percorso, come tutti i processi emancipatori, che non può prescindere da una rottura della storica subalternità politica dei Paesi africani e la riscrittura di un nuovo ordine economico, commerciale e finanziario che può essere implementato solo da una nuova classe dirigente preparata, non corrotta e con un efficace progetto panafricano. In pratica l’effettiva indipendenza, 60 anni dopo quella formale.

    http://www.pisorno.it/africa-poverta-e-denutrizione-in-aumento-nonostante-la-crescita-economica-e-

    #Afrique #pauvreté #économie #croissance_économique #exportation #importation #industrie_agro-alimentaire #sous-alimentation #alimentation #mortalité_enfantile #pauvreté_absolue #Nigeria #RDC #République_démocratique_du_congo #statistiques #chiffres #Sud_Soudan #Soudan_du_Sud #land_grabbing #accaparement_des_terrres

  • Sudan’s Forgotten Films | Sudan | Al Jazeera
    https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2017/10/sudan-forgotten-films-171017121738091.html

    Benjamin and Awad run Sudan’s national film archive. The two men, who have worked together for more than 40 years, are devoted to protecting their country’s visual memories.

    Home to some 13,000 films, the archive preserves pivotal moments of Sudan’s turbulent history and is one of the largest in Africa.

    But the archive is in a fragile state. Following years of neglect and poor storage, many film reels are turning to dust in Sudan’s unforgiving tropical climate.

    The two friends are determined to turn it around and embark on a mission to save the old films.

    Will they succeed in preserving Sudan’s visual history for future generations before it’s too late?

    #soudan #film #cinéma

  • Return : voluntary, safe, dignified and durable ?

    Voluntary return in safety and with dignity has long been a core tenet of the international refugee regime. In the 23 articles on ‘Return’ in this issue of FMR, authors explore various obstacles to achieving sustainable return, discuss the need to guard against premature or forced return, and debate the assumptions and perceptions that influence policy and practice. This issue also includes a mini-feature on ‘Towards understanding and addressing the root causes of displacement’.


    https://www.fmreview.org/return

    #revue #retours_volontaires #dignité #retour #retour_au_pays
    #Soudan_du_Sud #réfugiés_sud-soudanais #réfugiés_Rohingya #Rohingya #Inde #Sri_Lanka #réfugiés_sri-lankais #réfugiés_syriens #Syrie #Allemagne #Erythrée #Liban #Turquie #Jordanie #Kenya #réfugiés_Somaliens #Somalie #Dadaab #Myanmar #Birmanie #Darfour #réintégration_économique #réintégration

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

  • Sudanese refugees in Syria? The story of hundreds of people who fled one civil conflict to end up in another

    Sudanese refugees in Syria are a community of hundreds of people who came fleeing the war in Sudan only to be trapped by another deadly civil conflict in Syria. They wait to be resettled in other countries as part of a UN program to help refugees. But decades after their arrival, they are still waiting with no end in sight.

    A group of African men chatting in the heat of the afternoon is not something you see very often in Damascus. More people stop by the makeshift stands to look at the vendors than they do to look at the products.

    But here in Kshakoul district, this is becoming a usual scene since Abdulkarim and Savok Monteh started working here in late 2018. Both men arrived from Sudan to Syria fleeing civil violence in late 1999, but, since then, a lot has changed.

    When they arrived, they were both Sudanese nationals, but now Abdulkarim is from Sudan while Savok is a national of South Sudan that gained independence in 2005. Moreover, they came to Syria, which was then one of the safest countries in the world before it plunged into deadly violence. However, they continue to share the hardship they had tried to escape.

    “All I can remember even from my days as a child is suffering from Sudan to here,” says Abdulkarim, the 54-year-old man who has had two heart bypasses and have been unemployed for a while.

    Abdulkarim sells secondhand clothing in one of the most impoverished parts of Damascus. “I have been in Syria for nearly 20 years and I don’t have a job I did. The only thing I can do is this flea market. As a refugee, finding a steady job is difficult and there is a war in Syria and life is becoming more and more expensive, especially rent.”

    The obvious question would be why he stays in the country that has seen one of the worst conflicts of modern times. But options for people like Abdulkarim are not abundant. “I came to flee war in Darfur and now I find war here and I have no source of income but the aid I get. I can’t go back to Darfur. The situation there is worse than here. I would love to travel anywhere else where it is safe, just some place safe. Throughout the war here in Syria, rockets were coming down and just in this market, I saw three or four people dying right here in front of us.”

    Like the rest of the Sudanese nationals in Syria, Abdulkarim and Savok are registered as refugees with the UN refugee agency UNHCR, awaiting resettlement.

    But that much promised trip never came through for either of them, despite the dire need. Savok works at one of the stands with a Syrian partner. On a good business day, their stand would make around 1,000 Syrian pounds a day, which is less than two U.S. dollars.

    “If we make 1,000 pounds a day, and if we do, he gives me 200, and sometimes we make no money,” he talks to me as he restocks his merchandise of secondhand shoes.

    “Sometimes I think of going back to Sudan but recent turmoil there is making it more and more difficult, let alone the economic situation.”

    It seems difficult to believe that some refugees decided to come to Syria as the conflict was flaring up like Ahmad Mohamad who arrived in 2015. “I went abroad for treatment but couldn’t finish my treatment after I ran out of money. So I came back and got treatment in Syria because I can enter without a visa. Here I went to the UN and they registered me as a refugee and they helped me get into hospital and got an operation done. The situation in Sudan is uncertain and I can’t go back there as I lost my house there.”

    For many of Sudanese refugees, getting resettlement in a third country is about getting over a very difficult past; but for others like Ringer, it is his only chance at a future.

    Ringer came to Syria 20 years ago. He was a six-year-old child then. He stayed after his parents went back to Sudan as he was finishing college. “It is true that there was war here and rockets were falling around but in Syria I can get university degree for free.” He tells me that his parents told him that it will be impossible for him to find work in their part of Sudan now, so he’d better stay in Syria and wait for the UN-sponsored resettlement.

