Time to Break the Silence

/syria-and-the-left-time-to-break-the-si

  • The Debate Over Syria Has Reached a Dead End | The Nation
    https://www.thenation.com/article/the-debate-over-syria-has-reached-a-dead-end

    The first narrative asserts the purity and consistency of a revolution that started in 2011. This revolution, the narrative goes, seeks the removal of a brutal dictatorship in favor of a more accountable and just order. Many of its adherents recognize the problem of militarization and radicalization in the uprising, and even of problematic external interventions on that side. However, such dynamics are not allowed to impinge on the nature of the revolution. In this view, no degree of militarization, radicalization, or sectarianism of the uprising is enough to fundamentally change its potential in securing a more accountable and just order in Syria. This narrative thus acknowledges that various jihadists are practically spearheading the fight against the Assad regime on the battlefield. Yet it simultaneously either denounces their worldview or writes them off as a product of repression, in both cases distancing “the revolution” from jihadists. This narrative may also decry the subordination of the official representatives of the revolution to Arab Gulf states and Turkey, and by connection the United States, including their role in funding or facilitating the entry of jihadists into Syria. Yet it does not recognize the implications of doing so. The revolution is always said to be able to emerge unscathed, and rejection of this claim is dismissed as akin to betrayal.
    The second narrative acknowledges the regime’s repression, but sees only external conspiracy and internal jihadists.
    The second narrative recognizes the repression of the regime and the need for change. Its adherents often even recognize the legitimacy of protest, at least in theory. Yet when it comes to the actual uprising, they only see external conspiracy and internal jihadists. In this narrative, the rest of the protesters either fade into an irrelevant background or are brought to the fore as stooges of problematic external actors. Accordingly, there are no secular, anti-imperialist Syrians who are still working, one way or another, to overthrow the regime. They either do not exist or are too few to be counted. Concomitantly, this narrative makes the regime’s destruction of Syria less visible by its descriptive privileging of the imperialist forces that benefit from such destruction. Some go so far as to put the regime’s scale of destruction on par with that of the much weaker rebels. In this view, Syria is not only a theater for regional and international conflict; it is also where external designs must be defeated, no matter the cost to Syrians themselves. Participating in the opposition thus becomes a form of betrayal against anti-imperialism (and the nation itself).

    Both narratives fail to recognize the legitimate aspects of their counterpart. Adherents of both narratives refuse to allow facts and developments to alter their views. Both adopt hypocritical stances regarding intervention. According to the first narrative, US intervention is good only if it is against the regime. For the second narrative, external intervention is good if it supports the regime—Russia is not imperialist, but the United States is, the argument goes. For the first narrative, the potential dangers resulting from state collapse is a moot point. Yet for the second narrative, state collapse is unacceptable no matter how bad things get. On the question of state collapse (as distinguished from regime overthrow), neither position is based on weighted analysis or a consideration of consequences. Instead, both start with an assumption about which side must be defeated, and both reverse-engineer the argument that suits that end. Usually, the first narrative is associated with the West and the second narrative with the regime, with all sorts of “incriminating” implications. And finally, neither side seems open to compromise: Nothing less than complete defeat of either the regime or the opposition is acceptable, forfeiting thereby a number of potential exits from the mayhem.

  • The Debate Over Syria Has Reached a Dead End
    https://www.thenation.com/article/the-debate-over-syria-has-reached-a-dead-end

    The basics are not a puzzle. There can be no return to the pre-2011 rule of Syria—whether or not Russia or the almighty wills it. Similarly, the opposition will not overthrow the regime and build a secular, democratic, and socially equitable Syria, because neither its external supporters nor its strongest internal militants desire it. Those who do actually desire a secular, democratic, and egalitarian Syrian society exist on both sides of the divide, but their voices are drowned out.

    #Syrie

  • Ainsi donc, Max Blumenthal s’attaque frontalement au lobby de la « no-fly zone » en Syrie, avec un long passage sur les « Casques blancs » :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/530028

    Il y a une évolution assez étonnante depuis, disons, cet été. En dehors de As‘ad Abukhalil (Angry Arab), toute cette partie de la gauche pro-palestinienne aux États-Unis avait assez soigneusement évité d’écrire explicitement contre la campagne de changement de régime en Syrie.

    Mais depuis cet été, Ali Abunimah (Electronic Intifada) rentre régulièrement dans le lard du « néoconservateur Charles Lister ». Sa collègue Rania Khalek est désormais tellement ouvertement critique qu’elle semble focaliser sur elle les critiques du fan club de la rébellitude syrienne. Et dans les échanges sur Twitter, Max Blumenthal s’était joint aux deux précédents et les a clairement soutenus contre « le lobby de la NFZ ».

    Mais je suis tout de même étonné de le voir aujourd’hui publier une enquête aussi longue, en pleine campagne militaro-médiatique sur Alep, avec les Casques blancs que l’on pousse pour le Nobel de la Paix, et qui démonte aussi longuement le lobby au service d’une intervention militaire américaine de changement de régime.

    Pour rappel : en juin 2012, Max Blumenthal avait quitté le Akhbar en le dénonçant, d’une manière assez indigne, comme « pro-Assad » :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/309303

    Alors qu’il y a un argument, dans son long article du jour, qu’il aurait immanquablement reproché à un auteur du Akhbar à l’époque :

    Asfari’s support for opposition forces was so pronounced the Syrian government filed a warrant for his arrest, accusing him of supporting “terrorism.”

    Oui, là il utilise la classification comme terroriste, par le régime même, d’un de ses opposants, pour prouver ce qu’il affirme sur cet individu (certes, il a beaucoup d’autres arguments, mais qu’il commence à évoquer Asfari avec un tel argument me semble très… hum…).

    On n’a pas fini de lire des éructations indignées contre "cette gauche" pro-palestinienne et anti-impérialiste ; je pense même que ça va redevenir une priorité du fan-club, parce qu’il y a là pour eux un grave problème de légitimité militante.