    “Just think about it. I am a stranger to my native country, a foreigner in the country I grew up in and after waiting for 20 years, I am still waiting to get to a place I can call home,” Ringer summed up as we walked through the streets of old Damascus. Like the rest of his community, he understands that his tale might not have a happy ending ever after.

    https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-10-09/Sudanese-refugees-in-Syria-Flee-one-civil-conflict-to-another-KEcpjA3eUM/index.html
    #réfugiés_soudanais #Soudan #Syrie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #deux_fois_réfugiés

  • Afrique subsaharienne et #sionisme évangélique | Sciences Po L’Enjeu mondial
    https://www.sciencespo.fr/enjeumondial/fr/odr/afrique-subsaharienne-et-sionisme-evangelique

    Janvier 2017

    Dans sa politique étrangère en #Afrique subsaharienne, l’État d’Israël n’est pas insensible au poids joué par les cultures protestantes #évangéliques, nourries de Gospel. On peut aller jusqu’à faire l’hypothèse que les réseaux évangéliques sont même devenus un élément du soft power de Tel Aviv en Afrique. À chaque étape de sa tournée africaine 2016 (Ouganda, Kenya, Ethiopie, Rwanda), le premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou a ainsi pu compter sur l’appui local et les prières ferventes des puissants réseaux évangéliques d’Afrique de l’Est. Ces réseaux, en Afrique de l’Ouest, sont (un peu) moins influents, mais du point de vue français, ils sont francophones et pèsent des millions de fidèles : dans une #géopolitique des #religions où le conflit israélo-arabe demeure en toile de fond, ils méritent toute l’attention de la puissance publique.

    #évangélisme

  • Habibi Funk, le label qui joue à cache-cache dans la médina

    Déjà aux commandes du label Jakarta, Jannis Stürtz nous emmène dans les coulisses de son dernier né, #Habibi_Funk, destiné à rééditer les trésors oubliés de la musique nord-africaine. Du #Maroc au #Soudan en passant par la #Lybie et l’#Algérie, chaque disque devient une enquête passionnante. Avec à la clef, des rencontres et des sons inédits.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOX8ckmW-tU

    #musique #digging #digger

  • #Soudan : les #milices #Janjawid garde-frontières ou #passeurs ?

    Dans un communiqué, les #Forces_de_soutien_rapide (#RSF), groupe paramilitaire servant de “garde-frontières” au Soudan, ont annoncé avoir arrêté 138 migrants africains, jeudi 19 septembre. Pour le spécialiste Jérôme Tubiana, cette annonce fait partie d’une stratégie : le Soudan cherche à attirer l’attention de l’Union européenne qui a arrêté de lui verser des fonds.

    Les Forces de soutien rapide (RSF), une organisation paramilitaire soudanaise, ont annoncé avoir arrêté, jeudi 19 septembre, 138 Africains qui souhaitaient pénétrer “illégalement” en Libye. Parmi eux, se trouvaient des dizaines de Soudanais mais aussi des Tchadiens et des Éthiopiens.

    "Le 19 septembre, une patrouille des RSF a arrêté 138 personnes de différentes nationalités qui essayaient de traverser illégalement la frontière avec la Libye", précise le communiqué.

    Une partie de ces migrants ont été incarcérés dans la zone désertique de #Gouz_Abudloaa, situé environ à 100 km au nord de Khartoum, comme ont pu le constater des journalistes escortés sur place par des RSF, mercredi 25 septembre. Dans le communiqué, les RSF assurent également avoir saisi six véhicules appartenant à des passeurs libyens chargés du transit des migrants.

    Le même jour, le Soudan a décidé de fermer ses #frontières avec la Libye et la Centrafrique pour des raisons de sécurité. Dans les faits, le pays souhaite mettre fin aux départs de rebelles soudanais vers la Libye, qui sont parfois rejoints par des migrants.

    Créées en 2013 par l’ex-président soudanais, Omar el-Béchir, les RSF assurent le maintien de l’ordre dans le pays. Trois ans après leur création, elles ont été dotées d’une mission supplémentaire : empêcher les migrants et les rebelles de franchir les frontières nationales. C’est ce que montrent notamment des chercheurs dans un rapport publié par un think tank néerlandais, Clingendael, publié en septembre 2018.

    Les Forces de soutien rapide, véritables gardes-frontières du Soudan

    Si le document pointe une politique soudanaise de surveillance des frontières "en grande partie assignée aux ‘forces de soutien rapide’ (RSF)", derrière cette appellation officielle, se cache une réalité plus sombre. Connue localement sous le nom de Janjawid, cette milice fait notamment l’objet d’une enquête du Conseil militaire de transition, qui dirige le Soudan depuis la destitution, le 11 avril, du président Omar el-Béchir.

    D’après les conclusions de l’enquête, rendues publiques samedi 27 juillet, les RSF auraient frappé et tiré sur des manifestants lors d’un sit-in, le 3 juin, à Khartoum, alors qu’ils étaient venus protester contre la politique d’Omar el-Béchir. Si d’après un groupe de médecins, 127 manifestants ont été tués, le commission d’enquête compte, de son côté, 87 morts. Cette répression violente avait provoqué, dans la foulée, un levé de boucliers à l’échelle internationale.

    Un groupe armé qui a bénéficié de fonds européens

    Certains RSF sont aussi accusés d’avoir commis des exactions dans la région du Darfour, à l’ouest du Soudan. Le rapport précise pourtant que, grâce aux fonds versés par l’Union européenne, ils “sont mieux équipés, mieux financés et déployés non seulement au Darfour, mais partout au Soudan". D’après ce document, "160 millions d’euros ont été alloués au Soudan" entre 2016 et 2017. Et, une partie de cet argent a été versé par Khartoum aux RSF. Leur chef, Hemeti, est d’ailleurs officiellement le numéro 2 du Conseil militaire de transition.

    Fin juillet, l’Union européenne a toutefois annoncé le gel de ses financements au Soudan. "L’Union européenne a pris peur. Elle a considéré que cette coopération avec le Soudan était mauvaise pour son image car, depuis plusieurs années, elle finançait un régime très violent envers les migrants et les civils", explique Jérôme Tubiana, chercheur spécialiste du Soudan et co-auteur du rapport néerlandais.

    Non seulement les passeurs demandent de l’argent aux migrants mais ce ne sont pas les seuls à leur en réclamer. "La milice Janjawid taxe les migrants, elle joue à un double-jeu", dénonce sur RFI, Clotilde Warin, journaliste chercheuse et co-auteure du rapport. "Les miliciens […] qui connaissent très bien la zone frontalière entre le Soudan, le Tchad et le Niger […] deviennent eux-mêmes des passeurs, ils utilisent les voitures de l’armée soudanaise, le fuel de l’armée soudanaise. C’est un trafic très organisé."

    "Les RSF profitent de leur contrôle de la route migratoire pour vendre les migrants à des trafiquants libyens", ajoute, de son côté, Jérôme Tubiana, qui estime que ces miliciens s’enrichissent plus sur le dos des migrants qu’ils ne les arrêtent.

    Annoncer l’arrestation d’un convoi est donc un moyen, pour les RSF, de faire du chantage à l’Europe. "Ils essayent de lui dire que si elle veut moins de migrants sur son territoire, elle doit apporter son soutien aux RSF car, ils sont les seuls à connaître cette région dangereuse", précise Jérôme Tubiana, ajoutant qu’Hemeti, fragilisé, est en recherche de soutiens politiques.

    Un membre des RSF, interrogé dans le cadre de l’enquête néerlandaise, reconnaît lui-même le rôle actif de la milice dans le trafic des migrants. "De temps en temps, nous interceptons des migrants et nous les transférons à Khartoum, afin de montrer aux autorités que nous faisons le travail. Nous ne sommes pas censés prendre l’argent des migrants, [nous ne sommes pas censés] les laisser s’échapper ou les emmener en Libye… Mais la réalité est assez différente…", lit-on dans le rapport.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/19795/soudan-les-milices-janjawid-garde-frontieres-ou-passeurs?ref=tw_i
    #gardes-frontière #para-militaires #paramilitaires #fermeture_des_frontières #maintien_de_l'ordre #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance_des_frontières #fonds_européen #Hemeti #armée #trafic_d'êtres_humains #armée_soudanaise #externalisation #externalisation_des_frontières

    ping @karine4 @isskein @pascaline

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message804171

    • Une nouvelle de juillet 2019...

      EU suspends migration control projects in Sudan amid repression fears

      The EU has suspended projects targeting illegal migration in Sudan. The move comes amid fears they might have aided security forces responsible for violently repressing peaceful protests in the country, DW has learned.

      An EU spokesperson has confirmed to DW that a German-led project that organizes the provision of training and equipment to Sudanese border guards and police was “halted” in mid-March, while an EU-funded intelligence center in the capital, Khartoum, has been “on hold” since June. The EU made no public announcements at the time.

      The initiatives were paid for from a €4.5 billion ($5 billion) EU fund for measures in Africa to control migration and address its root causes, to which Germany has contributed over €160 million. Sudan is commonly part of migration routes for people aiming to reach Europe from across Africa.

      Critics had raised concerns that working with the Sudanese government on border management could embolden repressive state forces, not least the notorious Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, which is accused by Amnesty International of war crimes in Sudan’s Darfur region. An EU summary of the project noted that there was a risk that resources could be “diverted for repressive aims.”

      Support for police

      A wave of protest swept the country in December, with demonstrators calling for the ouster of autocratic President Omar al-Bashir. Once Bashir was deposed in April, a transitional military council, which includes the commander of the RSF as deputy leader, sought to restore order. Among various incidents of repression, the militia was blamed for a massacre on June 3 in which 128 protesters were reportedly killed.

      While the EU maintains it has provided neither funding nor equipment to the RSF, there is no dispute that Sudanese police, who also stand accused of brutally repressing the protests, received training under the programs.

      Dr. Lutz Oette, a human rights expert at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), told DW: “The suspension is the logical outcome of the change in circumstances but it exposes the flawed assumptions of the process as far as working with Sudan is concerned.”

      Oette said continuing to work with the Sudanese government would have been incompatible with the European Union’s positions on human rights, and counterproductive to the goal of tackling the root causes of migration.

      Coordination center

      The intelligence center, known as the Regional Operational Center in Khartoum (ROCK), was to allow the security forces of nine countries in the Horn of Africa to share intelligence about human trafficking and people smuggling networks.

      A spokesperson for the European Commission told DW the coordination center had been suspended since June “until the political/security situation is cleared,” with some of its staff temporarily relocated to Nairobi, Kenya. Training and some other activities under the Better Migration Management (BMM) program were suspended in mid-March “because they require the involvement of government counterparts to be carried out.” The EU declined to say whether the risk of support being provided to repressive forces had contributed to the decision.

      The spokesperson said other EU activities that provide help to vulnerable people in the country were continuing.

      An official EU document dated December 2015 noted the risk that the provision of equipment and training to security services and border guards could be “diverted for repressive aims” or subject to “criticism by NGOs and civil society for engaging with repressive governments on migration (particularly in Eritrea and Sudan).”

      ’Regular monitoring’

      The BMM program is being carried out by a coalition of EU states — France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom — and aid agencies led by the German development agency GIZ. It includes projects in 11 African countries under the auspices of the “Khartoum process,” an international cooperation initiative targeting illegal migration.

      The ROCK intelligence center, which an EU document shows was planned to be situated within a Sudanese police training facility, was being run by the French state-owned security company Civipol.

      The EU spokesperson said, “Sudan does not benefit from any direct EU financial support. No EU funding is decentralized or channeled through the Sudanese government.”

      “All EU-funded activities in Sudan are implemented by EU member states development agencies, the UN, international organizations and NGOs, who are closely scrutinized through strict and regular monitoring during projects’ implementation,” the spokesperson added.

      A spokesperson for GIZ said: “The participant lists of BMM’s training courses are closely coordinated with the [Sudanese government] National Committee for Combating Human Trafficking (NCCHT) to prevent RSF militiamen taking part in training activities.”

      The GIZ spokesperson gave a different explanation for the suspension to that of the EU, saying the program had been stopped “in order not to jeopardize the safety of [GIZ] employees in the country.” The spokesperson added: “Activities in the field of policy harmonization and capacity building have slowly restarted.”

      https://www.dw.com/en/eu-suspends-migration-control-projects-in-sudan-amid-repression-fears/a-49701408

      #police #Regional_Operational_Center_in_Khartoum (#ROCK) #Better_Migration_Management (#BMM) #processus_de_Khartoum

      Et ce subtil lien entre migrations et #développement :

      Sudan does not benefit from any direct EU financial support. No EU funding is decentralized or channeled through the Sudanese government.

      “All EU-funded activities in Sudan are implemented by EU member states development agencies, the UN, international organizations and NGOs, who are closely scrutinized through strict and regular monitoring during projects’ implementation,” the spokesperson added.

      #GIZ

      Ajouté à la métaliste #migrations et développement :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

  • South Sudanese Refugees Transform a Camp Into a City in Uganda

    #Bidi_Bidi refugee camp is home to nearly a quarter-million South Sudanese who fled the violence of civil war in their home country. Its progressive policies allow refugees to live, farm and work together while they wait to return to their home country. But, as conditions are slow to improve in South Sudan, many refugees are opting to stay.

    U.S. Democratic Senators Chris Coons and Chris Van Hollen visited the camp recently. The two lawmakers were touring several refugee settlements throughout Uganda last month, including Bidi Bidi — one of the world’s largest.

    Speaking by phone, Senator Van Hollen called the settlements an “important model” that other countries should consider when housing the displaced.

    “Obviously a key ingredient to the success of that model has been significant international support,” he said.

    When Bidi Bidi was opened in 2016, it was a rural piece of land in northern Uganda, where South Sudanese refugees, mostly women and children, fled to avoid violence during their country’s civil war.

    As is often the case, tensions are common between refugees and the local population, who feel that the refugees are taking resources that might have been available for them.

    But, Uganda decided to do something different, earmarking a percentage of the country’s international funding to go toward local amenities. Refugee families were given plots of land to build family-style clusters of homes with room to grow their own fruits and vegetables. As a result, a small-scale economy began to flourish in the camp, with some refugees starting their own businesses.

    Last year, following a peace deal between warring South Sudan leaders, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni said he hoped the refugees would begin returning home.

    But, that’s not the case.

    According to a new report published this week by several humanitarian agencies, including Oxfam, refugees — especially women — are hesitant to return home. They fear the peace won’t last.

    As a result, settlement official Michael Joelle says Bidi Bidi has reached capacity, and refugees are being turned away and settlements are feeling the strain.

    “Before the 2016 emergency, we were offering a plot of 50 by 100, so the number has been decreasing as the number of refugees increase,” said Joelle.

    The situation has become more dire after international donors suspended their funding earlier this year after it was reported that funds for refugees in Uganda had been mismanaged.

    Grace, a refugee at Bidi Bidi, fled her home country with her children four years ago. Her husband finally joined the family last year.

    The former teacher said she doesn’t see herself moving back to South Sudan anytime soon.

    “Even we’re receiving bad news, so and so has been killed, so and so has been raped, so many things are happening.”

    https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudanese-refugees-transform-camp-city-uganda

    #Soudan_du_Sud #Ouganda #camps_de_réfugiés #réfugiés #asile #migrations #ville

    Et commentaire de Jeff Crisp sur twitter :

    It’s not a question of whether a camp looks like a city or not. It’s a question of what rights the refugees are able to exercise.

    https://twitter.com/JFCrisp/status/1170460384513466368

  • South Sudan displacement crisis still desperate, one year after peace deal

    One year on from the signing of the peace agreement, millions of South Sudanese remain displaced as the country continues to face a humanitarian crisis and people fear that peace may not last, according to a new report published today.

    Women, who lead the vast majority of displaced households, may be especially vulnerable, including facing the threat of sexual violence. While some women have begun returning to South Sudan, many are not going back to their homes but seeking a safer and better place to live.

    The report, No Simple Solutions: Women, Displacement and Durable Solutions in South Sudan, is by Oxfam, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Care Foundation, Danish Refugee Council, and South Sudanese organizations, Nile Hope and Titi Foundation. It highlights the experiences of women in transit and the conditions they need in order to return home.

    After five years of brutal conflict, more than seven million South Sudanese – over half the country’s population - are in need of humanitarian assistance. Homes, schools and hospitals have been destroyed and it will take years for essential infrastructure and services to recover.

    The conflict created the largest displacement crisis in Africa with over 4.3 million people forced to flee their homes; 1.8 million people are internally displaced and there are 2.3 million refugees in the region.

    Elysia Buchanan, South Sudan policy lead, Oxfam said: “Since the signing of the revitalized peace deal, armed clashes between parties have reduced, bringing tentative hope to many. But because of the slow implementation of the deal, many women told us they are still not sure if lasting peace is at hand.”

    The civil war also fueled the rise of sexual violence, including rape as a weapon of war, and the abduction of women and girls who were forced into sexual slavery.

    With the sheer scale of the crisis, and endemic levels of sexual and gender-based violence, a South Sudanese woman activist quoted in the report warned humanitarian agencies against rushing to support people to return home. “This would be like throwing people from one frying pan to another. Humanitarian actors should take things slow, until refugees and internally displaced people can move themselves.”

    Due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, people returning from neighboring countries often find themselves in more difficult conditions than when they were displaced, including struggling to find somewhere to live.

    Connolly Butterfield, Protection and Gender Specialist of NRC, said: “Time and again, women spoke to us of the challenges they face in returning to their homes. They make the journey back, only to find that their houses and properties were completely destroyed, or had already been occupied by strangers, sometimes soldiers. Some of the women said that if they try to reclaim their properties, they have no means of support. They are more likely to be threatened or exposed to physical or sexual assault,” said

    Because the context still poses risks, all actors should take a long-term, community-driven vision around supporting the conditions required to deliver a lasting end to the displacement crisis, to mitigate the risk of people falling into an endless cycle of movement. It is estimated some 60 percent of displaced South Sudanese have been displaced more than once, and one in 10 have been displaced more than five times.

    Buchanan said: “Helping people return to their homes and rebuild their lives is our goal. But by ignoring or downplaying the issues that make returning dangerous, or not ensuring people have adequate information on what they are coming home to, humanitarian agencies could inadvertently endanger people or make their lives worse.

    The international community must only support the return of internally displaced people if conditions are safe and dignified, and the decision to return is informed and voluntary. The humanitarian response must be sensitive to the needs of women and girls, taking into consideration the country’s harmful gender norms.

    Martha Nyakueka, Gender and Protection Coordinatior of the national NGO Nile Hope, said: “After years of conflict, it will take time for the country to recover. . The warring parties who signed the peace deal must ensure that the agreement leads to lasting changes on the ground, not just in terms of security, but also in terms of improving the lives of the South Sudanese people.”


    https://www.nrc.no/news/2019/september/south-sudan-displacement-crisis-still-desperate-one-year-after-peace-deal
    #Soudan_du_sud #asile #migrations #IDPs #déplacés_internes #réfugiés #paix #accord_de_paix

  • Habasha
    En discutant hier soir avec un réfugiés érythréen, et en parlant de sa sortie du pays pour aller au Soudan... il m’a dit :

    "Au #Soudan, tout le monde nous appelle « #habasha ». Habasha sont les personnes d’Érythrée et d’Ethiopie. Si la police t’identifie comme un Habasha, il te demande de l’argent en te menaçant de te renvoyer en Erythrée si tu ne paies pas. Habasha sont les personnes qui ne parlent pas arabe. Tu as donc intérêt, dès que tu arrives au Soudan à apprendre l’arabe, si tu ne le sait pas".

    #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots #migrations #asile #réfugiés
    ping @sinehebdo @reka

    –----------

    #Habesha peoples

    Habesha peoples: Ge’ez: ሐበሻ /Habesha/ or /Abesha/ ((rarely Habeshat: Ge’ez: ሐበሻይት), or rarely used exonyms like “Abyssinian people,” "Aithiops: Greek: Αἰθίοψ," “Cushites: Hebrew: כאשיטאס‎, [not the be confused with the larger group — Cushitic Peoples — that includes but is not limited to Habeshas],” or "al-Ḥabaš (al-Habash): Mehri-Arabic: الهباش‎/al-Ḥabaši (al-Habashi): Mehri-Arabic: الحبشي‎ ~ ‘incense gatherers’ ~”. Habesha (Ge’ez: ሐበሻ) ) is a common term used to refer to both Ethiopians and Eritreans as a whole [24][25]. Certain definitions considered the Ethiosemitic-speaking and Agwa-speaking Cushitic peoples inhabiting the highlands of Ethiopia and Eritrea as the core ethnic groups that historically constituted the pan-ethnic group Habesha peoples, while this notion is only partially accepted.[26] They historically include a linguistically, culturally and ancestrally related ethnic groups, conservatively-speaking mostly from the Ethiopian Highlands[27] Members’ cultural, linguistic, and in certain cases, ancestral origins trace back to the Kingdom of Dʿmt, the Kingdom of Aksum, among other kingdoms that preceded or made up the Ethiopian Empire in the Horn of Africa.[28] Some Scholars have classified the Tigrayans and the Amhara as Abyssinians proper under an ultra-neo-conservative theory postulated by a few scholars and political parties but not widely accepted by the general public or by most indigenous scholars of the region.[29][24][30][31][32]

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habesha_peoples
    #Abyssinie #Abyssins

    –--------

    Not black, but Habasha : Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants in American society

    In this article, I examine the identity choices of Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants of Amhara, Tigrayan and Tigrinya ethnicity within the context of the larger debate on how non-white immigrants are being incorporated into American society. I argue that these immigrants resist racialization even while their actions and attitudes potentially reinforce America’s racial divide. They implicitly challenge American racial categories by thinking of themselves as Habasha, which they view as a separate non-black ethno-racial category that emphasizes their Semitic origins. Meanwhile, they often distance themselves from American blacks through pursuing transnational connections, producing Habasha spaces, displaying the attributes of a ‘model minority’ and preserving Habasha beauty through endogamy. By remaining relatively isolated within their ethnic communities in Washington, DC, which is the focus of this study, they may succeed in differentiating themselves from American blacks, but they are not likely to join the American mainstream on a par with whites.

    https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2011.598232

  • La #France persiste à expulser des réfugiés vers le Soudan
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/140819/la-france-persiste-expulser-des-refugies-vers-le-soudan

    En dépit de toutes les conventions et accords internationaux, les expulsions de réfugiés vers Khartoum se poursuivent en 2019 alors que la situation au Soudan est toujours très tendue. De plus, ces renvois forcés sont organisés avec la collaboration de la junte soudanaise.

    #Soudan,_réfugiés,_migrants,_France,_expulsion

  • #CIVIPOL au #Soudan

    L’Union européenne a suspendu ses programmes liés au #contrôle_migratoire au Soudan, en raison de la situation politique. CIVIPOL était en charge des programmes coordonnés par la #France. Présentation.

    CIVIPOL est défini comme "l’opérateur de #coopération_technique_internationale du ministère de l’Intérieur". C’est une #société_anonyme dont 40% du capital son détenus par l’État et 60% par des acteurs privés comme #Airbus, #Safran, #Thalès et d’autres, ainsi que #Défense_Conseil_International, qui est la société privée équivalente de CIVIPOL pour le ministère de la défense.

    CIVIPOL a une action d’#expertise, de #conseil, de #formation. Elle est "financée quasi exclusivement par les bailleurs internationaux". Elle a aussi comme savoir-faire le "soutien à la filière des #industries_de_sécurité" : "Civipol soutient les acteurs de la filière des industries de sécurité. À travers le réseau international des salons #Milipol, Civipol permet aux États partenaires d’identifier, avec les industriels, les #solutions_technologiques les plus adaptées à leurs impératifs de protection. En proposant des offres intégrées issues de la filière européenne des industries de sécurité, Civipol contribue à la mise en place de #systèmes_opérationnels_interopérables au sein des États partenaires et, le cas échéant, avec les systèmes homologues européens."

    #CIVIPOL_Conseil, la société anonyme, est en effet associée dans #CIVIPOL_Groupe au Groupement d’Intérêt Économique Milipol, qui organise des #salons "de la sûreté et de la sécurité intérieure des États" à Paris, au Qatar et dans la zone Asie - Pacifique (on peut découvrir ici le message adressé par le ministre français de l’intérieur à l’ouverture du dernier salon).

    CIVIPOL a aussi racheté en 2016 la société #Transtec, qui a des activités de soutien, accompagnement, conseil, expertise, dans le domaine de la #gouvernance. Elle a par exemple mené deux programmes au Soudan, l’un « #Soutien_à_l'Analyse_Economique_et_à_la Planification_Sectorielle_à_l’Appui_de_la_République_du_Soudan » « afin de permettre à la délégation de l’UE au Soudan de mieux comprendre la situation économique du pays et de contribuer à une approche plus cohérente de la programmation de l’UE dans chaque secteur d’intervention » ; l’autre « #Programme_de_renforcement_des_capacités_des_organisations_de_la_société_civile_soudanaise », dont « l’objectif consistait à renforcer les capacités des bénéficiaires des #OSC locales dans le cadre du programme de l’#Instrument_Européen_pour_la_Démocratie_et_les_Droits_de_l'Homme (#IEDDH) afin d’améliorer leur gestion administrative et financière des projets financés par l’UE » (il ne s’agit donc pas de développer la démocratie, mais de permettre aux OSC – Organisations de la Société Civile – soudanaises de s’inscrire dans les programmes de financement de l’Union européenne.

    CIVIPOL intervient dans quatre programmes au Soudan, financés par l’Union européenne. L’un concernant le #terrorisme, « Lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent et le financement du terrorisme dans la grande Corne de l’Afrique (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-dargent-et-le-financement-du-terrorisme) », l’autre concernant l’application de la loi, « #Regional_law_enforcement_in_the_Greater_Horn_of_Africa_and_Yemen (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/regional-law-enforcement-in-the-greater-horn-of-africa-and-yemen-rl) ». Notons que ces deux programmes concernent aussi le #Yémen, pays en proie à une guerre civile, et une intervention militaire extérieure par une coalition menée par l’Arabie saoudite, pays allié de la France et en partie armée par elle, coalition à laquelle participe plusieurs milliers de membres des #Forces_d’Action_Rapide soudanaises, ancienne milice de Janjawid, aussi reconvertie en garde-frontière dans le cadre de la politique de contrôle migratoire mise en place par le Soudan à la demande de l’Union européenne, Forces d’Action Rapide dont le chef est l’homme fort actuel de la junte militaire qui a succédé au dictateur Omar El-Béchir. CIVIPOL agit dans cette complexité.

    Les deux autres programmes concerne la politique de #contrôle_migratoire. L’un, sous l’intitulé de « #Meilleure_Gestion_des_Migrations (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/better-migration-management-bmm.pdf) », implique différents intervenants pour le compte de plusieurs États membres de l’Union européenne et des agences de l’ONU, sous coordination allemande, l’#Allemagne cofinançant ce programme. « Dans cette contribution, CIVIPOL fournit des formations pour les unités spécialisés en charge de la lutte contre le trafic d’êtres humains, forme les agents de police dans les #zones_frontalières et aide les autorités chargées de la formation de la #police ». Compte-tenu du rôle des Forces d’Action Rapide, il semble difficile que CIVIPOL ne les ait pas croisées. Ce programme a été suspendu en mars 2019, l’Union européenne ayant donné une explication quelque peu sybilline : « because they require the involvement of government counterparts to be carried out » (« parce que leur mise en œuvre exige l’implication d’interlocuteurs gouvernementaux d’un niveau équivalent »).

    L’autre, mis en œuvre par CIVIPOL, est le #ROCK (#Centre_opérationnel_régional_d'appui_au_processus_de_Khartoum et à l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique de l’Union africaine (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/regional-operational-center-in-khartoum-in-support-of-the-khartoum-) – en anglais #Regional_Operational_Centre_in_Khartoum etc.) La stratégie du projet ROCK est de faciliter l’#échange_d'informations entre les services de police compétents. Ainsi, le projet consiste à mettre en place une plate-forme à Khartoum, le centre régional "ROCK", afin de rassembler les #officiers_de_liaison des pays bénéficiaires en un seul endroit pour échanger efficacement des #informations_policières. » Il a été suspendu en juin « until the political/security situation is cleared » (« jusqu’à ce que la situation politique/sécurtiaire soit clarifiée ») selon l’Union européenne.

    D’après la présentation qu’on peut télécharger sur le site de CIVIPOL, le premier « programme intervient en réponse aux besoins identifiés par les pays africains du #processus_Khartoum », tandis que le second a été « lancé dans le cadre du processus de Khartoum à la demande des pays de la #Corne_de_l'Afrique ». Il ne faut donc surtout pas penser qu’il puisse s’agir d’une forme d’externalisation des politiques migratoires européennes.

    Ces deux programmes concernent neuf pays africains. L’un d’eux est l’#Érythrée. Il n’est pas interdit de penser que les liens tissés ont pu faciliter la coopération entre autorités françaises et érythréennes qui a permis l’expulsion d’un demandeur d’asile érythréen de France en Érythrée le 6 juin dernier.

    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/philippe-wannesson/blog/260719/civipol-au-soudan
    #complexe_militaro-industriel #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #asile #réfugiés #suspension #Erythrée

  • Expulser au #Soudan, une vocation française

    Alors que l’Union européenne a suspendu ses programmes de contrôle migratoire au Soudan, la France continue de vouloir y expulser. Aujourd’hui à la manœuvre, la préfecture d’Indre-et-Loire. Appel à soutien.

    C’est fin juillet que la Deutsche Welle obtient confirmation que l’Union européenne a suspendu ses programmes de #contrôle_migratoire au Soudan, le soutien aux #gardes-frontières et à la police, coordonné par l’#Allemagne, dès mars, et le centre de renseignement (#ROCK : #Regional_Operation_Center in Khartoum) mené par la France, en juin, après la répression sanglante du 3 juin et des jours suivants.

    https://www.dw.com/en/eu-suspends-migration-control-projects-in-sudan-amid-repression-fears/a-49701408?maca=en-Twitter-sharing

    Si l’Union européenne a suspendu sa coopération avec le Soudan en matière migratoire, ce n’est pas le cas de la France, qui continue sa politique d’expulsion vers ce pays et donc la coopération avec les autorités soudanaises que cela suppose. Un ressortissant soudanais enfermé au centre de rétention de Rennes devait être expulsé le 22 juillet sur décision de la préfecture d’Indre-et-Loire. Il a refusé d’embarquer. Ramené au centre de rétention, il peut être expulsé à tout moment.

    https://larotative.info/la-prefete-d-indre-et-loire-tente-3377.html

    Voir aussi sur le fil twitter de la Cimade :

    https://twitter.com/lacimade

    Un appel à soutien a été lancé :

    « POUR SOUTENIR R. ENVOYEZ UN MAIL A LA PRÉFETE

    Recopiez ce courriel et adressez-le à :

    prefecture@indre-et-loire.gouv.fr

    Madame la Préfète d’Indre et Loire,

    Je vous écris pour vous demander d’interrompre les procédures d’éloignement d’un homme vers le Soudan actuellement au centre de rétention de Rennes. Il a déjà refusé d’embarquer dans l’avion.

    Vous vous apprêtez à renvoyer R. vers le Soudan où sa vie est gravement menacée.

    Le Soudan ne peut aujourd’hui être regardé comme un pays sûr vu l’instabilité politique actuelle et la violente répression qui a fait de nombreux morts ces derniers mois.

    En vertu du principe de non-refoulement, garanti par l’article 33 de la Convention de 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés, par l’article 3 de la Convention contre la torture et par l’article 19.2 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, la France ne peut procéder au renvoi d’une personne vers un pays où sa vie sera en danger.

    Compte tenu de ces risques importants, je vous demande donc d’annuler l’ordre de quitter le territoire français de R. et de le libérer.

    Je vous prie d’agréer, Madame la Préfète, l’expression de mes salutations distinguées.

    Vous pouvez envoyer cette communication par mail à cette adresse :

    prefecture@indre-et-loire.gouv.fr »

    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/philippe-wannesson/blog/240719/expulser-au-soudan-une-vocation-francaise
    #renvois #expulsions #France #réfugiés_soudanais #asile #migrations #réfugiés #suspension #UE #EU #Europe #externalisation

  • Le compromis obtenu au Soudan laisse perplexe
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/110719/le-compromis-obtenu-au-soudan-laisse-perplexe

    Anthropologue spécialiste du Soudan, Clément Deshayes revient dans un entretien filmé pour Mediapart sur le compromis trouvé entre les militaires putschistes et la coalition civile. Une bonne nouvelle, juge-t-il en substance, mais l’accord reste de papier. Rien ne dit que l’armée tiendra ses promesses.

    #Un_monde_à_vif #Soudan,_révolution,_Hemetti,_armée_soudanaise,_Omar_El_Béchir

  • Derrière le nouvel homme fort du #Soudan, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, l’#Arabie_Saoudite ?
    https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/proche-orient/yemen/derriere-le-nouvel-homme-fort-du-soudan-mohamed-hamdan-daglo-l-arabie-s

    Le chef des RSF (Forces de soutien rapide), « une unité paramilitaire formée à partir des vestiges des redoutables milices à cheval Janjawid au Darfour » s’est ainsi rendu en Arabie Saoudite. Il a construit une véritable relation avec l’Arabie en s’occupant, sous le règne d’Omar el-Béchir, le président déchu, du déploiement des forces soudanaises au Yémen dans la coalition dirigée par Riyad. "En retour, le général Hamdan a gagné d’importants nouveaux amis, dont le prince héritier saoudien Mohammed ben Salmane, en plus d’une rémunération généreuse pour ses troupes. Les salaires saoudiens ont contribué à redorer le blason du général Hamdan dans son Darfour natal, où certains habitants des communautés qu’il avait terrorisées ont constaté des avantages lors de son accession au pouvoir", écrit le Financial Times.

    Le général au passé sulfureux (il est accusé de massacres au Darfour) a réussi son ascension. Selon le New York Times, "la guerre a enrichi le général Hamdan, qui possède des intérêts dans les mines d’or, la construction et même une société de location de limousines. Parmi ses clients, Mohammed ben Salmane, prince héritier de l’Arabie Saoudite."

    C’est ce même homme qui a mené la sanglante repression le 3 juin contre les manifestants à Khartoum. Le responsable des RSF "conserve un soutien régional, voire international. [...]

    Dans ce conflit yéménite qui concrétise toutes les divisions du Proche-Orient, le Soudan, frontalier de l’Egypte, est devenu un élément important que l’Arabie n’entend pas perdre. Tout comme le président Sissi au Caire, allié de l’Arabie. Dans un article du 15 juin, Le Monde prête à Mohamed Hamdan Daglo « Hemetti » l’intention d’envoyer certains de ses ex-miliciens en Libye… aux côtés des forces du maréchal Haftar, grand allié du maréchal Sissi… et donc de l’Arabie Saoudite.

  • Egypt’s hand appears in play behind scenes in Sudan
    https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/egypt-sudan-military-council-protests-role.html

    “I think the Egyptian regime is advising the military council to stall, as stalling guarantees more tension among the revolution forces," the political scientist said, adding, “It seems work is underway to foil the popular revolution in Sudan and empower a military rule with no Brotherhood presence.”

    #Soudan

  • À « Qiyadah », l’utopie d’un nouveau #Soudan
    https://www.cetri.be/A-Qiyadah-l-utopie-d-un-nouveau

    Soulevé depuis des mois à travers tout le Soudan, le peuple réclame la fin du pouvoir militaire et la transition vers un pouvoir civil. À Khartoum même, au cœur de la capitale, des milliers de personnes s’organisent, discutent, se mobilisent pour atteindre cet objectif. Mais les forces de la contre-révolution s’organisent. Leurs pieds battent l’asphalte encore chaud et la poussière. Leur menton embrasse le ciel. C’est une bien belle parade militaire. Sauf que les pieds sont chaussés de tongs et les (...)

    #Le_Sud_en_mouvement

    / #Le_Sud_en_mouvement, Soudan, #Mobilisations_populaires, #Orient_XXI

  • Soudan : l’armée assassine l’espoir d’une transition démocratique
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/050619/soudan-l-armee-assassine-l-espoir-d-une-transition-democratique

    En réprimant dans le sang le sit-in pacifique de l’opposition et en rompant toute négociation sur le transfert du pouvoir aux civils, les militaires soudanais ont révélé leur projet : garder le pouvoir et en finir avec cette nouvelle révolte populaire qui inquiétait leurs protecteurs du Golfe.

    #Analyse #Soudan,_répression,_MBS

  • What it means to be a ‘refugee’ in South Sudan and Uganda

    After decades of armed conflict in South Sudan and Uganda, labels of ‘refugee’ and ‘internally displaced person’ fail to reflect the complex realities of the people they refer to. Leben Moro examines the history of movement across the region’s borders, and argues refugees are not the passive recipients of aid as often presented by humanitarian initiatives.

    Since independence from British colonial rule, large numbers of South Sudanese and Ugandans have repeatedly crossed the shared border to escape civil wars. These forced movements of large populations have created shifting labels of ‘refugees’ and ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs), with tremendous social, economic and political repercussions for the persons to which these labels are applied.

    In August 1955, months before Sudan’s independence, the largely Christian Southern Sudanese took up arms against Muslim rulers in the North to achieve a vision of greater regional autonomy, which sparked a mass flight of people from their homes. By the end of the First Sudanese Civil War in 1972, the Sudanese government estimated that 500,000 people had hidden in the bush, and another 180,000 had crossed into neighbouring countries, with 74,000 settling in four official camps (Onigo, Agago, Acholpii and Nakapiripirit) in northern Uganda. Many of the displaced persons, including my own family members, self-settled in other parts of Uganda, mainly near cotton ginning mills and other businesses operated by Ugandans of Indian origin, who employed them as casual labourers.

    My own family members settled near Gulu, the largest town in northern Uganda, among the Acholi ethnic group. Some South Sudanese journeyed southwards to Bwelye in the centre of Uganda, where there was plentiful fertile land and jobs in Indian enterprises. Others travelled further south into the heartland of the Baganda, the largest tribe in the country, to work in sugar plantations and different enterprises, including fields where locals grew coffee, bananas and other crops.

    Over time, many newcomers acquired land with their earnings and became poll taxpayers. Their receipt documentation allowed them to move across land in relative safety. In general, however, life was hard as they lacked citizenship and were vulnerable to exploitation and harassment.

    The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) coordinated a programme of official repatriation, supported by public authorities in Sudan and Uganda, including a mandate that supported Sudan’s IDPs. Many people, however, chose not to leave.

    In 1979, Uganda became embroiled in a bitter civil war following the overthrow of President Idi Amin Dada, forcing Southern Sudanese, including my own family members, and many Ugandans from the north of the country, to flee into the relatively peaceful Southern Sudan. The UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations as well as public authorities in Sudan helped settle many refugees in camps, but some Ugandans settled among local people, initially without external support.

    The relative peace in Southern Sudan was disrupted in 1983 when the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was founded to lead another armed struggle against Sudan’s newly declared Islamic state under President Gaafar Nimeiry – which came to be known as the Second Sudanese Civil War. The violence forced Ugandan peoples living in Southern Sudan back into Uganda and many Southern Sudanese also made the crossing. Some of the refugees returned to locations they had lived in during the first civil war or joined relatives or friends who had remained in Uganda. People used their established networks.

    The new wave of refugees received generous assistance from the UNHCR and the Ugandan government, whose policy was the settlement of refugees in camps and dedicated areas. Effectively, the policy redefined a refugee as ‘someone receiving assistance and living in a camp’. Many displaced Southern Sudanese avoided encampment, with its associated restrictions of movement, by self-settling among locals or dividing their family members or time between camps and outside locations.

    As in the first civil war, many displaced persons in Southern Sudan did not cross international borders, but remained behind in dire circumstances. Their plight forced the United Nations to launch another initiative, Operation Lifeline Sudan, in the 1980s to assist those trapped in the war zone. This suffering formally ceased in 2005 with the conclusion of the much-lauded Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A, enabling the return of the IDPs to their original homes and refugees back to the country.

    In 2011, Southern Sudan seceded from Sudan. About two years later, the world’s newest country relapsed into a vicious civil war. Sparked by divisions among the country’s key leaders, ethnic identities were subsequently exploited to mobilise fighters with devastating consequences for national unity and the wellbeing of civilians.

    During the conflict, many Nuer people, an ethnic group primarily inhabiting South Sudan’s Nile Valley, fled into areas created on UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) bases, called Protection of Civilians Sites (PoCs), to escape killing by members of the Dinka, the largest ethnic group, who had effectively taken over the country with the support of Ugandan soldiers. Nuer fighters retaliated against Dinka civilians, forcing many to flee to the Uganda border and other locations.

    Many South Sudanese headed north into the new Republic of Sudan, where public authorities labelled them ’arrivals’, a new term with no precedent in refugee policy or literature, and confined them to ‘waiting stations’. Uganda also received a large number of displaced persons, among them refugees placed in settlements with international assistance. Many displaced persons settled among locals without external assistance, thus avoiding the label of ‘refugee’.

    What it means to be ‘refugees’ in Uganda

    The 1951 Refugee Convention states a person becomes a refugee after crossing an internationally recognised border in search of protection, recognition and status by public authorities in the asylum country or the UNHCR. When the circumstances that forced the person to seek refuge cease to exist, the refugee re-avails themselves of the country’s protection they had fled. Thus defined concrete international borders are characterised as integral to becoming a refugee or ending refuge.

    For South Sudanese displaced persons, the border between their country and Uganda is not a clearly defined line separating two jurisdictions. Many parts of the border are contested by ordinary people and public authorities on both sides. Consequently, people inhabiting locations along these contested areas are not always on peaceful terms despite often belonging to the same ethnic groups, such as the Acholi of South Sudan and Uganda.

    Different ethnic groups that have seen clashes over contested territories have also been forced into settling in areas of close proximity following unrest in their respective homelands. My own research reveals the Kuku of Kajokeji in South Sudan were so suspicious of the Madi in the Ugandan Moyo district that, when they settled in the latter’s region, they avoided treatment in the Moyo hospital for fear of maltreatment by Madi medical personnel. The history of conflict over certain borders has a direct bearing on the welfare of refugees in the present.

    Armed groups and criminals also operate along the border, posing serious security problems, with some people losing their lives at the hands of unknown gunmen. Despite this danger, refugees and other South Sudanese cross in and out of South Sudan for matters of family and livelihoods, such as to harvest crops in their old fields due to food shortages in their new home. Others return their deceased kin to bury them decently on their old compounds and, further, trips are made to the national capital, Juba, to visit relatives or deal with administrative issues.

    These movements defy the legal meaning of ‘refugee’, who is supposed to return home when the threat of persecution that caused the flight is over. They demonstrate that refugees are not the passive and docile recipients of aid, as often presented, but active individuals who exercise agency. Studies remind us that were refugees only to eat the ‘food which is distributed to them, they would die’.

    What it means to stay behind as an IDP

    Because IDPs are citizens living in their native county they are entitled to the same rights and legal protections as fellow citizens as stipulated by the constitution. In reality, IDPs do not always enjoy citizenship rights because those in power consider them enemies or supporters of enemies.

    During the second civil war, the Sudanese government branded IDPs as rebel supporters and subjected them to all kinds of punitive measures, including starvation and denial of basic services. Many IDPs consequently starved to death or died due to deadly diseases, such as kala azar, as the already rudimentary healthcare system in pre-war Southern Sudan was destroyed by repeated military bombardments as well as frequent obstructions of international humanitarian access.

    When South Sudan gained independence and descended into civil war, IDPs did not fare any better. Following shocking atrocities and the continued risk of further violence, many Nuer civilians remain in PoCs on UNMISS bases under the protection of peacekeepers in refugee-like situations. Deprived of state protection, their situation has become worse than most refugees in South Sudan, deprioritised over the dominant Dinka.

    The labels of ‘refugee’ and ‘internally displaced person’ do not reflect the experiences of most South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, and IDPs within South Sudan. These terms present refugees and IDPs as powerless recipients of aid when, in reality, refugees and IDPs are active agents in efforts to improve their situation. In some cases, they creatively manipulate borders and the systems in place to satisfy their basic needs.

    It has been expressed that South Sudanese refugees have shown an extraordinary creativity and resourcefulness that can form a blueprint for future refugee assistance programmes. When ‘official legal categories rarely match realities on the ground’, aid workers should now appreciate and encourage the active involvement of refugees and IDPs to address the challenges that confront them.

    https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2019/05/28/what-it-means-to-be-a-refugee-in-south-sudan-and-uganda
    #réfugiés #IDPs #déplacés_internes #Soudan_du_Sud #Ouganda #histoire #histoire

  • Soulèvement au #Soudan : de l’indifférence à la solidarité avec le Darfour
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/220519/es-darfouris-ont-aussi-compris-avec-cette-revolution-qu-ils-n-ont-pas-ete-

    « Nous sommes tous le Darfour. » Le slogan fleurit dans les rues de Khartoum, capitale d’un pays dont les habitants furent longtemps indifférents au sort de leurs compatriotes du Darfour, massacrés en 2003 par une milice guidée par le pouvoir central. À l’occasion de la mobilisation, les manifestants prennent conscience de ce qui les rapproche de cette population persécutée. Mais le pardon n’est pas pour maintenant.

    #Afrique

  • Le génocide voilé

    « Les #Arabes ont razzié l’#Afrique_subsaharienne pendant treize siècles sans interruption. La plupart des millions d’hommes qu’ils ont déportés ont disparu du fait des traitements inhumains.
    Cette douloureuse page de l’#histoire des peuples noirs n’est apparemment pas définitivement tournée. La #traite_négrière a commencé lorsque l’émir et général arabe #Abdallah_ben_Saïd a imposé aux #Soudanais un #bakht (accord), conclu en 652, les obligeant à livrer annuellement des centaines d’#esclaves. La majorité de ces hommes était prélevée sur les populations du #Darfour. Et ce fut le point de départ d’une énorme #ponction_humaine qui devait s’arrêter officiellement au début du XXe siècle. »


    http://www.gallimard.fr/Catalogue/GALLIMARD/Continents-Noirs/Le-genocide-voile

    #esclavage #déportations #livre #racisme
    ping @reka

    On me signale ce livre, que je signale du coup à mon tour.
    Elle me l’a signalé avec ce commentaire :

    c’est sur la #traite_arabe, qui a saigné l’Afrique bien plus longtemps , en plus grand nombre, et plus inhumaine aussi (car tous ces esclaves ont bien peu de descendants dans les pays arabes) et en accouchant, tout autant que l’autre, d’un #racisme_anti-noirs très fort.

    (indispensable pour saisir l’immensité de l’horreur libyenne).

    Pas tout récent, il est sorti en 2008...